International Politics and Postwar Relations

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Contents

Chapter 1

Introduction

International relations and politics

International relations (IR) or international affairs, depending on academic institution, is either a field of political science, an interdisciplinary academic field similar to global studies, or an entirely independent academic discipline in which students take a variety of internationally focused courses in social science and humanities disciplines.

In both cases, the field studies relationships between *political entities* (polities) such as states, sovereign states, empires, inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), international non-governmental organizations (INs), other non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and multinational corporations (MNCs), and the wider world-systems produced by this interaction. International relations is an academic and a public policy field, and so can be positive and normative, because it analyses and formulates the foreign policy of a given state.

As political activity, international relations dates from the time of the Greek historian Thucydides (c.•460–395 BC), and, in the early 20th century, became a discrete academic field (no. 5901 in the 4-digit UNESCO Nomenclature) within political science. In practice, international relations and international affairs forms a separate academic program or field from political

science, and the courses taught therein are highly interdisciplinary.

For example, international relations draws from the fields of: technology and engineering, economics, communication studies, history, international law, demography, philosophy, geography, social work, sociology, anthropology, criminology, psychology, gender studies, cultural studies, culturology, and diplomacy. The scope of international relations comprehends globalization, diplomatic relations, state sovereignty, international security, ecological sustainability, nuclear proliferation, nationalism, economic development, global finance, as well as terrorism and organized crime, human security, foreign interventionism, and human rights, as well, as, more recently, comparative religion. The history of international relations can be traced back to thousands of years ago; Barry Buzan and Richard Little, for example, consider the interaction of ancient Sumerian city-states, starting in 3,500 BC, as the first fully-fledged international system.

The history of international relations based on sovereign states is often traced back to the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, a stepping stone in the development of the modern state system. Prior to this the European medieval organization of political authority was based on a vaguely hierarchical religious order. Contrary to popular belief, Westphalia still embodied layered systems of sovereignty, especially within the Holy Roman Empire. More than the Peace of Westphalia, the Treaty of

Utrecht of 1713 is thought to reflect an emerging norm that sovereigns had no internal equals within a defined territory and no external superiors as the ultimate authority within the territory's sovereign borders.

The centuries of roughly 1500 to 1789 saw the rise of the independent, sovereign states, the institutionalization of diplomacy and armies. The French Revolution added to this the new idea that not princes or an oligarchy, but the citizenry of a state, defined as the nation, should be defined as sovereign. Such a state in which the nation is sovereign would thence be termed a nation-state (as opposed to a monarchy or a religious state). The term republic increasingly became its synonym. An alternative model of the nation-state was developed in reaction to the French republican concept by the Germans and others, who instead of giving the citizenry sovereignty, kept the princes and nobility, but defined nation-statehood in ethnic-linguistic terms, establishing the rarely if ever fulfilled ideal that all people speaking one language should belong to one state only. The same claim to sovereignty was made for both forms of nation-state. (It is worth noting that in Europe today, few states conform to either definition of nation-state: many continue to have royal sovereigns, and hardly any are ethnically homogeneous.)

The particular European system supposing the sovereign equality of states was exported to the Americas, Africa, and Asia via colonialism and the "standards of civilization". The contemporary international system was finally established

through decolonization during the Cold War. However, this is somewhat over-simplified. While the nation-state system is considered "modern", many states have not incorporated the system and are termed "pre-modern".

Further, a handful of states have moved beyond insistence on full sovereignty, and can be considered "post-modern". The ability of contemporary IR discourse to explain the relations of these different types of states is disputed. "Levels of analysis" is a way of looking at the international system, which includes the individual level, the domestic state as a unit, the international level of transnational and intergovernmental affairs, and the global level.

What is explicitly recognized as international relations theory was not developed until after World War I, and is dealt with in more detail below. IR theory, however, has a long tradition of drawing on the work of other social sciences. The use of capitalizations of the "I" and "R" in international relations aims to distinguish the academic discipline of international relations from the phenomena of international relations. Many cite Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* (6th century BC), Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* (5th century BC), Chanakya's *Arthashastra* (4th century BC), as the inspiration for realist theory, with Hobbes' *Leviathan* and Machiavelli's *The Prince* providing further elaboration.

Similarly, liberalism draws upon the work of Kant and Rousseau, with the work of the former often being cited as the

first elaboration of democratic peace theory. Though contemporary human rights is considerably different from the type of rights envisioned under natural law, Francisco de Vitoria, Hugo Grotius and John Locke offered the first accounts of universal entitlement to certain rights on the basis of common humanity. In the 20th century, in addition to contemporary theories of liberal internationalism, Marxism has been a foundation of international relations.

Study of international relations

nternational relations as a distinct field of study began in Britain. IR emerged as a formal academic discipline in 1919 with the founding of the first IR professorship: the Woodrow Wilson Chair at Aberystwyth, University of Wales (now Aberystwyth University), endowed by David Davies. Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service is the oldest international relations faculty in the United States, founded in 1919. In the early 1920s, the London School of Economics' department of international relations was founded at the behest of Nobel Peace Prize winner Philip Noel-Baker: this was the first institute to offer a wide range of degrees in the field. This was rapidly followed by establishment of IR at universities in the US and in Geneva, Switzerland. The creation of the posts of Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at LSE and at Oxford gave further impetus to the academic study of international relations. Furthermore, the International History department at LSE developed a focus on

the history of IR in the early modern, colonial and Cold War periods.

The first university entirely dedicated to the study of IR was the Graduate Institute of International Studies (now the Graduate Institute of International and Development Studies), which was founded in 1927 to form diplomats associated to the League of Nations. The Committee on International Relations at the University of Chicago was the first to offer a graduate degree, in 1928. In 1965, Glendon College and the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs were the first institutions in Canada to offer an undergraduate and a graduate program in international studies and affairs, respectively. In 2012, Ramon Llull University initiated the first International Relations degree in Barcelona, fully in English.

Theory of International Relations

International relations theory is the study of international relations (IR) from a theoretical perspective. It attempts to provide a conceptual framework upon which international relations can be analyzed. Ole Holsti describes international relations theories as acting like pairs of coloured sunglasses that allow the wearer to see only salient events relevant to the theory; e.g., an adherent of realism may completely disregard an event that a constructivist might pounce upon as crucial, and vice versa. The three most prominent theories are realism, liberalism and constructivism.

International relations theories can be divided into "positivist/rationalist" theories which focus on a principally state-level analysis, and "post-positivist/reflectivist" ones which incorporate expanded meanings of security, ranging from class, to gender, to postcolonial security. Many often conflicting ways of thinking exist in IR theory, including constructivism, institutionalism, Marxism, neo-Gramscianism, and others. However, two positivist schools of thought are most prevalent: realism and liberalism. Constructivism, however, is increasingly becoming mainstream.

The study of International relations as theory can be traced to E. H. Carr's *The Twenty Years' Crisis* which was published in 1939 and to Hans Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations* published in 1948. International relations as a discipline is believed to have emerged after the First World War with the establishment of a Chair of International Relations at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. Early international relations scholarship in the interwar years focused on the need for the balance of power system to be replaced with a system of collective security. These thinkers were later described as "Idealists". The leading critique of this school of thinking was the "realist" analysis offered by Carr.

However, a more recent study by David Long and Brian Schmidt in 2005, offers a revisionist account of the origins of the field International Relations. They claim, that the history of the field can be traced back to late 19th Century imperialism and internationalism. The fact that the history of

the field is presented by "great debates", such as the realist-idealist debate does not correspond with the historic evidence found in earlier works: "We should once and for all dispense with the outdated anachronistic artifice of the debate between the idealists and realists as the dominant framework for and understanding the history of the field". Their revisionist account claims that up until 1918, International Relations already existed in the form of colonial administration, race science and race development.

Explanatory and constitutive approaches in international relations theory is a distinction made when classifying international relations theories. Explanatory theories are ones which see the world as something external to theorize about it. A constitutive theory is one which believes that theories actually help construct the world.

Realism

Realism is an important school of thought in international relations theory, theoretically formalising the realpolitik statesmanship of early modern Europe. Although a highly diverse body of thought, it can be thought of as unified by the belief that world politics ultimately is always and necessarily a field of conflict among actors pursuing power. Crudely, realists are of three kinds in what they take the source of ineliminable conflict to be. Classical realists believe that it follows from human nature, neorealists focus upon the structure of the anarchic state system, and neoclassical realists believe that it

is a result of a combination of the two and certain domestic variables. Realists also disagree about what kind of action states ought to take to navigate world politics, dividing between (although most realists fall outside the two groups) defensive realism and offensive realism. Realists have also claimed that a realist tradition of thought is evident within the history of political thought all the way back to antiquity, including Thucydides, Thomas Hobbes and Niccolò Machiavelli.

Jonathan Haslam from the University of Cambridge characterizes Realism as "a spectrum of ideas." Regardless of which definition is used, the theories of realism revolve around four central propositions:

- That states are the central actors in international politics rather than individuals or international organizations,
- That the international political system is anarchic as there is no supranational authority that can enforce rules over the states,
- That the actors in the international political system are rational as their actions maximize their own self-interest, and
- That all states desire power so that they can ensure their own self-preservation.

Realism is often associated with Realpolitik as both are based on the management of the pursuit, possession, and application of power. *Realpolitik*, however, is an older prescriptive guideline limited to policy-making (like foreign policy), while

Realism is a particular paradigm, or wider theoretical and methodological framework, aimed at describing, explaining and, eventually, predicting events in the international relations domain. The theories of Realism are contrasted by the cooperative ideals of Liberalism.

Common assumptions

Realism is a tradition of international theory centered upon four propositions.

1. The international system is anarchic.
    - No actor exists above states, capable of regulating their interactions; states must arrive at relations with other states on their own, rather than it being dictated to them by some higher controlling entity.
    - The international system exists in a state of constant antagonism.
2. States are the most important actors.
3. All states within the system are unitary, rational actors
    - States tend to pursue self-interest.
    - Groups strive to attain as many resources as possible.
4. The primary concern of all states is survival.

- States build up military to survive, which may lead to a security dilemma.

In summary, realists think that Mankind is not inherently benevolent but rather self-centered and competitive. This perspective, which is shared by theorists such as Thomas Hobbes, views human nature as egocentric (not necessarily selfish) and conflictual unless there exist conditions under which humans may coexist. It is also disposed of the notion that an individual's intuitive nature is made up of anarchy. In regards to self-interest, these individuals are self-reliant and are motivated in seeking more power. They are also believed to be fearful. This view contrasts with the approach of liberalism to international relations.

The state emphasizes an interest in accumulating power to ensure security in an anarchic world. Power is a concept primarily thought of in terms of material resources necessary to induce harm or coerce other states (to fight and win wars). The use of power places an emphasis on coercive tactics being acceptable to either accomplish something in the national interest or avoid something inimical to the national interest.

The state is the most important actor under realism. It is unitary and autonomous because it speaks and acts with one voice. The power of the state is understood in terms of its military capabilities.

A key concept under realism is the international distribution of power referred to as system polarity. Polarity refers to the

number of blocs of states that exert power in an international system. A multipolar system is composed of three or more blocs, a bipolar system is composed of two blocs, and a unipolar system is dominated by a single power or hegemon.

Under unipolarity realism predicts that states will band together to oppose the hegemon and restore a balance of power. Although all states seek hegemony under realism as the only way to ensure their own security, other states in the system are incentivised to prevent the emergence of a hegemon through balancing.

States employ the rational model of decision making by obtaining and acting upon complete and accurate information. The state is sovereign and guided by a national interest defined in terms of power. Since the only constraint of the international system is anarchy, there is no international authority and states are left to their own devices to ensure their own security.

Realists believe that Sovereign states are the principal actors in the international system. International institutions, non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations, individuals and other sub-state or trans-state actors are viewed as having little independent influence. States are inherently aggressive (offensive realism) and/or obsessed with security (defensive realism), and that territorial expansion is only constrained by opposing power(s). This aggressive build-up, however, leads to a security dilemma whereby increasing

one's security may bring along even greater instability as an opposing power builds up its own arms in response (an arms race). Thus, security becomes a zero-sum game where only *relative gains* can be made.

Realists believe that there are no universal principles with which all states may guide their actions. Instead, a state must always be aware of the actions of the states around it and must use a pragmatic approach to resolve problems as they arise.

Realism in statecraft

- Henry Kissinger
- Zbigniew Brzezinski
- Brent Scowcroft

The ideas behind George F. Kennan's work as a diplomat and diplomatic historian remain relevant to the debate over American foreign policy, which since the 19th century has been characterized by a shift from the Founding Fathers' realist school to the idealistic or Wilsonian school of international relations. In the realist tradition, security is based on the principle of a balance of power and the reliance on morality as the sole determining factor in statecraft is considered impractical. According to the Wilsonian approach, on the other hand, the spread of democracy abroad as a foreign policy is key and morals are universally valid. During the Presidency of Bill Clinton, American diplomacy reflected the Wilsonian school to such a degree that those in favor of the realist

approach likened Clinton's policies to social work. According to Kennan, whose concept of American diplomacy was based on the realist approach, such moralism without regard to the realities of power and the national interest is self-defeating and will lead to the erosion of power, to America's detriment.

Realists often hold that statesmen tend towards realism whereas realism is deeply unpopular among the public. When statesmen take actions that divert from realist policies, academic realists often argue that this is due to distortions that stem from domestic politics. However, some research suggests that realist policies are actually popular among the public whereas elites are more beholden to liberal ideas.

Historical branches and antecedents

hile Realism as a formal discipline in international relations did not arrive until World War II, its primary assumptions have been expressed in earlier writings:

Modern realism began as a serious field of research in the United States during and after World War II. This evolution was partly fueled by European war migrants like Hans Morgenthau.

- George F. Kennan – containment
- Nicholas Spykman – geostrategy, containment
- Herman Kahn – nuclear strategy
- E. H. Carr

Classical realism

Classical realism states that it is fundamentally the nature of humans that pushes states and individuals to act in a way that places interests over ideologies. Classical realism is an ideology defined as the view that the "drive for power and the will to dominate [that are] held to be fundamental aspects of human nature".

Liberal realism or the English school or rationalism

The English School holds that the international system, while anarchical in structure, forms a "society of states" where common norms and interests allow for more order and stability than that which may be expected in a strict realist view. Prominent English School writer Hedley Bull's 1977 classic, *The Anarchical Society*, is a key statement of this position.

Prominent liberal realists:

- Hedley Bull – argued for both the existence of an international society of states and its perseverance even in times of great systemic upheaval, meaning regional or so-called "world wars"
- Martin Wight
- Barry Buzan

Neorealism or structural realism

Neorealism derives from classical realism except that instead of human nature, its focus is predominantly on the anarchic

structure of the *international system*. States are primary actors because there is no political monopoly on force existing above any sovereign.

While states remain the principal actors, greater attention is given to the forces above and below the states through levels of analysis or structure-agency debate. The international system is seen as a *structure* acting on the state with individuals below the level of the state acting as *agency* on the state as a whole.

While neorealism shares a focus on the *international system* with the English School, neorealism differs in the emphasis it places on the permanence of conflict. To ensure state security, states must be on constant preparation for conflict through economic and military build-up.

Prominent neorealists:

- Robert J. Art – neorealism
- Robert Gilpin – hegemonic theory
- Joanne Gowa – neorealism
- Robert Jervis – defensive realism
- John Mearsheimer – offensive realism
- Kenneth Waltz – structural realism
- Stephen Walt – defensive realism

Neoclassical realism

Neoclassical Realism can be seen as the third generation of realism, coming after the classical authors of the first wave

(Thucydides, Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes), and the neorealists (esp. Kenneth Waltz). Its designation of "neoclassical", then, has a double meaning:

1. It offers the classics a renaissance;
2. It is a synthesis of the neorealist and the classical realist approaches.

Gideon Rose is responsible for coining the term in a book review he wrote.

The primary motivation underlying the development of neoclassical realism was the fact that neorealism was only useful to explain political outcomes (classified as being 'theories of international politics'), but had nothing to offer about particular states' behavior (or 'theories of foreign policy'). The basic approach, then, was for these authors to "refine, not refute, Kenneth Waltz", by adding domestic intervening variables between systemic incentives and a state's foreign policy decision. Thus, the basic theoretical architecture of Neoclassical Realism is:

Distribution of power in the international system (independent variable) >>>

Domestic perception of the system and/or domestic incentives (intervening variable) >>>

Foreign policy decision (dependent variable)

While neoclassical realism has only been used for theories of foreign policy so far, Randall Schweller notes that it could be useful to explain certain types of political outcomes as well.

Neoclassical realism is particularly appealing from a research standpoint because it still retains a lot of the theoretical rigor that Waltz has brought to realism, but at the same time can easily incorporate a content-rich analysis, since its main method for testing theories is the process-tracing of case studies.

Prominent neoclassical realists:

- Randall Schweller
- Thomas J. Christensen
- William Wohlforth
- Aaron Friedberg
- Norrin Ripsman
- Fareed Zakaria
- Tom Dyson
- Jonathan D. Kirshner

Left realism

Several scholars, including Mark Laffey at the School of Oriental and African Studies, and Ronald Osborn at the University of Southern California, have argued for the idea of a "Left Realism" in IR theory with particular reference to the work of Noam Chomsky. Both Laffey and Osborn have suggested in separate articles in *Review of International*

Studies that Chomsky's understanding of power in the international sphere reflects the analytical assumptions of classical realism combined with a radical moral, normative or "Left" critique of the state.

Realist constructivism

Some see a complementarity between realism and constructivism. Samuel Barkin, for instance, holds that "realist constructivism" can fruitfully "study the relationship between normative structures, the carriers of political morality, and uses of power" in ways that existing approaches do not. Similarly, Jennifer Sterling-Folker has argued that theoretical synthesis helps explanations of international monetary policy by combining realism's emphasis of an anarchic system with constructivism's insights regarding important factors from the domestic level. Scholars such as Oded Löwenheim and Ned Lebow have also been associated with realist constructivism.

Criticisms

Democratic peace theory advocates also that realism is not applicable to democratic states' relations with each another, as their studies claim that such states do not go to war with one another. However, Realists and proponents of other schools have critiqued both this claim and the studies which appear to support it, claiming that its definitions of "war" and

"democracy" must be tweaked in order to achieve the desired result.

Hegemonic peace

Robert Gilpin developed the theory of hegemonic stability theory within the realist framework, but limited it to the economic field. Niall Ferguson remarked that the theory has offered insights into the way that economic power works, but neglected the military and cultural aspects of power. Historian Max Ostrovsky applied the theory to political field. Comparing different civilizations, he found that the core of the realist paradigm—the balance of power—was in world history exception from the rule. The rule was unipolar orders ranging from hegemonies to empires. Persistent worldwide hegemony and empire are both possible and probable. There is a causal link between democracy and peace but the link is reverse: peace causes democracy, while the cause of peace is the unipolar distribution of power and the hegemonic world order.

Federalism

The term refers to the theory or advocacy of federal political orders, where final authority is divided between sub-units and a centre. Unlike a unitary state, sovereignty is constitutionally split between at least two territorial levels so that units at each level have final authority and can act independently of the others in some area. Citizens thus have political obligations to two authorities. The allocation of authority

between the sub-unit and centre may vary. Typically the centre has powers regarding defence and foreign policy, but sub-units may also have international roles. The sub-units may also participate in central decision-making bodies.

The basic idea behind federalism is that a unifying relationship between states should be established under a common system of law. Conflict and disagreement should be resolved through peaceful means rather than through coercion or war. Its most important aspect is in recognizing that different types of institutions are needed to deal with different types of political issues.

Post-realism

Post-realism suggests that Realism is a form of social, scientific and political rhetoric. It closes rather than opens a debate about what is real and what is realistic in international relations.

Prominent Post-Realists:

- Francis A. Beer
- James Der Derian
- Robert Hariman
- Michael J. Shapiro

Neorealism (international relations)

Neorealism or structural realism is a theory of international relations that says power is the most important factor in international relations. It was first outlined by Kenneth Waltz in his 1979 book *Theory of International Politics*. Alongside neoliberalism, neorealism is one of the most influential contemporary approaches to international relations; the two perspectives have dominated international relations theory for the last three decades. Neorealism emerged from the North American discipline of political science, and reformulates the classical realist tradition of E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, and Reinhold Niebuhr.

Neorealism is subdivided into defensive and offensive neorealism.

Origins

Neorealism is an ideological departure from Hans Morgenthau's writing on classical realism. Classical realism originally explained the machinations of international politics as being based on human nature, and therefore subject to the ego and emotion of world leaders. Neorealist thinkers instead propose that structural constraints—not strategy, egoism, or motivation—will determine behavior in international relations. Kenneth Waltz made significant distinctions between his position on the three types of international relations in defensive neorealism and that of Morgenthau in his book *Man,*

the State, and War from the late 1950s. John Mearsheimer made significant distinctions between his version of offensive neorealism and Morgenthau in this co-authored book on Israel with Stephen Walt at Harvard University titled *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*.

Theory

Structural realism holds that the nature of the international structure is defined by its ordering principle, anarchy, and by the distribution of capabilities (measured by the number of great powers within the international system).

The anarchic ordering principle of the international structure is decentralized, meaning there is no formal central authority; every sovereign state is formally equal in this system. These states act according to the logic of self-help, meaning states seek their own interest and will not subordinate their interest to the interests of other states.

States are assumed at a minimum to want to ensure their own survival as this is a prerequisite to pursue other goals. This driving force of survival is the primary factor influencing their behavior and in turn ensures states develop offensive military capabilities for foreign interventionism and as a means to increase their relative power.

Because states can never be certain of other states' future intentions, there is a lack of trust between states which requires them to be on guard against relative losses of power

which could enable other states to threaten their survival. This lack of trust, based on uncertainty, is called the security dilemma.

States are deemed similar in terms of needs but not in capabilities for achieving them. The positional placement of states in terms of abilities determines the distribution of capabilities. The structural distribution of capabilities then limits cooperation among states through fears of relative gains made by other states, and the possibility of dependence on other states.

The desire and relative abilities of each state to maximize relative power constrain each other, resulting in a 'balance of power', which shapes international relations. It also gives rise to the 'security dilemma' that all nations face. There are two ways in which states balance power: internal balancing and external balancing. Internal balancing occurs as states grow their own capabilities by increasing economic growth and/or increasing military spending. External balancing occurs as states enter into alliances to check the power of more powerful states or alliances.

Neorealists contend that there are essentially three possible systems according to changes in the distribution of capabilities, defined by the number of great powers within the international system. A unipolar system contains only one great power, a bipolar system contains two great powers, and a multipolar system contains more than two great powers.

Neorealists conclude that a bipolar system is more stable (less prone to great power war and systemic change) than a multipolar system because balancing can only occur through internal balancing as there are no extra great powers with which to form alliances. Because there is only internal balancing in a bipolar system, rather than external balancing, there is less opportunity for miscalculations and therefore less chance of great power war. That is a simplification and a theoretical ideal.

Scholarly debate

While neorealists agree that the structure of the international relations is the primary impetus in seeking security, there is disagreement among neorealist scholars as to whether states merely aim to survive or whether states want to maximize their relative power.

