

Scientific Approaches of International Politics

Nick Lynn



**SCIENTIFIC APPROACHES
OF
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS**

SCIENTIFIC APPROACHES OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS

Nick Lynn



Scientific Approaches of International Politics
by Nick Lynn

Copyright© 2022 BIBLIOTEX

www.bibliotex.com

All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or used in any manner without the prior written permission of the copyright owner, except for the use brief quotations in a book review.

To request permissions, contact the publisher at info@bibliotex.com

Ebook ISBN: 9781984662309



Published by:

Bibliotex

Canada

Website: www.bibliotex.com

Contents

Chapter 1	Introduction	1
Chapter 2	Bilateral and Regional Relations	31
Chapter 3	Marxian Approach to the Study of International Relations	85
Chapter 4	Theories of International Politics	126
Chapter 5	Factors Determining Foreign Policy	172

Chapter 1

Introduction

International Relations and International Politics

International relations is the study of relationships between countries, including the roles of states, inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), international nongovernmental organizations (INGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and multinational corporations (MNCs). It is both an academic and public policy field, and can be either positive or normative as it both seeks to analyse as well as formulate the foreign policy of particular states. It is often considered a branch of political science, but an important sector of academia prefer to treat it as an interdisciplinary field of study. Aspects of international relations have been studied for thousands of years, since the time of Thucydides, but IR became a separate and definable discipline in the early 20th century.

Apart from political science, IR draws upon such diverse fields as economics, history, international law, philosophy, geography, social work, sociology, anthropology, psychology, women's studies/gender studies, and cultural studies/ culturology. It involves a diverse range of issues including but not limited to: globalization, state sovereignty, international security, ecological sustainability, nuclear proliferation, nationalism, economic

development, global finance, terrorism, organized crime, human security, foreign interventionism and human rights.

No nation is an island. Because domestic policies are constantly affected by developments outside, nations are compelled to enter into dialogue with target or initiating entities or form alliance(s) for the purpose of enhancing their status quo, or increasing their power or prestige and survival in' the international system.

Because international relations is in transition following emerging realities in the international system, it has become complex and even more difficult arriving at a more universally acceptable definition of the subject. But this is not peculiar to international relations as there are more intense disagreements over the definition of political sciences itself. Nevertheless scholars have persisted in their attempt to define international relations.

Trevor Taylor (1979) defines International Relations as:

- "A discipline, which tries to explain political activities
- Across state boundaries".

Ola, Joseph (1999):

- "International relations are the study of all forms of interactions
- That exist between members of separate entities or nations within
- The international system".

Seymour Brown (1988) thus defines international relations as:

- "The investigating and study of patterns of action and reactions among
- Sovereign states as represented by their governing elites."

As Stanley Hoffman writes:

- "The discipline of international relations is concerned with the
- Factors and the activities which affect the external policies and
- Power of the basic units into which the world is divided."

In the words of Karl Wolfgang Deutsch (1968):

- "An introduction to the study of international relations in our
- Time is an introduction to the art and science of the survival of
- Mankind. If civilization is killed in the nearest future, it will not be
- Killed by famine or plague, but by foreign policy and international relations."

The point expressed here is that we can cope with hunger and pestilence, but we cannot deal with the power of our own weapons and our own behaviour as nation states. It is important to note that since the end of World War 1, nation states have

possessed unprecedented instruments for national action in the form of ideologies and weapons, and they have become even more dangerous vehicles of international conflict, carrying the potential for its escalation to mutual destruction and ultimate annihilation. The nation state holds the power to control most events within its borders, but few events beyond them.

It is thus decisively important for the student of international relations to understand that the world of today is marked by two factors. One fact has to do with the nature of power in the age of the atom; the other concerns the interdependence of mankind in an age of the individual.

Nature of International Relations

International Relations, like the world community itself are in transition. In a rapidly changing and increasingly complex world, it encompasses much more than relations among nation states and international organization and groups. It includes a variety of transitional relationships at various levels, above and below the level of the nation states. International relations are a multidisciplinary field gathering together the international aspects of politics, economics, geography, history, law, sociology, psychology, philosophy and cultural studies. It is a meta-discipline.

Scope of International Relations

It is known by now that international relations encompass a myriad of discipline. Attempts to structure and intellectualize it

have often been thematically and analytically confined to boundaries determined by data. The core concepts of international relations are International Organization, International Law, Foreign Policy, International Conflict, International Economic Relations and Military Thought and Strategy. International/Regional Security, Strategic Studies, International Political Economy, Conflict/War and Peace Studies, Globalization, International Regimes. Moreover it covers, state sovereignty, ecological sustainability, nuclear proliferation, nationalism, economic development, terrorism, organized crime, human security, foreign interventionism and human rights. These have been grounded in various schools of thought notably Realism and Idealism.

History of International Relations

The history of international relations can be traced thousands of years ago; Barry Buzan and Richard Little, for example, consider the interaction of ancient Sumerian city-states, starting in 3,500 BC, as the first fully-fledged international system.

The history of international relations based on nation-states is often traced back to the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, where the modern state system was developed. Prior to this, the European medieval organization of political authority was based on a vaguely hierarchical religious order. Westphalia instituted the legal concept of sovereignty, that didn't exist in classical and medieval times, which essentially meant that rulers, or the legitimate sovereigns, had no internal equals within a defined territory and no external superiors as the ultimate authority

within the territory's sovereign borders. A simple way to view this is that sovereignty says, "I'm not allowed to tell you what to do and you are not allowed to tell me what to do."

Westphalia encouraged the rise of the independent nation-state, the institutionalization of diplomacy and armies. This particular European system was exported to the Americas, Africa, and Asia via colonialism and the "standards of civilization". The contemporary international system was finally established through decolonization during the Cold War. However, this is somewhat over-simplified. While the nation-state system is considered "modern", many states have not incorporated the system and are termed "pre-modern".

Further, a handful of states have moved beyond the nation-state system and can be considered "post-modern". The ability of contemporary IR discourse to explain the relations of these different types of states is disputed. "Levels of analysis" is a way of looking at the international system, which includes the individual level, the domestic nation-state as a unit, the international level of transnational and intergovernmental affairs, and the global level.

What is explicitly recognized as International Relations theory was not developed until after World War I. IR theory, however, has a long tradition of drawing on the work of other social sciences. The use of capitalizations of the "I" and "R" in International Relations aims to distinguish the academic discipline of International Relations from the phenomena of international relations. Many cite Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* (6th

century BC), Thucydides' History of the Peloponnesian War (5th century BC), Chanakya's Arthashastra (4th century BC), as the inspiration for realist theory, with Hobbes' Leviathan and Machiavelli's The Prince providing further elaboration.

Similarly, liberalism draws upon the work of Kant and Rousseau, with the work of the former often being cited as the first elaboration of democratic peace theory. Though contemporary human rights is considerably different than the type of rights envisioned under natural law, Francisco de Vitoria, Hugo Grotius and John Locke offered the first accounts of universal entitlement to certain rights on the basis of common humanity. In the twentieth century, in addition to contemporary theories of liberal internationalism, Marxism has been a foundation of international relations.

Study of IR

Initially, international relations as a distinct field of study was almost entirely British-centered. IR only emerged as a formal academic 'discipline' in 1918 with the founding of the first 'chair' in IR-the Woodrow Wilson Chair at Aberystwyth, University of Wales, from an endowment given by David Davies, became the first academic position dedicated to IR. This was rapidly followed by establishment of IR at US universities and Geneva, Switzerland. In the early 1920s, the London School of Economics' department of International Relations was founded at the behest of Nobel Peace Prize winner Philip Noel-Baker. The first university entirely dedicated to the study of IR was the Graduate Institute of International Studies, which was founded in 1927 to

form diplomats associated to the League of Nations, established in Geneva some years before. The Graduate Institute of International Studies offered one of the first Ph.D. degrees in international relations. Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service is the oldest international relations faculty in the United States, founded in 1919. The Committee on International Relations at the University of Chicago was the first to offer a graduate degree, in 1928.

Theories of International Relations

Epistemology and IR Theory

IR theories can be roughly divided into one of two epistemological camps: "positivist" and "post-positivist". Positivist theories aim to replicate the methods of the natural sciences by analysing the impact of material forces. They typically focus on features of international relations such as state interactions, size of military forces, balance of powers etc. Post-positivist epistemology rejects the idea that the social world can be studied in an objective and value-free way. It rejects the central ideas of neo-realism/liberalism, such as rational choice theory, on the grounds that the scientific method cannot be applied to the social world and that a 'science' of IR is impossible.

A key difference between the two positions is that while positivist theories, such as neo-realism, offer causal explanations, post-positivist theories focus instead on constitutive questions, for instance what is meant by 'power'; what makes it up, how it is experienced and how it is reproduced. Often, post-positivist

theories explicitly promote a normative approach to IR, by considering ethics. This is something which has often been ignored under 'traditional' IR as positivist theories make a distinction between 'facts' and normative judgments, or 'values'.

During the late 1980s/1990 debate between positivists and post-positivists became the dominant debate and has been described as constituting the Third "Great Debate".

Positivist Theories

Realism

Realism focuses on state security and power all else. Early realists such as E.H. Carr and Hans Morgenthau argued that states are self-interested, power-seeking rational actors, who seek to maximize their security and chances of survival. Cooperation between states is a way to maximize each individual state's security. Similarly, any act of war must be based on self-interest, rather than on idealism. Many realists saw World War II as the vindication of their theory.

It should be noted that classical writers such as Thucydides, Machiavelli, Hobbes and Theodore Roosevelt, are often cited as "founding fathers" of realism by contemporary self-described realists. However, while their work may support realist doctrine, it is not likely that they would have classified themselves as realists. Realists are often split up into two groups: Classical or Human Nature Realists and Structural or Neorealists. Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed

by objective laws that have their roots in human nature. To improve society, it is first necessary to understand the laws by which society lives. The operation of these laws being impervious to our preferences, men will challenge them only at the risk of failure. Realism, believing as it does in the objectivity of the laws of politics, must also believe in the possibility of developing a rational theory that reflects, however imperfectly and one-sidedly, these objective laws. It believes also, then, in the possibility of distinguishing in politics between truth and opinion-between what is true objectively and rationally, supported by evidence and illuminated by reason, and what is only a subjective judgment, divorced from the facts as they are and informed by prejudice and wishful thinking.

The placement of Realism under positivism is far from unproblematic however. E.H. Carr's 'What is History' was a deliberate critique of positivism, and Hans Morgenthau's aim in 'Scientific Man vs Power Politics'-as the title implies-was to demolish any conception that international politics/power politics can be studied scientifically.

Liberalism/Idealism/Liberal Internationalism

Liberal international relations theory arose after World War I in response to the inability of states to control and limit war in their international relations. Early adherents include Woodrow Wilson and Norman Angell, who argued vigorously that states mutually gained from cooperation and that war was so destructive to be essentially futile.

Liberalism was not recognized as a coherent theory as such until it was collectively and derisively termed idealism by E. H. Carr. A new version of "idealism" that focused on human rights as the basis of the legitimacy of international law was advanced by Hans K ochler.

Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism seeks to update liberalism by accepting the neorealist presumption that states are the key actors in international relations, but still maintains that non-state actors (NSAs) and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) matter. Proponents such as Maria Chattha argue that states will cooperate irrespective of relative gains, and are thus concerned with absolute gains.

This also means that nations are, in essence, free to make their own choices as to how they will go about conducting policy without any international organizations blocking a nation's right to sovereignty. Neoliberalism also contains an economic theory that is based on the use of open and free markets with little, if any, government intervention to prevent monopolies and other conglomerates from forming. The growing interdependence throughout and after the Cold War through international institutions led to neo-liberalism being defined as institutionalism, this new part of the theory being fronted by Robert Keohane and also Joseph Nye.

Regime Theory

Regime theory is derived from the liberal tradition that argues that international institutions or regimes affect the behaviour of states. It assumes that cooperation is possible in the anarchic system of states, indeed, regimes are by definition, instances of international cooperation.

While realism predicts that conflict should be the norm in international relations, regime theorists say that there is cooperation despite anarchy. Often they cite cooperation in trade, human rights and collective security among other issues. These instances of cooperation are regimes. The most commonly cited definition of regimes comes from Stephen Krasner. Krasner defines regimes as "institutions possessing norms, decision rules, and procedures which facilitate a convergence of expectations."

Not all approaches to regime theory, however are liberal or neoliberal; some realist scholars like Joseph Greico have developed hybrid theories which take a realist based approach to this fundamentally liberal theory.

Post-positivist/Reflectivist Theories

International Society Theory

International society theory, also called the English School, focuses on the shared norms and values of states and how they

regulate international relations. Examples of such norms include diplomacy, order, and international law. Unlike neo-realism, it is not necessarily positivist. Theorists have focused particularly on humanitarian intervention, and are subdivided between solidarists, who tend to advocate it more, and pluralists, who place greater value in order and sovereignty. Nicholas Wheeler is a prominent solidarist, while Hedley Bull and Robert H. Jackson are perhaps the best known pluralists.

Social Constructivism

Social Constructivism encompasses a broad range of theories that aim to address questions of ontology, such as the Structure and agency debate, as well as questions of epistemology, such as the "material/ideational" debate that concerns the relative role of material forces versus ideas. Constructivism is not a theory of IR in the manner of neo-realism, but is instead a social theory which is used to better explain the actions taken by states and other major actors as well as the identities that guide these states and actors.

Constructivism in IR can be divided into what Hopf calls 'conventional' and 'critical' constructivism. Common to all varieties of constructivism is an interest in the role that ideational forces play. The most famous constructivist scholar, Alexander Wendt noted in a 1992 article in *International Organization*, that "anarchy is what states make of it". By this he means that the anarchical structure that neo-realists claim governs state interaction is in fact a phenomenon that is socially constructed and reproduced by states.

For example, if the system is dominated by states that see anarchy as a life or death situation then the system will be characterised by warfare. If on the other hand anarchy is seen as restricted then a more peaceful system will exist. Anarchy in this view is constituted by state interaction, rather than accepted as a natural and immutable feature of international life as viewed by neo-realist IR scholars.

Critical Theory

Critical international relations theory is the application of 'critical theory' to international relations. Proponents such as Andrew Linklater, Robert W. Cox and Ken Booth focus on the need for human emancipation from States. Hence, it is "critical" of mainstream IR theories that tend to be state-centric.

Marxism

Marxist and Neo-Marxist theories of IR reject the realist/liberal view of state conflict or cooperation; instead focusing on the economic and material aspects. It makes the assumption that the economy trumps other concerns; allowing for the elevation of class as the focus of study. Marxists view the international system as an integrated capitalist system in pursuit of capital accumulation. Thus, the period of colonialism brought in sources for raw materials and captive markets for exports, while decolonialization brought new opportunities in the form of dependence. Linked in with Marxist theories is dependency theory which argues that developed countries, in their pursuit of power, penetrate developing states through political advisors,

missionaries, experts, and MNCs to integrate them into the capitalist system in order to appropriate natural resources and foster dependence.

Marxist theories receive scant attention in the United States where no significant socialist party ever existed. It is more common in parts of Europe and is one of the most important theoretic contributions of Latin American academia, for example through Liberation theology.

Leadership Theories

Interest Group Perspective

Interest Group theory posits that the driving force behind state behaviour is sub-state interest groups. Examples of interest groups include political lobbyists, the military, and the corporate sector. Group theory argues that although these interest groups are constitutive of the state, they are also causal forces in the exercise of state power.

Strategic Perspective

Strategic Perspective is a theoretical approach that views individuals as choosing their actions by taking into account the anticipated actions and responses of others with the intention of maximizing their own welfare.

Inherent Bad Faith Model in International Relations and Political Psychology

The "inherent bad faith model" of information processing is a theory in political psychology that was first put forth by Ole Holsti to explain the relationship between John Foster Dulles' beliefs and his model of information processing. It is the most widely studied model of one's opponent. A state is presumed to be implacably hostile, and contra-indicators of this are ignored. They are dismissed as propaganda ploys or signs of weakness. Examples are John Foster Dulles' position regarding the Soviet Union, or Israel's initial position on the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

Poststructuralist theories of International Relations

Poststructuralist theories of IR developed in the 1980s from postmodernist studies in political science. Post-structuralism explores the deconstruction of concepts traditionally not problematic in IR, such as 'power' and 'agency' and examines how the construction of these concepts shapes international relations.

The examination of 'narratives' plays an important part in poststructuralist analysis, for example feminist poststructuralist work has examined the role that 'women' play in global society and how they are constructed in war as 'innocent' and 'civilians'.

Examples of post-positivist research include:

- Feminisms

- Postcolonialism
- Post-realism

Concepts in international relations

Conjuncture

In decision making in international relations, the concept of Conjuncture, together with freedom of action and equality are important elements. Decision makers must take into account the set of international conditions in taking initiatives that would create different types of responses.

Systemic Level Concepts

International relations is often viewed in terms of levels of analysis. The systemic level concepts are those broad concepts that define and shape an international milieu, characterised by Anarchy.

Power

The concept of power in international relations can be described as the degree of resources, capabilities, and influence in international affairs. It is often divided up into the concepts of hard power and soft power, hard power relating primarily to coercive power, such as the use of force, and soft power commonly covering economics, diplomacy and cultural influence. However, there is no clear dividing line between the two forms of power.

Polarity

Polarity in International Relations refers to the arrangement of power within the international system. The concept arose from bipolarity during the Cold War, with the international system dominated by the conflict between two superpowers, and has been applied retrospectively by theorists. However, the term bipolar was notably used by Stalin who said he saw the international system as a bipolar one with two opposing powerbases and ideologies. Consequently, the international system prior to 1945 can be described as multi-polar, with power being shared among Great powers.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 had led to what some would call unipolarity, with the United States as a sole superpower. However, due to China's continued rapid economic growth combined with the respectable international position they hold within political spheres and the power that the Chinese Government exerts over their people, there is debate over whether China is now a superpower or a possible candidate in the future. Several theories of international relations draw upon the idea of polarity.

The balance of power was a concept prevalent in Europe prior to the First World War, the thought being that by balancing power blocs it would create stability and prevent war. Theories of the balance of power gained prominence again during the Cold War, being a central mechanism of Kenneth Waltz's Neorealism. Here, the concepts of balancing and bandwagoning are developed.

Hegemonic stability theory also draws upon the idea of Polarity, specifically the state of unipolarity. Hegemony is the preponderance of power at one pole in the international system, and the theory argues this is a stable configuration because of mutual gains by both the dominant power and others in the international system. This is contrary to many Neorealist arguments, particularly made by Kenneth Waltz, stating that the end of the Cold War and the state of unipolarity is an unstable configuration that will inevitably change.

This can be expressed in Power transition theory, which states that it is likely that a great power would challenge a hegemon after a certain period, resulting in a major war. It suggests that while hegemony can control the occurrence of wars, it also results in the creation of one. Its main proponent, A.F.K. Organski, argued this based on the occurrence of previous wars during British, Portuguese and Dutch hegemony.

Interdependence

Many advocate that the current international system is characterized by growing interdependence; the mutual responsibility and dependency on others.

Advocates of this point to growing globalization, particularly with international economic interaction. The role of international institutions, and widespread acceptance of a number of operating principles in the international system, reinforces ideas that relations are characterized by interdependence.

Dependency

Dependency theory is a theory most commonly associated with Marxism, stating that a set of Core states exploit a set of weaker Periphery states for their prosperity. Various versions of the theory suggest that this is either an inevitability or use the theory to highlight the necessity for change.

Systemic Tools of International Relations

- Diplomacy is the practice of communication and negotiation between representatives of states. To some extent, all other tools of international relations can be considered the failure of diplomacy. Keeping in mind, the use of other tools are part of the communication and negotiation inherent within diplomacy. Sanctions, force, and adjusting trade regulations, while not typically considered part of diplomacy, are actually valuable tools in the interest of leverage and placement in negotiations.
- Sanctions are usually a first resort after the failure of diplomacy, and are one of the main tools used to enforce treaties. They can take the form of diplomatic or economic sanctions and involve the cutting of ties and imposition of barriers to communication or trade.
- War, the use of force, is often thought of as the ultimate tool of international relations. A widely accepted definition is that given by Clausewitz, with war being "the continuation of politics by other means". There is a growing study into 'new wars' involving

actors other than states. The study of war in International Relations is covered by the disciplines of 'War Studies' and 'Strategic studies'.

- The mobilization of international shame can also be thought of as a tool of International Relations. This is attempting to alter states' actions through 'naming and shaming' at the international level. This is mostly done by the large human rights NGOs such as Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch. A prominent use of was the UN Commission on Human Rights 1235 procedure, which publicly exposes state's human rights violations. The current Human Rights Council has yet to use this Mechanism
- The allotment of economic and/or diplomatic benefits. An example of this is the European Union's enlargement policy. Candidate countries are allowed entry into the EU only after the fulfillment of the Copenhagen criteria.

Unit-level concepts in international relations

As a level of analysis the unit level is often referred to as the state level, as it locates its explanation at the level of the state, rather than the international system.

Regime Type

It is often considered that a state's form of government can dictate the way that a state interacts with others in the international system:

- Democratic Peace Theory is a theory that suggests that the nature of democracy means that democratic countries will not go to war with each other. The justifications for this are that democracies externalise their norms and only go to war for just causes, and that democracy encourages mutual trust and respect.
- Communism justifies a world revolution, which similarly would lead to peaceful coexistence, based on a proletarian global society.

Revisionism/Status Quo

States can be classified by whether they accept the international status quo, or are revisionist, *i.e.* want change. Revisionist states seek to fundamentally change the rules and practices of international relations, feeling disadvantaged by the status quo. They see the international system as a largely western creation which serves to reinforce current realities.

Japan is an example of a state that has gone from being a revisionist state to one that is satisfied with the status quo, because the status quo is now beneficial to it.

Religion

It is often considered that religion can have an effect on the way a state acts within the international system. Religion is visible as an organising principle particularly for Islamic states, whereas secularism sits at the other end of the spectrum, with the separation of state and religion being responsible for the Liberal

international relations theory. The level beneath the unit level can be useful both for explaining factors in International Relations that other theories fail to explain, and for moving away from a state-centric view of international relations.

- Psychological factors in International Relations-Evaluating psychological factors in international relations comes from the understanding that a state is not a 'black box' as proposed by Realism, and that there may be other influences on foreign policy decisions. Examining the role of personalities in the decision making process can have some explanatory power, as can the role of misperception between various actors. A prominent application of sub-unit level psychological factors in international relations is the concept of Groupthink, another is the propensity of policymakers to think in terms of analogies.
- Bureaucratic politics-Looks at the role of the bureaucracy in decision making, and sees decisions as a result of bureaucratic in-fighting, and as having been shaped by various constraints.
- Religious, Ethnic, and secessionist groups-Viewing these aspects of the sub-unit level has explanatory power with regards to ethnic conflicts, religious wars, transnational diaspora and other actors which do not consider themselves to fit with the defined state boundaries. This is particularly useful in the context of the pre-modern world of weak states.

- Science, Technology and International Relations- How science and technology impact the global health, business, environment, technology, and development.
- International political economy, and economic factors in international relations.
- International political culturology - Looks at how culture and cultural variables impact in international relations . . .

Institutions in international relations

International institutions form a vital part of contemporary International Relations. Much interaction at the system level is governed by them, and they outlaw some traditional institutions and practices of International Relations, such as the use of war. As humanity enters the Planetary phase of civilization, some scientists and political theorists see a global hierarchy of institutions replacing the existing system of sovereign nation-states as the primary political community. They argue that nations are an imagined community that cannot resolve such modern challenges as the "Dogville" effect, the legal and political status of stateless people and refugees, and the need to address worldwide concerns like climate change and pandemics.

Futurist Paul Raskin has hypothesized that a new, more legitimate form of global politics could be based on "constrained pluralism." This principle guides the formation of institutions based on three characteristics: irreducibility, where some issues must be adjudicated at the global level; subsidiarity, which limits the scope of global authority to truly global issues while smaller-

scope issues are regulated at lower levels; and heterogeneity, which allows for diverse forms of local and regional institutions as long as they meet global obligations.

Generalist Inter-State Organizations

The United Nations is an international organization that describes itself as a "global association of governments facilitating co-operation in international law, international security, economic development, and social equity"; It is the most prominent international institution.

Many of the legal institutions follow the same organizational structure as the UN.

- African Union
- ASEAN
- Arab League
- CIS
- European Union
- G8
- G20
- League of Nations
- Organization of American States

Economic Institutions

- Asian Development Bank
- African Development Bank
- Inter-American Development Bank

- International Monetary Fund
- World Bank
- World Trade Organization

International Legal Bodies

Human Rights

- European Court of Human Rights
- Human Rights Committee
- Inter-American Court of Human Rights
- International Criminal Court
- International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda
- International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia
- United Nations Human Rights Council

Legal

- African Court of Justice
- European Court of Justice
- International Court of Justice
- International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea

Regional Security Arrangements

- CSCAP
- GUAM
- Maritime security regime

- NATO
- SCO
- SAARC
- UNASUR

International Politics: Meaning

After the end of the cold war, foreign and security policies have been subject to rapid change. This development has been further accelerated after September 11. The debates surrounding the war on Iraq have brought to the surface tensions between the USA and Europe - as well as within Europe itself. The implications of American unilateralism are still unfolding. Afghanistan, which was at the heart of assault post September 11, still faces political instability.

Nonetheless, with Afghanistan having recently joined the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC), a new opportunity has arisen for regional cooperation. It is increasingly being realised that the involvement and support of neighbours is essential to ending conflict, stabilization and reconstruction in that country. However, persistent antagonism between India and Pakistan has raised Pakistani fears of strategic competition in Afghanistan.

As a result, the Indo-Pakistan peace process; peacebuilding in Afghanistan; and American, European and NATO involvement in Afghanistan and Pakistan have all become interlinked. Increasingly, questions of foreign, security, and developmental policy have become intertwined.

Given this background, the Foundation underscores that traditional security policies such as deterrence and containment have been replaced by risk prevention, crisis intervention, and preemptive policy measures.

- H.J. Morgenthau, "International Politics include analysis of political relations and problems of peace among nations. Further he writes, It "is struggle for and use of power among nations."
- Charles Schleicher, " All inter-state relations are included in international politics, through all the inter-state relations are not political."

