

Encyclopedia of Indian History 20th Century, Vol 4

Johnny Cunningham



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by Johnny Cunningham

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Chapter 40

1946 Cabinet Mission to India

The **Cabinet Mission** came to India aiming to discuss the transfer of powers from the British government to the Indian leadership, with the aim of preserving India's unity and granting its independence. Formulated at the initiative of Clement Attlee, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, the mission had Lord Pethick-Lawrence, the Secretary of State for India, Sir Stafford Cripps, President of the Board of Trade, and A.V. Alexander, the First Lord of the Admiralty. Lord Wavell, the Viceroy of India, did not participate in every step but was present. It proposed to divide into three administrative groups: A, B and C clusters.

Background

Towards the end of their rule, the British found that their temporary patronage of the Muslim League conflicted with their longstanding need for Indian unity. The desire for a united India was an outcome of both their pride in having politically unified the subcontinent and the doubts of most British authorities as to the feasibility of Pakistan.

This desire for Indian unity was symbolized by the Cabinet Mission, which arrived in New Delhi on 24 March 1946, sent by the British government, in which the subject was the form of a post-independent India. The three men who constituted the mission, Stafford Cripps, Pethick-Lawrence and A.V. Alexander favoured India's unity for strategic reasons.

Upon arriving in the subcontinent the mission found both parties, the Indian National Congress and Muslim League, more unwilling than ever to reach a settlement. The two parties had performed well in the elections and emerged as the two main parties in the subcontinent, the provincial organisations having been defeated. This was because of the separate electorates system. The Muslim League had been victorious in approximately 90 percent of the seats for Muslims. After having achieved victory in the elections Jinnah gained a strong hand to bargain with the British and Congress. Having established the system of separate electorates, the British could no longer reverse its consequences in spite of their genuine commitment to Indian unity.

Plan

The mission made its own proposals, after inconclusive dialogue with the Indian leadership, seeing that the Congress opposed Jinnah's demand for a Pakistan comprising six full provinces. The mission proposed a complicated system for India with three tiers: the provinces, provincial groupings and the centre. The centre's power was to be confined to foreign affairs, defence, currency and communications. The provinces would keep all the other powers and were allowed to establish three groups. The plan's main characteristic was the grouping of provinces. Two groups would be constituted by the mainly-Muslim western and eastern provinces. The third group would comprise the mostly-Hindu areas in the south and the centre. Thus provinces such as UP, CP, Bombay, Bihar, Orissa and Madras would make Group A. Group B would comprise Sind, Punjab, Northwest Frontier and Baluchistan. Bengal and

Assam would make a Group C. Princely States will retain all subjects and powers(non central government's powers) other than those ceded to the Union.[1][2]

Reactions

Through the scheme, the British expected to maintain Indian unity, as both they and Congress wanted, and also providing Jinnah the substance of Pakistan. The proposals almost satisfied Jinnah's insistence on a large Pakistan, which would avert the moth-eaten Pakistan without the mostly non-Muslim districts in Bengal and Punjab being partitioned away. By holding the full provinces of Punjab and Bengal, Jinnah could satisfy the provincial leaders who feared losing power if their provinces were divided. The presence of large Hindu minorities in Punjab and Bengal also provided a safeguard for the Muslim minorities remaining in the mostly-Hindu provinces.

Most of all, Jinnah wanted parity between Pakistan and India. He believed that provincial groupings could best secure this. He claimed that Muslim India was a 'nation' equally entitled to central representations as Hindu India. Despite his preference for only two groups, the Muslim League's Council accepted the mission's proposals on 6 June 1946 after securing a guarantee from Wavell that the League would be placed in the interim government if the Congress did not accept the proposal.

The onus was now on Congress. It accepted the proposals, understanding it to be a repudiation of the demand for Pakistan, and its position was that the provinces should be allowed to stay out of groups that they did not want to join, in light of both NWFP and Assam being ruled by Congress

governments. However, Jinnah differed and saw the grouping plan as mandatory. Another point of difference concerned the Congress position that a sovereign constituent assembly would not be bound to the plan. Jinnah insisted it be binding once the plan was accepted. The groupings plan maintained India's unity, but the organisation's leadership and, most of all Nehru, increasingly believed that the scheme would leave the centre without the strength to achieve the party's ambitions. Congress' socialist section led by Nehru desired a government able to industrialize the country and to eliminate poverty.

Nehru's speech on 10 July 1946 rejected the idea that the provinces would be obliged to join a group and stated that the Congress was neither bound nor committed to the plan. In effect, Nehru's speech squashed the mission's plan and the chance to keep India united. Jinnah interpreted the speech as another instance of treachery by the Congress. With Nehru's speech on groupings, the Muslim League rescinded its previous approval of the plan on 29 July.

Interim government and breakdown

Concerned by the diminishing British power, Wavell was eager to inaugurate an interim government. Disregarding Jinnah's vote, he authorised a cabinet in which Nehru was the interim prime minister. Sidelined and with his Pakistan of "groups" refused, Jinnah became distraught. To achieve Pakistan and impose on Congress that he could not be sidelined, he resorted to calling for his supporters to utilize "direct action" to demonstrate their support for Pakistan, in the same manner as Gandhi's civil disobedience campaigns, though it led to rioting and massacres on religious grounds in some areas. Direct

Action Day further increased Wavell's resolve to establish the interim government. On 2 September 1946, Nehru's cabinet was installed.

Millions of Indian Muslim households flew black flags to protest the installation of the Congress government. Jinnah did not himself join the interim government but sent Liaquat Ali Khan into it to play a secondary role. Congress did not want to give him the important position of home minister and instead allowed him the post of finance minister. Liaquat Ali Khan infuriated Congress by using his role to prevent the functioning of Congress ministries, demonstrating (under Jinnah's instructions) the impossibility of a single government for India.

Britain tried to revive the Cabinet Mission's scheme by sending Nehru, Jinnah and Wavell in December to meet Attlee, Cripps and Pethick-Lawrence. The inflexible arguments were enough to cause Nehru to return to India and announce that "we have now altogether stopped looking towards London." Meanwhile, Wavell commenced the Constituent Assembly, which the League boycotted. He anticipated that the League would enter it as it had joined the interim government. Instead, the Congress became more forceful and asked him to drop ministers from the Muslim League. Wavell was also not able to obtain a declaration from the British government that would articulate their goals.

In the context of the worsening situation, Wavell drew up a breakdown plan that provided for a gradual British exit, but his plan was considered fatalistic by the Cabinet. When he insisted on his plan, he was replaced with Lord Mountbatten.

Chapter 41

Direct Action Day

Direct Action Day (16 August 1946), also known as the **1946 Calcutta Killings**, was a day of nationwide protest by the Indian Muslim community announced by Jinnah. It led to large-scale violence between Muslims and Hindus in the city of Calcutta (now known as Kolkata) in the Bengal province of British India. The day also marked the start of what is known as *The Week of the Long Knives*.

The Muslim League and the Indian National Congress were the two largest political parties in the Constituent Assembly of India in the 1940s. The Muslim League had demanded, since its 1940 Lahore Resolution, that the Muslim-majority areas of India in the northwest and the east, should be constituted as 'independent states'. The 1946 Cabinet Mission to India for planning of the transfer of power from the British Raj to the Indian leadership proposed a three-tier structure: a centre, groups of provinces, and provinces. The "groups of provinces" were meant to accommodate the Muslim League demand. Both the Muslim League and Congress in principle accepted the Cabinet Mission's plan. However, Muslim League suspected that Congress's acceptance was insincere.

Consequently, in July 1946, it withdrew its agreement to the plan and announced a general strike (*hartal*) on 16 August, terming it Direct Action Day, to assert its demand for a separate homeland for Indian Muslims out of certain northwestern and eastern provinces in colonial India. Calling for Direct Action Day, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, leader of the All

India Muslim League, said that he wanted “either a divided India or a destroyed India”.

Against a backdrop of communal tension, the protest triggered massive riots in Calcutta. More than 4,000 people lost their lives and 100,000 residents were left homeless in Calcutta within 72 hours. This violence sparked off further religious riots in the surrounding regions of Noakhali, Bihar, United Provinces (modern Uttar Pradesh), Punjab, and the North Western Frontier Province. These events sowed the seeds for the eventual Partition of India.

Background

In 1946, the Indian independence movement against the British Raj had reached a pivotal stage. British Prime Minister Clement Attlee sent a three-member Cabinet Mission to India aimed at discussing and finalizing plans for the transfer of power from the British Raj to the Indian leadership. After holding talks with the representatives of the Indian National Congress and the All India Muslim League—the two largest political parties in the Constituent Assembly of India—on 16 May 1946, the Mission proposed a plan of composition of the new Dominion of India and its government. The Muslim League demand for 'autonomous and sovereign' states in the northwest and the east was accommodated by creating a new tier of 'groups of provinces' between the provincial layer and the central government. The central government was expected to handle the subjects of defence, external affairs and communications. All other powers would be relegated to the 'groups'.

Muhammad Ali Jinnah, the one time Congressman and now the leader of the Muslim League, had accepted the Cabinet Mission Plan of 16 June, as had the central presidium of the Congress. On 10 July, however, Jawaharlal Nehru, the Congress President, held a press conference in Bombay declaring that although the Congress had agreed to participate in the Constituent Assembly, it reserved the right to modify the Cabinet Mission Plan as it saw fit. Fearing Hindu domination in the central government, the Muslim League politicians pressed Jinnah to revert to "his earlier unbending stance". Jinnah rejected the British Cabinet Mission plan for transfer of power to an interim government which would combine both the Muslim League and the Indian National Congress, and decided to boycott the Constituent Assembly. In July 1946, Jinnah held a press conference at his home in Bombay. He proclaimed that the Muslim league was "preparing to launch a struggle" and that they "have chalked out a plan". He said that if the Muslims were not granted a separate Pakistan then they would launch "direct action". When asked to be specific, Jinnah retorted: "Go to the Congress and ask them their plans. When they take you into their confidence I will take you into mine. Why do you expect me alone to sit with folded hands? I also am going to make trouble."

The next day, Jinnah announced 16 August 1946 would be "Direct Action Day" and warned Congress, "We do not want war. If you want war we accept your offer unhesitatingly. We will either have a divided India or a destroyed India."

In his book *The Great Divide*, H V Hodson recounted, "The Working Committee followed up by calling on Muslims throughout India to observe 16th August as 'Direct Action

Day'. On that day, meetings would be held all over the country to explain the League's resolution. These meetings and processions passed off—as was manifestly the central League leaders' intention—without more than commonplace and limited disturbances, with one vast and tragic exception ... What happened was more than anyone could have foreseen."

In *Muslim Societies: Historical and Comparative Aspects*, edited by Sato Tsugitaka, Nakazato Nariaki writes:

From the viewpoint of institutional politics, the Calcutta disturbances possessed a distinguishing feature in that they broke out in a transitional period which was marked by the power vacuum and systemic breakdown. It is also important to note that they constituted part of a political struggle in which the Congress and the Muslim League competed with each other for the initiative in establishing the new nation-state(s), while the British made an all-out attempt to carry out decolonization at the lowest possible political cost for them. The political rivalry among the major nationalist parties in Bengal took a form different from that in New Delhi, mainly because of the broad mass base those organizations enjoyed and the tradition of flexible political dealing in which they excelled. At the initial stage of the riots, the Congress and the Muslim League appeared to be confident that they could draw on this tradition even if a difficult situation arose out of political showdown. Most probably, Direct Action Day in Calcutta was planned to be a large-scale *hartal* and mass rally (*which is an accepted part of political culture in Calcutta*) which they knew very well how to control. However, the response from the masses far exceeded any expectations. The political leaders seriously miscalculated the strong emotional response that the word

'nation', as interpreted under the new situation, had evoked. In August 1946 the 'nation' was no longer a mere political slogan. It was rapidly turning into 'reality' both in realpolitik and in people's imaginations. The system to which Bengal political leaders had grown accustomed for decades could not cope with this dynamic change. As we have seen, it quickly and easily broke down on the first day of the disturbances.

Prelude

Since the 11–14 February 1946 riots in Calcutta, communal tension had been high. Hindu and Muslim newspapers whipped up public sentiment with inflammatory and highly partisan reporting that heightened antagonism between the two communities.

Following Jinnah's declaration of 16 August as the Direct Action Day, acting on the advice of R.L. Walker, the then Chief Secretary of Bengal, the Muslim League Chief Minister of Bengal, Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, requested Governor of Bengal Sir Frederick Burrows to declare a public holiday on that day. Governor Burrows agreed. Walker made this proposal with the hope that the risk of conflicts, especially those related to picketing, would be minimized if government offices, commercial houses and shops remained closed throughout Calcutta on 16 August. The Bengal Congress protested against the declaration of a public holiday, arguing that a holiday would enable 'the idle folks' to successfully enforce *hartals* in areas where the Muslim League leadership was uncertain. Congress accused the League government of "having indulged in 'communal politics' for a narrow goal". Congress leaders thought that if a public holiday was observed, its own

supporters would have no choice but to close down their offices and shops, and thus be compelled against their will to lend a hand in the Muslim League's *hartal*. On 14 August, Kiron Shankar Roy, a leader of the Congress Party in the Bengal Legislative Assembly, called on Hindu shopkeepers to not observe the public holiday, and keep their businesses open in defiance of the *hartal*. In essence, there was an element of pride involved in that the monopolistic position that the Congress had hitherto enjoyed in imposing and enforcing hartals, strikes, etc. was being challenged. However, the League went ahead with the declaration, and Muslim newspapers published the programme for the day.

The *Star of India*, an influential local Muslim newspaper, edited by Raghīb Ahsan Muslim League MLA from Calcutta published detailed programme for the day. The programme called for complete *hartal* and general strike in all spheres of civic, commercial and industrial life except essential services. The notice proclaimed that processions would start from multiple parts of Calcutta, Howrah, Hooghly, Metiabruz and 24 Parganas, and would converge at the foot of the Ochterlony Monument (now known as Shaheed Minar) where a joint mass rally presided over by Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy would be held. The Muslim League branches were advised to depute three workers in every mosque in every ward to explain the League's action plan before *Juma* prayers. Moreover, special prayers were arranged in every mosque on Friday after *Juma* prayers for the freedom of Muslim India. The notice drew divine inspiration from the Quran, emphasizing on the coincidence of Direct Action Day with the holy month of *Ramzaan*, claiming that the upcoming protests were an allegory of Prophet Muhammad's conflict with heathenism and subsequent

conquest of Mecca and establishment of the kingdom of Heaven in Arabia.

Hindu public opinion was mobilized around the *Akhand Hindusthan* (United India) slogan. Certain Congress leaders in Bengal imbibed a strong sense of Hindu identity, especially in view of the perceived threat from the possibility of marginalizing themselves into minority against the onslaught of the Pakistan movement. Such mobilization along communal lines was partly successful due to a concerted propaganda campaign which resulted in a 'legitimization of communal solidarities'.

On the other hand, following the protests against the British after INA trials, the British administration decided to give more importance to protests against the government, rather than management of communal violence within the Indian populace, according to their "Emergency Action Scheme". Frederick Burrows, the Governor of Bengal, rationalized the declaration of "public holiday" in his report to Lord Wavell — Suhrawardy put forth a great deal of effort to bring reluctant British officials around to calling the army in from Sealdah Rest Camp. Unfortunately, British officials did not send the army out until 1.45 am on 17 August.

Many of the mischief-makers were people who would have had idle hands anyhow. If shops and markets had been generally open, I believe that there would have been even more looting and murder than there was; the holiday gave the peaceable citizens the chance of staying at home.

- —□ *Frederick Burrows, Burrows' Report to Lord Wavell.*

Riots and massacre

Troubles started on the morning of 16 August. Even before 10 o'clock Police Headquarters at Lalbazar had reported that there was excitement throughout the city, that shops were being forced to close, and that there were many reports of brawls, stabbing and throwing of stones and brickbats. These were mainly concentrated in the North-central parts of the city like Rajabazar, Kelabagan, College Street, Harrison Road, Colootolla and Burrabazar. In these areas the Hindus were in a majority and were also in a superior and powerful economic position. The trouble had assumed the communal character which it was to retain throughout. The League's rally began at Ochterlony Monument at noon exactly. The gathering was considered as the 'largest ever Muslim assembly in Bengal' at that time.

The meeting began around 2 pm though processions of Muslims from all parts of Calcutta had started assembling since the midday prayers. A large number of the participants were reported to have been armed with iron bars and *lathis* (bamboo sticks). The numbers attending were estimated by a Central Intelligence Officer's reporter at 30,000 and by a Special Branch Inspector of Calcutta Police at 500,000. The latter figure is impossibly high and the *Star of India* reporter put it at about 100,000. The main speakers were Khawaja Nazimuddin and Chief Minister Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy. Khwaja Nazimuddin in his speech preached peacefulness and restraint but spoiled the effect and flared up the tensions by stating that till 11 o'clock that morning all the injured persons

were Muslims, and the Muslim community had only retaliated in self-defence.

The Special Branch of Calcutta Police had sent only one shorthand reporter to the meeting, with the result that no transcript of the Chief Minister's speech is available. But the Central Intelligence Officer and a reporter, who Frederick Burrows believed was reliable, deputed by the military authorities agree on one statement (not reported at all by the Calcutta Police). The version in the former's report was—"He [the Chief Minister] had seen to police and military arrangements who would not interfere". The version of the latter's was—"He had been able to restrain the military and the police". However, the police did not receive any specific order to "hold back". So, whatever Suhrawardy may have meant to convey by this, the impression of such a statement on a largely uneducated audience is construed by some to be an open invitation to disorder indeed, many of the listeners are reported to have started attacking Hindus and looting Hindu shops as soon as they left the meeting. Subsequently, there were reports of lorries (trucks) that came down Harrison Road in Calcutta, carrying hardline Muslim gangsters armed with brickbats and bottles as weapons and attacking Hindu-owned shops.

A 6 pm curfew was imposed in the parts of the city where there had been rioting. At 8 pm forces were deployed to secure main routes and conduct patrols from those arteries, thereby freeing up police for work in the slums and the other underdeveloped sections.

On 17 August, Syed Abdullah Farooqui, the President of Garden Reach Textile Workers' Union, along with Elian Mistry, a hardline Muslim hooligan, led a huge armed mob into the mill compound of Kesoram Cotton Mills in the Lichubagan area of Metiabruz. The mill workers, among whom were a substantial number of Odias, used to stay in the mill compound itself. On 25 August, four survivors lodged a complaint at the Metiabruz police station against Farooqui. Bishwanath Das, a Minister in the Government of Orissa, visited Lichubagan to investigate into the killings of the Oriya labourers of Kesoram Cotton Mills. Some sources estimate, that the death toll was upto 10,000 or more. Many authors claim that Hindus were the primary victims while many claim that Muslim workers were also killed.

The worst of the killing took place during the day on 17 August. By late afternoon, soldiers brought the worst areas under control and the military expanded its hold overnight. In the slums and other areas, however, which were still outside military control, lawlessness and rioting escalated hourly. In the morning of 18 August, "Buses and taxis were charging about loaded with Sikhs and Hindus armed with swords, iron bars and firearms."

Skirmishes between the communities continued for almost a week. Finally, on 21 August, Bengal was put under Viceroy's rule. 5 battalions of British troops, supported by 4 battalions of Indians and Gurkhas, were deployed in the city. Lord Wavell alleged that more troops ought to have been called in earlier, and there is no indication that more British troops were not available. The rioting reduced on 22 August.

Characteristics of the riot and demographics in 1946

Suhrawardy put forth a great deal of effort to bring reluctant British officials around to calling the army in from Sealdah Rest Camp. Unfortunately, British officials did not send the army out until 1.45 am on 17 August.

Violence in Calcutta, between 1945 and 1946, passed by stages from Indian versus European to Hindu versus Muslim. Indian Christians and Europeans were generally free from molestation as the tempo of Hindu-Muslim violence quickened. The decline of anti-European feelings as communal Hindu-Muslim tensions increased during this period is evident from the casualty numbers. During the riots of November 1945, casualty of Europeans and Christians were 46; in the riots of the 10-14 February 1946, 35; from 15 February to 15 August, only 3; during the Calcutta riots from 15 August 1946 to 17 September 1946, none.

Kolkata had a Hindu population of 2,952,142, Muslim population of 1,099,562, Sikh population of 12,852 as per 1946 year before partition and after independence Muslims population came down to just 601,817 due to the migration of 5 lakhs Muslims from Kolkata to East Pakistan after the riot. The 1951 Census of India recorded that 27% of Kolkata's population was East Bengali refugees mainly Hindu Bengalis and they contributed the economic growth of Kolkata in various fields just after settlement. Millions of Bengali Hindus from East Pakistan had taken refuge mainly in the city and a number of estimations shows that around 3.2 lakhs Hindus

from East Pakistan had immigrated to Kolkata alone during 1946-1950 period. The first census shows that Hindu percentage in Kolkata had gone from 73% in 1946 to 84% in 1951 alone (a huge increment of 11% in 5 years) and at the same time Muslim percentage had reduced from 23% in 1946 to 12% in 1951 (a decline 11% at the same time). According to 2011 census, Kolkata city have a Hindu population of (76.51%); 3,440,290, Muslim population of (20.6%); 926,414, Sikh population of (0.31%); 13,849 out of 4,496,694 people.

Aftermath

During the riots, thousands began fleeing Calcutta. For several days the Howrah Bridge over the Hooghly River was crowded with evacuees headed for the Howrah station to escape the mayhem in Calcutta. Many of them would not escape the violence that spread out into the region outside Calcutta. Lord Wavell claimed during his meeting on 27 August 1946 that Gandhi had told him, "If India wants bloodbath she shall have it ... if a bloodbath was necessary, it would come about in spite of non-violence".

There was criticism of Suhrawardy, Chief Minister in charge of the Home Portfolio in Calcutta, for being partisan and of Sir Frederick John Burrows, the British Governor of Bengal, for not having taken control of the situation. The Chief Minister spent a great deal of time in the Control Room in the Police Headquarters at Lalbazar, often attended by some of his supporters. Short of a direct order from the Governor, there was no way of preventing the Chief Minister from visiting the Control Room whenever he liked; and Governor Burrows was

not prepared to give such an order, as it would clearly have indicated complete lack of faith in him.

Prominent Muslim League leaders spent a great deal of time in police control rooms directing operations and the role of Suhrawardy in obstructing police duties is documented.

Both the British and Congress blamed Jinnah for calling the Direct Action Day and the Muslim League was seen responsible for stirring up the Muslim nationalist sentiment.

There are several views on the exact cause of the Direct Action Day riots. The Hindu press blamed the Suhrawardy Government and the Muslim League. According to the authorities, riots were instigated by members of the Muslim League and its affiliate Volunteer Corps, in the city in order to enforce the declaration by the Muslim League that Muslims were to 'suspend all business' to support their demand for an independent Pakistan. However, supporters of the Muslim League believed that the Congress Party was behind the violence in an effort to weaken the fragile Muslim League government in Bengal. Historian Joya Chatterji allocates much of the responsibility to Suhrawardy, for setting up the confrontation and failing to stop the rioting, but points out that Hindu leaders were also culpable. Members of the Indian National Congress, including Mohandas Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru responded negatively to the riots and expressed shock. The riots would lead to further rioting and pogroms between Hindus and Sikhs and Muslims.

Further rioting in India

The Direct Action Day riots sparked off several riots between Muslims and Hindus/Sikhs in Noakhali, Bihar, and Punjab in that year.

Noakhali riots

An important sequel to Direct Action Day was the massacre in Noakhali and Tippera districts in October 1946. News of the Great Calcutta Riot touched off the Noakhali–Tippera riot in reaction. However, the violence was different in nature from Calcutta.

Rioting in the districts began on 10 October 1946 in the area of northern Noakhali district under Ramganj police station. The violence unleashed was described as "the organized fury of the Muslim mob". It soon engulfed the neighbouring police stations of Raipur, Lakshmipur, Begumganj and Sandip in Noakhali, and Faridganj, Hajiganj, Chandpur, Laksham and Chudagram in Tippera. The disruption caused by the widespread violence was extensive, making it difficult to accurately establish the number of casualties. Official estimates put the number of dead between 200 and 300. After the riots were stopped in Noakhali, the Muslim League claimed that only 500 Hindus were killed in the mayhem, but the survivors opined that more than 50,000 Hindus were killed. Some sources also made some extreme claim that the Hindu population in Noakhali was nearly annihilated. According to Francis Toker, who at the time of the disturbances was General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Eastern Command, India, the Hindu press intentionally and grossly exaggerated

reports of disorder. The neutral and widely accepted death toll figure is around 5000.

According to Governor Burrows, "the immediate occasion for the outbreak of the disturbances was the looting of a Bazar [market] in Ramganj police station following the holding of a mass meeting." This included attacks on the place of business of Surendra Nath Bose and Rajendra Lal Roy Choudhury, the erstwhile president of the Noakhali Bar and a prominent Hindu Mahasabha leader.

Bihar and rest of India

A devastating riot rocked Bihar towards the end of 1946. Between 30 October and 7 November, a large-scale massacre of Muslims in Bihar brought Partition closer to inevitability. Severe violence broke out in Chhapra and Saran district, between 25 and 28 October. Very soon Patna, Munger and Bhagalpur also became the sites of serious violence. Begun as a reprisal for the Noakhali riot, whose death toll had been greatly overstated in immediate reports, it was difficult for authorities to deal with because it was spread out over a large area of scattered villages, and the number of casualties was impossible to establish accurately: "According to a subsequent statement in the British Parliament, the death-toll amounted to 5,000. *The Statesman's* estimate was between 7,500 and 10,000; the Congress party admitted to 2,000; Jinnah claimed about 30,000." However, By 3 November, the official estimate put the figure of death at only 445.

According to some independent sources of today, the death toll was around 8,000 human lives.

Some of the worst rioting also took place in Garhmukteshwar in United Provinces where a massacre occurred in November 1946, in which "Hindu pilgrims, at the annual religious fair, set upon and exterminated Muslims, not only on the festival grounds but in the adjacent town" while the police did little or nothing; the deaths were estimated at between 1,000 and 2,000. Rioting also took place in Punjab and Northwest Frontier Province in late 1946 and early 1947.

Chapter 42

Noakhali Riots

The **Noakhali riots** were a series of semi-organized massacres, mass rapes, abductions and forced conversions of Hindus to Islam and looting and arson of Hindu properties perpetrated by the Muslim community in the districts of Noakhali in the Chittagong Division of Bengal (now in Bangladesh) in October–November 1946, a year before India's independence from British rule.

It affected the areas under the Ramganj, Begumganj, Raipur, Lakshmipur, Chhagalnaiya and Sandwip police stations in Noakhali district and the areas under the Hajiganj, Faridganj, Chandpur, Laksham and Chaudagram police stations in Tipperah district, a total area of more than 2,000 square miles.

The massacre of the Hindu population started on 10 October, on the day of Kojagari Lakshmi Puja and continued unabated for about a week. It is estimated that 5,000 were killed, hundreds of Hindu women were raped and thousands of Hindu men and women were forcibly converted to Islam. Around 50,000 to 75,000 survivors were sheltered in temporary relief camps in Comilla, Chandpur, Agartala and other places. Around 50,000 Hindus remained marooned in the affected areas under the strict surveillance of the Muslims, where the administration had no say. In some areas, Hindus had to obtain permits from the Muslim leaders in order to travel outside their villages. The forcibly converted Hindus were coerced to give written declarations that they had converted to Islam of their own free will. Sometimes, they were confined in

others' houses and only allowed to be in their own house when an official party came for inspection. According to Dinesh Chandra, Hindus were forced to pay subscriptions to the Muslim League and *jiziyah*, the protection tax paid by dhimmis in an Islamic state.

Haran Chandra Ghosh Choudhuri, the only Hindu representative to the Bengal Legislative Assembly from the district of Noakhali, described the incidents as "the organized fury of the Muslim mob". Syama Prasad Mookerjee, the former Vice-Chancellor of the University of Calcutta and the former Finance Minister of Bengal, dismissed the argument that the Noakhali incidents were ordinary communal riots. He described the events as a planned and concerted attack on the minority community by the majority community.

Mahatma Gandhi camped in Noakhali for four months and toured the district in a mission to restore peace and communal harmony. However, the peace mission failed to restore confidence among the survivors, who could not be permanently rehabilitated in their villages. In the meantime, the Congress leadership accepted the Partition of India and the peace mission and other relief camps were abandoned. The majority of the survivors migrated to West Bengal, Tripura and Assam.

Cause of Riot

When elections were held in the provinces of India in 1937, the provincial power of Bengal came into the hands of the Muslims. But during the long British rule, Hindus were mainly in the seat of ruler (control of zamindari). They were also ahead in education and economics. As a result, Hindus did not take the

rise of neo-Muslim politics well. Educated and financially advanced Hindus were forced to obey many new laws of the new Muslim government in various ways. One of which is manifested in many places including Noakhali. Just as Hindus were concerned about the political rise of Muslims, a section of Muslims was also looking for an opportunity to vent their old grievances against Hindu zamindars (Local rulers). And that was the opportunity they got at the end of British rule in India.

attempts to bar Hindus from entering jobs, poor status of Muslims in Hindu-majority provinces, partition of Bengal, and the preposterously fanatic provocations by the Muslim League led to such a gruesome incident. The relationship between the Hindus and Muslims was very delicate. After this, the false news of a joint Hindu attack on Muslims in the Hindu-dominated Calcutta in retaliation to the attacks by Muslims on Direct Action Day spread exaggeratedly, adding fuel to the fire of previous accumulated anger. The Hindu-Muslim riots in Noakhali are believed to have been caused mainly by the resentment of Muslims against Hindus when the British rule was ending and the false news of massacre against Muslims in Calcutta and its outrage.

Prelude

Communal tensions in Noakhali started soon after the Great Calcutta Riots between Muslims and Hindus. Though it was quiet, the tension had been building up. During the six weeks leading up to the disturbances in Noakhali, Eastern Command

headquarters in Kolkata received reports indicating tension in the rural areas of Noakhali and Chittagong districts. Village poets and balladeers composed anti-Hindu poems and rhymes, which they recited and sang in market places and other public gathering places.

Eid al-Fitr violence

On 29 August, the day of Eid al-Fitr, the tension escalated into violence. A rumour spread that the Hindus had accumulated weapons. A group of Hindu fishermen were attacked with deadly weapons while fishing in the Feni River. One of them was killed and two seriously injured. Another group of nine Hindu fishermen from Charuriah were severely assaulted with deadly weapons. Seven of them were admitted to hospital. Devi Prasanna Guha, the son of a Congressman of Babupur village under the Ramganj police station, was murdered. One of his brothers and a servant were assaulted. The Congress office in front of their house was set on fire. Chandra Kumar Karmakar of Monpura was killed near Jamalpur. Jamini Dey, a hotel worker, was killed near Ghoshbag. Ashu Sen of Devisinghpur was severely beaten up at Tajumiarhat at Char Parvati. Rajkumar Choudhury of Banspara was severely assaulted on his way home. All the properties of six or seven Hindu families of Kanur Char were looted. At Karpara, a Muslim gang armed with deadly weapons entered the house of Jadav Majumdar and looted properties worth Rs. 1,500. Nakul Majumdar was assaulted. The houses of Prasanna Mohan Chakraborty of Tatarkhil, Nabin Chandra Nath of Miralipur and Radha Charan Nath of Latipur were looted. Five members of the Nath family of Latipur were injured. The temple of the family deity of Harendra Ghosh of Raipur was desecrated: a calf was

butchered and thrown inside the temple. The Shiva temple of Dr. Jadunath Majumdar of Chandipur was desecrated in a similar manner. The household shrines of Nagendra Majumdar and Rajkumar Choudhury of Dadpur were desecrated and the idols were stolen. The Durga images of Ishwar Chandra Pathak of Kethuri, Kedareshwar Chakraborty of Merkachar, Ananta Kumar De of Angrapara and Prasanna Mohan Chakraborty of Tatarkhil were broken.

Communal propaganda

In 1937, Gholam Sarwar Husseini, the scion of a Muslim Pir family, was elected to the Bengal Legislative Assembly on a Krishak Praja Party ticket. However, in the 1946 elections, he lost to a Muslim League candidate. Gholam Sarwar's father and grandfather were pious Muslims and had led lives of penance. Their family happened to be the hereditary *khadims* at the Diara Sharif in Shyampur, revered as a holy place by both Muslims and Hindus. After the Direct Action Day riots in Kolkata, Husseini began to deliver provocative speeches, inciting the Muslim masses to take revenge for the Kolkata riots. In some places, Hindu shops began to be boycotted. In the Ramganj and Begumganj police station areas, the Muslim boatmen refused to ferry Hindu passengers. In the first week of September, Muslims looted the Hindu shops in Sahapur market. Hindus were harassed and molested when they were returning to their native villages from Kolkata to spend the puja holidays. From 2 October onwards there were frequent instances of stray killings, theft and looting.

Events

According to Governor Burrows, "the immediate occasion for the outbreak of the disturbances was the looting of a Bazar [market] in Ramganj police station following the holding of a mass meeting and a provocative speech by Gholam Sarwar Husseini." That included attacks on the place of business of Surendra Nath Bose and Rajendra Lal Roy Choudhury, the former president of the Noakhali Bar and a prominent Hindu Mahasabha leader.

Violence

The riots started on 10 October, the day of Kojagari Lakshmi Puja, when the Bengali Hindus were involved in puja activities. Ghulam Sarwar instructed the Muslim masses to march towards the Sahapur market. Another Muslim League leader, Kasem, also arrived at the Sahapur market with his private army, then known as *Kasemer Fauz*.



- After that Kasem's army marched to Narayanpur to the *zamindari* office of Surendranath Basu. They

were joined there by another Muslim mob from Kalyannagar. Some of the Muslim tenants also joined the mob and attacked the *zamindari* office. On 11 October, the private army of Gholam Sarwar, known as the *Miyar Fauz*, attacked the residence of Rajendralal Roychowdhury, the president of the Noakhali Bar Association and the Noakhali District Hindu Mahasabha. At that time Swami Tryambakananda of Bharat Sevashram Sangha was staying at their house as a guest. Roychowdhury fended off the mob from his terrace with his rifle for the entire day. At nightfall, when they retreated, he sent the swami and his family members to safety. The next day the mob attacked again. Rajendralal Roychowdhury's severed head was presented to Golam Sarwar on a platter and his two daughters were given to two of his trusted generals. According to Sucheta Kriplani, Rajendralal Roychowdhury had followed the footsteps of Shivaji and Guru Gobind Singh and became a martyr, defending his faith and family honour. Acharya Kripalani, a staunch believer in non-violence, held that the resistance offered by Rajendralal Roychowdhury and his family was the nearest approach to non-violence. After three months Mahatma Gandhi, while touring Noakhali, visited their gutted house. On 11 January 1947, the corpses of the Roychowdhurys were exhumed from a swamp in Azimpur and brought before Mahatma Gandhi's prayer assembly at Lamchar High School. After the prayers the corpses were cremated according to Hindu rites.

