CHADRASHEKHAR RAJE

PERSPECTIVES AND PROBLEMS OF DEVELOPING NATIONS

VOLUME 1

THE INFO LIBRARY

Perspectives and Problems of Developing Nations: Volume 1

Perspectives and Problems of Developing Nations: Volume 1

Chadrashekhar Raje

THE INFO LIBRARY

Published by The InfoLibrary,
4/21B, First Floor, E-Block,
Model Town-II,
New Delhi-110009, India

Perspectives and Problems of Developing Nations: Volume 1
Chadrashekhar Raje
ISBN: 978-93-5590-828-5

Table of Contents

Part I

Africa: A Paradoxical Conundrum

1

Africa: Dilemmas Of Development and Change

My Encounters with Africa

There is a famous saying in Korea that with the passage of a decade, even rivers and mountains change. Over time, things are expected to change, and for the better. Sub-Saharan Africa is so blessed with abundant natural resources, fertile soils and beautiful weather, and it attracts so many foreign visitors who come and marvel at the unexpected. You can see a lot of dynamism in the capitals, but the vast majority of the ordinary people remain poor, to the bewilderment and disappointment of many. With globalization and business opportunities, international development assistance, advances in technology, etc., one would think that the 'great convergence' would also apply in Africa.

My early encounter with Africa was a story of fascination and disillusion, and to this day Sub-Saharan Africa largely remains a land of mystification and paradox. I still remember how surprised we were when we first came to Africa. As a teenager, when I placed my first step on African soil in 1973, I was charmed by the unexpected. My father, who was a diplomat at that time, was posted to Uganda and our family stopped over Nairobi, Kenya, for a couple of days before heading to Uganda. We were struck by the orderliness, cleanliness and level of development of Nairobi compared to Seoul.

This was not what we had imagined Africa to be. Kampala, which was rather modest compared to Nairobi, was nonetheless very attractive. It was a beautiful city full of gardens and greenery, sitting on the rolling hills under the fabulous blue sky, and it had a number of good hotels like the International Hotel (now called the Sheraton Kampala Hotel), which is famous for its swimming pool, which was frequented by then President Idi Amin. A scene in the Hollywood film *The Last King of Scotland* (2006), which tells a tale of a Scottish doctor who arrives in Uganda in the early 1970s to serve as Idi Amin's personal physician, was also filmed at this swimming pool.

Just before we departed Korea, I and my older brothers were scared of going to Africa and watched, of our own accord, the film *Mondo Cane* in a downtown Seoul cinema. This was to mentally 'prepare' ourselves for the worst in Africa. The movie is a documentary of all the horrible things like cannibalism that happen in Africa and elsewhere in the world, but to our relief, we did not come across anything like that. At the time, there was not much difference in the per capital income of South Korea, Uganda and Kenya ($278, $133 and $142 respectively in 1970).[1] Economic indicators aside, the actual quality of life and even some facilities and infrastructure in these African capitals looked better than that of Korea. Politically, however, in Uganda, needless to say it was trying times under the infamous Idi Amin.

The advantage of being a teenager is that you can be carefree in respect of many things, including politics, which can be left to adults to worry about. The best thing about Uganda was its beautiful weather all year round. The weather then was clearly better than now, being more moderate and predictable, without the climate change effect that we are currently seeing. I enjoyed the natural environment and the kindness of the natives, and the merry moments with my family and friends, like when we even went on a safari tour to Murchison Falls National Park and fishing on the Victoria Lake.

What was also unexpected was the level of education in Uganda. When I entered Aga Khan Middle School, I could see the marked difference between this school and the school I went to back in Korea.

We were taught with Oxford University Press and Cambridge University Press textbooks, and the science classes—physics, chemistry and biology—were all conducted in laboratory rooms. My English teacher was native Irish and the French teacher was native French. Just a few hundred metres away from my school towered the Makerere University, at that time one of the most prestigious universities in Africa.

That was my early life in Africa. A couple of years later, we departed for Turkey, but the time I spent in Uganda left a profound and lasting imprint on me. Much later, I entered the Korean Foreign Service and the first time that I engaged in work on Africa was when I was stationed at Washington, DC as a political section officer. Besides the Korean Peninsula and East Asia, I covered the Middle East and Africa.