The Nature of International Politics

- Sovereign States are not its chief Actors
- Protection of National Interest is the Objective
- International Politics is struggle for power
- Power is both, a means as well as an end in international Politics
- Conflicts are condition of international Politics
- International Politics is a process of conflict resolution among Nations.
- Behavioural Study
- Inter-disciplinary Study
- International Politics is a Continuous Process
- Analytical and Scientific

Scope Or Subject Matter Of International Politics

- In 1947, Grayson Kirk included the following five ingredients in the scope or subject matter of international politics.:-
- The nature and operation of the state system
- Factors which influence the power of the state,
- The international position and foreign policies of great powers
- The building of more stable world order.

A report published by Vincent Baker in which the following subjects were included in the scope of International Politics.:

- The nature and principal forces of International Politics.
- The political, social and economic organisation of international life.
- Elements of national Power
- Instruments used for the promotion of national Power
- Limitations on and control of national power
- Foreign Policies of major powers
- History of International Relation.

Others are:-

- Study of State Systems
- Study of national Interests
- Study of national Power
- Study of foreign policy

- Study of international Law
- Study of International organisations
- Study of Geopolitics
- Study of war and Peace
- Study of Conflict Management and Conflict Resolution
- Study of Ideologies
- Study of Nationalism, colonialism and imperialism
- Study of National Character
- Study of Disarmament
- Study of the issues related to environment Protection
- Study of Policy- Making
- Study of the issue related to Human Rights
- Study of the role of Economic Factors
- Study of Demographic Factors
- Study of special Areas
- Study of the problem of terrorism
- Study of relations among states.

Importance Of The Study Of International Politics

- It increase the knowledge of individual
- Enables to understand world Problems
- Helpful to maintain World Peace and Harmony
- Enables us to understand the behaviour of Nations
- Harmony between Nationalism and Internalism
- Helpful in building world based on justice
- Practical Importance
- Essential for the survival of mankind.

Chapter 2

Bilateral and Regional Relations

Afghanistan

Bilateral relations between India and Afghanistan have been traditionally strong and friendly. While India was the only South Asian country to recognize the Soviet-backed Democratic Republic of Afghanistan in the 1980s, its relations were diminished during the Afghan civil wars and the rule of the Islamist Taliban in the 1990s. India aided the overthrow of the Taliban and became the largest regional provider of humanitarian and reconstruction aid.

The new democratically-elected Afghan government strengthened its ties with India in wake of persisting tensions and problems with Pakistan, which was suspected of continuing to shelter and support the Taliban. India pursues a policy of close cooperation to bolster its standing as a regional power and contain its rival Pakistan, which it maintains is supporting Islamic militants in Kashmir and other parts of India. India is the largest regional investor in Afghanistan, having committed more than US\$2.2 billion for reconstruction purposes.

Bangladesh

Both states are part of the Indian subcontinent and have had a long common cultural, economic and political history. India

played a crucial part in Bangladesh's independence from Pakistan. In recent years India provides co-operation and assistance during annual natural calamities. India is largest exporter to Bangladesh. Most of differences are of sharing water resources between the two countries, such as the Ganges, where Bangladesh accuses India of diverting Ganges water to Calcutta through Farakka Barrage.

Bhutan

Historically, there have been close ties with India. Both countries signed a Friendship treaty in 1949, where India would assist Bhutan in foreign relations. On 8 February 2007, the Indo-Bhutan Friendship Treaty was substantially revised under the Bhutanese King, Jigme Khesar Namgyel Wangchuck. Whereas in the Treaty of 1949 "The Government of India undertakes to exercise no interference in the internal administration of Bhutan. On its part the Government of Bhutan agrees to be guided by the advice of the Government of India in regard to its external relations."

In the revised treaty it now reads as, "In keeping with the abiding ties of close friendship and cooperation between Bhutan and India, the Government of the Kingdom of Bhutan and the Government of the Republic of India shall cooperate closely with each other on issues relating to their national interests. Neither government shall allow the use of its territory for activities harmful to the national security and interest of the other." The revised treaty also includes in it the preamble "Reaffirming their respect for each other's independence, sovereignty and territorial

integrity”, an element that was absent in the earlier version. The Indo-Bhutan Friendship Treaty of 2007 strengthens Bhutan’s status as an independent and sovereign nation.

Tata Power is building a hydro-electric dam. This dam will greatly develop the Bhutanese economy by providing employment, and by selling electricity to India and fulfilling India’s burgeoning energy needs. Due to this dam Bhutan’s economy grew 20%, the second highest growth rate in the world.

Myanmar

India was one of the leading supporters of Burmese independence and established diplomatic relations after Burma’s independence from Great Britain in 1948. For many years, Indo-Burmese relations were strong due to cultural links, flourishing commerce, common interests in regional affairs and the presence of a significant Indian community in Burma. India provided considerable support when Burma struggled with regional insurgencies. However, the overthrow of the democratic government by the Military of Burma led to strains in ties. Along with much of the world, India condemned the suppression of democracy and Burma ordered the expulsion of the Burmese Indian community, increasing its own isolation from the world. Only China maintained close links with Burma while India supported the pro-democracy movement.

However, due to geo-political concerns, India revived its relations and recognised the new name of Myanmar in 1993 overcoming strains over drug trafficking, the suppression of democracy and

the rule of the military junta in Burma. Burma is situated to the south of the states of Mizoram, Manipur, Nagaland and Arunachal Pradesh in Northeast India. and the proximity of the People's Republic of China gives strategic importance to Indo-Burmese relations.

The Indo-Burmese border stretches over 1,600 miles and some insurgents in North-east India seek refuge in Myanmar. Consequently, India has been keen on increasing military cooperation with Myanmar in its counter-insurgency activities.

In 2001, the Indian Army completed the construction of a major road along its border with Myanmar. India has also been building major roads, highways, ports and pipelines within Myanmar in an attempt to increase its strategic influence in the region and also to counter China's growing strides in the Indochina peninsula. Indian companies have also sought active participation in oil and natural gas exploration in Myanmar. In February 2007, India announced a plan to develop the Sittwe port, which would enable ocean access from Indian Northeastern states like Mizoram, via the Kaladan River.

India is a major customer of Myanmar oil and gas. In 2007, Indian exports to Myanmar totaled US\$185 million, while its imports from Myanmar were valued at around US\$810 million, consisting mostly of oil and gas. India has granted US\$100 million credit to fund highway infrastructure projects in Myanmar, while US\$ 57 million has been offered to upgrade Myanmar railways. A further US\$27 million in grants has been pledged for road and rail projects. India is one of the few

countries that has provided military assistance to the Myanmarese junta.

However, there has been increasing pressure on India to cut some of its military supplies to Myanmar. Relations between the two remain close which was evident in the aftermath of Cyclone Nargis, when India was one of the few countries whose relief and rescue aid proposals were accepted by Myanmar's ruling junta.

China

Despite lingering suspicions remaining from the 1962 Sino-Indian War and continuing boundary disputes over Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh, Sino-Indian relations have improved gradually since 1988. Both countries have sought to reduce tensions along the frontier, expand trade and cultural ties, and normalize relations.

A series of high-level visits between the two nations have helped improve relations. In December 1996, PRC President Jiang Zemin visited India during a tour of South Asia. While in New Delhi, he signed with the Indian Prime Minister a series of confidence-building measures for the disputed borders. Sino-Indian relations suffered a brief setback in May 1998 when the Indian Defence minister justified the country's nuclear tests by citing potential threats from the PRC.

However, in June 1999, during the Kargil crisis, then-External Affairs Minister Jaswant Singh visited Beijing and stated that India did not consider China a threat. By 2001, relations between

India and the PRC were on the mend, and the two sides handled the move from Tibet to India of the 17th Karmapa in January 2000 with delicacy and tact. In 2003, India formally recognized Tibet as a part of China, and China recognized Sikkim as a formal part of India in 2004. Since 2004, the economic rise of both China and India has also helped forge closer relations between the two. Sino-Indian trade reached US\$36 billion in 2007, making China the single largest trading partner of India. The increasing economic reliance between India and China has also bought the two nations closer politically, with both India and China eager to resolve their boundary dispute.

They have also collaborated on several issues ranging from WTO's Doha round in 2008 to regional free trade agreement. Similar to Indo-US nuclear deal, India and China have also agreed to cooperate in the field of civilian nuclear energy.

However, China's economic interests have clashed with those of India. Both the countries are the largest Asian investors in Africa and have competed for control over its large natural resources. India and China agreed to take bilateral trade up to US\$100 billion on a recent visit by Wen Jiabao to India.

Maldives

India enjoys a considerable influence over Maldives' foreign policy and provides extensive security co-operation especially after the Operation Cactus in 1988 during which India repelled Tamil mercenaries who invaded the country. As founder member in 1985 of the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation,

SAARC, which brings together Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan and Sri Lanka, the country plays a very active role in SAARC.

The Maldives has taken the lead in calling for a South Asian Free Trade Agreement, the formulation of a Social Charter, the initiation of informal political consultations in SAARC forums, the lobbying for greater action on environmental issues, the proposal of numerous human rights measures such as the regional convention on child rights and for setting up a SAARC Human Rights Resource Centre. The Maldives is also an advocate of greater international profile for SAARC such as through formulating common positions at the UN. But the Maldives claims the Indian-administered territory of Minicoy as part of its country, that is inhabited by Muslims.

India is starting the process to bring the island country into India's security grid. The move comes after the moderate Islamic nation approached New Delhi earlier this year over fears that one of its island resorts could be taken over by terrorists given its lack of military assets and surveillance capabilities.

India is also signing an agreement later this year which includes following things:

- India will permanently base two helicopters in the country to enhance its surveillance capabilities and ability to respond swiftly to threats. One helicopter from the Coast Guard is likely to be handed over

during Antony's visit while another from the Navy will be cleared for transfer shortly.

- Maldives has coastal radars on only two of its 26 atolls. India will help set up radars on all 26 for seamless coverage of approaching vessels and aircraft.
- The coastal radar chain in Maldives will be networked with the Indian coastal radar system. India has already undertaken a project to install radars along its entire coastline. The radar chains of the two countries will be interlinked and a central control room in India's Coastal Command will get a seamless radar picture.
- The Indian Coast Guard (ICG) will carry out regular Dornier sorties over the island nation to look out for suspicious movements or vessels. The Southern Naval Command will overlook the inclusion of Maldives into the Indian security grid.
- Military teams from Maldives will visit the tri-services Andaman Nicobar Command (ANC) to observe how India manages security and surveillance of the critical island chain.

Nepal

Relations between India and Nepal are close yet fraught with difficulties stemming from geography, economics, the problems inherent in big power-small power relations, and common ethnic and linguistic identities that overlap the two countries' borders. In 1950 New Delhi and Kathmandu initiated their intertwined relationship with the Treaty of Peace and Friendship and accompanying letters that defined security relations between the

two countries, and an agreement governing both bilateral trade and trade transiting Indian soil.

The 1950 treaty and letters stated that “neither government shall tolerate any threat to the security of the other by a foreign aggressor” and obligated both sides “to inform each other of any serious friction or misunderstanding with any neighbouring state likely to cause any breach in the friendly relations subsisting between the two governments.” Which granted the Indian and Nepali People don't mandatory to have Work permit for any economic activity such as work and business related activity. These accords cemented a “special relationship” between India and Nepal that granted Nepal preferential economic treatment and provided Nepalese in India the same economic and educational opportunities as Indian citizens.

Pakistan

Despite historical, cultural and ethnic links between them, relations between India and Pakistan have been plagued by years of mistrust and suspicion ever since the partition of India in 1947. The principal source of contention between India and its western neighbour has been the Kashmir conflict. After an invasion by Pashtun tribesmen and Pakistani paramilitary forces, the Hindu Maharaja of the Dogra Kingdom of Jammu and Kashmir, Hari Singh, and its Muslim Prime Minister, Sheikh Abdullah, signed an Instrument of Accession with New Delhi.

The First Kashmir War started after the Indian Army entered Srinagar, the capital of the state, to secure the area from the

invading forces. The war ended in December 1948 with the Line of Control dividing the erstwhile princely state into territories administered by Pakistan (northern and western areas) and India (southern, central and northeastern areas). Pakistan contested the legality of the Instrument of Accession since the Dogra Kingdom has signed a standstill agreement with it.

The Indo-Pakistani War of 1965 started following the failure of Pakistan's Operation Gibraltar, which was designed to infiltrate forces into Jammu and Kashmir to precipitate an insurgency against rule by India. The five-week war caused thousands of casualties on both sides. It ended in a United Nations (UN) mandated ceasefire and the subsequent issuance of the Tashkent Declaration.

India and Pakistan went to war again in 1971, this time the conflict being over East Pakistan. The large-scale atrocities committed there by the Pakistan army led to millions of Bengali refugees pouring over into India. India, along with the Mukti Bahini, defeated Pakistan and the Pakistani forces surrendered on the eastern front. The war resulted in the creation of Bangladesh.

In 1998, India carried out the Pokhran-II nuclear tests which was followed by Pakistan's Chagai-I tests. Following the Lahore Declaration in February 1999, relations briefly improved. A few months later however, Pakistani paramilitary forces and Pakistani Army, infiltrated in large numbers into the Kargil district of Indian Kashmir. This initiated the Kargil conflict after India moved in thousands of troops to successfully flush out the

infiltrators. Although the conflict did not result in a full-scale war between India and Pakistan, relations between the two reached all-time low which worsened even further following the involvement of Pakistan-based terrorists in the hijacking of the Indian Airlines IC814 plane in December 1999. Attempts to normalize relations, such as the Agra summit held in July 2001, failed.

An attack on the Indian Parliament in December 2001, which was blamed on Pakistan, which had condemned the attack caused a military standoff between the two countries which lasted for nearly a year raising fears of a nuclear conflict. However, a peace process, initiated in 2003, led to improved relations in the following years.

Since the initiation of the peace process, several confidence-building-measures (CBMs) between India and Pakistan have taken shape. The Samjhauta Express and Delhi–Lahore Bus service are two of these successful measures which have played a crucial role in expanding people-to-people contact between the two countries. The initiation of Srinagar–Muzaffarabad Bus service in 2005 and opening of a historic trade route across the Line of Control in 2008 further reflects increasing eagerness between the two sides to improve relations. Although bilateral trade between India and Pakistan was a modest US\$1.7 billion in March 2007, it is expected to cross US\$10 billion by 2010. After the Kashmir earthquake in 2005, India sent aid to affected areas in Pakistani Kashmir and Punjab as well as Indian Kashmir. The 2008 Mumbai attacks seriously undermined the relations between the two countries. India alleged Pakistan of harboring

militants on their soil, while Pakistan vehemently denies such claims. Relations are currently hampered since India has sent a list of 40 alleged fugitive in various terror strikes to Pakistan, expecting them to be handed over to India. Pakistan, on the other hand, has declared that it has no intentions whatsoever of carrying out their extradition.

Sri Lanka

Bilateral relations between Sri Lanka and India have been generally friendly, but were affected by the Sri Lankan civil war and by the failure of Indian intervention during the Sri Lankan civil war. India is Sri Lanka's only neighbour, separated by the Palk Strait; both nations occupy a strategic position in South Asia and have sought to build a common security umbrella in the Indian Ocean.

India-Sri Lanka relations have undergone a qualitative and quantitative transformation in the recent past. Political relations are close, trade and investments have increased dramatically, infrastructural linkages are constantly being augmented, defence collaboration has increased and there is a general, broad-based improvement across all sectors of bilateral cooperation. India was the first country to respond to Sri Lanka's request for assistance after the tsunami in December 2004. In July 2006, India evacuated 430 Sri Lankan nationals from Lebanon, first to Cyprus by Indian Navy ships and then to Delhi and Colombo by special Air India flights. There exists a broad consensus within the Sri Lankan polity on the primacy of India in Sri Lanka's external relations matrix. Both the major political parties in Sri

Lanka, the Sri Lanka Freedom Party and the United Nationalist Party have contributed to the rapid development of bilateral relations in the last ten years. Sri Lanka has supported India's candidature to the permanent membership of the UN Security Council.

Asia-Pacific

Australia

The strongest ties between these two states is the commonwealth connection. Cricketing and Bollywood ties also help foster relations as in the frequent travel for games, and, more importantly, the presence of Australian cricketers in India for commercial gain. This was further enhanced with the IPL, and, to a lesser degree, the ICL. Bollywood has also improved ties as with John Howard's visit to Mumbai to increase tourism to Australia. Furthermore, there is a going strategic connection to forming an "Asian NATO" with India, Japan, the US and Australia.

The bilateral agreements have worked out for all but the Indo-Australian angle, though this has been hurt by India's refusal to sign the NPT and Australia's consequent refusal to provide India with uranium until the latter do so. However Australia has now cleared uranium sales to India by Labour party decision in Australian parliament and by this development the relations between both the commonwealth nations are set to improve. The Australian and Indian militaries have already worked well together. Of late the relations between the two countries were jolted, with attacks on Indian Community students in Melbourne,

Australia. Indian Government lodged strong protests with the Australian Government.

Australian Prime Minister Mr. Kevin Rudd said that "Australia valued its education system and International Students are valued more here in Australia." Mr. Rudd though said that his Govt. has ordered a thorough probe into the attacks and also condemned it in strongest possible terms no significant breakthrough has been achieved. Under the leadership of Incumbent Prime Minister of Australia Julia Gillard the relations between both the nations have significantly improved on part due to her holistic approach in relations.

Fiji

Fiji's relationship with the Republic of India is often seen by observers against the backdrop of the sometimes tense relations between its indigenous people and the 44 per cent of the population who are of Indian descent. India has used its influence in international forums such as the Commonwealth of Nations and United Nations on behalf of ethnic Indians in Fiji, lobbying for sanctions against Fiji in the wake of the 1987 coups and the 2000 coup, both of which removed governments, one dominated and one led, by Indo-Fijians.

Japan

India-Japan relations have always been strong. India has culturally influenced Japan through Buddhism. During the

Indian Independence Movement, the Japanese Imperial Army helped Netaji Subhash Chandra Bose's Indian National Army.

Relations have remained warm since India's independence. Japanese companies, like Sony, Toyota, and Honda, have manufacturing facilities in India, and with the growth of the Indian economy, India is a big market for Japanese firms.

The most prominent Japanese company to have a big investment in India is automobiles giant Suzuki which is in partnership with Indian automobiles company Maruti Suzuki, the largest car manufacturer in India.

Honda was also a partner in "Hero Honda", one of the largest motor cycle sellers in the world (the companies split in 2011).

In December 2006, Prime Minister Manmohan Singh's visit to Japan culminated in the signing of the "Joint Statement Towards Japan-India Strategic and Global Partnership". Japan has funded some major infrastructure projects in India, most notably the Delhi Metro subway system.

Indian applicants were welcomed in 2006 to the JET Programme, starting with just one slot available in 2006 and 41 in 2007. Also, in 2007, the Japanese Self Defence Forces took part in a naval exercise in the Indian Ocean, known as Malabar 2007, which also involved the naval forces of India, Australia, Singapore and the United States.

In October 2008, Japan signed an agreement with India under which it would grant the latter a low-interest loan worth US\$4.5

billion to construct a high-speed rail line between Delhi and Mumbai. This is the single largest overseas project being financed by Japan and reflects growing economic partnership between the two. India is also one of three countries with whom Japan has security pact, the other being Australia and the United States.

Laos

In recent years, India has endeavoured to build relations, with this small Southeast Asian nation. They have strong military relations, and India shall be building an Airforce Academy in Laos.

Nauru

India and Nauru relations have been cordial and friendly. Leaders of the both countries have been meeting on the side lines of some of the international forums of which both the nations are part of such as the United Nations and the Non-Aligned Movement.

Indonesia

The ties between Indonesia and India date back to the times of the Ramayana, "Yawadvipa" (Java) is mentioned in India's earliest epic, the Ramayana. Sugriva, the chief of Rama's army dispatched his men to Yawadvipa, the island of Java, in search of Sita. Indonesians had absorbed many aspects of Indian culture since almost two millennia ago. The most obvious trace is the large adoption of Sanskrit into Indonesian language. Indianised

Hindu-Buddhist kingdoms, such as Srivijaya, Medang, Sunda and Majapahit were the predominant governments in Indonesia, and lasted from 200 to the 1500s, with the last remaining being in Bali. The example of profound Hindu-Buddhist influences in Indonesian history are the 9th century Prambanan and Borobudur temples.

In 1950, the first President of Indonesia – Sukarno called upon the peoples of Indonesia and India to “intensify the cordial relations” that had existed between the two countries “for more than 1000 years” before they had been “disrupted” by colonial powers. In the spring of 1966, the foreign ministers of both countries began speaking again of an era of friendly relations. India had supported Indonesian independence and Nehru had raised the Indonesian question in the United Nations Security Council.

India has an embassy in Jakarta and Indonesia operates an embassy in Delhi. India regards Indonesia as a key member of ASEAN. Today, both countries maintain cooperative and friendly relations. India and Indonesia is one of the few (and also one of the largest) democracies in Asian region which can be projected as a real democracy. Both nations had agreed to establish a strategic partnership. As a fellow Asian democracies that shares common value, it is natural for both countries to nurture and foster strategic alliance. Indonesia and India are member states of the G-20, the E7 (countries), the Non-aligned Movement, and the United Nations.

Malaysia

India has a high commission in Kuala Lumpur, and Malaysia has a high commission in New Delhi. Both countries are full members of the Commonwealth of Nations, and the Asian Union. India and Malaysia are also connected by various cultural and historical ties that date back to antiquity. The two countries are on excellently friendly terms with each other seeing as Malaysia is home to a strong concentration of Indian immigrants. Mahathir bin Mohamad the fourth and longest serving Prime Minister of Malaysia is of Indian origin, his father Mohamad Iskandar, was a Malayalee Muslim (who migrated from Kerala) and his mother Wan Tampawan, was Malay.

Philippines

Through the Srivijaya and Majapahit empires, Hindu influence has been visible in Philippine history from the 10th to 14th century A.D. During the 18th century, there was robust trade between Manila and the Coromandel Coast of Bengal, involving Philippine exports of tobacco, silk, cotton, indigo, sugar cane and coffee. The Philippines established diplomatic relations with India on 16 November 1949. The first Philippine envoy to India was the late Foreign Secretary Narciso Ramos. Seven years after India's independence in 1947, the Philippines and India signed a Treaty of Friendship on 11 July 1952 in Manila to strengthen the friendly relations existing between the two countries. Soon after, the Philippine Legation in New Delhi was established and then elevated to an Embassy. However, due to foreign policy differences as a result of the bipolar alliance structure of the

Cold War, the development of bilateral relations was stunted. It was only in 1976 that relations started to normalize when Mr. Aditya Birla, one of India's successful industrialists, met with then President Ferdinand E. Marcos to explore possibilities of setting up joint ventures in the Philippines.

Today, like India, the Philippines is the leading voice-operated business process outsourcing (BPO) source in terms of revenue (US\$ 5.7) and number of people (500,000) employed in the sector. In partnership with the Philippines, India has 20 IT/BPO companies in the Philippines. Philippines-India bilateral trade stood at US\$ 986.60 million dollars in 2009. In 2004 it was US\$ 600 million. Both countries aim to reach US\$1 billion by 2010. There are 60,000 Indians living in the Philippines. The Philippines and India signed in October 2007 the Framework for Bilateral Cooperation which created the PH-India JCBC. It has working groups in trade, agriculture, tourism, health, renewable energy and a regular policy consultation mechanism and security dialogue.

Singapore

India and Singapore share long-standing cultural, commercial and strategic relations, with Singapore being a part of the "Greater India" cultural and commercial region. More than 300,000 people of Indian origin live in Singapore. Following its independence in 1965, Singapore was concerned with China-backed communist threats as well as domination from Malaysia and Indonesia and sought a close strategic relationship with India, which it saw as a counter-balance to Chinese influence

and a partner in achieving regional security. Singapore had always been an important strategic trading post, giving India trade access to Maritime Southeast Asia and the Far East.

Although the rival positions of both nations over the Vietnam War and the Cold War caused consternation between India and Singapore, their relationship expanded significantly in the 1990s; Singapore was one of the first to respond to India's "Look East" Policy of expanding its economic, cultural and strategic ties in Southeast Asia to strengthen its standing as a regional power. Singapore, and especially, the Singaporean Foreign Minister, George Yeo, have taken an interest, in re-establishing the ancient Indian university, Nalanda University.

Singapore is the 8th largest source of investment in India and the largest amongst ASEAN member nations. It is also India's 9th biggest trading partner as of 2005-06. Its cumulative investment in India totals US\$ 3 billion as of 2006 and is expected to rise to US 5 billion by 2010 and US 10 billion by 2015.

India's economic liberalisation and its "Look East" policy have led to a major expansion in bilateral trade, which grew from USD 2.2 billion in 2001 to US 9-10 billion in 2006 – a 400% growth in span of five years – and to USD 50 billion by 2010. Singapore accounts for 38% of India's trade with ASEAN member nations and 3.4% of its total foreign trade. India's main exports to Singapore in 2005 included petroleum, gemstones, jewellery, machinery and its imports from Singapore included electronic goods, organic chemicals and metals. More than half of

Singapore's exports to India are basically "re-exports" – items that had been imported from India.

South Korea

The cordial relationship between the two countries extends back to 48AD, when Queen Suro, or Princess Heo, travelled from the kingdom of Ayodhya to Korea. The princess had a dream about a heavenly king who was awaiting heaven's anointed ride. After Princess Heo had the dream, she asked her parents, the king and queen, for permission to set out and seek the man, which the king and queen urged with the belief that god orchestrated the whole fate.

Upon approval, she set out on a boat, carrying gold, silver, a tea plant, and a stone which calmed the waters. Archeologists discovered a stone with two fish kissing each other, a symbol of the Gaya kingdom that is unique to the Mishra royal family in Ayodhya, India.

This royal link provides further evidence that there was an active commercial engagements between India and Korea since the queen's arrival to Korea. Current descendants live in the city of Kimhae as well as abroad in America's state of New Jersey and Kentucky. Many of them became prominent and well-known around the world like President Kim Dae Jung, Prime Minister Jong Pil Kim.