The former represents the ideas of Kenneth Waltz and defensive realism while the latter represents the ideas of John Mearsheimer and offensive realism.

With other schools of thought

Neorealists conclude that because war is an effect of the anarchic structure of the international system, it is likely to continue in the future. Indeed, neorealists often argue that the ordering principle of the international system has not fundamentally changed from the time of Thucydides to the

advent of nuclear warfare. The view that long-lasting peace is not likely to be achieved is described by other theorists as a largely pessimistic view of international relations. One of the main challenges to neorealist theory is the democratic peace theory and supporting research such as the book *Never at War*. Neorealists answer this challenge by arguing that democratic peace theorists tend to pick and choose the definition of democracy to get the wanted empirical result.

For example, the Germany of Kaiser Wilhelm II, the Dominican Republic of Juan Bosch, or the Chile of Salvador Allende are not considered to be "democracies of the right kind" or the conflicts do not qualify as wars according to these theorists. Furthermore, they claim several wars between democratic states have been averted only by causes other than ones covered by democratic peace theory.

Advocates of democratic peace theory see the spreading of democracy as helping to mitigate the effects of anarchy. With enough democracies in the world, Bruce Russett thinks that it "may be possible in part to supersede the 'realist' principles (anarchy, the security dilemma of states) that have dominated practice...since at least the seventeenth century." John Mueller believes that it is not the spreading of democracy but rather other conditions (e.g., power) that bring about democracy and peace. Confirming Mueller's argument, Kenneth Waltz notes that "some of the major democracies—Britain in the nineteenth century and the United States in the twentieth century—have been among the most powerful states of their eras."

Liberalism

Liberalism (international relations)

Liberalism is a school of thought within international relations theory which can be thought to revolve around three interrelated principles:

1. Rejection of power politics as the only possible outcome of international relations. Questions security/warfare principles of realism

2. Accentuates mutual benefits and international cooperation

3. Implements international organizations and nongovernmental actors for shaping state preferences and policy choices.

Liberals believe that international institutions play a key role in cooperation among states. With the correct international institutions, and increasing interdependence (including economic and cultural exchanges) states have the opportunity to reduce conflict. Interdependence has three main components. States interact in various ways, through economic, financial, and cultural means; security tends to not be the primary goal in state-to-state interactions; and military forces are not typically used. Liberals also argue that international diplomacy can be a very effective way to get states to interact with each other honestly and support

nonviolent solutions to problems. With the proper institutions and diplomacy, Liberals believe that states can work together to maximize prosperity and minimize conflict.

Liberalism is one of the main schools of international relations theory. Liberalism comes from the Latin "liber" meaning "free", referred originally to the philosophy of freedom. Its roots lie in the broader liberal thought originating in the Enlightenment. The central issues that it seeks to address are the problems of achieving lasting peace and cooperation in international relations, and the various methods that could contribute to their achievement.

Areas of study

Broad areas of study within liberal international relations theory include:

- The democratic peace theory, and, more broadly, the effect of domestic political regime types and domestic politics on international relations;
- The commercial peace theory, arguing that free trade has pacifying effects on international relations. Current explorations of globalization and interdependence are a broader continuation of this line of inquiry;
- Institutional peace theory, which attempts to demonstrate how cooperation can be sustained in anarchy, how long-term interests can be pursued over short-term interests, and how actors may

realize absolute gains instead of seeking relative gains;

- Related, the effect of international organizations on international politics, both in their role as forums for states to pursue their interests, and in their role as actors in their own right;
- The role of international law in moderating or constraining state behavior;
- The effects of liberal norms on international politics, especially relations between liberal states;
- The role of various types of unions in international politics (relations), such as highly institutionalized alliances (e.g. NATO), confederations, leagues, federations, and evolving entities like the European Union; and,
- The role, or potential role, of cosmopolitanism in transcending the state and affecting international relations.

Early beginnings

Liberalism originally arose from both deep scholarly and philosophical roots. With the theory's prime principle being international cooperation and peace, early influences are seen in some bigger religious practices sharing the same goal. It was later in the 17th and 18th centuries in which political liberalism began to take form that challenged nobility and inherited equality. Followed shortly after was the Enlightenment where liberal ideals began to develop with works by philosophers such as Voltaire, Locke, Smith, and German thinker Immanuel Kant. In part, liberal scholars were

influenced by the Thirty Years' War and the Enlightenment. The length, and disastrous affects of the Thirty Years' War caused a common disdain for warfare throughout much of Europe. Thinkers, like Locke and Kant, wrote about what they saw in the world around them. They believed that war is fundamentally unpopular and that man is born with certain rights because the end of the Thirty Years' War proved these ideas to them.

John Locke discusses many ideas that are now attributed to Liberalism in Two Treatises of Government, published in 1689. In his second treatise, Locke comments on society and outlines the importance of natural rights and laws. Locke believes that people are born as blank slates without any preordained ideas or notions. This state is known as the State of Nature because it shows people in their most barbaric form. As people grow, their experiences begin to shape their thoughts and actions. They are naturally in the State of Nature until they choose not to be, until something changes their barbaric nature. Locke says that, civil government can remedy this anarchy. When it comes to the Law of Nature, people are more likely to act rationally when there is a government in place because there are laws and consequences to abide by. Locke argues that civil government can help people gain the basic human rights of health, liberty and possession. Governments that grant these rights and enforce laws benefit the world. Many of these ideas have influenced leaders such as the Founding Father's during the American Revolution and French revolutionaries during the French Revolution.

In Kant's *To Perpetual Peace*, the philosopher set the way by forming guidelines to create a peace program to be applied by nations. This program would require cooperation between states as well as the mutual pursuit of secure freedom and shared benefits. One such idea was the Democratic Peace Theory. In To Perpetual Peace, Kant put fourth the idea that democracies do not fight wars because leaders were too worried about re-election.

Because war was naturally unpopular, Kant thought that leaders would avoid burdening voters with its costs.After seeing success in intertwining states through economic coalition, liberal supporters began to believe that warfare was not always an inevitable part of IR. Support of liberal political theory continued to grow from there.

Liberal theory today

Kant's Democratic Peace Theory has since been revised by Neoliberals like Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye. These theorists have seen that democracies do in fact fight wars. However, democracies do not fight wars with other democracies because of capitalist ties. Democracies are economically dependent and therefore are more likely to resolve issues diplomatically. Furthermore, citizens in democracies are less likely to think of citizens in other democracies as enemies because of shared morals. Kant's original ideas have influenced liberalist scholars and have had a large impact on liberal thought.

Neoliberalism (international relations)

In the study of international relations, neoliberalism refers to a school of thought which believes that states are, or at least should be, concerned first and foremost with absolute gains rather than relative gains to other states. Neoliberalism is not the same as neoliberal economic ideology, although both theories use common methodologies, which include game theory.

Activities of the international system

Neoliberal international relations thinkers often employ game theory to explain why states do or do not cooperate; since their approach tends to emphasize the possibility of mutual wins, they are interested in institutions which can arrange jointly profitable arrangements and compromises.

Neoliberalism is a response to Neorealism; while not denying the anarchic nature of the international system, neoliberals argue that its importance and effect has been exaggerated. The neoliberal argument is focused on neorealists' alleged underestimation of "the varieties of cooperative behavior possible within... a decentralized system."

Both theories, however, consider the state and its interests as the central subject of analysis; neoliberalism may have a wider conception of what those interests *are*.

Neoliberalism argues that even in an anarchic system of autonomous rational states, cooperation can emerge through the cultivation of mutual trust and the building of norms, regimes and institutions.

In terms of the scope of international relations theory and foreign interventionism, the debate between Neoliberalism and Neorealism is an intra-paradigm one, as both theories are positivist and focus mainly on the state system as the primary unit of analysis.

Development

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye are considered the founders of the neoliberal school of thought; Keohane's book *After Hegemony* is a classic of the genre. Other major influences are the hegemonic stability theory of Stephen Krasner and the work of Charles P. Kindleberger, among others.

Contentions

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, in response to neorealism, develop an opposing theory they dub "Complex interdependence." Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye explain, "... complex interdependence sometimes comes closer to reality than does realism." In explaining this, Keohane and Nye cover the three assumptions in realist thought: First, states are coherent units and are the dominant actors in international relations; second, force is a usable and effective instrument of

policy; and finally, the assumption that there is a hierarchy in international politics.

The heart of Keohane and Nye's argument is that in international politics there are, in fact, multiple channels that connect societies exceeding the conventional Westphalian system of states. This manifests itself in many forms ranging from informal governmental ties to multinational corporations and organizations. Here they define their terminology; interstate relations are those channels assumed by realists; *transgovernmental* relations occur when one relaxes the realist assumption that states act coherently as units; *transnational* applies when one removes the assumption that states are the only units. It is through these channels that political exchange occurs, not through the limited interstate channel as championed by realists.

Secondly, Keohane and Nye argue that there is not, in fact, a hierarchy among issues, meaning that not only is the martial arm of foreign policy not the supreme tool by which to carry out a state's agenda, but that there are a multitude of different agendas that come to the forefront. The line between domestic and foreign policy becomes blurred in this case, as realistically there is no clear agenda in interstate relations.

Finally, the use of military force is not exercised when complex interdependence prevails. The idea is developed that between countries in which a complex interdependence exists, the role of the military in resolving disputes is negated. However,

Keohane and Nye go on to state that the role of the military is in fact important in that "alliance's political and military relations with a rival bloc."

Lebow

Richard Ned Lebow states that the failure of neorealism lies in its "institutionalist" ontology, whereas the neorealist thinker Kenneth Waltz states, "the creators [of the system] become the creatures of the market that their activity gave rise to." This critical failure, according to Lebow, is due to the realists' inability "to escape from the predicament of anarchy." Or rather, the assumption that states do not adapt and will respond similarly to similar constraints and opportunities.

Mearsheimer

Norman Angell, a classical London School of Economics liberal, had held: "We cannot ensure the stability of the present system by the political or military preponderance of our nation or alliance by imposing its will on a rival."

Keohane and Lisa L. Martin expound upon these ideas in the mid 1990s as a response to John J. Mearsheimer's "The False Promise of International Institutions," where Mearsheimer purports that, "institutions cannot get states to stop behaving as short-term power maximizers." In fact Mearsheimer's article is a direct response to the liberal-institutionalist movement created in response to neo-realism. The central point in

Keohane and Martin's idea is that neo-realism insists that, "institutions have only marginal effects... [which] leaves [neo-realism] without a plausible account of the investments that states have made in such international institutions as the EU, NATO, GATT, and regional trading organizations." This idea is in keeping with the notion of complex interdependence. Moreover, Keohane and Martin argue that the fact that international institutions are created in response to state interests, that the real empirical question is "knowing how to distinguish the effects of underlying conditions from those of the institutions themselves." The debate between the institutionalists and Mearsheimer is about whether institutions have an independent effect on state behavior, or whether they reflect great power interests that said powers employ to advance their respective interests.

Mearsheimer is concerned with 'inner-directed' institutions, which he states, "seek to cause peace by influencing the behavior of the member states." In doing so he dismisses Keohane and Martin's NATO argument in favor of the example of the European Community and the International Energy Agency. According to Mearsheimer, NATO is an alliance that is interested in "an outside state, or coalition of states, which the alliance aims to deter, coerce, or defeat in war." Mearsheimer reasons that since NATO is an alliance it has special concerns. He concedes this point to Keohane and Martin. However, Mearsheimer reasons, "to the extent that alliances cause peace, they do so by deterrence, which is straightforward realist behavior." In essence, Mearsheimer believes that

Keohane and Martin "are shifting the terms of the debate, and making realist claims under the guise of institutionalism.

Mearsheimer criticizes Martin's argument that the European Community (EC) enhances the prospects of cooperation, particularly in the case of Great Britain's sanctioning of Argentina during the Falklands war, where it was able to secure the cooperation of other European states by linking the issues at hand to the EC. Mearsheimer purports that the United States was not a member of the EC and yet the US and Britain managed to cooperate on sanctions, creating an ad hoc alliance which effected change. "... Issue linkage was a commonplace practice in world politics well before institutions came on the scene; moreover, Britain and other European states could have used other diplomatic tactics to solve the problem. After all, Britain and America managed to cooperate on sanctions even though the United States was not a member of the EC."

Complex Interdependence

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Chapter 2

Post-Liberalism and Post Wars Politics

Constructivism and international relations politics

One version of post-liberal theory argues that within the modern, globalized world, states in fact are driven to cooperate in order to ensure security and sovereign interests. The departure from classical liberal theory is most notably felt in the re-interpretation of the concepts of sovereignty and autonomy. Autonomy becomes a problematic concept in shifting away from a notion of freedom, self-determination, and agency to a heavily responsible and duty laden concept. Importantly, autonomy is linked to a capacity for good governance. Similarly, sovereignty also experiences a shift from a right to a duty. In the global economy, International organizations hold sovereign states to account, leading to a situation where sovereignty is co-produced among "sovereign" states. The concept becomes a variable capacity of good governance and can no longer be accepted as an absolute right. One possible way to interpret this theory, is the idea that in order to maintain global stability and security and solve the problem of the anarchic world system in International Relations, no overarching, global, sovereign authority is

created. Instead, states collectively abandon some rights for full autonomy and sovereignty. Another version of post-liberalism, drawing on work in political philosophy after the end of the Cold War, as well as on democratic transitions in particular in Latin America, argues that social forces from below are essential in understanding the nature of the state and the international system. Without understanding their contribution to political order and its progressive possibilities, particularly in the area of peace in local and international frameworks, the weaknesses of the state, the failings of the liberal peace, and challenges to global governance cannot be realised or properly understood. Furthermore, the impact of social forces on political and economic power, structures, and institutions, provides some empirical evidence of the complex shifts currently underway in IR.

In the discipline of international relations, constructivism is the claim that significant aspects of international relations are historically and socially constructed, rather than inevitable consequences of human nature or other essential characteristics of world politics.

Development

Nicholas Onuf is usually credited with coining the term "constructivism" to describe theories that stress the socially constructed character of international relations. Contemporary constructivist theory traces its roots to pioneering work not only by Onuf, but also by Richard K. Ashley, Friedrich

Kratochwil, John Ruggie, and Christian Reus-Smit. Nevertheless, Alexander Wendt is the best-known advocate of social constructivism in the field of international relations. Wendt's 1992 article "Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics" published in *International Organization* laid the theoretical groundwork for challenging what he considered to be a flaw shared by both neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists, namely, a commitment to a (crude) form of materialism. By attempting to show that even such a core realist concept as "power politics" is socially constructed—that is, not given by nature and hence, capable of being transformed by human practice—Wendt opened the way for a generation of international relations scholars to pursue work in a wide range of issues from a constructivist perspective. Wendt further developed these ideas in his central work, *Social Theory of International Politics* (1999).

Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, constructivism has become one of the major schools of thought within international relations. John Ruggie and Christian Reus-Smit have identified several strands of constructivism. On the one hand, there are constructivist scholars such as Martha Finnemore, Kathryn Sikkink, Peter Katzenstein, Elizabeth Kier, and Alexander Wendt, whose work has been widely accepted within the mainstream IR community and has generated vibrant scholarly discussions among realists, liberals, institutionalists, and constructivists. On the other hand, there

are radical constructivists who take discourse and linguistics more seriously.

Theory

Constructivism primarily seeks to demonstrate how core aspects of international relations are, contrary to the assumptions of Neorealism and Neoliberalism, *socially constructed*, that is, they are given their form by ongoing processes of social practice and interaction. Alexander Wendt calls two increasingly accepted basic tenets of Constructivism "that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature".

The notion that international relations are not only affected by power politics, but also by ideas, is shared by writers who describe themselves as *constructivist theorists.* According to this view, the fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than strictly material. This leads to *social constructivists* to argue that changes in the nature of social interaction between states can bring a fundamental shift towards greater international security.

Challenging realism

During Constructivism's formative period Neorealism was the dominant discourse of international relations, thus much of

Constructivism's initial theoretical work challenged basic Neorealist assumptions. Neorealists are fundamentally causal *Structuralists*, in that they hold that the majority of important content to international politics is explained by the structure of the international system, a position first advanced in Kenneth Waltz's *Man, the State, and War* and fully elucidated in his core text of Neorealism, *Theory of International Politics*. Specifically, international politics is primarily determined by the fact that the international system is anarchic – it lacks any overarching authority, instead it is composed of units (states) which are formally equal – they are all sovereign over their own territory. Such anarchy, Neorealists argue, forces States to act in certain ways, specifically, they can rely on no-one but themselves for security (they have to *Self-help*). The way in which anarchy forces them to act in such ways, to defend their own self-interest in terms of power, Neorealists argue, explains most of international politics. Because of this, Neorealists tend to disregard explanations of international politics at the "unit" or "state" level. Kenneth Waltz attacked such a focus as being reductionist.

Constructivism, particularly in the formative work of Wendt, challenges this assumption by showing that the causal powers attributed to "structure" by Neorealists are in fact not "given", but rest on the way in which Structure is constructed by social practice. Removed from presumptions about the nature of the identities and interests of the actors in the system, and the meaning that social institutions (including Anarchy) have for such actors, Wendt argues Neorealism's "structure" reveals

very little: "it does not predict whether two states will be friends or foes, will recognize each other's sovereignty, will have dynastic ties, will be revisionist or status quo powers, and so on". Because such features of behavior are not explained by Anarchy, and require instead the incorporation of evidence about the interests and identities held by key actors, Neorealism's focus on the material structure of the system (Anarchy) is misplaced. But Wendt goes further than this – arguing that because the way in which Anarchy constrains states depends on the way in which States conceive of Anarchy, and conceive of their own identities and interests, Anarchy is not necessarily even a 'self-help' system. It only forces states to self-help if they conform to Neorealist assumptions about states as seeing security as a competitive, relative concept, where the gain of security for any one state means the loss of security for another.

If States instead hold alternative conceptions of security, either "co-operative", where states can maximise their security without negatively affecting the security of another, or "collective" where states identify the security of other states as being valuable to themselves, Anarchy will not lead to self-help at all. Neorealist conclusions, as such, depend entirely on unspoken and unquestioned assumptions about the way in which the meaning of social institutions are constructed by actors. Crucially, because Neorealists fail to recognize this dependence, they falsely assume that such meanings are unchangeable, and exclude the study of the processes of social

construction which actually do the key explanatory work behind Neorealist observations.

Identities and interests

As Constructivists reject Neorealism's conclusions about the determining effect of anarchy on the behavior of international actors, and move away from Neorealism's underlying materialism, they create the necessary room for the identities and interests of international actors to take a central place in theorizing international relations. Now that actors are not simply governed by the imperatives of a self-help system, their identities and interests become important in analyzing how they behave. Like the nature of the international system, Constructivists see such identities and interests as not objectively grounded in material forces (such as dictates of the human nature that underpins Classical Realism) but the result of ideas and the social construction of such ideas. In other words, the meanings of ideas, objects, and actors are all given by social interaction. We give objects their meanings and can attach different meanings to different things.

Martha Finnemore has been influential in examining the way in which international organizations are involved in these processes of the social construction of actor's perceptions of their interests. In *National Interests In International Society*, Finnemore attempts to "develop a systemic approach to understanding state interests and state behavior by investigating an international structure, not of power, but of

meaning and social value". "Interests", she explains, "are not just 'out there' waiting to be discovered; they are constructed through social interaction". Finnemore provides three case studies of such construction – the creation of Science Bureaucracies in states due to the influence of UNESCO, the role of the Red Cross in the Geneva Conventions and the World Bank's influence of attitudes to poverty.

Studies of such processes are examples of the Constructivist attitude towards state interests and identities. Such interests and identities are central determinants of state behavior, as such studying their nature and their formation is integral in Constructivist methodology to explaining the international system. But it is important to note that despite this refocus onto identities and interests—properties of States—Constructivists are not necessarily wedded to focusing their analysis at the unit-level of international politics: the state. Constructivists such as Finnemore and Wendt both emphasize that while ideas and processes tend to explain the social construction of identities and interests, such ideas and processes form a structure of their own which impact upon international actors. Their central difference from Neorealists is to see the structure of international politics in primarily ideational, rather than material, terms.

Research areas

Many constructivists analyze international relations by looking at goals, threats, fears, cultures, identities, and other elements

of "social reality" as social facts. In an important edited volume, *The Culture of National Security*, constructivist scholars—including Elizabeth Kier, Jeffrey Legro, and Peter Katzenstein - challenged many realist assumptions about the dynamics of international politics, particularly in the context of military affairs.

Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber applied constructivist approaches to understand the evolution of state sovereignty as a central theme in international relations, and works by Rodney Bruce Hall and Daniel Philpott (among others) developed constructivist theories of major transformations in the dynamics of international politics. In international political economy, the application of constructivism has been less frequent. Notable examples of constructivist work in this area include Kathleen R. McNamara's study of European Monetary Union and Mark Blyth's analysis of the rise of Reaganomics in the United States.

By focusing on how language and rhetoric are used to construct the social reality of the international system, constructivists are often seen as more optimistic about progress in international relations than versions of realism loyal to a purely materialist ontology, but a growing number of constructivists question the "liberal" character of constructivist thought and express greater sympathy for realist pessimism concerning the possibility of emancipation from power politics.

Constructivism is often presented as an alternative to the two leading theories of international relations, realism and liberalism, but some maintain that it is not necessarily inconsistent with one or both. Wendt shares some key assumptions with leading realist and neorealist scholars, such as the existence of anarchy and the centrality of states in the international system. However, Wendt renders anarchy in cultural rather than materialist terms; he also offers a sophisticated theoretical defense of the state-as-actor assumption in international relations theory. This is a contentious issue within segments of the IR community as some constructivists challenge Wendt on some of these assumptions. It has been argued that progress in IR theory will be achieved when Realism and Constructivism can be aligned or even synthesized. An early example of such synthesis was Jennifer Sterling-Folker's analysis of the United States' international monetary policy following the Bretton Woods system. Sterling-Folker argued that the U.S. shift towards unilateralism is partially accounted for by realism's emphasis of an anarchic system, but constructivism helps to account for important factors from the domestic or second level of analysis.

Recent developments

A significant group of scholars who study processes of social construction self-consciously eschew the label "Constructivist". They argue that "mainstream" constructivism has abandoned many of the most important insights from linguistic turn and

social-constructionist theory in the pursuit of respectability as a "scientific" approach to international relations. Even some putatively "mainstream" constructivists, such as Jeffrey Checkel, have expressed concern that constructivists have gone too far in their efforts to build bridges with non-constructivist schools of thought. A growing number of constructivists contend that current theories pay inadequate attention to the role of habitual and unreflective behavior in world politics. These advocates of the "practice turn" take inspiration from work in neuroscience, as well as that of social theorists such as Pierre Bourdieu, that stresses the significance of habit and practices in psychological and social life - essentially calling for greater attention and sensitivity towards the 'every day' and 'taken for granted' activities of international politics Increasingly, these scholars are also moving towards employing the related sociological approach known as Actor-Network Theory (ANT), which extends the early focus of the Practice Turn on the work of Pierre Bourdieu towards that of Bruno Latour and others. Scholars have employed ANT in order to disrupt traditional world political binaries (civilised/barbarian, democratic/ autocratic, etc.), consider the implications of a posthuman understanding of IR, explore the infrastructures of world politics, and consider the effects of technological agency.