On 12 October, the residence of Chittaranjan Dutta Raychaudhuri, at Shayestaganj, under the Raipur police station, was attacked by a Muslim mob. Kasem's private army attacked the Das family of Gopairbag, near Sompara market, under the Ramganj police station. The Das family were Kasem's immediate neighbour. The Chaudhuri family of Noakhola village under the Ramganj police station were also attacked by a Muslim mob. The attackers resorted to murder, loot and arson. Another Muslim mob attacked the residence of Yashoda Pal and Bharat Bhuiyan at Gobindapur under Ramganj police station. Between Amishapara and Satgharia the residences of the Bhaumiks and the Pals were totally destroyed by fire. In Nandigram, Golam Sarwar's private army burnt the Nag residence, the post office and the school founded by Ramanikanta Nag. The Hindus from the nearby areas had taken shelter in the Nag residence and initially the police protected them, repulsing the first attacks. The attackers then resorted to indiscriminate looting in the village. On 13 October, at 12 noon, a mob of 200 to 250 Muslims armed with deadly weapons attacked the Hindus in Changirgaon. 1,500 maunds of paddy were burnt and all the temples were destroyed. The Hindu women were stripped of their *shankha* and *sindur*. The men were forced to perform the *namaz*.

On 14 October, Jogendra Chandra Das, the M.L.A. from Chandpur, Tipperah, wrote to Jogendra Nath Mandal stating that thousands of Scheduled Caste Hindus had been attacked in Ramganj police station area in Noakhali. Their houses were being looted and set on fire and they were being forcibly converted to Islam.

- According to eyewitnesses, the attackers used petrol to set the houses on fire. In the remote island of Sandwip, which had no motor cars, petrol was imported from the mainland to set the houses on fire. According to Rakesh Batabyal, the use of petrol and kerosene indicates the premeditated and organised nature of the attacks. In Sandwip, revolutionary freedom fighter Lalmohan Sen was killed when he tried to resist a Muslim mob from killing the Hindus.

Violence broke out in the Ramganj police station area, in the north of Noakhali District, on 10 October 1946. The violence unleashed was described as "the organized fury of the Muslim mob". It soon engulfed the neighbouring police stations of Raipur, Lakshmipur, Begumganj and Sandip in Noakhali, and Faridganj, Hajiganj, Chandpur, Lakshman and Chudagram in Tippera. As per Gandhian Ashoka Gupta's report during Mahatma Gandhi's visit to the area, at least 2000 Hindus were forced to change their religion to Islam, six were forced to marry by force and one was murdered. However, the official estimate was 200. Jashoda Ranjan Das, one of the landlord of Noakhali Nauri, was killed during the riot. He succeeded in saving his wife and children, sending them to West Bengal with the help of local Muslims, and stayed with his brothers-in-law. A few months later, with the help of Mahatma Gandhi, the bodies were found.

Forcible conversions

Village after village was forcibly converted to Islam. The men were forced to wear skullcaps and grow beards. The women

were stripped of their *shankha* and sindur and forced to recite the kalma. Moulavis visited their homes and imparted Islamic teachings.

Ashoka Gupta, whose husband was then a judge serving in Chittagong, was among the first outsiders to reach Noakhali to provide relief.

When the news of the killings and forced conversions appeared in the news for the first time, *Star of India*, a newspaper patronised by the Muslim League, denied any incidents of forcible conversion. However, Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, while answering a question from Dhirendranath Datta in the assembly, stated that there had been 9,895 cases of forcible conversion in Tipperah. The exact figure was not known for Noakhali, but it ran into thousands. Edward Skinner Simpson stated in his report that 22,550 cases of forcible conversion took place in the three police station areas of Faridganj, Chandpur and Hajiganj in the district of Tipperah. Dr. Taj-ul-Islam Hashmi concluded that the number of Hindu women raped or converted was probably many times the number of Hindus killed. According to M. A. Khan, at least 95% of the Hindus of Noakhali were converted to Islam. According to Justice G. D. Khosla, the entire Hindu population of Noakhali were robbed of all they possessed and then forcibly converted to Islam.

Official developments

On 13 October, Kamini Kumar Dutta, the leader of the Indian National Congress in the Bengal Legislative Council, paid a visit of inquiry to Noakhali in his personal capacity during

which interviewed Abdullah, the District Superintendent of Police. On the 15th, he met the Minister of Civil Supplies of the Government of Bengal, who was on his way to Noakhali. On his return he communicated with the Home Department of the Interim Government seeking effective remedial measures and stating that it was impossible for anyone from outside to enter the disturbed areas without risking his life. He further stated that the authorities were anxious to hush up the entire episode from public inspection. No force had been sent to the disturbed areas till 14 October.

Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, the Prime Minister of Bengal, held a press conference in Kolkata on 16 October at which he acknowledged the forcible conversion, plunder and looting of Hindus in Noakhali. While insisting that the incidents had stopped, he said he had no idea why the incidents had occurred. He stated that it had become difficult for troops to move in because the canals had been jammed, bridges were damaged and roads blocked. He contemplated dropping printed appeals and warnings from the air instead of rushing in troops. On 18 October, Frederick Burrows, the Governor of Bengal, along with Suhrawardy and the Inspector General of Police for Bengal, visited Feni by plane and flew over the affected areas. Later, the Government of Bengal sent an official team to Noakhali and Tipperah to assess the situation. The team consisted of Jogendra Nath Mandal the newly appointed Member-in-Charge of Law in the Interim Government; Shamsuddin Ahmed, the Minister of Labour in the Bengal Government; Abul Hashem, the Secretary of Bengal Provincial Muslim League; Fazlur Rahman; Hamidul Haque Chowdhury; Moazzem Hossain; A. Malik and B. Wahiduzzaman.

On 19 October, Jivatram Bhagwandas Kripalani, the president-elect of the Indian National Congress; Sarat Chandra Bose, the Member-in-Charge of Works, Mines and Power in the Interim Government; Surendra Mohan Ghosh, the President of the Bengal Provincial Congress Committee; Sucheta Kripalani; Major General A. C. Chatterjee; Kumar Debendra Lal Khan and the editor of *Anandabazar Patrika* flew to Chittagong at the suggestion of Mahatma Gandhi. On the way they had made a brief stop at Comilla, where thousands of Hindu victims reported experiencing atrocities. In Chittagong, they met Frederick Burrows, the Governor of Bengal, who assured them that according to Suhrawardy, the Prime Minister of Bengal, everything was peaceful and orderly. He explained the rape and molestation of Hindu women as natural because they were more attractive than Muslim women.

On 21 October, Arthur Henderson, the Under-Secretary of State for India and Burma, read a report from the Governor of Bengal in the House of Commons that stated that the number of casualties was expected to be in the three-figure range. Sarat Chandra Bose challenged the statement, saying that 400 Hindus had been killed in a single incident at the office and residence of landlord Surendranath Bose.

On 25 October, at a mass meeting in New Delhi presided over by Suresh Chandra Majumdar, the managing director of the *Anandabazar Patrika* and the *Hindusthan Standard*, a resolution was passed demanding the immediate recall of the Governor of Bengal, the dismissal of the Muslim League ministry and intervention of the Centre. At a press conference in Kolkata on 26 October, Lieutenant General F. R. R. Bucher, the GoC of Eastern Command, stated that it was impossible to

estimate how long it would take to restore the confidence of the affected people in the government.

Relief operations

When the news of the events in Noakhali reached the outside world, Indian social, religious and political institutions came forward for relief and rescue operations. Notable among them were Bharat Sevashram Sangha, Hindu Mahasabha, the Indian National Congress, the Communist Party of India, the Indian National Army, Prabartak Sangha, Abhay Ashram, Arya Samaj and Gita Press. 30 relief organisations and six medical missions performed relief work in Noakhali. In addition there were 20 camps under Gandhi's "one village one worker" plan.

On receiving the news of Noakhali, Ashutosh Lahiry, the General Secretary of Hindu Mahasabha, immediately left for Chandpur. Syama Prasad Mookerjee, Nirmal Chandra Chatterjee and Pandit Narendranath Das, along with other workers, flew to Comilla and entered the affected area with military escorts. A plane was requisitioned and dispatched to the affected area loaded with rice, *chira*, bread, milk, biscuits, barley and medicines. Other consignments of relief supplies were dispatched by train. The affected people who took refuge in Kolkata were given protection in about 60 centres in the city and suburbs. Syama Prasad Mookerjee appointed M/S. P. K. Mitter & Co., a Kolkata-based accountancy firm, to control the collection, disbursement and audit of funds contributed by the public.

- Nirmal Chandra Chatterjee, the acting President of the Bengal Provincial Hindu Mahasabha;

Debendranath Mukherjee, the general secretary; and Nagendranath Bose, the Assistant Secretary, proceeded to the affected areas of Noakhali and Tipperah. Chatterjee consulted Larkin, the Relief Commissioner, and considered zonal settlement to be the best method for providing relief and safety, keeping in mind the future resettlement of the victims in their respective villages. Accordingly, relief centres were opened at Bamni under the Raipur police station, Dalalbazar under the Lakshmipur police station and Paikpara under the Faridganj police station. M. L. Biswas, the Secretary of the Bengal Provincial Hindu Mahasabha; P. Bardhan, the Medical Secretary; and J. N. Banerjee, the Treasurer, were sent to the other affected areas to set up relief centres. Each of the relief centres was provided with a mobile medical unit under medical officers. Sanat Kumar Roy Chowdhury, the Vice-President of the Bengal Provincial Hindu Mahasabha, inaugurated a well equipped 25-bed hospital at Lakshmipur in the memory of Rajendralal Raychaudhuri. Dr. Subhodh Mitra was placed in charge of the hospital. Nirmal Chandra Chatterjee visited Noakhali for a third time and inaugurated a students' home at Bajapati named 'Shyamaprasad Chhatrabas'.

On 20 October, at a meeting of the Chattogram Mahila Sangha, the Chittagong branch of the All India Women's Conference, presided over by Nellie Sengupta, a resolution was passed that the organisation would work for the relief and recovery of the abducted Hindu women in Noakhali. The Noakhali Relief

Committee was formed for the purpose of providing relief and rehabilitation to the affected Hindu women. From 26 October onwards, the committee began to send a group of volunteers led by Ashoka Gupta to Noakhali for relief operations on a weekly basis. Their task was to search for abducted Hindu women, provide relief to the refugees at the railway stations, and prepare a list of affected villages based on the accounts of affected villagers. Leela Roy reached Ramganj on 9 December, walking 90 miles on foot from Chaumohani. She recovered 1,307 abducted girls. Her organisation, the National Services Institute, set up 17 relief camps in Noakhali. In December, the Srihatta Mahila Sangha decided to send Kiranshashi Deb, Leela Dasgupta, Saralabala Deb and Suhasini Das to Noakhali for relief work. The Congress leaders who took the lead in the relief work were Satish Chandra Dasgupta, Dhirendranath Dutta, Trailokya Chakrabarti and Bishwaranjan Sen.

Mahatma Gandhi sent four Hindu girls to Sujata Devi, the daughter-in-law of Chittaranjan Das, for rehabilitation. Sujata Devi established the Bangiya Pallee Sangathan Samity for the rehabilitation and a free school for the education of the girls.

The Government of Bengal appointed a Special Relief Commissioner with magisterial powers for the distribution of funds to the refugees. A Government Order dated 10 February 1947 announced relief of Rs 250 to each affected household for rebuilding and also promised the amount of Rs 200 to each affected weaver, fisherman and peasant for buying a new loom, langal, ox cart or fishing equipment on furnishing proof of loss. The relief workers were surprised at the government decision considering an entire joint family as one single holding or unit and contested that the sum of Rs 250 was

greatly inadequate for rebuilding a homestead. Ashoka Gupta met Akhtaruzzaman, the Additional District Magistrate of Noakhali, on 11 February on behalf of the relief workers and obtained an explanation of the government order so that none of the affected families were left out.

Gandhi peace mission

Gandhi played a role in cooling down the situation. He toured the area with his aides, and was instrumental in calming the communal tension.

On 18 October, Dr. Bidhan Chandra Roy personally communicated with Gandhi, appraising him of the massacre of Hindus in Noakhali and the plight of the Hindu women in particular. At the evening prayer, Gandhi mentioned the events in Noakhali with concern. He said, if one-half of India's humanity was paralyzed, India could never really feel free. He would far rather see India's women trained to wield arms than that they should feel helpless. On 19 October, he decided to visit Noakhali. Before leaving, he was interviewed on 6 November by Dr. Amiya Chakravarty at the Abhay Ashram in Sodepur, near Kolkata. After the interview, Dr Amiya Chakravarty said that the most urgent need of the hour was to rescue the abducted Hindu women who obviously could not be approached by the military because, after being forcefully converted, they were kept under the veil.

Gandhi started for Noakhali on 6 November and reached Chaumuhani the next day. After spending two nights at the residence of Jogendra Majumdar, on 9 November he embarked on his tour of Noakhali, barefoot. In the next seven weeks, he

covered 116 miles and visited 47 villages. He set up his base in a half-burnt house in the village of Srirampur, where he stayed until 1 January. He organized prayer meetings, met local Muslim leaders, and tried to win their confidence. Mistrust between Hindus and Muslims continued to exist, and stray incidents of violence occurred even during his stay in Noakhali. On the evening of 10 November, two persons were reported to have been murdered while returning home after attending Gandhi's evening prayer at Duttapara relief camp.

Gandhi's stay in Noakhali was resented by the Muslim leadership. On 12 February 1947, while addressing a rally at Comilla, A. K. Fazlul Huq said that Gandhi's presence in Noakhali had harmed Islam enormously. His presence had created a bitterness between the Hindus and the Muslims. The resentment against Gandhi's stay in Noakhali grew day by day. Towards the end of February 1947, it became vulgar. Gandhi's route was deliberately dirtied every day and Muslims began to boycott his meetings.

Gandhi discontinued his mission halfway and started for Bihar on 2 March 1947 at the request of the Muslim League leaders of Bengal. On 7 April, more than a month after leaving Noakhali, Gandhi received telegrams from Congress Party workers in Noakhali, describing attempts to burn Hindus alive. He responded that the situation in Noakhali required that the Hindus should either leave or perish.

Refugees

The survivors fled Noakhali and Tippera in two distinct phases. The first batches of refugees arrived in Kolkata after the

massacres and forced conversions. The refugee flow subsided when the Government announced relief measures and the relief organisations started working in Noakhali and Tippera. However, in March 1947, when the Congress agreed to the Partition of India, the relief camps were abandoned and a fresh refugee influx took place in Tripura, Assam and the region that was to become West Bengal. Around 50,000 Hindu refugees who were sheltered in temporary relief camps were subsequently relocated to Guwahati in Assam.

Aftermath

According to historian Rakesh Batabyal, the situation never returned to normal. Sporadic incidents of violence continued and even the police were not spared. In one incident in early November, reported by Frederick Burrows to Frederick Pethick-Lawrence, a senior ICS officer and his police party were attacked three times while escorting Hindu survivors to a refugee camp. The police had to open fire; seven people were killed and ten wounded. The Bengali periodical *Desher Vani* published in Noakhali quoted a relief worker in the Ramganj police station area who stated that even after four months people had not returned to their houses.

Investigation and cover-up

On 29 September 1946, the Government of Bengal passed an ordinance prohibiting the press from publishing information regarding any communal disturbances. Any statement, advertisement, notice, news or opinion piece was prohibited from mentioning: the name of the place where the incident

occurred; the way in which the victims were killed or injured; the name of the community to which the victim or the perpetrator belonged; and the destruction or desecration of places of worship or shrines, if any. According to Ramesh Chandra Majumdar, the promulgation of the ordinance was the main reason that news of the incidents was not published in the press for a week.

The Government of Bengal appointed Edward Skinner Simpson, a retired judge, to investigate the incidents in Noakhali. His report was covered up by the government. After arriving at Kolkata, on his way to Noakhali, Gandhi sought a copy of the report from Prime Minister Suhrawardy. The latter had initially agreed to provide him with a copy. However, the Governor and the secretaries strongly objected to such a proposition and Suhrawardy declined to hand over the report to Gandhi. A copy of the report was with Mathur, the secretary to Suhrawardy, who secretly provided a summary to *The Statesman*. The editor published a censored version on 13 November 1946. In the report, Simpson mentioned that for a proper investigation into the happenings in Noakhali, at least 50 senior officers would need to be engaged for a period of six months.

Noakhali on the eve of Partition

Though the massacres and mass conversions had stopped in October, persecution of the Hindu population continued in Noakhali, even during Gandhi's stay there. A week after Gandhi's departure from Noakhali, A. V. Thakkar wrote from Chandpur on 9 March before leaving for Mumbai that lawlessness was still persisting in Noakhali and Tipperah. Even five months after the riots in October, there was no sign of its

stopping. On the contrary the withdrawal of some of the temporary police stations was encouraging the criminal elements. On 19 March 1947, the Muslims held secret meetings in various places. They threatened the Hindus with mass slaughter. Ghulam Sarwar convened a huge meeting at Sonapur under the Ramganj police station on 23 March. The day was to be celebrated as Pakistan Day, and the day's programme was a general strike. Thousands of Muslims would gather at the meeting, which had been announced in the village markets on 20 March by the beating of the drums. At the announcement of the meeting, the Hindus began to flee, fearing further oppression. The Choumohani railway station became packed with Hindu refugees. The relief workers of the Gandhi peace mission requested the District Superintendent of Police, the Additional District Magistrate and Abdul Gofran, a minister, not to allow the meeting to be held. The DSP, however, stated that the meeting would be held and the police would adopt adequate security measures. The relief workers reported the matter to Mahatma Gandhi and Suhrawardy and the latter wired a government order to the Noakhali SP on 22 March prohibiting meetings in public places, processions and slogans. However, meetings could be held in private places like madrasas and mosques. Rehan Ali, the Officer-in-Charge of the Ramganj police station, said that the meeting would be held at the Amtali ground, which was a private place as it was adjacent to a mosque, and therefore the government order would not be violated. The Muslim League leadership resolved to hold the meeting at any cost. Muslim League leaders Mohammad Ershad and Mujibur Rahman enlisted minister Abdul Gofran as one of the speakers at the meeting. On 23 March 4,000 to 5,000 Muslims marched in a procession from Ramganj to Kazirkhil and then back to Ramganj, chanting

slogans, and gathered for the meeting. Addressing the gathering one of the speakers, Yunus Mian Pandit, criticised the Hindus for the practice of untouchability and lack of a purdah system and justified an economic boycott on them.

On 13 May 1947, William Barret, the Divisional Commissioner of the Chittagong Division, submitted a top secret report to P. D. Martyn, the Additional Secretary to the Department of Home, Government of Bengal detailing the persecution of the Hindus. He reported that groups of Muslims sometimes searched Hindus and took belongings which caught their fancy. In some cases the Hindus had their daily shopping snatched away. Coconuts and betel nuts were forcefully taken from Hindu homesteads. Cattle were stolen. Corrugated iron sheets and timber were taken. Paddy plants were uprooted from Hindu-owned land. Efforts were made to close down Hindu-owned cinemas. Demands were made that the Muslims should have 50% of the loom licenses, even though the vast majority of weavers were Hindus belonging to the Yogi caste. Efforts were made to rid the marketplaces of Hindu merchants and shopkeepers. Hindus who had rebuilt their houses were told to leave the district. Hindu complainants at the police station were threatened by Muslims and compelled to agree to their cases being compromised. Hindus were openly addressed as *malauns* and *kafirs*. It was reported on 13 May that a Hindu woman of Dharmapur village had been rescued while being abducted by Muslims. On 16 May abduction was unsuccessfully attempted on two Hindu women.

Repercussions in Bihar and United Provinces

As a reaction to the Noakhali riots, riots rocked Bihar towards the end of 1946. Severe violence broke out in Chhapra and Saran district between 25 and 28 October. Between 30 October and 7 November, mass communal massacres in Bihar brought Partition closer to inevitability. Very soon Patna, Munger and Bhagalpur also became the sites of serious turbulence. Begun as a reprisal for the Noakhali riot, this rioting was difficult for authorities to deal with because it was spread out over a large area of scattered villages, and the number of casualties was impossible to establish accurately: "According to a subsequent statement in the British Parliament, the death-toll amounted to 5,000. *The Statesman's* estimate was between 7,500 and 10,000; the Congress party admitted to 2,000; Mr. Jinnah [the head of the Muslim League] claimed about 300." However, by 3 November, the official estimate put the number of deaths at only 445. Writing in 1950, Francis Taker, who at the time of the violence was General Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Eastern Command, India, put the Muslim death toll between 7,000 and 8,000.

Severe rioting also took place in Garhmukteshwar in United Provinces, where a massacre occurred in November 1946 in which "Hindu pilgrims, at the annual religious fair, set upon and exterminated Muslims, not only on the festival grounds but in the adjacent town" while the police did little or nothing; the deaths were estimated at between 1,000 and 2,000.

Chapter 43

Indian Independence Act 1947 by British Raj

The 1947 **Indian Independence Act** [1947 c. 30 (10 & 11. Geo. 6.)] is an Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom that partitioned British India into the two new independent dominions of India and Pakistan. The Act received Royal Assent on 18 July 1947 and thus India and Pakistan, comprising West (modern day Pakistan) and East (modern day Bangladesh) regions, came into being on 14 August.

The legislature representatives of the Indian National Congress, the Muslim League, and the Sikh community came to an agreement with Lord Mountbatten on what has come to be known as the *3 June Plan* or *Mountbatten Plan*. This plan was the last plan for independence.

Backward class

Attlee's announcement

Clement Attlee, the Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, announced on 20 February 1947 that:

- The British Government would grant full self-government to British India by 30 June 1948 at the latest,

- The future of the Princely States would be decided after the date of final transfer is decided.

Future of the Princely States

Attlee wrote to Mountbatten on 18 March 1947:[1]

It is, of course, important that the Indian States should adjust their relations with the authorities to whom it is intended to hand over power in British India; but as was explicitly stated by the Cabinet Mission His Majesty's Government do not intend to hand over their powers and obligations under paramountcy to any successor Government. It is not intended to bring paramountcy as a system to a conclusion earlier than the date of the final transfer of power, but you are authorised, at such time as you think appropriate, to enter into negotiations with individual States for adjusting their relations with the Crown. The princely states would be free from orders and treaties of British Rule in India.

3 June Plan

The 3 June 1947 Plan was also known as the Mountbatten Plan. The British government proposed a plan, announced on 3 June 1947, that included these principles:

- Principle of the partition of British India was accepted by the British Government
- Successor governments would be given dominion status
- Autonomy and sovereignty to both countries
- Can make their own constitution

- Princely States were given the right to join either Pakistan or India, based on two major factors: Geographical contiguity and the people's wishes.

Provisions

The Act's most important provisions were:

- Division of British India into the two new dominions – the Dominion of India and the Dominion of Pakistan – with effect from 15 August 1947;
- Partition of the provinces of Bengal and Punjab between the two new countries;
- Establishment of the office of Governor-General in each of the two new countries, as representatives of the Crown;
- Conferral of complete legislative authority upon the respective Constituent Assemblies of the two new countries;
- Termination of British suzerainty over the princely states, with effect from 15 August 1947. These states could decide to join either India or Pakistan; and
- Abolition of the use of the title "Emperor of India" by the British monarch (this was subsequently executed by King George VI by royal proclamation on 22 June 1948);

The Act also made provision for the division of joint property, etc. between the two new countries, including in particular the division of the armed forces.

Salient features

- Two new dominion states: Two new dominions were to emerge from the Indian empire: India and Pakistan.
- Appointed Date: 15 August 1947 was declared as the appointed date for the partition.
- Territories:
 - Pakistan: East Bengal, West Punjab, Sind, and Chief Commissioner's Province of Baluchistan.
 - The fate of North West Frontier Province (now Pakhtunkhwa) was subject to the result of a referendum.
- Bengal & Assam:
 - The province of Bengal as constituted under the Government of India Act 1935 ceased to exist.
 - In lieu thereof two new provinces were to be constituted, to be known respectively as East Bengal and West Bengal.
 - The fate of District Sylhet, in the province of Assam, was to be decided in a referendum.
- Punjab:
 - The province as constituted under the Government of India Act 1935 ceased to exist.
 - Two new provinces were to be constituted, to be known respectively as West Punjab and East Punjab.
 - The boundaries of the new provinces were to be determined, whether before or after the appointed date, by the award of a boundary commission to be appointed by the Governor-General.

- Constitution for the New Dominions: until the time of the making of the new constitution, the new dominions and the provinces thereof were to be governed by the Government of India Act 1935. (Temporary Provisions as to the Government of Each New Dominion).
- The Governors-General of the new dominions:
- For each of the new dominions a new Governor-General was to be appointed by the Crown, subject to the law of the legislature of either of the new dominions.
- Same person as Governor-General of both dominions: if unless and until provision to the contrary was made by a law of the legislature of either of the new dominions, the same person could be the Governor-General of both.
- Powers of Governor-General: (Section-9)
- The Governor-General was empowered to bring this Act into force.
- Division of territories, powers, duties, rights, assets, liabilities, etc., was the responsibility of Governor General.
- To adopt, amend, Government of India Act 1935, as the Governor-General may consider it necessary.
- power to introduce any change was until 31 March 1948, after that it was open to the constituent assembly to modify or adopt the same Act. (Temporary Provisions as to the Government of Each New Dominion.)
- Governor-General had full powers to give assent to any law.
- Legislation for the new dominions:

- The existing legislative setup was allowed to continue as Constitution making body as well as a legislature. (Temporary Provisions as to the Government of Each New Dominion.)
- The legislature of each dominion was given full powers to make laws for that dominion, including laws having extraterritorial operation.
- No Act of Parliament of UK passed after the appointed date would be extended to the territories of new dominions.
- No law and provision of any law made by the legislature of the new dominions shall be void or inoperative on the ground that it is repugnant to the law of England.
- The Governor-General of each dominion had full powers to give assent in His Majesty's name to any law of the legislature. [Configuration of Pakistan's Constitution Assembly (CAP I): 69 members of the central legislature + 10 immigrant members= 79].
- Consequences of setting up of the new dominions:
- His Majesty's Government lost all the responsibility to the new dominions.
- The suzerainty of His Majesty's Government over the Indian States lapsed.
- All the treaties or agreements with the Indian States and the tribal areas that were in force at the passing of the act lapsed.
- The title of "Emperor of India" was dropped from the titles of British Crown.
- The office of Secretary of State for India was abolished and the provisions of GOI Act 1935 relating to the appointments to the civil service or

civil posts under the crown by the secretary of the state ceased to operate.

- Civil servants: Section 10 provided for the continuance of service of the government servants appointed on or before 15 August 1947 under the Governments of new Dominions with full benefits.
- Armed Forces: Sections 11, 12, and 13 dealt with the future of the Indian armed forces. A Partition Committee was formed on 7 June 1947, with two representatives from each side and the viceroy in the chair, to decide about the division thereof. As soon as the process of partition was to start it was to be replaced by a Partition Council with a similar structure.
- First and Second Schedules:
- First Schedule listed the districts provisionally included in the new province of East Bengal:
 - Chittagong Division: Districts of Chittagong, Chittagong Hill Tracts, Noakhali and Tipperah.
 - Dacca Division: Districts of Bakarganj, Dacca, Faridpur, and Mymensingh.
 - Presidency Division: Districts of Jessore (except Bangaon Tehsil), and Kustia and Meherpur Tehsils (of Nadia district).
 - Rajshahi Division: Districts of Bogra, Dinajpur (except Raiganj and Balurghat Tehsil), Rajshahi, Rangpur and Nawabganj Tehsil (of Malda district).
- Second Schedule listed the districts provisionally included in the new province of West Punjab:
 - Lahore Division: Districts of Gujranwala, Lahore (except Patti Tehsil), Sheikhpura, Sialkot and Shakargarh Tehsil (of Gurdaspur district).

- Rawalpindi Division: Districts of Attock, Gujrat, Jehlum, Rawalpindi and Shahpur.
- Multan Division: Districts of Dera Ghazi Khan, Jhang, Lyallpur, Montgomery, Multan and Muzaffargarh.

Partition

There was much violence, and many Muslims from what would become India fled to Pakistan; and Hindus and Sikhs from what would become Pakistan fled to India. Many people left behind all their possessions and property to avoid the violence and flee to their new country.

Princely states

On 4 June 1947, Mountbatten held a press conference in which he addressed the question of the princely states, of which there were over 565. The treaty relations between Britain and the Indian States would come to an end, and on 15 August 1947 the suzerainty of the British Crown was to lapse. They would be free to accede to one or the other of the new dominions contrary to popular beliefs independence was never an option for the princely states as per the Mountbatten plan.

Princely states had no option to remain independent.

India

Lord Mountbatten of Burma, the last Viceroy, was asked by the Indian leaders to continue as the Governor-General of India.

Jawaharlal Nehru became the Prime Minister of India and Sardar Vallabhbhai Patel became the Home Minister.

Over 560 princely states acceded to India by 15 August. The exceptions were Junagadh, Hyderabad and Jammu and Kashmir. The state of Jammu and Kashmir was contiguous to both India and Pakistan, but its Hindu ruler chose to remain initially independent. Following a Pakistani tribal invasion, he acceded to India on 26 October 1947, and the state was disputed between India and Pakistan. The state of Junagadh initially acceded to Pakistan but faced a revolt from its Hindu population. Following a breakdown of law and order, its Dewan requested India to take over the administration on 8 November 1947. India conducted a referendum in the state on 20 February 1948, in which the people voted overwhelmingly to join India. The state of Hyderabad, with the majority Hindu population but Muslim ruler faced intense turmoil and sectarian violence. India intervened in the state on 13 September 1948, following which the ruler of the state signed the Instrument of Accession, joining India.

Pakistan

Muhammad Ali Jinnah became the Governor-General of Pakistan, and Liaquat Ali Khan became the Prime Minister of Pakistan.

Between October 1947 and March 1948 the rulers of several Muslim-majority states signed instruments of accession to join Pakistan. These included Amb, Bahawalpur, Chitral, Dir, Kalat, Khairpur, Kharan, Las Bela, Makran, and Swat.

Repeal

The Indian Independence Act was subsequently repealed in Article 395 of the Constitution of India and in Article 221 of the Constitution of Pakistan of 1956, both constitutions being intended to bring about greater independence for the new states. Although under British law, the new constitutions did not have the legal authority to repeal the Act, the repeal was intended to establish them as independent legal systems based only on home-grown legislation. The Act has not been repealed in the United Kingdom, where it still has an effect, although some sections of it have been repealed.

Chapter 44

Partition of India

The **Partition of India** was the division of British India into two independent Dominions: India and Pakistan. The two states have since gone through further reorganization: the Dominion of India is today the Republic of India (since 1950); while the Dominion of Pakistan was composed of what is known today as the Islamic Republic of Pakistan (since 1956) and the People's Republic of Bangladesh (since 1971). The partition involved the division of two provinces, Bengal and Punjab, based on district-wide non-Muslim or Muslim majorities. The partition also saw the division of the British Indian Army, the Royal Indian Navy, the Indian Civil Service, the railways, and the central treasury. The partition was outlined in the *Indian Independence Act 1947* and resulted in the dissolution of the British Raj, i.e. Crown rule in India. The two self-governing independent Dominions of India and Pakistan legally came into existence at midnight on 15 August 1947. The partition displaced between 10 and 20 million people along religious lines, creating overwhelming refugee crises in the newly constituted dominions. There was large-scale violence, with estimates of the loss of life accompanying or preceding the partition disputed and varying between several hundred thousand and two million. The violent nature of the partition created an atmosphere of hostility and suspicion between India and Pakistan that affects their relationship to this day.

The term *partition of India* does not cover the secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971, nor the earlier separations

of Burma (now Myanmar) and Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) from the administration of British India. The term also does not cover the political integration of princely states into the two new dominions, nor the disputes of annexation or division arising in the princely states of Hyderabad, Junagadh, and Jammu and Kashmir, though violence along religious lines did break out in some princely states at the time of the partition. It does not cover the incorporation of the enclaves of French India into India during the period 1947–1954, nor the annexation of Goa and other districts of Portuguese India by India in 1961. Other contemporaneous political entities in the region in 1947—the Kingdom of Sikkim, Kingdom of Bhutan, Kingdom of Nepal, and the Maldives—were unaffected by the partition. Among princely states, the violence was often highly organised with the involvement or complicity of the rulers. It is believed that in the Sikh states (except for Jind and Kapurthala), the Maharajas were complicit in the ethnic cleansing of Muslims, while other Maharajas such as those of Patiala, Faridkot, and Bharatpur were heavily involved in ordering them. The ruler of Bharatpur, in particular, is said to have witnessed the ethnic cleansing of his population, especially at places such as Deeg.

Background, pre-World War II (1905–1938)

Partition of Bengal: 1905

In 1905, during his second term as Viceroy of India, Lord Curzon divided the Bengal Presidency—the largest administrative subdivision in British India—into the Muslim-

majority province of *Eastern Bengal and Assam* and the Hindu-majority province of *Bengal* (present-day Indian states of West Bengal, Bihar, Jharkhand, and Odisha). Curzon's act, the *partition of Bengal*—which had been contemplated by various colonial administrations since the time of Lord William Bentinck, though never acted upon—was to transform nationalist politics as nothing else before it.

The Hindu elite of Bengal, many of whom owned land that was leased out to Muslim peasants in East Bengal, protested strongly. The large Bengali-Hindu middle-class (the *Bhadralok*), upset at the prospect of Bengalis being outnumbered in the new Bengal province by Biharis and Oriyas, felt that Curzon's act was punishment for their political assertiveness. The pervasive protests against Curzon's decision predominantly took the form of the *Swadeshi* ('buy Indian') campaign, involving a boycott of British goods. Sporadically, but flagrantly, the protesters also took to political violence, which involved attacks on civilians. The violence, however, would be ineffective, as most planned attacks were either pre-empted by the British or failed. The rallying cry for both types of protest was the slogan *Bande Mataram* (Bengali, lit: 'Hail to the Mother'), the title of a song by Bankim Chandra Chatterjee, which invoked a mother goddess, who stood variously for Bengal, India, and the Hindu goddess Kali. The unrest spread from Calcutta to the surrounding regions of Bengal when Calcutta's English-educated students returned home to their villages and towns. The religious stirrings of the slogan and the political outrage over the partition were combined as young men, in such groups as Jugantar, took to bombing public buildings, staging armed robberies, and assassinating British officials. Since

Calcutta was the imperial capital, both the outrage and the slogan soon became known nationally.

The overwhelming, predominantly-Hindu protest against the partition of Bengal, along with the fear of reforms favouring the Hindu majority, led the Muslim elite of India in 1906 to the new viceroy Lord Minto, asking for separate electorates for Muslims. In conjunction, they demanded proportional legislative representation reflecting both their status as former rulers and their record of cooperating with the British. This would result in the founding of the All-India Muslim League in Dacca in December 1906. Although Curzon by now had returned to England following his resignation over a dispute with his military chief, Lord Kitchener, the League was in favor of his partition plan. The Muslim elite's position, which was reflected in the League's position, had crystallized gradually over the previous three decades, beginning with the 1871 Census of British India, which had first estimated the populations in regions of Muslim majority. For his part, Curzon's desire to court the Muslims of East Bengal had arisen from British anxieties ever since the 1871 census, and in light of the history of Muslims fighting them in the 1857 Mutiny and the Second Anglo-Afghan War.