The relations between the countries have been relatively limited, although much progress arose during the three decades. Since

the formal establishment of the diplomatic ties between two countries in 1973, several trade agreements have been reached. Trade between the two nations has increased exponentially, exemplified by the \$530 million during the fiscal year of 1992–1993, and the \$10 billion during 2006–2007. During the 1997 Asian financial crisis, South Korean businesses sought to increase access to the global markets, and began trade investments with India.

The last two presidential visits from South Korea to India were in 1996 and 2006, and the embassy works between the two countries are seen as needing improvements. Recently, there have been acknowledgements in the Korean public and political spheres that expanding relations with India should be a major economical and political priority for South Korea. Much of the economic investments of South Korea have been drained into China; however, South Korea is currently the fifth largest source of investment in India. To the Times of India, President Roh voiced his opinion that cooperation between India's software and Korea's IT industries would bring very efficient and successful outcomes.

The two countries agreed to shift their focus to the revision of the visa policies between the two countries, expansion of trade, and establishment of free trade agreement to encourage further investment between the two countries. Korean companies such as LG, Hyundai and Samsung have established manufacturing and service facilities in India, and several Korean construction companies won grants for a portion of the many infrastructural building plans in India, such as the "National Highway

Development Project". Tata Motor's purchase of Daewoo Commercial Vehicles at the cost of \$102 million highlights the India's investments in Korea, which consist mostly of subcontracting.

Taiwan

The bilateral relations between India and Taiwan (officially *Republic of China*) have improved since the 1990s despite both nations *not* maintaining official diplomatic relations, India recognizes only the People's Republic of China and not the Republic of China's contention of being the legitimate government of territorial China – a conflict that emerged after the Chinese Civil War (1945–49). However, India's economic and Commercial links as well as people-to-people contacts with Taiwan have expanded in recent years.

Thailand

India's Look East policy, saw India grow relations with ASEAN countries including Thailand, and Thailand's Look West policy, also saw it grow its relations with India. Both countries are members of BIMSTEC. Indian Prime Ministers Rajiv Gandhi, P.V. Narasimha Rao, Atal Bihari Vajpayee, and Manmohan Singh, have visited Thailand, which were reciprocated by contemporary Thai Prime Ministers Chatchai Choonhavan, Thaksin Sinawatra, and Surayud Chulanont. In 2003, a Free Trade Agreement was signed between the two countries. India, is the 13th largest investor in Thailand. The spheres of trade are in chemicals, pharmaceuticals, textiles, nylon, tyre cord, real estate, rayon

fibres, paper grade pulps, steel wires, and rods. However, IT services, and manufacturing, are the main spheres. Through Buddhism, India, has culturally influenced Thailand. The Indian epics, Mahabharata, and Ramayana, are popular and are widely taught in schools as part of the curriculum in Thailand. The example can also be seen in temples around Thailand, where the story of Ramayana and renowned Indian folk stories are depicted on the temple wall. Thailand, has become a big tourist destination for Indians.

Vietnam

India supported Vietnam's independence from France, opposed U.S. involvement in the Vietnam War and supported unification of Vietnam. India established official diplomatic relations in 1972 and maintained friendly relations, especially in the wake of Vietnam's hostile relations with the People's Republic of China, which had become India's strategic rival.

India granted the "Most Favoured Nation" status to Vietnam in 1975 and both nations signed a bilateral trade agreement in 1978 and the Bilateral Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement (BIPPA) on 8 March 1997. In 2007, a fresh joint declaration was issued during the state visit of the Prime Minister of Vietnam Nguyen Tan Dung. Bilateral trade has increased rapidly since the liberalisation of the economies of both Vietnam and India.

India is the 13th-largest exporter to Vietnam, with exports have grown steadily from US\$ 11.5 million in 1985–86 to USD 395.68 million by 2003. Vietnam's exports to India rose to USD 180

million, including agricultural products, handicrafts, textiles, electronics and other goods. Between 2001 and 2006, the volume of bilateral trade expanded at 20–30% per annum to reach USD 1 billion by 2006. Continuing the rapid pace of growth, bilateral trade is expected to rise to USD 2 billion by 2008, 2 years ahead of the official target. India and Vietnam have also expanded cooperation in information technology, education and collaboration of the respective national space programmes. Direct air links and lax visa regulations have been established to bolster tourism.

India and Vietnam are members of the Mekong-Ganga Cooperation, created to develop to enhance close ties between India and nations of Southeast Asia. Vietnam has supported India's bid to become a permanent member of the U.N. Security Council and join the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). In the 2003 joint declaration, India and Vietnam envisaged creating an "Arc of Advantage and Prosperity" in Southeast Asia; to this end, Vietnam has backed a more important relationship and role between India and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and its negotiation of an Indo-ASEAN free trade agreement. India and Vietnam have also built strategic partnerships, including extensive cooperation on developing nuclear power, enhancing regional security and fighting terrorism, transnational crime and drug trafficking.

Americas

India's commonalities with developing nations in Latin America, especially Brazil and Mexico have continued to grow. India and

Brazil continue to work together on the reform of Security Council through the G4 nations while have also increased strategic and economic cooperation through the IBSA Dialogue Forum. The process of finalizing Preferential Trade Agreement (PTA) with MERCOSUR (Brazil, Argentina, Uruguay, and Paraguay) is on the itinerary and negotiations are being held with Chile. Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva was the guest of honour at the 2004 Republic Day celebrations in New Delhi.

Argentina

Formal relations between both the countries were first established in 1949. India has an embassy in Buenos Aires and Argentina has an embassy in New Delhi. The current Indian Ambassador to Argentina (concurrently accredited to Uruguay and Paraguay) is Mr. R Viswanathan. The Ministry of External Affairs of the Government of India, "Under the 1968 Visa agreement, (Argentine)fees for transit and tourist visas have been abolished.

Under the new visa agreement signed during Argentine Presidential visit in October 2009, it has been agreed that five year multi-entry business visas would be given free of cost. The Embassy of India in Buenos Aires gives Cafe Con Visa (coffee with visa) to Argentine visitors. The applicants are invited for coffee and visa is given immediately. This has been praised by the Argentine media, public and the Foreign Minister himself.

Barbados

India and Barbados established diplomatic relations on 30 November 1966 (the date of Barbados' national independence). On that date, the government of India gifted Barbados the throne in Barbados' national House of Assembly. India is represented in Barbados through its embassy in Suriname and an Indian consulate in Holetown, St. James. Today around 3,000 persons from India call Barbados home. Two-thirds are from the India's Surat district of Gujarat known as Suratis. Most of the Suratis are involved in trading. The rest are mainly Sindhis.

Brazil

A group called the Filhos de Gandhi (Sons of Gandhi) participates regularly in the carnival in Salvador. Private Brazilian organizations occasionally invite Indian cultural troupes.

In recent years, relations between Brazil and India have grown considerably and co-operation between the two countries has been extended to such diverse areas as science and technology, pharmaceuticals and space.

The two-way trade in 2007 nearly tripled to US\$ 3.12 billion from US\$ 1.2 billion in 2004. India attaches tremendous importance to its relationship with this Latin American giant and hopes to see the areas of co-operation expand in the coming years.

Both countries want the participation of developing countries in the UNSC permanent membership since the underlying

philosophy for both of them are: UNSC should be more democratic, legitimate and representative – the G4 is a novel grouping for this realization. Brazil and India are deeply committed to IBSA (South-South cooperation) initiatives and attach utmost importance to this trilateral cooperation between the three large, multi-ethnic, multi-racial and multi-religious developing countries, which are bound by the common principle of pluralism and democracy.

Canada

Indo-Canadian relations, are the longstanding bilateral relations between India and Canada, which are built upon a “mutual commitment to democracy”, “pluralism”, and “people-to-people links”, just as to the government of Canada. In 2004, bilateral trade between India and Canada was at about C\$2.45 billion. However, the botched handling of the Air India investigation and the case in general suffered a setback to Indo-Canadian relations. India’s Smiling Buddha nuclear test led to connections between the two countries being frozen, with allegations that India broke the terms of the Colombo Plan. Although Jean Chrétien and Roméo LeBlanc both visited India in the late 1990s, relations were again halted after the Pokhran-II tests.

Cuba

Even though Indian Community in Cuba is large, Indo-Cuba relations have been warm and friendly. India was amongst the first countries to extend recognition to Cuba after the 1959 Revolution. Both countries have maintained close contacts with

each other in various international fora, such as the UN, NAM etc. India granted an aid of US\$ 2 million in cash as disaster relief assistance to Cuba in the wake of massive devastation caused by the hurricanes Gustav, Ike and Paloma during August and September 2008. Early in the year 2008, Government of India had written off the principal and interest of US\$62 million, equivalent to ₹. 1.28 billion debt owed to India.

The donation was a measure of solidarity towards the friendly people and the Government of Cuba and this act further strengthened the existing warm and friendly bilateral ties.

The major Indian presence is of ONGC Videsh Ltd. (OVL) since 2009, which is planning to drill for oil in one of the blocks assigned to it by the Cuban government off the northern coast of Cuba.

Substantial exports from India take place via third countries especially Spain, Canada, and Panama. Even in Cuban exports to India, the share of trade via third countries is substantial. Main Commodities exported from India to Cuba: Electronic items, cotton yarn fabrics and made-ups, drugs, pharmaceuticals and fine chemicals, plastic and linoleum products, machinery and instruments, spices etc. Main Commodities being exported to India from Cuba: Vaccines, medicines nickel, and cigars.

Colombia

Both countries established diplomatic ties on 19 January 1959. Since then the relationship between the two countries has been

gradually increasing with more frequent diplomatic visits to promote political, commercial cultural and academic exchanges. Colombia is currently the commercial point of entry into Latin America for Indian companies.

Mexico

Mexico is a very important and major economic partner of India. Mexico and India, both have embassies in the other country. Octavio Paz worked as a diplomat in India. His book *In Light of India* is an analysis of Indian history and culture.

Paraguay

The bilateral relations between the Republic of India and the Paraguay have been traditionally strong due to strong commercial, cultural and strategic cooperation. India is represented in Paraguay through its embassy in Buenos Aires in Argentina. India also has an Honorary Consul General in Asuncion. Paraguay opened its embassy in India in 2005.

United States of America

Historically, relations between India and the United States were lukewarm following Indian independence, as India took a leading position in the Non-Aligned Movement, and attempted to pursue even-handed economic and military relations with the Soviet Union, although US provided support to India in 1962 during its war with China. For most of the Cold War, the USA tended to have warmer relations with Pakistan, primarily as a way to

contain Soviet-friendly India and to use Pakistan to back the Afghan Mujahideen against the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. An Indo-Soviet twenty year friendship treaty, signed in 1971, also positioned India against the USA.

Cold War Era

India played a key role in establishing the Non-Aligned Movement in 1961. Though India pursued close relations with both the US and the USSR, it decided not to join any major power bloc and refrained from joining military alliances. India, however began establishing close military relationship with the Soviet Union.

After the Sino-Indian War and the Indo-Pakistani War of 1965, India made considerable changes to its foreign policy. It developed a close relationship with the Soviet Union and started receiving massive military equipment and financial assistance from the USSR. This had an adverse effect on the Indo-US relationship. The United States saw Pakistan as a counterweight to pro-Soviet India and started giving the former military assistance. This created an atmosphere of suspicion between India and the US. The Indo-US relationship suffered a considerable setback during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan when India openly supported the Soviet Union.

Relations between India and the United States came to an all-time low during the early 1970s. Despite reports of atrocities in East Pakistan, and being told, most notably in the *Blood telegram*, of genocidal activities being perpetrated by Pakistani forces, U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and U.S. President

Richard Nixon did nothing to discourage then Pakistani President Yahya Khan and the Pakistan Army. Kissinger was particularly concerned about Soviet expansion into South Asia as a result of a treaty of friendship that had recently been signed between India and the Soviet Union, and sought to demonstrate to the People's Republic of China the value of a tacit alliance with the United States.

During the Indo-Pakistani War of 1971, Indian Armed Forces, along with the Mukti Bahini, succeeded in liberating East Pakistan which soon declared independence. Richard Nixon, then USA President, feared that an Indian invasion of West Pakistan would mean total Soviet domination of the region, and that it would seriously undermine the global position of the United States and the regional position of America's new tacit ally, China. In order to demonstrate to China the *bona fides* of the United States as an ally, and in direct violation of the Congress-imposed sanctions on Pakistan, Nixon sent military supplies to Pakistan, routing them through Jordan and Iran, while also encouraging China to increase its arms supplies to Pakistan.

When Pakistan's defeat in the eastern sector seemed certain, Nixon sent the USS *Enterprise* to the Bay of Bengal, a move deemed by the Indians as a nuclear threat. The *Enterprise* arrived on station on 11 December 1971. On 6 and 13 December, the Soviet Navy dispatched two groups of ships, armed with nuclear missiles, from Vladivostok; they trailed U.S. Task Force 74 into the Indian Ocean from 18 December 1971 until 7 January 1972. The Soviets also sent nuclear submarines to ward off the threat posed by USS *Enterprise* in the Indian Ocean.

Though American efforts had no effect in turning the tide of the war, the incident involving USS *Enterprise* is viewed as the trigger for India's subsequent nuclear programme. American policy towards the end of the war was dictated primarily by a need to restrict the escalation of war on the western sector to prevent the 'dismemberment' of West Pakistan. Years after the war, many American writers criticized the White House policies during the war as being badly flawed and ill-serving the interests of the United States. India carried out nuclear tests a few years later resulting in sanctions being imposed by United States, further drifting the two countries apart. In recent years, Kissinger came under fire for comments made during the Indo-Pakistan War in which he described Indians as "bastards." Kissinger has since expressed his regret over the comments.

Post Cold War Era

Since the end of the Cold War, India-USA relations have improved dramatically. This has largely been fostered by the fact that the USA and India are both democracies and have a large and growing trade relationship. During the Gulf War, the economy of India went through an extremely difficult phase. The Government of India liberalized the Indian economy. After the breakup of the Soviet Union, India improved diplomatic relations with the members of the NATO particularly the Canada, France and Germany. In 1992, India established formal diplomatic relations with Israel.

Pokhran Tests

In 1998, India tested nuclear weapons which resulted in several U.S., Japanese and European sanctions on India. India's then defence minister, George Fernandes, said that India's nuclear programme was necessary as it provided a deterrence to some potential nuclear threat. Most of the sanctions imposed on India were removed by 2001. India has categorically stated that it will never use weapons first but will defend if attacked.

The economic sanctions imposed by the United States in response to India's nuclear tests in May 1998 appeared, at least initially, to seriously damage Indo-American relations. President Bill Clinton imposed wide-ranging sanctions pursuant to the 1994 Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act. U.S. sanctions on Indian entities involved in the nuclear industry and opposition to international financial institution loans for non-humanitarian assistance projects in India. The United States encouraged India to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) immediately and without condition. The U.S. also called for restraint in missile and nuclear testing and deployment by both India and Pakistan. The non-proliferation dialogue initiated after the 1998 nuclear tests has bridged many of the gaps in understanding between the countries.

Post-11 September

After the 11 September attacks in 2001, Indian intelligence agencies provided the U.S. with significant information on Al-Qaeda and related groups' activities in Pakistan and Afghanistan.

India's extensive contribution to the War on Terrorism has helped India's diplomatic relations with several countries. Over the past few years, India has held numerous joint military exercises with U.S. and European nations that have resulted in a strengthened U.S.-India and E.U.-India bilateral relationship. India's bilateral trade with Europe and U.S. has more than doubled in the last five years.

However, India has not signed the CTBT, or the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, claiming the discriminatory nature of the treaty that allows the five declared nuclear countries of the world to keep their nuclear arsenal and develop it using computer simulation testing. Prior to its nuclear testing, India had pressed for a comprehensive destruction of nuclear weapons by all countries of the world in a time-bound frame. This was not acceptable to the USA and other countries. Presently, India has declared its policy of "no-first use of nuclear weapons" and the maintenance of a "credible nuclear deterrence".

The USA, under President George W. Bush has also lifted most of its sanctions on India and has resumed military co-operation. Relations with USA have considerably improved in the recent years, with the two countries taking part in joint naval exercises off the coast of India and joint air exercises both in India as well as in the United States.

India has been pushing for reforms in the UN and WTO with mixed results. India's candidature for a permanent seat at the UN Security Council is currently backed by several countries including United Kingdom, France, Germany, Japan, Brazil,

African Union nations, USA and recently People's Republic of China. In 2005, the United States signed a nuclear co-operation agreement with India even though the latter is not a part of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. The US argued that India's strong nuclear non-proliferation record made it an exception and persuaded other Nuclear Suppliers Group members to sign similar deals with India.

On 2 March 2006 India and the USA signed the Indo-U.S. Nuclear Pact on co-operation in civilian nuclear field. This was signed during the four days state visit of USA President George Bush in India. On its part, India would separate its civilian and military nuclear programmes, and the civilian programmes would be brought under the safeguards of International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The United States would sell India the reactor technologies and the nuclear fuel for setting up and upgrading its civilian nuclear programme. The U.S. Congress needs to ratify this pact since U.S. federal law prohibits the trading of nuclear technologies and materials outside the framework of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG).

Indo-USA Strategic Partnership

Indo-USA relations got strategic content in the early 1960s. The rise of China worried the policymakers in Washington. Chinese assertion in Tibet, its role in the Korean War and other such acts concerned Washington. As the relations between India and China deteriorated during late fifties, the Americans found a golden opportunity to take advantage of this situation to promote India as a counterweight to China. But any unidimensional alliance is

bound to be short-lived and this alliance was no exception to this general rule. As China ceased to be a headache for the American policymakers by the late sixties, this unidimensional alliance disappeared into thin air.

The end of the Cold War necessitated as well as facilitated the infusion of strategic content to Indo-USA relations—this time multidimensional. In the post Cold War era, the strategic objectives of India and the USA converges on a number of issues and not just one—as well as the case earlier. These issues include, inter alia, containment of terrorism, promotion of democracy, counter proliferation, freedom of navigation in the Indian Ocean, Asian balance of power, etc.

One of the very interesting feature of Indo-USA relations of recent times is the changes on the terms of engagement between the two countries on the issue of nuclear proliferation. While earlier, in the USA strategic thinking on nuclear proliferation, India figured mainly because of American concern about latter's nuclear and missile programmes, in the twenty-first century, however, American strategic thinking on the issue of nuclear proliferation has undergone radical reorientation. Now, the Americans are increasingly realising the futility of insisting on a rollback of India's nuclear programme. They, rather, want to leverage India's growing power and influence in favour of their broader nonproliferation and counter proliferation objectives.

As promotion of democracy around the world is one of the most important foreign policy objective of the USA, India – as the largest democracy of the world-can hardly be ignored by the USA.

This is the reason, cooperation in promotion of democracy in the world has become one of the most important facets of Indo-USA relations in recent times. India is a founding member of the 'Community of Democracies' – a prominent endeavour of the USA on promotion of democracy. However, India rejected the suggestion of the USA about setting up a Centre for Asian Democracy.

Agriculture is another important area of cooperation between India and the USA in present times. Considering the fact that both the nations at present have a vast pool of human resources adept at knowledge economy, it is only natural that the best course such partnership can aim at is harnessing these human resources by concentrating on development and dissemination of agricultural knowledge through research, education and training etc. An initiative to forge such a partnership is the 'India-USA Knowledge Initiative on Agriculture' (KIA).

Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh was the guest of honour at the first state dinner, which took place on 24 November 2009, of the administration of US President Barack Obama. Obama later visited India from 6–9 November 2010, signing numerous trade and defence agreements with India. He addressed the joint session of the Indian parliament in New Delhi, becoming only the second US President to do so, and announced that the United States would lend its support to India's bid for a permanent seat in the United Nations Security Council, signifying the growing strategic dimension of the relationship between the world's two largest democracies.

Russia and Central Asia

The dissolution of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) had major repercussions for Indian foreign policy. Substantial trade with the former Soviet Union plummeted after the Soviet collapse and has yet to recover. Longstanding military supply relationships were similarly disrupted due to questions over financing, although Russia continues to be India's largest supplier of military systems and spare parts.

The relationship with USSR was tested (and proven) during the 1971 war with Pakistan, which led to the subsequent liberation of Bangladesh. Soon after the victory of the Indian Armed Forces, one of the foreign delegates to visit India was Admiral S.G. Gorshkov, Chief of the Soviet Navy. During his visit to Mumbai (Bombay) he came on board INS *Vikrant*.

During a conversation with Vice Admiral Swaraj Prakash, Gorshkov asked the Vice Admiral, "Were you worried about a battle against the American carrier?" He answered himself: "Well, you had no reason to be worried, as I had a Soviet nuclear submarine trailing the American task force all the way into the Indian Ocean."

Russian Federation

India's ties with the Russian Federation are time-tested and based on continuity, trust and mutual understanding. There is national consensus in both the countries on the need to preserve

and strengthen India-Russia relations and further consolidate the strategic partnership between the two countries. A Declaration on Strategic Partnership was signed between former Russian President and current Prime Minister Vladimir Putin and former Indian Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in October 2000.

Russia and India have decided not to renew the 1971 Indo-Soviet Peace and Friendship Treaty and have sought to follow what both describe as a more pragmatic, less ideological relationship. Russian President Yeltsin's visit to India in January 1993 helped cement this new relationship. Ties have grown stronger with President Vladimir Putin's 2004 visit. The pace of high-level visits has since increased, as has discussion of major defence purchases. Russia, is working for the development of the Koodankulam Nuclear Power Plant, that will be capable of producing 1000 MW of electricity. Gazprom, is working for the development of oil and natural gas, in the Bay of Bengal.

India and Russia, have collaborated extensively, on space technology. Other areas of collaboration include software, ayurveda, etc. India and Russia, have set a determination in increasing trade to \$10 billion. Cooperation between clothing manufacturers of the two countries continues to strengthen. India and Russia signed an agreement on joint efforts to increase investment and trade volumes in the textile industry in both countries. In signing the document included representatives of the Russian Union of Entrepreneurs of Textile and Light Industry Council and apparel exports of India (AEPC). A cooperation agreement provides, inter alia, exchange of technology and know-how in textile production. For this purpose, a special Commission

on Affairs textile (Textile Communication Committee). Counter-terrorism techniques are also in place between Russia and India. In 2007 President Vladimir Putin was guest of honour at Republic Day celebration on 26 January 2007. 2008, has been declared by both countries as the Russia-India Friendship Year. Bollywood films are quite popular in Russia.

The Indian public sector oil company ONGC bought Imperial Energy in 2008. In December 2008, during President Medvedev's visit, to New Delhi, India and Russia, signed a nuclear energy co-operation agreement. In March, 2010, Russian Prime Minister Vladimir Putin signed an additional 19 pacts with India which included civilian nuclear energy, space and military co-operation and the final sale of Admiral Gorshkov (Aircraft Carrier) along with MiG-29K fighter jets.

Mongolia

The relations between India and Mongolia are still at a nascent stage and Indo-Mongolian cooperation is limited to diplomatic visits, provision of soft loans and financial aid and the collaborations in the IT sector. India established diplomatic relations in December 1955. India was the first country outside the Soviet block to establish diplomatic relations with Mongolia. Since then, there have been treaties of mutual friendship and cooperation between the two countries in 1973, 1994, 2001 and 2004.

Seychelles

There are many Indians living in Seychelles. The Indian Navy also helps the Seychelles government defend against pirates.

Tajikistan

Diplomatic relations were established India and Tajikistan following Tajikistan's independence from the 1991 dissolution of the Soviet Union, which had been friendly with India. Tajikistan occupies a strategically important position in Central Asia, bordering Afghanistan, the People's Republic of China and separated by a small strip of Afghan territory from Pakistan. India's role in fighting the Taliban and Al-Qaeda and its strategic rivalry with both China and Pakistan have made its ties with Tajikistan important to its strategic and security policies.

Despite their common efforts, bilateral trade has been comparatively low, valued at USD 12.09 million in 2005; India's exports to Tajikistan were valued at USD 6.2 million and its imports at USD 5.89 million. India's military presence and activities have been significant, beginning with India's extensive support to the anti-Taliban Afghan Northern Alliance (ANA). India began renovating the Farkhor Air Base and stationed aircraft of the Indian Air Force there. The Farkhor Air Base became fully operational in 2006, and 12 MiG-29 bombers and trainer aircraft are planned to be stationed there.

Uzbekistan

The countries have some culture in common especially because of deep Turkic and Persian influences in the two countries. India has an embassy in Tashkent. Uzbekistan has an embassy in New Delhi. Uzbekistan has had a great impact on Indian culture mostly due to the Mughal Empire which was founded by Babur of Ferghana (in present-day Uzbekistan) who created his empire southward first in Afghanistan and then in India.

Africa

As of year 2011, India's total trade with Africa is over US\$46 billion and total investment is over US\$11 billion with US\$5.7 billion line of credit for executing various projects in Africa.

India has had good relationships with most sub-Saharan African nations for most of its history. In the Prime Minister's visit to Mauritius in 1997, the two countries secured a deal to a new Credit Agreement of INR 10.50 crore (US\$3 million) to finance import by Mauritius of capital goods, consultancy services and consumer durable from India. The government of India secured a rice and medicine agreement with the people of Seychelles.

India continued to build upon its historically close relations with Ethiopia, Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania. Visits from political ministers from Ethiopia provided opportunities for strengthening bilateral cooperation between the two countries in the fields of education and technical training, water resources management and development of small industries. This has allowed India to

gain benefits from nations that are generally forgotten by other Western Nations.

The South African President, Thabo Mbeki has called for a strategic relationship between India and South Africa to avoid imposition by Western Nations.

India continued to build upon its close and friendly relations with Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia, Swaziland, Zambia and Zimbabwe. The Minister of Foreign Affairs arranged for the sending of Special Envoys to each of these countries during 1996–97 as a reaffirmation of India's assurance to strengthening cooperation with these countries in a spirit of South-South partnership. These relations have created a position of strength with African nations that other nations may not possess.

Côte d'Ivoire

The bilateral relations between the Republic of India and the Republic of Côte d'Ivoire have considerably expanded in recent years as India seeks to develop an extensive commercial and strategic partnership in the West African region. The Indian diplomatic mission in Abidjan was opened in 1979. Côte d'Ivoire opened its resident mission in New Delhi in September 2004. Both nations are currently fostering efforts to increase trade, investments and economic cooperation.