It was in 2001 that I returned to Africa, this time to Côte d'Ivoire. For the first time in its history since independence, a military coup was launched in the country in 1999 by General Robert Guéï and political unrest ensued. Laurent Gbagbo defeated General Guéï in the presidential election held in October 2000 and it looked as if peace would be restored. As I approached Abidjan, the capital, and saw its skyline unfold before my eyes, I could see why it was called the 'Paris of Africa' or 'little Manhattan'. But in September 2002, a mutiny by disgruntled soldiers sparked a civil war, engulfing the country in chaos and uncertainty. I witnessed how a country that was long regarded as a beacon of stability and prosperity in Africa with comparatively good institutions, infrastructures and sound economy could crumble so easily. All this was a good learning experience for me to understand the fragility of African states and the dynamics of external influence in the region.

In 2006, I was working on the President's African tour to Egypt, Nigeria and Algeria in the office of the President. It was during this tour, when we were in Nigeria, that 'Korea's Initiative for Africa's Development' was announced, the first of its kind for Korea. The visit to Algeria in particular was extraordinary and unforgettable, and it inspired me to seriously contemplate Korea's soft power.

Then in 2010, when I was in Rome, I applied for the position of the head of our mission to be re-established in Uganda. My government decided to reopen the embassy in Kampala that had been closed down in 1994 and I took a once-in-a-lifetime opportunity: to become the head of the diplomatic mission to the country that you have always reminisced about, but never thought you would return to. When I first heard that the position was open, I still needed some time to think about it and to consult with my family. Obviously, physically setting up an embassy is a really challenging task, especially in places like Uganda, a landlocked country of Sub-Saharan Africa. But the more I thought about it, the more I felt that it would be a wise choice. I made the decision to return to Uganda and there was no turning back.

On 18 May 2011, I returned to Uganda for the first time in 36 years. As the British Airways plane was hovering over Lake Victoria, approaching Entebbe Airport, my heart started to beat faster. I was anxiously staring out the window. It was a dream come true and I couldn't wait to see what Uganda looked like after all those years. Coming out of the airport, moving to Kampala, I saw that there were so many more vehicles, but that the road has not been widened at all, and its condition had deteriorated significantly, with potholes and torn-off edges that I didn't see back in the 1970s.

Then there was an unbelievable traffic bottleneck of about 10 kilometres into central Kampala. It was Monday morning, making matters worse. *Boda-boda* motorcycle taxis and *Matatu* public taxis, along with other passenger cars and trucks, flooded and converged on roundabouts and crossroads as we were approaching the city. I don't know how long we were stuck in the traffic just a few kilometres away from downtown Kampala. I have not seen such chaos in my life. The total disorderliness on the outskirts of the city made me wonder whether this was the main gateway to the centre of the capital.

I sensed that something must have been going wrong for a long time for the situation to have come to this. When our car finally mounted the hills of Nakasero, things got a lot better, but still I couldn't quite catch a glimpse of the clean and orderly downtown that I used to see 36 years ago. By the time we arrived at the hotel, we were so exhausted. Apparently, population growth and concentration, deterioration of the physical infrastructure, environmental degradation in urban areas, etc. are common phenomena in the developing world. But it was not what I had expected to see. Koreans are used to fast improvement and development, and we tend to take it for granted that with the passing of time, things gets better. What I felt this day was a sober reminder that in Sub-Saharan Africa, some kind of deep-seated problems persist and that they needed to be identified and addressed.

But other than the terrible traffic situation and poorly maintained roads, the nature of Uganda is most attractive and visitors soon get to understand why Winston Churchill named Uganda 'the Pearl of Africa'. Outside the central urban district, the beautiful, lush greenery unfolds wherever you go. I couldn't forget when I travelled for the first time to western Uganda. On the way through the Mbarara District, I saw so many wonderfully manicured plantations and rich livestock farms, and densely planted vegetables and fruits growing in red and black fertile soils. It made you wonder whether this is really Africa and not somewhere in Europe.

Each way you look at it, you sense that for whatever reason, huge opportunities have been lost, but still there is great potential for growth and prosperity. Someone said that living in perennial poverty amid such an abundance and riches of natural gifts, when you have just about everything you need, is tantamount to a sin.