In the three decades since the 1871 census, Muslim leaders across northern India had intermittently experienced public animosity from some of the new Hindu political and social groups. The Arya Samaj, for example, had not only supported Cow Protection Societies in their agitation, but also—distracted at the Census' Muslim numbers—organized "reconversion" events for the purpose of welcoming Muslims back to the Hindu fold. In the United Provinces, Muslims

became anxious in the late-19th century as Hindu political representation increased, and Hindus were politically mobilized in the Hindi-Urdu controversy and the anti-cow-killing riots of 1893. In 1905 Muslim fears grew when Tilak and Lajpat Rai attempted to rise to leadership positions in the Congress, and the Congress itself rallied around the symbolism of Kali. It was not lost on many Muslims, for example, that the *bande mataram* rallying cry had first appeared in the novel *Anandmath* in which Hindus had battled their Muslim oppressors. Lastly, the Muslim elite, including Nawab of Dacca, Khwaja Salimullah, who hosted the League's first meeting in his mansion in Shahbag, was aware that a new province with a Muslim majority would directly benefit Muslims aspiring to political power.

World War I, Lucknow Pact: 1914–1918

World War I would prove to be a watershed in the imperial relationship between Britain and India. 1.4 million Indian and British soldiers of the British Indian Army would take part in the war, and their participation would have a wider cultural fallout: news of Indian soldiers fighting and dying with British soldiers, as well as soldiers from dominions like Canada and Australia, would travel to distant corners of the world both in newsprint and by the new medium of the radio. India's international profile would thereby rise and would continue to rise during the 1920s. It was to lead, among other things, to India, under its name, becoming a founding member of the League of Nations in 1920 and participating, under the name, "Les Indes Anglaises" (British India), in the 1920 Summer Olympics in Antwerp. Back in India, especially among the

leaders of the Indian National Congress, it would lead to calls for greater self-government for Indians.

The 1916 Lucknow Session of the Congress was also the venue of an unanticipated mutual effort by the Congress and the Muslim League, the occasion for which was provided by the wartime partnership between Germany and Turkey. Since the Turkish Sultan, or *Khalifah*, also had sporadically claimed guardianship of the Islamic holy sites of Mecca, Medina, and Jerusalem, and since the British and their allies were now in conflict with Turkey, doubts began to increase among some Indian Muslims about the "religious neutrality" of the British, doubts that had already surfaced as a result of the reunification of Bengal in 1911, a decision that was seen as ill-disposed to Muslims. In the Lucknow Pact, the League joined the Congress in the proposal for greater self-government that was campaigned for by Tilak and his supporters; in return, the Congress accepted separate electorates for Muslims in the provincial legislatures as well as the Imperial Legislative Council. In 1916, the Muslim League had anywhere between 500 and 800 members and did not yet have its wider following among Indian Muslims of later years; in the League itself, the pact did not have unanimous backing, having largely been negotiated by a group of "Young Party" Muslims from the United Provinces (UP), most prominently, the brothers Mohammad and Shaukat Ali, who had embraced the Pan-Islamic cause. However, it did have the support of a young lawyer from Bombay, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who was later to rise to leadership roles in both the League and the Indian independence movement. In later years, as the full ramifications of the pact unfolded, it was seen as benefiting the Muslim minority elites of provinces like UP and Bihar more

than the Muslim majorities of Punjab and Bengal. At the time, the "Lucknow Pact" was an important milestone in nationalistic agitation and was seen so by the British.

Montagu–Chelmsford Reforms: 1919

Secretary of State for India, Montagu and Viceroy Lord Chelmsford presented a report in July 1918 after a long fact-finding trip through India the previous winter. After more discussion by the government and parliament in Britain, and another tour by the Franchise and Functions Committee to identify who among the Indian population could vote in future elections, the Government of India Act of 1919 (also known as the Montagu–Chelmsford Reforms) was passed in December 1919. The new Act enlarged both the provincial and Imperial legislative councils and repealed the Government of India's recourse to the "official majority" in unfavourable votes. Although departments like defence, foreign affairs, criminal law, communications, and income-tax were retained by the Viceroy and the central government in New Delhi, other departments like public health, education, land-revenue, local self-government were transferred to the provinces. The provinces themselves were now to be administered under a new dyarchical system, whereby some areas like education, agriculture, infrastructure development, and local self-government became the preserve of Indian ministers and legislatures, and ultimately the Indian electorates, while others like irrigation, land-revenue, police, prisons, and control of media remained within the purview of the British governor and his executive council. The new Act also made it easier for Indians to be admitted into the civil service and the army officer corps.

A greater number of Indians were now enfranchised, although, for voting at the national level, they constituted only 10% of the total adult male population, many of whom were still illiterate. In the provincial legislatures, the British continued to exercise some control by setting aside seats for special interests they considered cooperative or useful. In particular, rural candidates, generally sympathetic to British rule and less confrontational, were assigned more seats than their urban counterparts. Seats were also reserved for non-Brahmins, landowners, businessmen, and college graduates. The principle of "communal representation," an integral part of the Minto-Morley Reforms, and more recently of the Congress-Muslim League Lucknow Pact, was reaffirmed, with seats being reserved for Muslims, Sikhs, Indian Christians, Anglo-Indians, and domiciled Europeans, in both provincial and Imperial legislative councils. The Montagu-Chelmsford reforms offered Indians the most significant opportunity yet for exercising legislative power, especially at the provincial level; however, that opportunity was also restricted by the still limited number of eligible voters, by the small budgets available to provincial legislatures, and by the presence of rural and special interest seats that were seen as instruments of British control.

Introduction of the two-nation theory: 1924

The *two-nation theory* is the ideology that the primary identity and unifying denominator of Muslims in the Indian subcontinent is their religion, rather than their language or ethnicity, and therefore Indian Hindus and Muslims are two distinct nations regardless of commonalities. The two-nation theory was a founding principle of the Pakistan Movement (i.e., the ideology of Pakistan as a Muslim nation-state in South

Asia), and the partition of India in 1947. The ideology that religion is the determining factor in defining the nationality of Indian Muslims was undertaken by Muhammad Ali Jinnah, who termed it as the awakening of Muslims for the creation of Pakistan. It is also a source of inspiration to several Hindu nationalist organizations, with causes as varied as the redefinition of Indian Muslims as non-Indian foreigners and second-class citizens in India, the expulsion of all Muslims from India, the establishment of a legally Hindu state in India, prohibition of conversions to Islam, and the promotion of conversions or reconversions of Indian Muslims to Hinduism.

The Hindu Mahasabha leader Lala Lajpat Rai was one of the first persons to demand to bifurcate India by Muslim and non-Muslim population. He wrote in *The Tribune* of 14 December 1924:

Under my scheme the Muslims will have four Muslim States: (1) The Pathan Province or the North-West Frontier; (2) Western Punjab (3) Sindh and (4) Eastern Bengal. If there are small Muslim communities in any other part of India, sufficiently large to form a province, they should be similarly constituted. But it should be distinctly understood that this is not a united India. It means a clear partition of India into a Muslim India and a non-Muslim India.

There are varying interpretations of the two-nation theory, based on whether the two postulated nationalities can coexist in one territory or not, with radically different implications. One interpretation argued for sovereign autonomy, including the right to secede, for Muslim-majority areas of the Indian subcontinent, but without any transfer of populations (i.e.,

Hindus and Muslims would continue to live together). A different interpretation contends that Hindus and Muslims constitute "two distinct and frequently antagonistic ways of life and that therefore they cannot coexist in one nation." In this version, a transfer of populations (i.e., the total removal of Hindus from Muslim-majority areas and the total removal of Muslims from Hindu-majority areas) was a desirable step towards a complete separation of two incompatible nations that "cannot coexist in a harmonious relationship."

Opposition to the theory has come from two sources. The first is the concept of a single Indian nation, of which Hindus and Muslims are two intertwined communities. This is a founding principle of the modern, officially-secular Republic of India. Even after the formation of Pakistan, debates on whether Muslims and Hindus are distinct nationalities or not continued in that country as well. The second source of opposition is the concept that while Indians are not one nation, neither are the Muslims or Hindus of the subcontinent, and it is instead the relatively homogeneous provincial units of the subcontinent which are true nations and deserving of sovereignty; the Baloch has presented this view, Sindhi, and Pashtun sub-nationalities of Pakistan and the Assamese and Punjabi sub-nationalities of India.

Muslim homeland, provincial elections: 1930–1938

In 1933, Choudhry Rahmat Ali had produced a pamphlet, entitled *Now or never*, in which the term *Pakistan*, 'land of the pure,' comprising the Punjab, North West Frontier Province (Afghania), Kashmir, Sindh, and Balochistan, was coined for the first time. However, the pamphlet did not attract political

attention and, a little later, a Muslim delegation to the Parliamentary Committee on Indian Constitutional Reforms gave short shrift to the idea of Pakistan, calling it "chimerical and impracticable." In 1932, British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald accepted Dr. Ambedkar's demand for the "Depressed Classes" to have separate representation in the central and provincial legislatures. The Muslim League favoured the award as it had the potential to weaken the Hindu caste leadership. However, Mahatma Gandhi, who was seen as a leading advocate for Dalit rights, went on a fast to persuade the British to repeal the award. Ambedkar had to back down when it seemed Gandhi's life was threatened.

Two years later, the *Government of India Act 1935* introduced provincial autonomy, increasing the number of voters in India to 35 million. More significantly, law and order issues were for the first time devolved from British authority to provincial governments headed by Indians. This increased Muslim anxieties about eventual Hindu domination. In the 1937 Indian provincial elections, the Muslim League turned out its best performance in Muslim-minority provinces such as the United Provinces, where it won 29 of the 64 reserved Muslim seats. However, in the Muslim-majority regions of the Punjab and Bengal regional parties outperformed the League. In Punjab, the Unionist Party of Sikandar Hayat Khan, won the elections and formed a government, with the support of the Indian National Congress and the Shiromani Akali Dal, which lasted five years. In Bengal, the League had to share power in a coalition headed by A. K. Fazlul Huq, the leader of the Krishak Praja Party.

The Congress, on the other hand, with 716 wins in the total of 1585 provincial assemblies seats, was able to form governments in 7 out of the 11 provinces of British India. In its manifesto, Congress maintained that religious issues were of lesser importance to the masses than economic and social issues. However, the election revealed that Congress had contested just 58 out of the total 482 Muslim seats, and of these, it won in only 26. In UP, where the Congress won, it offered to share power with the League on condition that the League stops functioning as a representative only of Muslims, which the League refused. This proved to be a mistake as it alienated Congress further from the Muslim masses. Besides, the new UP provincial administration promulgated cow protection and the use of Hindi. The Muslim elite in UP was further alienated, when they saw chaotic scenes of the new Congress Raj, in which rural people who sometimes turned up in large numbers in Government buildings, were indistinguishable from the administrators and the law enforcement personnel.

The Muslim League conducted its investigation into the conditions of Muslims under Congress-governed provinces. The findings of such investigations increased fear among the Muslim masses of future Hindu domination. The view that Muslims would be unfairly treated in an independent India dominated by the Congress was now a part of the public discourse of Muslims.

Background, during and post-World War II (1939–1947)

With the outbreak of World War II in 1939, Lord Linlithgow, Viceroy of India, declared war on India's behalf without consulting Indian leaders, leading the Congress provincial ministries to resign in protest. By contrast the Muslim League, which functioned under state patronage, organized "Deliverance Day" celebrations (from Congress dominance) and supported Britain in the war effort. When Linlithgow met with nationalist leaders, he gave the same status to Jinnah as he did to Gandhi, and a month later described the Congress as a "Hindu organization."

In March 1940, in the League's annual three-day session in Lahore, Jinnah gave a two-hour speech in English, in which were laid out the arguments of the Two-nation theory, stating, in the words of historians Talbot and Singh, that "Muslims and Hindus...were irreconcilably opposed monolithic religious communities and as such, no settlement could be imposed that did not satisfy the aspirations of the former." On the last day of its session, the League passed, what came to be known as the Lahore Resolution, sometimes also "Pakistan Resolution," demanding that "the areas in which the Muslims are numerically in the majority as in the North-Western and Eastern zones of India should be grouped to constitute independent states in which the constituent units shall be autonomous and sovereign." Though it had been founded more than three decades earlier, the League would gather support

among South Asian Muslims only during the Second World War.

August Offer, Churchill proposal: 1940–1942

In August 1940, Lord Linlithgow proposed that India be granted a Dominion status after the war. Having not taken the Pakistan idea seriously, Linlithgow supposed that what Jinnah wanted was a non-federal arrangement without Hindu domination. To allay Muslim fears of Hindu domination, the "August Offer" was accompanied by the promise that a future constitution would consider the views of minorities. Neither the Congress nor the Muslim League were satisfied with the offer, and both rejected it in September. The Congress once again started a program of civil disobedience.

In March 1942, with the Japanese fast moving up the Malayan Peninsula after the Fall of Singapore, and with the Americans supporting independence for India, Winston Churchill, the wartime Prime Minister of Britain, sent Sir Stafford Cripps, leader of the House of Commons, with an offer of dominion status to India at the end of the war in return for the Congress's support for the war effort. Not wishing to lose the support of the allies they had already secured—the Muslim League, Unionists of Punjab, and the Princes—Cripps's offer included a clause stating that no part of the British Indian Empire would be forced to join the post-war Dominion. The League rejected the offer, seeing this clause as insufficient in meeting the principle of Pakistan. As a result of that proviso, the proposals were also rejected by the Congress, which, since its founding as a polite group of lawyers in 1885, saw itself as the representative of all Indians of all faiths. After the arrival

in 1920 of Gandhi, the pre-eminent strategist of Indian nationalism, the Congress had been transformed into a mass nationalist movement of millions.

Quit India Resolution

In August 1942, Congress launched the Quit India Resolution, asking for drastic constitutional changes which the British saw as the most serious threat to their rule since the Indian rebellion of 1857. With their resources and attention already spread thin by a global war, the nervous British immediately jailed the Congress leaders and kept them in jail until August 1945, whereas the Muslim League was now free for the next three years to spread its message. Consequently, the Muslim League's ranks surged during the war, with Jinnah himself admitting, "The war which nobody welcomed proved to be a blessing in disguise." Although there were other important national Muslim politicians such as Congress leader Abul Kalam Azad, and influential regional Muslim politicians such as A. K. Fazlul Huq of the leftist Krishak Praja Party in Bengal, Sikander Hyat Khan of the landlord-dominated Punjab Unionist Party, and Abd al-Ghaffar Khan of the pro-Congress Khudai Khidmatgar (popularly, "red shirts") in the North West Frontier Province, the British were to increasingly see the League as the main representative of Muslim India. The Muslim League's demand for Pakistan pitted it against the British and Congress.

1946 Election

In January 1946, mutinies broke out in the armed services, starting with RAF servicemen frustrated with their slow repatriation to Britain. The insurgencies came to a head in

February 1946 with the mutiny of the Royal Indian Navy in Bombay, followed by others in Calcutta, Madras, and Karachi. Although the mutinies were rapidly suppressed, they had the effect of spurring the Attlee government to action. Labour Prime Minister Clement Attlee had been deeply interested in Indian independence since the 1920s, and for years had supported it. He now took charge of the government position and gave the issue the highest priority. A Cabinet Mission was sent to India led by the Secretary of State for India, Lord Pethick Lawrence, which also included Sir Stafford Cripps, who had visited India four years before. The objective of the mission was to arrange for an orderly transfer to independence.

In early 1946, new elections were held in India. With the announcement of the polls, the line had been drawn for Muslim voters to choose between a united Indian State or partition. At the end of the war in 1945, the colonial government had announced the public trial of three senior officers of Subhas Chandra Bose's defeated Indian National Army (INA) who stood accused of treason. Now as the trials began, the Congress leadership, although having never supported the INA, chose to defend the accused officers. The subsequent convictions of the officers, the public outcry against the beliefs, and the eventual remission of the sentences created positive propaganda for Congress, which enabled it to win the party's subsequent electoral victories in eight of the eleven provinces. The negotiations between the Congress and the Muslim League, however, stumbled over the issue of partition.

British rule had lost its legitimacy for most Hindus, and conclusive proof of this came in the form of the 1946 elections with the Congress winning 91 percent of the vote among non-

Muslim constituencies, thereby gaining a majority in the Central Legislature and forming governments in eight provinces, and becoming the legitimate successor to the British government for most Hindus. If the British intended to stay in India the acquiescence of politically active Indians to British rule would have been in doubt after these election results, although the views of many rural Indians were uncertain even at that point. The Muslim League won the majority of the Muslim vote as well as most reserved Muslim seats in the provincial assemblies, and it also secured all the Muslim seats in the Central Assembly.

Cabinet Mission: July 1946

Recovering from its performance in the 1937 elections, the Muslim League was finally able to make good on the claim that it and Jinnah alone represented India's Muslims and Jinnah quickly interpreted this vote as a popular demand for a separate homeland. However, tensions heightened while the Muslim League was unable to form ministries outside the two provinces of Sind and Bengal, with the Congress forming a ministry in the NWFP and the key Punjab province coming under a coalition ministry of the Congress, Sikhs and Unionists.

The British, while not approving of a separate Muslim homeland, appreciated the simplicity of a single voice to speak on behalf of India's Muslims. Britain had wanted India and its army to remain united to keep India in its system of 'imperial defence'. With India's two political parties unable to agree, Britain devised the *Cabinet Mission Plan*. Through this mission, Britain hoped to preserve the united India which they and the

Congress desired, while concurrently securing the essence of Jinnah's demand for a Pakistan through 'groupings.' The Cabinet mission scheme encapsulated a federal arrangement consisting of three groups of provinces. Two of these groupings would consist of predominantly Muslim provinces, while the third grouping would be made up of the predominantly Hindu regions. The provinces would be autonomous, but the centre would retain control over the defence, foreign affairs, and communications. Though the proposals did not offer independent Pakistan, the Muslim League accepted the proposals. Even though the unity of India would have been preserved, the Congress leaders, especially Nehru, believed it would leave the Center weak. On 10 July 1946, Nehru gave a "provocative speech," rejected the idea of grouping the provinces and "effectively torpedoed" both the Cabinet mission plan and the prospect of a United India.

Direct Action Day: August 1946

After the Cabinet Mission broke down, Jinnah proclaimed 16 August 1946 *Direct Action Day*, with the stated goal of peacefully highlighting the demand for a Muslim homeland in British India. However, on the morning of the 16th, armed Muslim gangs gathered at the Ochterlony Monument in Calcutta to hear Huseyn Shaheed Suhrawardy, the League's Chief Minister of Bengal, who, in the words of historian Yasmin Khan, "if he did not explicitly incite violence certainly gave the crowd the impression that they could act with impunity, that neither the police nor the military would be called out and that the ministry would turn a blind eye to any action they unleashed in the city." That very evening, in Calcutta, Hindus were attacked by returning Muslim celebrants, who carried

pamphlets distributed earlier which showed a clear connection between violence and the demand for Pakistan, and directly implicated the celebration of Direct Action Day with the outbreak of the cycle of violence that would later be called the "Great Calcutta Killing of August 1946". The next day, Hindus struck back, and the violence continued for three days in which approximately 4,000 people died (according to official accounts), both Hindus and Muslims. Although India had had outbreaks of religious violence between Hindus and Muslims before, the Calcutta killings were the first to display elements of "ethnic cleansing". Violence was not confined to the public sphere, but homes were entered and destroyed, and women and children were attacked. Although the Government of India and the Congress were both shaken by the course of events, in September, a Congress-led interim government was installed, with Jawaharlal Nehru as united India's prime minister.

The communal violence spread to Bihar (where Hindus attacked Muslims), to Noakhali in Bengal (where Muslims targeted Hindus), to Garhmukteshwar in the United Provinces (where Hindus attacked Muslims), and on to Rawalpindi in March 1947 in which Hindus were attacked or driven out by Muslims.

Plan for partition: 1946–1947

The British Prime Minister Attlee appointed Lord Louis Mountbatten as India's last viceroy, giving him the task to oversee British India's independence by June 1948, with the instruction to *avoid* partition and *preserve* a United India, but with adaptable authority to ensure a British withdrawal with minimal setbacks. Mountbatten hoped to revive the Cabinet

Mission scheme for a federal arrangement for India. But despite his initial keenness for preserving the centre, the tense communal situation caused him to conclude that partition had become necessary for a quicker transfer of power.

Vallabhbhai Patel was one of the first Congress leaders to accept the partition of India as a solution to the rising Muslim separatist movement. He had been outraged by Jinnah's Direct Action campaign, which had provoked communal violence across India, and by the viceroy's vetoes of his home department's plans to stop the violence on the grounds of constitutionality. Patel severely criticized the viceroy's induction of League ministers into the government and the revalidation of the grouping scheme by the British without Congress approval. Although further outraged at the League's boycott of the assembly and non-acceptance of the plan of 16 May despite entering government, he was also aware that Jinnah enjoyed popular support amongst Muslims, and that an open conflict between him and the nationalists could degenerate into a Hindu-Muslim civil war. The continuation of a divided and weak central government would in Patel's mind, result in the wider fragmentation of India by encouraging more than 600 princely states towards independence.

Between the months of December 1946 and January 1947, Patel worked with civil servant V. P. Menon on the latter's suggestion for a separate dominion of Pakistan created out of Muslim-majority provinces. Communal violence in Bengal and Punjab in January and March 1947 further convinced Patel of the soundness of partition. Patel, a fierce critic of Jinnah's demand that the Hindu-majority areas of Punjab and Bengal be included in a Muslim state, obtained the partition of those

provinces, thus blocking any possibility of their inclusion in Pakistan. Patel's decisiveness on the partition of Punjab and Bengal had won him many supporters and admirers amongst the Indian public, which had been tired of the League's tactics. Still, he was criticized by Gandhi, Nehru, secular Muslims, and socialists for a perceived eagerness for the partition.

Proposal of the *Indian Independence Act*

regarding proposals of partition, Patel engaged him in private meetings discussions over the perceived practical unworkability of any Congress-League coalition, the rising violence, and the threat of civil war. At the All India Congress Committee meeting called to vote on the proposal, Patel said:

I fully appreciate the fears of our brothers from [the Muslim-majority areas]. Nobody likes the division of India, and my heart is heavy. But the choice is between one division and many divisions. We must face facts. We cannot give way to emotionalism and sentimentality. The Working Committee has not acted out of fear. But I am afraid of one thing, that all our toil and hard work of these many years might go waste or prove unfruitful. My nine months in office have completely disillusioned me regarding the supposed merits of the Cabinet Mission Plan. Except for a few honourable exceptions, Muslim officials from the top down to the chaprasis (peons or servants) are working for the League. The communal veto given to the League in the Mission Plan would have blocked India's progress at every stage. Whether we like it or not, de facto Pakistan already exists in the Punjab and Bengal. Under the circumstances, I would prefer a de jure Pakistan, which may make the League more responsible. Freedom is coming. We

have 75 to 80 percent of India, which we can make strong with our genius. The League can develop the rest of the country.

Following Gandhi's denial and Congress' approval of the plan, Patel represented India on the Partition Council, where he oversaw the division of public assets and selected the Indian council of ministers with Nehru. However, neither he nor any other Indian leader had foreseen the intense violence and population transfer that would take place with partition. Late in 1946, the Labour government in Britain, its exchequer exhausted by the recently concluded World War II, decided to end British rule of India, and in early 1947 Britain announced its intention of transferring power no later than June 1948. However, with the British army unprepared for the potential for increased violence, the new viceroy, Louis Mountbatten, advanced the date for the transfer of power, allowing less than six months for a mutually agreed plan for independence.

Radcliffe Line

In June 1947, the nationalist leaders, including Nehru and Abul Kalam Azad on behalf of the Congress, Jinnah representing the Muslim League, B. R. Ambedkar representing the Untouchable community, and Master Tara Singh representing the Sikhs, agreed to a partition of the country along religious lines in stark opposition to Gandhi's views. The predominantly Hindu and Sikh areas were assigned to the new India and predominantly Muslim areas to the new nation of Pakistan; the plan included a partition of the Muslim-majority provinces of Punjab and Bengal. The communal violence that accompanied the announcement of the *Radcliffe Line*, the line of partition, was even more horrific.

Describing the violence that accompanied the partition of India, historians Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh write:

There are numerous eyewitness accounts of the maiming and mutilation of victims. The catalogue of horrors includes the disemboweling of pregnant women, the slamming of babies' heads against brick walls, the cutting off of the victim's limbs and genitalia, and the displaying of heads and corpses. While previous communal riots had been deadly, the scale and level of brutality during the Partition massacres were unprecedented.

Although some scholars question the use of the term 'genocide' concerning the partition massacres, much of the violence was manifested with genocidal tendencies. It was designed to cleanse an existing generation and prevent its future reproduction."

Independence: 1947

On 14 August 1947, the new Dominion of Pakistan came into being, with Muhammad Ali Jinnah sworn in as its first Governor-General in Karachi.

The following day, 15 August 1947, India, now Dominion of India, became an independent country, with official ceremonies taking place in New Delhi, Jawaharlal Nehru assuming the office of prime minister, and with Viceroy Mountbatten staying on as the country's first Governor General. Gandhi remained in Bengal to work with the new refugees from the partitioned subcontinent.

Geographic partition, 1947

Mountbatten Plan

The actual division of British India between the two new dominions was accomplished according to what has come to be known as the "3 June Plan" or "Mountbatten Plan". It was announced at a press conference by Mountbatten on 3 June 1947, when the date of independence - 15 August 1947 - was also announced. The plan's main points were:

- Sikhs, Hindus and Muslims in Punjab and Bengal legislative assemblies would meet and vote for partition. If a simple majority of either group wanted partition, then these provinces would be divided.
- Sind and Baluchistan were to make their own decision.
- The fate of North-West Frontier Province and Sylhet district of Assam was to be decided by a referendum.
- India would be independent by 15 August 1947.
- The separate independence of Bengal was ruled out.
- A boundary commission to be set up in case of partition.

The Indian political leaders accepted the Plan on 2 June. It could not deal with the question of the princely states, which were not British possessions, but on 3 June Mountbatten advised them against remaining independent and urged them to join one of the two new Dominions.

The Muslim League's demands for a separate country were thus conceded. The Congress's position on unity was also

taken into account while making Pakistan as small as possible. Mountbatten's formula was to divide India and, at the same time, retain maximum possible unity. Abul Kalam Azad expressed concern over the likelihood of violent riots, to which Mountbatten replied:

At least on this question I shall give you complete assurance. I shall see to it that there is no bloodshed and riot. I am a soldier and not a civilian. Once the partition is accepted in principle, I shall issue orders to see that there are no communal disturbances anywhere in the country. If there should be the slightest agitation, I shall adopt the sternest measures to nip the trouble in the bud.

Jagmohan has stated that this and what followed showed a "glaring failure of the government machinery."

On 3 June 1947, the partition plan was accepted by the Congress Working Committee. *Boloji* states that in Punjab, there were no riots, but there was communal tension, while Gandhi was reportedly isolated by Nehru and Patel and observed *maun vrat* (day of silence). Mountbatten visited Gandhi and said he hoped that he would not oppose the partition, to which Gandhi wrote the reply: "Have I ever opposed you?"

Within British India, the border between India and Pakistan (the Radcliffe Line) was determined by a British Government-commissioned report prepared under the chairmanship of a London barrister, Sir Cyril Radcliffe. Pakistan came into being with two non-contiguous enclaves, East Pakistan (today Bangladesh) and West Pakistan, separated geographically by

India. India was formed out of the majority Hindu regions of British India, and Pakistan from the majority Muslim areas.

On 18 July 1947, the British Parliament passed the Indian Independence Act that finalized the arrangements for partition and abandoned British suzerainty over the princely states, of which there were several hundred, leaving them free to choose whether to accede to one of the new dominions or to remain independent outside both. The Government of India Act 1935 was adapted to provide a legal framework for the new dominions.

Following its creation as a new country in August 1947, Pakistan applied for membership of the United Nations and was accepted by the General Assembly on 30 September 1947. The Dominion of India continued to have the existing seat as India had been a founding member of the United Nations since 1945.

Radcliffe Line

The Punjab—the region of the five rivers east of Indus: Jhelum, Chenab, Ravi, Beas, and Sutlej—consists of inter-fluvial *doabs* ('two rivers'), or tracts of land lying between two confluent rivers (see map on the right):

- the *Sindh-Sagar* doab (between Indus and Jhelum);
- the *Jech* doab (Jhelum/Chenab);
- the *Rechna* doab (Chenab/Ravi);
- the *Bari* doab (Ravi/Beas); and
- the *Bist* doab (Beas/Sutlej).

In early 1947, in the months leading up to the deliberations of the Punjab Boundary Commission, the main disputed areas appeared to be in the Bari and Bist doabs. However, some areas in the Rechna doab were claimed by the Congress and Sikhs. In the Bari doab, the districts of Gurdaspur, Amritsar, Lahore, and Montgomery were all disputed. All districts (other than Amritsar, which was 46.5% Muslim) had Muslim majorities; albeit, in Gurdaspur, the Muslim majority, at 51.1%, was slender. At a smaller area-scale, only three *tehsils* (sub-units of a district) in the Bari doab had non-Muslim majorities: Pathankot, in the extreme north of Gurdaspur, which was not in dispute; and Amritsar and Tarn Taran in Amritsar district. Nonetheless, there were four Muslim-majority *tehsils* east of Beas-Sutlej, two of which were Muslims outnumbered Hindus and Sikhs together.

Before the Boundary Commission began formal hearings, governments were set up for the East and the West Punjab regions. Their territories were provisionally divided by "notional division" based on simple district majorities. In both the Punjab and Bengal, the Boundary Commission consisted of two Muslim and two non-Muslim judges with Sir Cyril Radcliffe as a common chairman. The mission of the Punjab commission was worded generally as: "To demarcate the boundaries of the two parts of Punjab, based on ascertaining the contiguous majority areas of Muslims and non-Muslims. In doing so, it will take into account other factors." Each side (the Muslims and the Congress/Sikhs) presented its claim through counsel with no liberty to bargain. The judges, too, had no mandate to compromise, and on all major issues they "divided two and two, leaving Sir Cyril Radcliffe the invidious task of making the actual decisions."

Independence, population transfer and violence

Massive population exchanges occurred between the two newly formed states in the months immediately following the partition. There was no conception that population transfers would be necessary because of the partitioning. Religious minorities were expected to stay put in the states they found themselves residing in. However, an exception was made for Punjab, where the transfer of populations was organized because of the communal violence affecting the province, this did not apply to other provinces.

"The population of undivided India in 1947 was approx 390 million. After partition, there were 330 million people in India, 30 million in West Pakistan, and 30 million people in East Pakistan (now Bangladesh)." Once the boundaries were established, about 14.5 million people crossed the borders to what they hoped was the relative safety of religious majority. The 1951 Census of Pakistan identified the number of displaced persons in Pakistan at 7,226,600, presumably all Muslims who had entered Pakistan from India; the 1951 Census of India counted 7,295,870 displaced persons, apparently all Hindus and Sikhs who had moved to India from Pakistan immediately after the partition. The overall total is therefore around 14.5 million, although since both censuses were held about 4 years after the partition, these numbers include net population increase following the mass migration.

About 11.2 million (77.4% of the displaced persons) were in the west, the majority from the Punjab of it: 6.5 million Muslims

moved from India to West Pakistan, and 4.7 million Hindus and Sikhs moved from West Pakistan to India; thus the net migration in the west from India to West Pakistan (now Pakistan) was 1.8 million. The other 3.3 million (22.6% of the displaced persons) were in the east: 2.6 million moved from East Pakistan to India, and 0.7 million moved from India to East Pakistan (now Bangladesh); thus, net migration in the east was 1.9 million into India.

Regions affected by Partition

Punjab

- The partition of British India split the former British province of Punjab between the Dominion of India and the Dominion of Pakistan. The mostly Muslim western part of the province became Pakistan's Punjab province; the mostly Hindu and Sikh eastern part became India's East Punjab state (later divided into the new states of Punjab, Haryana and Himachal Pradesh). Many Hindus and Sikhs lived in the west, and many Muslims lived in the east, and the fears of all such minorities were so great that the Partition saw many people displaced and much inter-communal violence. Some have described the violence in Punjab as a retributive genocide. Total migration across Punjab during the partition is estimated at around 12 million people; around 6.5 million Muslims moved from East Punjab to West Punjab, and 4.7 million Hindus and Sikhs moved from West Punjab to East Punjab.

The newly formed governments had not anticipated, and were completely unequipped for, a two-way migration of such staggering magnitude, and massive violence and slaughter occurred on both sides of the new India-Pakistan border. Estimates of the number of deaths vary, with low estimates at 200,000 and high estimates at 2,000,000. The worst case of violence among all regions is concluded to have taken place in Punjab. Virtually no Muslim survived in East Punjab (except in Malerkotla) and virtually no Hindu or Sikh survived in West Punjab.

Lawrence James observed that "Sir Francis Mudie, the governor of West Punjab, estimated that 500,000 Muslims died trying to enter his province, while the British High Commissioner in Karachi put the full total at 800,000. This makes nonsense of the claim by Mountbatten and his partisans that only 200,000 were killed": [James 1998: 636].

During this period, many alleged that Tara Singh was endorsing the killing of Muslims. On 3 March 1947, at Lahore, Singh, along with about 500 Sikhs, declared from a dais "Death to Pakistan." According to political scientist Ishtiaq Ahmed:

On March 3, radical Sikh leader Master Tara Singh famously flashed his kirpan (sword) outside the Punjab Assembly, calling for the destruction of the Pakistan idea prompting violent response by the Muslims mainly against Sikhs but also Hindus, in the Muslim-majority districts of northern Punjab. Yet, at the end of that year, more Muslims had been killed in East Punjab than Hindus and Sikhs together in West Punjab.

Nehru wrote to Gandhi on 22 August that, up to that point, twice as many Muslims had been killed in East Punjab than Hindus and Sikhs in West Punjab.

Bengal

The province of Bengal was divided into the two separate entities of West Bengal, awarded to the Dominion of India, and East Bengal, awarded to the Dominion of Pakistan. East Bengal was renamed East Pakistan in 1955, and later became the independent nation of Bangladesh after the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971.

While the Muslim majority districts of Murshidabad and Malda were given to India, the Hindu majority district of Khulna and the Buddhist majority, but sparsely populated, Chittagong Hill Tracts were given to Pakistan by the Radcliffe award.

Thousands of Hindus, located in the districts of East Bengal, which were awarded to Pakistan, found themselves being attacked, and this religious persecution forced hundreds of thousands of Hindus from East Bengal to seek refuge in India. The massive influx of Hindu refugees into Calcutta affected the demographics of the city. Many Muslims left the city for East Pakistan, and the refugee families occupied some of their homes and properties.