Marxism and Critical Theory

Marxist and Neo-Marxist international relations theories are structuralist paradigms which reject the realist/liberal view of

state conflict or cooperation; instead focusing on the economic and material aspects. Marxist approaches argue the position of historical materialism and make the assumption that the economic concerns transcend others; allowing for the elevation of *class* as the focus of study. Marxists view the international system as an integrated capitalist system in pursuit of capital accumulation. A sub-discipline of Marxist IR is Critical Security Studies. Gramscian approaches rely on the ideas of Italian Antonio Gramsci whose writings concerned the hegemony that capitalism holds as an ideology. Marxist approaches have also inspired Critical Theorists such as Robert W. Cox who argues that "Theory is always for someone and for some purpose".

One notable Marxist approach to international relations theory is Immanuel Wallerstein's World-system theory which can be traced back to the ideas expressed by Lenin in Imperialism: The Highest Stage of capitalism. World-system theory argues that globalized capitalism has created a core of modern industrialized countries which exploit a periphery of exploited "Third World" countries. These ideas were developed by the Latin American Dependency School. "Neo-Marxist" or "New Marxist" approaches have returned to the writings of Karl Marx for their inspiration. Key "New Marxists" include Justin Rosenberg and Benno Teschke. Marxist approaches have enjoyed a renaissance since the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe.

Criticisms of Marxists approaches to international relations theory include the narrow focus on material and economic aspects of life.

Feminism

Feminist approaches to international relations became popular in the early 1990s. Such approaches emphasize that women's experiences continue to be excluded from the study of international relations. International Relations Feminists who argue that gender relations are integral to international relations focus on the role of diplomatic wives and marital relationship that facilitate sex trafficking. Early feminist IR approaches were part of the "Third Great Debate" between positivists and post-positivists. They argued against what they saw as the positivism and state-centrism of mainstream international relations. J. Ann Tickner argues that these approaches did not describe what a feminist perspective on world politics would look like.

The feminist international relations scholar Jacqui True differentiates between empirical feminism, analytical feminism and normative feminism. Empirical feminism sees women and gender relations as empirical aspects of international relations. It is argued that mainstream international relations emphasis on anarchy and statecraft mean that areas of study that make the reproduction of the state system possible are marginalized. Analytical feminism claims that the theoretical framework of international relations has a gender bias. Here gender refers

not to the "biological" differences between men and women but the social constructs of masculine and feminine identity. It is claimed that in mainstream international relations masculinity is associated with objectivity. Analytical feminists would see neo-realism's dislike of domestic explanations for explaining interstate behaviour as an example of this bias. Normative feminist sees theorizing as part of an agenda for change.

Criticisms of feminist international relations theory include its portrayal of third-world women.

Feminist International Relations is sometimes oversimplified into a women's issue or simply a need to 'add women and stir'. "Masculinities, IR and the 'gender variable': a cost-benefit analysis for (sympathetic) gender sceptics", an article by Charlotte Hooper, makes the case that looking at international relations through a gendered lens is important for all genders. The article illustrates that the hyper-masculinity used in international relations has a negative impact on all genders. It privileges only a certain kind of man, forcing all others to fit into the constraints of one vision of masculinity. Hooper also argues that this gendered lens requires a complete overhaul of traditional methods, rather than just adding women to the study. "In order to investigate the intersections between gender identities and international relations, one cannot rely on approaches which would take gender identities as 'givens' or as independent, externally derived variables". Traditional methods do not meet the needs of men or women. They attempt to reduce our needs to security, failing to take into account class,

education level, gender, or experience. Hooper argues that traditional studies of international relations are causing us to miss many factors for more than just women and children.

To appeal to sympathetic sceptics, Hooper explains that international relations shapes masculinity in a way that affects us all. To establish this she explains that masculinity and femininity are social constructs that can be influenced by theories and discourse. Hooper turns so called feminist international relations into gendered international relations, which brings in all people and highlights the importance of new methods to the field. Genders just like class, ethnicity, age, etc. can help inform our understanding of how people and nations act and if we ignore the range of masculinities and femininities we are only working with half the puzzle. The system that Feminist International Relations is trying to subvert affects us all and influences many of our traditional theories.

Hooper offers the example of war which has shaped the male body; it has created men as takers of life and women as givers of it. We proceed to tell men they simply have more natural aggression. Hooper also illustrates the ways masculinity, like femininity, has been influenced by colonization. The hierarchy formed by colonization labels Asians as effeminate, Africans as savage and white men as the proper balance at the top the hierarchy. War and colonialism still influence international relations to a large extent.

Green Theory

Green Theory in international relations is a sub-field of international relations theory which concerns international environmental cooperation.

Liberal institutionalism

The majority of scholarly literature in international relations approaches environmental problems from a liberal institutionalist perspective focusing on international environmental regimes. There is a relationship between Globalization and Environment which is among the forces behind the birth of green theory. However a unified theory is missed. Controversy of the human species as world managers where "conservation" is "right use" of nature and "preservation" is "right non-use" of nature and humanity as protecting nature against itself with little allowance for ecological dynamics is part of the cause for some "essentially contested concepts" where even "sustainable development" is sometimes contested.

The "collective action problem" is central to cooperation. It is discussed by Michael Laver (1997) in "Private Desires, Political Action" with examples of "The Prisoner's dilemma" and the "Tragedy of the commons." The disconnect between individual goals and group goals suggests a role for leadership and more than simple management. Green theory has championed consensus decision making as best it can be done. Empowering the disempowered is also a strand in Green theory.

Interactions are important to Green theory. From Stephen W. Littlejohn's (1983) book "Theories of Human Communication" (2nd ed.) we find a discussion of macronetworks with members and links. The five properties of links are: (1) symmetry (how much who relates to who or how equal the communication is); (2) strength (how often who relates to who); (3) reciprocity (agreement between members of links); (4) content (what the area or context of communication is); and, (5) mode (what the means or context of communication is). [Littlejohn is actually referring to Richard V. Farace, Peter R. Monge, and Hamish Russell from "Communicating and Organizing" Network communication is a bridge to appreciating the interdependence of ecosystems. "International Regimes" is a classic IR work edited by Stephen D. Krasner (1983) which discusses emergent norms in complex (international) systems. International regimes are deemed to be a collective solution to problems of turbulence and unpredictability. On the micro level, Marshall Rosenberg's "Nonviolent Communication" (2nd ed., 2003) suggests people must agree on the description of the situation, agree on the stakeholders' feelings, agree on the stakeholders' needs, and then agree on the stakeholders' requests in order for healthy negotiation to be possible. In veridical conflict, when it occurs, there may not be a mutually satisfactory resolution possible.

Green IPE

This field studies the impact of IPE (international political economy) and it has been widely accepted as an area within IR

theory. The strongest protesters of such irregular emigration movements are the ecofeminists who tend to gather once a month to hold non-peaceful and noisy demonstrations. J. K. Galbraith said in "The Age of Uncertainty" that economics entails understanding the relationship of people with land. Green theory uses case studies of people living on land to better understand economy. Later, the idea of "ecological footprint" developed.

Green leaders use suasion, persuasion, exemplification and all the techniques of public relations and propaganda to shift the publics' tastes towards green decisions both in markets and in other areas where decisions, goals, or choices are being made. As Fraser P. Seitel (1989) in "The Practice of Public Relations" says there are many "publics" and many choices. Places or contexts of choices matter too. Green theory rewrites the rules for consumers. David R. Boyd & David T. Suzuki's (2008) "Green guide" comes to mind.

The public as workers is critical to Green theory. The greening of the labour market, workplace, and industry is important. One wonders, as democracy is valued in Green theory, what the appropriate attitude towards "economic democracy" would be. Robert A. Dahl (1985) in his "A Preface to Economic Democracy" argues weakly in favour of workplace democracy. If the factors of production are land, labour, capital, and entrepreneurship, it is unclear how these can be democratically related and what kind of property rights might survive.

Joseph Heath (2009), in "Filthy Lucre," describes "capitalism" as a "nexus of relationships" (as between suppliers, producers, consumers, marketers, regulators, for example). Green theory is complex in its management of policy networks. The New Age idea of "segmented, polycentric, integrated networks" (SPINs) suggests a possible complex replacement for capitalism. In public administration the idea of "governance" systems addresses some of the complexity.

Pierre Teilhard de Chardin's idea of "noosphere" as a connection and link thick environment where multilateral group, system, organization, and network interrelations can instantiate human wisdom is also possible for Green theory.

"Globalization" is commonly understood to involve cross-border flows. This can be transportation of material or people, transmission of information or ideas, transfer of capital or ownership, transactions altering status, transmissions of disease and disease causing organisms, trade in goods and services, transfers of technology or industrial arts and products, and may be considered a stage of "modernization" and/or "development." Global flows are to be monitored and controlled through many local actions. For this 'globalization' to work, local decisions must successfully restrict the perverse effects of global flows. A margin for error must be maintained.

Free trade appears to be focused upon free markets. Yet, even Raymond Vernon (1977) in "Storm Over the Multinationals" suggests that a multinational corporation could serve as a

non-tariff barrier to free trade. You could go further and suggest that concentrations of purchasing power and control over property rights might serve to restrict "free trade" even if we do not wish to have the total equality of no concentrations of wealth. Free markets are not free if those who have wealth can control flows and restrictions as well as the litigation over disputes.

Control over energy and power, likewise, serves to replace the slave trade. "Nature" is never clearly enough defined. Natural resources and natural flows of energy and nutrients are neither entirely free nor entirely artificial. No one, apparently, wants total energy entropy (insofar as it can be delayed). It seems that a mixed economy may be best suited to the "natural" as complete rational planning and complete free markets are no friends to nature. This assumption is, of course, quite contestable.

Normative and Cosmopolitan

One aspect of Green IR theory is normative theorising such as bioregionalism. The idea of a "land ethic" and the belief that people can "think globally and act locally" have given hope that norms can be directly or indirectly derived from nature.

Futurology and counterfactual reasoning, such as that promoted by Philip E. Tetlock & Aaron Belkin (1996) in "Counterfactual Thought Experiments in World Politics," may just as easily produce dystopias as utopias. Environmental

security, while still questionable, is at least more basic than human security. Likewise, "ecology" (the study of households or habitats) has priority over "economics" (the applied laws of households or habitats).

The fit between people and their environments brings up the topic of positive and negative eugenics which has been a background challenge in Green theory. Healthy and unhealthy have seemed to replace the theology of good and evil. Holistic health is a popular part of green theories combined with green living. Public health with prevention and health promotion are more consistent with Green theory too.

The non-violent thread in Green theory has led to an anti-hierarchical standard which can seem to be anarchical in this theory. Eco-feminists may hold anti-hierarchical views. Living wages and more equality may be emphasized. Ernest Callenbach's "Ecotopia" seems to almost be a matriarchal totalitarianism. The choices and liberties can be shifted in Green theory.

Turn taking among Green leaders means sometimes the responsibilities of power and sometimes being the follower. All this within groups attempting consensus with group skills added to communication skills which can be overpowering.

A behavioural space with contingencies, classical and operant conditioning, plus systems of semiotic systems with underlying structures, even for individual cells, organisms, groups, and

all conceivable units of analysis could certainly be overpowering. It would seem to be a case of Michel Foucault's "governmentality" where both individuals and populations are simultaneously controlled. And the governmentality would grow and evolve.

Growth of any particular species can be in numbers, qualities, adaptations (fitting in), and adjustments (changes to environment) which makes for complex practical syllogisms. As Thomas Szasz said in "Ideology and Insanity": "stars move, machines function, animals behave, and people conduct themselves." It is an idea of "ecopsychology" that contact with nature promotes mental health and wellness.

According to Morris Berman there is a "Shadow Side of Systems" from the Journal of Humanistic Psychology (Winter 1996). Just as democracy can make for a tyranny of the majority so can systems thinking provide for authoritarianism and/or paternalism. A case study of Green theorists' dealing with the issue of "abortion" can illustrate this matter. Life and choice are both important to Green theorists. Disconnecting the conception decision from the birth decision can have eugenic consequences. Perhaps females could take charge of reproductive technology but then they would be in charge of eugenics too.

The compromises of living where you like and liking where you live; of doing what you like and liking what you do; and, of having the child you like and liking the child you have -- these

do not make choices easier. Do we love the people we love and love the people we love -- both? Green theory does not always distinguish public space from private space. As for political ideologies and Green theory, Timothy O'Riordan (1990) in "Major Projects and the Environment" in Geographical Journal, indicates there to be "dry greens" (perhaps conservative and market centered), "shallow greens" (perhaps liberal and sustainable development centered), and "deep greens" (perhaps radical and ecosystem or earth centered). This, of course, may be an oversimplification. "Dry Greens" may be the least appreciated environmentalists and might not even be given that title. However, a very good economic treatment is given in "The Plundered Planet" by Paul Collier (2010). Collier may put the plight of the bottom billion (poorest and worst off people) on the planet above environmentalism. He believes protecting the viability of the planet and the bottom billion must both be done. Green theorists, of course, emphasize equality such that the bottom billion are equal to the top billion. How that works out is challenging. If the planet does need a billion fewer people, then there is no agreed upon way of choosing. Market solution would include rising food prices and only those with ability to pay survive. Each culture, religion, and academic discipline has developed and produced different solutions to the "Who survives?" conundrum.

Security Studies

Green IR approaches have challenged traditional approaches to security in international relations. This has included the

concept of environmental security which has involved the 'securitization' of environmental threats.

While Green theory embraces non-violence and condemns the toxicity of much military materials, civilian defence and protest have long been used as tactics. Appropriate technology, even for military use, is becoming more preferred. Green theorists may dispense with much strategic security planning as letting the laws of nature take their course.

John H. Storer in "The Web of Life" (1953, 1956, pp. 76 – 77), mentions some of the laws of nature as: adaptation, succession, multiplication, and, control, such that a species occupies a niche with a carrying capacity and limiting factors. This is the long view of strategy. Strategy is assumed to be phylogenetic and tactics more ontogenetic (as may be morals and ethics respectively). Families and nations may be similar and different. "The Advent of Netwar" by John Arquilla & David Ronfeldt (RAND, 1996) suggests that fractal thinking may highlight fractal warfare. Swords and spears, the tools of regular warfare, may be changed to plows and pruning-hooks, the tools of eugenic management.

As for the short view, private security or acting locally may be of interest. Harvey Burstein (1994) in "Introduction to Security" gives five items that security staff must control: crime, waste, accidents, errors, and unethical practices. Such is the short view of tactics—albeit from an environmental perspective. Even the best "securitization" cannot eliminate

error. The items that security controls also have their carrying capacities and limiting factors. Control may interact with higher level controls and counter-controls like a flow chart.

Agenda 21, that optimistic document for the beginning of the Twenty-first Century, seeks to control all accidents so that human beings can live in safety. It failed, but it can provide a guide for those who think globally and act locally. The move from human centered to ecosystem centered thinking and feeling may, ironically, be an improvement to humanity.

An area of challenge to all IR theories is secrecy and surveillance along with control of information. Monitoring is necessary for protection and control (security) but sometimes secrecy is necessary too. Realism, capitalism, and socialism could not handle secrecy well and it remains to be seen whether Green theory's handling of secrecy could not create worse disasters. Transparency and democracy may not be appropriate political technologies for all decisions.

Further discussion of power, secrecy vs. espionage, persuasion vs. evaluation, and information control is in "Policing Politics: Security Intelligence and the Liberal Democratic State" by Peter Gill (1994). Citizen policing of politics goes with empowering the disempowered and consensus. Perhaps "subsidiarity" may be needed with a secret "black box" at the appropriate level of decision making which is always the lowest possible.

It would be a good exercise in Green Theory to consider Derrick Jensen's "Twenty Premises" from his books "Endgame: Volumes I & II" (2006) with "Agenda 21" and its efforts to control humanity and the environment to produce security. Is a graceful transition from the present world to a greener future world possible? How possible?

A critical point in the history of Green Theory is 1992 when, of course, the Rio Conference happened. Also Biodiversity and Global Warming became more important. Emphasis may have moved from local ecosystems to the global ecosystem. One book published at this time in which the author seeks perhaps to rescue Greens from themselves and provide a revisionist Green policy is "Green Political Theory" by Robert E. Goodin (1992). It was a timely criticism. He compares a capitalist theory of value based upon consumer satisfaction; a socialist theory of value based upon labour; and, a Green theory of value based upon natural resources.

He also discusses the weakness for international organization of a highly decentralized political system. Perhaps in answer, "Leaders lead; but none too much," might provide a solution to Michel's 'iron law of oligarchy' where leaders can do job rotation with teaching environmental education, group decision-making, policy-making, as well as with other leaders, taking turns with administrative and diplomatic tasks. Much leaders make for much participation and many types of participation. Therefore diversity is increased.

Goodin (1992) also discusses norms or values by focusing on "goods" and "the good" as well as "agency" which is more in the direction of "the right." Such a critical analysis of Green Theory at what is also a critical point in history is invaluable.

An obvious modern point about environment and security is distribution of risk and even global flows of risk. If the rich are not to be protected too much, then it also might follow that the poor are not to be protected too much as well. Proper balance is not the mere matter of comforting the afflicted and afflicting the comfortable. Ulrich Beck and others have written on the "risk society" which seems to enter into the discussions both of economy and security. Subsidiarity may include levels of government which share authority, for example, national government, religious or organizational government, family government, and individual government. There would not seem to be a monopoly over use of force. There may be a tendency for eco-anarchism here.

Just as we may use computer software to determine such things as financial crime and corruption, we might also use actuarial tables to determine unjust distribution of risk. We would have to find ways to prevent "fait accompli" acts of the powerful to the less powerful. This goes far beyond environmental impact statements or even studies. It is a whole fabric with the socio-economic structures.

Solving the problem of a gentle transition to a green future can be difficult. Between Derrick Jensen's "Endgame 1 & 2" and

Donald R. Liddick's (2006) "Eco-Terrorism", it can seem like opposite sides must be taken. Liddick's book was published by Praeger Publishers which may have a reputation as being influenced by Intelligence agencies. Of course, there is not necessarily anything wrong with patriotism and good intelligence writing is often better than standard academic publishing. "Eco-Terrorism" could, however, be a bit of a propaganda piece. It might knock down weak forms of green arguments to establish those arguments of a more capitalist nature supporting free markets and corporations. Praeger Publishers may also have published "Crimes Against Nature" also by Donald R. Liddick (2011) and "The Rise of the Anti-Corporate Movement" by Evan Osborne (2007). If Green theorists are to take consensus decision-making quite seriously, then bringing the environmental skeptics on board to the gentle transition becomes very important to a Green future.

The question of whether (national) government alone must have a monopoly over the legitimate use of force has been contested for some time. Should national government also have a monopoly of the use of fear, violence, and terror and would this ever be legitimate? Can dissent, protest, and civil disobedience and holding the viewpoint of subversion of the current system be justified? Is the "right to rebel" really an euphemism for the "right to revolt"? It seems one other book: "Crime Wars: The Global Intersection of Crime, Political Violence, and International Law" by Paul Battersby, Joseph M. Siracusa, and Sasho Ripiloski (2011) might be worth reading.

But, books like "Folks, this ain't normal" by Joel Salatin (2011) and "Green is the New Red" by Will Potter (2011) may also be worth reading.

Green theorists sometimes shift the meanings of "rights" and "freedoms" but a book to be published this year by Praeger Publishers about "Eco-psychology" (in two volumes) by Darlyne G. Nemeth, Robert B. Hamilton, and Judy Kuriansky, according to their catalogue would seem to shift some of the standard Green vocabulary. Even "eco-terrorism" is a use of a label with often pejorative connotations. It seems there is a battle going on over the future of Green discourse. We may have to rethink definitions for "genocide" and "ecocide" with both broad and narrow definitions for each and how much powers and authorities whether those of people and families, organizations (religious or otherwise), governments (at all levels), or businesses can be criminalized and especially where and how prevention can best be practiced. The Encyclopedia of Earth website is apparently neutral and non-controversial. Green theory has many essentially contested concepts. Encyclopedia of Earth may also be in the process of updating its ideas of biosecurity and bioterrorism. Antonio Gramsci's ideas of "war of manoeuvre" (real war in physical space) and "war of position" (war of words or what in Michel Foucault's terms could be a discussion and shaping of a discourse space) are pertinent to what is currently happening. John Stuart Mill's "On Liberty" applies to discourse rather well for a standard 'liberal' approach which, itself, is not neutral. It is supposed that Green thinkers clearly realize that much

discussion need not lead to consensus and there can still remain veridical conflicts. Whether the 'soft energy path' and a 'steady state economy' can actually be made to work require further theory and practice too. The making of a fait accompli by mass ecocide or mass genocide (whether these be sudden or gradual) can hopefully be avoided.

Alternative approaches

Several alternative approaches have been developed based on foundationalism, anti-foundationalism, positivism, behaviouralism, structuralism and post-structuralism. These theories however are not widely known.

Behaviouralism in international relations theory is an approach to international relations theory which believes in the unity of science, the idea that the social sciences are not fundamentally different from the natural sciences.

English School

The "English School" of international relations theory, also known as International Society, Liberal Realism, Rationalism or the British institutionalists, maintains that there is a 'society of states' at the international level, despite the condition of "anarchy", i.e., the lack of a ruler or world state. Despite being called the English School many of the academics from this school were neither English nor from the United

Kingdom. A great deal of the work of the English School concerns the examination of traditions of past international theory, casting it, as Martin Wight did in his 1950s-era lectures at the London School of Economics, into three divisions:

- Realist or Hobbesian (after Thomas Hobbes)
- Rationalist (or Grotian, after Hugo Grotius)
- Revolutionist (or Kantian, after Immanuel Kant)

In broad terms, the English School itself has supported the rationalist or Grotian tradition, seeking a middle way (or via media) between the power politics of realism and the "utopianism" of revolutionism. The English School reject behavioralist approaches to international relations theory. The international relations theories have become a typical learning of the fundamental insight and origin of international relations.

Functionalism (international relations)

Functionalism is a theory of international relations that arose during the inter-War period principally from the strong concern about the obsolescence of the State as a form of social organization. Rather than the self-interest of nation-states that realists see as a motivating factor, functionalists focus on common interests and needs shared by states (but also by non-

state actors) in a process of global integration triggered by the erosion of state sovereignty and the increasing weight of knowledge and hence of scientists and experts in the process of policy-making. Its roots can be traced back to the liberal/idealist tradition that started with Kant and goes as far as Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points" speech.