Afterwards, to add a little more to our adventure, we drove deep into the southwestern end of Uganda bordering Rwanda and, from there, ventured into Rwanda in order to arrive at Kigali. How the city infrastructure was managed was so impressive, and what I saw there was really an eye opener and renewed my hope for Africa. On the contrary, my visits to South Sudan after the infighting broke out there has reminded me that still in some parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, even the most basic political, social and economic conditions required to run a state are seriously deficient.

Fast forward to 2018, as if almost seven years of my assignment in Uganda was not enough, I am still working in Africa, of course with great pleasure, having moved to South Africa in February to begin another tour of duty in the continent. I have arrived at a very interesting time when South Africa's new President Ramaphosa is trying to navigate through tough political and economic challenges in the wake of Zuma's downfall. While the fight against the legacy of apartheid and the campaign to redress historical 'injustices' continues to be waged explicitly in South Africa, from a developmental point of view, South Africa nonetheless poses another dilemma. In a sense, South Africa offers an epitome of Africa's great irony.

A Glimpse Back at Colonization and Its Legacies

Colonial history and legacies, whether one likes it or not, has relevance to the nations that have experienced colonialism and is an unavoidable subject of conversation on the development processes of the nations concerned. Almost all developing countries of the world today have gone through colonialism in one form or another, and the impact it has had on Africa is considered to be especially far-reaching. But how the colonial experience is perceived by the peoples and how this has shaped their relationship with their former colonizers will depend on the nature of the colonial rule and how it was pursued, along with many other factors. Regardless, for any developing nation, understanding its historical path and status in the nation-building process is an obvious necessity.

Sub-Saharan Africa's urban centres are rapidly becoming globalized, but the tendency to view things in terms of their historical connectivity to a colonial past evidently persists in the region. And many African leaders are not shy to speak out on colonial legacies, neo-imperialism, the 'arrogance of the West', the 'conspiracy of the West', the 'political agenda of the West' and so on, whenever they feel challenged by the Western world. It could be political gesturing, rationalization or a way of expressing African solidarity. Normally, the rhetoric is not literally antagonistic, but rather political or conventional.

A typical case is when African leaders express their displeasure over 'political pressures' from Western countries on such issues as violations of human rights, the rule of law and democracy. Generally, people in the region are very receptive to Westerners and other foreigners, are pragmatic and non-ideological, and espouse 'global civilization', which is predominantly Western in its composition. Based on historical ties and geographical proximity, European nations maintain special ties with Africa, and they continue to play 'principal' roles in the region as major partners.

The influence of the major Western powers was truly far-reaching. By 1921, the British Empire, at its peak, was covering about one-quarter of both the world's population and territory: about 4.6 billion people and 37 million km^2 respectively.[2] France, another former colossal power, boasts over 56 member states in La Francophonie on a par with the Commonwealth of Nations membership of 53. Interestingly enough, those who have lived both in the Commonwealth and the Francophonie world would be able to tell there are some differences between them, reflecting respective colonial legacies. Most Latin American countries were formerly Spanish colonies, and many other colonial powers existed in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

The vast majority of developing countries have experienced colonialism in some form or another. The influence of the West in terms of political, economic and social institutions, as well as popular cultures and the 'modern' way of life, has been dominant in the rest of the world, and this continues under globalization, although now there are more players in the region. Africa was the object of an all-out exploitation by the Western powers in the nineteenth century. Continuous population growth and concentration in Europe from around the early fifteenth century required an increasing supply of farmland, foods and energy, but there were also widespread epidemic diseases, wars and exploitation by rulers and landlords. Power struggles, frequent wars among Europeans powers and the difficulty in extracting resources from their own boundaries led European states to seek wealth overseas.[3]

The fragmentation of the European political systems actually started much earlier, with the fall of the Roman Empire in the late sixth century and the expansion of Islamic powers in the eighth century. The nobility built fortresses against potential invaders and looters, while exploiting the serfs and mobilizing troops to put down rebellions by the serfs, and to counter attacks from outside and within. The frequency of wars was on the rise and never-ending, and new armouries like cannons were developed, driving up the costs of waging war. Crusaders were also sent to recapture holy places occupied by Islamic forces. Their objectives, besides religious, were political and commercial in nature, and successful campaigns helped reopen the Mediterranean Sea for trade and travel.[4]