Chittagong Hill Tracts

Buddhist majority Chittagong Hill Tracts was given to Pakistan even though the British Parliament or the Indian Independence Act 1947 did not give mandate to the Boundary Commission to separate the Chittagong Hill Tracts from India. In 1947,

Chittagong Hill Tracts had 98.5% Buddhist and Hindu majority. According to the Indian Independence Act 1947, Indian province of Bengal was divided into West Bengal and East Bengal on religious ground. Chittagong Hill Tracts was an excluded area since 1900 and was not part of Bengal. Chittagong Hill Tracts had no representative at the Bengal Legislative Assembly in Calcutta, since it was not part of Bengal.

On 15 August 1947, Chakma and other indigenous Buddhists celebrated independence day by hoisting the Indian flag in Rangamati, the capital of Chittagong Hill Tracts. When the boundaries of Pakistan and India were announced by radio on 17 August 1947, they were shocked to know that the Chittagong Hill Tracts had been awarded to Pakistan. The indigenous people sent a delegation led by Sneha Kumar Chakma to Delhi to seek help from the Indian leadership. Sneha Kumar Chakma contacted Deputy Prime Minister Vallabhbhai Patel by phone. Vallabhbhai Patel was willing to help, but insisted Sneha Kumar Chakma to seek agreement from Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru. But Nehru refused to help fearing that military conflict for Chittagong Hill Tracts might draw the British back to India.

The Baluch Regiment of the Pakistani Army entered Chittagong Hill Tracts a week after independence and lowered the Indian flag on 21 August at gun point. East Pakistan viewed the indigenous Buddhist people as pro-India and systematically discriminated against them in jobs, education, trades and economic opportunities. The situation of indigenous people became worse after the emergence of Bangladesh in 1971. Bangladesh government sponsored hundreds of thousands of

Muslim settlers to migrate to Chittagong Hill Tracts with the purpose of changing the demographic profile of the region. The Bangladesh government sent tens of thousands of armed forces personnel to protect the Muslim settlers and suppress the indigenous Buddhist resistance. Bangladeshi armed forces and Muslim settlers committed more than 20 massacres in Chittagong Hill Tracts, numerous rapes, extrajudicial killings, tortures, forcible conversions, and land grabs.

Sindh

At the time of partition, the majority of Sindh's prosperous upper and middle class was Hindu. The Hindus were mostly concentrated in cities and formed the majority of the population in cities including Hyderabad, Karachi, Shikarpur, and Sukkur. During the initial months after partition, only some Hindus migrated. However, by late 1947 and early 1948, the situation began to change. Large numbers of Muslim refugees from India started arriving in Sindh and began to live in crowded refugee camps.

On 6 December 1947, communal violence broke out in Ajmer in India, precipitated by an argument between some Sindhi Hindu refugees and local Muslims in the Dargah Bazaar. Violence in Ajmer again broke out in the middle of December with stabbings, looting and arson resulting in mostly Muslim casualties. Many Muslims fled across the Thar Desert to Sindh in Pakistan. This sparked further anti-Hindu riots in Hyderabad, Sindh. On 6 January anti-Hindu riots broke out in Karachi, leading to an estimate of 1100 casualties. The arrival of Sindhi Hindu refugees in North Gujarat's town of Godhra in March 1948 again sparked riots there which led to more

emigration of Muslims from Godhra to Pakistan. These events triggered the large scale of exodus of Hindus. An estimated 1.2 - 1.4 million Hindus migrated to India primarily by ship or train.

Despite the migration, a significant Sindhi Hindu population still resides in Pakistan's Sindh province, where they number at around 2.3 million as per Pakistan's 1998 census. Some districts in Sindh had a Hindu majority like Tharparkar District, Umerkot, Mirpurkhas, Sanghar and Badin, but these have decreased drastically due to persecution. Due to the religious persecution of Hindus in Pakistan, Hindus from Sindh are still migrating to India.

Gujarat

There was no mass violence in Gujarat as there was in Punjab and Bengal. However, Gujarat experienced large refugee migrations. Est. 340,000 Muslims migrated to Pakistan, of which 75% went to Karachi largely due to business interests. The number of incoming refugees was quite large, with over a million people migrating to Gujarat. These Hindu refugees were largely Sindhi and Gujarati.

Delhi

For centuries Delhi had been the capital of the Mughal Empire from Babur to the successors of Aurangzeb and previous Turkic Muslim rulers of North India. The series of Islamic rulers keeping Delhi as a stronghold of their empires left a vast array of Islamic architecture in Delhi, and a strong Islamic culture permeated the city. In 1911, when the British Raj

shifted their colonial capital from Calcutta to Delhi, the nature of the city began changing. The core of the city was called 'Lutyens' Delhi,' named after the British architect Sir Edwin Lutyens, and was designed to service the needs of the small but growing population of the British elite. Nevertheless, the 1941 census listed Delhi's population as being 33.2% Muslim.

As refugees began pouring into Delhi in 1947, the city was ill-equipped to deal with the influx of refugees. Refugees "spread themselves out wherever they could. They thronged into camps ... colleges, temples, *gurdwaras*, *dharmshalas*, military barracks, and gardens." By 1950, the government began allowing squatters to construct houses in certain portions of the city. As a result, neighbourhoods such as Lajpat Nagar and Patel Nagar sprang into existence, which carry a distinct Punjabi character to this day. However, as thousands of Hindu and Sikh refugees from Punjab fled to the city, upheavals ensued as communal pogroms rocked the historical stronghold of Indo-Islamic culture and politics. A Pakistani diplomat in Delhi, Hussain, alleged that the Indian government was intent on eliminating Delhi's Muslim population or was indifferent to their fate. He reported that army troops openly gunned down innocent Muslims. Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru estimated 1,000 casualties in the city. However, other sources claim that the casualty rate was 20 times higher. Gyanendra Pandey's more recent account of the violence in Delhi puts the figure of Muslim casualties in Delhi at between 20,000 and 25,000.

Tens of thousands of Muslims were driven to refugee camps regardless of their political affiliations, and numerous historical sites in Delhi such as the Purana Qila, Idgah, and Nizamuddin were transformed into refugee camps. In fact,

many Hindu and Sikh refugees eventually occupied the abandoned houses of Delhi's Muslim inhabitants. At the culmination of the tensions in Delhi, 330,000 Muslims had migrated to Pakistan. The 1951 Census registered a drop of the Muslim population in the city from 33.2% in 1941 to 5.3% in 1951.

Princely States

In several cases, rulers of Princely States were involved in communal violence or did not do enough to stop in time. Some rulers were away from their states for the summer, such as those of the Sikh states. Some believe that the rulers were whisked away by communal ministers in large part to avoid responsibility for the soon-to-come ethnic cleansing. However, in Bhawalpur and Patiala, upon the return of their ruler to the state, there was a marked decrease in violence, and the rulers consequently stood against the cleansing. The Nawab of Bahawalpur was away in Europe and returned on 1 October, shortening his trip. A bitter Hassan Suhrawardy would write to Mahatma Gandhi:

What is the use now, of the Maharaja of Patiala, when all the Muslims have been eliminated, standing up as the champion of peace and order?

With the exceptions of Jind and Kapurthala, the violence was well organised in the Sikh states, with logistics provided by the durbar. In Patiala and Faridkot, the Maharajas responded to the call of Master Tara Singh to cleanse India of Muslims. The Maharaja of Patiala was offered the headship of a future united Sikh state that would rise from the "ashes of a Punjab civil

war." The Maharaja of Faridkot, Harinder Singh, is reported to have listened to stories of the massacres with great interest going so far as to ask for "juicy details" of the carnage. The Maharaja of Bharatpur State personally witnessed the cleansing of Muslim Meos at Khumbar and Deeg. When reproached by Muslims for his actions, Brijendra Singh retorted by saying: "Why come to me? Go to Jinnah." In Alwar and Bahawalpur communal sentiments extended to higher echelons of government, and the prime ministers of these States were said to have been involved in planning and directly overseeing the cleansing. In Bikaner, by contrast, the organisation occurred at much lower levels.

Alwar and Bharatpur

In Alwar and Bharatpur, princely states of Rajputana (modern-day Rajasthan), there were bloody confrontation between the dominant, Hindu land-holding community and the Muslim cultivating community. Well-organised bands of Hindu Jats, Ahirs and Gurjars, started attacking Muslim Meos in April 1947. By June, more than fifty Muslim villages had been destroyed. The Muslim League was outraged and demanded that the Viceroy provide Muslim troops. Accusations emerged in June of the involvement of Indian State Forces from Alwar and Bharatpur in the destruction of Muslim villages both inside their states and in British India. In the wake of unprecedented violent attacks unleashed against them in 1947, 100,000 Muslim Meos from Alwar and Bharatpur were forced to flee their homes, and an estimated 30,000 are said to have been massacred. On 17 November, a column of 80,000 Meo refugees went to Pakistan. However, 10,000 stopped travelling due to the risks.

Jammu and Kashmir

In September–November 1947 in the Jammu region of the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, a large number of Muslims were killed, and others driven away to West Punjab. The impetus for this violence was partly due to the "harrowing stories of Muslim atrocities", brought by Hindu and Sikh refugees arriving to Jammu from West Punjab since March 1947. The killings were carried out by extremist Hindus and Sikhs, aided and abetted by the forces of the Jammu and Kashmir State, headed by the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir Hari Singh. Observers state that Hari Singh aimed to alter the demographics of the region by eliminating the Muslim population and ensure a Hindu majority. This was followed by a massacre of Hindus and Sikhs starting in November 1947, in Rajouri and Mirpur by Pashtun tribal militias and Pakistani soldiers. Women were raped and sexually assaulted. Many of those killed, raped and injured had come to these areas to escape massacres in West Punjab, which had become part of Pakistan.

Resettlement of refugees:

1947–1951

Resettlement in India

According to the 1951 Census of India, 2% of India's population were refugees (1.3% from West Pakistan and 0.7% from East Pakistan).

Majority of Sikhs and Hindu Punjabis refugees from West Punjab, were settled in Delhi and East Punjab (incl. Haryana and Himachal Pradesh). Delhi received the largest number of refugees for a single city, with population of Delhi growing rapidly in 1947 from under 1 million (917,939) to a little less than 2 million (1,744,072) during the period 1941–1951. The refugees were housed in various historical and military locations such as the Purana Qila, Red Fort, and military barracks in Kingsway Camp (around the present Delhi University). The latter became the site of one of the largest refugee camps in northern India, with more than 35,000 refugees at any given time besides Kurukshetra camp near Panipat. The campsites were later converted into permanent housing through extensive building projects undertaken by the Government of India from 1948 onwards. Many housing colonies in Delhi came up around this period, like Lajpat Nagar, Rajinder Nagar, Nizamuddin East, Punjabi Bagh, Rehgar Pura, Jangpura, and Kingsway Camp. Several schemes such as the provision of education, employment opportunities, and easy loans to start businesses were provided for the refugees at the all-India level. Many Punjabi Hindu refugees were also settled in Cities of Western and Central Uttar Pradesh. A Colony consisting largely of Sikhs and Punjabi Hindus was also founded in Central Mumbai's Sion Koliwada region, and named Guru Tegh Bahadur Nagar.

Hindus fleeing from East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) were settled across Eastern, Central and Northeastern India, many ending up in neighbouring Indian states such as West Bengal, Assam, and Tripura. Substantial number of refugees were also settled in Madhya Pradesh (incl. Chhattisgarh) Bihar (incl.

Jharkhand), Odisha and Andaman islands (where Bengalis today form the largest linguistic group)

Sindhi Hindus settled predominantly in Gujarat, Maharashtra, and Rajasthan. Substantial, however, were also settled in Madhya Pradesh, A few also settled in Delhi. A new township was established for Sindhi Hindu refugees in Maharashtra. The Governor-General of India, Sir Rajagopalachari, laid the foundation for this township and named it Ulhasnagar ('city of joy').

Substantial communities of Hindu Gujarati and Marathi Refugees who had lived in cities of Sindh and Southern Punjab were also resettled in Cities of Modern-day Gujarat and Maharashtra.

Resettlement in Pakistan

The 1951 Census of Pakistan recorded that the most significant number of Muslim refugees came from the East Punjab and nearby Rajputana states (Alwar and Bharatpur). They were several 5,783,100 and constituted 80.1% of Pakistan's total refugee population. This was the effect of the retributive ethnic cleansing on both sides of the Punjab where the Muslim population of East Punjab was forcibly expelled like the Hindu/Sikh population in West Punjab.

Migration from other regions of India were as follows: Bihar, West Bengal and Orissa, 700,300 or 9.8%; UP and Delhi 464,200 or 6.4%; Gujarat and Bombay, 160,400 or 2.2%; Bhopal and Hyderabad 95,200 or 1.2%; and Madras and Mysore 18,000 or 0.2%.

So far as their settlement in Pakistan is concerned, 97.4% of the refugees from East Punjab and its contiguous areas went to West Punjab; 95.9% from Bihar, West Bengal and Orissa to the erstwhile East Pakistan; 95.5% from UP and Delhi to West Pakistan, mainly in Karachi Division of Sindh; 97.2% from Bhopal and Hyderabad to West Pakistan, mainly Karachi; and 98.9% from Bombay and Gujarat to West Pakistan, largely to Karachi; and 98.9% from Madras and Mysore went to West Pakistan, mainly Karachi. West Punjab received the largest number of refugees (73.1%), mainly from East Punjab and its contiguous areas. Sindh received the second largest number of refugees, 16.1% of the total migrants, while the Karachi division of Sindh received 8.5% of the total migrant population. East Bengal received the third-largest number of refugees, 699,100, who constituted 9.7% of the total Muslim refugee population in Pakistan. 66.7% of the refugees in East Bengal originated from West Bengal, 14.5% from Bihar and 11.8% from Assam.

NWFP and Baluchistan received the lowest number of migrants. NWFP received 51,100 migrants (0.7% of the migrant population) while Baluchistan received 28,000 (0.4% of the migrant population).

The Government undertook a census of refugees in West Punjab in 1948, which displayed their place of origin in India.

Missing people

A study of the total population inflows and outflows in the districts of Punjab, using the data provided by the 1931 and 1951 Census has led to an estimate of 1.3 million missing

Muslims who left western India but did not reach Pakistan. The corresponding number of missing Hindus/Sikhs along the western border is estimated to be approximately 0.8 million. This puts the total of missing people, due to partition-related migration along the Punjab border, to around 2.2 million. Another study of the demographic consequences of partition in the Punjab region using the 1931, 1941 and 1951 censuses concluded that between 2.3 and 3.2 million people went missing in the Punjab.

Rehabilitation of women

Both sides promised each other that they would try to restore women abducted and raped during the riots. The Indian government claimed that 33,000 Hindu and Sikh women were abducted, and the Pakistani government claimed that 50,000 Muslim women were abducted during riots. By 1949, there were legal claims that 12,000 women had been recovered in India and 6,000 in Pakistan. By 1954, there were 20,728 Muslim women recovered from India, and 9,032 Hindu and Sikh women recovered from Pakistan. Most of the Hindu and Sikh women refused to go back to India, fearing that their family would never accept them, a fear mirrored by Muslim women.

Post-partition migration

Pakistan

Even after the 1951 Census, many Muslim families from India continued migrating to Pakistan throughout the 1950s and the

early 1960s. According to historian Omar Khalidi, the Indian Muslim migration to West Pakistan between December 1947 and December 1971 was from Uttar Pradesh, Delhi, Gujarat, Rajasthan, Maharashtra, Madhya Pradesh, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh, Tamil Nadu, and Kerala. The next stage of migration was between 1973 and the 1990s, and the primary destination for these migrants was Karachi and other urban centres in Sindh.

In 1959, the International Labour Organization (ILO) published a report stating that from 1951 to 1956, a total of 650,000 Muslims from India relocated to West Pakistan. However, Visaria (1969) raised doubts about the authenticity of the claims about Indian Muslim migration to Pakistan, since the 1961 Census of Pakistan did not corroborate these figures. However, the 1961 Census of Pakistan did incorporate a statement suggesting that there had been a migration of 800,000 people from India to Pakistan throughout the previous decade. Of those who left for Pakistan, most never came back.

Indian Muslim migration to Pakistan declined drastically in the 1970s, a trend noticed by the Pakistani authorities. In June 1995, Pakistan's interior minister, Naseerullah Babar, informed the National Assembly that between the period of 1973–1994, as many as 800,000 visitors came from India on valid travel documents. Of these only 3,393 stayed. In a related trend, intermarriages between Indian and Pakistani Muslims have declined sharply. According to a November 1995 statement of Riaz Khokhar, the Pakistani High Commissioner in New Delhi, the number of cross-border marriages has dropped from 40,000 a year in the 1950s and 1960s to barely 300 annually.

In the aftermath of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, 3,500 Muslim families migrated from the Indian part of the Thar Desert to the Pakistani section of the Thar Desert. 400 families were settled in Nagar after the 1965 war and an additional 3000 settled in the Chachro taluka in Sindh province of West Pakistan. The government of Pakistan provided each family with 12 acres of land. According to government records, this land totalled 42,000 acres.

The 1951 census in Pakistan recorded 671,000 refugees in East Pakistan, the majority of which came from West Bengal. The rest were from Bihar. According to the ILO in the period 1951–1956, half a million Indian Muslims migrated to East Pakistan. By 1961 the numbers reached 850,000. In the aftermath of the riots in Ranchi and Jamshedpur, Biharis continued to migrate to East Pakistan well into the late sixties and added up to around a million. Crude estimates suggest that about 1.5 million Muslims migrated from West Bengal and Bihar to East Bengal in the two decades after partition.

India

Due to religious persecution in Pakistan, Hindus continue to flee to India. Most of them tend to settle in the state of Rajasthan in India. According to data of the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, just around 1,000 Hindu families fled to India in 2013. In May 2014, a member of the ruling Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N), Dr. Ramesh Kumar Vankwani, revealed in the National Assembly of Pakistan that around 5,000 Hindus are migrating from Pakistan to India every year. Since India is not a signatory to the 1951 United Nations Refugee Convention, it refuses to recognise Pakistani Hindu

migrants as refugees. The population in the Tharparkar district in the Sindh province of West Pakistan was 80% Hindu and 20% Muslim at the time of independence in 1947. During the Indo-Pakistani Wars of 1965 and 1971, estimated 1,500 Hindu families fled to India, this led to a massive demographic shift in the district. During these same wars, 23,300 Hindu families also migrated to Jammu Division from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir and West Punjab

The migration of Hindus from East Pakistan to India continued unabated after partition. The 1951 census in India recorded that 2.5 million refugees arrived from East Pakistan, of which 2.1 million migrated to West Bengal while the rest migrated to Assam, Tripura, and other states. These refugees arrived in waves and did not come solely at partition. By 1973, their number reached over 6 million. The following data displays the major waves of refugees from East Pakistan and the incidents which precipitated the migrations:

Documentation efforts and oral history

In 2010 a Berkeley, California and Delhi, India-based non-profit organization, The 1947 Partition Archive, began documenting oral histories from those who lived through the partition and consolidated the interviews into an archive. As of June 2021, nearly 9,700 interviews are preserved from 18 countries and are being released in collaboration with five university libraries in India and Pakistan, including Ashoka University, Habib University, Lahore University of Management

Sciences, Guru Nanak Dev University and Delhi University in collaboration with Tata Trusts.

In August 2017, The Arts and Cultural Heritage Trust (TAACHT) of United Kingdom set up what they describe as "the world's first Partition Museum" at Town Hall in Amritsar, Punjab. The Museum, which is open from Tuesday to Sunday, offers multimedia exhibits and documents that describe both the political process that led to partition and carried it forward, and video and written narratives offered by survivors of the events.

A 2019 book by Kavita Puri, *Partition Voices: Untold British Stories*, based on the BBC Radio 4 documentary series of the same name, includes interviews with about two dozen people who witnessed partition and subsequently migrated to Britain.

Perspectives

The partition was a highly controversial arrangement, and remains a cause of much tension on the Indian subcontinent today. According to American scholar Allen McGrath, many British leaders including the British Viceroy, Mountbatten, were unhappy over the partition of India. Lord Mountbatten of Burma had not only been accused of rushing the process through but also is alleged to have influenced the Radcliffe Line in India's favor. The commission took longer to decide on a final boundary than on the partition itself. Thus the two nations were granted their independence even before there was a defined boundary between them.

Some critics allege that British haste led to increased cruelties during the partition. Because independence was declared *prior* to the actual partition, it was up to the new governments of India and Pakistan to keep public order. No large population movements were contemplated; the plan called for safeguards for minorities on both sides of the new border. It was a task at which both states failed. There was a complete breakdown of law and order; many died in riots, massacre, or just from the hardships of their flight to safety. What ensued was one of the largest population movements in recorded history. According to Richard Symonds, at the lowest estimate, half a million people perished and twelve million became homeless.

However, many argue that the British were forced to expedite the partition by events on the ground. Once in office, Mountbatten quickly became aware that if Britain were to avoid involvement in a civil war, which seemed increasingly likely, there was no alternative to partition and a hasty exit from India. Law and order had broken down many times before partition, with much bloodshed on both sides. A massive civil war was looming by the time Mountbatten became Viceroy. After the Second World War, Britain had limited resources, perhaps insufficient to the task of keeping order. Another viewpoint is that while Mountbatten may have been too hasty, he had no real options left and achieved the best he could under difficult circumstances. The historian Lawrence James concurs that in 1947 Mountbatten was left with no option but to cut and run. The alternative seemed to be involved in a potentially bloody civil war from which it would be difficult to get out.

Conservative elements in England consider the partition of India to be the moment that the British Empire ceased to be a world power, following Curzon's dictum: "the loss of India would mean that Britain drop straight away to a third rate power."

Venkat Dhulipala rejects the idea that the British divide and rule policy was responsible for partition and elaborates on the perspective that Pakistan was popularly imagined as a sovereign Islamic state or a 'New Medina', as a potential successor to the defunct Turkish caliphate and as a leader and protector of the entire Islamic world. Islamic scholars debated over creating Pakistan and its potential to become a true Islamic state. The majority of Barelvis supported the creation of Pakistan and believed that any co-operation with Hindus would be counter productive. Most Deobandis, who were led by Maulana Husain Ahmad Madani, were opposed to the creation of Pakistan and the two-nation theory. According to them Muslims and Hindus could be a part of a single nation.

In their authoritative study of the partition, Ian Talbot and Gurharpal Singh have shown that the partition was not the inevitable end of the so-called British 'divide and rule policy' nor was it the inevitable end of Hindu-Muslim differences.

A cross-border student initiative, *The History Project*, was launched in 2014 to explore the differences in perception of the events during the British era, which led to the partition. The project resulted in a book that explains both interpretations of the shared a history in Pakistan and India.

Artistic depictions of the partition

The partition of India and the associated bloody riots inspired many in India and Pakistan to create literary/cinematic depictions of this event. While some creations depicted the massacres during the refugee migration, others concentrated on the aftermath of the partition in terms of difficulties faced by the refugees in both side of the border. Even now, more than 70 years after the partition, works of fiction and films are made that relate to the events of partition.

The early members of the Bombay Progressive Artist's Group cite "The partition" of India and Pakistan as a key reason for its founding in December 1947. Those members included F. N. Souza, M. F. Husain, S. H. Raza, S. K. Bakre, H. A. Gade, and K. H. Ara, who went on to become some of the most important and influential Indian artists of the 20th Century.

Literature

Literature describing the human cost of independence and partition includes, among others:

- "Subh-e-Azadi" ('Freedom's Dawn'; 1947), Urdu poem by Faiz Ahmad Faiz
- "Toba Tek Singh" (1955), short story by Saadat Hassan Manto
- *Train to Pakistan* (1956) by Khushwant Singh
- *A Bend in the Ganges* (1965) by Manohar Malgonkar
- *Tamas* (1974) by Bhisham Sahni

- *AZADI* (1975) by Chaman Nahal, originally written in English and winner of the 1977 Sahitya Akedemi Award in India
- *Ice-Candy Man* (1988) by Bapsi Sidhwa
- *Forgotten Atrocities* (2012), memoir by Bal K. Gupta

Salman Rushdie's novel *Midnight's Children* (1980), which won the Booker Prize and The Best of the Booker, wove its narrative based on the children born with magical abilities on midnight of 14 August 1947. *Freedom at Midnight* (1975) is a non-fiction work by Larry Collins and Dominique Lapierre that chronicled the events surrounding the first Independence Day celebrations in 1947.

The novel *Lost Generations* (2013) by Manjit Sachdeva describes the March 1947 massacre in rural areas of Rawalpindi by the Muslim League, followed by massacres on both sides of the new border in August 1947 seen through the eyes of an escaping Sikh family, their settlement and partial rehabilitation in Delhi, and ending in ruin (including death), for the second time in 1984, at the hands of mobs after a Sikh assassinated the prime minister.

Chapter 45

Nathuram Godse

Nathuram Vinayak Godse (19 May 1910 – 15 November 1949) was the assassin of Mahatma Gandhi, who shot Gandhi in the chest three times at point blank range in New Delhi on 30 January 1948. Godse, who believed Gandhi to have favoured the political demands of India's Muslims who were partitioning India, plotted the assassination with Narayan Apte and six others. After a trial that lasted over a year, Godse was sentenced to death on 8 November 1949. Although pleas for commutation were made by Gandhi's two sons, Manilal Gandhi and Ramdas Gandhi, they were turned down by India's prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, deputy prime minister Vallabhbhai Patel, and the Governor-General C. Rajagopalachari. Godse was hanged in the Ambala Central Jail on 15 November 1949.

Early life

Nathuram Vinayakrao Godse was born into a Maharashtrian Chitpavan Brahmin family. His father, Vinayak Vamanrao Godse, was a postal employee; his mother was Lakshmi (née Godavari). At birth, he was named Ramachandra. Nathuram was given his name because of an unfortunate incident. Before he was born, his parents had three sons and a daughter, with all three boys dying in their infancy. Fearing a curse that targeted male children, young Ramachandra was brought up as a girl for the first few years of his life, including having his nose pierced and being made to wear a nose-ring (*nath* in Marathi). It was then that he earned the nickname "Nathuram"

(literally "Ram with a nose-ring"). After his younger brother was born, they switched to treating him as a boy.

Godse attended the local school at Baramati through the fifth standard, after which he was sent to live with an aunt in Pune so that he could study at an English-language school.

Political career and beliefs

Godse dropped out of high school and became an activist with Hindu nationalist organisations Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS; National Volunteer Organisation) and Hindu Mahasabha, although the exact dates of his membership are uncertain.

RSS membership

Godse joined RSS in Sangli (Maharashtra) in 1932 as a *boudhik karyawah* (ground worker), and simultaneously remained a member of the Hindu Mahasabha, both right-wing organisations. He often wrote articles in newspapers to publicise his thoughts. During this time, Godse and M. S. Golwalkar, later RSS chief, often worked together, and they translated Babarao Savarkar's book "Rashtra Mimansa" into English. They had a falling out when Golwalkar took the entire credit for this translation. In the early 1940s, Godse formed his own organisation, "Hindu Rashtra Dal" on the Vijayadashami day of 1942, though he continued to remain a member of the RSS and Hindu Mahasabha.

In 1946, Godse claimed to have left the RSS and moved to the Hindu Mahasabha over the issue of the partition of India.

However, historical sources do not corroborate this claim; an investigation published by *The Caravan* in January 2020 revealed that up until his final days, Godse was listed as a member in records kept by the RSS of meetings that took place long after he was supposed to have left the organisation. His family has also said that he had never left the RSS, highlighting that he held membership at the RSS as well as the Hindu Mahasabha. Godse's 1946 claim is also refuted by his first deposition in Marathi after he assassinated Gandhi, where he says that while he did join the Hindu Mahasabha, "I remained active in Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh."

Assassination of Mahatma Gandhi

At 17:17 on 30 January 1948, as Gandhi made his way to a prayer meeting on a raised lawn behind Birla House, a mansion in New Delhi, where he was staying, Godse stepped out of the crowd flanking his path to the dais. He fired three bullets into Gandhi's chest. Gandhi fell immediately, sending the attendant crowd into a state of shock. Herbert Reiner Jr., a 32-year-old vice-consul at the new American embassy in Delhi, was the first to rush forward and grasp Godse by the shoulders, spinning him into the arms of some military personnel, who disarmed him. Reiner then held Godse by the neck and shoulders until he was taken away by the military and police. Reiner reported later that in the moments before he apprehended him, Godse looked a little stunned at how easily he had carried out his plan. Gandhi was taken back to his room in Birla House, where he died soon thereafter.

Trial and execution

Godse was put on trial at the Punjab High Court, at Peterhoff, Shimla. On 8 November 1949, he was sentenced to death. Although pleas for commutation were made by Gandhi's two sons, Manilal Gandhi and Ramdas Gandhi, they were turned down by India's prime minister Jawaharlal Nehru, deputy prime minister Vallabhbhai Patel and the Governor-General Chakravarti Rajagopalachari, and Godse was hanged at Ambala Central Jail on 15 November 1949.

Aftermath

Millions of Indians mourned Gandhi's assassination; the Hindu Mahasabha was vilified and the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh was temporarily banned.

The RSS has consistently denied any connection with Godse. It has maintained that Godse "left RSS in the mid-1930s". However, Nathuram Godse's brother Gopal Godse stated that all the Godse brothers were members of the RSS at the time of the assassination and blamed the RSS for disowning them. The other members of the Godse's family too have denied that he ever left the RSS. "He remained a *boudhik karyawah* till his death."

Attempts at image rehabilitation

In 2014, following the Bharatiya Janata Party's rise to power, the Hindu Mahasabha began attempts to rehabilitate Godse

and portray him as a patriot. It requested Prime Minister Narendra Modi to install the bust of Godse. It created a documentary film *Desh Bhakt Nathuram Godse* (Patriot Nathuram Godse) for release on the death anniversary of Gandhi on 30 January 2015. There were attempts to build a temple for Godse and to celebrate 30 January as a *Shaurya Diwas* ("Bravery Day"). A civil suit was filed in Pune Court asking for a ban on the documentary film.

In May 2019, in the lead up to the final phase of Indian elections, BJP's candidate from Bhopal, Pragya Thakur, called Godse a "patriot". Facing intense backlash, she apologised later.

As Hindu nationalism becomes more widespread in India, statues and temples are being raised in Godse's honour. The city of Meerut was proposed to be renamed after him but the possibility of such a name change was ruled out by the District Magistrate.

Chapter 46

Indo-Pakistani War of 1947–1948

The **Indo-Pakistani War of 1947–1948** or the **First Kashmir War** was an armed conflict that was fought between India and Pakistan over the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir from 1947 to 1948. It was the first of four Indo-Pakistani wars that was fought between the two newly-independent nations. Pakistan precipitated the war a few weeks after its independence by launching tribal *lashkar* (militias) from Waziristan, in an effort to capture Kashmir and to preempt the possibility of its ruler joining India. The inconclusive result of the war still affects the geopolitics of both countries.

Hari Singh, the Maharaja of Jammu and Kashmir, was facing an uprising by his Muslim subjects in Poonch, and lost control of the western districts of his kingdom. On 22 October 1947, Pakistan's Pashtun tribal militias crossed the border of the state. These local tribal militias and irregular Pakistani forces moved to take the capital city of Srinagar, but upon reaching Baramulla, they took to plunder and stalled. Maharaja Hari Singh made a plea to India for assistance, and help was offered, but it was subject to his signing of an Instrument of Accession to India.

The war was initially fought by the Jammu and Kashmir State Forces and by militias from the Frontier Tribal Areas adjoining the North-West Frontier Province. Following the accession of the state to India on 26 October 1947, Indian troops were airlifted to Srinagar, the state capital. British commanding officers initially refused the entry of Pakistani troops into the

conflict, citing the accession of the state to India. However, later in 1948, they relented and Pakistan's armies entered the war shortly afterwards. The fronts solidified gradually along what later came to be known as the Line of Control. A formal ceasefire was declared effective 1 January 1949. The result of the war was inconclusive. However, most neutral assessments agree that India was the victor of the war as it was able to successfully defend about two-thirds of the erstwhile princely state, including the Kashmir Valley, Jammu and Ladakh.

Background

Prior to 1815, the area now known as "Jammu and Kashmir" comprised 22 small independent states (16 Hindu and six Muslim) carved out of territories controlled by the Amir (King) of Afghanistan, combined with those of local small rulers. These were collectively referred to as the "Punjab Hill States". These small states, ruled by Rajput kings, were variously independent, vassals of the Mughal Empire since the time of Emperor Akbar or sometimes controlled from Kangra state in the Himachal area. Following the decline of the Mughals, turbulence in Kangra and invasions of Gorkhas, the hill states fell successively under the control of the Sikhs under Ranjit Singh.

The First Anglo-Sikh War (1845–46) was fought between the Sikh Empire, which asserted sovereignty over Kashmir, and the East India Company. In the Treaty of Lahore of 1846, the Sikhs were made to surrender the valuable region (the Jullundur Doab) between the Beas River and the Sutlej River and required to pay an indemnity of 1.2 million rupees. Because they could not readily raise this sum, the East India Company

allowed the Dogra ruler Gulab Singh to acquire Kashmir from the Sikh kingdom in exchange for making a payment of 750,000 rupees to the Company. Gulab Singh became the first Maharaja of the newly formed princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, founding a dynasty, that was to rule the state, the second-largest principality during the British Raj, until India gained its independence in 1947.

Partition of India

- The years 1946–1947 saw the rise of All-India Muslim League and Muslim nationalism, demanding a separate state for India's Muslims. The demand took a violent turn on the Direct Action Day (16 August 1946) and inter-communal violence between Hindus and Muslims became endemic. Consequently, a decision was taken on 3 June 1947 to divide British India into two separate states, the Dominion of Pakistan comprising the Muslim majority areas and the Dominion of India comprising the rest. The two provinces Punjab and Bengal with large Muslim-majority areas were to be divided between the two dominions. An estimated 11 million people eventually migrated between the two parts of Punjab, and possibly 1 million perished in the inter-communal violence. Jammu and Kashmir, being adjacent to the Punjab province, was directly affected by the happenings in Punjab.

The original target date for the transfer of power to the new dominions was June 1948. However, fearing the rise of inter-communal violence, the British Viceroy Lord Mountbatten

advanced the date to 15 August 1947. This gave only 6 weeks to complete all the arrangements for partition. Mountbatten's original plan was to stay on the joint Governor General for both the dominions till June 1948. However, this was not accepted by the Pakistani leader Mohammad Ali Jinnah. In the event, Mountbatten stayed on as the Governor General of India, whereas Pakistan chose Jinnah as its Governor General. It was envisaged that the nationalisation of the armed forces could not be completed by 15 August. Hence British officers stayed on after the transfer of power. The service chiefs were appointed by the Dominion governments and were responsible to them. The overall administrative control, but not operational control, was vested with Field Marshal Claude Auchinleck, who was titled the 'Supreme Commander', answerable to a newly formed Joint Defence Council of the two dominions. India appointed General Rob Lockhart as its Army chief and Pakistan appointed General Frank Messervy.