Functionalism is a pioneer in globalisation theory and strategy. States had built authority structures upon a principle of territorialism. State-theories were built upon assumptions that identified the scope of authority with territory, aided by methodological territorialism. Functionalism proposed to build a form of authority based in functions and needs, which linked authority with needs, scientific knowledge, expertise and technology, i.e. it provided a supraterritorial concept of authority. The functionalist approach excludes and refutes the idea of state power and political influence (realist approach) in interpreting the cause for such proliferation of international organizations during the inter-war (which was characterized by nation-state conflict) and the subsequent years.

According to functionalism, international integration – the collective governance and 'material interdependence' (Mitrany, 1933:101) between states – develops its own internal dynamic as states integrate in limited functional, technical, and/or economic areas. International agencies would meet human needs, aided by knowledge and expertise. The benefits rendered by the functional agencies would attract the loyalty of the populations and stimulate their participation and expand

the area of integration. There are strong assumptions underpinning functionalism: 1) That the process of integration takes place within a framework of human freedom, 2) That knowledge and expertise are currently available to meet the needs for which the functional agencies are built. 3) That states will not sabotage the process.

Neofunctionalism

Neofunctionalism reintroduced territorialism in the functional theory and downplayed its global dimension. Neofunctionalism is simultaneously a theory and a strategy of regional integration, building on the work of David Mitrany. Neofunctionalists focused their attention solely on the immediate process of integration among states, i.e. regional integration. Initially, states integrate in limited functional or economic areas. Thereafter, partially integrated states experience increasing momentum for further rounds of integration in related areas. This "invisible hand" of integration phenomenon was termed "spill-over." by the neofunctionalist school. This was most apparent in the study of euthanasia. Although integration can be resisted, it becomes harder to stop integration's reach as it progresses.

According to neofunctionalists, there are two kinds of spillover: functional and political. Functional spillover is the interconnection of various *economic* sectors or issue-areas, and the integration in one policy-area spilling over into others. Political spillover is the creation of supranational governance

models, as far-reaching as the European Union, or as voluntary as the United Nations.

One of its protagonists was Ernst B. Haas, a US political scientist. Jean Monnet's approach to European integration, which aimed at integrating individual sectors in hopes of achieving spill-over effects to further the process of integration, is said to have followed the neofunctional school's tack. Unlike previous theories of integration, neofunctionalism declared to be non-normative and tried to describe and explain the process of regional integration based on empirical data. Integration was regarded as an inevitable process, rather than a desirable state of affairs that could be introduced by the political or technocratic elites of the involved states' societies. Its strength however was also its weakness: While it understood that regional integration is only feasible as an incremental process, its conception of integration as a linear process made the explanation of setbacks impossible.

Comparing Functionalism to Realism

John McCormick compares functionalism's fundamental principles with realism's thus (comments added to emphasise key distinctions) :

	Realism	Functionalism	Comments
Dominant	Military	Peace and	security

goals of actors	security	prosperity	through: Power vs collaboration
Instruments of state policy	Military force and economic instruments	Economic instruments and political acts of will	State policy of assertion vs negotiation
Forces behind agenda formation	Potential shifts in the balance of power and security threats	Initial emphasis on low politics, such as economic and social issues	Agenda sought: maintenance of position vs reaching consensus
Role of international organizations	Minor; limited by state power and the importance of military force	Substantial; new, functional international organizations will formulate policy and become increasingly responsible for implementation	International involvement: minimal vs substantial

Functional Cooperation and Functional International Organization

The objective of functionalism towards global peace is achieved through functional cooperation by the work of international organizations (including intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations). The activities of functional international organizations involve taking actions on practical and technical problems rather than those of military and political nature.

They are also non-controversial politically and involve a common interest to solve international problems that could best be tackled in a transnational manner. According to David Mitrany, dealing with functional matters provides the actors in the international community the opportunity to successfully cooperate in a non-political context, which might otherwise be harder to achieve in a political context.

Further development would lead to a process called "autonomous development" towards multiplication, expansion, and deepening of functional international organizations. Ideally, this would ultimately result in an international government. Functionalists in this manner assume that cooperation in a non-political context would bring international peace. Eradication of existent non-political, non-military global problems, which Functionalists consider to be the very origin of conflict within the global community, is what they aim to pursue. However, critics point out some limitations

of functionalist assumption: 1. In practice, dealing with functional matters does not nessarily and always facilitate cooperation. 2. Its simplified assumption overlooks different causes of state conflict.

The proliferation of functional international organizations has occurred without adequate reorganization and coordination efforts due to a lack of central global governance to ensure accountability of such organizations. As a result, a pattern of decentralization could be observed among functional international organizations to the present day. For example, the League of Nations' effort to coordinate functional international organizations in the field of social and economic cooperation through establishment of UN Economic and Social Council has been futile. As a result, the idea of decentralization prevails to the present day except in cases of special cooperative relationships between Economic and Social Council and some functional organizations. Subsequently, summits such as the World Summit for Social Development in 1995, The Millennium Summit in 2000 and World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 were held to address and coordinate functional cooperation, especially regarding the social and economic aspects.

Substantive functions of functional international organizations include human rights, international communication, health, the law of the sea, the environment, education and information, international relief programs, refugee support, and economic development.

Post-structuralism

Post-structuralism differs from most other approaches to international politics because it does not see itself as a theory, school or paradigm which produces a single account of the subject matter. Instead, post-structuralism is an approach, attitude, or ethos that pursues critique in particular way. Post-structuralism sees critique as an inherently positive exercise that establishes the conditions of possibility for pursuing alternatives.

It states that "Every understanding of international politics depends upon abstraction, representation and interpretation". Scholars associated with post-structuralism in international relations include Richard K. Ashley, James Der Derian, Michael J. Shapiro, R.B.J. Walker, and Lene Hansen.

Postmodernism (international relations)

Postmodern International relations is an approach that has been part of international relations scholarship since the 1980s.

Although there are various strands of thinking, a key element to postmodernist theories is a distrust of any account of human life which claims to have direct access to the "truth". Post-modern international relations theory critiques theories

like Marxism that provide an overarching metanarrative to history. Key postmodern thinkers include Lyotard, Foucault and Derrida.

Criticisms

A criticism made of post-modern approaches to international relations is that they place too much emphasis on theoretical notions and are generally not concerned with the empirical evidence.

Postcolonialism (international relations)

Postcolonial International relations scholarship posits a critical theory approach to International relations (IR), and is a non-mainstream area of international relations scholarship. According to Baylis postcolonial international relations scholarship has been largely ignored by mainstream international relations theorists and has only recently begun to make an impact on the discipline. Post-colonialism focuses on the persistence of colonial forms of power and the continuing existence of racism in world politics.

Postcolonial IR challenges the *eurocentrism* of IR—particularly its parochial assumption that Western Enlightenment thinking is superior, progressive and universally applicable.

Postcolonialists argue that this is enabled through constructing the *Other* as irrational and backwards.

Postcolonial IR attempts to expose such parochial assumptions of IR; for example, in the construction of white versus coloured peoples. An example is the IR story of a *white men's burden* to educate and liberate coloured men and women, to protect coloured women from coloured men. Often this is linked to other postpositivist theories, for example, through Postcolonial feminism, which analyze issues in IR through the lenses of *both* gender and culture. Examples of the parochialistic nature of IR include *geographical parochialism* and *cultural chauvinism*. For the former, the construction of the Cold War era as a time of peace ignores the reality that major conflicts continued in the developing world. Furthermore, the oft-cited history of IR is constructed in western terms (*more information under history*); and IR has been used to justify everything from imperialism to a *playground* for skirmishes between the two Cold War superpowers. For the latter, the West (through IGOs such as the IMF's quick rush to "save" Asia in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–8) could be seen as both a *white men's burden* to save Asia or to reformulate Asian capitalism in a Western image.

Criticisms and defense

Such IR stories are purposefully limited in scope in terms of statecentric modelling, cataloguing and predicting in formal terms; and like other postpositivist theories, they do not

attempt to form an overarching theory as after all, postpositivism is defined as *incredulity towards metanarratives*. This is replaced by a sensitivity and openness to the unintended consequences of metanarratives and their negative impacts on the most marginalised actors in IR. In defence, postpositivists argue that metanarratives have proven unworkable. Thus, such theories, although limited in scope, provide for much greater possibilities in the normative work of developing an emancipatory politics, formulating foreign policy, understanding conflict, and making peace, which takes into account gender, ethnicity, other identity issues, culture, methodology and other common issues that have emerged from problem-solving, rationalist, reductive accounts IR.

Evolutionary perspectives

Evolutionary perspectives, such as from evolutionary psychology, have been argued to help explain many features of international relations. Humans in the ancestral environment did not live in states and likely rarely had interactions with groups outside of a very local area. However, a variety of evolved psychological mechanisms, in particular those for dealing with inter group interactions, are argued to influence current international relations. These include evolved mechanisms for social exchange, cheating and detecting cheating, status conflicts, leadership, ingroup and outgroup distinction and biases, coalitions, and violence. Evolutionary concepts such as inclusive fitness may help explain seeming

limitations of a concept such as egotism which is of fundamental importance to realist and rational choice international relations theories.

Neuroscience and IR

In recent years, with significant advances in neuroscience and neuroimaging tools, IR Theory has benefited from further multidisciplinary contributions. Prof. Nayef Al-Rodhan from Oxford University has argued that neuroscience can significantly advance the IR debate as it brings forward new insights about human nature, which is at the centre of political theory. New tools to scan the human brain, and studies in neurochemistry allow us to grasp what drives divisiveness, conflict, and human nature in general. The theory of human nature in Classical Realism, developed long before the advent of neuroscience, stressed that egoism and competition were central to human behaviour, to politics and social relations. Evidence from neuroscience, however, provides a more nuanced understanding of human nature, which Prof. Al-Rodhan describes as emotional amoral egoistic. These three features can be summarized as follows: 1. emotionality is more pervasive than rationality and central to decision-making, 2. we are born neither moral, nor immoral but *amoral*, and circumstances decide how our moral compass will develop, and finally, 3. we are egoistic insofar as we seek to ensure our survival, which is a basic form of egoism. This neurophilosophy of human nature can also be applied to states

- similarly to the Realist analogy between the character (and flaws) of man and the state in international politics. Prof Al-Rodhan argues there are significant examples in history and contemporary politics that demonstrate states behave less rationality than IR dogma would have us believe: different strategic cultures, habits, identity politics influence state conduct, geopolitics and diplomacy in profound ways.

Queer and transgender perspectives

Queer international relations scholarship aims to broaden the scope and method of traditional international relations theory to include sexed and gendered approaches that are often excluded in the discipline at large. While affiliated with feminist theory and gender studies, as well as post-structuralism, queer IR theory is not reducible to any other field of international relations scholarship. Queer international relations theory works to expose the many ways in which sexualities and gender affect international politics. This includes the ways in which queer subjects and practices are disciplined, normalized, or capitalized on by traditional sites of power; how queer identities have often been the focus of domestic and foreign policy in heteronormative states; and how the order-versus-anarchy dichotomy in traditional international relations theory socially manifests itself in normal-versus-perverse and hetero/homo-normative versus queer dichotomies. Queer IR theory takes sites of traditional international relations scholarship (war and peace,

international political economy, and state and nation building) as its subjects of study. It also expands its scope and methods beyond those traditionally utilized in Realist IR scholarship. Ontologically, queer IR utilizes a different scope from traditional IR, as it aims to non-monolithically address the needs of various queer groups, including trans-, inter-, cross-, and pan- gendered, sexed, and sexualized bodies. Epistemologically, queer IR explores alternative methodologies to those traditionally used in IR, as it emphasizes the sexual dimension of knowledge within international relations.

Criticism for queer theory in general, and queer international relations in particular, addresses worries of the minimization or exclusion of certain groups. While queer IR incorporates transgender individuals in its expanded scope, some argue its emphasis on sexuality fails to adequately capture transgender experiences.

Susan Stryker contests that queer theory's approach merely treats the 'T' in LGBT as another, detached genre of sexual identity, "rather than perceived, like race or class, as something that cuts across existing sexualities, revealing in often unexpected ways the means through which all identities achieve their specificities." While queer theoretical spaces remain friendly to transgender work, Stryker argues that 'queer' often acts as code for 'gays' or 'lesbians,' implicitly excluding transgender issues by privileging sexual orientations and identities. This leads Stryker to advocate that transgender studies follows its own trajectory.

Laura Sjoberg advocates for allying trans-theorizing and feminist theorizing in IR. She suggests some possible improvements that trans-theorizing may offer for feminist IR theory, which include a more nuanced understanding of gender hierarchy through a pluralist approach to sex, a holistic view of gender that resists viewing gender entirely either as a social construction or as biologically essential, and an increased awareness of gender as involving power relations among different sexes and genders. Additionally,

Sjoberg argues, trans-theorizing makes important contributions to traditional IR's understanding of global politics. Discussions of 'outness,' visibility, invisibility, and hypervisibility in transgender theorizing are applicable to questions of identity, relations between individuals and groups, and the enforcement of norms in IR. Additionally, transgender understandings of transition and liminality can fill the gap in traditional IR's need for an account of change and unrest in the international system. Moreover, talk of "crossing" and "passing" in trans-theorizing may assist in explaining the process, logic, and consequences of states shifting identities.

Finally, transgender disidentification, either from exclusionary movements or from their assigned sex, can help in unpacking "the problem of difference" in international relations. As such, Sjoberg advocates for the inclusion of trans-theorizing in feminist IR theory in the interests of improving explanations and understandings of global politics.

Theory in international relations scholarship

Several IR scholars bemoan what they see as a trend away from IR theory in IR scholarship. The September 2013 issue of *European Journal of International Relations* and the June 2015 issue of *Perspectives on Politics* debated the state of IR theory. A 2016 study showed that while theoretical innovations and qualitative analyses are a large part of graduate training, journals favor middle-range theory, quantitative hypothesis testing and methodology for publishing.

Leadership theories

Interest group perspective

Interest group theory posits that the driving force behind state behaviour is sub-state interest groups. Examples of interest groups include political lobbyists, the military, and the corporate sector. Group theory argues that although these interest groups are constitutive of the state, they are also causal forces in the exercise of state power.

Strategic perspective

Strategic perspective is a theoretical approach that views individuals as choosing their actions by taking into account

the anticipated actions and responses of others with the intention of maximizing their own welfare.

Inherent bad faith model in international relations and political psychology

The "inherent bad faith model" of information processing is a theory in political psychology that was first put forth by Ole Holsti to explain the relationship between John Foster Dulles' beliefs and his model of information processing. It is the most widely studied model of one's opponent. A state is presumed to be implacably hostile, and contra-indicators of this are ignored. They are dismissed as propaganda ploys or signs of weakness. Examples are John Foster Dulles' position regarding the Soviet Union, or Israel's initial position on the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

Post-structuralist theories

Post-structuralist theories of IR developed in the 1980s from postmodernist studies in political science. Post-structuralism explores the deconstruction of concepts traditionally not problematic in IR (such as "power" and "agency") and examines how the construction of these concepts shapes international relations. The examination of "narratives" plays an important part in poststructuralist analysis; for example, feminist poststructuralist work has examined the role that "women" play in global society and how they are constructed in war as "innocent" and "civilians".

Levels of analysis

Systemic level concepts

International relations are often viewed in terms of levels of analysis. The systemic level concepts are those broad concepts that define and shape an international milieu, characterized by anarchy.

Sovereignty

Preceding the concepts of interdependence and dependence, international relations relies on the idea of sovereignty. Described in Jean Bodin's "Six Books of the Commonwealth in 1576, the three pivotal points derived from the book describe sovereignty as being a state, that the sovereign power(s) have absolute power over their territories, and that such a power is only limited by the sovereign's "own obligations towards other sovereigns and individuals".

Such a foundation of sovereignty permits, is indicated by a sovereign's obligation to other sovereigns, interdependence and dependence to take place.

While throughout world history there have been instances of groups lacking or losing sovereignty, such as African nations prior to Decolonization or the occupation of Iraq during the Iraq War, there is still a need for sovereignty in terms of assessing international relations.

Power

Power in international relations is defined in several different ways. Modern discourse generally speaks in terms of state power, indicating both economic and military power. Those states that have significant amounts of power within the international system are referred to as small powers, middle powers, regional powers, great powers, superpowers, or hegemons, although there is no commonly accepted standard for what defines a powerful state. NATO Quint, The G7, the BRICS nations and the G20 are seen as forums of governments that exercise varying degrees of influence within the international system. Entities other than states can also be relevant in power acquisition in international relations. Such entities can include multilateral international organizations, military alliance organizations like NATO, multinational corporations like Wal-Mart, non-governmental organizations such as the Roman Catholic Church, or other institutions such as the Hanseatic League.

Concepts of political power

Political scientists, historians, and practitioners of international relations (diplomats) have used the following concepts of political power:

- Power as a goal of states or leaders;
- Power as a measure of influence or control over outcomes, events, actors and issues;

- Power as victory in conflict and the attainment of security;
- Power as control over resources and capabilities;
- Power as status, which some states or actors possess and others do not.

Power as a goal

Primary usage of "power" as a goal in international relations belongs to political theorists, such as Niccolò Machiavelli and Hans Morgenthau. Especially among Classical Realist thinkers, power is an inherent goal of mankind and of states. Economic growth, military growth, cultural spread etc. can all be considered as working towards the ultimate goal of international power. The German military thinker Carl von Clausewitz is considered to be the quintessential projection of European growth across the continent. In more modern times, Claus Moser has elucidated theories centre of distribution of power in Europe after the Holocaust, and the power of universal learning as its counterpoint. Jean Monnet was a French left-wing social theorist, stimulating expansive Eurocommunism, who followed on the creator of modern European community, the diplomat and statesman Robert Schuman.

Power as influence

Political scientists principally use "power" in terms of an actor's ability to exercise influence over other actors within the international system. This influence can be coercive,

attractive, cooperative, or competitive. Mechanisms of influence can include the threat or use of force, economic interaction or pressure, diplomacy, and cultural exchange.

Under certain circumstances, states can organize a sphere of influence or a bloc within which they exercise predominant influence. Historical examples include the spheres of influence recognized under the Concert of Europe, or the recognition of spheres during the Cold War following the Yalta Conference. The Warsaw Pact, the "Free World", and the Non-Aligned Movement were the blocs that arose out of the Cold War contest. Military alliances like NATO and the Warsaw Pact are another forum through which influence is exercised. However, "realist" theory attempted to maintain the balance of power from the development of meaningful diplomatic relations that can create a hegemony within the region. British foreign policy, for example, dominated Europe through the Congress of Vienna after the defeat of France. They continued the balancing act with the Congress of Berlin in 1878, to appease Russia and Germany from attacking Turkey. Britain has sided against the aggressors on the European continent—i.e. the German Empire, Nazi Germany, Napoleonic France or Habsburg Austria, known during the Great War as the Central Powers and, in the World War Two were called the Axis Powers.

Power as security

Power is also used when describing states or actors that have achieved military victories or security for their state in the

international system. This general usage is most commonly found among the writings of historians or popular writers. For instance, a state that has achieved a string of combat victories in a military campaign against other states can be described as powerful. An actor that has succeeded in protecting its security, sovereignty, or strategic interests from repeated or significant challenge can also be described as powerful.

Power as capability

American author Charles W. Freeman, Jr. described power as the following:

- Power is the capacity to direct the decisions and actions of others. Power derives from strength and will. Strength comes from the transformation of resources into capabilities. Will infuses objectives with resolve. Strategy marshals capabilities and brings them to bear with precision. Statecraft seeks through strategy to magnify the mass, relevance, impact, and irresistibility of power. It guides the ways the state deploys and applies its power abroad. These ways embrace the arts of war, espionage, and diplomacy. The practitioners of these three arts are the paladins of statecraft.

Power is also used to describe the resources and capabilities of a state. This definition is quantitative and is most often used by geopoliticians and the military. Capabilities are thought of in tangible terms—they are measurable, weighable, quantifiable assets. A good example for this kind of

measurement is the *Composite Indicator on Aggregate Power*, which involves 54 indicators and covers the capabilities of 44 states in Asia-Pacific from 1992 to 2012. Thomas Hobbes spoke of power as "present means to obtain some future apparent good." Hard power can be treated as a potential and is not often enforced on the international stage.

Chinese strategists have such a concept of national power that can be measured quantitatively using an index known as comprehensive national power.

Chapter 3

Power Relations and War Politics

International Relations and post cold wars

Much effort in academic and popular writing is devoted to deciding which countries have the status of "power", and how this can be measured. If a country has "power" (as influence) in military, diplomatic, cultural, and economic spheres, it might be called a "power" (as status). There are several categories of power, and inclusion of a state in one category or another is fraught with difficulty and controversy. In his famous 1987 work, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers,* British-American historian Paul Kennedy charts the relative status of the various powers from AD 1500 to 2000. He does not begin the book with a theoretical definition of a "great power"; however he does list them, separately, for many different eras. Moreover, he uses different working definitions of a great power for different eras. For example:

- "France was not strong enough to oppose Germany in a one-to-one struggle... If the mark of a Great Power is country which is willing to take on any other, then France (like Austria-Hungary) had slipped to a lower position. But that definition seemed too abstract in 1914 to a nation geared up for war, militarily

stronger than ever, wealthy, and, above all, endowed with powerful allies."

Categories of power

In the modern geopolitical landscape, a number of terms are used to describe various types of powers, which include the following:

- *Superpower*: In 1944, William T. R. Fox defined *superpower* as "great power plus great mobility of power" and identified three states, the British Empire, the Soviet Union and the United States. With the decolonisation of the British Empire following World War II, and then the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States is currently the only country considered to be a superpower.
- *Great power*: In historical mentions, the term *great power* refers to the states that have strong political, cultural and economical influence over nations around them and across the world.
- *Middle power*: A subjective description of influential second-tier states that could not quite be described as great or small powers. A middle power has sufficient strength and authority to stand on its own without the need of help from others (particularly in the realm of security) and takes diplomatic leads in regional and global affairs. Clearly not all middle powers are of equal status; some are members of forums such as the G20 and play important roles in

the United Nations and other international organisations such as the WTO.

- *Small power*: The International System is for the most part made up by *small powers*. They are instruments of the other powers and may at times be dominated; but they cannot be ignored.

Other categories:

- *Regional power*: This term is used to describe a nation that exercises influence and power within a region. Being a *regional power* is not mutually exclusive with any of the other categories of power. The majority of them exert a strategic degree of influence as minor or secondary regional powers. A primary regional power (like Australia) has often an important role in international affairs outside of its region too.
- *Cultural superpower*: Refers to a country whose culture, arts or entertainment have worldwide appeal, significant international popularity or large influence on much of the world. Countries such as Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States have often been described as cultural superpowers, although it is sometimes debated on which one meets such criteria. Unlike traditional forms of national power, the term cultural superpower is in reference to a nation's Soft power capabilities.
- *Energy superpower*: Describes a country that supplies large amounts of energy resources (crude oil, natural gas, coal, uranium, etc.) to a significant

number of other states, and therefore has the potential to influence world markets to gain a political or economic advantage. Saudi Arabia and Russia, are generally acknowledged as the world's current energy superpowers, given their abilities to globally influence or even directly control prices to certain countries. Australia and Canada are potential energy superpowers due to their large natural resources.