The development of city states in Europe that became the major centres of trade, together with connections of various trade routes, formed a natural 'world system' of trade. But the fall of Constantinople in 1453 caused by the Ottoman Empire's invasion dealt a heavy blow to Europe as the trade route to the East through the eastern Mediterranean Sea was blocked by the Ottomans, forcing the West to find alternate sea routes to access Asia's riches through the Indian Ocean.[5]

Europe's limited farmland and natural resources, the increasing struggle and competition among factional powers, and greed for wealth and power drove Europeans to venture into aggressive campaigns outside their continent. During this period of excursions, America was discovered and Sub-Saharan Africa was further surveyed. A Portuguese expeditionary force in the early sixteenth century ended the era of peaceful navigation by introducing maritime trade using coercive means. While the West's mission to Asia was mostly to find markets in order to trade commodities, their efforts in Africa were focused on mobilizing slaves for plantation farming in Africa and the New World.[6]

In Latin America, the two powerful Aztec and Inca Empires were known to have flourished by the fifteenth century, but they were conquered by the Spanish expedition and subjected to harsh domination. Also in Africa, before it was colonized by the West, there existed many empires in Sub-Saharan Africa, besides those in Maghreb or the North Africa region. They were mostly concentrated in West Africa, but other empires or kingdoms were identified in central, eastern, western and southern Africa as well.[7] The most prominent ones were the Ghana Empire, the Mali Empire, the Benin Empire, the Mossi Kingdoms, the Aksum Empire and the Ethiopian Empire.[8]

While the features of European incursions into Asia, Africa and America varied, they all had one thing in common, in that they were carried out coercively, by 'gunboat trade', conquest, imposition of terms, etc., based on the Europeans' superior arms and fighting capability. As time passed, the exploitive nature of the West's adventurism intensified and degenerated to the point of doing anything possible, like conducting forced opium sales and the gunboat diplomacy in Asia in the nineteenth century.[9]

The continents that Europeans targeted to advance their wealth and power—Asia, Africa and Latin America, including the Caribbean—were themselves more or less inter-connected in the dynamics of growing international trading system. But the trade in the Indian Ocean, even before Portugal, the Netherlands, Britain and France embarked on the 'armed trade', was robustly carried out by regional players, including Islamic powers, India and China. Natural resources such as gold and silver were introduced to China and India, and from these countries fabrics and other commodities were exported to neighbouring regions. Some items like cotton fabrics were distributed beyond East Africa to reach West Africa.[10]

In the process, the Western imperial powers erected what can be called a world trading system. An example of its sub-system is the one which was based on plantation systems in Africa and South America and Caribbean. The Atlantic world was connected to two triangular trade systems which emerged in the seventeenth century and were completed in the eighteenth century. The most widely known one is that linking the Britain, Africa and America: sugar cane, timber and fisheries from America were exported to Britain, and manufactured goods from Britain were sold to Africa in exchange for slaves, who were exported to America. The other system involved the export of rum to Africa from the North American British colony, the sale of African slaves exchanged for rum to the Caribbean, and the export of molasses from the Caribbean to New England. Through such trade systems, the colonial rulers amassed huge wealth.[11]

How such a large-scale slave trade could have been brazenly and persistently carried out for many centuries is unimaginable today, but at that time human expropriation and exploitation were not uncommon. Muslims are said to have engaged in trans-Saharan slave trade well before this transatlantic slave trade took place, while various kingdoms and states in Africa were operating slavery in one form or another. Of course, slavery itself was prevalent in many regions and throughout our history, and skin colour was of no relevance in terms of becoming a slave. When you look up the word 'slave' in the dictionary, you will find that it is derived from the 'Slavs', who were sold off in great numbers into servitude by conquering forces in the early Middle Ages.[12]

Wars, conquests and subjugation of the weak by the powerful—in other words, the rule of the survival of the fittest—were commonplace among Europeans. The development of modern nation states in Europe in some ways exacerbated the rivalry and divisions in the region, culminating in the two World Wars in the twentieth century. When we reflect on the history of imperialism and colonialism of the West, people may see these as 'sins' committed by the West on others, but back then there were no such thing as universal values like human rights, let alone the kind of international norms or regulations that we take for granted today.[13]

However, the word 'imperialism' in today's context only has negative connotations. It implies greed, exploitation, control and subjugation of the weak. In ancient or medieval times, empires might have been helpful in reducing wars or bringing about stability. However, with growing populations and political entities or states having limited land and natural resources, Europe was increasing engaged in internal rivalries and conflicts, not to mention clashes with foreign (namely Islamic) forces.