The presence of the British commanding officers on both sides made the Indo-Pakistani War of 1947 a strange war. The two commanding officers were in daily telephone contact and adopted mutually defensive positions. The attitude was that "you can hit them so hard but not too hard, otherwise there will be all kinds of repercussions." Both Lockhart and Messervy were replaced in the course of war, and their successors Roy Bucher and Douglas Gracey tried to exercise restraint on their respective governments. Roy Bucher was apparently successful in doing so in India, but Gracey yielded and let British officers be used in operational roles on the side of Pakistan. One British officer even died in action.

Developments in Jammu and Kashmir (August–October 1947)

With the independence of the Dominions, the British Paramountcy over the princely states came to an end. The rulers of the states were advised to join one of the two dominions by executing an Instrument of Accession. Maharaja Hari Singh of Jammu and Kashmir, along with his prime minister Ram Chandra Kak, decided not to accede to either dominion. The reasons cited were that the Muslim majority population of the State would not be comfortable with joining India, and that the Hindu and Sikh minorities would become vulnerable if the state joined Pakistan.

In 1947, the princely state of Jammu and Kashmir had a wide range of ethnic and religious communities. The Kashmir province consisting of the Kashmir Valley and the Muzaffarabad district had a majority Muslim population (over 90%). The Jammu province, consisting of five districts, had a roughly equal division of Hindus and Muslims in the eastern districts (Udhampur, Jammu and Reasi) and Muslim majority in the western districts (Mirpur and Poonch). The mountainous Ladakh district (*wazarat*) in the east had a significant Buddhist presence with a Muslim majority in Baltistan. The Gilgit Agency in the north was overwhelmingly Muslim and was directly governed by the British under an agreement with the Maharaja. Shortly before the transfer of power, the British returned the Gilgit Agency to the Maharaja, who appointed a Dogra governor for the district and a British commander for the local forces.

The predominant political movement in the Kashmir Valley, the National Conference led by Sheikh Abdullah, believed in secular politics. It was allied with the Indian National Congress and was believed to favour joining India. On the other hand, the Muslims of the Jammu province supported the Muslim Conference, which was allied to the All-India Muslim League and favoured joining Pakistan. The Hindus of the Jammu province favoured an outright merger with India. In the midst of all the diverging views, the Maharaja's decision to remain independent was apparently a judicious one.

Operation Gulmarg plan

According to Indian military sources, the Pakistani Army prepared a plan called **Operation Gulmarg** and put it into action as early as 20 August, a few days after Pakistan's independence. The plan was accidentally revealed to an Indian officer, Major O. S. Kalkat serving with the Bannu Brigade. According to the plan, 20 *lashkars* (tribal militias), each consisting of 1000 Pashtun tribesmen, were to be recruited from among various Pashtun tribes, and armed at the brigade headquarters at Bannu, Wanna, Peshawar, Kohat, Thall and Nowshera by the first week of September. They were expected to reach the launching point of Abbottabad on 18 October, and cross into Jammu and Kashmir on 22 October. Ten *lashkars* were expected to attack the Kashmir Valley through Muzaffarabad and another ten *lashkars* were expected to join the rebels in Poonch, Bhimber and Rawalakot with a view to advance to Jammu. Detailed arrangements for the military leadership and armaments were described in the plan.

The regimental records show that, by the last week of August, the Prince Albert Victor's Own Cavalry (PAVO Cavalry) regiment was briefed about the invasion plan. Colonel Sher Khan, the Director of Military Intelligence, was in charge of the briefing, along with Colonels Akbar Khan and Khanzadah. The Cavalry regiment was tasked with procuring arms and ammunition for the 'freedom fighters' and establishing three wings of the insurgent forces: the South Wing commanded by General Kiani, a Central Wing based at Rawalpindi and a North Wing based at Abbottabad. By 1 October, the Cavalry regiment completed the task of arming the insurgent forces. "Throughout the war there was no shortage of small arms, ammunitions, or explosives at any time." The regiment was also told to be on stand by for induction into fighting at an appropriate time.

Scholars have noted considerable movement of Pashtun tribes during September–October. By 13 September, armed Pashtuns drifted into Lahore and Rawalpindi. The Deputy Commissioner of Dera Ismail Khan noted a scheme to send tribesmen from Malakand to Sialkot, in lorries provided by the Pakistan Government. Preparations for attacking Kashmir were also noted in the princely states of Swat, Dir, and Chitral. Scholar Robin James Moore states there is "little doubt" that Pashtuns were involved in border raids all along the Punjab border from the Indus to the Ravi.

Pakistani sources deny the existence of any plan called Operation Gulmarg. However, Shuja Nawaz does list 22 Pashtun tribes involved in the invasion of Kashmir on 22 October.

Rebellion in Poonch

Sometime in August 1947, the first signs of trouble broke out in Poonch, about which diverging views have been received. Poonch was originally an internal *jagir* (autonomous principality), governed by an alternative family line of Maharaja Hari Singh. The taxation is said to have been heavy. The Muslims of Poonch had long campaigned for the principality to be absorbed into the Punjab province of British India. In 1938, a notable disturbance occurred for religious reasons, but a settlement was reached. During the Second World War, over 60,000 men from Poonch and Mirpur districts enrolled in the British Indian Army. After the war, they were discharged with arms, which is said to have alarmed the Maharaja. In June, Poonchis launched a 'No Tax' campaign. In July, the Maharaja ordered that all the soldiers in the region be disarmed. The absence of employment prospects coupled with high taxation drove the Poonchis to rebellion. The "gathering head of steam", states scholar Srinath Raghavan, was utilised by the local Muslim Conference led by Sardar Muhammad Ibrahim Khan (Sardar Ibrahim) to further their campaign for accession to Pakistan.

According to state government sources, the rebellious militias gathered in the Naoshera-Islamabad area, attacking the state troops and their supply trucks. A battalion of state troops was dispatched, which cleared the roads and dispersed the militias. By September, order was reestablished. The Muslim Conference sources, on the other hand, narrate that hundreds of people were killed in Bagh during flag hoisting around 15 August and that the Maharaja unleashed a 'reign of terror' on 24 August. Local Muslims also told Richard Symonds, a British Quaker

social worker, that the army fired on crowds, and burnt houses and villages indiscriminately. According to the Assistant British High Commissioner in Pakistan, H. S. Stephenson, "the Poonch affair... was greatly exaggerated".

Pakistan's preparations, Maharaja's manoeuvring

Scholar Prem Shankar Jha states that the Maharaja had decided, as early as April 1947, that he would accede to India if it was not possible to stay independent. The rebellion in Poonch possibly unnerved the Maharaja. Accordingly, on 11 August, he dismissed his pro-Pakistan Prime Minister, Ram Chandra Kak, and appointed retired Major Janak Singh in his place. On 25 August, he sent an invitation to Justice Mehr Chand Mahajan of the Punjab High Court to come as the Prime Minister. On the same day, the Muslim Conference wrote to the Pakistani Prime Minister Liaquat Ali Khan warning him that "if, God forbid, the Pakistan Government or the Muslim League do not act, Kashmir might be lost to them". This set the ball rolling in Pakistan.

Liaquat Ali Khan sent a Punjab politician Mian Iftikharuddin to explore the possibility of organising a revolt in Kashmir. Meanwhile, Pakistan cut off essential supplies to the state, such as petrol, sugar and salt. It also stopped trade in timber and other products, and suspended train services to Jammu. Iftikharuddin returned in mid-September to report that the National Conference held strong in the Kashmir Valley and ruled out the possibility of a revolt.

Meanwhile, Sardar Ibrahim had escaped to West Punjab, along with dozens of rebels, and established a base in Murree. From

there, the rebels attempted to acquire arms and ammunition for the rebellion and smuggle them into Kashmir. Colonel Akbar Khan, one of a handful of high-ranking officers in the Pakistani Army, with a keen interest in Kashmir, arrived in Murree, and got enmeshed in these efforts. He arranged 4,000 rifles for the rebellion by diverting them from the Army stores. He also wrote out a draft plan titled *Armed Revolt inside Kashmir* and gave it to Mian Iftikharuddin to be passed on to the Pakistan's Prime Minister.

On 12 September, the Prime Minister held a meeting with Mian Iftikharuddin, Colonel Akbar Khan and another Punjab politician Sardar Shaukat Hayat Khan. Hayat Khan had a separate plan, involving the Muslim League National Guard and the militant Pashtun tribes from the Frontier regions. The Prime Minister approved both the plans, and despatched Khurshid Anwar, the head of the Muslim League National Guard, to mobilise the Frontier tribes.

The Maharaja was increasingly driven to the wall with the rebellion in the western districts and the Pakistani blockade. He managed to persuade Justice Mahajan to accept the post of Prime Minister (but not to arrive for another month, for procedural reasons). He sent word to the Indian leaders through Mahajan that he was willing to accede to India but needed more time to implement political reforms. However, it was India's position that it would not accept accession from the Maharaja unless it had the people's support. The Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru demanded that Sheikh Abdullah should be released from prison and involved in the state's government. Accession could only be contemplated

afterwards. Following further negotiations, Sheikh Abdullah was released on 29 September.

Nehru, foreseeing a number of disputes over princely states, formulated a policy that states

"wherever there is a dispute in regard to any territory, the matter should be decided by a referendum or plebiscite of the people concerned. We shall accept the result of this referendum whatever it may be."

The policy was communicated to Liaquat Ali Khan on 1 October at a meeting of the Joint Defence Council. Khan's eyes are said to have "sparkled" at the proposal. However, he made no response.

Operations in Poonch and Mirpur

Armed rebellion started in the Poonch district at the beginning of October 1947. The fighting elements consisted of "bands of deserters from the State Army, serving soldiers of the Pakistan Army on leave, ex-servicemen, and other volunteers who had risen spontaneously." The first clash is said to have occurred at Thorar (near Rawalakot) on 3–4 October 1947. The rebels quickly gained control of almost the entire Poonch district. The State Forces garrison at the Poonch city came under heavy siege.

In the Mirpur district, the border posts at Saligram and Owen Pattan on the Jhelum river were captured by rebels around 8 October. Sehnsa and Throchi were abandoned by State Forces after attack.

Radio communications between the fighting units were operated by the Pakistan Army. Even though the Indian Navy intercepted the communications, lacking intelligence in Jammu and Kashmir, it was unable to determine immediately where the fighting was taking place.

Accession of Kashmir

Following the Muslim revolution in the Poonch and Mirpur area and Pakistani backed Pashtun tribal intervention from the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa aimed at the supporting the revolution, the Maharaja asked for Indian military assistance. Mountbatten urged him to accede to India to complete the legal formalities, although Mountbatten's insistence on accession before assistance has been questioned. The Maharaja complied, and the Government of India recognised the accession of the princely state to India. However, Nehru, according to his biographer Sarvepalli Gopal, did not give any importance to Mountbatten's insistence that there be a temporary accession. Neither did Sardar Patel. Indian troops were sent to the state to defend it. The Jammu & Kashmir National Conference volunteers aided the Indian Army in its campaign to drive out the Pathan invaders.

Pakistan refused to recognise the accession of Kashmir to India, claiming that it was obtained by "fraud and violence." Governor General Mohammad Ali Jinnah ordered its Army Chief General Douglas Gracey to move Pakistani troops to Kashmir at once. However, the Indian and Pakistani forces were still under a joint command, and Field Marshal Auchinleck prevailed upon him to withdraw the order. With its accession to India, Kashmir became legally Indian territory,

and the British officers could not play any role in an inter-Dominion war.

The Pakistan army made available arms, ammunition and supplies to the rebel forces who were dubbed the 'Azad Army'. Pakistani army officers 'conveniently' on leave and the former officers of the Indian National Army were recruited to command the forces. In May 1948, the Pakistani army officially entered the conflict, in theory to defend the Pakistan borders, but it made plans to push towards Jammu and cut the lines of communications of the Indian forces in the Mehndar Valley.

In Gilgit, the force of Gilgit Scouts under the command of a British officer Major William Brown mutinied and overthrew the governor Ghansara Singh. Brown prevailed on the forces to declare accession to Pakistan. They are also believed to have received assistance from the Chitral Scouts and the Chitral State Bodyguard's of the state of Chitral, one of the princely states of Pakistan, which had acceded to Pakistan on 6 October 1947.

India claimed that the accession had the people's support through the support of the National Conference, the most popular organisation in the state. Historians have questioned the representativeness of the National Conference and the clarity of its leaderships' goals. They observe that while many Kashmiris supported Sheikh Abdullah and the National Conference at the state level, they also supported Jinnah and the Muslim League at the all-India level.

Stages of the war

Initial invasion

On 22 October the Pashtun tribal attack was launched in the Muzaffarabad sector. The state forces stationed in the border regions around Muzaffarabad and Domel were quickly defeated by tribal forces (Muslim state forces mutinied and joined them) and the way to the capital was open. Among the raiders, there were many active Pakistani Army soldiers disguised as tribals. They were also provided logistical help by the Pakistan Army. Rather than advancing toward Srinagar before state forces could regroup or be reinforced, the invading forces remained in the captured cities in the border region engaging in looting and other crimes against their inhabitants. In the Poonch valley, the state forces retreated into towns where they were besieged.

Records indicate that the Pakistani tribals beheaded many Hindu and Sikh civilians in Jammu and Kashmir.

Indian operation in the Kashmir Valley

After the accession, India airlifted troops and equipment to Srinagar under the command of Lt. Col. Dewan Ranjit Rai, where they reinforced the princely state forces, established a defence perimeter and defeated the tribal forces on the outskirts of the city. Initial defense operations included the notable defense of Badgam holding both the capital and airfield overnight against extreme odds. The successful defence included an outflanking manoeuvre by Indian armoured cars during the Battle of Shalateng. The defeated tribal forces were

pursued as far as Baramulla and Uri and these towns, too, were recaptured.

In the Poonch valley, tribal forces continued to besiege state forces.

In Gilgit, the state paramilitary forces, called the Gilgit Scouts, joined the invading tribal forces, who thereby obtained control of this northern region of the state. The tribal forces were also joined by troops from Chitral, whose ruler, Muzaffar ul-Mulk the Mehtar of Chitral, had acceded to Pakistan.

Attempted link-up at Poonch and fall of Mirpur

Indian forces ceased pursuit of tribal forces after recapturing Uri and Baramula, and sent a relief column southwards, in an attempt to relieve Poonch. Although the relief column eventually reached Poonch, the siege could not be lifted. A second relief column reached Kotli, and evacuated the garrisons of that town and others but were forced to abandon it being too weak to defend it. Meanwhile, Mirpur was captured by the tribal forces on 25 November 1947 with the help of Pakistan's PAVO Cavalry. This led to the 1947 Mirpur massacre where Hindu women were reportedly abducted by tribal forces and taken into Pakistan. They were sold in the brothels of Rawalpindi. Around 400 women jumped into wells in Mirpur committing suicide to escape from being abducted.

Fall of Jhanger and attacks on Naoshera and Uri

- The tribal forces attacked and captured Jhanger. They then attacked Naoshera unsuccessfully, and made a series of unsuccessful attacks on Uri. In the

south a minor Indian attack secured Chamb. By this stage of the war the front line began to stabilise as more Indian troops became available.

Operation Vijay: counterattack to Jhanger

The Indian forces launched a counterattack in the south recapturing Jhanger and Rajauri. In the Kashmir Valley the tribal forces continued attacking the Uri garrison. In the north Skardu was brought under siege by the Gilgit Scouts.

Indian spring offensive

The Indians held onto Jhanger against numerous counterattacks, who were increasingly supported by regular Pakistani Forces. In the Kashmir Valley the Indians attacked, recapturing Tithwail. The Gilgit scouts made good progress in the High Himalayas sector, infiltrating troops to bring Leh under siege, capturing Kargil and defeating a relief column heading for Skardu.

Operations Gulab and Eraze

The Indians continued to attack in the Kashmir Valley sector driving north to capture Keran and Gurais (Operation Eraze). They also repelled a counterattack aimed at Tithwal. In the Jammu region, the forces besieged in Poonch broke out and temporarily linked up with the outside world again. The Kashmir State army was able to defend Skardu from the Gilgit Scouts impeding their advance down the Indus valley towards Leh. In August the Chitral Scouts and Chitral Bodyguard under Mata ul-Mulk besieged Skardu and with the help of

artillery were able to take Skardu. This freed the Gilgit Scouts to push further into Ladakh.

Operation Bison

- During this time the front began to settle down. The siege of Poonch continued. An unsuccessful attack was launched by 77 Parachute Brigade (Brig Atal) to capture Zoji La pass. Operation Duck, the earlier epithet for this assault, was renamed as Operation Bison by Cariappa. M5 Stuart light tanks of 7 Cavalry were moved in dismantled conditions through Srinagar and winched across bridges while two field companies of the Madras Sappers converted the mule track across Zoji La into a jeep track. The surprise attack on 1 November by the brigade with armour supported by two regiments of 25 pounders and a regiment of 3.7-inch guns, forced the pass and pushed the tribal and Pakistani forces back to Matayan and later Dras. The brigade linked up on 24 November at Kargil with Indian troops advancing from Leh while their opponents eventually withdrew northwards toward Skardu. The Pakistani attacked the Skardu on 10 February 1948 which was repulsed by the Indian soldiers. Thereafter, the Skardu Garrison was subjected to continuous attacks by the Pakistan Army for the next three months and each time, their attack was repulsed by the Colonel Sher Jung Thapa and his men. Thapa held the Skardu with hardly 250 men for whole six long months without any reinforcement and replenishment. On 14 August Indian General Sher Jung Thapa had to

surrender Skardu to the Pakistani Army, and raiders after a year long siege.

Operation Easy; Poonch link-up

- The Indians now started to get the upper hand in all sectors. Poonch was finally relieved after a siege of over a year. The Gilgit forces in the High Himalayas, who had previously made good progress, were finally defeated. The Indians pursued as far as Kargil before being forced to halt due to supply problems. The Zoji La pass was forced by using tanks (which had not been thought possible at that altitude) and Dras was recaptured.

Moves up to cease-fire

After protracted negotiations, both countries agreed to a cease-fire. The terms of the cease-fire, laid out in a UN Commission resolution on 13 August 1948, were adopted by the Commission on 5 January 1949.

This required Pakistan to withdraw its forces, both regular and irregular, while allowing India to maintain minimal forces within the state to preserve law and order. Upon compliance with these conditions, a plebiscite was to be held to determine the future of the territory.

Indian losses in the war totaled 1,104 killed and 3,154 wounded; Pakistani, about 6,000 killed and 14,000 wounded. India gained control of about two-thirds of Kashmir; Pakistan, the remaining one-third. Most neutral assessments agree that India emerged victorious from the war, as it successfully

defended most of the contested territory, including the Kashmir valley, Jammu, and Ladakh.

Military awards

Battle honours

After the war, a total of number of 11 battle honours and one theatre honour were awarded to units of the Indian Army, the notable amongst which are:

<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Jammu and Kashmir 1947–48 (theatre honour)• Gurais• Kargil	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Naoshera• Punch• Rajouri	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• Srinagar• Tithwal• Zoji La
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Gallantry awards

For bravery, a number of soldiers and officers were awarded the highest gallantry award of their respective countries.

Following is a list of the recipients of the Indian award Param Vir Chakra, and the Pakistani award Nishan-E-Haider:

- India
- Major Som Nath Sharma (Posthumous)
- Lance Naik Karam Singh

- Second Lieutenant Rama Raghoba Rane
- Naik Jadu Nath Singh

(Posthumous)

- Company Havildar Major Piru Singh Shekhawat

(Posthumous)

- Pakistan
- Captain Muhammad Sarwar

Chapter 47

India Seizes Diu, Daman and Goa from Portuguese India

Diu, India

Diu also known as **Diu Town**, is a town in Diu district in the union territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu, India. Diu District is the tenth least populated district of India.

The town of Diu lies at the eastern end of Diu Island and is known for its fortress and old Portuguese cathedral. It is a fishing town.

The city is one of the hundred Indian cities competing in a national level competition to get the funds under Narendra Modi's flagship Smart Cities Mission. Diu will be competing for the one of last 10 spots against 20 cities from across India. In April 2018, it was reported that the Diu Smart City has already become India's first city to run on 100 percent renewable energy during the daytime.

The town and district were historically part of the Saurashtra region of Gujarat and an important port on trade routes of Arabian sea of Indian Ocean.

Due to its strategic importance, there was a Battle of Diu in 1509 between Portugal and a combined force of Mamluks, Venetians, the Ragusians, the Zamorin of Calicut, and the

Sultan of Gujarat, Mahmud Begada. In 1513, the Portuguese tried to establish an outpost, but negotiations were unsuccessful. There were failed attempts by Diogo Lopes de Sequeira in 1521 and Nuno da Cunha in 1523. In 1531 the conquest attempted by D. Nuno da Cunha was unsuccessful.

In 1535 Bahadur Shah, the Sultan of Gujarat, concluded a defensive alliance with the Portuguese against the Mughal emperor Humayun and allowed the Portuguese to construct the Diu Fort and maintain a garrison on the island.

The alliance quickly unravelled, and attempts by the Sultans to oust the Portuguese from Diu between 1537 and 1546 failed. Regretting his generosity, Bahadur Shah sought to recover Diu but was defeated and killed by the Portuguese, followed by a period of war between them and the people of Gujarat. In 1538, Coja Sofar, Lord of Cambay, together with the Ottoman Suleiman Pasha, came to lay siege to Diu and were defeated by Portuguese resistance led by Anthony Silveira. A second siege was imposed by the same Coja Sofar in 1546. It was repelled by the Portuguese conquerors, led on land by D. João Mascarenhas and at sea by D. João de Castro. Coja Sofar and D. Fernando de Castro, son of the Portuguese viceroy, perished in the struggle. The fortress, completed by Dom João de Castro after the siege of 1545, still stands.

After this second siege, Diu was so fortified that it could withstand later attacks of the Arabs of Muscat and the Dutch in the late 17th century. From the 18th century, Diu declined in strategic importance (due to development of Bombay) and was reduced to a museum or historical landmark as a

commercial and strategic bulwark in the struggle between the forces of the Islamic East and Christian West.

Diu remained a possession of the Portuguese from 1535 until 1961, when it fell to troops of the Indian Union, who invaded all of former Portuguese India under Operation Vijay. The island was occupied by the Indian military on 19 December 1961. The Battle of Diu involved overwhelming land, sea and air strikes on the enclave for 48 hours until the Portuguese garrison there surrendered. It was declared a union territory of India, Goa, Daman, and Diu. Goa separated as a state in 1987; the remainder became union territory of Daman and Diu. On 26 January 2020, the union territories of Daman and Diu were merged with Dadra and Nagar Haveli to form the union territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu.

Daman district, India

- **Daman** is one of the three districts of the union territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli and Daman and Diu on the western coast of India, surrounded by Valsad district of Gujarat state on the north, east and south and the Arabian Sea to the west. The district has an area of 72 square kilometres (28 sq mi), and a population of 191,173 at the 2011 census, an increase of 69.256% from the preceding 2001 Census. The district headquarters is Daman.

Daman lies at the mouth of the Daman Ganga River. Major industries have units here. The closest railway station is Vapi (7 km). It is also famous for its beach, Portuguese colonial architecture, churches, and for the scenic beauty in the twin

towns of Nani-Daman and Moti-Daman, which lie opposite each other across the Daman Ganga. The city of Surat lies to the north, and Mumbai lies approximately 160 km (100 mi) south of Daman on the Arabian Sea coast in Maharashtra state.

The edict of the Emperor Ashoka (273 to 136 BC) was found in Saurashtra and Sopara near Bombay. Satrya Kshatrapas under the Kushana emperor seemed to have ruled over Daman District during the 1st century, AD. The coins of Bhumaka and Nahapan, the kshaharata rulers were discovered in the surrounding areas of Surat District. Ushavadatta, son-in-law of Nahapan, is said to have provided ferries on rivers Dhanuha Dhamana, Parada and Tapi.

This is the earliest reference of these rivers and the names of the places, i.e. Dahanu, Daman and Pardi, remained unchanged for the last 2000 years. The District seems to have been subjected to the rule of Gautamaputra Satakarnin, about 125 AD, who drove away the Kshaharatas. But Satavahana's rule was short lived.

Rudraman I, grandson of Chastan of Kadamaka branch of Kshatrapas reconquered a large part of Western India including the seaboard from the river Mahi in Gujarat to Ratnagiri by about 150 AD from Satavahana ruler, Satakarni, and Daman district again passed under the rule of Kshatrapa Vijayasen (234-239 AD) who seems to have ruled over the district till 249 AD. Abhir king Ishwarasena of Nasik, who conquered the western part of the Deccan from the Satavahanas seems to have been laid by Gautamaputra Yajnashri, campaigns the Kshatrapas from 180 to 200 AD.

The District seems to have been subjected to the rule of traikutakas during the 5th century, AD. The Lata Country was ruled by Rashtrakutas of Malkhed in the Deccan directly till 808 by the successors, Govinda II (575- 795 AD), Druvaraja - I (795-800) and Govinda III (800-808).

Govinda III handed over the Lata kingdom to his brother Indra about 808 and was given the title Lateswaramandalasya or the protector of Latamandala. Indra was succeeded by his son Karka who seems to have ruled Latamandala with his brother, Govinda jointly till 826. Druva II, son of Karka came to the throne about 835 and was succeeded by Akalavarsha in 867. The District was passed to Tailappa II of the Chalupas of Kalyani in 973. Tailappa II placed Lata Country in the hands of his relative and general Barrpa alias Dvarappa Chalukya. By the middle of the 13th century, a Rajput prince Ramsingh alias Ramashah seems to have defeated the koli chief Nathorat and established himself in the hilly tract at Asheri of Asserseta near Daman about 1262. Ramsingh was succeeded by his son Somanath in 1295. The newly founded Ramnagar at the foot of the ghats flourished under Somnath (1335-1360) and Daram shah (1360-1391). Jagatshah succeeded Gopushah and ruled during 1432 to 1470. The Portuguese from Shah of Gujarat acquired Daman. They noticed the port of Daman for the first time in 1523. A Portuguese enclave for four centuries and a half till the close of the colonial rule in 1961; Daman has been a coveted prize for which princes, monarchs and alien powers waged wars. Muted memories of history lie vaulted in the monuments of Daman. It had been a melting pot, where races and cultures met and mixed to bring forth a multi-coloured identity.

Daman was occupied by the Portuguese in 1531, and was formally ceded to Portugal in 1539 by the Sultan of Gujarat.

Mirroring the system of administrative division in European Portugal, Daman district (*Distrito de Damão*) was established as an administrative division of the Portuguese State of India (*Estado da Índia*) in the first half of the 19th century. The District was made up of the Portuguese territories of Daman, Dadra and Nagar Haveli. It was headed by a district governor, subordinate to the governor-general of Portuguese India in Goa. The district was divided in the two municipalities of Daman and Nagar Haveli, which were further subdivided into civil parishes.

The Dadra and Nagar Haveli landlocked parts of the Daman district were occupied by pro-Indian Union forces in 1954. In 1961, Dadra and Nagar Haveli was officially annexed by India, forming a union territory separated from Daman.

The rest of the District remained under Portuguese rule until it was annexed by Indian forces on 19 December 1961. From 1961-87, it was a part of the union territory of Goa, Daman and Diu. In 1987, it became a part of the newly formed union territory of Daman and Diu.

On 3 November 2019, Daman Collector Rakesh Minhas issued a Section 144 order banning peaceful assembly of four or more persons, slogan-shouting and the use of loudspeakers across the entire district and ordered the conversion of High School, Bhimpore and the Sarvottam High School, Moti Daman into 'temporary jails'. This was in response to a land ownership dispute between the local indigenous fishing community and the local administration that had confiscated their land and

bulldozed their homes. The ensuing 2019 Daman Indigenous Land Clearing Protests resulted with the detention of 70 protesters in the 'temporary jails' and another 8 arrests. Few of the adivasi fisherfolk were rehoused whilst most languished traumatised and homeless on the streets near the rubble of their razed homes.

Goa

Goa is a state on the southwestern coast of India within the region known as the Konkan, and geographically separated from the Deccan highlands by the Western Ghats. It is surrounded by the Indian states of Maharashtra to the north and Karnataka to the east and south, with the Arabian Sea forming its western coast. It is India's smallest state by area and its fourth-smallest by population. Goa has the highest GDP per capita among all Indian states, two and a half times as high as the GDP per capita of the country as a whole. The Eleventh Finance Commission of India named Goa the best-placed state because of its infrastructure, and India's National Commission on Population rated it as having the best quality of life in India (based on the commission's "12 Indicators"). It is the third-highest ranking among Indian states in human development index.

Panaji is the state's capital, while Vasco da Gama is its largest city. The historic city of Margão in Goa still exhibits the cultural influence of the Portuguese, who first voyaged to the subcontinent in the early 16th century as merchants, and conquered it soon thereafter, whereupon Goa became an overseas territory of the Portuguese Empire, part of what was then known as Portuguese India, and remained as such for

about 450 years, until it was annexed by India in 1961. Goa's official language, which is spoken by a majority of its inhabitants, is Konkani.

Goa is visited by large numbers of international and domestic tourists each year because of its white-sand beaches, active nightlife, places of worship, and World Heritage-listed architecture. It also has rich flora and fauna because it lies on the Western Ghats range, a biodiversity hotspot.

The **history of Goa** dates back to prehistoric times, though the present-day state of Goa was only established as recently as 1987. In spite of being India's smallest state by area, Goa's history is both long and diverse. It shares a lot of similarities with Indian history, especially with regard to colonial influences and a multi-cultural aesthetic.

The Usgalimal rock engravings, belonging to the upper paleolithic or mesolithic periods, exhibit some of the earliest traces of human settlement in India. The Mauryan and Satavahana Empires ruled modern-day Goa during the Iron Age.

During the medieval period, Goa was ruled by the Kadamba kingdom, Vijayanagara Empire, Bahmani Sultanate and Bijapur Sultanate.

The Portuguese invaded Goa in 1510, defeating the Bijapur Sultanate. The Portuguese rule lasted for about 450 years, and heavily influenced Goan culture, cuisine, and architecture.

In 1961, the Indian Army invaded and annexed Goa after a 36 hour battle. The region was incorporated as a union territory of

Goa, Daman and Diu. In 1987, Goa was granted statehood. Goa has one of the highest GDP per capita and Human Development Index among Indian states.

The **Annexation of Goa** was the process in which the Republic of India annexed *Estado da India*, the then Portuguese Indian territories of Goa, Daman and Diu, starting with the armed action carried out by the Indian Armed Forces in December 1961. In India, this action is referred to as the "**Liberation of Goa**". In Portugal, it is referred to as the "**Invasion of Goa**".

The "armed action" was code named **Operation Vijay** (meaning "Victory") by the Indian Armed Forces. It involved air, sea and land strikes for over 36 hours, and was a decisive victory for India, ending 451 years of rule by Portugal over its remaining exclaves in India. The engagement lasted two days, and twenty-two Indians and thirty Portuguese were killed in the fighting. The brief conflict drew a mixture of worldwide praise and condemnation. In India, the action was seen as a liberation of historically Indian territory, while Portugal viewed it as an aggression against its national soil and citizens. Following the end of Portuguese rule in 1961, Goa was placed under military administration headed by Kunhiraman Palat Candeth as lieutenant governor. On 8 June 1962, military rule was replaced by civilian government when the Lieutenant Governor nominated an informal Consultative Council of 29 nominated members to assist him in the administration of the territory.

Background

After India's independence from the British Empire in August 1947, Portugal continued to hold a handful of exclaves on the

Indian subcontinent—the districts of Goa, Daman and Diu and Dadra and Nagar Haveli—collectively known as the *Estado da Índia*. Goa, Daman and Diu covered an area of around 1,540 square miles (4,000 km) and held a population of 637,591. The Goan diaspora was estimated at 175,000 (about 100,000 within the Indian Union, mainly in Bombay). Religious distribution was 61% Hindu, 36.7% Christian (mostly Catholic) and 2.2% Muslim. The economy was primarily based on agriculture, although the 1940s and 1950s saw a boom in mining—principally iron ore and some manganese.

Local resistance to Portuguese rule

Resistance to Portuguese rule in Goa in the 20th century was pioneered by Tristão de Bragança Cunha, a French-educated Goan engineer who founded the Goa Congress Committee in Portuguese India in 1928. Cunha released a booklet called 'Four hundred years of Foreign Rule', and a pamphlet, 'Denationalisation of Goa', intended to sensitise Goans to the oppression of Portuguese rule. Messages of solidarity were received by the Goa Congress Committee from leading figures in the Indian independence movement including Rajendra Prasad, Jawaharlal Nehru and Subhas Chandra Bose. On 12 October 1938, Cunha with other members of the Goa Congress Committee met Subhas Chandra Bose, the President of the Indian National Congress, and on his advice, opened a Branch Office of the Goa Congress Committee at 21, Dalal Street, Bombay. The Goa Congress was also made affiliate to the Indian National Congress and Cunha was selected as its first President.

In June 1946, Ram Manohar Lohia, an Indian Socialist leader, entered Goa on a visit to his friend, Julião Menezes, a nationalist leader, who had founded the Gomantak Praja Mandal in Bombay and edited the weekly newspaper *Gomantak*. Cunha and other leaders were also with him. Ram Manohar Lohia advocated the use of non-violent Gandhian techniques to oppose the government. On 18 June 1946, the Portuguese government disrupted a protest against the suspension of civil liberties in Panaji (then spelt 'Panjim') organised by Lohia, Cunha and others including Purushottam Kakodkar and Laxmikant Bhembre in defiance of a ban on public gatherings, and arrested them. There were intermittent mass demonstrations from June to November.

In addition to non-violent protests, armed groups such as the Azad Gomantak Dal (The Free Goa Party) and the United Front of Goans conducted violent attacks aimed at weakening Portuguese rule in Goa. The Indian government supported the establishment of armed groups like the Azad Gomantak Dal, giving them full financial, logistic and armament support. The armed groups acted from bases situated in Indian territory and under cover of Indian police forces. The Indian government—through these armed groups—attempted to destroy economic targets, telegraph and telephone lines, road, water and rail transport, in order to impede economic activity and create conditions for a general uprising of the population. A Portuguese army officer stationed with the army in Goa, Captain Carlos Azaredo, stated in 2001 in the Portuguese newspaper *Expresso*: "To the contrary to what is being said, the most evolved guerilla warfare which our Armed Forces encountered was in Goa. I know what I'm talking about, because I also fought in Angola and in Guiné. In 1961 alone,

until December, around 80 policemen died. The major part of the freedom fighters of Azad Gomantak Dal were not Goans. Many had fought in the British Army, under General Montgomery, against the Germans."

Diplomatic efforts to resolve Goa dispute

On 27 February 1950, the Government of India asked the Portuguese government to open negotiations about the future of Portuguese colonies in India. Portugal asserted that its territory on the Indian subcontinent was not a colony but part of metropolitan Portugal and hence its transfer was non-negotiable, and that India had no rights to this territory because the Republic of India did not exist at the time when Goa came under Portuguese rule. When the Portuguese government refused to respond to subsequent aide-mémoires in this regard, the Indian government, on 11 June 1953, withdrew its diplomatic mission from Lisbon.