Liberia

The bilateral relations between the Republic of India and the Republic of Liberia have expanded on growing bilateral trade and strategic cooperation. India is represented in Liberia through its embassy in Abidjan (Ivory Coast) and an active honorary consulate in Monrovia since 1984. Liberia was represented in India through its resident mission in New Delhi which subsequently closed due to budgetary constraints.

Nigeria

India has close relations with this oil rich West African country. Twenty per cent of India's crude oil needs are met, by Nigeria. 40,000 barrels per day (6,400 m/d) of oil, is the amount of oil, that India receives from Nigeria. Trade, between these two countries stands at \$875 million in 2005–2006.

Indian companies have also invested in manufacturing, pharmaceuticals, iron ore, steel, information technology, and communications, amongst other things. Both India and Nigeria, are members of the Commonwealth of Nations, G-77, and the Non Aligned Movement. The Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo was the guest of honour, at the Republic Day parade, in 1999, and the Indian Prime Minister Manmohan Singh, visited Nigeria in 2007, and addressed the Nigerian Parliament.

South Africa

India and South Africa, have always had strong relations even though India revoked diplomatic relations in protest to the apartheid regime in the mid 20th century. The history of British rule connects both lands. There is a large group of South Africans of Indian descent. Mahatma Gandhi, spent many years in South Africa, during which time, he fought for the rights of the ethnic Indians. Nelson Mandela was inspired by Gandhi. After India's independence, India strongly condemned apartheid, and refused diplomatic relations while apartheid was conducted as state policy in South Africa.

The two countries, now have close economic, political, and sports relations. Trade between the two countries grew from \$3 million in 1992–1993 to \$4 billion in 2005–2006, and aim to reach trade of \$12 billion by 2010. One third of India's imports from South Africa is gold bullion. Diamonds, that are mined from South Africa, are polished in India. Nelson Mandela was awarded the Gandhi Peace Prize. The two countries are also members of the IBSA Dialogue Forum, with Brazil. India hopes to get large amounts of uranium, from resource rich South Africa, for India's growing civilian nuclear energy sector.

Sudan

Indo-Sudanese relations have always been characterized as longstanding, close, and friendly, even since the early development stages of their countries. At the time of Indian independence, Sudan had contributed 70000 pounds, which was

used to build part of the National Defence Academy in Pune. The main building of NDA is called Sudan Block. The two nations established diplomatic relations shortly after India became known as one of the first Asian countries to recognize the newly independent African country.

India and Sudan also share geographic and historical similarities, as well as economic interests. Both countries are former British colonies, and remotely border Saudi Arabia by means of a body of water. India and Sudan continue to have cordial relations, despite issues such as India's close relationship with Israel, India's solidarity with Egypt over border issues with Sudan, and Sudan's intimate bonds with Pakistan and Bangladesh. India had also contributed some troops as United Nations peacekeeping force in Darfur.

Morgenthau's realist theory

Hans Joachim Morgenthau (February 17, 1904 – July 19, 1980) was one of the leading twentieth-century figures in the study of international politics. He made landmark contributions to international relations theory and the study of international law, and his *Politics Among Nations*, first published in 1948, went through five editions during his lifetime.

Morgenthau also wrote widely about international politics and U.S. foreign policy for general-circulation publications such as *The New Leader*, *Commentary*, *Worldview*, *The New York Review of Books*, and *The New Republic*. He knew and corresponded with

many of the leading intellectuals and writers of his era, such as Reinhold Niebuhr, George F. Kennan, and Hannah Arendt.

At one point in the early Cold War, Morgenthau was a consultant to the U.S. Department of State when Kennan headed its Policy Planning Staff, and a second time during the Kennedy and Johnson administrations until he was dismissed when he began to publicly criticize American policy in Vietnam. For most of his career, however, Morgenthau was esteemed as an academic interpreter of U.S. foreign policy.

Education, career, and personal life

Morgenthau was born in an Ashkenazi Jewish family in Coburg, Germany in 1904, and, after attending Casimirianum, was educated at the universities of Berlin, Frankfurt, Munich, and pursued postgraduate work at the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies in Geneva, Switzerland. He taught and practiced law in Frankfurt before emigrating to the United States in 1937, after several interim years in Switzerland and Spain. Morgenthau taught in Kansas City from 1939–1943, during which time he attended the Keneseth Israel Shalom Congregation. Morgenthau then taught at the University of Chicago until 1973, when he moved to New York and took a professorial chair at the City University of New York (CUNY).

On moving to New York, Morgenthau separated from his wife, who remained in Chicago partly due to medical issues. He is reported twice to have tried to initiate plans to start a new family while in New York, once with the political philosopher Hannah Arendt as

documented by her biographer, and a second time with Ethel Person (d. 2012), a medical professor at Columbia University (she documents this in her essay for the Morgenthau Centenary in 2004).

On October 8, 1979, Morgenthau was one of the passengers on board Swissair Flight 316, which crashed while trying to land at Athens-Ellinikon International Airport, while he was en route on a flight destined for Bombay and Peking. Morgenthau died after a brief hospitalization on July 19, 1980, after being admitted with a grave diagnosis of a perforated ulcer at Lenox Hill Hospital in New York, according to the account recorded by Ethel Person. Morgenthau completed his doctoral dissertation in Germany in the late 1920s. It was published in 1929 as his first book, *The International Administration of Justice, Its Essence and Its Limits*. The book was reviewed by Carl Schmitt, who was then a jurist teaching at the University of Berlin. In an autobiographical essay written near the end of his life, Morgenthau related that despite initially anticipating meeting Schmitt while on a visit to Berlin, the meeting went badly and Morgenthau left thinking that he had been in the presence of, in his own words, “the demonic.” By the late 1920s Schmitt was becoming the leading jurist of the rising National Socialist movement in Germany, and Morgenthau came to see their positions as irreconcilable.

Following completion of his doctoral dissertation, Morgenthau left Germany to complete his Habilitation dissertation (license to teach at universities) in Geneva. It was published (in French) as *The Reality of Norms and in Particular the Norms of International Law: Foundations of a Theory of Norms*. The legal scholar Hans

Kelsen, who had just arrived in Geneva as a professor, was an adviser to Morgenthau's dissertation. Kelsen was among the strongest critics of Carl Schmitt. Kelsen and Morgenthau became lifelong colleagues even after both emigrated from Europe to take their respective academic positions in the United States.

In 1933, Morgenthau wrote a second book in French, *The Concept of the Political*, which was translated into English in 2012. In this book Morgenthau sought to articulate the difference between legal disputes between nations and political disputes between nations or other litigants. The questions driving the inquiry were:

- Who holds legal power over the objects or concerns being disputed,
- In what manner can the holder of this legal power be changed or held accountable;
- How can a dispute, the object of which concerns a legal power, be resolved; and
- In what manner will the holder of the legal power be protected in the course of exercising that power. The end goal of any legal system in this context for Morgenthau is to “ensure justice and peace.”

Morgenthau sought in the 1920s and 1930s a realist alternative to mainstream international law, a quest for “functional jurisprudence”. He borrowed ideas from Sigmund Freud, Max Weber, Roscoe Pound, and others.

In 1940 Morgenthau set out a research program for legal functionalism in the article “Positivism, Functionalism, and

International Law”. Francis Boyle has written that Morgenthau’s post-war writings perhaps contributed to a “break between international political science and international legal studies.” However, *Politics Among Nations* contains a chapter on international law, and Morgenthau remained an active contributor to the subject of the relationship between international politics and international law until the end of his career.

Morgenthau in his American years and political realism

Hans Morgenthau is considered one of the “founding fathers” of the realist school in the 20th century. This school of thought holds that nation-states are the main actors in international relations and that the main concern of the field is the study of power. Morgenthau emphasized the importance of “the national interest”, and in *Politics Among Nations* he wrote that “the main signpost that helps political realism to find its way through the landscape of international politics is the concept of interest defined in terms of power.” Morgenthau is sometimes referred to as a classical realist or modern realist in order to differentiate his approach from the structural realism or neo-realism associated with Kenneth Waltz.

Realism and Politics Among Nations (1948)

Recent scholarly assessments of Morgenthau show that his intellectual trajectory was more complicated than originally thought. His realism was infused with moral considerations, and

during the last part of his life he favored supranational control of nuclear weapons and strongly opposed the U.S. role in the Vietnam War.

His book *Scientific Man versus Power Politics* (1946) argued against an overreliance on science and technology as solutions to political and social problems.

Starting with the second edition of *Politics Among Nations*, Morgenthau included a section in the opening chapter called “Six Principles of Political Realism”.

The principles, paraphrased, are:

- Political realism believes that politics, like society in general, is governed by objective laws that have their roots in human nature.
- The main signpost of political realism is the concept of interest defined in terms of power, which infuses rational order into the subject matter of politics, and thus makes the theoretical understanding of politics possible. Political realism avoids concerns with the motives and ideology of statesmen. Political realism avoids reinterpreting reality to fit the policy. A good foreign policy minimizes risks and maximizes benefits.
- Realism recognizes that the determining kind of interest varies depending on the political and cultural context in which foreign policy, not to be confused with a theory of international politics, is made. It does not

give “interest defined as power” a meaning that is fixed once and for all.

- Political realism is aware of the moral significance of political action. It is also aware of the tension between the moral command and the requirements of successful political action. Realism maintains that universal moral principles must be filtered through the concrete circumstances of time and place, because they cannot be applied to the actions of states in their abstract universal formulation.
- Political realism refuses to identify the moral aspirations of a particular nation with the moral laws that govern the universe.
- The political realist maintains the autonomy of the political sphere; the statesman asks “How does this policy affect the power and interests of the nation?” Political realism is based on a pluralistic conception of human nature. The political realist must show where the nation’s interests differ from the moralistic and legalistic viewpoints.

Dissent on the Vietnam War

Morgenthau was a strong supporter of the Roosevelt and Truman administrations. When the Eisenhower administration gained the White House, Morgenthau turned his efforts towards a large amount of writing for journals and the press in general. By the time of Kennedy’s election in 1960, he had become a consultant to the Kennedy administration. When Johnson became President, Morgenthau became much more vocal in his dissent concerning

American participation in the Vietnam war, for which he was dismissed as a consultant to the Johnson administration in 1965. This debate with Morgenthau has been related in books about policy advisors McGeorge Bundy and Walt Rostow. Morgenthau's dissent concerning American involvement in Vietnam brought him considerable public and media attention.

Aside from his writing of *Politics Among Nations*, Morgenthau continued with a prolific writing career and published the three volume collection of his writings in 1962. Volume One was entitled *The Decline of Democratic Politics*, Volume Two was *The Impasse of American Politics*, and Volume Three was *The Restoration of American Politics*. In addition to Morgenthau's interest and competence in writing about the political affairs of his own time, Morgenthau also wrote about the philosophy of democratic theory when faced with situations of crisis or tension.

Chapter 3

Marxian Approach to the Study of International Relations

Leninism

Marxist and Neo-Marxist international relations theories are paradigms which reject the realist/liberal view of state conflict or cooperation, instead focusing on the economic and material aspects. It purports to reveal how the economy trumps other concerns, which allows for the elevation of *class* as the focus of the study. Marxist theories receive little attention in the United States where even democratic socialist parties lack mainstream political influence. Throughout Africa, Latin America, south-eastern Asia, and parts of Europe—especially France, Greece, and Italy—Marxist and other theories are more incorporated and influential into political and social discourse. In Marxist philosophy, Leninism is the body of political theory for the democratic organisation of a revolutionary vanguard party, and the achievement of a dictatorship of the proletariat, as political prelude to the establishment of socialism. Developed by, and named for, the Russian revolutionary and later Soviet premier Vladimir Lenin, Leninism comprises political and socialist economic theories, developed from Marxism, as well as Lenin's interpretations of Marxist theory for practical application to the socio-political conditions of the agrarian early-20th-century

Russian Empire. In February 1917, for five years, Leninism was the Russian application of Marxist economics and political philosophy, effected and realised by the Bolshevik party, the vanguard party who led the fight for the political independence of the working class. Functionally, the Leninist vanguard party provided to the working class the political consciousness (education and organisation), and the revolutionary leadership necessary to depose capitalism in Imperial Russia. After the October Revolution of 1917, Leninism was the dominant version of Marxism in Russia; in fact, the Bolsheviks considered it the only legitimate form and persecuted non-Leninist Marxists such as Mensheviks and some factions of Socialist Revolutionaries.

The Russian Civil War thus included various left-wing uprisings against the Bolsheviks, but they were overpowered, and Leninism became the official state ideology of Soviet democracy (by workers' council) in the Russian Socialist Federative Soviet Republic (RSFSR), before its unitary amalgamation into the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in 1922. In 1925–29 post-Lenin Russia, Joseph Stalin reinforced the assertion that Leninism was the only legitimate form of Marxism by recasting them as one indivisible entity called Marxism–Leninism, which then became the state ideology of the Soviet Union.

As a political-science term, *Leninism* entered common usage in 1922, after infirmity ended Lenin's participation in governing the Russian Communist Party. Two years later, in July 1924, at the fifth congress of the Communist International, Grigory Zinoviev popularized the term to denote "vanguard-party revolution". Leninism was composed as and for revolutionary praxis, and

originally was neither a rigorously proper philosophy nor discrete political theory. After the Russian Revolution, in *History and Class Consciousness* (1923), György Lukács ideologically developed and organised Lenin's pragmatic revolutionary practices into the formal philosophy of vanguard-party revolution (Leninism). As a work of political science and philosophy, *History and Class Consciousness* illustrated Lenin's 1915 dictum about the commitment to the cause of the revolutionary man, and said of Lukács:

- One cannot be a revolutionary Social-Democrat without participating, according to one's powers, in developing this theory [Marxism], and adapting it to changed conditions.— *Lenin and the Russian Revolution* (1971) p. 35.

In the 19th century, *The Communist Manifesto* (1848), by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, called for the international political unification of the European working classes in order to achieve a Communist revolution; and proposed that, because the socio-economic organization of communism was of a higher form than that of capitalism, a workers' revolution would first occur in the economically advanced, industrialized countries. Yet, in the early 20th century, the socio-economic backwardness of Imperial Russia (uneven and combined economic development) facilitated rapid and intensive industrialization, which produced a united, working-class proletariat in a predominantly rural, agrarian peasant society. Moreover, because the industrialization was financed mostly with foreign capital, Imperial Russia (1721–1917) did not possess a revolutionary bourgeoisie with political and

economic influence upon the workers and the peasants (as occurred in the French Revolution, 1789). So, although Russia's political economy principally was agrarian and semi-feudal, the task of democratic revolution therefore fell to the urban, industrial working class, as the only social class capable of effecting land reform and democratization, in view that the Russian propertied classes would attempt to suppress any revolution, in town and country. In April 1917, Lenin published the *April Theses*, the strategy of the October Revolution, which proposed that the Russian revolution was not an isolated national event, but a fundamentally international event — the first world socialist revolution. Thus, Lenin's practical application of Marxism and working-class urban revolution to the social, political, and economic conditions of the agrarian peasant society that was Tsarist Russia sparked the "revolutionary nationalism of the poor" to depose the absolute monarchy of the three-hundred-year Romanov dynasty (1613–1917).

Imperialism

In the course of developing the Russian application of Marxism, the pamphlet *Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism* (1916) presented Lenin's analysis of an economic development predicted by Karl Marx: that capitalism would become a global financial system, wherein advanced industrial countries export financial capital to their colonial countries, to finance the exploitation of their natural resources and the labour of the native populations. Such superexploitation of the poor (undeveloped) countries allows the wealthy (developed) countries to maintain some homeland workers politically content with a slightly higher standard of

living, and so ensure peaceful labour–capital relations in the capitalist homeland. Hence, a proletarian revolution of workers and peasants could not occur in the developed capitalist countries, while the imperialist global-finance system remained intact; thus an underdeveloped country would feature the first proletarian revolution; and, in the early 20th century, Imperial Russia was the politically weakest country in the capitalist global-finance system. In the *United States of Europe Slogan* (1915), Lenin said:

- *Workers of the world, unite!* — Uneven economic and political development is an absolute law of capitalism. Hence the victory of socialism is possible, first in several, or even in one capitalist country taken separately. The victorious proletariat of that country, having expropriated the capitalists and organised its own socialist production, would stand up against the rest of the world, the capitalist world.— *Collected Works*, vol. 18, p. 232.
- The more powerful enemy can be vanquished only by exerting the utmost effort, and by the most thorough, careful, attentive, skilful and obligatory use of any, even the smallest, rift between the enemies, any conflict of interests among the bourgeoisie of the various countries and among the various groups or types of bourgeoisie within the various countries, and also by taking advantage of any, even the smallest, opportunity of winning a mass ally, even though this ally is temporary, vacillating, unstable, unreliable and conditional. Those who do not understand this reveal a

failure to understand even the smallest grain of Marxism, of modern scientific socialism in general. Those who have not proved in practice, over a fairly considerable period of time and in fairly varied political situations, their ability to apply this truth in practice have not yet learned to help the revolutionary class in its struggle to emancipate all toiling humanity from the exploiters. And this applies equally to the period before and after the proletariat has won political power.—
Left-Wing Communism: an Infantile Disorder (1920)

Leninist theory

The Vanguard Party

In Chapter II: “Proletarians and Communists” of *The Communist Manifesto* (1848), Engels and Marx presented the idea of the vanguard party as solely qualified to politically lead the proletariat in revolution:

- The Communists, therefore, are, on the one hand, practically the most advanced and resolute section of the working-class parties of every country, that section which pushes forward all others; on the other hand, theoretically, they have over the great mass of the proletariat the advantage of clearly understanding the lines of march, the conditions, and the ultimate general results of the proletarian movement. The immediate aim of the Communists is the same as that of all other proletarian parties: Formation of the

proletariat into a class, overthrow of the bourgeois supremacy, conquest of political power by the proletariat.

Hence, the purpose of the Leninist vanguard party is to establish a democratic dictatorship of the proletariat; supported by the working class, the vanguard party would lead the revolution to depose the incumbent Tsarist government, and then transfer power of government to the working class, which change of ruling class — from bourgeoisie to proletariat — makes possible the full development of socialism.

In the pamphlet *What is to be Done?* (1902), Lenin proposed that a revolutionary vanguard party, mostly recruited from the working class, should lead the political campaign, because it was the only way that the proletariat could successfully achieve a revolution; unlike the economist campaign of trade-union-struggle advocated by other socialist political parties; and later by the anarcho-syndicalists. Like Karl Marx, Lenin distinguished between the aspects of a revolution, the “economic campaign” (labour strikes for increased wages and work concessions), which featured diffused plural leadership; and the “political campaign” (socialist changes to society), which required the decisive revolutionary leadership of the Bolshevik vanguard party.

Democratic Centralism

As epitomised in the slogan “Freedom in Discussion, Unity in Action”, Lenin followed the example of the First International (IWA, International Workingmen’s Association, 1864–1876), and

organised the Bolsheviks as a democratically centralised vanguard party, wherein free political-speech was recognised legitimate until policy consensus; afterwards, every member of the Party would be expected to uphold the official policy established in consensus. In the pamphlet *Freedom to Criticise and Unity of Action* (1905), Lenin said:

- Of course, the application of this principle in practice will sometimes give rise to disputes and misunderstandings; but only on the basis of this principle can all disputes and all misunderstandings be settled honourably for the Party.... The principle of democratic centralism and autonomy for local Party organisations implies universal and full freedom to criticise, so long as this does not disturb the unity of a definite action; it rules out all criticism which disrupts or makes difficult the unity of an action decided on by the Party.

Full, inner-party democratic debate was Bolshevik Party practice under Lenin, even after the banning of party factions in 1921. Although a guiding influence in policy, Lenin did not exercise absolute power, and continually debated and discussed to have his point of view accepted. Under Stalin, the inner-party practice of democratic free debate did not continue after the death of Lenin in 1924.

Revolution

Before the Revolution, despite supporting political reform (including Bolsheviks elected to the Duma, when opportune), Lenin proposed that capitalism could ultimately only be overthrown with revolution, not with gradual reforms — from within (Fabianism) and from without (social democracy) — which would fail, because the ruling capitalist social class, who hold economic power (the means of production), determine the nature of political power in a bourgeois society.

As epitomised in the slogan, “For a Democratic Dictatorship of the Proletariat and Peasantry”, a revolution in underdeveloped Tsarist Russia required an allied proletariat of town and country (urban workers and peasants), because the urban workers would be too few to successfully assume power in the cities on their own. Moreover, owing to the middle-class aspirations of much of the peasantry, Leon Trotsky proposed that the proletariat should lead the revolution, as the only way for it to be truly socialist and democratic; although Lenin initially disagreed with Trotsky’s formulation, he adopted it before the Russian Revolution in October 1917.

Dictatorship of the proletariat

In the Russian socialist society, government by direct democracy was effected by elected *soviets* (workers’ councils), which “soviet government” form Lenin described as the manifestation of the Marxist ‘democratic dictatorship of the proletariat’. As political organisations, the soviets would comprise representatives of

factory workers' and trade union committees, but would exclude capitalists, as a social class, in order to ensure the establishment of a proletarian government, by and for the working class and the peasants.

About the political disenfranchisement of the Russian capitalist social classes, Lenin said that 'depriving the exploiters of the franchise is a purely Russian question, and not a question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, in general.... In which countries... democracy for the exploiters will be, in one or another form, restricted... is a question of the specific national features of this or that capitalism'. In chapter five of *The State and Revolution* (1917) Lenin describes:

- ...the dictatorship of the proletariat — i.e. the organisation of the vanguard of the oppressed as the ruling class for the purpose of crushing the oppressors.... An immense expansion of democracy, which for the first time becomes democracy for the poor, democracy for the people, and not democracy for the rich:... and suppression by force, i.e. exclusion from democracy, for the exploiters and oppressors of the people — this is the change which democracy undergoes during the 'transition' from capitalism to communism.
- Soviet constitutionalism was the collective government form of the Russian dictatorship of the proletariat, the opposite of the government form of the dictatorship of capital (privately owned means of production) practised in bourgeois democracies. In the soviet political

system, the (Leninist) vanguard party would be one of many political parties competing for elected power. Nevertheless, the circumstances of the Red vs. White Russian Civil War, and terrorism by the opposing political parties, and in aid of the White Armies' counter-revolution, led to the Bolshevik government banning other parties; thus, the vanguard party became the sole, legal political party in Russia. Lenin did not regard such political suppression as philosophically inherent to the dictatorship of the proletariat; yet the Stalinists retrospectively claimed that such factional suppression was original to Leninism. Democracy for the vast majority of the people, and suppression by force, i.e. exclusion from democracy, of the exploiters and oppressors of the people — this is the change democracy undergoes during the transition from capitalism to communism.

Economics

Soviet democracy nationalised industry and established a foreign-trade monopoly to allow the productive co-ordination of the national economy, and so prevent Russian national industries from competing against each other. To feed the populaces of town and country, Lenin instituted War Communism (1918–21) as a necessary condition — adequate supplies of food and weapons — for fighting the Russian Civil War (1917–23). Later, in March 1921, he established the New Economic Policy (NEP, 1921–29), which allowed measures of private commerce, internal free trade, and replaced grain requisitions with an agricultural tax, under

the management of State banks. The purpose of the NEP was to resolve food-shortage riots among the peasantry, and allowed measures of private enterprise, wherein the profit motive encouraged the peasants to harvest the crops required to feed the people of town and country; and to economically re-establish the urban working class, who had lost many men (workers) to the counter-revolutionary Civil War. With the NEP, the socialist nationalisation of the economy could then be developed to industrialise Russia, strengthen the working class, and raise standards of living; thus the NEP would advance socialism against capitalism. Lenin regarded the appearance of new socialist states in the developed countries as necessary to the strengthening Russia's economy, and the eventual development of socialism. In that, he was encouraged by the German Revolution of 1918–1919, the Italian insurrection and general strikes of 1920, and industrial unrest in Britain, France, and the U.S.

National Self-determination

Lenin recognized and accepted the existence of nationalism among oppressed peoples, advocated their national rights to self-determination, and opposed the ethnic chauvinism of “Greater Russia” because such ethnocentrism was a cultural obstacle to establishing the proletarian dictatorship in the territories of the deposed Tsarist Russian Empire (1721–1917). In *The Right of Nations to Self-determination* (1914), Lenin said:

- • We fight against the privileges and violence of the oppressor nation, and do not in any way condone strivings for privileges on the part of the oppressed

nation.... The bourgeois nationalism of any oppressed nation has a general democratic content that is directed against oppression, and it is this content that we unconditionally support. At the same time, we strictly distinguish it from the tendency towards national exclusiveness.... Can a nation be free if it oppresses other nations? It cannot.

The internationalist philosophies of Bolshevism and of Marxism are based upon class struggle transcending nationalism, ethnocentrism, and religion, which are intellectual obstacles to class consciousness, because the bourgeois ruling classes manipulated said cultural *status quo* to politically divide the proletarian working classes. To overcome the political barrier of nationalism, Lenin said it was necessary to acknowledge the existence of nationalism among oppressed peoples, and to guarantee their national independence, as the right of secession; and that, based upon national self-determination, it was natural for socialist states to transcend nationalism and form a federation. In *The Question of Nationalities, or "Autonomisation"* (1923), Lenin said:

- ..nothing holds up the development and strengthening of proletarian class solidarity so much as national injustice; "offended" nationals are not sensitive to anything, so much as to the feeling of equality, and the violation of this equality, if only through negligence or jest — to the violation of that equality by their proletarian comrades.

Socialist Culture

The role of the Marxist vanguard party was to politically educate the workers and peasants to dispel the societal false consciousness of religion and nationalism that constitute the cultural *status quo* taught by the bourgeoisie to the proletariat to facilitate their economic exploitation of peasant and worker. Influenced by Lenin, the Central Committee of the Bolshevik Party stated that the development of the socialist workers' culture should not be 'hamstrung from above', and opposed the *Proletkult* (1917–25) organisational control of the national culture.