Europe's internal tensions could have been relieved as European states focused on expanding into other continents: Portugal and Spain led expeditions to find new sea routes and riches, and embarked on the colonization of foreign lands during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, while the Netherlands, Britain, France, Belgium and Germany followed suit. After Asia and America, it was Africa's turn to be subjected to renewed exploitation, culminating in the Scramble for Africa by the European powers in the late nineteenth century. The Berlin Conference of 1894 and subsequent arrangements among the colonial powers largely defined the territorial boundaries of African countries that we see today. The colonial expansion in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries is referred to as the New Imperialism.

However, as it turned out, the West's power game did not end with such partitioning of sphere of influence. Meanwhile, the Industrial Revolution that started in Britain and spread to other European countries as well as to the US and Japan, also upgraded the technology and output of weaponry, making wars all the more devastating. The tensions were brought right back to the continent of Europe, where the First

World War was triggered. This was followed by the Great Depression and the Second World War, which was unprecedented in the history of humankind in terms of the scale of its casualties. The surfacing of a whole different form of nationalism in Europe—Nazism and fascism—showed the dangers inherent in Western democracies degenerating into something far worse.

Imperialism and colonialism withered following the World Wars, and as the principle of self-determination of nations was declared. On 14 December 1960, the United Nations (UN) General Assembly adopted a resolution called the 'Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples'. Most Asian and Middle Eastern countries were decolonized by the 1950s, while almost all African and Caribbean countries achieved independence by the 1960s. For African countries, decolonization was not the end of the story of international intrusions. They were still being drawn deep into the forces of the international political economy, and faced challenging tasks of nation-building and development both during and after the Cold War and into the era of globalization.

No doubt, for Sub-Saharan African nations, extensive colonization, subsequent decolonization and continued close ties with their former colonial powers have helped them to become open and engaged with the West and the world as a whole. In the process, Western ideas, education, cultures, political, economic and social systems and know-how continued to flow in, having a truly profound influence on the region.

African colonization was a conquest launched by the West equipped with superior armoury and professional expeditionary forces. Before the twentieth century, there were no widely established norms like human equality and non-aggression in the world as we know it today, and many in Europe viewed the white race as being superior.[14] Europeans went about taking the lands and assets of others by forceful means in the context of building empires or enriching themselves and their motherland. The politics of sheer realism prevailed. There were not many objections to those actions taking place outside of Europe and even when Europeans clashed with each other, it was not considered to be extraordinary. With the passage of time, however, the exploitive apparatus of the colonial settlers turned into a more stable and routine governing mechanism that later provided a groundwork for state-building by Africans.[15]

Although Sub-Saharan African countries adopted Western-style modern state institutions and governing systems, and pursued market economics early on, common syndromes such as the weakness of state institutions and the weakness of national identity or a sense of nation persist. Modern states or nation states that we see today began in Europe, although in other continents, such as Asia, there were highly centralized and developed kingdoms or dynasties. As mentioned earlier, there were already empires and kingdoms in Africa before colonization and to this day, some of those sub-national kingdoms persist. Uganda is an example of a country having officially five kingdoms or monarchies: Buganda, Bunyoro, Busoga, Toro and Rwenzururu.

In medieval Europe, there existed a variety of forms of authority or rule over people like feudal lords, empires, religious authorities, free cities and other authorities.[16] Students of international politics have learned that the 1648 Peace of Westphalia, which was the outcome of the Thirty Years' War, gave rise to the development of modern states having a sweeping capability for taxation, a sophisticated bureaucratic system and coercive control over their populations. The form of statehood that became prominent in Europe later spread to the rest of the world through the process of colonization and decolonization. Modern colonialism has deep roots in the Western history of the formation of nation states and we are reminded of its influence on the rest of the world. It is argued that among the countries that were colonized, some types of modern states were developed in Asia and elsewhere prior to colonialism, but they were largely displaced by colonial rule.[17] The West's military capability, technology and expansionist posture made the difference.