Hard, soft, smart and just power

Some political scientists distinguish between two types of power: Hard and Soft. The former is coercive while the latter is attractive.

Hard power refers to coercive tactics: the threat or use of armed forces, economic pressure or sanctions, assassination and subterfuge, or other forms of intimidation. Hard power is generally associated to the stronger of nations, as the ability to change the domestic affairs of other nations through military threats. Realists and neorealists, such as John Mearsheimer, are advocates of the use of such power for the balancing of the international system.

Joseph Nye is the leading proponent and theorist of soft power. Instruments of soft power include debates on cultural values, dialogues on ideology, the attempt to influence through good example, and the appeal to commonly accepted human values. Means of exercising soft power include diplomacy,

dissemination of information, analysis, propaganda, and cultural programming to achieve political ends.

Others have synthesized soft and hard power, including through the field of smart power. This is often a call to use a holistic spectrum of statecraft tools, ranging from soft to hard.

Oxford University Professor Nayef Al-Rodhan also introduced the concept of Just Power, stating that any foreign policy must be smart as well as just. In the 21st century, countries that want to exert influence and enjoy legitimacy on the international stage must be perceived as respectful of the collective dignity of others, and they must adhere to international law and norms.

European powers of the modern age

During the time of the Renaissance, powers in Europe included Spain, Portugal, England, France, the Habsburg Empire, Poland–Lithuania and the Ottoman Empire. Bolstered by shipments of gold and silver from the Americas, the Spanish Habsburg dynasty emerged as a dominant force and regularly launched military interventions to project its power and defend Catholicism, while its rival, France, was torn apart by religious civil war. Meanwhile, in Eastern Europe, the Ottoman Empire reached its zenith and completed its conquest of the Balkan region.

During the 17th century the Netherlands and Sweden were added to the group, whilst the Ottomans, Poland and Spain

gradually declined in power and influence. France progressively grew stronger and by the latter part of the century found itself repeatedly facing alliances designed to hold its military power in check.

In the 18th century, Great Britain (formed from a union of England and Scotland) progressively gained strength and Russia and Prussia also saw their importance increase, while Sweden and the Dutch Republic declined. Great Britain and France increasingly struggled for dominance both on the continent and abroad (notably in North America, the Caribbean and India). By the century's end, the British had established themselves as the foremost naval power while the French were dominant on land, conquering many of their neighbors during the French Revolutionary Wars and establishing client republics. The struggle between the two nations ended only in 1815 with the final defeat of the French under Napoleon.

During the 19th century, there was an informal convention recognising five Great Powers in Europe: the French Empire, the British Empire, the Russian Empire, the Austrian Empire (later Austria-Hungary) and the Kingdom of Prussia (later the German Empire). In the late 19th century the newly united Italy was added to this group.

National interest

Perhaps the most significant concept behind that of power and sovereignty, national interest is a state’s action in relation to

other states where it seeks to gain advantage or benefits to itself. National interest, whether aspirational or operational, is divided by core/vital and peripheral/non-vital interests. Core or vital interests constitute the things which a country is willing to defend or expand with conflict such as territory, ideology (religious, political, economic), or its citizens. Peripheral or non-vital are interests which a state is willing to compromise. For example, in the German annexation of the Sudetenland in 1938 (a part of Czechoslovakia) under the Munich Agreement, Czechoslovakia was willing to relinquish territory which was considered ethnically German in order to preserve its own integrity and sovereignty.

Non-state actors

In the 21st century, the status-quo of the international system is no longer monopolized by states alone. Rather, it is the presence of non-state actors, who autonomously act to implement unpredictable behaviour to the international system. Whether it is transnational corporations, liberation movements, non-governmental agencies, or international organizations, these entities have the potential to significantly influence the outcome of any international transaction. Additionally, this also includes the individual person as while the individual is what constitutes the states collective entity, the individual does have the potential to also create unpredicted behaviours. Al-Qaeda, as an example of a non-state actor, has significantly influenced the way states (and non-state actors) conduct international affairs.

Power blocs

The existence of power blocs in international relations is a significant factor related to polarity. During the Cold War, the alignment of several nations to one side or another based on ideological differences or national interests has become an endemic feature of international relations. Unlike prior, shorter-term blocs, the Western and Soviet blocs sought to spread their national ideological differences to other nations. Leaders like U.S. President Harry S. Truman under the Truman Doctrine believed it was necessary to spread democracy whereas the Warsaw Pact under Soviet policy sought to spread communism. After the Cold War, and the dissolution of the ideologically homogeneous Eastern bloc still gave rise to others such as the South-South Cooperation movement.

Polarity

Polarity in international relations refers to the arrangement of power within the international system. The concept arose from bipolarity during the Cold War, with the international system dominated by the conflict between two superpowers, and has been applied retrospectively by theorists. However, the term bipolar was notably used by Stalin who said he saw the international system as a bipolar one with two opposing powerbases and ideologies. Consequently, the international system prior to 1945 can be described as multipolar, with power being shared among Great powers.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 had led to unipolarity, with the United States as a sole superpower, although many refuse to acknowledge the fact. China's continued rapid economic growth (in 2010 it became the world's second-largest economy), combined with the respectable international position they hold within political spheres and the power that the Chinese Government exerts over their people (consisting of the largest population in the world), resulted in debate over whether China is now a superpower or a possible candidate in the future. However, China's strategic force unable of projecting power beyond its region and its nuclear arsenal of 250 warheads (compared to 7700 of the United States) mean that the unipolarity will persist in the policy-relevant future.

Several theories of international relations draw upon the idea of polarity. The balance of power was a concept prevalent in Europe prior to the First World War, the thought being that by balancing power blocs it would create stability and prevent war. Theories of the balance of power gained prominence again during the Cold War, being a central mechanism of Kenneth Waltz's Neorealism. Here, the concepts of balancing (rising in power to counter another) and bandwagonning (siding with another) are developed.

Robert Gilpin's Hegemonic stability theory also draws upon the idea of polarity, specifically the state of unipolarity. Hegemony is the preponderance of power at one pole in the international system, and the theory argues this is a stable configuration because of mutual gains by both the dominant power and

others in the international system. This is contrary to many neorealist arguments, particularly made by Kenneth Waltz, stating that the end of the Cold War and the state of unipolarity is an unstable configuration that will inevitably change.

The case of Gilpin proved to be correct and Waltz's article titled "The Stability of a Bipolar World" was followed in 1999 by William Wohlforth's article titled "The Stability of a Unipolar World"

Waltz's thesis can be expressed in power transition theory, which states that it is likely that a great power would challenge a hegemon after a certain period, resulting in a major war. It suggests that while hegemony can control the occurrence of wars, it also results in the creation of one. Its main proponent, A. F. K. Organski, argued this based on the occurrence of previous wars during British, Portuguese, and Dutch hegemony.

Interdependence

Many advocate that the current international system is characterized by growing interdependence; the mutual responsibility and dependency on others. Advocates of this point to growing globalization, particularly with international economic interaction. The role of international institutions, and widespread acceptance of a number of operating principles

in the international system, reinforces ideas that relations are characterized by interdependence.

Dependency

Dependency theory is a theory most commonly associated with Marxism, stating that a set of core states exploit a set of weaker periphery states for their prosperity. Various versions of the theory suggest that this is either an inevitability (standard dependency theory), or use the theory to highlight the necessity for change (Neo-Marxist).

Systemic tools of international relations

- Diplomacy is the practice of communication and negotiation between representatives of states. To some extent, all other tools of international relations can be considered the failure of diplomacy. Keeping in mind, the use of other tools are part of the communication and negotiation inherent within diplomacy. Sanctions, force, and adjusting trade regulations, while not typically considered part of diplomacy, are actually valuable tools in the interest of leverage and placement in negotiations.
- Sanctions are usually a first resort after the failure of diplomacy, and are one of the main tools used to enforce treaties. They can take the form of diplomatic or economic sanctions and involve the cutting of ties and imposition of barriers to communication or trade.

- War, the use of force, is often thought of as the ultimate tool of international relations. A widely accepted definition is that given by Clausewitz, with war being "the continuation of politics by other means". There is a growing study into "new wars" involving actors other than states. The study of war in international relations is covered by the disciplines of "war studies" and "strategic studies".
- The mobilization of international shame can also be thought of as a tool of international relations. This is attempting to alter states' actions through 'naming and shaming' at the international level. This is mostly done by the large human rights NGOs such as Amnesty International (for instance when it called Guantanamo Bay a "Gulag"), or Human Rights Watch. A prominent use of was the UN Commission on Human Rights 1235 procedure, which publicly exposes state's human rights violations. The current UN Human Rights Council has yet to use this mechanism
- The allotment of economic and/or diplomatic benefits such as the European Union's enlargement policy; candidate countries are only allowed to join if they meet the Copenhagen criteria.

Unit-level concepts in international relations

As a level of analysis the unit level is often referred to as the state level, as it locates its explanation at the level of the state, rather than the international system.

Regime type

It is often considered that a state's form of government can dictate the way that a state interacts with others in the international system.

Democratic peace theory is a theory that suggests that the nature of democracy means that democratic countries will not go to war with each other. The justifications for this are that democracies externalize their norms and only go to war for just causes, and that democracy encourages mutual trust and respect.

Communism justifies a world revolution, which similarly would lead to peaceful coexistence, based on a proletarian global society.

Revisionism/status quo

States can be classified by whether they accept the international status quo, or are revisionist—i.e., want change. Revisionist states seek to fundamentally change the rules and practices of international relations, feeling disadvantaged by the status quo. They see the international system as a largely western creation which serves to reinforce current realities. Japan is an example of a state that has gone from being a revisionist state to one that is satisfied with the status quo, because the status quo is now beneficial to it.

Religion

Religion can have an effect on the way a state acts within the international system. Different theoretical perspectives treat it in somewhat different fashion. One dramatic example is the Thirty Years' War (1618–48) that ravaged much of Europe. Religion is visible as an organizing principle particularly for Islamic states, whereas secularism sits at the other end of the spectrum, with the separation of state and religion being responsible for the liberal international relations theory. Events since the September 11 attacks in the United States, the role of Islam in terrorism, and the strife in the Middle East have made it a major topic.

Individual or sub-unit level concepts

The level beneath the unit (state) level can be useful both for explaining factors in international relations that other theories fail to explain, and for moving away from a state-centric view of international relations.

- Psychological factors in international relations – Evaluating psychological factors in international relations comes from the understanding that a state is not a "black box" as proposed by realism, and that there may be other influences on foreign policy decisions. Examining the role of personalities in the decision making process can have some explanatory power, as can the role of misperception between various actors. A prominent application of sub-unit

level psychological factors in international relations is the concept of Groupthink, another is the propensity of policymakers to think in terms of analogies.

- Bureaucratic politics – Looks at the role of the bureaucracy in decision making, and sees decisions as a result of bureaucratic in-fighting, and as having been shaped by various constraints.
- Religious, ethnic, and secessionist groups – Viewing these aspects of the sub-unit level has explanatory power with regards to ethnic conflicts, religious wars, transnational diaspora (diaspora politics) and other actors which do not consider themselves to fit with the defined state boundaries. This is particularly useful in the context of the pre-modern world of weak states.
- Science, technology and international relations – How science and technology impact global health, business, environment, technology, and development.
- International political economy, and economic factors in international relations
- International political culturology – Looks at how culture and cultural variables impact in international relations
- Personal relations between leaders

Feminism (international relations)

Feminism is a broad term given to works of those scholars who have sought to bring gender concerns into the academic study of international politics.

In terms of international relations (IR) theory it is important to understand that feminism is derived from the school of thought known as reflectionism. One of the most influential works in feminist IR is Cynthia Enloe's *Bananas, Beaches and Bases* (Pandora Press 1990). This text sought to chart the many different roles that women play in international politics - as plantation sector workers, diplomatic wives, sex workers on military bases etc. The important point of this work was to emphasize how, when looking at international politics from the perspective of women, one is forced to reconsider his or her personal assumptions regarding what international politics is 'all about'.

However, it would be a mistake to think that feminist IR was solely a matter of identifying how many groups of women are positioned in the international political system. From its inception, feminist IR has always shown a strong concern with thinking about men and, in particular, masculinities. Indeed, many IR feminists argue that the discipline is inherently masculine in nature. For example, in her article "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals" *Signs* (1988), Carol Cohn claimed that a highly masculinised culture within the defense establishment contributed to the divorcing of war from human emotion.

A feminist IR involves looking at how international politics affects and is affected by both men and women and also at how the core concepts that are employed within the discipline of IR (e.g. war, security, etc.) are themselves gendered. Feminist IR

has not only concerned itself with the traditional focus of IR on states, wars, diplomacy and security, but feminist IR scholars have also emphasized the importance of looking at how gender shapes the current global political economy. In this sense, there is no clear cut division between feminists working in IR and those working in the area of International Political Economy (IPE).

Feminist IR emerged largely from the late 1980s onwards. The end of the Cold War and the re-evaluation of traditional IR theory during the 1990s opened up a space for gendering International Relations. Because feminist IR is linked broadly to the critical project in IR, by and large most feminist scholarship has sought to problematise the politics of knowledge construction within the discipline - often by adopting methodologies of deconstructivism associated with postmodernism/poststructuralism. However, the growing influence of feminist and women-centric approaches within the international policy communities (for example at the World Bank and the United Nations) is more reflective of the liberal feminist emphasis on equality of opportunity for women.

In regards to feminism in International Relations, some of the founding feminist IR scholars refer to using a "feminist consciousness" when looking at gender issues in politics. In Cynthia Enloe's article "Gender is not enough: the need for a feminist consciousness", Enloe explains how International Relations needs to include masculinity in the discussion on war, while also giving attention to the issues surrounding

women and girls. In order to do so, Enloe urges International Relations scholars to look at issues with a 'feminist consciousness', which will ultimately include a perspective sensitive to masculinities and femininities. In this way, the feminist consciousness, together with a gendered lens, allows for IR academics to discuss International Politics with a deeper appreciation and understanding of issues pertaining to gender around the world.

Enloe argues how the IR discipline continues to lack serious analysis of the experiences, actions and ideas of girls and women in the international arena, and how this ultimately excludes them from the discussion in IR. For instance, Enloe explains Carol Cohn's experience using a feminist consciousness while participating in the drafting of a document that outlines the actions taken in negotiating ceasefires, peace agreements and new constitutions. During this event, those involved came up with the word "combatant" to describe those in need during these usually high-strung negotiations. The use of 'combatant' in this context is particularly problematic as Carol points out, because it implies one type of militarized people, generally men carrying guns, and excludes the women and girls deployed as porters, cooks and forced 'wives' of male combatants. This term effectively renders the needs of these women invisible, and excludes them from the particularly critical IR conversation regarding who needs what in war and peace. This discussion is crucial for the analysis of how various masculinities are at play in International Politics, and how those masculinities affect

women and girls during wartime and peace and initially eliminates them from the discussion.

Conversely, feminist IR scholar Charlotte Hooper effectively applies a feminist consciousness when considering how "IR disciplines men as much as men shape IR". So, instead of focusing on what and whom IR excludes from the conversation, Hooper focuses on how masculine identities are perpetuated and ultimately are the products of the practice of IR. In this way, it is ineffective to use a gendered lens and feminist consciousness to analyze the exclusion of a discussion in gender in IR. Hooper suggests that a deeper examination of the ontological and epistemological ways in which IR has been inherently a masculine discipline is needed. The innate masculinity of IR is because men compose the vast majority of modern IR scholars, and their masculine identities have been socially constructed over time through various political progressions. For instance, Hooper gives examples of the historical and political developments of masculinities that are still prevalent in IR and society at large; the Greek citizen/warrior model, the Judeo Christian model and the Protestant bourgeois rationalist model. These track the masculine identities throughout history, where manliness is measured in militarism and citizenship, ownership and authority of the fathers, and finally, competitive individualism and reason. These masculinities in turn asks one to not only use the feminist consciousness to analyze the exclusions of femininities from IR, but additionally, Hooper illuminates how

one can locate the inherent inclusions of masculinities in the field of IR with a feminist consciousness.

Feminist Anti-Militarism

Feminists within IR often look to how conceptions of masculinity have shaped foreign policy, state identity, and security and armament during and outside of warfare. One tradition that exists within the field for this purpose is that of feminist anti-militarism. This is a stance within Feminist International Relations that opposes weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear weaponry, and holds gender accountable in part for the propagation of militarism. Gender becomes embedded in relations of power as that which is seen to be stronger is assigned a masculinized identity, while concepts such as emotion are seen as indicators of weakness and become associated with femininity. In this way, the military strength and capability of a state becomes associated with its degree of masculinity, which feminist anti-militarists see as problematic. As disarmament could be perceived as emasculatory, states are less likely to disarm; consequently, militarism becomes normalized, downplayed, and more likely to incite warfare. These are some of the concepts that Carol Cohn and Sara Ruddick explored in their article "Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction," (2003) which laid out the meaning behind what they referred to as "anti-war feminism". They explain that it opposes the use of weapons of mass destruction whether for military, political, or deterring purposes, yet that it differs from pacifism in that it does not

outright reject all forms of warfare. Such opposition stems partly from the questionability of how effective warfare/militarism is, and whether the costs, (albeit monetary, environmental, and especially human) that are inevitably incurred yet not always accounted, for are worth it.

Manifestations of feminist anti-militarism can be identified in various contexts and methods. In line with Cohn and Ruddick's (2003) aforementioned article, part of what feminist anti-militarism critiques is the framework in which weapons of mass destruction are "discussed". Such discourse assumedly would have large influence in the outcome, as investigated by Cohn in one of her earlier articles, "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals." Her participation in security discussions allowed her to observe the way in which the "technostrategic" language used by American defense intellectuals was highly gendered, and assigned greater value and strength to that which was assigned masculine or highly sexualized terminology. While Cohn does not explicitly identify the use of a feminist anti-militarist view in this article, the ideas and subjects at hand run parallel. Relatedly, Claire Duncanson and Catherine Eschle do state their use of a feminist anti-militarist perspective in their article "Gender and the Nuclear Weapons State: A Feminist Critique of the UK Government's White Paper on Trident". The authors borrow Cohn's rendition of the relationship between gender and nuclear weapons to examine the way in which discourses are shaped by underlying dichotomous views of masculinity and femininity. This perspective is then applied to the renewal of

Trident nuclear weapons, a plan which Duncanson and Eschl argue is enabled by the UK government's use of masculinized language that seems to be constructed into the state's identity. The UK Trident Program was the cause of another expression of feminist anti-militarism, beginning a few decades earlier in the form of the Greenham Common Women's Peace Camp. The 1979 decision by NATO to base ground cruise missiles at Greenham Common initiated a response from women largely associated with various feminist and anti-nuclear groups. Their opposition to such militarism was demonstrated in the persistence of peace camps, demonstrations and other forms of resistance for the following two decades (nat. archive website). Such efforts brought to life the feminist anti-militarist perception of the relationship between gender and militarism as exhibited through nuclear weaponry.

Gender Theory and Feminisms

Gender theory highlights the limitations of linguistic categories, asserts the significance of intersectionality, values concrete cultural context over universalisms and essentialisms (for example, the notion of universal patriarchy), rigorously problematizes sex and gender binaries, recounts and accounts for the history of sex and gender relations, and deals directly with other theoretical strains such as structuralism, post-structuralism, socialism, and psychoanalysis. For example, in her book *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*, Judith Butler explores the possibility of *troubling gender* first by examining conventional understandings of

gender that support masculine hegemony and heterosexist power, and subsequently wondering about the extent to which one can undermine such constitutive categories (that is, male/female, man/woman) through continually mobilizing, subverting, and proliferating the very foundational illusions of identity which seek to keep gender in its place. Gender theory can inform critical lenses and perspectives such as Cynthia Enloe's "feminist consciousness," as well as other feminist perspectives such as *liberal feminism*, *difference feminism*, and *poststructuralist feminism*. In terms of feminist international relations, gender theory engages directly with the notion of mainstreaming gender in both *institutional politics* and *discursive politics*.

Liberal feminism deals specifically with policy-making, and requires that women as well as perspectives on both women's and men's lived realities are fairly included and represented in that policy-making. With regard to liberal feminism, gender theory contemplates, for example, what is meant by the term "women," whose perspectives on "women's" and "men's" lived realities are considered valuable in facilitating fair representation in policy-making, and what aspects of life are considered components of "lived reality".

Difference feminism focusses on empowering women in particular through specific designs, implementations, and evaluations of policies that account for the material and cultural differences between men and women and their significance. With regard to difference feminism, gender theory

questions, again, what is meant by the term "women;" what factors might lead to "women" requiring specific designs, implementations, and evaluations of policies; what is considered to constitute "difference" in the material and cultural experience of "men" and "women;" and what aspects of that "difference" suppose its especial significance.

Poststructuralist feminism prioritizes difference and diversity to the extent that it recognizes all identities as absolutely contingent social constructions. With regard to poststructuralist feminism, gender theory points out that due to this ontological and epistemological discursiveness, poststructuralist feminism can, in some cases, risk understanding the subjects in policy-making as distinct social subjectivities primarily and/or exclusively in terms of gender difference, rather than in terms of the multiplicities of difference that comprise subjectivities in poststructural feminist thought.

Institutional politics describes the political, material, bureaucratic, and organizational relationships and conventions that govern administrative institutions. Gender theory seeks to examine the ways in which these normalized relationships and conventions shape the policy-making processes of and within these institutions.

Discursive politics refers to the ways in which institutionalized norms, policy procedures, organizational identities, and material structures shape the language and meaning of gender

equality and/or difference therein. Gender theory, with regard to discursive politics, for instance, would examine the identities, the constitutive categories, created and/or perpetuated by the language and meaning of gender equality and/or difference in such international institutions.

Barriers to femininities and female bodies

A feminist approach to international relations also provides analyses for not only theoretical understandings of gender relations, but also the consequences that perpetuate the subordination of femininities and female-bodies. 'Women' (female bodies + performed femininities) endure a higher level of criticism for their actions, personalities, and behaviors within the public and private spheres, particularly while running for political office, whether this at the local or national levels. This is due to a perception of politically ambitious women as either being too feminine or too masculine, to be capable of the job that certain offices demand. This is typically linked to the ideal that women will take care of 'women's issues', such as education and abortion, while men will take care of 'men's issues' such as the military, national security, and the economy. It is critical that researchers seek to explain further the barriers that women endure in their attempts to attain political office on any level. To begin with, there must be a consideration of women's socioeconomic status, and thus a difficulty in funding a campaign. While women are more educated in the western world than ever before, the average women's socioeconomic

powers still do not match the average man's. This results in a further consequence for women, as employment is positively related to one's ability to attain political information, and to build internal political efficacy. Thus, not only does socioeconomic status lead to a lesser ability to finance a political campaign for women, but it also leads to lower levels of political efficacy, impacting women's participation in politics from the very beginning.