By 1954, the Republic of India instituted visa restrictions on travel from Goa to India which paralysed transport between Goa and other exclaves like Daman, Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli. Meanwhile, the Indian Union of Dockers had, in 1954, instituted a boycott on shipping to Portuguese India. Between 22 July and 2 August 1954, armed activists attacked and forced the surrender of Portuguese forces stationed in Dadra and Nagar Haveli.

On 15 August 1955, 3000–5000 unarmed Indian activists attempted to enter Goa at six locations and were violently repulsed by Portuguese police officers, resulting in the deaths of between 21 and 30 people. The news of the incident built

public opinion in India against the presence of the Portuguese in Goa. On 1 September 1955, India shut its consul office in Goa.

In 1956, the Portuguese ambassador to France, Marcello Mathias, along with Portuguese Prime Minister António de Oliveira Salazar, argued in favour of a referendum in Goa to determine its future. This proposal was however rejected by the Ministers for Defence and Foreign Affairs. The demand for a referendum was repeated by presidential candidate General Humberto Delgado in 1957.

Prime Minister Salazar, alarmed by India's hinted threats at armed action against Portugal's presence in Goa, first asked the United Kingdom to mediate, then protested through Brazil and eventually asked the United Nations Security Council to intervene. Mexico offered the Indian government its influence in Latin America to bring pressure on the Portuguese to relieve tensions. Meanwhile, Krishna Menon, India's defence minister and head of India's UN delegation, stated in no uncertain terms that India had not "abjured the use of force" in Goa. The US ambassador to India, John Kenneth Galbraith, requested the Indian government on several occasions to resolve the issue peacefully through mediation and consensus rather than armed conflict.

On 24 November 1961, *Sabarmati*, a passenger boat passing between the Indian port of Kochi and the Portuguese-held island of Anjidiv, was fired upon by Portuguese ground troops, resulting in the death of a passenger and injuries to the chief engineer. The action was precipitated by Portuguese fears that the boat carried a military landing party intent on storming the

island. The incidents lent themselves to fostering widespread public support in India for military action in Goa.

Eventually, on 10 December, nine days prior to the armed action, code named Operation Vijay, Nehru stated to the press: "Continuance of Goa under Portuguese rule is an impossibility". The American response was to warn India that if and when India's armed action in Goa was brought to the UN security council, it could expect no support from the US delegation.

Annexation of Dadra and Nagar Haveli

The hostilities between India and Portugal started seven years before the annexation of Goa, when Dadra and Nagar Haveli were invaded and occupied by pro-Indian forces with the support of the Indian authorities.

Dadra and Nagar Haveli were two Portuguese landlocked exclaves of the Daman district, totally surrounded by Indian territory. The connection between the exclaves and the coastal territory of Daman had to be made by crossing about 20 kilometres (12 mi) of Indian territory. Dadra and Nagar Haveli did not have any Portuguese military garrison, but only police forces.

The Indian government started to develop isolation actions against Dadra and Nagar Haveli already in 1952, including the creation of impediments to the transit of persons and goods between the two landlocked enclaves and Daman. In July 1954, pro-Indian forces, including members of organisations like the United Front of Goans, the National Movement Liberation Organisation, the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh and the Azad

Gomantak Dal, with the support of Indian Police forces, began to launch assaults against Dadra and Nagar Haveli. On the night of 22 July, UFG forces stormed the small Dadra police station, killing Police Sergeant Aniceto do Rosário and Constable António Fernandes, who resisted the attack. On 28 July, RSS forces took Naroli police station.

Meanwhile, the Portuguese authorities asked the Indian Government for permission to cross the Indian territory with reinforcements to Dadra and Nagar Haveli, but no permission was given. Surrounded and prevented from receiving reinforcements by the Indian authorities, the Portuguese Administrator and police forces in Nagar Haveli eventually surrendered to the Indian police forces on 11 August 1954. Portugal appealed to the International Court of Justice, which, in a decision dated 12 April 1960, stated that Portugal had sovereign rights over the territories of Dadra and Nagar Haveli but India had the right to deny passage to armed personnel of Portugal over Indian territories. Therefore, the Portuguese authorities could not legally pass through Indian territory.

Events preceding the hostilities

Indian military build-up

On receiving the go-ahead for military action and a mandate for the capture of all occupied territories for the Indian government, Lieutenant-General Chaudhari of the Indian Army's Southern Command fielded the 17th Infantry Division commanded by Major-General K. P. Candeth and the 50th Parachute Brigade commanded by Brigadier Sagat Singh. The

assault on the enclave of Daman was assigned to the 1st battalion of the Maratha Light Infantry while the operations in Diu were assigned to the 20th battalion of the Rajput Regiment and the 5th battalion of the Madras Regiment.

Meanwhile, the Commander-in-Chief of India's Western Air Command, Air Vice Marshal Eric Pinto, was appointed as the commander of all air resources assigned to the operations in Goa. Air resources for the assault on Goa were concentrated in the bases at Pune and Samba (Belgaum). The mandate handed to Pinto by the Indian Air Command was listed out as follows:

- The destruction of Goa's lone airfield in Dabolim, without causing damage to the terminal building and other airport facilities.
- Destruction of the wireless station at Bambolim, Goa.
- Denial of airfields at Daman and Diu, which were, however, not to be attacked without prior permission.
- Support to advancing ground troops.

The Indian Navy deployed two warships—the INS *Rajput*, an 'R' Class destroyer, and INS *Kirpan*, a Blackwood class anti-submarine frigate—off the coast of Goa. The actual attack on Goa was delegated to four task groups: a Surface Action Group comprising five ships: *Mysore*, *Trishul*, *Betwa*, *Beas* and *Cauvery*; a Carrier Group of five ships: *Delhi*, *Kuthar*, *Kirpan*, *Khukri* and *Rajput* centred on the light aircraft carrier *Vikrant*; a Mine Sweeping Group consisting of mine sweepers including *Karwar*, *Kakinada*, *Cannonore* and *Bimilipatan*, and a Support Group which consisted of *Dharini*.

Portuguese mandate

In March 1960, Portuguese Defence Minister General Júlio Botelho Moniz told Prime Minister Salazar that a sustained Portuguese campaign against decolonisation would create for the army "a suicide mission in which we could not succeed". His opinion was shared by Army Minister Colonel Afonso Magalhães de Almeida Fernandes, by the Army under secretary of State Lieutenant-Colonel Francisco da Costa Gomes and by other top officers.

Ignoring this advice, Salazar sent a message to Governor General Manuel António Vassalo e Silva in Goa on 14 December, in which he ordered the Portuguese forces in Goa to fight to the last man: "Do not expect the possibility of truce or of Portuguese prisoners, as there will be no surrender rendered because I feel that our soldiers and sailors can be either victorious or dead." Salazar asked Vassalo e Silva to hold out for at least eight days, within which time he hoped to gather international support against the Indian invasion. Vassalo e Silva disobeyed Salazar to avoid the unnecessary loss of human lives and surrendered the day after the Indian invasion.

Portuguese military preparations

Portuguese military preparations began in earnest in 1954, following the Indian economic blockade, the beginning of the anti-Portuguese attacks in Goa and the annexation of Dadra and Nagar Haveli. Three light infantry battalions (one each sent from Portugal, Angola and Mozambique) and support units were transported to Goa, reinforcing a locally raised battalion and increasing the Portuguese military presence there from

almost nothing to 12,000 men. Other sources state that, at the end of 1955, Portuguese forces in India represented a total of around 8,000 men (Europeans, Africans and Indians), including 7,000 in the land forces, 250 in the naval forces, 600 in the police and 250 in the Fiscal Guard, split between the districts of Goa, Daman and Diu. Following the annexation of Dadra and Nagar Haveli, the Portuguese authorities markedly strengthened the garrison of Portuguese India, with units and personnel sent from the Metropole and from the Portuguese African provinces of Angola and Mozambique.

The Portuguese forces were organised as the Armed Forces of the State of India (FAEI, *Forças Armadas do Estado da Índia*), under a unified command headed by General Paulo Bénard Guedes, who combined the civil role of Governor-General with the military role of Commander-in-Chief. Guedes ended his commission in 1958, with General Vassalo e Silva being appointed to replace him in both the civil and military roles.

The Portuguese government and military commands were, however, well aware that even with this effort to strengthen the garrison of Goa, the Portuguese forces would never be sufficient to face a conventional attack from the overwhelmingly stronger Indian Armed Forces. The Portuguese government hoped however to politically deter the Indian government from attempting a military aggression through the showing of a strong will to fight and to sacrifice to defend Goa.

In 1960, during an inspection visit to Portuguese India and referring to a predictable start of guerrilla activities in Angola, the Under Secretary of State of the Army, Francisco da Costa Gomes, stated the necessity to reinforce the Portuguese

military presence in that African territory, partly at the expense of the military presence in Goa, where the then existing 7,500 men were too many just to deal with anti-Portuguese actions, and too few to face an Indian invasion, which, if it were to occur, would have to be handled by other means. This led to the Portuguese forces in India suffering a sharp reduction to about 3,300 soldiers.

Faced with this reduced force strength, the strategy employed to defend Goa against an Indian invasion was based on the *Plano Sentinela* (Sentinel Plan), which divided the territory into four defence sectors (North, Center, South and Mormugão), and the *Plano de Barragens* (Barrage Plan), which envisaged the demolition of all bridges to delay the invading army, as well as the mining of approach roads and beaches. Defence units were organised as four battlegroups (*agrupamentos*), with one assigned to each sector and tasked with slowing the progress of an invading force. Then-Captain Carlos Azaredo, who was stationed in Goa at the time of hostilities, described the Plano Sentinela in the Portuguese newspaper *Expresso* on 8 December 2001 as "a totally unrealistic and unachievable plan, which was quite incomplete. It was based on exchange of ground with time. But, for this purpose, portable communication equipment was necessary." The plans to mine roads and beaches were also unviable because of an insufficient quantity of mines.

Navy

The naval component of the FAEI were the Naval Forces of the State of India (FNEI, *Forças Navais do Estado da Índia*), headed by the Naval Commander of Goa, Commodore Raúl Viegas

Ventura. The only significant Portuguese Navy warship present in Goa at the time of invasion was the sloop NRP *Afonso de Albuquerque*. It was armed with four 120 mm guns capable of two shots per minute, and four automatic rapid-firing guns. In addition to the sloop, the Portuguese Naval Forces had three light patrol boats (*lanchas de fiscalização*), each armed with a 20 mm Oerlikon gun, one based in each of Goa, Daman and Diu. There were also five merchant marine ships in Goa. An attempt by Portugal to send naval warships to Goa to reinforce its marine defences was foiled when President Nasser of Egypt denied the ships access to the Suez Canal.

Ground forces

Portuguese ground defences were organised as the Land Forces of the State of India (FTEI, *Forças Terrestres do Estado da Índia*), under the Portuguese Army's Independent Territorial Command of India, headed by Brigadier António José Martins Leitão. At the time of the invasion, they consisted of a total of 3,995 men, including 810 native (*Indo-Portugueses* – Indo-Portuguese) soldiers, many of whom had little military training and were utilised primarily for security and anti-extremist operations. These forces were divided amongst the three Portuguese enclaves in India. The Portuguese Army units in Goa included four motorised reconnaissance squadrons, eight rifle companies (*caçadores*), two artillery batteries and an engineer detachment. In addition to the military forces, the Portuguese defences counted on the civil internal security forces of Portuguese India. These included the State of India Police (PEI, *Polícia do Estado da Índia*), a general police corps modelled after the Portuguese Public Security Police; the Fiscal Guard (*Guarda Fiscal*), responsible for Customs enforcement

and border protection; and the Rural Guard (*Guarda Rural*), game wardens. In 1958, as an emergency measure, the Portuguese government gave provisional military status to the PEI and the Fiscal Guard, placing them under the command of the FAEI. The security forces were also divided amongst the three districts and were mostly made up of Indo-Portuguese policemen and guards. Different sources indicate between 900 and 1400 men as the total effective strength of these forces at the time of the invasion.

Air defence

The Portuguese Air Force did not have any presence in Portuguese India, with the exception of a single officer with the role of air adviser in the office of the Commander-in-Chief.

On 16 December, the Portuguese Air Force was placed on alert to transport ten tonnes of anti-tank grenades in two DC-6 aircraft from Montijo Air Base in Portugal to Goa to assist in its defence. When the Portuguese Air Force was unable to obtain stopover facilities at any air base along the way because most countries, including Pakistan, denied passage of Portuguese military aircraft, the mission was passed to the Portuguese international civilian airline TAP, which offered a Lockheed Constellation (registration CS-TLA) on charter. However, when permission to transport weapons through Karachi was denied by the Pakistani government, the Constellation landed in Goa at 18:00 on 17 December with a consignment of half a dozen bags of sausages as food supplies instead of the intended grenades. In addition it transported a contingent of female paratroopers to assist in the evacuation of Portuguese civilians.

The Portuguese air presence in Goa at the time of hostilities was thus limited to the presence of two civilian transport aircraft, the Lockheed Constellation belonging to TAP and a Douglas DC-4 Skymaster belonging to the Goan airline Portuguese India Airlines. The Indians claimed that the Portuguese had a squadron of F-86 Sabres stationed at Dabolim Airport—which later turned out to be false intelligence. Air defence was limited to a few obsolete anti-aircraft guns manned by two artillery units who had been smuggled into Goa disguised as football teams.

Portuguese civilian evacuation

The military buildup created panic amongst Europeans in Goa, who were desperate to evacuate their families before the commencement of hostilities. On 9 December, the vessel *India* arrived at Goa's Mormugão port en route to Lisbon from Timor. Despite orders from the Portuguese government in Lisbon not to allow anyone to embark on this vessel, Governor General Manuel Vassalo e Silva allowed 700 Portuguese civilians of European origin to board the ship and flee Goa. The ship had capacity for only 380 passengers, and was filled to its limits, with evacuees occupying even the toilets. On arranging this evacuation of women and children, Vassalo e Silva remarked to the press, "If necessary, we will die here." Evacuation of European civilians continued by air even after the commencement of Indian air strikes.

Indian reconnaissance operations

Indian reconnaissance operations had commenced on 1 December, when two Leopard class frigates, the INS *Betwa* and

the INS *Beas*, undertook linear patrolling of the Goa coast at a distance of 8 miles (13 km). By 8 December, the Indian Air Force had commenced baiting missions and fly-bys to lure out Portuguese air defences and fighters.

On 17 December, a tactical reconnaissance flight conducted by Squadron Leader I. S. Loughran in a Vampire NF54 Night Fighter over Dabolim Airport in Goa was met with five rounds fired from a ground anti-aircraft gun. The aircraft took evasive action by drastically dropping altitude and escaping out to sea. The anti-aircraft gun was later recovered near the ATC building with a round jammed in its breech.

The Indian light aircraft carrier INS *Vikrant* was deployed 75 miles (121 km) from the coast of Goa to head off a possible amphibious operation on Goa and deter any foreign military intervention.

Commencement of hostilities

Military actions in Goa

Ground attack on Goa: North and North East sectors; On 11 December 1961, 17th Infantry Division and attached troops of the Indian Army were ordered to advance into Goa to capture Panaji and Mormugão. The main thrust on Panaji was to be made by the 50th Para Brigade Group, led by Brigadier Sagat Singh from the north. Another thrust was to be carried out by 63rd Indian Infantry Brigade from the east. A deceptive thrust,

in company strength, was to be made from the south along the Majali-Canacona-Margao axis.

Although the 50th Para Brigade was charged with merely assisting the main thrust conducted by the 17th Infantry, its units moved rapidly across minefields, roadblocks and four riverine obstacles to be the first to reach Panaji.

Hostilities at Goa began at 09:45 on 17 December 1961, when a unit of Indian troops attacked and occupied the town of Maulinguém in the north east, killing two Portuguese soldiers. The Portuguese 2nd EREC (*esquadrão de reconhecimento*—reconnaissance squadron), stationed near Maulinguém, asked for permission to engage the Indians, but permission was refused at about 13:45. During the afternoon of the 17th, the Portuguese command issued instructions that all orders to defending troops would be issued directly by headquarters, bypassing the local command outposts. This led to confusion in the chain of command. At 02:00 on 18 December, the 2nd EREC was sent to the town of Doromagogo to support the withdrawal of police forces present in the area, and were attacked by Indian Army units on their return journey.

At 04:00, the Indian assault commenced with artillery bombardment on Portuguese positions south of Maulinguém, launched on the basis of the false intelligence that the Portuguese had stationed heavy battle tanks in the area. By 04:30, Bicholim was under fire. At 04:40, the Portuguese forces destroyed the bridge at Bicholim and followed this with the destruction of the bridges at Chapora in Colvale and at Assonora at 05:00.

On the morning of 18 December, the 50th Para Brigade of the Indian Army moved into Goa in three columns.

- The eastern column comprised the 2nd Para Maratha advanced towards the town of Ponda in central Goa via Usgão.
- The central column consisting of the 1st Para Punjab advanced towards Panaji via the village of Banastari.
- The western column—the main thrust of the attack—comprised the 2nd Sikh Light Infantry as well as an armoured division which crossed the border at 06:30 and advanced on Tivim.

At 05:30, Portuguese troops left their barracks at Ponda in central Goa and marched towards the town of Usgão, in the direction of the advancing eastern column of the Indian 2nd Para Maratha, which was under the command of Major Dalip Singh Jind and included tanks of the Indian 7th Cavalry. At 09:00, these Portuguese troops reported that Indian troops had already covered half the distance to the town of Ponda.

By 10:00, Portuguese forces of the 1st EREC, faced with the advancing 2nd Sikh Light Infantry, began a south-bound withdrawal to the town of Mapuca where, by 12:00, they came under the risk of being surrounded by Indian forces. At 12:30, the 1st EREC began a retreat, making their way through the Indian forces, with their armoured cars firing ahead to cover the withdrawal of the personnel carrier vehicles. This unit relocated by ferry further south to the capital city of Panaji. At 13:30, just after the retreat of the 2nd EREC, the Portuguese destroyed the bridge at Banastarim, cutting off all road links to Panaji.

By 17:45, the forces of the 1st EREC and the 9th *Caçadores* Company of the Portuguese Battlegroup North had completed their ferry crossing of the Mandovi River to Panaji, just minutes ahead of the arrival of the Indian armoured forces. The Indian tanks had reached Betim, just across the Mandovi River from Panaji, without encountering any opposition. The 2nd Sikh Light Infantry joined it by 21:00, crossing over mines and demolished bridges en route. In the absence of orders, the unit stayed at Betim for the night.

At 20:00, a Goan by the name of Gregório Magno Antão crossed the Mandovi River from Panaji and delivered a ceasefire offer letter from Major Acácio Tenreiro of the Portuguese Army to Major Shivdev Singh Sidhu, the commanding officer of the Indian 7th Cavalry camped there. The letter read: "The Military Commander of the City of Goa states that he wishes to parley with the commander of the army of the Indian Union with respect to the surrender. Under these conditions, the Portuguese troops must immediately cease fire and the Indian troops do likewise in order to prevent the slaughter of the population and the destruction of the city."

The same night Major Shivdev Singh Sidhu with a force of the 7th Cavalry decided to take Fort Aguada and obtain its surrender, after receiving information that a number of supporters of the Indian Republic were held prisoners there. However, the Portuguese defenders of the fort had not yet received orders to surrender and responded by opening fire on the Indian forces, Major Sidhu and Captain Vinod Sehgal being killed in the firefight.

The order for Indian forces to cross the Mandovi River was received on the morning of 19 December, upon which two rifle companies of the 2nd Sikh Light Infantry advanced on Panaji at 07:30 and secured the town without facing any resistance. On orders from Brigadier Sagat Singh, the troops entering Panaji removed their steel helmets and donned the Parachute Regiment's maroon berets. Fort Aguada was also captured on that day, when the Indian 7th Cavalry attacked with assistance from the armoured division stationed at Betim and freed its political prisoners.

Advance from the east

Meanwhile, in the east, the 63rd Indian Infantry Brigade advanced in two columns. The right column, consisting of the 2nd Bihar Battalion, and the left column, consisting of the 3rd Sikh Battalion, linked up at the border town of Mollem and then advanced by separate routes on Ponda. By nightfall, the 2nd Bihar had reached the town of Candearpur, while the 3rd Sikh had reached Darbondara. Although neither column had encountered any resistance, their further progress was hampered because all bridges spanning the river had been destroyed.

The rear battalion was the 4th Sikh Infantry, which reached Candearpar in the early hours of 19 December, and not to be bogged down by the destruction of the Borim bridge, went across the Zuari river in their military tankers and then waded through chest-high water across a small stream to reach a dock known as Embarcadouro de Tembim in the village of Raia, from where a road connects to Margão, the administrative centre of southern Goa. Their rear battalion took some rest in

a cattle shed and on the grounds and the balcony of an adjacent house before proceeding to Margão by 12:00. From here, the column advanced towards the harbour of Mormugão. En route they encountered fierce resistance from a 500-strong Portuguese unit at the village of Verna, where they were joined by the 2nd Bihar. The Portuguese unit surrendered at 15:30 after fierce fighting, and the 4th Sikh then proceeded to Mormugão and Dabolim Airport, where the main body of the Portuguese Army awaited the Indians.

The 4th Rajput company staged a decoy attack south of Margão in order to mislead the Portuguese. This column overcame minefields, roadblocks and demolished bridges, and eventually went on to help secure the town of Margão.

Air raids over Goa

The first Indian raid was led by Wing Commander N.B. Menon on 18 December on the Dabolim Airport using 12 English Electric Canberra aircraft. 63,000 pounds of explosives were dropped within minutes, completely destroying the runway. In line with the mandate given by the Air Command, structures and facilities at the airfield were left undamaged.

The second Indian raid was conducted on the same target by eight Canberras led by Wing Commander Surinder Singh, again leaving the airport's terminal and other buildings untouched. Two civilian transport aircraft—a Lockheed Constellation belonging to the Portuguese airline TAP and a Douglas DC-4 belonging to the Goan airline TAIP—were parked on the apron. On the night of 18 December, the Portuguese used both aircraft to evacuate the families of some government and

military officials after airport workers had hastily recovered part of the heavily damaged runway that evening. The first aircraft to leave was the TAP Constellation, commanded by Manuel Correia Reis, which took off using only 700 metres; debris from the runway damaged the fuselage, causing 25 holes and a flat tire. To make the 'short take-off' possible, the pilots had jettisoned all the extra seats and other unwanted equipment. The TAIP DC-4 then also took off, piloted by TAIP Director Major Solano de Almeida. The two aircraft successfully used the cover of night and very low altitudes to break through Indian aerial patrols and escape to Karachi, Pakistan.

A third Indian raid was carried out by six Hawker Hunters, successfully targeting the wireless station at Bambolim with rockets and gun cannons.

The mandate to support ground troops was served by the de Havilland Vampires of No. 45 squadron, which patrolled the sector but did not receive any requests into action. In an incident of friendly fire, two Vampires fired rockets into the positions of the 2nd Sikh Light Infantry, injuring two soldiers, while elsewhere, Indian ground troops mistakenly opened fire on an IAF T-6 Texan, causing minimal damage.

In later years, commentators have maintained that India's intense air strikes against the airfields were uncalled-for, since none of the targeted airports had any military capabilities and they did not cater to any military aircraft. As such, the airfields were defenceless civilian targets. The Indian navy continues to control the Dabolim Airport, although it is also once more used as a civilian airport.

Storming of Anjidiv Island

Anjidiv was a small 1.5 km island of Portuguese India, then almost uninhabited, belonging to the District of Goa, although off the coast of the Indian state of Karnataka. On the island stood the ancient Anjidiv Fort, defended by a platoon of Goan soldiers of the Portuguese Army.

The Indian Naval Command assigned the task of securing Anjidiv to the cruiser *INS Mysore* and the frigate *INS Trishul*. Under covering artillery fire from the ships, Indian marines under the command of Lieutenant Arun Auditto stormed the island at 14:25 on 18 December and engaged the Portuguese garrison. The assault was repulsed by the Portuguese defenders, with seven Indian marines killed and 19 wounded. Among the Indian casualties were two officers.

The Portuguese defences were eventually overrun after fierce shelling from the Indian ships offshore. The island was secured by the Indians at 14:00 on the next day, all the Portuguese defenders being captured with the exception of two corporals and one private. Hidden in the rocks, one corporal surrendered on 19 December. The other was captured in the afternoon of 20 December, but not before launching hand grenades that injured several Indian marines. The last of the three, Goan private Manuel Caetano, became the last Portuguese soldier in India to be captured, on 22 December, after he had reached the Indian shore by swimming.

Naval battle at Mormugão harbour

On the morning of 18 December, the Portuguese sloop NRP *Afonso de Albuquerque* was anchored off Mormugao Harbour. Besides engaging Indian naval units, the ship was also tasked with providing a coastal artillery battery to defend the harbour and adjoining beaches, and providing vital radio communications with Lisbon after on-shore radio facilities had been destroyed in Indian airstrikes.

At 09:00, three Indian frigates led by the INS *Betwa* (F139) took up position off the harbour, awaiting orders to attack the *Afonso* and secure sea access to the port. At 11:00, Indian planes bombed Mormugão harbour. At 12:00, upon receiving clearance, the INS *Betwa* and the INS *Beas* (F137) entered the harbour and fired on the *Afonso* with their 4.5-inch guns while transmitting requests to surrender in morse code between shots. In response, the *Afonso* lifted anchor, headed out towards the enemy and returned fire with its 120 mm guns.

The *Afonso* was outnumbered by the Indians, and was at a severe disadvantage since it was in a confined position that restricted its maneuvering, and because its four 120mm guns could fire only two rounds a minute, as compared to the 16 rounds per minute of the guns aboard the Indian frigates. A few minutes into the exchange of fire, at 12:15, the *Afonso* took a direct hit in its control tower, injuring its weapons officer. At 12:25, an anti-personnel shrapnel bomb fired from an Indian vessel exploded directly over the ship, killing its radio officer and severely injuring its commander, Captain António da Cunha Aragão, after which First Officer Pinto da Cruz took

command of the vessel. The ship's propulsion system was also badly damaged in this attack.

At 12:35, the *Afonso* swerved 180 degrees and was run aground against Bambolim beach. At that time, against the commander's orders, a white flag was hoisted under instructions from the sergeant in charge of signals, but the flag coiled itself around the mast and as a result was not spotted by the Indians, who continued their barrage. The flag was immediately lowered.

Eventually at 12:50, after the *Afonso* had fired nearly 400 rounds at the Indians, hitting two of the Indian vessels, and had taken severe damage, the order was given to start abandoning ship. Under heavy fire directed at both the ship and the coast, non-essential crew including weapons staff left the ship and went ashore. They were followed at 13:10 by the rest of the crew, who, along with their injured commander, set fire to the ship and disembarked directly onto the beach. Following this, the commander was transferred by car to the hospital at Panaji. The NRP *Afonso de Albuquerque* lost 5 dead and 13 wounded in the battle.

The sloop's crew formally surrendered with the remaining Portuguese forces on 19 December 1961 at 20:30. As a gesture of goodwill, the commanders of the INS *Betwa* and the INS *Beas* later visited Captain Aragão as he lay recuperating in bed in Panaji.

The *Afonso*—having been renamed *Saravastri* by the Indian Navy—lay grounded at the beach near Dona Paula until 1962, when it was towed to Bombay and sold for scrap. Parts of the ship were recovered and are on display at the Naval Museum in

Mumbai. The Portuguese patrol boat NRP *Sirius*, under the command of Lieutenant Marques Silva, was also present at Goa. After observing *Afonso* running aground and not having communications from the Goa Naval Command, Lieutenant Marques Silva decided to scuttle the *Sirius*. This was done by damaging the propellers and making the boat hit the rocks. The eight men of the *Sirius*'s crew avoided being captured by the Indian forces and boarded a Greek freighter on which they reached Pakistan.

Military actions in Daman

Ground attack on Daman

Daman, approximately 72 km in area, is at the south end of Gujarat bordering Maharashtra, approximately 193 km north of Bombay. The countryside is broken and interspersed with marsh, salt pans, streams, paddy fields, coconut and palm groves. The river Daman Ganga splits the capital city of Daman (Damão in Portuguese) into halves—Nani Daman (*Damão Pequeno*) and Moti Daman (*Damão Grande*). The strategically important features were Daman Fort (fortress of São Jerónimo) and the air control tower of Daman Airport.

The Portuguese garrison in Daman was headed by Major António José da Costa Pinto (combining the roles of District Governor and military commander), with 360 soldiers of the Portuguese Army, 200 policemen and about 30 customs officials under him. The army forces consisted of two companies of *caçadores* (light infantry) and an artillery battery, organised as the battlegroup "Constantino de Bragança". The

artillery battery was armed with 87.6 mm guns, but these had insufficient and old ammunition. The Portuguese also placed a 20 mm anti-aircraft gun ten days before the invasion to protect the artillery. Daman had been secured with small minefields and defensive shelters had been built.

The advance on the enclave of Daman was conducted by the 1st Maratha Light Infantry Battalion under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel S.J.S. Bhonsle in a pre-dawn operation on 18 December. The plan was to capture Daman piecemeal in four phases, starting with the area of the airfield, then progressively the open countryside, Damão Pequeno and finally Damão Grande including the fort.

The advance commenced at 04:00 when one battalion and three companies of Indian soldiers progressed through the central area of the northern territory, aiming to seize the airfield. However, the surprise was lost when the Indian A Company tried to capture the control tower and suffered three casualties. The Portuguese lost one soldier dead and six taken captive. The Indian D Company captured a position named "Point 365" just before the next morning. At the crack of dawn, two sorties by Indian Air Force Mystère fighters struck Portuguese mortar positions and guns inside Moti Daman Fort.

At 04:30, the Indian artillery began to bombard Damão Grande. The artillery attack and transportation difficulties isolated the Portuguese command post there from the forces in Damão Pequeno. At 07:30, a Portuguese unit at the fortress of São Jerónimo fired mortars on Indian forces attempting to capture the airstrip.

At 11:30, Portuguese forces resisting an Indian advance on the eastern border at Varacunda ran out of ammunition and withdrew westwards to Catra. At 12:00, to delay the Indian advance following the withdrawal from Varacunda, the Portuguese artillery battery on the banks of the Rio Sandalcalo was ordered to open fire. The commander of the battery, Captain Felgueiras de Sousa, instead dismantled the guns and surrendered to the Indians. By 12:00, the airfield was assaulted by the Indian A and C companies simultaneously. In the ensuing exchange of fire the A Company lost one more soldier and seven were wounded.

By 13:00, the remaining Portuguese forces on the east border at Calicachigão exhausted their ammunition and retreated towards the coast. By 17:00, in the absence of resistance, the Indians had managed to occupy most of the territory, except the airfield and Damão Pequeno, where the Portuguese were making their last stand. By this time, the Indian Air Force had conducted six air attacks, severely demoralising the Portuguese forces. At 20:00, after a meeting between the Portuguese commanders, a delegation was dispatched to the Indian lines to open negotiations, but was fired on, and was forced to withdraw. A similar attempt by the artillery to surrender at 08:00 next day was also fired on.

The Indians assaulted the airfield the next morning, upon which the Portuguese surrendered at 11:00 without a fight. Garrison commander Major Costa Pinto, although wounded, was stretchered to the airfield, as the Indians were only willing to accept a surrender from him. Approximately 600 Portuguese soldiers and policemen (including 24 officers) were taken prisoner. The Indians suffered 4 dead and 14 wounded, while

the Portuguese suffered 10 dead and two wounded. The 1st Light Maratha Infantry was decorated for the battle with one VSM for the commanding officer, two Sena Medals and five Mentioned in Dispatches.

Daman air raids

In the Daman sector, Indian Mystères flew 14 sorties, continuously harassing Portuguese artillery positions.

Naval action at Daman

Like the *Vega* in Diu, the patrol boat NRP *Antares*—based at Daman under the command of 2nd Lieutenant Abreu Brito—was ordered to sail out and fight the imminent Indian invasion. The boat stayed in position from 07:00 on 18 December and remained a mute witness to repeated air strikes followed by ground invasion until 19:20, when it lost all communications with land.

With all information pointing to total occupation of all Portuguese enclaves in India, Lieutenant Brito decided to save his crew and vessel by escaping; the *Vega* traversed 530 miles (850 km), escaping detection by Indian forces, and arrived at Karachi at 20:00 on 20 December.

Military actions in Diu

Ground attack on Diu

Diu is a 13.8 km by 4.6 km island (area about 40 km) at the south tip of Gujarat. The island is separated from the

mainland by a narrow channel running through a swamp. The channel could only be used by fishing boats and small craft. No bridges crossed the channels at the time of hostilities. The Portuguese garrison in Diu was headed by Major Fernando de Almeida e Vasconcelos (district governor and military commander), with around 400 soldiers and police officers, organised as the battlegroup "António da Silveira".

Diu was attacked on 18 December from the north west along Kob Forte by two companies of the 20th Rajput Battalion—with the capture of the Diu Airfield being the primary objective—and from the northeast along Gogal and Amdepur by the Rajput B Company and the 4th Madras Battalion.

These Indian Army units ignored requests from Wing Commander M.P.O. "Micky" Blake, planning-in-charge of the Indian Air Force operations in Diu, to attack only on first light when close air support would be available. The Portuguese defences repulsed the attack backed by 87.6mm artillery and mortars, inflicting heavy losses on the Indians. The first attack was made by the 4th Madras on a police border post at 01:30 on 18 December at Gogol and was repulsed by 13 Portuguese police officers. Another attempt by the 4th Madras at 02:00 was again repulsed, this time backed with Portuguese 87.5mm artillery and mortar which suffered due to poor quality of munitions. By 04:00, ten of the original 13 Portuguese defenders at Gogol had been wounded and were evacuated to a hospital. At 05:30, the Portuguese artillery launched a fresh attack on the 4th Madras assaulting Gogol and forced their retreat.

Meanwhile, at 03:00, two companies of the 20th Rajput attempted to cross a muddy swamp separating them from the Portuguese forces at Passo Covo under cover of dark on rafts made of bamboo cots tied to oil barrels. The attempt was to establish a bridgehead and capture the airfield. This attack was repulsed, with losses on the Indian side, by a well entrenched unit of Portuguese soldiers armed with small automatic weapons, sten guns as well as light and medium machine guns. According to Indian sources this unit included between 125 and 130 soldiers, but according to Portuguese sources this post was defended by only eight soldiers, but this number doesn't support the total number of weapon operators.

As the Rajputs reached the middle of the creek, the Portuguese on Diu opened fire with two medium and two light machine-guns, capsizing some of the rafts. Major Mal Singh of the Indian Army along with five men pressed on his advance and crossed the creek. On reaching the far bank, he and his men assaulted the light machine gun trenches at Fort-De-Cova and eliminated the weapon operators. The Portuguese medium machine gun fire from another position wounded the officer and two of his men. However, with the efforts of company Havildar Major Mohan Singh and two other men, the three wounded were evacuated back across the creek to safety. As dawn approached, the Portuguese increased the intensity of fire and the battalion's water crossing equipment suffered extensive damage. As a result, the Indian battalion was ordered to fall back to Kob village by first light.