Jürgen Osterhammel points out that colonialism contributed to making the European concept of the modern state universal and that this is one of the greatest impacts colonialism had on the world.[18] Before Western colonization, it is said that only centralized despotic powers like the Mughul Empire had the semblance of a modern state. Other than this, political powers in Asia and Africa had the appearance of being rather informal, personal and ritual-religious. These entities were not based on sound institutional structures, but were founded on loose networks of loyalty. On the other hand, colonial states of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries were secularized and administrative states were backed up by a military apparatus.[19]

A problem here was that while the colonial states and subsequent independent states were territorial states, they were hardly nation states. In other words, there was a discrepancy between the concept of territorial state and nation state due to arbitrary territorial boundaries set by the colonial powers. It was an outcome of social Darwinism thinking and the 'divide and rule' policy of European colonialists, which may explain why to this day so many ethnic, religious conflicts occur in Africa.[20] However, a mismatch between territorial boundaries and the peoples does not necessarily correlate to conflicts, and it would be virtually impossible to divide up territories in order to suit every ethnicity or tribe. Correcting the 'territorial mismatch' can still bring about conflict, as can be seen in the case of South Sudan, which became independent from Sudan.

The prime objective of the colonial state was to maintain control over the people conquered and establish conditions or mechanism through which the colony could be exploited economically to serve the interests of the colonial power. In addition, colonial states were equipped with a highly developed bureaucracy. In the case of Sub-Saharan Africa, the current modern state structure that was 'transplanted' by the West and also many of its institutional components emulated by African countries are in most cases functionally weak, inefficient and unreliable, and are frequently riddled with corruption and bad governance.

Unlike in other regions, where the state acquires its sovereignty in the political process of building capacity for the statehood and is eventually recognized by other states, African states gained their sovereign status instantly by collective recognition by the international community, such as the UN. Despite the fact that more than half a century has passed since most African countries gained independence, they are still struggling with the fundamentals of statehood and governance.

Continuing Woes and Dilemmas in Africa's Development

Many decades have passed since the independence of Sub-Saharan African countries, but to this day not much has occurred in terms of fundamental progress in their development. When Ghana, then the wealthiest nation in Sub-Saharan Africa, became independent in 1957, it was more prosperous than South Korea, but by the early 2000s, Korea's gross national product (GNP) per capita was over 20 times that of Ghana. Nigeria collected over $600 billion in oil revenues since the early 1960s when it started oil production, but a study conducted in 2004 revealed that as much as $400 billion has disappeared, while the majority of its population suffers from acute poverty.[21]

How the predicaments have persisted expansively and commonly over many decades throughout the region is quite astonishing, as Martin Meredith observes: 'Although Africa is a continent of great diversity, African states have much in common, not only their origins as colonial territories, but the similar hazards and difficulties they have faced. Indeed, what is so striking about the fifty-year period since independence is the extent to which African states have suffered so many of the same misfortunes.'[22]

Crawford Young also notes African countries' similarities on many fronts, such as in cultural patterns 'that underpin the regular invocation of an "African Society" as a generic entity by leaders and analyst'.[23] Other similarities include the 'defining impact of the colonial occupation', the fact that most of the countries decolonized at the same time, the similarity of regime structures at the outset, the 'high degree of political diffusion in the political arena' and Africa's poor developmental performance.[24]

From the perspective of development, Africa's history since colonization can be broken down into five periods: (1) the period of exploitation by the colonizers; (2) the period of early nation-building (the mid-twentieth century, roughly the 1950s–60s); (3) the period of 'deepening' of international aid (the 1970s–80s); (4) the period of post-Cold War globalization (the 1990s–2015); and (5) period of the Post-2015 Development Agenda (2015 onwards).