The Oppositionists

Until exiled from Russia in 1929, Leon Trotsky helped develop and led the Left Opposition (and the later Joint Opposition) with members of the Workers' Opposition, the Decembrists, and (later) the Zinovievists. *Trotskyism* ideologically predominated the political platform of the Left Opposition, which demanded the restoration of soviet democracy, the expansion of democratic centralism in the Communist Party, national industrialisation, international permanent revolution, and socialist internationalism. The Trotskyist demands countered Stalin's political dominance of the Russian Communist Party, which was officially characterised by the 'cult of Lenin', the rejection of permanent revolution, and the doctrine of *Socialism in One Country*. The Stalinist economic policy vacillated between appeasing capitalist kulak interests in the countryside, and destroying them. Initially, the Stalinists also rejected the

national industrialisation of Russia, but then pursued it in full, sometimes brutally. In both cases, the Left Opposition denounced the regressive nature of the policy towards the kulak social class of wealthy peasants, and the brutality of forced industrialisation. Trotsky described the vacillating Stalinist policy as a symptom of the undemocratic nature of a ruling bureaucracy.

During the 1920s and the 1930s, Stalin fought and defeated the political influence of Leon Trotsky and of the Trotskyists in Russia, by means of slander, anti-Semitism, programmed censorship, expulsions, exile (internal and external), and imprisonment. The anti-Trotsky campaign culminated in the executions (official and unofficial) of the Moscow Trials (1936–38), which were part of the Great Purge of Old Bolsheviks (who had led the Revolution). Once established as ruler of the USSR, General Secretary Stalin re-titled the official *Socialism in One Country* doctrine as “Marxism-Leninism”, to establish ideologic continuity with Leninism, whilst opponents continued calling it “Stalinism”.

Philosophic Successors

In political practice, Leninism (vanguard-party revolution), despite its origin as Communist revolutionary praxis, was adopted throughout the political spectrum.

- In China, the Communist Party of China was organised as a Leninist vanguard party, based upon Mao Zedong Thought, the Chinese practical application of Marxism-

Leninism, specific to Chinese socio-economic conditions.

- The People's Action Party (PAP) of Singapore was originally organized on Leninist lines, with internal democracy, and initiated a legacy of single-party dominance over the government that continues to the present.

In turn, Maoism became the theoretical basis of some third world revolutionary vanguard parties, such as the Communist Party of Peru – Red Fatherland and others.

Other Dependency Theorists

Two other early writers relevant to dependency theory were François Perroux and Kurt Rothschild. Other leading dependency theorists include Herb Addo, Walden Bello, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, Enzo Faletto, Armando Cordova, Ernest Feder, Andre Gunder Frank, Walter Rodney, Pablo González Casanova, Keith Griffin, Kunibert Raffer, Paul Israel Singer, and Osvaldo Sunkel. Many of these authors focused their attention on Latin America; the leading dependency theorist in the Islamic world is the Egyptian economist Samir Amin.

Later, world systems theory expanded on dependency arguments. It postulates a third category of countries, the *semi-periphery*, intermediate between the core and periphery. In this model, the semi-periphery is industrialised, but with less sophistication of technology than in the core; and it does not control finances. The rise of one group of semi-peripheries tends to be at the cost of

another group, but the unequal structure of the world economy based on unequal exchange tends to remain stable.

Tausch (2003) traces the beginnings of World systems theory to the writings of the Austro-Hungarian socialist Karl Polanyi after the First World War. In its present form it is usually associated with the work of Immanuel Wallerstein. Sociologist Fernando Henrique Cardoso (later President of Brazil) summarized his version of dependency theory as follows:

- There is a financial and technological penetration by the developed capitalist centers of the countries of the periphery and semi-periphery;
- This produces an unbalanced economic structure both within the peripheral societies and between them and the centers;
- This leads to limitations on self-sustained growth in the periphery;
- This favors the appearance of specific patterns of class relations;
- These require modifications in the role of the state to guarantee both the functioning of the economy and the political articulation of a society, which contains, within itself, foci of inarticulateness and structural imbalance.

Tausch (2003), based on works of Amin from 1973 to 1997, lists the following main characteristics of periphery capitalism:

- Regression in both agriculture and small scale industry characterizes the period after the onslaught of foreign domination and colonialism
- Unequal international specialization of the periphery leads to the concentration of activities in export oriented agriculture and or mining. Some industrialization of the periphery is possible under the condition of low wages, which, together with rising productivity, determine that unequal exchange sets in
- These structures determine in the long run a rapidly growing tertiary sector with hidden unemployment and the rising importance of rent in the overall social and economic system
- Chronic current account balance deficits, re-exported profits of foreign investments, and deficient business cycles at the periphery that provide important markets for the centers during world economic upswings
- Structural imbalances in the political and social relationships, inter alia a strong 'compradore' element and the rising importance of state capitalism and an indebted state class

The analysis of development patterns in the 1990s and beyond is complicated by the fact that capitalism develops not smoothly, but with very strong and self-repeating ups and downs, called cycles. Relevant results are given in studies by Joshua Goldstein, Volker Bornschier, and Luigi Scandella.

Dependency theorists hold that short-term spurts of growth notwithstanding, long-term growth in the periphery will be

imbalanced and unequal, and will tend towards high negative current account balances. Cyclical fluctuations also have a profound effect on cross-national comparisons of economic growth and societal development in the medium and long run. What seemed like spectacular long-run growth, may in the end turn out to be just a short run cyclical spurt after a long recession. Cycle time plays an important role. Giovanni Arrighi believed that the logic of accumulation on a world scale shifts over time, and that we again witness during the 1980s and beyond a deregulated phase of world capitalism with a logic, characterized - in contrast to earlier regulatory cycles - by the dominance of financial capital.

At this stage, the role of unequal exchange in the entire relationship of dependency cannot be underestimated. Unequal exchange is given, if double factorial terms of trade of the respective country are < 1.0 .

Criticism

Dependency theory has been criticized by free-market economists such as Peter Bauer and Martin Wolf (but not only them):

- Corruption. State-owned companies have higher rates of corruption than privately owned companies.
- Lack of competition. By subsidizing in-country industries and preventing outside imports, these companies may have less incentive to improve their products, to try to become more efficient in their

processes, to please customers, or to research new innovations.

- **Sustainability.** Industries reliant on government support may not be sustainable for very long, particularly in poorer countries and countries which largely depend on foreign aid from more developed countries.
- **Domestic opportunity costs.** Subsidies on domestic industries come out of state coffers and therefore represent money not spent in other ways, like development of domestic infrastructure, seed capital or need-based social welfare programs. At the same time, the higher prices caused by tariffs and restrictions on imports require the people either to forgo these goods altogether or buy them at higher prices, forgoing other goods.

Market economists cite a number of examples in their arguments against dependency theory. The improvement of India's economy after it moved from state-controlled business to open trade is one of the most often cited. India's example seems to contradict dependency theorists' claims concerning comparative advantage and mobility, as much as its economic growth originated from movements such as outsourcing - one of the most mobile forms of capital transfer. South Korea and North Korea provide another example of trade-based development vs autarkic self-sufficiency. When the two states were divided at the end of the Korean War, they possessed roughly identical populations, resources and infrastructure and were at similar levels of development. North Korea pursued a policy of Import substitution industrialization as

suggested by dependency theory, while South Korea pursued a policy of Export-oriented industrialization as suggested by comparative advantage theory. In 2013 South Korea's per capita GDP was 18 times that of North Korea. In Africa, states which have emphasized import-substitution development, such as Zimbabwe, have typically been among the worst performers, while the continent's most successful non-oil based economies such as Egypt, South Africa and Tunisia, have pursued trade-based development.

Free market theorists see dependency theorists' complaints as legitimate, but their policy prescriptions as terrible, in that the policies only aggravate the disparity between the developed nations and the underdeveloped countries.

World-systems theory

World-systems theory (also known as world-systems analysis or the world-systems perspective), a multidisciplinary, macro-scale approach to world history and social change, emphasizes the world-system (and not nation states) as the primary (but not exclusive) unit of social analysis.

“World-system” refers to the inter-regional and transnational division of labor, which divides the world into core countries, semi-periphery countries, and the periphery countries. Core countries focus on higher skill, capital-intensive production, and the rest of the world focuses on low-skill, labor-intensive production and extraction of raw materials. This constantly reinforces the dominance of the core countries. Nonetheless, the

system has dynamic characteristics, in part as a result of revolutions in transport technology, and individual states can gain or lose their core (semi-periphery, periphery) status over time. For a time, some countries become the world hegemon; during the last few centuries, as the world-system has extended geographically and intensified economically, this status has passed from the Netherlands, to the United Kingdom and (most recently) to the United States of America. Immanuel Wallerstein has developed the best-known version of world-systems analysis, beginning in the 1970s. Wallerstein traces the rise of the capitalist world-economy from the “long” sixteenth century (c. 1450-1640). The rise of capitalism, in Wallerstein’s view, was a contingent (not inevitable) outcome of the protracted crisis of feudalism (c. 1290-1450). Europe (the West) utilized its advantages and gained control over most of the world economy, presiding over the development and spread of industrialization and capitalist economy, indirectly resulting in unequal development. Though other commentators refer to Wallerstein’s project as world-systems “theory,” that is a term that he consistently rejects. For Wallerstein, world-systems analysis is above all a mode of analysis that aims to transcend the structures of knowledge inherited from the 19th century.

This includes, especially, the divisions within the social sciences, and between the social sciences and history. For Wallerstein, then, world-systems analysis is a “knowledge movement” that seeks to discern the “totality of what has been paraded under the labels of the... human sciences and indeed well beyond.” “We must invent a new language,” Wallerstein insists, to transcend the illusions of the “three supposedly distinctive arenas” of

society, economy, and politics. This trinitarian structure of knowledge is grounded in another, even grander, modernist architecture – the alienation of biophysical worlds (including those within bodies) from social ones. “One question, therefore, is whether we will be able to justify something called social science in the twenty-first century as a separate sphere of knowledge.”

Many other scholars have contributed significant work in this “knowledge movement”. World-systems theory traces emerged in the 1970s. Its roots can be found in sociology, but it has developed into a highly interdisciplinary field.

World-systems theory was aiming to replace modernization theory. Wallerstein criticized modernization theory due to:

- Its focus on the state as the only unit of analysis,
- Its assumption there is only a single path of evolutionary development for all countries,
- Its disregard of transnational structures that constrain local and national development.

Three major predecessors of world-systems theory are: the Annales school, Marxist, and dependence theory. The Annales School tradition (represented most notably by Fernand Braudel) influenced Wallerstein in focusing on long-term processes and geo-ecological regions as unit of analysis. Marxist theories added:

- A stress on social conflict,
- A focus on the capital accumulation process and
- Competitive class struggles,

- A focus on a relevant totality,
- The transitory nature of social forms, and
- A dialectical sense of motion through conflict and contradiction.

World-systems theory was also significantly influenced by dependency theory - a neo-Marxist explanation of development processes.

Other influences on the world-systems theory come from scholars such as Karl Polanyi, Nikolai Kondratiev and Joseph Schumpeter (particular, from their research on business cycles and the concepts of three basic modes of economic organization: reciprocal, redistributive, and market modes, which Wallerstein reframed into a discussion of mini-systems, world-empires, and world-economies).

Wallerstein sees the development of the capitalist world-economy as detrimental to a large proportion of the world's population. Wallerstein views the period since the 1970s as an "age of transition," one that will give way to a future world-system (or world-systems) whose configuration cannot be determined in advance.

World-systems thinkers include Samir Amin, Giovanni Arrighi, Andre Gunder Frank, and Immanuel Wallerstein with major contributions by Christopher Chase-Dunn, Beverly Silver, Volker Bornschier, Janet Abu Lughod, Thomas D. Hall, Kunibert Raffer, Theotonio dos Santos, Dale Tomich, Jason W. Moore, and others.

In sociology, a primary alternative perspective is World Polity Theory as formulated by John W. Meyer.

Immanuel Wallerstein

The best-known version of the world-systems approach has been developed by Immanuel Wallerstein. Wallerstein notes that world-systems analysis calls for an unidisciplinary historical social science, and contends that the modern disciplines, products of the 19th century, are deeply flawed because they are not separate logics, as is manifest for example in the de facto overlap of analysis among scholars of the disciplines.

Wallerstein offers several definitions of a world-system. He defined it, in 1974, briefly, as:

- A system is defined as a unit with a single division of labor and multiple cultural systems.

He also offered a longer definition:

- ...a social system, one that has boundaries, structures, member groups, rules of legitimation, and coherence. Its life is made up of the conflicting forces which hold it together by tension and tear it apart as each group seeks eternally to remold it to its advantage. It has the characteristics of an organism, in that it has a life-span over which its characteristics change in some respects and remain stable in others. One can define

its structures as being at different times strong or weak in terms of the internal logic of its functioning.

In 1987 Wallerstein defined world-system as:

- ... not the system of the world, but a system that is a world and which can be, most often has been, located in an area less than the entire globe. World-systems analysis argues that the units of social reality within which we operate, whose rules constrain us, are for the most part such world-systems (other than the now extinct, small mini systems that once existed on the earth). World-systems analysis argues that there have been thus far only two varieties of world-systems: world-economies and world empires. A world-empire (examples, the Roman Empire, Han China) are large bureaucratic structures with a single political center and an axial division of labor, but multiple cultures. A world-economy is a large axial division of labor with multiple political centers and multiple cultures. In English, the hyphen is essential to indicate these concepts. “World system” without a hyphen suggests that there has been only one world-system in the history of the world.

Wallerstein characterizes the world system as a set of mechanisms which redistributes surplus value from the *periphery* to the *core*. In his terminology, the *core* is the developed, industrialized part of the world, and the *periphery* is the “underdeveloped”, typically raw materials-exporting, poor part of

the world; the *market* being the means by which the *core* exploits the *periphery*. Apart from these, Wallerstein defines four temporal features of the world system. *Cyclical rhythms* represent the short-term fluctuation of economy, while *secular trends* mean deeper long run tendencies, such as general economic growth or decline. The term *contradiction* means a general controversy in the system, usually concerning some short term vs. long term trade-offs. For example the problem of under consumption, wherein the drive-down of wages increases the profit for the capitalists on the short-run, but considering the long run, the decreasing of wages may have a crucially harmful effect by reducing the demand for the product. The last temporal feature is the *crisis*: a crisis occurs, if a constellation of circumstances brings about the end of the system.

In Wallerstein's view, there have been three kinds of historical systems across human history: mini-systems or what anthropologists call bands, tribes, and small chiefdoms, and two types of world-systems - one that is politically unified and the other, not (single state world-empires and multi-polity world-economies). World-systems are larger, and ethnically diverse. Modernity, called the "modern world-system" is of the latter type, but unique in being the first and only fully capitalist world-economy to have emerged, around 1450 - 1550 and to have geographically expanded across the entire planet, by about 1900. Capitalism is a system based on competition between free producers using free labor with free commodities, 'free' meaning available for sale and purchase on a market.

The U.S. and India Entente from Estrangement to Engagement

During the visit of the Indian prime minister, Manmohan Singh, to the United States in July 2005, the George W. Bush administration declared its ambition to achieve full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India as part of its broader goals of promoting nuclear power and achieving nuclear security. In pursuit of this objective, the Bush administration agreed to “seek agreement from Congress to adjust U.S. laws and policies” and to “work with friends and allies to adjust international regimes to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation and trade with India, including but not limited to expeditious consideration of fuel supplies for safeguarded nuclear reactors at Tarapur.”

India, for its part, promised “to assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages of other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology.” The Indo-U.S. nuclear pact has virtually rewritten the rules of the global nuclear regime by underlining India’s credentials as a responsible nuclear state that should be integrated into the global nuclear order.

The nuclear agreement creates a major exception to the U.S. prohibition of nuclear assistance to any country that does not accept international monitoring of all its nuclear facilities. It is remarkable achievement not the least because it reveals the desire on both sides to challenge their long-held assumptions about each other so as to be able to strike a partnership that serves the interests of both India and the United States. The

Indian prime minister's visit to the United States was followed by the visit of the U.S. President Bush, to New Delhi in March 2006. Together, these visits have marked a new phase in the rather topsy-turvy bilateral relationship between the world's oldest and the world's largest democracies. It was during President Bush's visit to India that the two sides finally managed to reach a crucial understanding on the separation plan for India's nuclear facilities, the first crucial step towards putting the July 2005 agreement into effect.

This plan is part of India's obligation under the Indo-U.S. nuclear agreement that requires separation of civil and military facilities in a phased manner and filing of a declaration about the civilian facilities with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). After being given the go-ahead by the House International Relations Committee and Senate Foreign Relations Committee, the U.S. Congress overwhelmingly approved the deal, leading to the signing by the U.S. president of the Henry J Hyde United States-India Peaceful Atomic Energy Cooperation Act of 2006.

Given its significant implications, the Indo-U.S. nuclear agreement has, not surprisingly, sparked off a heated debate in India, the United States, and the larger international community. This chapter examines the debate surrounding the nuclear pact and argues that the nuclear agreement is about much more than mere nuclear technicalities: it is about the emergence of a new configuration in the global balance of power and a broader need for a new international nuclear order in the face of a global nuclear nonproliferation regime that seems to have become

ineffective in meeting the challenges confronting the international community today.

U.S.-India Ties after the Cold War

The demise of the Soviet Union liberated Indian and U.S. attitudes from the structural confines of cold war realities. As India pursued economic reforms and moved towards global integration, it was clear that the United States and India would have to find a modus vivendi for a deeper engagement with each other. As Indian foreign policy priorities changed, U.S.-India cooperation increased on a range of issue areas. India needed U.S. support for its economic regeneration and the administration of former U.S. president Bill Clinton viewed India as an emerging success story of globalization. Yet, relations could only go so far with the U.S. refusal to reconcile itself to India's nuclear programme and its inability to move beyond India's hyphenated relationship with Pakistan in its South Asia policy.

The Indian nuclear tests of 1998, while removing ambiguity about India's nuclear status, further complicated U.S.-India bilateral relations. The Bill Clinton administration wanted to improve U.S. relations with India, but it did not want to compromise on its goal of nonproliferation. Protracted negotiations between the deputy chairman of the Planning Commission and later the foreign minister of India, Jaswant Singh, and the U.S. deputy secretary of state, Strobe Talbott, emphasized this palpable difficulty. While in concrete terms these negotiations achieved little, they set in motion a process that saw U.S.-India bilateral engagement taking on a new meaning. Mutual trust developed in

the U.S. and Indian foreign policy bureaucracies that is so crucial to sustaining high-level political engagements. The visit of President Clinton to India in 2000 and the Next Steps in Strategic Partnership, which was announced by the Indian Prime Minister and the U.S. President in 2004 also laid the foundation for a dramatic upswing in Indo-U.S. ties.

But it was the George W. Bush administration that redefined the parameters of U.S.-India bilateral engagement. That India would figure prominently in the Bush administration's global strategic calculus was made clear by Condoleezza Rice in her *Foreign Affairs* article before the 2000 presidential elections in which she had argued that "there is a strong tendency conceptually [in the United States] to connect India with Pakistan and to think only of Kashmir or the nuclear competition between the two states." She made it clear that India has the potential to become a great power and that U.S. foreign policy would do well to take that into account. The Bush administration, from the very beginning, refused to look at India through the prism of nonproliferation and viewed India as a natural and strategic ally.

The events of September 11, 2001, and the subsequent dramatic changes in U.S. foreign policy prevented the Bush administration from following through with its new approach towards India though gradual changes in U.S. attitudes towards India continues apace. It was only when Rice became the secretary of state in 2005 that the United States started evolving a coherent approach in building its ties with India. Rice visited India in March 2005 as part of her Asia tour and put forth "an

unprecedented framework for cooperation with India,” something that took the Indian government by surprise.

Rice transformed the terms of the debate completely by revealing that the Bush administration was willing to consider civilian nuclear energy cooperation with India. A few days later, the State Department announced the administration’s new India policy, which declared its goal “to help India become a major world power in the 21st century.” And the first step in that direction was removing the age-old distrust that has resulted between the two states over the nuclear issue. It was clear to both the United States and India that the road to a healthy strategic partnership between the two democracies was through nuclear energy cooperation.

U.S.-India relations have been steadily strengthening in the last few years, with their interests converging on a range of issues. But the nuclear nonproliferation regime denying civilian nuclear technology to India, with its larger restrictive implications across the entire high technology spectrum, has been a fundamental irritant in this relationship.

It was made clear to the U.S. Congress that its failure to approve the deal would not only set back the clock on U.S.-India relations but would also revive the anti-U.S. sections of the Indian elite. In her testimonies before the House and Senate committees, Rice described India as “a rising global power that could be a pillar of stability in a rapidly changing Asia” and argued that the nuclear agreement was critical for forging a full-scale partnership between the world’s two largest democracies. Aside from the fact

that the United States is India's largest trading and investment partner, U.S.-India cooperation on strategic issues has also been growing. India is one of the top five donors to the Afghan government, and it contributed \$2 million in response to the United Nations secretary general's appeal for help in Iraq, followed by another \$10 million at the donor's conference in Madrid.

India also contributed \$10 million to the global democracy fund initiated by the UN secretary general. The Indian and U.S. navies are jointly patrolling the Malacca Straits, and India's rapid reaction to the Indian Ocean tsunami in 2004 won accolades from the Pentagon. It is by no means an exaggeration to suggest that the United States would like a strong U.S.-India alliance to act as a "bulwark against the arc of Islamic instability running from the Middle East to Asia and to create much greater balance in Asia." The 2006 Quadrennial Defence Review (QDR) of the United States strongly emphasizes India's importance for the United States in the emerging global security architecture. While a concern with China's rising military power is palpable throughout the defence review, it is instructive to note the importance that the QDR has attached to India's rising global profile.

The report describes India as an emerging great power and a key strategic partner of the United States. Shared values such as the two states being longstanding multiethnic democracies are underlined as providing a foundation for increased strategic cooperation. This stands in marked contrast to the unease that has been expressed with the centralization of power in Russia and lack of transparency in security affairs in China.

It is also significant that India is mentioned along with America's traditional allies such as the NATO countries, Japan, and Australia. The QDR goes on to say categorically that close cooperation with these partners (including India) in the war against terrorism as well as in efforts to counter weapons of mass destruction (WMD) proliferation and other nontraditional threats ensures not only the continuing need for these alliances but also the improvement of their capabilities.

It is in this context of burgeoning U.S.-India ties that the nuclear pact between the two states assumes great significance, because it not only demonstrates the commitment of the two sides to take their bilateral ties out of the confines of cold war nuclear realities, but it also reveals the complexities inherent in the process of doing so. The debate that followed (and in many ways still continues) in both states on the nuclear deal underlines the significance that both attach to the deal and its wide-ranging consequences for the U.S.-India bilateral relationship.

The Debate in the United States: Nuclear Proliferation vs. Strategic Engagement

The signing of the nuclear deal in July 2005 was followed by a range of negative reactions in the United States. The main focus of most of these reactions was the impact that this deal would have on other states considering pursuing nuclear weapons. It was argued that the nuclear deal signaled to such states that acquiring nuclear weapons represented a means to recognition as a major global player without any penalty for such actions. Specifically, the issue of Pakistan was raised in so far as

Pakistan might also demand the status given to India and a refusal might mean growing anti-U.S. feelings in a state crucial for the success of the global war on terrorism.

India was also criticized for its refusal to curtail the development of its nuclear weapons and delivery systems and for not permitting the full scope of safeguards for its military and civilian facilities. While most in the United States did see India as a major global actor in the coming years, there were concerns whether India could be trusted on such critical issues as U.S.-China relations or Iran's nuclear weapons programme.

Initial reactions from some members of the U.S. Congress were also negative. They argued that the United States could not afford to play favourites and break the rules of the nonproliferation regime to favour one nation at the risk of undermining critical international treaties on nuclear weapons. It was clear at the outset that garnering support from the U.S. Congress for the nuclear pact was going to be an uphill task for the Bush administration.

While many U.S. lawmakers realized India's growing strategic importance and its impeccable track record in nuclear nonproliferation, both domestic U.S. laws and India's status as a nonsignator of the Treaty on the Non- Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) meant that Congress would find it difficult to lend their support to the Bush administration's decision to provide India with civilian nuclear reactors. The difficulty was that making an exception in India's case would establish a precedent and open the United States to charges that it lacked commitment

to the nonproliferation regime. While most Republican members of the Congress were circumspect, many Democratic members made it abundantly clear that the agreement was highly controversial, and even members of the India caucus were restrained in their views.

Moreover, the euphoria over the nuclear deal was soon overtaken by the realities of international politics. India was asked to prove its loyalty by lining up behind the United States on the question of Iran's nuclear programme or risk its own nuclear bargain with Washington. Some members of the U.S. Congress became upset over the visit of the Indian foreign minister to Iran and flayed India during a hearing on the Indo-U.S. nuclear pact. U.S. congressman Tom Lantos (D-CA) went so far as to say that India "will pay a heavy price for a total disregard of U.S. concerns vis-à-vis Iran." It is not clear what part U.S. pressure played in India's decision to vote in support of the European Union- and U.S.-led resolution censuring Tehran in the September 2005 meeting of the IAEA board of governors, but the Bush administration made it clear that if India voted against the U.S. motion, the U.S. Congress would likely not approve the U.S.-India nuclear agreement. Lantos later hailed the Indian vote in the IAEA, arguing that it would promote a positive consideration in Congress of the new U.S.-India nuclear agreement. India, on its part, has continued to claim that its vote had nothing to do with its nuclear agreement with the United States. The hearings in the U.S. Congress on the Indo-U.S. nuclear pact also brought to light the difficulties involved in its ratification. Most members of the U.S. Congress struggled with the question of whether the net impact of this agreement on U.S. nonproliferation policy

would be positive or negative. The majority of the experts testifying before the House Committee on International Relations argued that the deal weakened the international nonproliferation regime. Only a few, such as Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie Endowment of International Peace, dared to suggest that bringing India into the global nonproliferation fold through a lasting bilateral agreement that defines clearly enforceable benefits and obligations, not merely strengthens American efforts to stem further proliferation but also enhances U.S. national security. The hearings in the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee also highlighted the expectations that the Bush administration had of India regarding the nuclear pact. Not only were India's attitudes vis-à-vis Iran mentioned by senior Bush administration officials as crucial, but it was also made clear that Washington expected India to perform in conformity with U.S. interests.

India's help in building democratic institutions worldwide was deemed essential for the Indo-U.S. partnership. India's support for the multinational Proliferation Security Initiative was also referred to as highly desirable. It was made clear to the Senate that the initiation of legislation by the Bush administration in the U.S. Congress operationalizing the nuclear pact would be based on evidence that the Indian government had begun acting on the most important commitment of separating its civilian and military nuclear facilities in a credible and transparent manner. Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), then chairing the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee, made it a point to mention in his 2005 opening statement that India's nuclear record with the international community had been unsatisfying and that India

had “in 1974 violated bilateral pledges it made to Washington not to use U.S.-supplied nuclear materials for weapons purposes.”