Another assault at 05:00 was similarly repulsed by the Portuguese defenders. At 06:30, Portuguese forces retrieved rafts abandoned by the 20th Rajput, recovered ammunition left

behind and rescued a wounded Indian soldier, who was given treatment.

At 07:00, with the onset of dawn, Indian air strikes began, forcing the Portuguese to retreat from Passo Covo to the town of Malala. By 09:00 the Portuguese unit at Gogol also retreated, allowing the Rajput B Company (who replaced the 4th Madras) to advance under heavy artillery fire and occupy the town. By 10:15, the Indian cruiser INS *Delhi*, anchored off Diu, began to bombard targets on the shore. At 12:45, Indian jets fired a rocket at a mortar at Diu Fortress causing a fire near a munitions dump, forcing the Portuguese to order the evacuation of the fortress—a task completed by 14:15 under heavy bombardment from the Indians.

At 18:00, the Portuguese commanders agreed in a meeting that in view of repeated military advances with naval and air strikes, along with the inability to establish contact with headquarters in Goa or Lisbon, there was no way to pursue an effective defence and decided to surrender to the Indian military. On 19 December, by 12:00, the Portuguese formally surrendered. The Indians took 403 prisoners, which included the Governor of the island along with 18 officers and 43 sergeants.

When surrendering to the Indians, the Diu Governor stated that he could have stalled the army's advances for a few days to weeks, but he had no answer to the Indian Air Force and Navy. The Indian Air Force was also present at the ceremony and was represented by Gp Capt Godkhindi, Wing Cmdr Micky Blake and Sqn Ldr Nobby Clarke. 7 Portuguese soldiers were killed in the battle.

Major Mal Singh and Sepoy Hakam Singh of the Indian army were awarded Ashok Chakra (Class III).

On 19 December, the 4th Madras C Company landed on the island of Pani Khota off Diu, where a group of 13 Portuguese soldiers surrendered to them there.

The Diu air raids

The Indian air operations in the Diu Sector were entrusted to the Armaments Training Wing led by Wg Cdr Micky Blake. The first air attacks were made at dawn on 18 December and were aimed at destroying Diu's fortifications facing the mainland. Throughout the rest of the day, the Air Force had at least two aircraft in the air at any time, giving close support to advancing Indian infantry. During the morning, the air force attacked and destroyed Diu Airfield's ATC as well as parts of Diu Fort. On orders from Tactical Air Command located at Pune, a sortie of two Toofanis attacked and destroyed the airfield runway with 4 1000 lb Mk 9 bombs. A second sortie aimed at the runway and piloted by Wg Cdr Blake himself was aborted when Blake detected what he reported as people waving white flags. In subsequent sorties, PM Ramachandran of the Indian Air Force attacked and destroyed the Portuguese ammunition dump as well a patrol boat N.R.P. Vega that attempted to escape from Diu.

In the absence of any Portuguese air presence, Portuguese ground-based anti-aircraft units attempted to offer resistance to the Indian raids, but were overwhelmed and quickly silenced, leaving complete air superiority to the Indians.

Continued attacks forced the Portuguese governor of Diu to surrender.

Naval action at Diu

The Indian cruiser INS *Delhi* was anchored off the coast of Diu and fired a barrage from its 6-inch guns at the Portuguese occupied Diu Fortress. The Commanding Officer of the Indian Air Force operating in the area reported that some of the shells fired from the *New Delhi* were bouncing off the beach and exploding on the Indian mainland. However, no casualties were reported from this.

At 04:00 on 18 December, the Portuguese patrol boat NRP *Vega* encountered the *New Delhi* around 12 miles (19 km) off the coast of Diu, and was attacked with heavy machine gun fire. Staying out of range, the boat had no casualties and minimal damage, the boat withdrew to the port at Diu.

At 07:00, news was received that the Indian invasion had commenced, and the commander of the *Vega*, 2nd Lt Oliveira e Carmo was ordered to sail out and fight until the last round of ammunition. At 07:30 the crew of the *Vega* spotted two Indian aircraft led by Flt. Lt. PM Ramachandran on patrol missions and opened fire on them with the ship's 20mm Oerlikon gun. In retaliation the Indian aircraft attacked the *Vega* twice, killing the captain and the gunner and forcing the rest of the crew to abandon the boat and swim ashore, where they were taken prisoners of war.

UN attempts at ceasefire

On 18 December, a Portuguese request was made to the UN Security Council for a debate on the conflict in Goa. The request was approved when the bare minimum of seven members supported the request (the US, UK, France, Turkey, Chile, Ecuador, and Nationalist China), two opposed (the Soviet Union and Ceylon), and two abstained (the United Arab Republic and Liberia).

Opening the debate, Portugal's delegate, Vasco Vieira Garin, said that Portugal had consistently shown her peaceful intentions by refraining from any counter-action to India's numerous "provocations" on the Goan border. Garin also stated that Portuguese forces, though "vastly outnumbered by the invading forces," were putting up "stiff resistance" and "fighting a delaying action and destroying communications in order to halt the advance of the enemy." In response, India's delegate, Jha said that the "elimination of the last vestiges of colonialism in India" was an "article of faith" for the Indian people, "Security Council or no Security Council." He went on to describe Goa, Daman, and Diu as "an inalienable part of India unlawfully occupied by Portugal."

In the ensuing debate, the US delegate, Adlai Stevenson, strongly criticised India's use of force to resolve her dispute with Portugal, stressing that such resort to violent means was against the charter of the UN. He stated that condoning such acts of armed forces would encourage other nations to resort to similar solutions to their own disputes, and would lead to the death of the United Nations. In response, the Soviet delegate, Valerian Zorin, argued that the Goan question was wholly

within India's domestic jurisdiction and could not be considered by the Security Council. He also drew attention to Portugal's disregard for UN resolutions calling for the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples.

Following the debate, the delegates of Liberia, Ceylon and the U.A.R. presented a resolution which: (1) stated that "the enclaves claimed by Portugal in India constitute a threat to international peace and security and stand in the way of the unity of the Republic of India; (2) asked the security Council to reject the Portuguese charge of aggression against India; and (3) called upon Portugal "to terminate hostile action and cooperate with India in the liquidation of her colonial possessions in India." This resolution was supported only by the Soviet Union, the other seven members opposing.

After the defeat of the Afro-Asian resolution, a resolution was presented by France, Turkey, the United Kingdom and the United States which: (1) Called for the immediate cessation of hostilities; (2) Called upon India to withdraw her forces immediately to "the positions prevailing before 17 Dec 1961." (3) Urged India and Portugal "to work out a permanent solution of their differences by peaceful means in accordance with the principles embodied in the Charter"; and (4) Requested the U.N. Secretary-General "to provide such assistance as may be appropriate."

This resolution received seven votes in favour (the four sponsors and Chile, Ecuador, and Nationalist China) and four against (the Soviet Union, Ceylon, Liberia, and the United Arab Republic). It was thus defeated by the Soviet veto. In a statement after the vote, Mr. Stevenson said that the "fateful"

Goa debate could have been be "the first act of a drama" which could have ended in the death of the United Nations.

Portuguese surrender

By the evening of 18 December, most of Goa had been overrun by advancing Indian forces, and a large party of more than two thousand Portuguese soldiers had taken position at the military base at Alparqueiros at the entrance to the port town of Vasco da Gama. Per the Portuguese strategy code named *Plano Sentinela* the defending forces were to make their last stand at the harbour, holding out against the Indians until Portuguese naval reinforcements could arrive. Orders delivered from the Portuguese President called for a scorched earth policy—that Goa was to be destroyed before it was given up to the Indians. Canadian political scientist Antonio Rangel Bandeira has argued that the sacrifice of Goa was an elaborate public relations stunt calculated to rally support for Portugal's wars in Africa.

Despite his orders from Lisbon, Governor General Manuel António Vassalo e Silva took stock of the numerical superiority of the Indian troops, as well as the food and ammunition supplies available to his forces and took the decision to surrender. He later described his orders to destroy Goa as "*um sacrifício inútil*" (a useless sacrifice).

In a communication to all Portuguese forces under his command, he stated, "Having considered the defence of the Peninsula of Mormugão ... from aerial, naval and ground fire of the enemy and ... having considered the difference between the forces and the resources ... the situation does not allow myself

to proceed with the fight without great sacrifice of the lives of the inhabitants of Vasco da Gama, I have decided with ... my patriotism well present, to get in touch with the enemy ... I order all my forces to cease-fire."

The official Portuguese surrender was conducted in a formal ceremony held at 2030 hours on 19 December when Governor General Manuel António Vassalo e Silva signed the instrument of surrender bringing to an end 451 years of Portuguese Rule in Goa. In all, 4,668 personnel were taken prisoner by the Indians—a figure which included military and civilian personnel, Portuguese, Africans and Goan.

Upon the surrender of the Portuguese governor general, Goa, Daman and Diu was declared a federally administered Union Territory placed directly under the President of India, and Major-General K. P. Candeth was appointed as its military governor. The war had lasted two days, and had cost 22 Indian and 30 Portuguese lives.

Those Indian forces who served within the disputed territories for 48 hours, or flew at least one operational sortie during the conflict, received a General Service Medal 1947 with the *Goa 1961* bar.

Portuguese actions post-hostilities

When they received news of the fall of Goa, the Portuguese government formally severed all diplomatic links with India and refused to recognise the incorporation of the seized territories into the Indian Republic. An offer of Portuguese citizenship was instead made to all Goan natives who wished to

emigrate to Portugal rather than remain under Indian rule. This was amended in 2006 to include only those who had been born before 19 December 1961. Later, in a show of defiance, Prime Minister Salazar's government offered a reward of US\$10,000 for the capture of Brigadier Sagat Singh, the commander of the maroon berets of India's parachute regiment who were the first troops to enter Panaji, Goa's capital.

Lisbon went virtually into mourning, and Christmas celebrations were extremely muted. Cinemas and theatres shut down as tens of thousands of Portuguese marched in a silent parade from Lisbon's city hall to the cathedral, escorting the relics of St. Francis Xavier.

Salazar, while addressing the Portuguese National Assembly on 3 January 1962, invoked the principle of national sovereignty, as defined in the legal framework of the Constitution of the Estado Novo. "We can not negotiate, not without denying and betraying our own, the cession of national territory and the transfer of populations that inhabit them to foreign sovereigns," said Salazar. He went on to state that the UN's failure to halt aggression against Portugal, showed that effective power in the U.N. had passed to the Communist and Afro-Asian countries. Dr. Salazar also accused Britain of delaying for a week her reply to Portugal's request to be allowed the use of certain airfields. "Had it not been for this delay," he said, "we should certainly have found alternative routes and we could have rushed to India reinforcements in men and material for a sustained defence of the territory."

Hinting that Portugal would yet be vindicated, Salazar went on to state that "difficulties will arise for both sides when the

programme of the Indianization of Goa begins to clash with its inherent culture ... It is therefore to be expected that many Goans will wish to escape to Portugal from the inevitable consequences of the invasion."

In the months after the conflict, the Portuguese Government used broadcasts on Emissora Nacional, the Portuguese national radio station, to urge Goans to resist and oppose the Indian administration. An effort was made to create clandestine resistance movements in Goa, and within Goan diaspora communities across the world to use general resistance and armed rebellion to weaken the Indian presence in Goa. The campaign had the full support of the Portuguese government with the ministries of defence, foreign affairs, army, navy and finance involved. A plan was chalked out called the 'Plano Gralha' covering Goa, Daman and Diu, which called for paralysing port operations at Mormugao and Bombay by planting bombs in some of the ships anchored at the ports.

On 20 June 1964, Casimiro Monteiro, a Portuguese PIDE agent of Goan descent, along with Ismail Dias, a Goan settled in Portugal, executed a series of bombings in Goa.

Relations between India and Portugal thawed only in 1974, when, following an anti-colonial military coup d'état and the fall of the authoritarian rule in Lisbon, Goa was finally recognised as part of India, and steps were taken to re-establish diplomatic relations with India. On 31 December 1974, a treaty was signed between India and Portugal with the Portuguese recognising full sovereignty of India over Goa, Daman, Diu, Dadra and Nagar Haveli. In 1992, Portuguese President Mário Soares became the first Portuguese head of

state to visit Goa after its annexation by India, following Indian President Ramaswamy Venkataraman's visit to Portugal in 1990.

Internment and repatriation of the prisoners of war

After they surrendered, the Portuguese soldiers were interned by the Indian Army at their own military camps at Navelim, Aguada, Pondá and Alparqueiros under harsh conditions which included sleeping on cement floors and hard manual labour. By January 1962, most prisoners of war had been transferred to the newly established camp at Ponda where conditions were substantially better.

Portuguese non-combatants present in Goa at the surrender—which included Mrs Vassalo e Silva, wife of the Portuguese Governor General of Goa—were transported by 29 December to Mumbai, from where they were repatriated to Portugal. Manuel Vassalo e Silva, however, remained along with approximately 3,300 Portuguese combatants as prisoners in Goa.

Air Marshal S Raghavendran, who met some of the captured Portuguese soldiers, wrote in his memoirs several years later "I have never seen such a set of troops looking so miserable in my life. Short, not particularly well built and certainly very unsoldierlike."

In one incident, recounted by Lieutenant Francisco Cabral Couto (now retired general), on 19 March 1962 some of the prisoners tried to escape the Ponda camp in a garbage truck.

The attempt was foiled, and the Portuguese officers in charge of the escapees were threatened with court martial and execution by the Indians. This situation was defused by the timely intervention of Ferreira da Silva, a Jesuit military chaplain. Following the foiled escape attempt, Captain Carlos Azeredo (now retired general) was beaten with rifle butts by four Indian soldiers while a gun was pointed at him, on the orders of Captain Naik, the 2nd Camp Commander. The beating was in retaliation for Azeredo's telling Captain Naik to "Go to Hell", and was serious enough to make him lose consciousness and cause severe contusions. Captain Naik was later punished by the Indian Army for violating the Geneva Convention.

During the internment of the Portuguese prisoners of war at various camps around Goa, the prisoners were visited by large numbers of Goans—described by Captain Azeredo as "Goan friends, acquaintances, or simply anonymous persons"—who offered the internees cigarettes, biscuits, tea, medicines and money. This surprised the Indian military authorities, who first limited the visits to twice a week, and then only to representatives of the Red Cross.

The captivity lasted for six months "thanks to the stupid stubbornness of Lisbon" (according to Capt. Carlos Azeredo). The Portuguese Government insisted that the prisoners be repatriated by Portuguese aircraft—a demand that was rejected by the Indian Government who instead insisted on aircraft from a neutral country. The negotiations were delayed even further when Salazar ordered the detention of 1200 Indians in Mozambique allegedly as a bargaining chip in exchange for Portuguese prisoners.

By May 1962, most of the prisoners had been repatriated—being first flown to Karachi, Pakistan, in chartered French aircraft, and then sent off to Lisbon by three ships: *Vera Cruz*, *Pátria* and *Moçambique*. On arrival at the Tejo in Portugal, returning Portuguese servicemen were taken into custody by military police at gunpoint without immediate access to their families who had arrived to receive them. Following intense questioning and interrogations, the officers were charged with direct insubordination on having refused to comply with directives not to surrender to the Indians. On 22 March 1963, the governor general, the military commander, his chief of staff, one naval captain, six majors, a sub lieutenant and a sergeant were cashiered by the council of ministers for cowardice and expelled from military service. Four captains, four lieutenants and a lieutenant commander were suspended for six months. Ex-governor Manuel António Vassalo e Silva had a hostile reception when he returned to Portugal. He was subsequently court martialed for failing to follow orders, expelled from the military and sent into exile. He returned to Portugal only in 1974, after the fall of the regime, and was given back his military status. He was later able to conduct a state visit to Goa, where he was given a warm reception.

International reaction to the invasion and annexation of Goa

Support

African states: Before the invasion the press speculated about international reaction to military action and recalled the recent

charge by African nations that India was "too soft" on Portugal and was thus "dampening the enthusiasm of freedom fighters in other countries". Many African countries, themselves former European colonies, reacted positively to the capture of Goa by the Indians. Radio Ghana termed it as the "Liberation of Goa" and went on to state that the people of Ghana would "long for the day when our downtrodden brethren in Angola and other Portuguese territories in Africa are liberated." Adelino Gwambe, the leader of the Mozambique National Democratic Union stated: "We fully support the use of force against Portuguese butchers."

Also in 1961, the tiny Portuguese enclave of Fort of São João Baptista de Ajudá was annexed by the Republic of Dahomey (now Benin). Portugal recognised the annexation in 1975.

Soviet Union

The future leader of the Soviet Union, Leonid Brezhnev, who was touring India at the time of the war, made several speeches applauding the Indian action. In a farewell message, he urged Indians to ignore Western indignation as it came "from those who are accustomed to strangle the peoples striving for independence ... and from those who enrich themselves from colonialist plunder". Nikita Khrushchev, the de facto Soviet leader, telegraphed Nehru stating that there was "unanimous acclaim" from every Soviet citizen for "Friendly India". The USSR had earlier vetoed a UN security council resolution condemning the Indian annexation of Goa.

Arab states

The United Arab Republic expressed its full support for India's "legitimate efforts to regain its occupied territory". A Moroccan Government spokesman said that "India has been extraordinarily patient and a non-violent country has been driven to violence by Portugal"; while Tunisia's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of Tunisia, Sadok Mokaddem expressed the hope that "the liberation of Goa will bring nearer the end of the Portuguese colonial regime in Africa." Similar expressions of support for India were forthcoming from other Arab countries.

Ceylon

Full support for India's action was expressed in Ceylon, where Prime Minister Sirimavo Bandaranaike issued an order on 18 December directing that "transport carrying troops and equipment for the Portuguese in Goa shall not be permitted the use of Ceylon's seaports and airports." Ceylon went on, along with delegates from Liberia and the UAR, to present a resolution in the UN in support of India's annexation of Goa.

Condemnation

United States

The United States' official reaction to the annexation of Goa was delivered by Adlai Stevenson in the United Nations Security Council, where he condemned the armed action of the

Indian government and demanded that all Indian forces be unconditionally withdrawn from Goan soil.

To express its displeasure with the Indian action in Goa, the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee attempted, over the objections of President John F. Kennedy, to cut the 1962 foreign aid appropriation to India by 25 percent.

Referring to the perception, especially in the West, that India had previously been lecturing the world about the virtues of nonviolence, President Kennedy told the Indian ambassador to the US, "You spend the last fifteen years preaching morality to us, and then you go ahead and act the way any normal country would behave ... People are saying, the preacher has been caught coming out of the brothel."

In an article titled "India, The Aggressor", *The New York Times* on 19 December 1961, stated "With his invasion of Goa Prime Minister Nehru has done irreparable damage to India's good name and to the principles of international morality."

Life International, in its issue dated 12 February 1962, carried an article titled "Symbolic pose by Goa's Governor" in which it expressed its vehement condemnation of the military action.

The world's initial outrage at pacifist India's resort to military violence for conquest has subsided into resigned disdain. And in Goa, a new Governor strikes a symbolic pose before portraits of men who had administered the prosperous Portuguese enclave for 451 years. He is K. P. Candeth, commanding India's 17th Infantry Division, and as the very model of a modern major general, he betrayed no sign that he is finding Goans less than happy about their "liberation". Goan girls refuse to

dance with Indian officers. Goan shops have been stripped bare by luxury-hungry Indian soldiers, and Indian import restrictions prevent replacement. Even in India, doubts are heard. "India", said respected Chakravarti Rajagopalachari, leader of the Swatantra Party, "has totally lost the moral power to raise her voice against the use of military power"

- —□ "Symbolic pose by Goa's Governor", *Life International*, 12 February 1962

United Kingdom

Commonwealth Relations Secretary, Duncan Sandys told the House of Commons on 18 December 1961 that while the UK Government had long understood the desire of the Indian people to incorporate Goa, Daman, and Diu in the Indian Republic, and their feeling of impatience that the Portuguese Government had not followed the example of Britain and France in relinquishing their Indian possessions, he had to "make it plain that H.M. Government deeply deplores the decision of the Government of India to use military force to attain its political objectives."

The Leader of the Opposition in the House of Commons Hugh Gaitskell of the Labour Party also expressed "profound regret" that India should have resorted to force in her dispute with Portugal, although the Opposition recognised that the existence of Portuguese colonies on the Indian mainland had long been an anachronism and that Portugal should have abandoned them long since in pursuance of the example set by Britain and France. Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations, Sir Patrick Dean, stated in the

UN that Britain had been "shocked and dismayed" at the outbreak of hostilities.

Netherlands

A Foreign Ministry spokesman in The Hague regretted that India, "of all countries," had resorted to force to gain her ends, particularly as India had always championed the principles of the U.N. Charter and consistently opposed the use of force to achieve national purposes. Fears were expressed in the Dutch Press lest the Indian attack on Goa might encourage Indonesia to make a similar attack on West New Guinea. On 27 December 1961, Dutch ambassador to the United States, Herman Van Roijen asked the US Government if their military support in the form of the USN's 7th Fleet would be forthcoming in case of such an attack.

Brazil

The Brazilian government's reaction to the annexation of Goa was one of staunch solidarity with Portugal, reflecting earlier statements by Brazilian presidents that their country stood firmly with Portugal anywhere in the world and that ties between Brazil and Portugal were built on ties of blood and sentiment. Former Brazilian President Juscelino Kubitschek, and long time friend and supporter of Portuguese PM Salazar, stated to Indian PM Nehru that "Seventy Million Brazilians could never understand, nor accept, an act of violence against Goa." In a speech in Rio de Janeiro on 10 June 1962, Brazilian congressman Gilberto Freyre commented on the annexation of Goa by declaring that "a Portuguese wound is Brazilian pain".

Shortly after the conflict, the new Brazilian ambassador to India, Mário Guimarães, stated to the Portuguese ambassador to Greece that it was "necessary for the Portuguese to comprehend that the age of colonialism is over". Guimarães dismissed the Portuguese ambassador's argument that Portuguese colonialism was based on miscegenation and the creation of multiracial societies, stating that this was "not enough of a reason to prevent independence".

Pakistan

In a statement released on 18 December, the Pakistani Foreign Ministry spokesman described the Indian attack on Goa as "naked militarism". The statement emphasised that Pakistan stood for the settlement of international disputes by negotiation through the United Nations and stated that the proper course was a "U.N.-sponsored plebiscite to elicit from the people of Goa their wishes on the future of the territory." The Pakistani statement (issued on 18 December) continued: "The world now knows that India has double standards One set of principles seem to apply to India, another set to non-India. This is one more demonstration of the fact that India remains violent and aggressive at heart, whatever the pious statements made from time to time by its leaders."

"The lesson from the Indian action on Goa is of practical interest on the question of Kashmir. Certainly the people of Kashmir could draw inspiration from what the Indians are reported to have stated in the leaflets they dropped ... on Goa. The leaflets stated that it was India's task to 'defend the honour and security of the Motherland from which the people of Goa had been separated far too long' and which the people

of Goa, largely by their own efforts could again make their own. We hope the Indians will apply the same logic to Kashmir. Now the Indians can impress their electorate with having achieved military glory. The mask is off. Their much-proclaimed theories of non-violence, secularism, and democratic methods stand exposed."

In a letter to the US President on 2 January 1962, Pakistani President General Ayub Khan stated: "My Dear President, The forcible taking of Goa by India has demonstrated what we in Pakistan have never had any illusions about—that India would not hesitate to attack if it were in her interest to do so and if she felt that the other side was too weak to resist."

Ambivalence

People's Republic of China

In an official statement issued on 19 December, the Chinese government stressed its "resolute support" for the struggle of the people of Asia, Africa and Latin America against "imperialist colonialism". However, the Hong Kong Communist newspaper *Ta Kung Pao* described the attack on Goa as "a desperate attempt by Mr. Nehru to regain his sagging prestige among the Afro-Asian nations." The *Ta Kung Pao* article – published before the statement from the Chinese Government – conceded that Goa was legitimately part of Indian territory and that the Indian people were entitled to take whatever measures were necessary to recover it. At the same time, however, the paper ridiculed Mr. Nehru for choosing "the world's tiniest imperialist country" to achieve his aim and asserted that "internal unrest, the failure of Nehru's anti-China campaign,

and the forthcoming election forced him to take action against Goa to please the Indian people."

The Catholic Church

The Roman Catholic Archbishop of Goa and Daman and Patriarch of the East Indies was always a Portuguese-born cleric; at the time of the annexation, José Vieira Alvernaz was archbishop, and days earlier Dom José Pedro da Silva had been nominated by the Holy See as coadjutor bishop with right to succeed Alvernaz. After the annexation, Silva remained in Portugal and was never consecrated; in 1965 he became bishop of Viseu in Portugal. Alvernaz retired to the Azores but remained titular Patriarch until resigning in 1975 after Portuguese recognition of the 1961 annexation.

Although the Vatican did not voice its reaction to the annexation of Goa, it delayed the appointment of a native head of the Goan Church until the inauguration of the Second Vatican Council in Rome, when Msgr Francisco Xavier da Piedade Rebelo was consecrated Bishop and Vicar Apostolic of Goa in 1963. He was succeeded by Raul Nicolau Gonçalves in 1972, who became the first native-born Patriarch in 1978.

Legality

Upon independence in 1947 India had accorded recognition to the Portuguese sovereignty over Goa. After invading Goa India's case was built around the illegality of colonial acquisitions. This argument was correct according to the legal norms of the twentieth century, but did not hold to the standards of sixteenth century international law. India gained

sympathy from much of the international community, but this did not, however, signify any legal support for the invasion. The Supreme Court of India recognised the validity of the annexation and rejected the continued applicability of the law of occupation. In a treaty with retroactive effect, Portugal recognised Indian sovereignty in 1974. Under the *jus cogens* rule forceful annexations including the annexation of Goa are held as illegal since they have taken place after the UN Charter came into force. A later treaty can not justify it. Sharon Korman argues that the principle of self-determination may bend the rule to accommodate the new reality but it will not change the illegal aspect of the original annexation.

Chapter 48

Indo-Pakistani War of 1965

The **Indo-Pakistani War of 1965** was a culmination of skirmishes that took place between April 1965 and September 1965 between Pakistan and India. The conflict began following Pakistan's Operation Gibraltar, which was designed to infiltrate forces into Jammu and Kashmir to precipitate an insurgency against Indian rule. India retaliated by launching a full-scale military attack on West Pakistan. The seventeen-day war caused thousands of casualties on both sides and witnessed the largest engagement of armored vehicles and the largest tank battle since World War II. Hostilities between the two countries ended after a ceasefire was declared through UNSC Resolution 211 following a diplomatic intervention by the Soviet Union and the United States, and the subsequent issuance of the Tashkent Declaration. Much of the war was fought by the countries' land forces in Kashmir and along the border between India and Pakistan. This war saw the largest amassing of troops in Kashmir since the Partition of India in 1947, a number that was overshadowed only during the 2001–2002 military standoff between India and Pakistan. Most of the battles were fought by opposing infantry and armoured units, with substantial backing from air forces, and naval operations.

India had the upper hand over Pakistan when the ceasefire was declared. Although the two countries fought to a standoff, the conflict is seen as a strategic and political defeat for Pakistan, as it had neither succeeded in fomenting insurrection in Kashmir nor had it been able to gain meaningful support at an international level.

Internationally, the war was viewed in the context of the greater Cold War, and resulted in a significant geopolitical shift in the subcontinent. Before the war, the United States and the United Kingdom had been major material allies of both India and Pakistan, as their primary suppliers of military hardware and foreign developmental aid. During and after the conflict, both India and Pakistan felt betrayed by the perceived lack of support by the western powers for their respective positions; those feelings of betrayal were increased with the imposition of an American and British embargo on military aid to the opposing sides. As a consequence, India and Pakistan openly developed closer relationships with the Soviet Union and China, respectively. The perceived negative stance of the western powers during the conflict, and during the 1971 war, has continued to affect relations between the West and the subcontinent. In spite of improved relations with the U.S. and Britain since the end of the Cold War, the conflict generated a deep distrust of both countries within the subcontinent which to an extent lingers to this day.

Pre-war escalation

Since the Partition of British India in 1947, Pakistan and India remained in contention over several issues. Although the Kashmir conflict was the predominant issue dividing the nations, other border disputes existed, most notably over the Rann of Kutch, a barren region in the Indian state of Gujarat. The issue first arose in 1956 which ended with India regaining control over the disputed area. Pakistani patrols began patrolling in territory controlled by India in January 1965, which was followed by attacks by both countries on each

other's posts on 8 April 1965. Initially involving border police from both nations, the disputed area soon witnessed intermittent skirmishes between the countries' armed forces. In June 1965, British Prime Minister Harold Wilson successfully persuaded both countries to end hostilities and set up a tribunal to resolve the dispute. The verdict, which came later in 1968, saw Pakistan awarded 910 square kilometres (350 square miles) of the Rann of Kutch, as against its original claim of 9,100 km (3,500 sq mi).

After its success in the Rann of Kutch, Pakistan, under the leadership of General Ayub Khan, believed the Indian Army would be unable to defend itself against a quick military campaign in the disputed territory of Kashmir as the Indian military had suffered a loss to China in 1962 in the Sino-Indian War. Pakistan believed that the population of Kashmir was generally discontented with Indian rule and that a resistance movement could be ignited by a few infiltrating saboteurs. Pakistan attempted to ignite the resistance movement by means of a covert infiltration, code-named Operation Gibraltar. The Pakistani infiltrators were soon discovered, however, their presence reported by local Kashmiris, and the operation ended unsuccessfully.

War

On 5 August 1965 between 26,000 and 33,000 Pakistani soldiers crossed the Line of Control dressed as Kashmiri locals headed for various areas within Kashmir. Indian forces, tipped off by the local populace, crossed the cease fire line on 15 August.

Initially, the Indian Army met with considerable success, capturing three important mountain positions after a prolonged artillery barrage. By the end of August, however, both sides had relative progress; Pakistan had made progress in areas such as Tithwal, Uri and Poonch and India had captured the Haji Pir pass, 8 km into Pakistan administered Kashmir.

On 1 September 1965, Pakistan launched a counterattack, called Operation Grand Slam, with the objective to capture the vital town of Akhnoor in Jammu, which would sever communications and cut off supply routes to Indian troops. Ayub Khan calculated that "Hindu morale would not stand more than a couple of hard blows at the right time and place" although by this time Operation Gibraltar had failed and India had captured the Haji Pir Pass. At 03:30 on 1 September 1965, the entire Chhamb area came under massive artillery bombardment. Pakistan had launched operation Grand Slam and India's Army Headquarter was taken by surprise. Attacking with an overwhelming ratio of troops and technically superior tanks, Pakistan made gains against Indian forces, who were caught unprepared and suffered heavy losses. India responded by calling in its air force to blunt the Pakistani attack. The next day, Pakistan retaliated, its air force attacked Indian forces and air bases in both Kashmir and Punjab. India's decision to open up the theatre of attack into Pakistani Punjab forced the Pakistani army to relocate troops engaged in the operation to defend Punjab. Operation Grand Slam therefore failed, as the Pakistan Army was unable to capture Akhnoor; it became one of the turning points in the war when India decided to relieve pressure on its troops in Kashmir by attacking Pakistan further south. In the valley, another area of

strategic importance was Kargil. Kargil town was in Indian hands but Pakistan occupied high ground overlooking Kargil and Srinagar-Leh road. However, after the launch of a massive anti-infiltration operation by the Indian army, the Pakistani infiltrators were forced out of that area in the month of August.

India crossed the International Border on the Western front on 6 September. On 6 September, the 15th Infantry Division of the Indian Army, under World War II veteran Major General Niranjana Prasad, battled a massive counterattack by Pakistan near the west bank of the Ichhogil Canal (BRB Canal), which was a *de facto* border of India and Pakistan. The General's entourage itself was ambushed and he was forced to flee his vehicle. A second, this time successful, attempt to cross the Ichhogil Canal was made over the bridge in the village of Barki (Battle of Burki), just east of Lahore. These developments brought the Indian Army within the range of Lahore International Airport. As a result, the United States requested a temporary ceasefire to allow it to evacuate its citizens in Lahore. However, the Pakistani counterattack took Khem Karan from Indian forces which tried to divert the attention of Pakistanis from Khem Karan by an attack on Bedian and the adjacent villages.

The thrust against Lahore consisted of the 1st Infantry Division supported by the three tank regiments of the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade; they quickly advanced across the border, reaching the Ichhogil (BRB) Canal by 6 September. The Pakistani Army held the bridges over the canal or blew up those it could not hold, effectively stalling any further advance by the Indians on Lahore. One unit of the Indian Jat Regiment,

3 Jat, had also crossed the Icchogil canal and captured the town of Batapore (Jallo Mur to Pakistan) on the west side of the canal. The same day, a counter offensive consisting of an armoured division and infantry division supported by Pakistan Air Force Sabres forced the Indian 15th Division to withdraw to its starting point. Although 3 Jat suffered minimal casualties, the bulk of the damage being taken by ammunition and stores vehicles, the higher commanders had no information of 3 Jat's capture of Batapore and misleading information led to the command to withdraw from Batapore and Dograi to Ghosal-Dial. This move brought extreme disappointment to Lt-Col Desmond Hayde, CO of 3 Jat. Dograi was eventually recaptured by 3 Jat on 21 September, for the second time but after a much harder battle due to Pakistani reinforcements, in the Battle of Dograi.

On 8 September 1965, a company of 5 Maratha Light Infantry was sent to reinforce a Rajasthan Armed Constabulary (RAC) post at Munabao – a strategic hamlet about 250 kilometres from Jodhpur. Their brief was simple. To hold the post and to keep Pakistan's infantry battalions from overrunning the post at bay. But at Maratha Hill (in Munabao) – as the post has now been christened – the Indian company could barely manage to thwart the intense attack for 24 hours. A company of 3 Guards with 954 heavy mortar battery ordered to reinforce the RAC post at Munabao could never reach. The Pakistani Air Force had strafed the entire area, and also hit a railway train coming from Barmer with reinforcements near Gadra road railway station. On 10 September, Munabao fell into Pakistani hands, and efforts to capture the strategic point did not succeed.

On the days following 9 September, both nations' premiere formations were routed in unequal battles. India's 1st Armoured Division, labeled the "pride of the Indian Army", launched an offensive towards Sialkot. The Division divided itself into two prongs, was forced back by the Pakistani 6th Armoured Division at Chawinda and was forced to withdraw after suffering heavy losses of nearly 100 tanks.

The Pakistanis followed up their success by launching Operation Windup, which forced the Indians back farther. Similarly, Pakistan's pride, the 1st Armoured Division, pushed an offensive towards Khem Karan, with the intent to capture Amritsar (a major city in Punjab, India) and the bridge on River Beas to Jalandhar.

The Pakistani 1st Armoured Division never made it past Khem Karan, however, and by the end of 10 September lay disintegrated by the defences of the Indian 4th Mountain Division at what is now known as the Battle of *Asal Uttar* (lit. meaning – "Real Answer", or more appropriate English equivalent – "Fitting Response"). The area became known as 'Patton Nagar' (Patton Town), because of the large number of US-made Pakistani Patton tanks. Approximately 97 Pakistani tanks were destroyed or abandoned, with only 32 Indian tanks destroyed or damaged. The Pakistani 1st Armoured Division less 5th Armoured Brigade was next sent to Sialkot sector behind Pakistani 6th Armoured Division where it didn't see action as 6th Armoured Division was already in process of routing Indian 1st Armoured Division which was superior to it in strength.