Further barriers exist into women's entrance into politics, which include, but are not limited to, attachment to the private sphere and the scrutiny of the media. Media coverage of campaigns can be particularly detrimental to a woman's ability to attain political office. The media focuses far more on physical appearance and lifestyle, rather than the prominent political questions of the campaign, for female candidates. Further, women receive less overall media coverage, the media questions women's abilities and potential for future power, as well as focusing on what are deemed as 'women's issues'. These kinds of coverage discourage voters from voting or contributing to the campaigns of female candidates, and moreover, discourage women from entering into a campaign. Thus, the media has demonstrated its ability to deem candidates either capable or ill-suited for political office, simply through the dialogue in which they use, that perpetuates systems of disqualification for women. These dialogues place men in positions of high politics, and reinforce symbolic understandings of 'women's issues' versus 'men's issues', and who best represents offices of high-politics due to

naturalized understandings of individual's bodies and gendered identities. Through a feminist lens of international relations however, we may understand the systemic nature of these perceptions of the relationships between bodies and identities in order to discount popular dialogue, and find places for women within high-politics.

Critique

Certain parts of the academic realm of IR theory did not offer the feminist perspective serious attention because of differences with its ways of addressing problems within the discipline. Some circles within social sciences are increasingly employing a hypothetico-deductivist way of looking at social phenomena. In that context, feminist perspective is criticized for providing a more politically engaged way of looking at issues than a problem-solving way. Robert Keohane has suggested that feminists formulate verifiable problems, collect data, and proceed only scientifically when attempting to solve issues. Unsurprisingly, Keohane's suggestion received a cold reaction from feminists; one particular rebuttal was entitled "You Still Don't Understand: Why Troubled Engagements Continue between Feminists and (Critical) IPE."

Introduction and the Evolution of World Politics

World politics names both the discipline that studies the political and economical patterns of the world and the field that is being studied. At the centre of that field are the

different processes of political globalization in relation to questions of social power.

The discipline studies the relationships between cities, nation-states, shell-states, multinational corporations, non-governmental organizations and international organizations. Current areas of discussion include national and ethnic conflict regulation, democracy and the politics of national self-determination, globalization and its relationship to democracy, conflict and peace studies, comparative politics, political economy, and the international political economy of the environment. One important area of world politics is contestation in the world political sphere over legitimacy.

It can be argued that world politics should be distinguished from the field of international politics, which seeks to understand political relations between nation-states, and thus has a narrower scope. Similarly, international relations, which seeks to understand general economic and political relations between nation-states, is a narrower field than world politics.

Defining the field

Beginning in the late nineteenth century, several groups extended the definition of the political community beyond nation-states to include much, if not all, of humanity. These "internationalists" include Marxists, human rights advocates, environmentalists, peace activists, feminists, and dalits. This

was the general direction of thinking on world politics, though the term was not used as such.

Today, the practices of world politics are defined by values: norms of human rights, ideas of human development, and beliefs such as Internationalism or cosmopolitanism about how we should relate to each. Over the last couple of decades cosmopolitanism has become one of the key contested ideologies of world politics:

- Cosmopolitanism can be defined as a world politics that, firstly, projects a sociality of common political engagement among all human beings across the globe, and, secondly, suggests that this sociality should be either ethically or organizationally privileged over other forms of sociality.

Debates

The intensification of globalization led some writers to suggest that states were no longer relevant to world politics. This view has been subject to debate:

- On the other hand, other commentators have been arguing that states have remained essential to world politics. They have facilitated globalizing processes and projects; not been eclipsed by them. They have been rejuvenated because, among other reasons, they are still the primary providers of (military) security in the world arena; they are still the

paramount loci for articulating the voices of (procedurally democratic) national communities, and for ordering their interactions with similar polities; and finally, they are indispensable to relations of (unequal) economic exchange insofar as they legitimize and enforce the world legal frameworks that enable globalization in the first place.

Global administrative law

Global administrative law is an emerging field that is based upon a dual insight: that much of what is usually termed "global governance" can be accurately characterized as administrative action; and that increasingly such action is itself being regulated by administrative law-type principles, rules and mechanisms – in particular those relating to participation, transparency, accountability and review. GAL, then, refers to the structures, procedures and normative standards for regulatory decision-making including transparency, participation, and review, and the rule-governed mechanisms for implementing these standards, that are applicable to formal intergovernmental regulatory bodies; to informal intergovernmental regulatory networks; to regulatory decisions of national governments where these are part of or constrained by an international intergovernmental regime; and to hybrid public-private or private transnational bodies. The focus of this field is not the specific content of substantive rules, but rather the operation of existing or possible principles, procedural rules and reviewing and other

mechanisms relating to accountability, transparency, participation, and assurance of legality in global governance.

Today almost all human activity is subject to some form of global regulation. Goods and activities that are beyond the effective control of any one State are regulated at the global level. Global regulatory regimes cover a vast array of different subject-areas, including forest preservation, the control of fishing, water regulation, environmental protection, arms control, food safety and standardization, financial and accounting standards, internet governance, pharmaceuticals regulation, intellectual property protection, refugee protection, coffee and cocoa standards, labour standards, antitrust regulation, to name but a very few. This increase in the number and scope of regulatory regimes has been matched by the huge growth of international organizations: nowadays over 2,000 intergovernmental organizations (IGO) and around 40,000 Non-governmental organizations (NGO) are operating worldwide.

There are, of course, great differences among the various different types of regulatory regimes. Some merely provide a framework for State action, whereas others establish guidelines addressed to domestic administrative agencies, and others still impact directly upon national civil society actors. Some regulatory regimes create their own implementation mechanisms, while others rely on national or regional authorities for this task. To settle disputes, some regulatory regimes have established judicial (or quasi-judicial) bodies, or

refer to those of different regimes; while others resort to "softer" forms, such as negotiation. Within this framework, the traditional mechanisms based on State consent as expressed through treaties or custom are simply no longer capable of accounting for all global activities.

A new regulatory space is emerging, distinct from that of inter-State relations, transcending the sphere of influence of both international law and domestic administrative law: this can be defined as the global administrative space. IOs have become much more than instruments of the governments of their Member States; rather, they set their own norms and regulate their field of activity; they generate and follow their own, particular legal proceedings; and they can grant participatory rights to subjects, both public and private, affected by their activities. Ultimately, they have emerged as genuine global public administrations.

In other words, the structures, procedures and normative standards for regulatory decision-making applicable to global institutions (including transparency, participation, and review), and the rule-governed mechanisms for implementing these standards are coming to form a specific field of legal theory and practice: that of global administrative law.

The main focus of this emerging field is not the particular content of substantive rules generated by global regulatory institutions, but rather the actual or potential application of principles, procedural rules and reviewing and other

mechanisms relating to accountability, transparency, participation, and the rule of law in global governance.

Asia Council

The Asia Council is a pan-Asian organization constituted in 2016 to serve as a continent wide forum to address Asia's key challenges and foster cooperation among countries of Asia. The council has its headquarters in Tokyo and regional directorates in Doha, Chengdu and Bangkok.

Organization

The Asia Council operates through the council headquarters in Tokyo, three regional directorates and country offices.

Administrative Divisions

The Asia Council is organized into three administrative divisions. The East Asia division has its regional directorate in Tokyo, the South Asia & South East Asia division has its regional directorate in Bangkok and the West Asia & Central Asia division has its regional directorate in Doha.

Countries

The Asia Council covers 48 countries and 6 dependent territories.

Forums

The Asia Council has seven forums. Each forum is mandated to deliberate on a defined area relating Asia. The forum is attended by decision makers and experts.

- Forum on Biodiversity
- Forum for Asian Economic Cooperation
- Forum on Energy Security
- Forum on Climate Change
- Forum for Inter-cultural Dialogue
- Forum on Counter-terror Strategies

Fellowships

The Asia Council fellowship provides financial grant to students from Asian countries to study for a graduate degree in world's top universities.

Global Leaders Fellowship

The Asia Council Global Leaders Fellowship is an international graduate fellowship scheme which supports students with exceptional leadership qualities from 48 countries and 6 dependent territories of Asia to undertake graduate studies at some of world's top universities in United States and United Kingdom.

Asia Fellowship

The Asia Fellowship is an international graduate fellowship scheme which supports students with exceptional leadership qualities from 48 countries and 6 dependent territories of Asia to undertake graduate studies at Asia's top universities.

Einstein Fellowship

The Asia Council Einstein Fellowship is an international fellowship scheme which supports students with exceptional leadership qualities from 48 countries and 6 dependent territories of Asia to undertake study for a degree at Tokyo Institute of Technology, Nanyang Technological University, KAIST, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology, and Tsinghua University.

Reports and Publications

The council's research and publishing division produces several reports on Asia including the Asia Security Report and Asia Statistical Report.

Asian Review

The Asian Review is a journal published by the Asia Council. It covers political, economic and strategic review of the continent.

Events

- Asia Roundtable: The Asia Roundtable is an international conference held by the Asia Council outside Asia. The meeting discusses in detail a single issue that is geopolitically significant for the Asian region. The conference is attended by regional leaders and policy experts.
- Asia Security Dialogue: The Asia Security Dialogue is a bi-annual meeting held by the Asia Council on most pressing security issues relating Asia.

Democratic globalization

Democratic globalisation is a social movement towards an institutional system of global democracy. This would, in their view, bypass nation-states, corporate oligopolies, ideological NGOs, cults and mafias. One of its most prolific proponents is the British political thinker David Held. In the last decade he published a dozen books regarding the spread of democracy from territorially defined nation states to a system of global governance that encapsulates the entire world. For some, democratic mundialisation is a variant of democratic globalisation stressing the need for the direct election of world leaders and members of global institutions by citizens worldwide; for others, it is just another name for democratic globalisation.

These proponents state that democratic globalisation's purpose is to:

- Expand globalisation and make people closer and more united. This expansion should differ from economic globalization and "make people closer, more united and protected"; because of a variety of opinions and proposals it is still unclear what this would mean in practice and how it could be realized.
- Have it reach all fields of activity and knowledge, including governmental and economic, since the economic one is crucial to develop the well-being of world citizens; and
- Give world citizens democratic access and a say in those global activities. For example, presidential voting for United Nations Secretary-General by citizens and direct election of members of a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly.

Supporters of the democratic globalization movement draw a distinction between their movement and the one most popularly known as the 'anti-globalization' movement, claiming that their movement avoids ideological agenda about economics and social matters. Democratic globalization supporters state that the choice of political orientations should be left to the world citizens, via their participation in world democratic institutions. Some proponents in the "anti-globalization movement" do not necessarily disagree with this position. For example, George Monbiot, normally associated with the anti-globalization movement (who prefers the term Global Justice Movement) in his work *Age of Consent* has proposed similar democratic reforms of most major global institutions,

suggesting direct democratic elections of such bodies, and suggests a form of "world government."

Background

Democratic globalization supports the extension of political democratization to economic and financial globalization. It is based upon an idea that free international transactions benefit the global society as a whole. They believe in financially open economies, where the government and central bank must be transparent in order to retain the confidence of the markets, since transparency spells doom for autocratic regimes. They promote democracy that makes leaders more accountable to the citizenry through the removal of restrictions on such transactions.

Social movements

The democratic globalization movement started to get public attention when New York Times reported its demonstration to contest a World Trade Organization (WTO) in Seattle, Washington, November 1999. This gathering was to criticize unfair trade and undemocratic globalization of the WTO, World Bank, World Economic Forum (WEF), the International Monetary Fund. Its primary tactics were public rallies, street theater and civil disobedience.

Democratic globalization, proponents claim, would be reached by creating democratic global institutions and changing

international organizations (which are currently intergovernmental institutions controlled by the nation-states), into global ones controlled by world citizens. The movement suggests to do it gradually by building a limited number of democratic global institutions in charge of a few crucial fields of common interest. Its long-term goal is that these institutions federate later into a full-fledged democratic world government.

Global democracy

Thus, it supports the International Campaign for the Establishment of a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly, that would allow for participation of member nations' legislators and, eventually, direct election of United Nations (UN) parliament members by citizens worldwide.

Difference to anti-globalization

Some supporters of the democratic globalization movement draw a distinction between their movement and the one most popularly known as the 'anti-globalization' movement, claiming that their movement avoids ideological agenda about economics and social matters although, in practice, it is often difficult to distinguish between the two camps. Democratic globalization supporters state that the choice of political orientations should be left to the world citizens, via their participation in world democratic institutions and direct vote for world presidents.

Some supporters of the "anti-globalization movement" do not necessarily disagree with this position. For example, George Monbiot, normally associated with the anti-globalization movement (who prefers the term Global Justice Movement) in his work *Age of Consent* has proposed similar democratic reforms of most major global institutions, suggesting direct democratic elections of such bodies by citizens, and suggests a form of "federal world government".

Procedure

Democratic globalization, proponents claim, would be reached by creating democratic global institutions and changing international organizations (which are currently intergovernmental institutions controlled by the nation-states), into global ones controlled by voting by the citizens. The movement suggests to do it gradually by building a limited number of democratic global institutions in charge of a few crucial fields of common interest. Its long-term goal is that these institutions federate later into a full-fledged democratic world government. They propose the creation of world services for citizens, like world civil protection and prevention (from natural hazards) services.

Proponents

The concept of democratic globalization has supporters from all fields. Many of the campaigns and initiatives for global

democracy, such as the UNPA campaign, list quotes by and names of their supporters on their websites.

Academics

Some of the most prolific proponents are the British political thinker David Held and the Italian political theorist Daniele Archibugi. In the last decade they published several books regarding the spread of democracy from territorially defined nation states to a system of global governance that encapsulates the entire planet. Richard Falk has developed the idea from an international law perspective, Ulrich Beck from a sociological approach and Jürgen Habermas has elaborate the normative principles.

Politicians

- In 2003 Bob Brown, the leader of the Australian Green Party, has tabled a move for global democracy in the Australian Senate: "I move: That the Senate supports global democracy based on the principle of `one person, one vote, one value'; and supports the vision of a global parliament which empowers all the world's people equally to decide on matters of international significance."
- The current President of Bolivia Evo Morales and the Bolivian UN Ambassador Pablo Solón Romero have demanded a democratisation of the UN on many occasions. For example, Evo Morales at the United Nations, May 7, 2010: “The response to global warming is global democracy for life and for the

Mother Earth.. ... we have two paths: to save capitalism, or to save life and Mother Earth."

- Graham Watson (Member of the European Parliament and former leader of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe) and Jo Leinen (Member of the European Parliament) are strong supporter of global democracy. They were among those presenting the "Brussels Declaration on Global Democracy" on February 23, 2010, at an event inside the European Parliament.
- The appeals of the campaign for a United Nations Parliamentary Assembly has already been endorsed by more than 700 parliamentarians from more than 90 countries.

List of prominent figures

- Garry Davis (Peace activist who created the first "World Passport)
- Albert Einstein ("The moral authority of the UN would be considerable enhanced if the delegates were elected directly by the people.")
- George Monbiot ("A world parliament allows the poor to speak for themselves")
- Emma Thompson
- Desmond Tutu ("We must strive for a global democracy, in which not only the rich and the powerful have a say, but which treats everyone, everywhere with dignity and respect.")
- Peter Ustinov (President of the World Federalist Movement from 1991 to 2004)

- Abhay K ("The mass availability of internet-connected mobile phones paves the way for planetary consciousness and global democracy.")

Grassroot movements

Jim Stark has initiated a process for a Democratic World Parliament through a Global Referendum. As of August 20, 2013, 22,126 people have voted.

So far, the votes are 95.3% in favor of creating a democratic world parliament. Mr. Stark has published a companion book to the online referendum entitled "Rescue Plan for Planet Earth".

Global apartheid

Global apartheid is a term used to mean minority rule in international decision-making. The term comes from apartheid, the system of governmental that ruled South Africa until 27 April 1994 when people of all races were able to vote as equals for the first time.

The concept of global apartheid has been developed by many researchers, including Titus Alexander, Bruno Amoroso, Patrick Bond, Gernot Kohler, Arjun Makhijiani, Ali Mazuri, Vandana Shiva, Anthony Richmond, Joseph Nevins, Muhammed Asadi, Gustav Fridolin, and many others.

Origin and use

The first use of the term may have been by Gernot Koehler in a 1978 Working Paper for the World Order Models Project. In 1995 Koehler develop this in *The Three Meanings of Global Apartheid: Empirical, Normative, Existential*.

Its best known use was by Thabo Mbeki, then-President of South Africa, in a 2002 speech, drawing comparisons of the status of the world's people, economy, and access to natural resources to the apartheid era. Mbeki got the term from Titus Alexander, initiator of Charter 99, a campaign for global democracy, who was also present at the UN Millennium Summit and gave him a copy of *Unravelling Global Apartheid*.

Concept

Minority rule in global governance is based on national sovereignty rather than racial identity, but in many other respects the history and structures of apartheid South Africa can be seen as a microcosm of the world. Following the Great Depression in the 1930s and the Second World War, the United States and United Kingdom used their political power to create systems of economic management and protection to mitigate the worst effects of free trade and neutralise the competing appeals of communism and national socialism. In South Africa *civilized labour* policies restricted public employment to whites, reserved skilled jobs for whites and controlled the movement of non-whites through a system of pass laws. In the West,

escalating tariff barriers reserved manufacturing work for Europeans and Americans while immigration laws controlled the movement of immigrants seeking work.

At a political level, the West still dominates global decision-making through minority control of the central banking system (Bank of International Settlements), IMF, World Bank, Security Council and other institutions of global governance. The G8 represent less than 15% of world population, yet have over 60% of its income. 80% of the permanent members of the UN Security Council represent white Western states, 60% from Europe.

The West has veto power in the World Bank, IMF and WTO and regulates global monetary policy through the Bank of International Settlements (BIS). By tradition, the head of the World Bank is always a US citizen, nominated by the US President, and the IMF is a European. Although the rest of the world now has a majority in many international institutions, it does not have the political power to reject decisions by the Western minority.

In *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Samuel P. Huntington describes how "the United States together with Britain and France make the crucial decisions on political and security issues; the United States together with Germany and Japan make the crucial decisions on economic issues." Huntington quoted Jeffrey R Bennett to claim that Western nations:

- own and operate the international banking system
- control all hard currencies
- are the world's principle customer
- provide the majority of the world's finished goods
- dominate international capital markets
- exert considerable moral leadership within many societies
- are capable of massive military intervention
- control the sea lanes

Huntington presents a 'framework, a paradigm, for viewing global politics' to protect "Western civilization". He argues that other civilizations threaten the West through immigration, cultural differences, growing economic strength and potential military power. 'If North America and Europe renew their moral life, build on their cultural commonality, and develop close forms of economic and political integration to supplement their security collaboration in NATO, they could generate a third Euroamerican phase of Western affluence and political influence. Meaningful political integration would in some measure counter the relative decline in the West's share of the world's people, economic product, and military capabilities and revive the power of the West in the eyes of the leaders of other civilizations.' However, this 'depends overwhelmingly on whether the United States reaffirms its identity as a Western nation and defines its global role as the leader of Western civilization.'

Alexander identifies numerous *pillars of global apartheid* including:

- veto power by the Western minority in the UN Security Council
- voting powers in the IMF and World Bank
- dominance of the World Trade Organisation through effective veto power and 'weight of trade' rather than formal voting power
- one-sided rules of trade, which give privileged protection to Western agriculture and other interests while opening markets in the Majority World
- protection of 'hard currency' through the central banking system through the Bank of International Settlements
- immigration controls which manage the flow of labour to meet the needs of Western economies
- use of aid and investment to control elites in the Majority World through reward and punishment
- support for coups or military intervention in countries which defy Western dominance

International decision-making has a legacy of inequality which some authors have compared to historical apartheid in South Africa.

Chapter 4

World Governance/Global Governance

international relations between countries and political structures

Global governance or world governance is a movement towards political cooperation among transnational actors, aimed at negotiating responses to problems that affect more than one state or region. Institutions of global governance—the United Nations, the International Criminal Court, the World Bank, etc.—tend to have limited or demarcated power to enforce compliance.

The modern question of world governance exists in the context of globalization and globalizing regimes of power: politically, economically and culturally. In response to the acceleration of worldwide interdependence, both between human societies and between humankind and the biosphere, the term "global governance" may name the process of designating laws, rules, or regulations intended for a global scale.

Global governance is not a singular system. There is no "world government" but the many different regimes of global *governance* do have commonalities:

- While the contemporary system of global political relations is not integrated, the relation between the various regimes of global governance is not insignificant, and the system does have a common dominant organizational form. The dominant mode of organization today is bureaucratic rational – regularized, codified and rational. It is common to all modern regimes of political power and frames the transition from classical sovereignty to what David Held describes as the second regime of sovereignty – liberal international sovereignty.

Definition

The term world governance is broadly used to designate all regulations intended for organization and centralization of human societies on a global scale. The Forum for a new World Governance defines world governance simply as "collective management of the planet".

Traditionally, *government* has been associated with "governing," or with political authority, institutions, and, ultimately, control. *Governance* denotes a process through which institutions coordinate and control independent social relations, and that have the ability to enforce, by force, their decisions. However, authors like James Rosenau have also used "governance" to denote the regulation of interdependent relations in the absence of an overarching political authority, such as in the international system. Some now speak of the development of "global public policy".

Adil Najam, a scholar on the subject at the Pardee School of Global Studies, Boston University has defined global governance simply as "the management of global processes in the absence of global government." According to Thomas G. Weiss, director of the Ralph Bunche Institute for International Studies at the Graduate Center (CUNY) and editor (2000–05) of the journal *Global Governance: A Review of Multilateralism and International Organizations*, "'Global governance'—which can be good, bad, or indifferent—refers to concrete cooperative problem-solving arrangements, many of which increasingly involve not only the United Nations of states but also 'other UNs,' namely international secretariats and other non-state actors." In other words, global governance refers to the way in which global affairs are managed.

The definition is flexible in scope, applying to general subjects such as global security and order or to specific documents and agreements such as the World Health Organization's Code on the Marketing of Breast Milk Substitutes. The definition applies whether the participation is bilateral (e.g. an agreement to regulate usage of a river flowing in two countries), function-specific (e.g. a commodity agreement), regional (e.g. the Treaty of Tlatelolco), or global (e.g. the Non-Proliferation Treaty). These "cooperative problem-solving arrangements" may be formal, taking the shape of laws or formally constituted institutions for a variety of actors (such as state authorities, intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private sector entities, other civil society actors, and individuals) to manage collective

affairs. They may also be informal (as in the case of practices or guidelines) or ad hoc entities (as in the case of coalitions).

However, a single organization may take the nominal lead on an issue, for example the World Trade Organization (WTO) in world trade affairs. Therefore, global governance is thought to be an international process of consensus-forming which generates guidelines and agreements that affect national governments and international corporations. Examples of such consensus would include WHO policies on health issues.

In short, global governance may be defined as "the complex of formal and informal institutions, mechanisms, relationships, and processes between and among states, markets, citizens and organizations, both inter- and non-governmental, through which collective interests on the global plane are articulated, Duties, obligations and privileges are established, and differences are mediated through educated professionals."

Titus Alexander, author of *Unravelling Global Apartheid, an Overview of World Politics*, has described the current institutions of global governance as a system of global apartheid, with numerous parallels with minority rule in the formal and informal structures of South Africa before 1991.