He forcefully reminded everyone that an implementation of the Indo-U.S. nuclear accord requires congressional consent and that it would be his committee and the U.S. Congress that would determine “what effect the Joint Statement will have on U.S. efforts to halt the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.” Senator Lugar laid down very clearly the four benchmarks that would determine the U.S. Congress’s consent to the pact: “First, how does civil nuclear cooperation strengthen the U.S.-Indian strategic relationship and why is it so important? Second, how does the Joint Statement address U.S. concerns about India’s nuclear programme and policies? Third, what effects will the Joint Statement have on other proliferation challenges such as Iran and North Korea and the export policies of Russia and China? Fourth, what impact will the Joint Statement have on the efficacy and future of the NPT and the international non-proliferation regime?”

Even as this debate was moving apace in the United States, the Bush administration took some significant steps to further strengthen Indo-U.S. civil nuclear ties. It strongly supported India’s participation in the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER) consortium, an international enterprise aimed at building a reactor that can use nuclear fusion as a source of energy, and removed India’s safeguard reactors from the U.S. Department of Commerce Entities List. It also made a strong pitch supporting India at the meeting of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) to enable full peaceful civil

nuclear cooperation and trade with India. In a strong signal that the Bush administration was serious about the nuclear deal with India, the U.S. State Department told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that it could not determine whether India's forty-megawatt nuclear reactor called Cirus had violated a 1956 U.S.-India contract that said that U.S. heavy water could only be used for peaceful purposes. The Bush administration argued that it is not possible to have a conclusive answer on whether plutonium produced by the Cirus reactor was produced by the U.S. heavy water.

At the same time, hectic lobbying also started in the United States. The U.S.-India Business Council, a group of major U.S. corporations doing business in India, hired one of the most expensive lobbying firms in Washington, Patton Boggs LLP, to help ensure the enactment of legislation permitting the United States to pursue full-scale civilian nuclear cooperation with India. The government of India also worked with its own lobbying firms; Barbour, Griffith and Rogers LLC, which is headed by the former U.S. ambassador to India, Robert Blackwill, and the Venable Law firm.

The Nuclear Bargain

The nuclear agreement ultimately hinged on the ability of the Indian government to come up with a credible plan to separate its tightly entwined civilian and military nuclear facilities that was acceptable to the United States. After some tough negotiations over a period of seven months—negotiations that were still in progress even as the U.S. president landed in New Delhi on

March 1, 2006—the two states managed to arrive at an agreement. India agreed that fourteen of its twenty-two nuclear reactors would be classified as civilian and would be open to international safeguards. The other reactors, including the fast breeder reactors, would remain as military facilities and would therefore not be subject to international inspections.

The accord also allows India to build future breeder reactors and decide whether to keep them in or out of the international inspections regime. India accepted safeguards in perpetuity on its civilian nuclear reactors on the basis of a reciprocal commitment by the United States to guarantee unlimited nuclear fuel supply to India for its civilian programme. Unlike other nuclear weapons states, however, India will not have the right to pull out any of its reactors once they have been put under safeguards.

The IAEA chief, Mohammed ElBaradei, was quick to endorse the deal, claiming that this agreement would not only help satisfy India's growing needs but would also bring India closer as an important partner in the nonproliferation regime. He has argued that the deal is not only important because it gives India access to fuel and technology but also because it brings India into the nuclear mainstream, which is very important for the global efforts towards eliminating nuclear weapons.

But developing safeguards specific to India could turn out to be a complicated task. Although India had declared itself a nuclear weapon state after conducting nuclear tests in 1998, it is not recognized as such by the NPT of 1968. This makes India's case

unique in a way, and the IAEA safeguards would have to be negotiated accordingly. India might demand that its safeguards regime should be almost equivalent to the level of the inspection regime for the five acknowledged nuclear weapon states.

In fact, the Indian government would like the proposed India-specific safeguards with the IAEA to provide “on the one hand safeguards against the withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any time, and on the other, permit India to take corrective measures to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies.” But this technical nitty-gritty cannot disguise the fact that it is a great deal for India. The nuclear pact allows India access to nuclear fuel that it needs urgently in light of its fuel shortages and burgeoning energy requirements.

It ends three decades of Indian isolation from access to dual use and global high technology flows caused by the restrictions imposed by India’s rejection of the global nonproliferation order. At the same time, the strategic nuclear weapons programme India has maintained for all these years despite tremendous international pressure remains largely untouched. This is a very sensitive issue for the Indian scientific and strategic community, and the Indian prime minister had to assure the Indian parliament that “India will place under safeguards only those facilities that can be identified as civilian without damaging the nation’s deterrence potential.”

Chapter 4

Theories of International Politics

Realism

There have always been Americans, such as Alexander Hamilton, who viewed international relations from a realist perspective, but its contemporary intellectual roots are largely European. Three important figures of the interwar period probably had the greatest impact on American scholarship: diplomat-historian E. H. Carr, geographer Nicholas Spykman, and political theorist Hans Morgenthau. Other Europeans who have contributed significantly to realist thought include John Herz, Raymond Aron, Hedley Bull, and Martin Wight, while notable Americans of this school include scholars Arnold Wolfers and Norman Graebner, diplomat George Kennan, journalist Walter Lippmann, and theologian Reinhold Niebuhr. Although realists do not constitute a homogeneous school-any more than do any of the others discussed in this thesis-most of them share at least five core premises about international relations. To begin with, they view as central questions the causes of war and the conditions of peace. They also regard the structure of the international system as a necessary if not always sufficient explanation for many aspects of international relations. Classical realists, "structural anarchy" or the absence of a central authority to settle disputes, is the essential feature of the contemporary system, and it gives rise to the "security dilemma": in a self-help system one nation's search for security often leaves its current and potential

adversaries insecure, any nation that strives for absolute security leaves all others in the system absolutely insecure, and it can provide a powerful incentive for arms races and other types of hostile interactions. Consequently, the question of relative capabilities is a crucial factor.

Efforts to deal with this central element of the international system constitute the driving force behind the relations of units within the system; those that fail to cope will not survive. Thus, unlike "idealists" and some "liberal internationalists," classical realists view conflict as a natural state of affairs rather than as a consequence that can be attributed to historical circumstances, evil leaders, flawed sociopolitical systems, or inadequate international understanding and education.

A third premise that unites classical realists is their focus on geographically-based groups as the central actors in the international system. During other periods the primary entities may have been city states or empires, but at least since the Treaties of Westphalia, sovereign states have been the dominant units. Classical realists also agree that state behaviour is rational.

The assumption behind this fourth premise is that states are guided by the logic of the "national interest," usually defined in terms of survival, security, power, and relative capabilities. Although the national interest may vary just as to specific circumstances, the similarity of motives among nations permits the analyst to reconstruct the logic of policymakers in their pursuit of national interests-what Morgenthau called the

"rational hypothesis"-and to avoid the fallacies of "concern with motives and concern with ideological preferences."

Finally, the state can also be conceptualized as a unitary actor. Because the central problems for states are starkly defined by the nature of the international system, their actions are primarily a response to external rather than domestic political forces. Stephen Krasner, for example, the state "can be treated as an autonomous actor pursuing goals associated with power and the general interest of the society." Classical realists, however, sometimes use domestic politics, especially the alleged deficiencies of public opinion, as a residual category to explain deviations from "rational" policies. Realism has been the dominant model of international relations during at least the past six decades because it seemed to provide a useful framework for understanding the collapse of the post-World War I international order in the face of serial aggressions in the Far East and Europe, World War II, and the Cold War. Nevertheless, the classical versions articulated by Morgenthau and others have received a good deal of critical scrutiny.

The critics have included scholars who accept the basic premises of realism but who found that in at least four important respects these theories lacked sufficient precision and rigor.

Classical realism has usually been grounded in a pessimistic theory of human nature, either a theological version or a secular one. Egoism and self-interested behaviour are not limited to a few evil or misguided leaders but are basic to homo politicus and thus are at the core of a realist theory. But because human

nature, if it means anything, is a constant rather than a variable, it is an unsatisfactory explanation for the full range of international relations. If human nature explains war and conflict, what accounts for peace and cooperation? In order to avoid this problem, most modern realists have turned their attention from human nature to the structure of the international system to explain state behaviour.

In addition, critics have noted a lack of precision and even contradictions in the way classical realists use such core concepts as "power," "national interest," and "balance of power." They also see possible contradictions between the central descriptive and prescriptive elements of realism. On the one hand, nations and their leaders "think and act in terms of interests defined as power," but, on the other, statesmen are urged to exercise prudence and self-restraint, as well as to recognize the legitimate interests of other nations.

Power plays a central role in classical realism, but the correlation between relative power balances and political outcomes is often less than compelling, suggesting the need to enrich analyses with other variables. Moreover, the distinction between "power as capabilities" and "usable options" is especially important in the nuclear age, as the United States discovered in Vietnam and the Soviets learned in Afghanistan.

The terrorist attack on New York and Washington of September 11, 2001, even more dramatically illustrated the disjunction between material capabilities and political impact. Although classical realists have typically looked to history and political

science for insights and evidence, the search for greater precision has led many modern realists to look elsewhere for appropriate models, analogies, metaphors, and insights. The discipline of choice is often economics, from which modern realists have borrowed a number of tools and concepts, including rational choice, expected utility, theories of firms and markets, bargaining theory, and game theory.

The quest for precision has yielded a rich harvest of theories and models, and a somewhat less bountiful crop of supporting empirical applications. Drawing in part on game theory, Morton Kaplan described several types of international systems—for example, balance-of-power, loose bipolar, tight bipolar, universal, hierarchical, and unit-veto. He then outlined the essential rules that constitute these systems.

For example, the rules for a balance-of-power system are:

- Increase capabilities, but negotiate rather than fight;
- Fight rather than fail to increase capabilities;
- Stop fighting rather than eliminate an essential actor;
- Oppose any coalition or single actor that tends to assume a position of predominance within the system;
- Constrain actors who subscribe to supranational organizational principles; and
- Permit defeated or constrained essential actors to re-enter the system.

Richard Rosecrance, David Singer, Karl Deutsch, Bruce Russett, and many others, although not necessarily realists, also have

developed models that seek to understand international relations by virtue of system-level explanations. Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*, the most prominent effort to develop a rigorous and parsimonious model of "modern" or "structural" realism, has tended to define the terms of a vigorous debate during the past two decades. It follows and builds upon another enormously influential book in which Waltz developed the Rousseauian position that a theory of war must include the system level and not just first or second images. Why war? Because there is nothing in the system to prevent it.

Theory of International Relations is grounded in analogies from microeconomics:

- International politics and foreign policy are analogous to markets and firms. Oligopoly theory is used to illuminate the dynamics of interdependent choice in a self-help anarchical system.

Waltz explicitly limits his attention to a structural theory of international systems, eschewing the task of linking it to a theory of foreign policy. Indeed, he doubts that the two can be joined in a single theory and he is highly critical of many system-level analysts, including Morton Kaplan, Stanley Hoffmann, Richard Rosecrance, Karl Deutsch, David Singer, and others, charging them with various errors, including "reductionism," that is, defining the system in terms of the attributes or interactions of the units. In order to avoid reductionism and to gain parsimony, Waltz erects his theory on the foundations of three core propositions that define the structure of the international

system. The first concentrates on the principles by which the system is ordered. The contemporary system is anarchic and decentralized rather than hierarchical; although they differ in many respects, each unit is formally equal. A second defining proposition is the character of the units. An anarchic system is composed of sovereign units and therefore the functions that they perform are also similar; for example, all have the task of providing for their own security. In contrast, a hierarchical system would be characterized by some type of division of labour. Finally, there is the distribution of capabilities among units in the system. Although capabilities are a unit-level attribute, the distribution of capabilities is a system-level concept. A change in any of these elements constitutes a change in system structure. The first element of structure as defined by Waltz is a quasi-constant because the ordering principle rarely changes, and the second element drops out of the analysis because the functions of units are similar as long as the system remains anarchic. Thus, the third attribute, the distribution of capabilities, plays the central role in Waltz's model.

Waltz uses his theory to deduce the central characteristics of international relations. These include some nonobvious propositions about the contemporary international system. For example, with respect to system stability he concludes that, because a bipolar system reduces uncertainty, it is more stable than alternative structures. Furthermore, he contends that because interdependence has declined rather than increased during the twentieth century, this trend has actually contributed to stability, and he argues that the proliferation of nuclear weapons may contribute to rather than erode system stability.

Waltz's effort to bring rigor and parsimony to realism has stimulated a good deal of further research, but it has not escaped controversy and criticism. Most of the vigorous debate has centered on four alleged deficiencies relating to interests and preferences, system change, misallocation of variables between the system and unit levels, and an inability to explain outcomes. Specifically, a sparse structural approach suffers from an inability to identify completely the nature and sources of interests and preferences because these are unlikely to derive solely from the structure of the system. Ideology or domestic politics may often be at least as important. Consequently, the model is also unable to specify adequately how interests and preferences may change.

The three defining characteristics of system structure are not sufficiently sensitive to specify the sources and dynamics of system change. The critics buttress their claim that the model is too static by pointing to Waltz's assertion that there has only been a single structural change in the international system during the past three centuries.

Another drawback is the restrictive definition of system properties, which leads Waltz to misplace, and therefore neglect, elements of international relations that properly belong at the system level. Critics have focused on his treatment of the destructiveness of nuclear weapons and interdependence. Waltz labels these as unit-level properties, whereas some of his critics assert that they are in fact attributes of the system.

Finally, the distribution of capabilities explains outcomes in international affairs only in the most general way, falling short of

answering the questions that are of central interest to many analysts. For example, the distribution of power at the end of World War II would have enabled one to predict the rivalry that emerged between the United States and the Soviet Union but it would have been inadequate for explaining the pattern of relations between these two nations-the Cold War rather than withdrawal into isolationism by either or both, a division of the world into spheres of influence, or World War III. In order to do so, it is necessary to explore political processes within states-at minimum within the United States and the Soviet Union-as well as between them. Robert Gilpin shares the core assumptions of modern realism, but his study of *War and Change in World Politics* also attempts to cope with some of the criticism leveled at Waltz's theory by focusing on the dynamics of system change.

In doing so, Gilpin also seeks to avoid the criticism that the Waltz theory is largely ahistorical. Drawing upon both economic and sociological theory, his model is based on five core propositions. The first is that the international system is in a state of equilibrium if no state believes that it is profitable to attempt to change it. Second, a state will attempt to change the status quo of the international system if the expected benefits outweigh the costs. Related to this is the proposition that a state will seek change through territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal costs of further change equal or exceed the marginal benefits. Moreover, when an equilibrium between the costs and benefits of further change and expansion is reached, the economic costs of maintaining the status quo tend to rise faster than the resources needed to do so. An equilibrium exists when no powerful state believes that a change in the

system would yield additional net benefits. Finally, if the resulting disequilibrium between the existing governance of the international system and the redistribution of power is not resolved, the system will be changed and a new equilibrium reflecting the distribution of relative capabilities will be established.

Unlike Waltz, Gilpin includes state-level processes in order to explain change. Differential economic growth rates among nations—a structural-systemic level variable—play a vital role in his explanation for the rise and decline of great powers, but his model also includes propositions about the law of diminishing returns on investments, the impact of affluence on martial spirit and on the ratio of consumption to investment, and structural change in the economy.

Global Society, Interdependence, Institutionalism

Just as there are variants of realism, there are several Global-Society/Complex-Independence/Liberal Institutionalism models, but this discussion focuses on two common denominators; they all challenge the first and third core propositions of realism identified earlier, asserting that inordinate attention to the war/peace issue and the nation-state renders it an increasingly anachronistic model of global relations.

The agenda of critical problems confronting states has been vastly expanded during the twentieth century. Attention to the issues of war and peace is by no means misdirected, just as to proponents of a GS/CI/LI perspective, but concerns for welfare,

modernization, the environment, and the like are today no less potent sources of motivation and action. It is important to stress that the potential for cooperative action arises from self-interest, not from some utopian attribution of altruism to state leaders. Institution building to reduce uncertainty, information costs, and fears of perfidy; improved international education and communication to ameliorate fears and antagonisms based on misinformation and misperceptions; and the positive-sum possibilities of such activities as trade are but a few of the ways, just as to the GS/CI/LI perspective, by which states may jointly gain and thus mitigate, if not eliminate, the harshest features of a self-help international system.

The diffusion of knowledge and technology, combined with the globalization of communications, has vastly increased popular expectations. The resulting demands have outstripped resources and the ability of sovereign states to cope effectively with them. Interdependence and institution building arise from an inability of even the most powerful states to cope, or to do so unilaterally or at acceptable levels of cost and risk, with issues ranging from terrorism to trade, from immigration to environmental threats, and from AIDS to new strains of tuberculosis.

Paralleling the widening agenda of critical issues is the expansion of actors whose behaviour can have a significant impact beyond national boundaries; indeed, the cumulative effects of their actions can have profound consequences for the international system. Thus, although states continue to be the most important international actors, they possess a declining ability to control their own destinies. The aggregate effect of

actions by multitudes of nonstate actors can have potent effects that transcend political boundaries. These may include such powerful or highly visible nonstate organizations as Exxon, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, or the Palestine Liberation Organization, and even shadowy ones such as the al Qaeda group that claimed to have carried out the 9/11 terrorist attacks. On the other hand, the cumulative effects of decisions by less powerful actors may also have profound international consequences. For example, decisions by thousands of individuals, mutual funds, banks, pension funds, and other financial institutions to sell securities on 19 October 1987 not only resulted in an unprecedented "crash" on Wall Street but also within hours its consequences were felt throughout the entire global financial system. The difficulties of containing economic problems within a single country were also illustrated by the international consequences of difficulties in Thailand, Mexico and Russia during the late 1990s.

The widening agenda of critical issues, most of which lack a purely national solution, has also led to creation of new actors that transcend political boundaries; for example, international organizations, transnational organizations, nongovernment organizations, multinational corporations, and the like. Thus, not only does an exclusive focus on the war/peace issue fail to capture the complexities of contemporary international life but it also blinds the analyst to the institutions, processes, and norms that self-interested states may use to mitigate some features of an anarchic system. In short, just as to GS/CI/LI perspectives, analysts of a partially globalized world may incorporate elements

of realism as a necessary starting point, but these are not sufficient for an adequate understanding.

The GS/CI/LI models recognize that international behaviour and outcomes arise from a multiplicity of motives, not merely the imperatives of systemic power balances. They also alert us to the fact that important international processes originate not only in the actions of states but also in the aggregated behaviour of other actors. These models enable the analyst to deal with a broader agenda of critical issues; they also force one to contemplate a richer menu of demands, processes, and outcomes than would be derived from realist models, and thus, they are more sensitive to the possibility that politics of trade, currency, immigration, health, the environment, or energy may significantly and systematically differ from those typically associated with security issues.

A point of some disagreement among theorists lumped together here under the GS/CI/LI rubric centers on the importance and future prospects of the nation-state. The state serves as the starting point for analysts who focus on the ways in which these self-interested actors may pursue gains and reduce risks and uncertainties by various means, including creation of institutions. They view the importance of the nation-state as a given for at least the foreseeable future.

Other theorists regard the sovereign territorial state as in a process of irreversible decline, partly because the revolution in communications is widening the horizons and thus providing competition for loyalties of its citizens, partly because states are

increasingly incapable of meeting the expanding expectations of its subjects; the "revolution of rising expectations" is not limited to less developed countries. Theirs is a largely utilitarian view of the state in which national sentiments and loyalties depend importantly on continuing favorable answers to the question: "what have you done for me lately?" However, these analysts may be underestimating the potency of nationalism and the durability of the state. Several decades ago one of them wrote that "the nation is declining in its importance as a political unit to which allegiances are attached." Objectively, nationalism may be an anachronism but, for better or worse, powerful loyalties are still attached to states.

The suggestion that, because even some well-established nations have experienced independence movements among ethnic, cultural, or religious minorities, the territorial state is in an irreversible decline is not wholly persuasive. In virtually every region of the world there are groups that seek to create or restore geographically based entities in which its members may enjoy the status and privileges associated with sovereign territorial statehood. Events since 1989 in Eastern Europe, parts of the former Yugoslavia and Soviet Union, Palestine, Sri Lanka, Iraq, Quebec, Turkey, and elsewhere, seem to indicate that obituaries for nationalism may be somewhat premature.

The notion that such powerful nonnational actors as major multinational corporations will soon transcend the nation-state seems equally premature. International drug rings do appear capable of challenging and perhaps even dominating national authorities in Colombia, Panama, and some other states. But the

pattern of outcomes in confrontations between MNCs and states, including cases involving major expropriations of corporate properties, indicate that even relatively weak nations are not always the hapless pawns of MNCs. The 9/11 terrorist attacks demonstrated once again that even the most powerful states that also enjoy a favorable geographical location cannot provide absolute safety for their populations. Perhaps paradoxically, these attacks and the resulting responses also reconfirmed the continuing importance of the state in world politics.

Underlying the GS/CI/LI critique of realist theories is the view that the latter are too wedded to the past and are thus incapable of dealing adequately with change. Even if global dynamics arise from multiple sources, however the actions of states and their agents would appear to remain the major sources of change in the international system. The third group of systemic theories to be considered, the Marxist/World System/Dependency models, further downplays the role of the nation-state even further.

Marxism, World Systems, Dependency

Many of the distinctions among M/WS/D theories are lost by treating them together and by focusing on their common features, but in the brief description possible here only common denominators will be presented. These models challenge both the war/peace and state-centered features of realism, but they do so in ways that differ sharply from challenges of GS/CI/LI models. Rather than focusing on war and peace, these theories direct attention to quite different issues, including uneven development, poverty, and exploitation within and between nations. These

conditions, arising from the dynamics of the modes of production and exchange, and they must be incorporated into any analysis of intra- and inter-nation conflict.

These models, the key groups within and between nations are classes and their agents: As Immanuel Wallerstein put it, "in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there has been only one world system in existence, the world capitalist world economy." The "world capitalist system" is characterized by a highly unequal division of labour between the periphery and core. Those at the periphery are essentially the drawers of water and the hewers of wood whereas the latter appropriate the surplus of the entire world economy. This critical feature of the world system not only gives rise to and perpetuates a widening rather than narrowing gap between the wealthy core and poor periphery but also to a dependency relationship from which the latter are unable to break loose. Moreover, the class structure within the core, characterized by a growing gap between capital and labour, is faithfully reproduced in the periphery so that elites there share with their counterparts in the core an interest in perpetuating the system. Thus, in contrast to many realist theories, M/WS/D models encompass and integrate theories of both the global and domestic arenas. M/WS/D models have been subjected to trenchant critiques. The state, nationalism, security dilemmas, and related concerns are at the theoretical periphery rather than at the core.

"Capitalism was from the beginning an affair of the world-economy," Wallerstein asserts, "not of nation-states." A virtue of many M/WS/D theories is that they take a long historical

perspective on world affairs rather than merely focusing on contemporary issues. Yet, by neglecting nation-states and the dynamics arising from their efforts to deal with security in an anarchical system-or at best relegating these actors and motivations to a minor role-M/WS/D models are open to question, much as would be analyses of Hamlet that neglect the central character and his motivations.

Finally, the earlier observations about the persistence of nationalism as an element of international relations seem equally appropriate here. Perhaps national loyalties can be dismissed as prime examples of "false consciousness," but even in areas that experienced two generations of one-party Communist rule, as in China, Poland, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, or Estonia, there was scant evidence that feelings of solidarity with workers in the Soviet Union or elsewhere replaced nationalist sentiments.

The end of the Cold War and subsequent events have rendered Marxist theories somewhat problematic, but the gap between rich and poor states has, if anything, become more acute during the past decade. Globalization has helped some Third World countries such as Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan, but it has done little for most African countries. This condition has given rise to two somewhat related explanation for disparities, not only between the industrial west and the rest of the world, but also among countries that gained their independence since 1945.

The first focuses on geography. One analyst notes, for example, that landlocked countries in tropical zones have serious

disadvantages in coping with such health problems as malaria and in overcoming the high costs of land transportation for exporting their goods. The second cluster of theories purporting to explain uneven development point to cultural differences. Neither of these theories is new; Max Weber's *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* is a classic illustration of a cultural explanation for development.

While geographical and cultural theories have enjoyed some revival recently, they have also provoked spirited debates, in part because of highly dubious uses in the past. Unlike Marxist theories, they also appear to place the primary responsibility for under-development on the poor countries themselves, and they seem to offer limited prospects for coping with the problem because neither geography nor culture can easily be changed. Proponents of these theories respond that a proper diagnosis of the roots of under-development is a necessary condition for its amelioration; for example through aid programmes that target public health and transportation infrastructure needs.

Constructivism

Although the theories described to this point tended to dominate debates during the past century, "constructivism" has recently emerged as a significant approach to world politics. Unlike many "post-modernists", most constructivists work within the theoretical and epistemological premises of the social sciences, and they generally seek to expand rather than undermine the purview of other theoretical perspectives. As with other approaches summarized in this thesis, constructivists do not

constitute a monolithic perspective, but they do share some key ideas, the first of which is that the environment in which states act is social and ideational as well as material. Money provides a good example of the construction of social reality.

If money is limited to metals such as gold and silver, then it has value because the metal itself is valuable, and its use constitutes a form of barter. For reasons of convenience and to expand the money supply, modern governments have also designated bits of coloured paper and base metals to serve as money although they have little if any intrinsic value; that they are valuable and can be used as a medium of exchange is the result of a construction of economic reality. In their emphasis on the construction of social reality, its proponents challenge the materialist basis of the approaches. Because the social gives meaning to the material, many core concepts, including anarchy, power, national interest, security dilemma, and others, are seen as socially constructed rather than as the ineluctable consequences of system structures.

Moreover, interests and identities—for example, those who are designated as "allies" or "enemies"—are also social constructs, the products of human agency, rather than structurally determined. The title of a widely-cited work by Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It," provides something of the flavour of the constructionist perspective. Wendt shows that because anarchy can have multiple meanings for different actors, it may give rise to a wider range of behaviors than postulated by realism. Constructivists have also shown that ideas and norms sometimes compete with, shape, or even trump material interests.