The hostilities in the Rajasthan sector commenced on 8 September. Initially Pakistan Desert Force and the Hur militia (followers of Pir Pagaro) was placed in a defensive role, a role for which they were well suited as it turned out. The Hurs were familiar with the terrain and the local area and possessed many essential desert survival skills which their opponents and their comrades in the Pakistan Army did not. Fighting as mainly light infantry, the Hur inflicted many casualties on the Indian forces as they entered Sindh. The Hurs were also employed as skirmishers, harassing the Indians LOC, a task they often undertook on camels. As the battle wore on the Hurs and the Desert Force were increasingly used to attack and capture Indian villages inside Rajasthan.

The war was heading for a stalemate, with both nations holding territory of the other. The Indian army suffered 3,000 battlefield deaths, while Pakistan suffered 3,800. The Indian army was in possession of 1,920 km (740 sq mi) of Pakistani territory and the Pakistan army held 550 km (210 sq mi) of Indian territory. The territory occupied by India was mainly in the fertile Sialkot, Lahore and Kashmir sectors, while Pakistani ground gains were primarily in deserts opposite Sindh and in the Chumb sector near Kashmir. Pakistan claims that it held 1,600 km (620 sq mi) of Indian territory, while losing 1,200 km (450 sq mi) of its own territory.

Aerial warfare

The war saw aircraft of the Indian Air Force (IAF) and the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) engaging in combat for the first time since independence. Although the two forces had previously faced off in the First Kashmir War during the late 1940s, that

engagement was very limited in scale compared to the 1965 conflict. The IAF was flying large numbers of Hawker Hunters, Indian-manufactured Folland Gnats, de Havilland Vampires, EE Canberra bombers and a squadron of MiG-21s. The PAF's fighter force comprised 102 F-86F Sabres and 12 F-104 Starfighters, along with 24 B-57 Canberra bombers. During the conflict, the PAF claimed it was out-numbered by around 5:1.

The PAF's aircraft were largely of American origin, whereas the IAF flew an assortment of British and Soviet aeroplanes. However, the PAF's American aircraft were superior to those of the IAF's.

The F-86 was vulnerable to the diminutive Folland Gnat, nicknamed "Sabre Slayer". The Gnat is credited by many independent and Indian sources as having shot down seven Pakistani Canadair Sabres in the 1965 war, while two Gnats were downed by PAF fighters. The PAF's F-104 Starfighter of the PAF was the fastest fighter operating in the subcontinent at that time and was often referred to as "the pride of the PAF". However, according to Sajjad Haider, the F-104 did not deserve this reputation. Being "a high level interceptor designed to neutralise Soviet strategic bombers in altitudes above 40,000 feet," rather than engage in dogfights with agile fighters at low altitudes, it was "unsuited to the tactical environment of the region". In combat the Starfighter was not as effective as the IAF's far more agile, albeit much slower, Folland Gnat fighter. Yet it zoomed into an ongoing dogfight between Sabres and Gnats, at supersonic speed, successfully broke off the fight and caused the Gnats to egress. An IAF Gnat, piloted by Squadron Leader Brij Pal Singh Sikand, landed at an abandoned Pakistani airstrip at Pasrur, as he lacked the fuel

to return to his base, and was captured by the Pakistan Army. According to the pilot, he got separated from his formation due to a malfunctioning compass and radio. This Gnat is displayed as a war trophy in the Pakistan Air Force Museum, Karachi. Sqn Ldr Saad Hatmi who flew the captured aircraft to Sargodha, and later tested and evaluated its flight performance, was of view that Gnat was no "Sabre Slayer" when it came to dog fighting. Three Indian civilian aircraft were shot down by PAF, one of which shot down at Bhuj, Gujarat was carrying Balwantrai Mehta, chief minister of the Indian state of Gujarat, total 8 killed in the incident along with Balwantrai Mehta and his wife. The Pakistan Air Force had fought well in countering the much large Indian Air Force and supported the ground forces.

The two countries have made contradictory claims of combat losses during the war and few neutral sources have verified the claims of either country. The PAF claimed it shot down 104 IAF planes and lost 19 of its own, while the IAF claimed it shot down 73 PAF planes and lost 59. According to PAF, It flew 86 F-86 Sabres, 10 F-104 Starfighters and 20 B-57 Canberras in a parade soon after the war was over. Thus disproving the IAF's claim of downing 73 PAF fighters, which at the time constituted nearly the entire Pakistani front-line fighter force. Indian sources have pointed out that, despite PAF claims of losing only a squadron of combat craft, Pakistan sought to acquire additional aircraft from Indonesia, Iraq, Iran, Turkey and China within 10 days of the beginning war.

The two air forces were rather equal in the conflict, because much of the Indian air force remained farther east to guard against the possibility of China entering the war. According to

the independent sources, the PAF lost some 20 aircraft while the Indians lost 60–75. Pakistan ended the war having depleted 17 percent of its front line strength, while India's losses amounted to less than 10 percent. Moreover, the loss rate had begun to even out, and it has been estimated that another three week's fighting would have seen the Pakistani losses rising to 33 percent and India's losses totalling 15 percent. Air superiority was not achieved, and were unable to prevent IAF fighter bombers and reconnaissance Canberras from flying daylight missions over Pakistan. Thus 1965 was a stalemate in terms of the air war with neither side able to achieve complete air superiority. However, according to Kenneth Werrell, the Pakistan Air Force "did well in the conflict and probably had the edge". When hostilities broke out, the Pakistan Air Force with around 100 F-86s faced an enemy with five times as many combat aircraft; the Indians were also equipped with comparatively modern aircraft inventory. Despite this, Werrell credits the PAF as having the advantage of a "decade's experience with the Sabre" and pilots with long flight hours experience. One Pakistani fighter pilot, MM Alam, was credited with the record of downing five Indian aircraft in less than a minute, becoming the first known flying ace since the Korean War. However, his claims were never confirmed by the PAF and is disputed by Indian sources and some PAF officials.

Tank battles

The 1965 war witnessed some of the largest tank battles since World War II. At the beginning of the war, the Pakistani Army had both a numerical advantage in tanks, as well as better equipment overall. Pakistani armour was largely American-made; it consisted mainly of Patton M-47 and M-48 tanks, but

also included many M4 Sherman tanks, some M24 Chaffee light tanks and M36 Jackson tank destroyers, equipped with 90 mm guns. The bulk of India's tank fleet were older M4 Sherman tanks; some were up-gunned with the French high velocity CN 75 50 guns and could hold their own, whilst some older models were still equipped with the inferior 75 mm M3 L/40 gun. Besides the M4 tanks, India fielded the British-made Centurion Tank Mk 7, with the 105 mm Royal Ordnance L7 gun, and the AMX-13, PT-76, and M3 Stuart light tanks. Pakistan fielded a greater number and more modern artillery; its guns out-ranged those of the Indian artillery, according to Pakistan's Major General T.H. Malik.

At the outbreak of war in 1965, Pakistan had about 15 armoured cavalry regiments, each with about 45 tanks in three squadrons. Besides the Pattons, there were about 200 M4 Shermans re-armed with 76 mm guns, 150 M24 Chaffee light tank and a few independent squadrons of M36B1 tank destroyers. Most of these regiments served in Pakistan's two armoured divisions, the 1st and 6th Armoured divisions – the latter being in the process of formation.

The Indian Army of the time possessed 17 cavalry regiments, and in the 1950s had begun modernizing them by the acquisition of 164 AMX-13 light tanks and 188 Centurions. The remainder of the cavalry units were equipped with M4 Shermans and a small number of M3A3 Stuart light tanks. India had only a single armoured division, the 1st 'Black Elephant' Armoured Division, which consisted of the 17th Horse (The Poona Horse), also called 'Fakhr-i-Hind' ('Pride of India'), the 4th Horse (Hodson's Horse), the 16th Cavalry, the 7th Light Cavalry, the 2nd Lancers, the 18th Cavalry and the

62nd Cavalry, the two first named being equipped with Centurions. There was also the 2nd Independent Armoured Brigade, one of whose three regiments, the 3rd Cavalry, was also equipped with Centurions. Despite the qualitative and numerical superiority of Pakistani armour, Pakistan was outfought on the battlefield by India, which made progress into the Lahore-Sialkot sector, whilst halting Pakistan's counteroffensive on Amritsar; they were sometimes employed in a faulty manner, such as charging prepared defences during the defeat of Pakistan's 1st Armoured Division at Asal Uttar.

After India breached the Madhupur canal on 11 September, the Khem Karan counter-offensive was halted, affecting Pakistan's strategy substantially. Although India's tank formations experienced some results, India's attack at the Battle of Chawinda, led by its 1st Armoured Division and supporting units, was brought to halt by the newly raised 6th Armoured Division (ex-100th independent brigade group) in the Chawinda sector. Pakistan claimed that Indians lost 120 tanks at Chawinda. compared to 44 of its own But later, Indian official sources confirmed India lost only 29 tanks at Chawinda. Neither the Indian nor Pakistani Army showed any great facility in the use of armoured formations in offensive operations, whether the Pakistani 1st Armoured Division at Asal Uttar (Battle of Asal Uttar) or the Indian 1st Armoured Division at Chawinda. In contrast, both proved adept with smaller forces in a defensive role such as India's 2nd Armoured Brigade at Asal Uttar and Pakistan's 25th Cavalry at Chawinda. The Centurion battle tank, with its 105 mm gun and heavy armour, performed better than the overly complex Pattons.

Naval hostilities

Naval operations did not play a prominent role in the war of 1965. On 7 September, a flotilla of the Pakistan Navy under the command of Commodore S.M. Anwar, carried out a bombardment of the Indian Navy's radar station coastal down of Dwarka, which was 320 kilometres (200 mi) south of the Pakistani port of Karachi. Operation Dwarka, as it is known, is a significant naval operation of the 1965 war contested as a nuisance raid by some. The attack on Dwarka led to questions being asked in India's parliament and subsequent post-war modernization and expansion of the Indian Navy, with an increase in budget from Rs. 35 crores to Rs. 115 crores.

According to some Pakistani sources, one submarine, PNS *Ghazi*, kept the Indian Navy's aircraft carrier INS *Vikrant* besieged in Bombay throughout the war. Indian sources claim that it was not their intention to get into a naval conflict with Pakistan, and wished to restrict the war to a land-based conflict. Moreover, they note that the *Vikrant* was in dry dock in the process of refitting. Some Pakistani defence writers have also discounted claims that the Indian Navy was bottled up in Bombay by a single submarine, instead stating that 75% of the Indian Navy was under maintenance in harbour.

Covert operations

The Pakistan Army launched a number of covert operations to infiltrate and sabotage Indian airbases. On 7 September 1965, the Special Services Group (SSG) commandos were parachuted into enemy territory. According to Commander-in-Chief of the Pakistan Army General Muhammad Musa, about 135

commandos were airdropped at three Indian airfields (Halwara, Pathankot and Adampur). The daring attempt proved to be an "unmitigated disaster". Only 22 commandos returned to Pakistan as planned, 93 were taken prisoner (including one of the Commanders of the operations, Major Khalid Butt), and 20 were killed in encounters with the army, police or civilians. The reason for the failure of the commando mission is attributed to the failure to provide maps, proper briefings and adequate planning or preparation.

Despite failing to sabotage the airfields, Pakistan sources claim that the commando mission affected some planned Indian operations. As the Indian 14th Infantry Division was diverted to hunt for paratroopers, the Pakistan Air Force found the road filled with transport, and destroyed many vehicles.

India responded to the covert activity by announcing rewards for captured Pakistani spies or paratroopers. Meanwhile, in Pakistan, rumors spread that India had retaliated with its own covert operations, sending commandos deep into Pakistan territory, but these rumors were later determined to be unfounded.

Neutral assessments

There have been several neutral assessments of the losses incurred by both India and Pakistan during the war. Most of these assessments agree that India had the upper hand over Pakistan when ceasefire was declared. Some of the neutral assessments are mentioned below —

- According to the Library of Congress Country Studies conducted by the Federal Research Division of the United States –

The war was militarily inconclusive; each side held prisoners and some territory belonging to the other. Losses were relatively heavy—on the Pakistani side, twenty aircraft, 200 tanks, and 3,800 troops. Pakistan's army had been able to withstand Indian pressure, but a continuation of the fighting would only have led to further losses and ultimate defeat for Pakistan. Most Pakistanis, schooled in the belief of their own martial prowess, refused to accept the possibility of their country's military defeat by "Hindu India" and were, instead, quick to blame their failure to attain their military aims on what they considered to be the ineptitude of Ayub Khan and his government.

- Former *New York Times* reporter Arif Jamal wrote in his book *Shadow War* —

This time, India's victory was nearly total: India accepted cease-fire only after it had occupied 740 square miles [1,900 km], though Pakistan had made marginal gains of 210 square miles [540 km] of territory. Despite the obvious strength of the Indian wins, both countries claim to have been victorious.

- Devin T. Hagerty wrote in his book *South Asia in world politics* –

The invading Indian forces outfought their Pakistani counterparts and halted their attack on the outskirts of Lahore, Pakistan's second-largest city. By the time United

Nations intervened on September 22, Pakistan had suffered a clear defeat.

- In his book *National identity and geopolitical visions*, Gertjan Dijkink writes –

The superior Indian forces, however, won a decisive victory and the army could have even marched on into Pakistani territory had external pressure not forced both combatants to cease their war efforts.

- An excerpt from Stanley Wolpert's *India*, summarizing the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965,

In three weeks the second Indo-Pak War ended in what appeared to be a draw when the embargo placed by Washington on U.S. ammunition and replacements for both armies forced cessation of conflict before either side won a clear victory. India, however, was in a position to inflict grave damage to, if not capture, Pakistan's capital of the Punjab when the cease-fire was called, and controlled Kashmir's strategic Uri-Poonch bulge, much to Ayub's chagrin.

- In his book titled *The greater game: India's race with destiny and China*, David Van Praagh wrote –

India won the war. It held on to the Vale of Kashmir, the prize Pakistan vainly sought. It gained 1,840 km [710 sq mi] of Pakistani territory: 640 km [250 sq mi] in Azad Kashmir, Pakistan's portion of the state; 460 km [180 sq mi] of the Sailkot sector; 380 km [150 sq mi] far to the south of Sindh; and most critical, 360 km [140 sq mi] on the Lahore front. Pakistan took 540 km [210 sq mi] of Indian territory:

490 km [190 sq mi] in the Chhamb sector and 50 km [19 sq mi] around Khem Karan.

- Dennis Kux's *India and the United States estranged democracies* also provides a summary of the war,

Although both sides lost heavily in men and material, and neither gained a decisive military advantage, India had the better of the war. New Delhi achieved its basic goal of thwarting Pakistan's attempt to seize Kashmir by force. Pakistan gained nothing from a conflict which it had instigated.

- *A region in turmoil: South Asian conflicts since 1947* by Robert Johnson mentions –

India's strategic aims were modest – it aimed to deny Pakistani Army victory, although it ended up in possession of 720 square miles [1,900 km] of Pakistani territory for the loss of just 220 square miles [570 km] of its own.

- An excerpt from William M. Carpenter and David G. Wiencek's *Asian security handbook: terrorism and the new security environment* –

A brief but furious 1965 war with India began with a covert Pakistani thrust across the Kashmiri cease-fire line and ended up with the city of Lahore threatened with encirclement by Indian Army. Another UN-sponsored cease-fire left borders unchanged, but Pakistan's vulnerability had again been exposed.

- English historian John Keay's *India: A History* provides a summary of the 1965 war –

The 1965 Indo-Pak war lasted barely a month. Pakistan made gains in the Rajasthan desert but its main push against India's Jammu-Srinagar road link was repulsed and Indian tanks advanced to within a sight of Lahore. Both sides claimed victory but India had most to celebrate.

- Uk Heo and Shale Asher Horowitz write in their book *Conflict in Asia: Korea, China-Taiwan, and India-Pakistan* –

Again India appeared, logistically at least, to be in a superior position but neither side was able to mobilize enough strength to gain a decisive victory.

- According to the Office of the Historian within the U.S Department of State:

Conflict resumed again in early 1965, when Pakistani and Indian forces clashed over disputed territory along the border between the two nations. Hostilities intensified that August when the Pakistani army attempted to take Kashmir by force. The attempt to seize the state was unsuccessful, and the second India-Pakistan War reached a stalemate.

Ceasefire

On 20 September, the United Nations Security Council unanimously passed a resolution, which noted that its previous two resolutions went "unheeded" and now *demand*

an unconditional ceasefire from both nations within 48 hours. India immediately accepted, while Pakistan accepted it on 23 September, with some notable dramatics.

India and Pakistan accused each other of ceasefire violations; India charged Pakistan with 585 violations in 34 days, while Pakistan countered with accusations of 450 incidents by India. In addition to the expected exchange of small arms and artillery fire, India reported that Pakistan utilized the ceasefire to capture the Indian village of Chananwalla in the Fazilka sector. This village was recaptured by Indian troops on 25 December. On 10 October, a B-57 Canberra on loan to the PAF was damaged by 3 SA-2 missiles fired from the IAF base at Ambala. A Pakistani Army Auster AOP was shot down on 16 December, killing one Pakistani army captain; on 2 February 1967, an AOP was shot down by IAF Hunters.

The ceasefire remained in effect until the start of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971.

Truce agreement

The United States and the Soviet Union used significant diplomatic tools to prevent any further escalation in the conflict between the two South Asian nations. The Soviet Union, led by Premier Alexei Kosygin, hosted peace negotiations in Tashkent (now in Uzbekistan), where Indian Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri and Pakistani President Ayub Khan signed the Tashkent Agreement, agreeing to withdraw to pre-August lines no later than 25 February 1966.

India's Prime Minister, Shastri, suffered a fatal heart attack soon after the Tashkent Agreement on January 11, 1966. As a

consequence, the public outcry in India against the peace declaration transformed into a wave of sympathy for the ruling Indian National Congress.

Public perceptions

The ceasefire was criticised by many Pakistanis who, relying on fabricated official reports and the controlled Pakistani press, believed that the leadership had surrendered military gains. The protests led to student riots. Pakistan State's reports had suggested that their military was performing admirably in the war – which they incorrectly blamed as being initiated by India – and thus the Tashkent Declaration was seen as having forfeited the gains. Some recent books written by Pakistani authors, including one by ex-ISI chief Lieutenant General Mahmud Ahmed Durrani initially titled *The Myth of 1965 Victory*, reportedly exposed Pakistani fabrications about the war, but all copies of the book were bought by Pakistan Army to prevent circulation because the topic was "too sensitive". The book was published with the revised title *History of Indo Pak War 1965*, published by Services Book Club, a part of the Pakistan military and printed by Oxford University Press, Karachi. A few copies of the book have survived. A version was published in India as *Illusion of Victory: A Military History of the Indo-Pak War-1965* by Lexicon Publishers. Recently a new Pakistani impression has been published in 2017.

Intelligence failures

Strategic miscalculations by both India and Pakistan ensured that the war ended in a stalemate.

Indian miscalculations

Indian military intelligence gave no warning of the impending Pakistan invasion. The Indian Army failed to recognize the presence of heavy Pakistani artillery and armaments in Chumb and suffered significant losses as a result.

The "Official War History – 1965", drafted by the Ministry of Defence of India in 1992, was a long suppressed document that revealed other miscalculations. According to the document, on 22 September when the Security Council was pressing for a ceasefire, the Indian Prime Minister asked commanding Gen. Chaudhuri if India could possibly win the war, were he to delay accepting the ceasefire. The general replied that most of India's frontline ammunition had been used up and the Indian Army had suffered considerable tank losses. It was determined later that only 14% of India's frontline ammunition had been fired and India held twice the number of tanks as Pakistan. By this time, the Pakistani Army had used close to 80% of its ammunition.

Air Chief Marshal (retd) P.C. Lal, who was the Vice Chief of Air Staff during the conflict, points to the lack of coordination between the IAF and the Indian army. Neither side revealed its battle plans to the other. The battle plans drafted by the Ministry of Defence and General Chaudhari, did not specify a role for the Indian Air Force in the order of battle. This attitude of Gen. Chaudhari was referred to by ACM Lal as the "Supremo Syndrome", a patronizing attitude sometimes held by the Indian army towards the other branches of the Indian Military.

Pakistani miscalculations

The Pakistani Army's failures started with the supposition that a generally discontented Kashmiri people, given the opportunity provided by the Pakistani advance, would revolt against their Indian rulers, bringing about a swift and decisive surrender of Kashmir. The Kashmiri people, however, did not revolt. Instead, the Indian Army was provided with enough information to learn of Operation Gibraltar and the fact that the Army was battling not insurgents, as they had initially supposed, but Pakistani Army regulars.

The Pakistani Army also failed to recognize that the Indian policy makers would order an attack on the southern sector in order to open a second front. Pakistan was forced to dedicate troops to the southern sector to protect Sialkot and Lahore instead using them to support penetrating into Kashmir.

"Operation Grand Slam", which was launched by Pakistan to capture Akhnoor, a town north-east of Jammu and a key region for communications between Kashmir and the rest of India, was also a failure. Many Pakistani commentators criticised the Ayub Khan administration for being indecisive during Operation Grand Slam. These critics claim that the operation failed because Ayub Khan knew the importance of Akhnoor to India (having called it India's "jugular vein") and did not want to capture it and drive the two nations into an all-out war. Despite progress being made in Akhnoor, General Ayub Khan relieved the commanding Major General Akhtar Hussain Malik and replaced him with Gen. Yahya Khan. A 24-hour lull ensued the replacement, which allowed the Indian army to regroup in Akhnoor and successfully oppose a lackluster attack headed by

General Yahya Khan. "The enemy came to our rescue," asserted the Indian Chief of Staff of the Western Command. Later, Akhtar Hussain Malik criticised Ayub Khan for planning Operation Gibraltar, which was doomed to fail, and for relieving him of his command at a crucial moment in the war. Malik threatened to expose the truth about the war and the army's failure, but later dropped the idea for fear of being banned.

Some authors have noted that Pakistan might have been emboldened by a war game – conducted in March 1965, at the Institute for Defense Analyses in the United States. The exercise concluded that, in the event of a war with India, Pakistan would win. Other authors like Stephen P. Cohen, have consistently commented that the Pakistan Army had "acquired an exaggerated view of the weakness of both India and the Indian military ... the 1965 war was a shock."

Pakistani Air Marshal and Commander-in-Chief of PAF during the war, Nur Khan, later said that the Pakistan Army, and not India, should be blamed for starting the war. However propaganda in Pakistan about the war continued; the war was not rationally analysed in Pakistan, with most of the blame being heaped on the leadership and little importance given to intelligence failures that persisted until the debacle of the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971.

Involvement of other nations

The United States and the United Kingdom had been the principal suppliers of military matériel to India and Pakistan since 1947. Both India and Pakistan were Commonwealth

republics. While India had pursued a policy of nominal non-alignment, Pakistan was a member of both CENTO and SEATO and a purported ally of the West in its struggle against Communism. Well before the conflict began, however, Britain and the United States had suspected Pakistan of joining both alliances out of opportunism to acquire advanced weapons for a war against India. They had therefore limited their military aid to Pakistan to maintain the existing balance of power in the subcontinent. In 1959, however, Pakistan and the United States had signed an Agreement of Cooperation under which the United States agreed to take "appropriate action, including the use of armed forces" in order to assist the Government of Pakistan at its request. By 1965, American and British analysts had recognised the two international groupings, CENTO and SEATO, and Pakistan's continued alliance with the West as being largely meaningless.

Following the start of the 1965 war, both the United States and Britain took the view that the conflict was largely Pakistan's fault, and suspended all arms shipments to both India and Pakistan. While the United States maintained a neutral stance, the British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, condemned India for aggression after its army advanced towards Lahore; his statement was met with a furious rebuttal from India.

Internationally, the level of support which Pakistan received was limited at best. Iran and Turkey issued a joint communiqué on 10 September which placed the blame on India, backed the United Nations' appeal for a cease-fire and offered to deploy troops for a UN peacekeeping mission in Kashmir. Pakistan received support from Indonesia, Iran,

Turkey, and Saudi Arabia in the form of six naval vessels, jet fuel, guns and ammunition and financial support, respectively.

Since before the war, the People's Republic of China had been a major military associate of Pakistan and a military opponent of India, with whom it had fought a brief war in 1962. China had also become a foreign patron for Pakistan and had given Pakistan \$60 million in development assistance in 1965. During the war, China openly supported the Pakistani position. It took advantage of the conflict to issue a strongly worded ultimatum to India condemning its "aggression" in Tibet and hinting at nuclear retaliation by China (China had exploded its first nuclear device the previous year). Despite strong fears of Chinese intervention on the side of Pakistan, the Chinese government ultimately exercised restraint. This was partly due to the logistical difficulties of a direct Chinese military intervention against India and India's improved military strength after its defeat by China in 1962. China had also received strong warnings by the American and Soviet governments against expanding the scope of the conflict by intervening. In the face of this pressure, China backed down, extending the deadline for India to respond to its ultimatum and warning India against attacking East Pakistan. Ultimately, Pakistan rejected Chinese offers of military aid, recognising that accepting it would only result in further alienating Pakistan internationally. International opinion considered China's actions to be dangerously reckless and aggressive, and it was soundly rebuked in the world press for its unnecessarily provocative stance during the conflict.

India's participation in the Non-Aligned Movement yielded little support from its members. Support given by Indonesia to

Pakistan was seen as a major Indian diplomatic failure, as Indonesia had been among the founding members of the Non-Aligned Movement along with India. Despite its close relations with India, the Soviet Union was more neutral than other nations during the war, inviting both nations to peace talks under its aegis in Tashkent.

Aftermath

India

Despite the declaration of a ceasefire, India was perceived as the victor due to its success in halting the Pakistan-backed insurgency in Kashmir. In its October 1965 issue, the TIME magazine quoted a Western official assessing the consequences of the war —

Now it's apparent to everybody that India is going to emerge as an Asian power in its own right.

In light of the failures of the Sino-Indian War, the outcome of the 1965 war was viewed as a "politico-strategic" victory in India. The Indian prime minister, Lal Bahadur Shastri, was hailed as a national hero in India.

While the overall performance of the Indian military was praised, military leaders were criticised for their failure to effectively deploy India's superior armed forces so as to achieve a decisive victory over Pakistan. In his book *War in the modern world since 1815*, noted war historian Jeremy Black said that though Pakistan "lost heavily" during the 1965 war, India's hasty decision to call for negotiations prevented further

considerable damage to the Pakistan Armed Forces. He elaborates —

India's chief of army staff urged negotiations on the ground that they were running out ammunition and their number of tanks had become seriously depleted. In fact, the army had used less than 15% of its ammunition compared to Pakistan, which had consumed closer to 80 percent and India had double the number of serviceable tanks.

In 2015, Marshal of the Indian Air Force Arjan Singh, the last surviving armed force commander of the conflict, gave his assessment that the war ended in a stalemate, but only due to international pressure for a ceasefire, and that India would have achieved a decisive victory had hostilities continued for a few days more:

For political reasons, Pakistan claims victory in the 1965 war. In my opinion, the war ended in a kind of stalemate. We were in a position of strength. Had the war continued for a few more days, we would have gained a decisive victory. I advised then prime minister Lal Bahadur Shastri not to agree for ceasefire. But I think he was under pressure from the United Nations and some countries.

As a consequence, India focussed on enhancing communication and coordination within and among the tri-services of the Indian Armed Forces. Partly as a result of the inefficient information gathering preceding the war, India established the Research and Analysis Wing for external espionage and intelligence. Major improvements were also made in command and control to address various shortcomings and the positive impact of these changes was clearly visible during the Indo-

Pakistani War of 1971 when India achieved a decisive victory over Pakistan within two weeks.

China's repeated threats to intervene in the conflict in support of Pakistan increased pressure on the government to take an immediate decision to develop nuclear weapons. Despite repeated assurances, the United States did little to prevent extensive use of American arms by Pakistani forces during the conflict, thus irking India. At the same time, the United States and United Kingdom refused to supply India with sophisticated weaponry which further strained the relations between the West and India. These developments led to a significant change in India's foreign policy – India, which had previously championed the cause of non-alignment, distanced itself further from Western powers and developed close relations with the Soviet Union. By the end of the 1960s, the Soviet Union emerged as the biggest supplier of military hardware to India. From 1967 to 1977, 81% of India's arms imports were from the Soviet Union. After the 1965 war, the arms race between India and Pakistan became even more asymmetric and India was outdistancing Pakistan by far. India's defence budget too would increase gradually after the war, in 1966-1967 it would rise to 17% and by 1970-1971 it would rise to 25% of its revenue. However, according to the world bank data India's defence expenditure by GDP decrease from 3.871% in 1965 to 3.141% in 1969, thereafter slightly increased to 3.652% in 1971.

Pakistan

At the conclusion of the war, many Pakistanis considered the performance of their military to be positive. 6 September is

celebrated as Defence Day in Pakistan, in commemoration of the successful defence of Lahore against the Indian army. The performance of the Pakistani Air Force, in particular, was praised.

However, the Pakistani government was accused by analysts of spreading disinformation among its citizens regarding the actual consequences of the war. In his book *Mainsprings of Indian and Pakistani foreign policies*, S.M. Burke writes —

After the Indo-Pakistani war of 1965 the balance of military power had decisively shifted in favor of India. Pakistan had found it difficult to replace the heavy equipment lost during that conflict while her adversary, despite her economic and political problems, had been determinedly building up her strength.

Pakistani commentator Haidar Imtiaz remarked:

The myth of 'victory' was created after the war had ended, in order to counter Indian claims of victory on the one hand and to shield the Ayub regime and the army from criticism on the other.

A book titled *Indo-Pakistan War of 1965: A Flashback*, produced by the Inter-Services Public Relations of Pakistan, is used as the official history of the war, which omits any mention of the operations Gibraltar and Grand Slam, and begins with the Indian counter-offensive on the Lahore front. The Pakistan Army is claimed to have put up a "valiant defense of the motherland" and forced the attack in its tracks.

Most observers agree that the myth of a mobile, hard hitting Pakistan Army was badly dented in the war, as critical breakthroughs were not made. Several Pakistani writers criticised the military's ill-founded belief that their "martial race" of soldiers could defeat "Hindu India" in the war. Rasul Bux Rais, a Pakistani political analyst wrote –

The 1965 war with India proved that Pakistan could neither break the formidable Indian defences in a blitzkrieg fashion nor could she sustain an all-out conflict for long.

Historian Akbar S Zaidi notes that Pakistan "lost terribly in the 1965 war".

The Pakistan airforce on the other hand gained a lot of credibility and reliability among Pakistan military and international war writers for successful defence of Lahore and other important areas of Pakistan and heavy retaliation to India on the next day. The alertness of the airforce was also related to the fact that some pilots were scrambled 6 times in less than an hour on indication of Indian air raids. The Pakistan airforce along with the army is celebrated on Defence Day and Airforce Day in commemoration of this in Pakistan (6 and 7 September respectively).

Moreover, Pakistan had lost more ground than it had gained during the war and, more importantly, failed to achieve its goal of capturing Kashmir; this result has been viewed by many impartial observers as a defeat for Pakistan.

Many senior Pakistani officials and military experts later criticised the faulty planning of Operation Gibraltar, which ultimately led to the war. The Tashkent declaration was also

criticised in Pakistan, though few citizens realised the gravity of the situation that existed at the end of the war. Political leaders were also criticised. Following the advice of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, Pakistan's foreign minister, Ayub Khan had raised very high expectations among the people of Pakistan about the superiority – if not invincibility – of its armed forces, but Pakistan's inability to attain its military aims during the war created a political liability for Ayub. The defeat of its Kashmiri ambitions in the war led to the army's invincibility being challenged by an increasingly vocal opposition.

One of the farthest reaching consequences of the war was the wide-scale economic slowdown in Pakistan. The war ended the impressive economic growth Pakistan had experienced since the early 1960s. Between 1964 and 1966, Pakistan's defence spending rose from 4.82% to 9.86% of GDP, putting a tremendous strain on Pakistan's economy. By 1970–71, defence spending comprised a whopping 32% or 55.66% of government expenditure. According to veterans of the war, the war greatly cost Pakistan economically, politically, and militarily. Nuclear theorist Feroze Khan maintained that the 1965 war was a last conventional attempt to snatch Kashmir by military force, and Pakistan's own position in the international community, especially with the United States, began to deteriorate from the point the war started, while on the other hand, the alliance with China saw improvements. Chairman joint chiefs General Tariq Majid claims in his memoirs that Chou En-Lai had longed advised the government in the classic style of Sun Tzu: "to go slow, not to push India hard; and avoid a fight over Kashmir, 'for at least, 20–30 years, until you have developed your economy and consolidated your national power'." General Majid maintained in *Eating Grass* that the "sane, philosophical and

political critical thinking" was missing in Pakistan, and that the country had lost extensive human resources by fighting the war.

Pakistan was surprised by the lack of support from the United States, an ally with whom the country had signed an Agreement of Cooperation. The US turned neutral in the war when it cut off military supplies to Pakistan (and India); an action that the Pakistanis took as a sign of betrayal. After the war, Pakistan would increasingly look towards China as a major source of military hardware and political support.

Another negative consequence of the war was growing resentment against the Pakistani government in East Pakistan (present day Bangladesh), particularly for West Pakistan's obsession with Kashmir. Bengali leaders accused the central government of not providing adequate security for East Pakistan during the conflict, even though large sums of money were taken from the east to finance the war for Kashmir. In fact, despite some Pakistan Air Force attacks being launched from bases in East Pakistan during the war, India did not retaliate in that sector, although East Pakistan was defended only by an understrengthed infantry division (14th Division), sixteen planes and no tanks. Sheikh Mujibur Rahman was critical of the disparity in military resources deployed in East and West Pakistan, calling for greater autonomy for East Pakistan, an action that ultimately led to the Bangladesh Liberation War and another war between India and Pakistan in 1971.

Pakistan celebrates Defence Day every year to commemorate 6 September 1965 to pay tribute to the soldiers killed in the war.

However, Pakistani journalists, including Taha Siddiqui and Haseeb Asif have criticized the celebration of Defence Day.

Awards

National awards

- Joginder Singh Dhillon, Lt. Gen, awarded the Padma Bhushan in 1966 by the Government of India for his role in the 1965 war, becoming the first Indian Army officer to receive the award.

Gallantry awards

For bravery, the following soldiers were awarded the highest gallantry award of their respective countries, the Indian award Param Vir Chakra and the Pakistani award Nishan-e-Haider:

- India
- Company Quarter Master Havildar Abdul Hamid (Posthumous)
- Lieutenant-Colonel Ardeshir Burzorji Tarapore (Posthumous)
- Pakistan
- Major Raja Aziz Bhatti Shaheed (Posthumous)