Usage

The dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991 marked the end of a long period of international history based on a policy of balance of powers. Since this historic event, the planet has

entered a phase of geostrategic breakdown. The national-security model, for example, while still in place for most governments, is gradually giving way to an emerging collective conscience that extends beyond the restricted framework it represents.

The post-Cold War world of the 1990s saw a new paradigm emerge based on a number of issues:

- The growing idea of globalization as a significant theme and the subsequent weakening of nation-states, points to a prospect of transferring to a global level of regulatory instruments. Upon the model that regulation was no longer working effectively at the national or regional levels.
- An intensification of environmental concerns, which received multilateral endorsement at the Earth Summit. The Summit issues, relating to the climate and biodiversity, symbolized a new approach that was soon to be expressed conceptually by the term Global Commons.
- The emergence of conflicts over standards: trade and the environment, trade and property rights, trade and public health. These conflicts continued the traditional debate over the social effects of macroeconomic stabilization policies, and raised the question of arbitration among equally legitimate objectives in a compartmentalized governance system where the major areas of interdependence are each entrusted to a specialized international institution. Although often limited in scope, these conflicts are

nevertheless symbolically powerful, as they raise the question of the principles and institutions of arbitration.

- An increased questioning of international standards and institutions by developing countries, which, having entered the global economy, find it hard to accept that industrialized countries hold onto power and give preference to their own interests. The challenge also comes from civil society, which considers that the international governance system has become the real seat of power and which rejects both its principles and procedures. Although these two lines of criticism often have conflicting beliefs and goals, they have been known to join in order to oppose the dominance of developed countries and major institutions, as demonstrated symbolically by the failure of the World Trade Organization Ministerial Conference of 1999.

Technique

Global governance can be roughly divided into four stages:

1. agenda-setting;
2. policymaking,
3. implementation and enforcement, and
4. evaluation, monitoring, and adjudication.

World authorities including international organizations and corporations achieve deference to their agenda through

different means. Authority can derive from institutional status, expertise, moral authority, capacity, or perceived competence.

Themes

In its initial phase, world governance was able to draw on themes inherited from geopolitics and the theory of international relations, such as peace, defense, geostrategy, diplomatic relations, and trade relations. But as globalization progresses and the number of interdependences increases, the global level is also highly relevant to a far wider range of subjects. Following are a number of examples.

Environmental governance and managing the planet

"The crisis brought about by the accelerated pace and the probably irreversible character of the effect of human activities on nature requires collective answers from governments and citizens.

Nature ignores political and social barriers, and the global dimension of the crisis cancels the effects of any action initiated unilaterally by state governments or sectoral institutions, however powerful they may be. Climate change, ocean and air pollution, nuclear risks and those related to genetic manipulation, the reduction and extinction of resources and biodiversity, and above all a development model that remains largely unquestioned globally are all among the various manifestations of this accelerated and probably

irreversible effect. This effect is the factor, in the framework of globalization, that most challenges a system of states competing with each other to the exclusion of all others: among the different fields of global governance, environmental management is the most wanting in urgent answers to the crisis in the form of collective actions by the whole of the human community. At the same time, these actions should help to model and strengthen the progressive building of this community."

Proposals in this area have discussed the issue of how collective environmental action is possible. Many multilateral, environment-related agreements have been forged in the past 30 years, but their implementation remains difficult. There is also some discussion on the possibility of setting up an international organization that would centralize all the issues related to international environmental protection, such as the proposed World Environment Organization (WEO). The United Nations Environment Program (UNEP) could play this role, but it is a small-scale organization with a limited mandate. The question has given rise to two opposite views: the European Union, especially France and Germany, along with a number of NGOs, is in favor of creating a WEO; the United Kingdom, the USA, and most developing countries prefer opting for voluntary initiatives.

The International Institute for Sustainable Development proposes a "reform agenda" for global environmental governance. The main argument is that there seems to exist an

unspoken but powerful consensus on the essential objectives of a system of global environmental governance. These goals would require top-quality leadership, a strong environmental policy based on knowledge, effective cohesion and coordination, good management of the institutions constituting the environmental governance system, and spreading environmental concerns and actions to other areas of international policy and action.

A World Environment Organisation

The focus of environmental issues shifted to climate change from 1992 onwards. Due to the transboundary nature of climate change, various calls have been made for a World Environment Organisation (WEO) (sometimes referred to as a Global Environment Organisation) to tackle this global problem on a global scale. At present, a single worldwide governing body with the powers to develop and enforce environmental policy does not exist. The idea for the creation of a WEO was discussed thirty years ago but is receiving fresh attention in the light of arguably disappointing outcomes from recent, 'environmental mega-conferences'(e.g.Rio Summit and Earth Summit 2002).

Current global environmental governance

International environmental organisations do exist. The United Nations Environmental Programme (UNEP), created in 1972, coordinates the environmental activity of countries in the UN.

UNEP and similar international environmental organisations are seen as not up to the task. They are criticised as being institutionally weak, fragmented, lacking in standing and providing non-optimal environmental protection. It has been stated that the current decentralised, poorly funded and strictly intergovernmental regime for global environmental issues is sub-standard. However, the creation of a WEO may threaten to undermine some of the more effective aspects of contemporary global environmental governance; notably its fragmented nature, from which flexibility stems. This also allows responses to be more effective and links to be forged across different domains. Even though the environment and climate change are framed as global issues, Levin states that 'it is precisely at this level that government institutions are least effective and trust most delicate' while Oberthur and Gehring argue that it would offer little more than institutional restructuring for its own sake.

A World Environment Organisation and the World Trade Organisation

Many proposals for the creation of a WEO have emerged from the trade and environment debate. It has been argued that instead of creating a WEO to safeguard the environment, environmental issues should be directly incorporated into the World Trade Organisation (WTO). The WTO has "had success in integrating trade agreements and opening up markets because it is able to apply legal pressure to nation states and resolve disputes". Greece and Germany are currently in discussion

about the possibility of solar energy being used to repay some of Greece's debt after their economy crashed in 2010. This exchange of resources, if it is accepted, is an example of increased international cooperation and an instance where the WTO could embrace energy trade agreements. If the future holds similar trade agreements, then an environmental branch of the WTO would surely be necessary. However critics of a WTO/WEO arrangement say that this would neither concentrate on more directly addressing underlying market failures, nor greatly improve rule-making.

The creation of a new agency, whether it be linked to the WTO or not, has now been endorsed by Renato Ruggiero, the former head of the World Trade Organization (WTO), as well as by the new WTO director-designate, Supachai Panitchpakdi. The debate over a global institutional framework for environmental issues will undoubtedly rumble on but at present there is little support for any one proposal.

Governance of the economy and of globalization

The 2008 financial crisis may have undermined faith that laissez-faire capitalism will correct all serious financial malfunctioning on its own, as well as belief in the presumed independence of the economy from politics. It has been stated that, lacking in transparency and far from democratic, international financial institutions may be incapable of handling financial collapses. There are many who believe free-market capitalism may be incapable of forming the economic

policy of a stable society, as it has been theorised that it can exacerbate inequalities.

Nonetheless, the debate on the potential failings of the system has led the academic world to seek solutions. According to Tubiana and Severino, "refocusing the doctrine of international cooperation on the concept of public goods offers the possibility... of breaking the deadlock in international negotiations on development, with the perception of shared interests breathing new life into an international solidarity that is running out of steam."

Joseph Stiglitz argues that a number of global public goods should be produced and supplied to the populations, but are not, and that a number of global externalities should be taken into consideration, but are not. On the other hand, he contends, the international stage is often used to find solutions to completely unrelated problems under the protection of opacity and secrecy, which would be impossible in a national democratic framework.

On the subject of international trade, Susan George states that "... in a rational world, it would be possible to construct a trading system serving the needs of people in both North and South.... Under such a system, crushing third world debt and the devastating structural adjustment policies applied by the World Bank and the IMF would have been unthinkable, although the system would not have abolished capitalism."

Political and institutional governance

Building a responsible world governance that would make it possible to adapt the political organization of society to globalization implies establishing a democratic political legitimacy at every level: local, national, regional and global.

Obtaining this legitimacy requires rethinking and reforming, all at the same time:

- the fuzzy maze of various international organizations, instituted mostly in the wake of World War II; what is needed is a system of international organizations with greater resources and a greater intervention capacity, more transparent, fairer, and more democratic;
- the Westphalian system, the very nature of states along with the role they play with regard to the other institutions, and their relations to each other; states will have to share part of their sovereignty with institutions and bodies at other territorial levels, and all with have to begin a major process to deepen democracy and make their organization more responsible;
- the meaning of citizen sovereignty in the different government systems and the role of citizens as political protagonists; there is a need to rethink the meaning of political representation and participation and to sow the seeds of a radical change of consciousness that will make it possible to move in

> the direction of a situation in which citizens, in practice, will play the leading role at every scale.

The political aspect of world governance is discussed in greater detail in the section Problems of World Governance and Principles of Governance

Governance of peace, security, and conflict resolution

Armed conflicts have changed in form and intensity since the Berlin wall came down in 1989. The events of 9/11, the wars in Afghanistan and in Iraq, and repeated terrorist attacks all show that conflicts can repercuss well beyond the belligerents directly involved. The major powers and especially the United States, have used war as a means of resolving conflicts and may well continue to do so. If many in the United States believe that fundamentalist Muslim networks are likely to continue to launch attacks, in Europe nationalist movements have proved to be the most persistent terrorist threat. The Global War on Terrorism arguably presents a form of emerging global governance in the sphere of security with the United States leading cooperation among the Western states, non-Western nations and international institutions. Beyer argues that participation in this form of 'hegemonic governance' is caused both by a shared identity and ideology with the US, as well as cost-benefit considerations. Pesawar school attack 2014 is a big challenge to us. Militants from the Pakistani Taliban have attacked an army-run school in Peshawar, killing 141 people, 132 of them children, the military say.

At the same time, civil wars continue to break out across the world, particularly in areas where civil and human rights are not respected, such as Central and Eastern Africa and the Middle East. These and other regions remain deeply entrenched in permanent crises, hampered by authoritarian regimes, many of them being supported by the United States, reducing entire swathes of the population to wretched living conditions. The wars and conflicts we are faced with have a variety of causes: economic inequality, social conflict, religious sectarianism, Western imperialism, colonial legacies, disputes over territory and over control of basic resources such as water or land. They are all illustrations a deep-rooted crisis of world governance.

The resulting bellicose climate imbues international relations with competitive nationalism and contributes, in rich and poor countries alike, to increasing military budgets, siphoning off huge sums of public money to the benefit of the arms industry and military-oriented scientific innovation, hence fueling global insecurity. Of these enormous sums, a fraction would be enough to provide a permanent solution for the basic needs of the planet's population hence practically eliminating the causes of war and terrorism.

Andrée Michel argues that the arms race is not only proceeding with greater vigor, it is the surest means for Western countries to maintain their hegemony over countries of the South. Following the break-up of the Eastern bloc countries, she maintains, a strategy for the manipulation of the masses was set up with a permanent invention of an enemy (currently

incarnated by Iraq, Iran, Libya, Syria, and North Korea) and by kindling fear and hate of others to justify perpetuating the Military–industrial complex and arms sales. The author also recalls that the "Big Five" at the UN who have the veto right are responsible for 85% of arms sales around the world.

Proposals for the governance of peace, security, and conflict resolution begin by addressing prevention of the causes of conflicts, whether economic, social, religious, political, or territorial. This requires assigning more resources to improving people's living conditions—health, accommodation, food, and work—and to education, including education in the values of peace, social justice, and unity and diversity as two sides of the same coin representing the global village.

Resources for peace could be obtained by regulating, or even reducing military budgets, which have done nothing but rise in the past recent years. This process could go hand in hand with plans for global disarmament and the conversion of arms industries, applied proportionally to all countries, including the major powers. Unfortunately, the warlike climate of the last decade has served to relegate all plans for global disarmament, even in civil-society debates, and to pigeonhole them as a long-term goal or even a Utopian vision. This is definitely a setback for the cause of peace and for humankind, but it is far from being a permanent obstacle.

International institutions also have a role to play in resolving armed conflicts. Small international rapid deployment units

could intervene in these with an exclusive mandate granted by a reformed and democratic United Nations system or by relevant regional authorities such as the European Union. These units could be formed specifically for each conflict, using armies from several countries as was the case when the UNIFIL was reinforced during the 2006 Lebanon War. On the other hand, no national army would be authorized to intervene unilaterally outside its territory without a UN or regional mandate.

Another issue that is worth addressing concerns the legitimate conditions for the use of force and conduct during war. Jean-Réné Bachelet offers an answer with the conceptualization of a military ethics corresponding to the need for a "principle of humanity." The author defines this principle as follows: "All human beings, whatever their race, nationality, gender, age, opinion, or religion, belong to one same humanity, and every individual has an inalienable right to respect for his life, integrity, and dignity."

Governance of science, education, information, and communications

The World Trade Organization's (WTO) agenda of liberalizing public goods and services are related to culture, science, education, health, living organisms, information, and communication. This plan has been only partially offset by the alter-globalization movement, starting with the events that took place at the 1999 Seattle meeting, and on a totally

different and probably far more influential scale in the medium and long term, by the astounding explosion of collaborative practices on the Internet. However, lacking political and widespread citizen support as well as sufficient resources, civil society has not so far been able to develop and disseminate alternative plans for society as a whole on a global scale, even though plenty of proposals and initiatives have been developed, some more successful than others, to build a fairer, more responsible, and more solidarity-based world in all of these areas.

Above all, each country tries to impose their values and collective prefereences within international institutions such like WTO or UNESCO, particularly in the Medias sector. This is an excellent opportunity to promote their soft power, for instance with the promotion of the cinema

As far as science is concerned, "[r]esearch increasingly bows to the needs of financial markets, turning competence and knowledge into commodities, making employment flexible and informal, and establishing contracts based on goals and profits for the benefit of private interests in compliance with the competition principle. The directions that research has taken in the past two decades and the changes it has undergone have drastically removed it from its initial mission (producing competence and knowledge, maintaining independence) with no questioning of its current and future missions. Despite the progress, or perhaps even as its consequence, humankind continues to face critical problems: poverty and hunger are yet

to be vanquished, nuclear arms are proliferating, environmental disasters are on the rise, social injustice is growing, and so on.

Neoliberal commercialization of the commons favors the interests of pharmaceutical companies instead of the patients', of food-processing companies instead of the farmers' and consumers'. Public research policies have done nothing but support this process of economic profitability, where research results are increasingly judged by the financial markets. The system of systematically patenting knowledge and living organisms is thus being imposed throughout the planet through the 1994 WTO agreements on intellectual property. Research in many areas is now being directed by private companies."

On the global level, "[i]nstitutions dominating a specific sector also, at every level, present the risk of reliance on technical bodies that use their own references and deliberate in an isolated environment. This process can be observed with the 'community of patents' that promotes the patenting of living organisms, as well as with authorities controlling nuclear energy. This inward-looking approach is all the more dangerous that communities of experts are, in all complex technical and legal spheres, increasingly dominated by the major economic organizations that finance research and development."

On the other hand, several innovative experiments have emerged in the sphere of science, such as: conscience clauses and citizens' panels as a tool for democratizing the production system: science shops and community-based research. Politically committed scientists are also increasingly organizing at the global level.

As far as education is concerned, the effect of commoditization can be seen in the serious tightening of education budgets, which affects the quality of general education as a public service. The Global Future Online report reminds us that "... at the half-way point towards 2015 *(author's note: the deadline for the Millennium Goals)*, the gaps are daunting: 80 million children (44 million of them girls) are out of school, with marginalized groups (26 million disabled and 30 million conflict-affected children) continuing to be excluded. And while universal access is critical, it must be coupled with improved learning outcomes—in particular, children achieving the basic literacy, numeracy and life skills essential for poverty reduction."

In addition to making the current educational system available universally, there is also a call to improve the system and adapt it to the speed of changes in a complex and unpredictable world. On this point, Edgar Morin asserts that we must "[r]ethink our way of organizing knowledge. This means breaking down the traditional barriers between disciplines and designing new ways to reconnect that which has been torn apart." The UNESCO report drawn up by Morin

contains "seven principles for education of the future": detecting the error and illusion that have always parasitized the human spirit and human behavior; making knowledge relevant, i.e. a way of thinking that makes distinctions and connections; teaching the human condition; teaching terrestrial identity; facing human and scientific uncertainties and teaching strategies to deal with them; teaching understanding of the self and of others, and an ethics for humankind. The exponential growth of new technologies, the Internet in particular, has gone hand in hand with the development over the last decade of a global community producing and exchanging goods. This development is permanently altering the shape of the entertainment, publishing, and music and media industries, among others. It is also influencing the social behavior of increasing numbers of people, along with the way in which institutions, businesses, and civil society are organized. Peer-to-peer communities and collective knowledge-building projects such as Wikipedia have involved millions of users around the world. There are even more innovative initiatives, such as alternatives to private copyright such as Creative Commons, cyber democracy practices, and a real possibility of developing them on the sectoral, regional, and global levels.

Regional views

Regional players, whether regional conglomerates such as Mercosur and the European Union, or major countries seen as key regional players such as China, the United States, and

India, are taking a growing interest in world governance. Examples of discussion of this issue can be found in the works of: Martina Timmermann *et al.*, *Institutionalizing Northeast Asia: Regional Steps toward Global Governance*; Douglas Lewis, *Global Governance and the Quest for Justice - Volume I: International and Regional Organizations*; Olav Schram Stokke, "Examining the Consequences of International Regimes," which discusses Northern, or Arctic region building in the context of international relations; Jeffery Hart and Joan Edelman Spero, "Globalization and Global Governance in the 21st Century," which discusses the push of countries such as Mexico, Brazil, India, China, Taiwan, and South Korea, "important regional players" seeking "a seat at the table of global decision-making"; Dr. Frank Altemöller, "International Trade: Challenges for Regional and Global Governance:

A comparison between Regional Integration Models in Eastern Europe and Africa – and the role of the WTO", and many others.

Interdependence among countries and regions hardly being refutable today, regional integration is increasingly seen not only as a process in itself, but also in its relation to the rest of the world, sometimes turning questions like "What can the world bring to my country or region?" into "What can my country or region bring to the rest of the world?" Following are a few examples of how regional players are dealing with these questions.

Africa

Often seen as a problem to be solved rather than a people or region with an opinion to express on international policy, Africans and Africa draw on a philosophical tradition of community and social solidarity that can serve as inspiration to the rest of the world and contribute to building world governance. One example is given by Sabelo J. Ndlovu-Gathseni when he reminds us of the relevance of the Ubuntu concept, which stresses the interdependence of human beings.

African civil society has thus begun to draw up proposals for governance of the continent, which factor in all of the dimensions: local, African, and global. Examples include proposals by the network "Dialogues sur la gouvernance en Afrique" for "the construction of a local legitimate governance," state reform "capable of meeting the continent's development challenges," and "effective regional governance to put an end to Africa's marginalization."

United States

Foreign-policy proposals announced by President Barack Obama include restoring the Global Poverty Act, which aims to contribute to meeting the UN Millennium Development Goals to reduce by half the world population living on less than a dollar a day by 2015. Foreign aid is expected to double to 50 billion dollars. The money will be used to help build educated and

healthy communities, reduce poverty and improve the population's health.

In terms of international institutions, The White House Web site advocates reform of the World Bank and the IMF, without going into any detail.

Below are further points in the Obama-Biden plan for foreign policy directly related to world governance:

- strengthening of the nuclear non-proliferation treaty;
- global de-nuclearization in several stages including stepping up cooperation with Russia to significantly reduce stocks of nuclear arms in both countries;
- revision of the culture of secrecy: institution of a National Declassification Center to make declassification secure but routine, efficient, and cost-effective;
- increase in global funds for AIDS, TB and malaria. Eradication of malaria-related deaths by 2015 by making medicines and mosquito nets far more widely available;
- increase in aid for children and maternal health as well as access to reproductive health-care programs;
- creation of a 2-billion-dollar global fund for education. Increased funds for providing access to drinking water and sanitation;
- other similarly large-scale measures covering agriculture, small- and medium-sized enterprises and support for a model of international trade that

fosters job creation and improves the quality of life in poor countries;

- in terms of energy and global warming, Obama advocates a) an 80% reduction of greenhouse-gas emissions by 2050 b) investing 150 billion dollars in alternative energies over the next 10 years and c) creating a Global Energy Forum capable of initiating a new generation of climate protocols.

Latin America

The 21st century has seen the arrival of a new and diverse generation of left-wing governments in Latin America. This has opened the door to initiatives to launch political and governance renewal. A number of these initiatives are significant for the way they redefine the role of the state by drawing on citizen participation, and can thus serve as a model for a future world governance built first and foremost on the voice of the people. The constituent assemblies in Ecuador and Bolivia are fundamental examples of this phenomenon.

In Ecuador, social and indigenous movements were behind the discussions that began in 1990 on setting up a constituent assembly. In the wake of Rafael Correa's arrival at the head of the country in November 2006, widespread popular action with the slogan "*que se vayan todos*" (let them all go away) succeeded in getting all the political parties of congress to accept a convocation for a referendum on setting up the assembly.

In April 2007, Rafael Correa's government organized a consultation with the people to approve setting up a constituent assembly. Once it was approved, 130 members of the assembly were elected in September, including 100 provincial members, 24 national members and 6 for migrants in Europe, Latin America and the USA. The assembly was officially established in November. Assembly members belonged to traditional political parties as well as the new social movements. In July 2008, the assembly completed the text for the new constitution and in September 2008 there was a referendum to approve it. Approval for the new text won out, with 63.9% of votes for compared to 28.1% of votes against and a 24.3% abstention rate.

The new constitution establishes the rule of law on economic, social, cultural and environmental rights (ESCER). It transforms the legal model of the social state subject to the rule of law into a "constitution of guaranteed well-being" (*Constitución del bienestar garantizado*) inspired by the ancestral community ideology of "good living" propounded by the Quechuas of the past, as well as by 21st century socialist ideology. The constitution promotes the concept of food sovereignty by establishing a protectionist system that favors domestic production and trade. It also develops a model of public aid for education, health, infrastructures and other services.

In addition, it adds to the three traditional powers, a fourth power called the Council of Citizen Participation and Social

Control, made up of former constitutional control bodies and social movements, and mandated to assess whether public policies are constitutional or not.

The new Bolivian constitution was approved on 25 January 2009 by referendum, with 61.4% votes in favor, 38.6% against and a 90.2% turnout. The proposed constitution was prepared by a constituent assembly that did not only reflect the interests of political parties and the elite, but also represented the indigenous peoples and social movements. As in Ecuador, the proclamation of a constituent assembly was demanded by the people, starting in 1990 at a gathering of indigenous peoples from the entire country, continuing with the indigenous marches in the early 2000s and then with the Program Unity Pact (*Pacto de Unidad Programático*) established by family farmers and indigenous people in September 2004 in Santa Cruz.