Although not labeled as a constructivist analysis, an early study of John Foster Dulles' policies towards the USSR revealed that he constructed a model of the Soviet system, based largely on his lifelong study of Lenin's writings. Brutal Soviet foreign policies during the Stalin era provided ample support for Dulles' model, but the more variegated policies of those who came to power in the Kremlin after the Soviet dictator's death in 1953 were also interpreted in ways suggesting that Dulles' model was largely impervious to any evidence that might call it into question. The end of the Cold War and disintegration of the Soviet Union have triggered off a lively debate among proponents of ideational and material interpretations of the acceptance by Mikhail Gorbachev of domestic reforms and collapse of the Soviet empire in Eastern Europe. At this point, constructivism is less a theory than an approach. It has been used to analyse the origins, development, and consequences of norms and cultures in a broad range of settings. It might offer an especially fruitful contribution to the persisting debates on the "democratic peace" thesis. The constructivist approach is of relatively recent vintage, but it bears considerable resemblance to the venerable social science dictum that we all perceive our environment through the lenses of belief systems, and thus that, "It is what we think the world is like, not what it is really like, that determines our behaviour." This also illustrates the tendency for each generation of political scientists to reinvent, if not the whole wheel, at least some parts of it.

Decision Making

Many advocates of realism recognize that it cannot offer fine-grained analyses of foreign policy behaviour and, as noted earlier, Waltz denies that it is desirable or even possible to combine theories of international relations and foreign policy. Decision-making models challenge the premises that it is fruitful to conceptualize the nation as a unitary rational actor whose behaviour can adequately be explained by reference to the system structure-the second, fourth, and fifth realist propositions identified earlier-because individuals, groups, and organizations acting in the name of the state are also sensitive to domestic pressures and constraints, including elite maintenance, electoral politics, public opinion, interests groups, ideological preferences, and bureaucratic politics. Such core concepts as "the national interest" are not defined solely by the international system, much less by its structure alone, but they are also likely to reflect elements within the domestic political arena. Thus, rather than assuming with the realists that the state can be conceptualized as a "black box"-that the domestic political processes are unnecessary for explaining the sources of its external behaviour-decision-making analysts believe one must indeed take these internal processes into account, with special attention directed at policymakers.

At the broadest level of analyses within the "black box," the past two decades have witnessed a burgeoning literature and heated controversies on the "democratic peace," arising from the finding that, while democracies are no less likely to engage in wars, they do not fight each other. Some of the debate is about minutiae,

but parts of it engage such central issues as the role of institutions in allaying fears of perfidy or of norms in reducing or eliminating wars between democracies. Suffice it to say that proponents and critics of democratic peace thesis line up mostly along realist-liberal lines. The democratic peace thesis is especially troubling to realists for at least three reasons. It runs counter to a long tradition, espoused by Alexis de Tocqueville, Hans Morgenthau, George Kennan, Walter Lippmann, Henry Kissinger, and other notable realists, that depicts democracies as seriously disadvantaged in conducting foreign affairs.

Moreover, the thesis democracies may behave differently directly challenges a core premise of structural realism. As Waltz notes, "If the democratic peace thesis is right, structural realist theory is wrong." At the policy level, few realists are comfortable with espousal by the first Bush and Clinton administrations of "democracy promotion" abroad as a vital goal of American diplomacy, at least at the rhetorical level, usually denouncing it as an invitation to hopeless crusading, or as "international social work" worthy of Mother Theresa but not of the world's sole superpower. To reconstruct how nations deal with each other, it is necessary to view the situation through the eyes of those who act in the name of the state: decision makers and the group and bureaucratic-organizational contexts within which they act.

Bureaucratic and organizational politics

Traditional models of complex organizations and bureaucracy emphasized the benefits of a division of labour, hierarchy, and centralization, coupled with expertise, rationality, and obedience.

They also assumed that clear boundaries should be maintained between politics and decision making, on the one hand, and administration and implementation on the other.

Following pioneering works by Chester Barnard, Herbert Simon and James March, and others, more recent theories depict organizations quite differently. The central premise is that decision making in bureaucratic organizations is not constrained only by the legal and formal norms that are intended to enhance the rational and eliminate the capricious aspects of bureaucratic behaviour. There is an emphasis upon rather than a denial of the political character of bureaucracies, as well as on other "informal" aspects of organizational behaviour.

Complex organizations are composed of individuals and units with conflicting perceptions, values, and interests that may arise from parochial self-interest and also from different perceptions of issues arising ineluctably from a division of labour. Organizational norms and memories, prior policy commitments, inertia, and standard operating procedures may shape and perhaps distort the structuring of problems, channeling of information, use of expertise, the range of options that may be considered, and implementation of executive decisions. Consequently, organizational decision making is essentially political in character, dominated by bargaining for resources, roles and missions, and by compromise rather than analysis.

An ample literature of case studies on budgeting, weapons acquisitions, military doctrine, and similar situations confirms that foreign and defence policy bureaucracies rarely conform to

the Weberian "ideal type" of rational organization. Some analysts assert that crises may provide the motivation and means for reducing some of the nonrational aspects of bureaucratic behaviour: crises are likely to push decisions to the top of the organization where a higher quality of intelligence is available; information is more likely to enter the top of the hierarchy directly, reducing the distorting effects of information processing through several levels of the organization; and broader, less parochial values may be invoked. Short decision time in crises reduces the opportunities for decision making by bargaining, log rolling, incrementalism, lowest-common-denominator values, "muddling through," and the like.

Even studies of international crises from a bureaucratic-organizational perspective, however, are not uniformly sanguine about decision making in such circumstances. Graham Allison's analysis of the Cuban missile crisis identified several critical bureaucratic malfunctions concerning dispersal of American aircraft in Florida, the location of the naval blockade, and grounding of weather-reconnaissance flights from Alaska that might stray over the USSR. Richard Neustadt's study of two crises involving the United States and Great Britain revealed significant misperceptions of each other's interests and policy processes.

And an examination of three American nuclear alerts found substantial gaps in understanding and communication between policymakers and the military leaders who were responsible for implementing the alerts.

Critics of some organizational-bureaucratic models have directed their attention to several points. They assert, for instance, that the emphasis on bureaucratic bargaining fails to differentiate adequately between the positions of the participants. In the American system, the president is not just another player in a complex bureaucratic game. Not only must he ultimately decide but he also selects who the other players will be, a process that may be crucial in shaping the ultimate decisions. If General Matthew Ridgway and Attorney General Robert Kennedy played key roles in the American decisions not to intervene in Indochina in 1954 and not to bomb or invade Cuba in 1962, it was because Presidents Eisenhower and Kennedy chose to accept their advice rather than that of other officials. Also, the conception of bureaucratic bargaining tends to emphasize its nonrational elements to the exclusion of genuine intellectual differences that may be rooted in broader concerns, including disagreements on what national interests, if any, are at stake in a situation. Indeed, properly managed, decision processes that promote and legitimize "multiple advocacy" among officials may facilitate highquality decisions.

These models may be especially useful for understanding the slippage between executive decisions and foreign policy actions that may arise during implementation, but they may be less valuable for explaining the decisions themselves. Allison's study of the Cuban missile crisis does not indicate an especially strong correlation between bureaucratic roles and evaluations of the situation or policy recommendations, as predicted by his "Model III", and recently published transcripts of deliberations during the crisis do not offer more supporting evidence for that model.

Yet Allison does present some compelling evidence concerning policy implementation that casts considerable doubt on the adequacy of traditional realist conceptions of the unitary rational actor.

Small group politics

Another decision-making model used by some political scientists supplements bureaucratic-organizational models by narrowing the field of view to foreign policy decisions within small-group contexts. Some analysts have drawn upon sociology and social psychology to assess the impact of various types of group dynamics on decision making. Underlying these models are the premises that the group is not merely the sum of its members and that group dynamics can have a significant impact on the substance and quality of decisions.

Groups often perform better than individuals in coping with complex tasks owing to diverse perspectives and talents, an effective division of labour, and high-quality debates on definitions of the situation and prescriptions for dealing with it. Groups may also provide decision-makers with emotional and other types of support that may facilitate coping with complex problems. Conversely, they may exert pressures for conformity to group norms, thereby inhibiting the search for information and policy options, ruling out the legitimacy of some options, curtailing independent evaluation, and suppressing some forms of intragroup conflict that might serve to clarify goals, values, and options. Classic experiments have revealed the extent to which group members will suppress their beliefs and judgments

when faced with a majority adhering to the contrary view, even a counterfactual one. Drawing on historical case studies, social psychologist Irving Janis has identified a different variant of group dynamics, which he labels "groupthink" to distinguish it from the more familiar type of conformity pressure on "deviant" members of the group. Janis challenges the conventional wisdom that strong cohesion among group members invariably enhances performance. Under certain conditions, strong cohesion can markedly degrade the group's performance in decision making. Members of a cohesive group may, as a means of dealing with the stresses of having to cope with consequential problems and in order to bolster self-esteem, increase the frequency and intensity of face-to-face interaction, resulting in greater identification with the group and less competition within it; "concurrence seeking" may displace or erode reality-testing and sound information processing and judgment. As a consequence, groups may be afflicted by unwarranted feelings of optimism and invulnerability, stereotyped images of adversaries, and inattention to warnings. Janis's analyses of both "successful" and "unsuccessful" cases indicate that "groupthink" or other decision-making pathologies are not inevitable, and he develops some guidelines for avoiding them.

Individual leaders

Still other decision-making analysts focus on the individual policymaker, emphasizing the gap between the demands of the classical model of rational decision making and the substantial body of theory and evidence about various constraints that come into play in even relatively simple choice situations. Drawing

upon cognitive psychology, these models go well beyond some of the earlier formulations that drew upon psychodynamic theories to identify various types of psychopathologies among political leaders: paranoia, authoritarianism, the displacement of private motives on public objects, etc. Efforts to include information processing behaviour of the individual decision maker have been directed at the cognitive and motivational constraints that, in varying degrees, affect the decision-making performance of "normal" rather than pathological subjects. Thus, attention is directed to all leaders, not merely those, such as Hitler or Stalin, who display symptoms of clinical abnormalities.

Many challenges to the classical model have focused on limited human capabilities for objectively rational decision making. The cognitive constraints on rationality include limits on the individual's capacity to receive, process, and assimilate information about the situation; an inability to identify the entire set of policy alternatives; fragmentary knowledge about the consequences of each option; and an inability to order preferences on a single utility scale. These have given rise to several competing conceptions of the decision maker and his or her strategies for dealing with complexity, uncertainty, incomplete or contradictory information and, paradoxically, information overload. They variously characterize the decision maker as a problem solver, naive or intuitive scientist, cognitive balancer, dissonance avoider, information seeker, cybernetic information processor, and reluctant decision maker.

Three of these conceptions seem especially relevant for foreign policy analysis. The first views the decision-maker as a "bounded

rationalist" who seeks satisfactory rather than optimal solutions. As Herbert Simon has put it, "the capacity of the human mind for formulating and solving complex problems is very small compared with the size of the problem whose solution is required for objectively rational behaviour in the real world-or even a reasonable approximation of such objective rationality." Moreover, it is not practical for the decision maker to seek optimal choices; for example, because of the costs of searching for information. Related to this is the concept of the individual as a "cognitive miser," one who seeks to simplify complex problems and to find short cuts to problem solving.

Another approach is to look at the decision-maker as an "error prone intuitive scientist" who is likely to commit a broad range of inferential mistakes. Thus, rather than emphasizing the limits on search, information processing, and the like, this conception views the decision maker as the victim of flawed decision rules who uses data poorly. There are tendencies to underuse rate data in making judgments, believe in the "law of small numbers," underuse diagnostic information, overweight low probabilities and underweight high ones, and violate other requirements of consistency and coherence. The final perspective emphasizes the forces that dominate the policymaker, forces that will not or cannot be controlled. Decision-makers are not merely rational calculators; important decisions generate conflict, and a reluctance to make irrevocable choices often results in behaviour that reduces the quality of decisions. These models direct the analyst's attention to policymakers' belief systems, images of relevant actors, perceptions, information-processing strategies,

heuristics, certain personality traits and their impact on decision-making performance.

Despite this diversity of perspectives and the difficulty of choosing between cognitive and motivational models, there has been some convergence on several types of constraints that may affect decision processes. One involves the consequences of efforts to achieve cognitive consistency on perceptions and information processing. Several kinds of systematic bias have been identified in both experimental and historical studies. Policymakers have a propensity to assimilate and interpret information in ways that conform to rather than challenge existing beliefs, preferences, hopes, and expectations. They may deny the need to confront tradeoffs between values by persuading themselves that an option will satisfy all of them, and indulge in rationalizations to bolster the selected option while denigrating others.

A comparison of a pair of two-term conservative Republican presidents may be used to illustrate the point about coping with tradeoffs. Both came to office vowing to improve national security policy and to balance the federal budget. President Eisenhower, recognizing the tradeoff between these goals, pursued security policies that reduced defence expenditures—for example, the "New Look" policy that placed greater reliance on nuclear weapons, and alliance policies that permitted maintenance of global commitments at lower cost. Despite widespread demands for vastly increased defence spending after the Soviet space capsule Sputnik was successfully placed in orbit around the earth,

Eisenhower refused to give in; indeed, he left office famously warning of the dangers of the "military-industrial complex."

The result was a period of balanced budgets in which surpluses in some years offset deficits in others. In contrast, President Reagan denied any tradeoffs between defence expenditures and budget deficits by positing that major tax cuts would stimulate the economy to produce increases in government revenues. The results proved otherwise as the Reagan years were marked by annual deficits ranging between \$79 billion and \$221 billion.

An extensive literature on styles of attribution has revealed several types of systematic bias. Perhaps the most important for foreign policy is the basic attribution error—a tendency to explain the adversary's behaviour in terms of his characteristics rather than in terms of the context or situation, while attributing one's own behaviour to the latter rather than to the former. A somewhat related type of double standard has been noted by George Kennan: "Now is it our view that we should take account only of their capabilities, disregarding their intentions, but we should expect them to take account only of our supposed intentions, disregarding our capabilities?" Analysts also have illustrated the effect on decisions of policymakers' assumptions about order and predictability in the environment.

Whereas a policymaker may have an acute appreciation of the disorderly environment in which he or she operates, there is a tendency to assume that others, especially adversaries, are free of such constraints. Graham Allison, Robert Jervis, and others have demonstrated that decision makers tend to believe that the

realist "unitary rational actor" is the appropriate representation of the opponent's decision processes and, thus, whatever happens is the direct result of deliberate choices. Several models linking crisis-induced stress to decision processes have been developed and used in foreign policy studies. Irving Janis and Leon Mann have developed a more general conflict-theory model that conceives of man as a "reluctant decision maker" and focuses upon "when, how and why psychological stress generated by decisional conflict imposes limitations on the rationality of a person's decisions." One may employ five strategies for coping with a situation requiring a decision: unconflicted adherence to existing policy, unconflicted change, defensive avoidance, hypervigilance, and vigilant decision making.

The first four strategies are likely to yield low-quality decisions owing to an incomplete search for information, appraisal of the situation and options, and contingency planning, whereas vigilant decision making, characterized by a more adequate performance of vital tasks, is more likely to result in a high quality choice. The factors that will affect the employment of decision styles are information about risks, expectations of finding a better option, and time for adequate search and deliberation.

A final approach we should consider attempts to show the impact of personal traits on decision making. Typologies that are intended to link leadership traits to decision-making behaviour abound, but systematic research demonstrating such links is in much shorter supply. Still, some efforts have borne fruit. Margaret Hermann has developed a scheme for analysing leaders'

public statements of unquestioned authorship for eight variables: nationalism, belief in one's ability to control the environment, need for power, need for affiliation, ability to differentiate environments, distrust of others, self-confidence, and task emphasis. The scheme has been tested with impressive results on a broad range of contemporary leaders. Alexander George has reformulated Nathan Leites's concept of "operational code" into five philosophical and five instrumental beliefs that are intended to describe politically relevant core beliefs, stimulating a number of empirical studies and, more recently, further significant conceptual revisions. Finally, several psychologists have developed and tested the concept of "integrative complexity," defined as the ability to make subtle distinction along multiple dimensions, flexibility, and the integration of large amounts of diverse information to make coherent judgments.

A standard content analysis technique has been used for research on documentary materials generated by top decision makers in a wide range of international crises. Decision-making approaches permit the analyst to overcome many limitations of the systemic models described earlier, but they also impose increasingly heavy data burdens on the analyst. Moreover, there is a danger that adding levels of analysis may result in an undisciplined proliferation of categories and variables. It may then become increasingly difficult to determine which are more or less important, and ad hoc explanations for individual cases erode the possibilities for broader generalizations across cases. Several well-designed, multicase, decision-making studies, however, indicate that these and other traps are not unavoidable.

Post-modern challenges

The field of international relations has gone through three "great debates" during the past century. The first, pitting the venerable realist tradition against various challengers. The second, centered on disagreements about the virtues and limitations of quantification and, more recently, on "formal modeling." Although those arguments persist in various guises, they have been bypassed in this thesis. The most recent debate, in many respects the most fundamental of the three, is the "postmodern" challenges to all of the theories and models.

The intellectual foundations of post-modernism are largely in the humanities, but the current debates extend well beyond issues of humanistic versus social science perspectives on world politics. They are rooted in epistemology: what can we know? Rather than addressing the validity of specific variables, levels of analysis, or methodologies, most post-modernists challenges the premise that the social world constitutes an objective, knowable reality that is amenable to systematic description and analysis.

Although realism has been a prime target, all existing theories and methodologies are in the cross-hairs of post-modern critics who, as Pauline Rosenau noted, "soundly and swiftly dismiss international political economy, realism, regime theory, game theory, rational actor models, integration theory, transnational approaches, world system analysis and the liberal tradition in general." Nor are any of the conventional methodologies employed by political scientists or diplomatic historians spared.

Some versions of post-modernism label "evidence" and "truth" as meaningless concepts, and they are critical of categories, classification, generalization. Nor is there any objective language by which knowledge can be transmitted; the choice of language unjustifiably grants privileged positions to one perspective or another. Thus, the task of the observer is to deconstruct "texts". Each one creates a unique "reading" of the matter under consideration, none can ultimately be deemed superior to any other, and there are no guidelines for choosing among them.

Taken at face value, the ability of these post-modernist perspectives to shed light on the central issues of world affairs seems problematic, and thus their contributions to either political science or diplomatic history would appear to be quite modest. Indeed, they appear to undermine the foundations of both undertakings, eliminating conventional research methods and aspirations for the cumulation of knowledge. Moreover, if one rejects the feasibility of research standards because they necessarily "privilege" some theories or methodologies, does that not also rule out judgments of works by Holocaust deniers or of conspiracy buffs who write, for example, about the Kennedy assassination or the Pearl Harbor attack?

Even more moderate versions of post-modernism are skeptical of theories and methods based on reason and Western logic, but works of this genre have occasionally offered insightful critiques of conventional theories, methodologies and concepts. The proclivity of more than a few political scientists for reifying a false image of the "scientific method" and for overlooking the pervasiveness of less elegant methodologies offers an inviting

target. However, such thoughtful critical analyses are certainly not the unique province of post-modern authors; critiques of naive perspectives on scientific methods, for example, have abounded in political science and history journals for several decades.

Finally, most post-modernists are highly critical of other approaches because they have failed to come up with viable solutions for mankind's most pressing problems, including war, poverty, and oppression. Though some progress has been made on all these fronts, not even a modern-day Pangloss would declare victory on any of them. But what does post-modernist nihilism offer along these lines?

Jarvis makes the point nicely:

- In what sense, however, can this approach be at all adequate for the subject of International Relations? What, for example, do the literary devices of irony and textuality say to Somalian refugees who flee from famine and warlords or to Ethiopian rebels who fight in the desert plains against a government in Addis Ababa? How does the notion of textual deconstruction speak to Serbs, Croats, and Muslims who fight one another among the ruins of the former Yugoslavia? How do totalitarian narratives or logocentric binary logic feature in the deliberation of policy bureaucrats or in negotiations over international trade or the formulation of international law? Should those concerned with human rights or those who take it upon themselves to

study relationships between nation-states begin by contemplating epistemological facts and ontological disputes?

Quite aside from the emptiness of its message for those with a concern to improving the human condition, the stylistic wretchedness of most post-modern prose ensures that it will have scant impact on the real world. The study of international relations and foreign policy has always been an eclectic undertaking, with extensive borrowing from disciplines other than political science and history. At the most general level, the primary differences today tend to be between two broad approaches. Analysts of the first school focus on the structure of the international system, often borrowing from economics for models, analogies, insights, and metaphors, with an emphasis on rational preferences and strategy and how these tend to be shaped and constrained by the structure of the international system. Decision-making analysts, meanwhile, display a concern for internal political processes and tend to borrow from psychology and social psychology in order to understand better the limits and barriers to information processing and rational choice. For many purposes both approaches are necessary and neither is sufficient.

Neglect of the system structure and its constraints may result in analyses that depict policymakers as relatively free agents with an almost unrestricted menu of choices, limited only by the scope of their ambitions and the resources at their disposal. At worst, this type of analysis can degenerate into Manichean explanations that depict foreign policies of the "bad guys" as the external

manifestation of inherently flawed leaders or domestic structures, whereas the "good guys" only react from necessity.

Conversely, neglect of foreign policy decision making not only leaves one unable to explain fully the dynamics of international relations, but many important aspects of a nation's external behaviour will be inexplicable. Advocates of the realist model have often argued its superiority for understanding the "high" politics of deterrence, containment, alliances, crises, and wars, if not necessarily for "low" politics. But there are several rejoinders to this line of reasoning. First, the low politics of trade, currencies, and other issues that are usually sensitive to domestic pressures are becoming an increasingly important element of international relations. The George W. Bush administration came into office vowing to replace the "mushy" policies of its predecessor with "hard headed realism" based on self-defined national interests. Yet its actions have shown a consistent willingness to subordinate those interests to those of such favored domestic constituencies as the energy, steel and soft lumber industries, and the National Rifle Association.

Second, the growing literature on the putative domain par excellence of realism, including deterrence, crises, and wars, raises substantial doubts about the universal validity of the realist model even for these issues. Finally, exclusive reliance on realist models and their assumptions of rationality may lead to unwarranted complacency about dangers in the international system. Nuclear weapons and other features of the system have no doubt contributed to the "long peace" between major powers. At the same time, however, a narrow focus on power balances,

"correlations of forces," and other features of the international system will result in neglect of dangers—for example, the command, communication, control, intelligence problem or inadequate information processing—that can only be identified and analysed by a decision-making perspective. At a very general level, this termination parallels that drawn three decades ago by the foremost contemporary proponent of modern realism: The necessary for understanding the context of international behaviour. But to acknowledge the existence of various levels of analysis is not enough.

What the investigator wants to explain and the level of specificity and comprehensiveness to be sought should determine which level of analysis are relevant and necessary. In this connection, it is essential to distinguish between two different dependent variables: foreign policy decisions by states, on the one hand, and the outcomes of policy and interactions between two or more states, on the other. Political scientists studying international relations are increasingly disciplining their use of multiple levels of analysis in studying outcomes that cannot be adequately explained via only a single level of analysis.

A renowned diplomatic historian asserted that most theories of international relations flunked a critical test by failing to forecast the end of the Cold War. The end of the Cold War has also led some theorists to look outside the social sciences and humanities for appropriate metaphors and models, but these are beyond the scope of the present thesis. This termination speculates on the related question of how well the theories might help political scientists and historians understand global relations in the post-

Cold War world. Dramatic events since the late 1980s have posed serious challenges to several of the system level theories, but we should be wary of writing premature obituaries for any of them, or engaging in "naive falsification." Further, in 2002, only a little more than a decade after disintegration of the Soviet Union and less than a year after the 9/11 terrorist attacks, some caution about declaring that major events and trends are irreversible seems warranted.

The global society/complex interdependence/liberal institutionalism theories have fared relatively better than either structural realism or various Marxist theories. For example, creation of the World Trade Organization and progress towards economic unification of Europe, although not without detours and setbacks, would appear to provide significant support for the view that, even in an anarchic world, major powers may find that it is in their self-interest to establish and maintain institutions for cooperating and overcoming the constraints of the "relative gains" problem. Woodrow Wilson's thesis that a world of democratic nations will be more peaceful has also enjoyed some revival, at least among analysts who attach significance to the fact that democratic nations have been able to establish "zones of peace" among themselves. Wilson's diagnosis that self-determination also supports peace may be correct in the abstract, but universal application of that principle is neither feasible nor desirable, if only because it would result in immense bloodshed; the peaceful divorces of Norway and Sweden in 1905 and of the Czech Republic and Slovakia in 1992 are unfortunately not the norm. Although it appears that economic interests have come to dominate nationalist, ethnic, or religious passions among most

industrial democracies, the evidence is far less assuring in other areas, including parts of the former Soviet Union, Central Europe, the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa.

Recent events appear to have created an especially difficult challenge for structural realism; although it provides a parsimonious and elegant theory, its deficiencies are likely to become more rather than less apparent in the post-Cold War world. Its weaknesses in dealing with questions of system change and in specifying policy preferences other than survival and security are likely to be magnified. Moreover, whereas classical realism includes some attractive prescriptive features, neorealism is an especially weak source of policy-relevant theory.

Indeed, some of the prescriptions put forward by neo-realists, such as letting Germany join the nuclear club, or urging Ukraine to keep its nuclear weapons seem reckless. In addition to European economic cooperation, specific events that seem inexplicable by structural realism include Soviet acquiescence in the collapse of its empire and peaceful transformation of the system structure. The persistence of NATO, more than a decade after disappearance of the threat that gave rise to its creation, has also confounded realist predictions that it would not long survive the end of the Cold War; in 1993, Waltz asserted: "NATO's days are not numbered, but its years are." The problem cannot be resolved by definition: asserting that NATO is no longer an alliance because its original adversary has collapsed. Nor can the theory be saved by a tautology: claiming that the Cold War ended, exactly as predicted by structural realism, "only when the bipolar structure of the world disappeared." These developments

are especially telling because structural realism is explicitly touted as a theory of major powers.