The constitution recognizes the autonomy of indigenous peoples, the existence of a specific indigenous legal system, exclusive ownership of forest resources by each community and a quota of indigenous members of parliament. It grants autonomy to counties, which have the right to manage their natural resources and elect their representatives directly. The *latifundio* system has been outlawed, with maximum ownership of 5,000 hectares allowed per person. Access to water and sanitation are covered by the constitution as human rights that the state has to guarantee, as well as other basic services such as electricity, gas, postal services, and

telecommunications that can be provided by either the state or contracting companies. The new constitution also establishes a social and community economic model made up of public, private, and social organizations, and cooperatives. It guarantees private initiative and freedom of enterprise, and assigns public organizations the task of managing natural resources and related processes as well as developing public services covered by the constitution. National and cooperative investment is favored over private and international investment. The "unitary plurinational" state of Bolivia has 36 official indigenous languages along with Spanish. Natural resources belong to the people and are administered by the state. The form of democracy in place is no longer considered as exclusively representative and/or based on parties. Thus, "the people deliberate and exercise government via their representatives and the constituent assembly, the citizen legislative initiative and the referendum..." and "popular representation is exercised via the political parties, citizen groups, and indigenous peoples." This way, "political parties, and/or citizen groups and/or indigenous peoples can present candidates directly for the offices of president, vice-president, senator, house representative, constituent-assembly member, councilor, mayor, and municipal agent. The same conditions apply legally to all...."

Also in Latin America: "Amazonia... is an enormous biodiversity reservoir and a major climate-regulation agent for the planet but is being ravaged and deteriorated at an accelerated pace; it is a territory almost entirely devoid of

governance, but also a breeding place of grassroots organization initiatives.". "Amazonia can be the fertile field of a true school of 'good' governance if it is looked after as a common and valuable good, first by Brazilians (65% of Amazonia is within Brazilian borders) and the people of the South American countries surrounding it, but also by all the Earth's inhabitants." Accordingly, "[f]rom a world-governance perspective, [Amazonia] is in a way an enormous laboratory. Among other things, Amazonia enables a detailed examination of the negative effects of productivism and of the different forms of environmental packaging it can hide behind, including 'sustainable development.' Galloping urbanization, Human Rights violations, the many different types of conflicts (14 different types of conflicts have been identified within the hundreds of cases observed in Amazonia), protection of indigenous populations and their active participation in local governance: these are among the many Amazonian challenges also affecting the planet as a whole, not to mention the environment. The hosts of local initiatives, including among the indigenous populations, are however what may be most interesting in Amazonia in that they testify to the real, concrete possibility of a different form of organization that combines a healthy local economy, good social cohesion, and a true model of sustainable development—this time not disguised as something else. All of this makes Amazonia 'a territory of solutions.'"

According to Arnaud Blin, the Amazonian problem helps to define certain fundamental questions on the future of

humankind. First, there is the question of social justice: "ow do we build a new model of civilization that promotes social justice? How do we set up a new social architecture that allows us to live together?" The author goes on to refer to concepts such as the concept of "people's territory " or even "life territory" rooted in the indigenous tradition and serving to challenge private property and social injustice. He then suggests that the emerging concept of the "responsibility to protect," following up on the "right of humanitarian intervention" and until now used to try to protect populations endangered by civil wars, could also be applied to populations threatened by economic predation and to environmental protection.

Asia

The growing interest in world governance in Asia represents an alternative approach to official messages, dominated by states' nationalist visions. An initiative to develop proposals for world governance took place in Shanghai in 2006, attended by young people from every continent. The initiative produced ideas and projects that can be classified as two types: the first and more traditional type, covering the creation of a number of new institutions such as an International Emissions Organization, and a second more innovative type based on organizing network-based systems. For example, a system of cooperative control on a worldwide level among states and self-organization of civil society into networks using new technologies, a process that should serve to set up a *Global Calling-for-Help Center* or a

new model based on citizens who communicate freely, share information, hold discussions, and seek consensus-based solutions. They would use the Internet and the media, working within several types of organizations: universities, NGOs, local volunteers and civil-society groups.

Given the demographic importance of the continent, the development of discussion on governance and practices in Asia at the regional level, as well as global-level proposals, will be decisive in the years ahead in the strengthening of global dialog among all sorts of stakeholders, a dialog that should produce a fairer world order.

Europe

According to Michel Rocard, Europe does not have a shared vision, but a collective history that allows Europeans to opt for projects for gradual political construction such as the European Union. Drawing on this observation, Rocard conceives of a European perspective that supports the development of three strategies for constructing world governance: reforming the UN, drawing up international treaties to serve as the main source of global regulations, and "the progressive penetration of the international scene by justice."

Rocard considers that there are a number of "great questions of the present days" including recognition by all nations of the International Criminal Court, the option of an international

police force authorized to arrest international criminals, and the institution of judicial procedures to deal with tax havens, massively polluting activities, and states supporting terrorist activities. He also outlines "new problems" that should foster debate in the years to come on questions such as a project for a Declaration of Interdependence, how to re-equilibrate world trade and WTO activities, and how to create world regulations for managing collective goods (air, drinking water, oil, etc.) and services (education, health, etc.).

Martin Ortega similarly suggests that the European Union should make a more substantial contribution to global governance, particularly through concerted action in international bodies. European states, for instance, should reach an agreement on the reform of the United Nations Security Council.

In 2011, the European Strategy and Policy Analysis System (ESPAS), an inter-institutional pilot project of the European Union which aims to assist EU policy formulation through the identification and critical analysis of long-term global trends, highlighted the importance of expanding global governance over the next 20 years.

Stakeholders' views

It is too soon to give a general account of the view of world-governance stakeholders, although interest in world governance is on the rise on the regional level, and we will

certainly see different types of stakeholders and social sectors working to varying degrees at the international level and taking a stand on the issue in the years to come.

Members of parliament

The World Parliamentary Forum, open to members of parliament from all nations and held every year at the same time as the World Social Forum, drew up a declaration at the sixth forum in Caracas in 2006. The declaration contains a series of proposals that express participants' opinion on the changes referred to.

Regional organizations

The European Commission referred to global governance in its White Paper on European Governance. It contends that the search for better global governance draws on the same set of shared challenges humanity is currently facing. These challenges can be summed up by a series of goals: sustainable development, security, peace and equity (in the sense of "fairness").

Non-state stakeholders

The freedom of thought enjoyed by non-state stakeholders enables them to formulate truly alternative ideas on world-governance issues, but they have taken little or no advantage of this opportunity.

Pierre Calame believes that "[n]on-state actors have always played an essential role in global regulation, but their role will grow considerably in this, the beginning of the twenty-first Century... Non-state actors play a key role in world governance in different domains... To better understand and develop the non-state actors' role, it should be studied in conjunction with the general principles of governance." "Non-state actors, due to their vocation, size, flexibility, methods of organization and action, interact with states in an equal manner; however this does not mean that their action is better adapted."

One alternative idea encapsulated by many not-for-profit organisations relates to ideas in the 'Human Potential Movement' and might be summarised as a mission statement along these lines: 'To create an accepted framework for all humankind, that is self-regulating and which enables every person to achieve their fullest potential in harmony with the world and its place in existence.'

The use of the word 'humankind' is instead of 'mankind'. There are many examples of the use of the word 'humankind' and possibly therefore of this choice e.g. in the opening narration of the TV series Wonders of the Universe by Professor Brian Cox (physicist).

'Self-regulation' is meant to invoke the concept of regulation which includes rule-making such as laws, and related ideas e.g. legal doctrine as well as other frameworks. However its scope is wider than this and intended to encompass

cybernetics which allows for the study of regulation in as many varied contexts as possible from the regulation of gene expression to the Press Complaints Commission for example.

World Religious Leaders

Since 2005, religious leaders from a diverse array of faith traditions have engaged in dialogue with G8 leaders around issues of global governance and world risk. Drawing on the cultural capital of diverse religious traditions, they seek to strengthen democratic norms by influencing political leaders to include the interests of the most vulnerable when they make their decisions. Some have argued that religion is a key to transforming or fixing global governance.

Proposals

Several stakeholders have produced lists of proposals for a new world governance that is fairer, more responsible, solidarity-based, interconnected and respectful of the planet's diversity. Some examples are given below.

Joseph E. Stiglitz proposes a list of reforms related to the internal organization of international institutions and their external role in the framework of global-governance architecture. He also deals with global taxation, the management of global resources and the environment, the production and protection of global knowledge, and the need for a global legal infrastructure.

A number of other proposals are contained in the World Governance Proposal Paper: giving concrete expression to the principle of responsibility; granting civil society greater involvement in drawing up and implementing international regulations; granting national parliaments greater involvement in drawing up and implementing international regulations; re-equilibrating trade mechanisms and adopting regulations to benefit the southern hemisphere; speeding up the institution of regional bodies; extending and specifying the concept of the commons; redefining proposal and decision-making powers in order to reform the United Nations; developing independent observation, early-warning, and assessment systems; diversifying and stabilizing the basis for financing international collective action; and engaging in a wide-reaching process of consultation, a new Bretton Woods for the United Nations.

This list provides more examples of proposals:

- the security of societies and its correlation with the need for global reforms——a controlled legally-based economy focused on stability, growth, full employment, and North-South convergence;
- equal rights for all, implying the institution of a global redistribution process;
- eradication of poverty in all countries;
- sustainable development on a global scale as an absolute imperative in political action at all levels;
- fight against the roots of terrorism and crime;

- consistent, effective, and fully democratic international institutions;
- Europe sharing its experience in meeting the challenges of globalization and adopting genuine partnership strategies to build a new form of multilateralism.

Dr. Rajesh Tandon, president of the FIM (Montreal International Forum) and of PRIA (Participatory Research in Asia), prepared a framework document entitled "Democratization of Global Governance for Global Democracy: Civil Society Visions and Strategies (G05) conference." He used the document to present five principles that could provide a basis for civil society actions: "Global institutions and agenda should be subjected to democratic political accountability."

- Democratic policy at the global level requires legitimacy of popular control through representative and direct mechanisms.
- Citizen participation in decision making at global levels requires equality of opportunity to all citizens of the world.
- Multiple spheres of governance, from local to provincial to national to regional and global, should mutually support democratization of decision making at all levels.
- Global democracy must guarantee that global public goods are equitably accessible to all citizens of the world.
- Blockchain and decentralized platforms can be considered as hyper-political and Global governance

> tools, capable to manage social interactions on large scale and dismiss traditional central authorities.

Vijaya Ramachandran, Enrique Rueda-Sabater and Robin Kraft also define principles for representation of nations and populations in the system of global governance. They propose a "Two Percent Club" that would provide for direct representation of nations with at least two percent of global population or global GDP; other nations would be represented within international fora through regional blocs.

Academic tool or discipline

In the light of the unclear meaning of the term "global governance" as a concept in international politics, some authors have proposed to define it not in substantive, but in methodological terms. Global Governance, thus defined, becomes an analytical concept that provides a specific perspective on world politics different from that of conventional international relations theory. Some universities, including those offering courses in international relations, have begun to establish degree programmes in global governance.

Context

There are those who believe that world architecture depends on establishing a system of world governance. However, the equation is currently becoming far more complicated: Whereas the process used to be about regulating and limiting the individual power of states to avoid disturbing or overturning

the status quo, the issue for today's world governance is to have a collective influence on the world's destiny by establishing a system for regulating the many interactions that lie beyond the province of state action. The political homogenization of the planet that has followed the advent of what is known as liberal democracy in its many forms should make it easier to establish a world governance system that goes beyond market laissez-faire and the democratic peace originally formulated by Immanuel Kant, which constitutes a sort of geopolitical laissez-faire.

Another view regarding the establishment of global governance is based on the difficulties to achieve equitable development at the world scale. "To secure for all human beings in all parts of the world the conditions allowing a decent and meaningful life requires enormous human energies and far-reaching changes in policies. The task is all the more demanding as the world faces numerous other problems, each related to or even part of the development challenge, each similarly pressing, and each calling for the same urgent attention. But, as Arnold Toynbee has said, 'Our age is the first generation since the dawn of history in which mankind dares to believe it practical to make the benefits of civilization available to the whole human race'."

Need

Because of the heterogeneity of preferences, which are enduring despite globalization, are often perceived as an implacable homogenization process. Americans and Europeans

provide a good example of this point: on some issues they have differing common grounds in which the division between the public and private spheres still exist. Tolerance for inequalities and the growing demand for redistribution, attitudes toward risk, and over property rights vs human rights, set the stage. In certain cases, globalization even serves to accentuate differences rather than as a force for homogenization. Responsibility must play its part with respect to regional and International governments, when balancing the needs of its citizenry.

With the growing emergence of a global civic awareness, comes opposition to globalization and its effects. A rapidly growing number of movements and organizations have taken the debate to the international level. Although it may have limitations, this trend is one response to the increasing importance of world issues, that effect the planet.

Crisis of purpose

Pierre Jacquet, Jean Pisani-Ferry, and Laurence Tubiana argue that "[t]o ensure that decisions taken for international integration are sustainable, it is important that populations see the benefits, that states agree on their goals and that the institutions governing the process are seen as legitimate. These three conditions are only partially being met. Taklya"

The authors refer to a "crisis of purpose" and international institutions suffering from "imbalance" and inadequacy. They

believe that for these institutions, "a gap has been created between the nature of the problems that need tackling and an institutional architecture which does not reflect the hierarchy of today's problems. For example, the environment has become a subject of major concern and central negotiation, but it does not have the institutional support that is compatible with its importance."

Chapter 5

World Government and Political Relations

World Politics

Global governance is not world government, and even less democratic globalization. In fact, global governance would not be necessary, were there a world government. Domestic governments have monopolies on the use of force—the power of enforcement. Global governance refers to the political interaction that is required to solve problems that affect more than one state or region when there is no power to enforce compliance. Problems arise, and networks of actors are constructed to deal with them in the absence of an international analogue to a domestic government. This system has been termed disaggregated sovereignty.

Consensus example

Improved global problem solving need not involve the establishment of additional powerful formal global institutions. It does involve building consensus on norms and practices. One such area, currently under construction, is the development and improvement of accountability mechanisms. For example, the UN Global Compact brings together companies, UN agencies, labor organizations, and civil society

to support universal environmental and social principles. Participation is entirely voluntary, and there is no enforcement of the principles by an outside regulatory body. Companies adhere to these practices both because they make economic sense, and because stakeholders, especially shareholders, can monitor their compliance easily. Mechanisms such as the Global Compact can improve the ability of affected individuals and populations to hold companies accountable. However, corporations participating in the UN Global Compact have been criticized for their merely minimal standards, the absence of sanction-and-control measures, their lack of commitment to social and ecological standards, minimal acceptance among corporations around the world, and the high cost involved in reporting annually to small and medium-sized business

Bitcoin & Beyond: Blockchains, Globalization, and Global Governance workshop brings together an interdisciplinary group of researchers to examine the implications that blockchains pose for globalization and global governance.

Expansion of normative mechanisms and globalization of institutions

One effect of globalization is the increasing regulation of businesses in the global marketplace. Jan Aart Scholte asserts, however, that these changes are inadequate to meet the needs: "Along with the general intensified globalization of social relations in contemporary history has come an unprecedented expansion of regulatory apparatuses that cover planetary

jurisdictions and constituencies. On the whole, however, this global governance remains weak relative to pressing current needs for global public policy. Shortfalls in moral standing, legal foundations, material delivery, democratic credentials and charismatic leadership have together generated large legitimacy deficits in existing global regimes."

Proposals and initiatives have been developed by various sources to set up networks and institutions operating on a global scale: political parties, unions, regional authorities, and members of parliament in sovereign states.

Formulation and objectives

One of the conditions for building a world democratic governance should be the development of platforms for citizen dialogue on the legal formulation of world governance and the harmonization of objectives.

This legal formulation could take the form of a Global Constitution. According to Pierre Calame and Gustavo Marin, "[a] Global Constitution resulting from a process for the institution of a global community will act as the common reference for establishing the order of rights and duties applicable to United Nations agencies and to the other multilateral institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization." As for formulating objectives, the necessary but insufficient ambition of the United Nations Millennium Development Goals,

which aim to safeguard humankind and the planet, and the huge difficulties in implementing them, illustrates the inadequacy of institutional initiatives that do not have popular support for having failed to invite citizens to take part in the elaboration process.

Furthermore, the Global Constitution "must clearly express a limited number of overall objectives that are to be the basis of global governance and are to guide the common action of the U.N. agencies and the multilateral institutions, where the specific role of each of these is subordinated to the pursuit of these common objectives."

Calame proposes the following objectives:

1. instituting the conditions for sustainable development
2. reducing inequalities
3. establishing lasting peace while respecting diversity.

Reforming international institutions

Is the UN capable of taking on the heavy responsibility of managing the planet's serious problems? More specifically, can the UN reform itself in such a way as to be able to meet this challenge? At a time when the financial crisis of 2008 is raising the same questions posed by the climate disasters of previous years regarding the unpredictable consequences of disastrous human management, can international financial

institutions be reformed in such a way as to go back to their original task, which was to provide financial help to countries in need?

Lack of political will and citizen involvement at the international level has also brought about the submission of international institutions to the "neoliberal" agenda, particularly financial institutions such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Pierre Calame gives an account of this development, while Joseph E. Stiglitz points out that the need for international institutions like the IMF, the World Bank, and the WTO has never been so great, but people's trust in them has never been so low.

One of the key aspects of the United Nations reform is the problem of the representativeness of the General Assembly. The Assembly operates on the principle of "one state, one vote," so that states of hugely varying sizes have the same effect on the vote, which distorts representativeness and results in a major loss of credibility. Accordingly, "the General Assembly has lost any real capacity to influence. This means that the mechanisms for action and consultation organized by rich countries have the leading role."

Gustave Massiah advocates defining and implementing a radical reform of the UN. The author proposes building new foundations that can provide the basis for global democracy and the creation of a Global Social Contract, rooted in the

respect and protection of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights, as well as in the recognition of the strategic role of international law. The Brussels-based Global Governance Institute is dedicated to a more equitable, peaceful and sustainable global order.

The three 'gaps' in global governance

There is the jurisdictional gap, between the increasing need for global governance in many areas - such as health - and the lack of an authority with the power, or jurisdiction, to take action. Moreover, the gap of incentive between the need for international cooperation and the motivation to undertake it. The incentive gap is said to be closing as globalization provides increasing impetus for countries to cooperate. However, there are concerns that, as Africa lags further behind economically, its influence on global governance processes will diminish. At last, the participation gap, which refers to the fact that international cooperation remains primarily the affair of governments, leaving civil society groups on the fringes of policy-making. On the other hand, globalization of communication is facilitating the development of global civil society movements.

Global governance failure

Inadequate global institutions, agreements or networks as well as political and national interests may impede global governance and lead to failures. Such are the consequence of

ineffective global governance processes. Qin calls it a necessity to "reconstruct ideas for effective global governance and sustainable world order, which should include the principles of pluralism, partnership, and participation" for a change to this phenomenon. The 2012 Global Risks Report places global governance failure at the center of gravity in its geopolitical category.

World government

World government or global government is the notion of a common political authority for all of humanity, yielding a global government and a single state that exercises authority over the entire Earth. Such a government could come into existence either through violent and compulsory world domination or through peaceful and voluntary supranational union.

There has never been a worldwide executive, legislature, judiciary, military, or constitution with global jurisdiction. The United Nations is limited to a mostly advisory role, and its stated purpose is to foster co-operation between existing national governments rather than exert authority over them.

Origins of the idea

The idea and aspiration of world government is known since the dawn of history. Bronze Age Egyptian Kings aimed to rule "All That the Sun Encircles", Mesopotamian Kings "All from the

Sunrise to the Sunset", and ancient Chinese and Japanese Emperors "All under Heaven". These four civilizations developed impressive cultures of Great Unity, or Da Yitong as the Chinese put it. In 113 BC, the Han Dynasty in China erected an Altar of the Great Unity. Polybius expressed one Government over the Mediterranean world as the "marvelous" achievement of Fortune and the main task of Historian is to explain how she did it.

Dante

The ideal of world government outlived the fall of the Pax Romana for a millennium. Dante in the fourteenth century despairingly appealed to the human race: "But what has been the condition of the world since that day the seamless robe [of Pax Romana] first suffered mutilation by the claws of avarice, we can read—would that we could not also see! O human race! what tempests must need toss thee, what treasure be thrown into the sea, what shipwrecks must be endured, so long as thou, like a beast of many heads, strivest after diverse ends! Thou art sick in either intellect, and sick likewise in thy affection. Thou healest not thy high understanding by argument irrefutable, nor thy lower by the countenance of experience. Nor dost thou heal thy affection by the sweetness of divine persuasion, when the voice of the Holy Spirit breathes upon thee, "Behold, how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity!" (*De Monarchia*, 16:1)

Francisco de Vitoria

Early father of international law, Spanish philosopher Francisco de Vitoria (c. 1483–1546) is considered the "founder of global political philosophy". De Vitoria conceived of the *res publica totius orbis*, or the "republic of the whole world". This came at a time when the University of Salamanca was engaged in unprecedented thought concerning human rights, international law, and early economics based on the experiences of the Spanish Empire.

Hugo Grotius

De jure belli ac pacis (*On the Law of War and Peace*) is a 1625 book in Latin, written by Hugo Grotius (1583–1645) and published in Paris, on the legal status of war. It is now regarded as a foundational work in international law. Grotius was a philosopher, theologian, playwright, and poet. He is known for coming up with the idea of having an international law, and is still acknowledged today by the American Society of International Law.

Immanuel Kant

Immanuel Kant wrote the essay "Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch (Zum ewigen Frieden. Ein philosophischer Entwurf.) (1795)". In his essay, Kant describes three basic requirements for organizing human affairs to permanently abolish the threat of present and future war, and, thereby,

help establish a new era of lasting peace throughout the world. Specifically, Kant described his proposed peace program as containing two steps.

The "Preliminary Articles" described the steps that should be taken immediately, or with all deliberate speed:

1. "No Secret Treaty of Peace Shall Be Held Valid in Which There Is Tacitly Reserved Matter for a Future War"

2. "No Independent States, Large or Small, Shall Come under the Dominion of Another State by Inheritance, Exchange, Purchase, or Donation"

3. "Standing Armies Shall in Time Be Totally Abolished"

4. "National Debts Shall Not Be Contracted with a View to the External Friction of States"

5. "No State Shall by Force Interfere with the Constitution or Government of Another State,

6. "No State Shall, during War, Permit Such Acts of Hostility Which Would Make Mutual Confidence in the Subsequent Peace Impossible: Such Are the Employment of Assassins (percussores), Poisoners (venefici), Breach of Capitulation, and Incitement to Treason (perduellio) in the Opposing State"

Three Definitive Articles would provide not merely a cessation of hostilities, but a foundation on which to build a peace.

1. "The Civil Constitution of Every State Should Be Republican"

2. "The Law of Nations Shall be Founded on a Federation of Free States"

3. "The Law of World Citizenship Shall Be Limited to Conditions of Universal Hospitality"