Although proponents of realism are not ready to concede that events of the past decade have raised some serious questions about its validity, as distinguished a realist as Robert Tucker has characterized structural realism as "more questionable than ever." More importantly, even though the possibility of war among major powers cannot be dismissed and proliferation may place nuclear weapons into the hands of leaders with little stake in maintaining the status quo, national interests and even conceptions of national security have increasingly come to be defined in ways that transcend the power balances that lie at the core of structural realism. The expanded agenda of national interests, combined with the trend towards greater democracy in many parts of the world, suggests that we are entering an era in which the relative potency of systemic and domestic forces in shaping and constraining international affairs is moving towards the latter. The frequency of internal wars that have become international conflicts-the list includes but is not limited to Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, Afghanistan, Rwanda, Congo, and several parts of the former Yugoslavia-suggests that "failed states" may compete with international aggression as the major source of war.

Such issues as trade, immigration, the environment, and others, can be expected to enhance the impact of domestic actors-including legislatures, public opinion, and ethnic, religious, economic, and perhaps even regional interest groups-while reducing the ability of executives to dominate the process on the

grounds, so frequently invoked during times of war and crises, that the adept pursuit of national interests requires secrecy, flexibility, and the ability to act with speed on the basis of classified information.

If that prognosis is anywhere near the mark, it should enhance the value of decision-making models, that encompass domestic political processes. Whatever their strengths and weaknesses, these models seem less vulnerable to such major events as the end of the Cold War. Most policymaking will continue to be made by leaders in small groups, with supports and constraints from bureaucracies. Moreover, even if nation-states are having to share the global center stage with a plethora of non-state actors, decision-making concepts such as information processing, satisficing, bureaucratic politics, groupthink, and many of the others can be applied equally well to the World Trade Organization, NATO, OPEC, and the like.

Which of these models and approaches are likely to be of interest and utility to the diplomatic historian? Clearly there is no one answer: political scientists are unable to agree on a single multilevel approach to international relations and foreign policy; thus they are hardly in a position to offer a single recommendation to historians. In the absence of the often-sought but always-elusive unified theory of human behaviour that could provide a model for all seasons and all reasons, one must ask at least one further question: a model for what purpose? For example, in some circumstances, such as research on major international crises, it may be important to obtain systematic evidence on the beliefs and other intellectual baggage that key

policymakers bring to their deliberations. Some of the approaches should prove very helpful in this respect. Conversely, there are many other research problems for which the historian would quite properly decide that this type of analysis requires far more effort than could possibly be justified by the benefits to be gained.

Of the systemic approaches described here, little needs to be said about classical realism because its main features, as well as its strengths and weaknesses, are familiar to most diplomatic historians. Those who focus on security issues can hardly neglect its central premises and concepts. Waltz's version of structural realism is likely to have more limited appeal to historians, especially if they take seriously his doubts about being able to incorporate foreign policy into it. It may perhaps serve to raise consciousness about the importance of the systemic context within which international relations take place, but that may not be a major gain; after all, such concepts as "balance of power" have long been a standard part of the diplomatic historian's vocabulary.

The Global-Society/ Complex-Interdependence/ Liberal Institutionalism models will be helpful to historians with an interest in the evolution of the international system and with the growing disjuncture between demands on states and their ability to meet them, the "sovereignty gap." One need not be very venturesome to predict that this gap will grow rather than narrow. Historians of international and transnational organizations are also likely to find useful concepts and insights in these models.

It is much less clear that the Marxist/World System/Dependency theories will provide useful new insights to historians. If one has difficulty in accepting certain assumptions as true by definition—for example, that there has been and is today a single "world capitalist system"—then the kinds of analyses that follow are likely to seem flawed. Most diplomatic historians also would have difficulty in accepting models that relegate the state to a secondary role. Finally, whereas proponents of GS/CI/LI models can point with considerable justification to current events and trends that would appear to make them more rather than less relevant in the future, supporters of the M/WS/D models have a much more difficult task in this respect. The declining legitimacy of Marxism-Leninism as the basis for government does not, of course, necessarily invalidate social science theories that draw upon Marx, Lenin, and their intellectual heirs. It might, however, at least be the occasion for second thoughts, especially because Marx and his followers have always placed a heavy emphasis on an intimate connection between theory and practice.

Although the three decision-making models sometimes include jargon that may be jarring to the historian, many of the underlying concepts are familiar. Much of diplomatic history has traditionally focused on the decisions, actions, and interactions of national leaders who operate in group contexts, such as cabinets or ad hoc advisory groups, and who draw upon the resources of such bureaucracies as foreign and defence ministries or the armed forces. The three types of models typically draw heavily upon psychology, social psychology, organizational theory, and other social sciences; thus for the historian they open some important windows to these fields. For

example, theories and concepts of "information processing" by individuals, groups, and organizations should prove very useful.

Decision-making models may also appeal to diplomatic historians for another important reason. Political scientists who are accustomed to working with fairly accessible "hard" information such as figures on gross national products, defence budgets, battle casualties, alliance commitments, UN votes, trade, investments, and the like, often feel that the data requirements of decision-making models are excessive. This is precisely the area in which the historian has a decided comparative advantage, for the relevant data are usually to be found in the paper or electronic trails left by policymakers, and they are most likely to be unearthed by archival research. For purposes of organization this thesis has focused on some major distinctions between theoretical perspectives. This should not be read, however, as ruling out efforts to build bridges between them, as urged in several recent thesis. Perhaps the appropriate point on which to conclude this thesis is to reverse the question posed earlier: Ask not only what can the political scientist contribute to the diplomatic historian but ask also what can the diplomatic historian contribute to the political scientist. At the very least political scientists could learn a great deal about the validity of their own models if historians would use them and offer critical assessments of their strengths and limitations.

Chapter 5

Factors Determining Foreign Policy

Understanding the Foreign policy

A country's foreign policy, also called the foreign relations policy, consists of self-interest strategies chosen by the state to safeguard its national interests and to achieve its goals within international relations milieu. The approaches are strategically employed to interact with other countries. In recent times, due to the deepening level of globalization and transnational activities, the states will also have to interact with non-state actors. The aforesaid interaction is evaluated and monitored in attempts to maximize benefits of multilateral international cooperation. Since the national interests are paramount, foreign policies are designed by the government through high-level decision making processes. National interests accomplishment can occur as a result of peaceful cooperation with other nations, or through exploitation. Usually, creating foreign policy is the job of the head of government and the foreign minister. In some countries the legislature also has considerable oversight.

Basic Objectives and Principles of Foreign Policy

Preservation of national interest, achievement of world peace, disarmament, independence for Afro-Asian nations have been

important objectives of India's foreign policy. These objectives are sought to be achieved through some principles *viz.* Panchsheel; nonalignment; anti-colonialism, anti-imperialism, anti-racism, and strengthening the UN. It would be befitting to expand these principles.

Panchsheel

Nehru was a believer in world peace. He understood the linkage between peace for development and survival of mankind. He had seen the destruction caused by the two world wars and therefore realised that for the progress of a nation a long spell of peace was needed. In its absence social and economic priorities relating to development tend to get pushed to the background. The production of nuclear weapons strengthened Nehru's faith in the peaceful philosophy even more. Hence he gave utmost importance to world peace in his policy planning. India's desired peaceful and friendly relations with all countries, particularly the big powers and the neighbouring nations, while signing an agreement with China, on April 28, 1954, India advocated adherence to five guiding principles known as Panchsheel for the conduct of bilateral relations.

It includes the following:

- Mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty.
- Mutual non-aggression
- Mutual non-interference in each other's internal affairs
- Equality and mutual benefit

- Peaceful co-existence.

The Panchsheel agreement enumerates best the principles of peaceful co-existence with neighbours. It is an important component of India's foreign policy.

Non-alignment

Non-alignment has been regarded as the most important feature of India's foreign policy. Non alignment aimed to maintain national independence in foreign affairs by not joining any military alliance formed by the USA and Soviet Union in the aftermath of the Second World War. Non-alignment was neither neutrality nor non-involvement nor isolationism. It was a dynamic concept which meant not committing to any military bloc but taking an independent stand on international issues just as to the merits of each case. The policy of non-alignment won many supporters in the developing countries as it provided an opportunity to them for protecting their sovereignty as also retaining their freedom of action during the tension ridden cold war period.

India played an important role in forging the non-aligned movement. The concept of NAM emerged through a gradual process. Nehru took the initiative to convene the Asian Relations Conference in New Delhi in 1947. Later on a Conference, of 29 countries of Asia and Africa was held in Bandung in 1955.

This was the first gathering of its kind which pledged to work together for colonial liberation, peace, cultural, economic and

political cooperation. Bandung to Belgrade in 1961 where the first NAM conference was held was a logical process to project an alternative to cold war bloc politics and assertion of newly independent countries of their independent and sovereign rights.

Cold War was intense rivalry between USA and Soviet Union without fighting a direct war to attract allies in Africa, Asia and Latin America. It started soon after the Second World War and continued for forty five years. These two big countries became two opposite poles known as East and West. The world politics revolved around these two poles. Thus the world became bipolar.

Among the non-aligned, Nehru had evolved special relationship with President Tito of Yugoslavia and Nasser of Egypt. These three are regarded as the founding fathers of the Non-Aligned Movement. The non-aligned movement was a group of the newly independent states who refused to accept the dictates of the former colonial masters and decided to act just as to their own judgement on issues of international concern.

Non-aligned India and the World movement is anti-imperialist in approach. India as the prime architect of non-alignment and as one of the leading members of the non-aligned movement has taken an active part in its growth. The Non-Aligned Movement is providing all member states, regardless of size and importance, an opportunity to participate in global decision making and world politics. India hosted the Seventh NAM Summit at New Delhi in 1983. India hoped NAM take up the cause of development, disarmament and the Palestine question.

Since NAM was a product of the cold war scenario and the bipolar world, many scholars have questioned the relevance of NAM after the end of cold war and demise of the Soviet Union. However, even in the present scenario NAM has a significant role to play, First, with the disintegration of Soviet Union, the world faces threat from unipolar world. The NAM can act as a check against US dominance. Secondly the developed and developing world are divided over several economic issues. The NAM remains a very relevant forum for third world countries to engage the developed nations in a productive dialogue.

Moreover, the NAM can prove to be powerful instrument for South-South cooperation. Such a thing is essential if the third world countries are to increase their bargaining power vis-a-vis the developed world. India continues to take active part in the non-aligned movement even after the end of cold war. Finally, the developing countries united under the forum of NAM have to fight for the reform of UN and change it just as to the requirements of 21st century.

Anti Imperialism, Anti Racism, Anti Colonialism

India has always opposed colonialism and racism. Whenever any injustice happened, India raised her voice, for instance in favour of Indonesia's nationality fighting the Dutch colonialism in 1947, against South Africa's illegal occupation of Namibia and the infamous apartheid policy in South Africa India fully supported inclusion of communist China in the United Nations.

Strengthening of UN

India has always viewed UN as a vehicle for peace and for peaceful change in world politics. Apart from this, India has always expected UN to actively involve countries to moderate their differences through talks or negotiations. Further, India has advocated active role for UN in development effort of Third World countries. India has pleaded for a common united front of the third world countries in the UN. It believes that the nonaligned world by virtue of its massive number could play a constructive and meaningful role in the UN by stopping the superpowers from using this world body for their own designs. As early as 1950 India linked the reduction of armaments with the larger goal of development.

The UN has in fact played a key role in preserving world peace by helping in the decolonization process, by providing humanitarian and developmental assistance and through peacekeeping. Decolonization - refers to achievement of independence from colonial rule. After the Second World War many colonies of achieved freedom in Asia and Africa.

Major Concerns in India's Foreign Policy in the Post Cold War Period

The end of cold war in 1989 has brought about significant changes in the international scene and hence new policy problems for the various states in the developing world including India. The new situation is made by greater uncertainty and complexity.

For India, disintegration of the Soviet Union has meant uncertainty on several aspects *viz.* supply of weapons system, supply of spare parts, diplomatic support on Kashmir and other politico-strategic issues in and outside the United Nations and as a counter weight to US in South Asia. During the last one decade and a half international politics has undergone major changes.

The cold war has ended, the world has become unipolar, a number of states have disintegrated, cold war military blocs have lost their significance, some such blocs have dissolved and new regional economic blocs are shaping up. Globalisation has given rise to new set of problems such as terrorism, money laundering, proliferation of weapons, global warming etc. These problems are not endemic to any region but affect all the countries to some extent or the other. This has forced many nation states which were hitherto enemies to cooperate with each other to solve problems which are universal in nature. In this changed international scenario it has become imperative for UN to restructure and reform itself if it is to effectively respond to emerging challenges.

Militancy in Kashmir has emerged as the foremost challenge to our foreign policy. Pakistan and the Western countries blamed India for violating human rights and denial of rights to self determination. Gradually, India brought the situation under control.

Because of the Kashmir dispute, India's relations with Pakistan sharply deteriorated. India accused Pakistan of fanning trouble through cross border terrorism in Kashmir and other parts of our

country. India conducted nuclear weapon tests in 1998, followed by Pakistan's tests. Pakistan resorted to further mischief by secretly sending its soldiers into Kargil in India and the World order to cut off the Kashmir valley from the rest of India. India handled the challenge firmly and effectively. Now engaging Pakistan in a constructive and composite dialogue process remains a challenge to India's foreign policy, because there is a great deal of push from the United States Spread of terrorism to corners beyond Kashmir is a challenge as well as opportunity for our foreign policy now a days. India is interested in forging anti-terrorism coalition with as many countries as possible.

Keeping old friendship and looking for new friendships is another challenge for our foreign policy after the cold war has ended. For example, India is interested in strengthening its relations without damaging its relations with Arab countries. Similarly, India's foreign policy is tackling new tasks like deepening economic and security cooperation with the United States, while at the same time opposing unilateral actions against Iraq and Yugoslavia. Finally, India is realizing the growing importance of economic aspects of foreign policy. Hence, it is trying to establish a new basis for its relations with neighbouring countries in South Asia, China and the South East Asian counties.

India and the United Nations

The United Nations which came into being on Oct. 24, 1945 has been the most important international organisation since the Second World War. The formal basis for UN activities is the UN charter. The UN has a vital role in world affairs. For more than

fifty years UN has helped to manage relations between states and regulate a broad range of international activities. It has worked to protect the security of people and promote peace and development. One way in which UN has contributed to world peace is by taking up the cause of disarmament India has also contributed immensely to UN's disarmament efforts. Disarmament is limitation, reduction and possible elimination of dangerous weapons.

Since independence, India has consistently pursued the objective of global disarmament based on the principles of non-discrimination. Given the destructive capacity of nuclear weapons, India has always believed that a world free of nuclear weapons would enhance global security. Thus India has always advocated that highest priority be given to nuclear disarmament as a first step towards general and complete disarmament.

India has contributed to UN significantly on disarmament in terms of ideas, resolutions, initiatives and bridging differences through action plans. In 1948, India had proposed limiting the use of atomic energy to peaceful purposes and elimination of nuclear weapons from national arsenals. In 1950, India suggested formation of a UN Peace Fund created through peaceful reduction of arms and directing the amount thus released towards development purposes. In 1954, India advocated the cause for a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty. India was the first to become party to partial Test Ban Treaty in 1963. Hence India strongly and consistently refused to join the Treaty. In 1964, India took the initiative to place the item 'non-proliferation of weapons' on UN agenda. However, the purpose was defeated by

the carried that a large numbering of counties from going nuclear, without firm restrictions on the few nuclear weapon countries activities Nuclear Non-proliferation Treaty Although our country allged to the oppose to problem.

In 1984, India launched a Six-Nation Five Continent Peace Initiative along with Argentina, Greece, Mexico, Sweden and Tanzania. Four years later. In 1988, Rajiv Gandhi proposed an Action Plan for ushering in a nuclear weapon free and nonviolent world order. The Action Plan envisaged a binding commitment by all nations to the elimination of nuclear weapons in stages by 2010.

India is also an original signatory to the Chemical Weapons Convention, having signed it on Jan. 14, 1993 and was among the first 65 countries to have ratified the treaty. In 1993 India sponsored a resolution on comprehensive test ban along with the US within the overall framework of advancing towards nuclear disarmament. India was distressed when final version of the CTBT was rushed through without consenses. And it failed to address the security reasons of India.

Hence it bravely stood against the steadlity fashion in which some tests use canned while sophisticated nuclear tests were not in a way, India's conduct of nuclear tests in 1998 could we linked to the unfair framework of CTBT, though many initially misunderstood India's tests as a negative development for disarmament; India pledged to continue to work for inaugural and non-discriminaly nuclear disarmament.

India's Participation in UN Peacekeeping India and the World

India's history of participation in UN peacekeeping operations is a long one. India's contribution has been described as excellent by many political observers. In UN. India's contribution has been acknowledged by members of the international communities. Peace keeping stands for prevention, containment and termination of hostilities between or within states through the non offensive activities of multinational forces of soldiers, police and civilian people sent unto the authority of the United Nations with the consent of the countries concerned. Peacekeeping nations changed in its scope and nature just as to needs of a conflict situation.

India has taken part in 35 of UN peacekeeping operations in four continents. Its most significant contribution has been to peace and stability in Africa and Asia. Presently India is ranked as the largest troop contributor to UN.

The saga of India's role in UN peace keeping began with the establishment of the United Nation's Emergency Force in the Gaza strip and the Sinai in 1956 after Israeli war against Egypt ended. The Congo in Africa benefitted significantly from troop presence. India's contributed to keep unity and integrity of that history in 1960s.

After the end of cold war, India's contribution to UN peacekeeping remains significant equally, if not more, military personal at the request of the United Nations Secretery General

to Angola, Cambodia, Somalia, El Salvador and Sierra Leone etc. Many of these countries were victims of chaos caused by civil wars. No government machinery collapsed or was discredited. India sent not just troops, but police, doctors, engineers and administrators.

India's Case for a Permanent Seat in the Security Council

As you already know, the efficiency of peace maintenance in the world depends on the effectiveness of the Security Council but the Council has suffered in this regard due to its outdated, unchanged membership. Presently the permanent membership of the Security Council is confined to US, Russia, Great Britain, France and China.

However, such composition of the Security Council does not take into account the current global power configuration which has changed since the days when these countries were inducted as permanent members. Since India has emerged as the fourth fastest growing economy and also because of the leadership it has provided in all international fora, its contribution to UN peacekeeping, its track record in espousing the cause of the third world, India has a strong case for a permanent seat in the Security Council. We are getting support from many friendly countries. A final decision on the matter is likely to take some time, because of its complexity.

National interest

The national interest, often referred to by the French expression *raison d'État* is a country's goals and ambitions whether economic, military, or cultural. The concept is an important one in international relations where pursuit of the national interest is the foundation of the realist school.

The national interest of a state is multi-faceted. Primary is the state's survival and security. Also important is the pursuit of wealth and economic growth and power. Many states, especially in modern times, regard the preservation of the nation's culture as of great importance.

History of the Concept

In early human history the national interest was usually viewed as secondary to that of religion or morality. To engage in a war rulers needed to justify the action in these contexts. The first thinker to advocate for the primacy of the national interest is usually considered to be Niccolò Machiavelli.

The practice is first seen as being employed by France under the direction of its Chief Minister Cardinal Richelieu in the Thirty Years' War when it intervened on the Protestant side, despite its own Catholicism, to block the increasing power of the Holy Roman Emperor. At Richelieu's prompting, Jean de Silhon defended the concept of reason of state as "a mean between what conscience permits and affairs require." The notion of the national interest soon came to dominate European politics that

became fiercely competitive over the next centuries. It is a form of reason "born of the calculation and the ruse of men" and makes of the state "a knowing machine, a work of reason"; the state ceases to be derived from the divine order and is henceforth subject to its own particular necessities.

States could now openly embark on wars purely out of self-interest. Mercantilism can be seen as the economic justification of the aggressive pursuit of the national interest.

A foreign policy geared towards pursuing the national interest is the foundation of the realist school of international relations. The realist school reached its greatest heights at the Congress of Vienna with the practice of the balance of powers, which amounted to balancing the national interest of several great and lesser powers.

Metternich was celebrated as the principal artist and theoretician of this balancing but he was simply doing a more or less clean copy of what his predecessor Kaunitz had already done by reversing so many of the traditional Habsburg alliances and building international relations anew on the basis of national interest instead of religion or tradition.

These notions became much criticized after the bloody debacle of the First World War, and some sought to replace the concept of the balance of power with the idea of collective security, whereby all members of the League of Nations would "consider an attack upon one as an attack upon all," thus deterring the use of violence forevermore. The League of Nations did not work,

partially because the United States refused to join and partially because, in practice, nations did not always find it "in the national interest" to deter each other from the use of force.

The events of World War II lead to a rebirth of Realist and then Neo-realist thought, as international relations theorists re-emphasized the role of power in global governance. Many IR theorists blamed the weakness of the League of Nations for its idealism and ineffectiveness at preventing war, even as they blamed mercantilist beggar thy neighbour policies for the creation of fascist states in Germany and Italy. With hegemonic stability theory, the concept of the U.S. national interest was expanded to include the maintenance of open sea lanes and the maintenance and expansion of free trade.

Concept Today

Today, the concept of "the national interest" is often associated with political Realists who wish to differentiate their policies from "idealistic" policies that seek either to inject morality into foreign policy or promote solutions that rely on multilateral institutions which might weaken the independence of the state.

As considerable disagreement exists in every country over what is or is not in "the national interest," the term is as often invoked to justify isolationist and pacifistic policies as to justify interventionist or warlike policies.

The majority of the jurists consider that the "national interest" is incompatible with the "rule of law". Regarding this, Antonino

Troianiello has said that national interest and a state subject to the rule of law are not absolutely incompatible: "While the notion of state reason comes first as a theme of study in political science, it is a very vague concept in law and has never been an object of systematic study. This obvious lack of interest is due to a deliberate epistemological choice—a form of positivism applied to legal science; and as a result legal science affirms its autonomy regarding other social sciences while constituting with exactness its own object—law—in order to describe it. In doing so it implies deterministic causes which have an influence on its descriptive function. This method which puts aside state reason is not without any consequence: the fact that state reason is not taken into account by legal science is to be integrated within a global rejection of a description of law as presented in political science. A fundamental dynamic in modern constitutionalism, "the seizure of the political phenomenon by law" is all the more remarkable when it claims a scientific value, thus a neutrality aiming at preventing all objection. This convergence of legal science and constitutionalism has the tautological character of a rhetorical discourse in which law is simultaneously the subject and the object of the discourse on law.

Having as a basis state reason, it allows a reflexion on the legitimacy of power and authority of modern Western societies; this in connexion with the representations which make it and which it makes "state reason and public law".

Elements of national power

National power is composed of various elements, also referred to as instruments or attributes; these may be grouped into two categories based on their applicability and origin-"national" and "social".

National:

- Geography.
- Resources.
- Population.

Social:

- Economic.
- Political.
- Military.
- Psychological.
- Informational.

Geography

Important facets of geography such as location, climate, topography and size play a major role in the ability of a nation to acquire national power. Location has an important bearing on foreign policy of a nation. The relation between foreign policy and geographic location gave rise to the discipline of geopolitics.

The presence of a water obstacle provided protection to nation states such as Great Britain, Japan and USA and allowed Japan

to follow isolationist policies. The presence of large accessible seaboard also permitted these nations to build strong navies and expand their territories peacefully or by conquest. In contrast, Poland with no obstacle to separate from its powerful neighbours even lost its independent existence as a nation being partitioned among the Kingdom of Prussia, the Russian Empire, and Austria from 1795 onwards till it regained its independence in 1918. Climate affects the productivity of Russian agriculture as the majority of the nation is located in latitudes well north of those providing ideal conditions for farming. Conversely, Russia's size permitted it to trade space for time during the Great Patriotic War.

Polity, Security And Foreign Policy In Contemporary India

Sixty years ago, at the dawn of independence, modern India's first Prime Minister and Foreign Minister acknowledged the importance of domestic forces in the shaping of a country's security environment and foreign policy. This stage confronts a paradox: India is riven with internal conflicts that challenge state legitimacy, and levels of routine violence, often politically manipulated, that astound foreign observers. These sources of insecurity sometimes flow across its international borders, in both directions. And yet, India presents to the world, altogether credibly, the face of a rising economic and geostrategic power. It is today, well into India's seventh decade, hard to question its overall national cohesion as an international actor. Indeed, its pluralism, diversity, democratic practices and multicultural make-up are all seen internationally globally as elements of

strength rather than weakness, as proof of resilience rather than fragility. But viewed through a regional lens, the permeability of India's borders with several of its immediate neighbours combined with India's constitutionally guaranteed freedoms and the free flow of potential security threats of various sorts across these boundaries continues to preoccupy Indian policy-makers. Regional insecurities are exacerbated to a great extent by the persistence of domestic challenges to India's national security and foreign policy. India's domestic challenges often manifest themselves in the political sphere; hence the focus of this stage is on the Indian polity, especially the way it interacts with India's society and economy. In addressing the incongruity between India's continuing domestic insecurity and growing international stature, this stage argues that there is in fact no real tension between the two trends.

The social and political factors that complicate India's security environment have also served to evolve its foreign policy and policymaking in a way that is consonant with its current great power ambitions. The Indian polity may not have been able to resolve its domestic problems with a great degree of success, but it has had less difficulty in promoting Indian interests in international affairs.

The stage is divided into three main parts. First, we briefly review the evolution of India's polity and foreign policy since 1947 and address the main features of Indian society relevant to our subject, focusing particularly but not exclusively on the sources of insecurity arising from India's polity and from its development model, and discussing their relevance to India's international

relations. Second, we consider two major categories of domestic factors that complicate India's security environment - identity and the institutions of India's security and foreign policy establishment. Finally, we develop an account of how the development of India's polity has influenced the direction of its foreign policy towards pragmatism and a great power ideology rooted in economic diplomacy. The stage concludes that, in spite of tensions often rooted in security concerns with several of its neighbours, India is re-focusing its foreign policy beyond these regional concerns to the global level, seeing its interests today as more globally economic and geo-strategic than a foreign policy focused primarily on neighbours would allow. This is both encouraging for South Asia, but in some senses worrying for India's neighbours as the sub-region's anchor and power-house is moving beyond them to engage more than in the past with the great powers of the day. The sustainability of this arrangement depends on the extent to which India can rediscover a moral basis for projecting its power and influence globally.