Colonial legacies still matter today. It is evident that African countries became independent under the most adverse circumstances. They inherited very meagre agricultural or industrial foundations and lacked human capital and other assets required for rapid growth. The transatlantic African slave trade over some 400 years also had a profound impact on Africa. There were also slave trades within the region and across other regions, but these were smaller in scale. The early phase of colonization was marked by extensive human exploitation and plundering of natural resources. African economies became extractive to serve the colonizers and most infrastructures served the needs of the export market rather than internal development. The coercive force used to manipulate labour turned the economies into monocultures, and Gareth Austin notes that under colonialism 'African societies ceased being self-sufficient as they began to import manufactured goods and basic foodstuffs, while exporting raw materials. To this day, the perceived comparative advantages of many African economies are little more than their colonially derived specializations, even though export agriculture had begun to develop in late pre-colonial times'.[25]

Ever since African countries were decolonized, up until now, they have continuously missed opportunities and faced dilemmas regardless of how international dynamics and environment have evolved, to come to a state of 'African paradox'. During the early nation-building period, the goal of African states was to build autonomous states, but they faced strong counterforces holding them back or even driving them backwards towards structural and psychological dependency.

In the era of 'deepening of aid' in the 1970s and 1980s when emphasis was placed on targeting the poorest and correcting the 'dual economy', Africa again missed the opportunity due to its political unrest, tribal conflicts and wars, continued mismanagement, corruption, etc. Then, entering the 1990s, the demise of the Cold War ushered in the era of political transition, economic liberalization and globalization. Again, what could have been an opportunity disguised as a challenge presented itself to Africa, but the countries were virtually irresponsive. The adaption to the changing world was limited maybe due to failure to fully grasp the weight of dilemma they were in with respect to industrialization under globalization.

The globalization, and especially the financial liberalization, of the 1990s was a force to be reckoned with and not many saw it as such. Even South Korea, which in 1994 espoused *segyewha* (globalization) as a national policy was hit hard by it in the 1997 Asian financial crisis. Given the global economic environment and trends, in retrospect, the 1990s may have been the last real opportunity for Sub-Saharan African economies to solidify their industrialization capacity. The emergence of 'Africa's new tycoons' or 'business giants', while meaningful, cannot be a credible indicator of the countries' transformative economic development.

The global development regime entered a new chapter with the launch of the Post-2015 Development Agenda, and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015 after the completion of Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). The lesson learned from the MDGs may be that such global efforts may have been good in terms of tackling Africa's humanitarian needs and crisis, but were hardly effective in pushing African countries to have greater ownership and be developmental in substantive terms. The dilemma continues because when the dust settles, everyone is back to their routine business.

The irony is that Sub-Saharan African nations that should be most distressed about their state of development and therefore should be the most eager to undertake the necessary actions to lift themselves out of present situation in fact appear to be the least bothered in this regard. While serious deliberations and debates have taken place in and around the UN and other development forums like the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development's Development Assistance Committee (OECD DAC), equally serious soul searching by Africans within the African continent has been lacking.

The syndromes of dependency and 'backtracking' that will be dealt with later on seem to be quite widespread in the region. There is every reason to believe in the positivity of Africa rising in the long term, but for now, the great potential of Africa has not materialized and largely remains as potential. Yet in order to be able to move forward with confidence, countries would need to learn the lessons of their past trials and errors, and come to a clear understanding of where they stand. The dilemma for African countries was that as they were embarking on the path to national autonomy, they soon found themselves held back by the structure of dependency that has re-emerged in the aftermath of decolonization. In the absence of conscientious and sustained efforts to be autonomous, it would have been difficult for the newly independent states to delink themselves from the strong influence of their former colonizers.

A governance crisis was seen as a main culprit for Africa's poor performance in development. But in Sub-Saharan African states, the capacity and institutions of governance have never really been strong since the colonial period, nor was the sense of nation or national identity. Even after gaining independence, many of these states were not effectively prepared for self-government and had to deal with various social and political tensions that were created or neglected by the colonial regimes.

During this time of 'paradox of nation-building and dependency', the most important means sought was foreign aid. Aid was a prime objective for African nations and the main policy tools for developed countries. This was particularly so during the Cold War era, when the developing countries joined the political-ideological blocs. Although some small amounts of aid were given by some European countries for their colonies in the early twentieth century, it was after the Second World War that international aid as we know it began to be institutionalized and expanded to become an international norm.[26]

Initially, aid was primarily targeted at emergency relief, rehabilitation or national reconstruction and was directed at Western countries. After the war, much of Europe was left in ruins and it was the Marshall Plan, or the European Recovery Program, pushed forward by the US, that first set up the international aid regime. The rise of the Soviet Bloc and the beginning of the Cold War increased such efforts. So the purpose of aid during this period was to serve the donor's diplomatic, political and strategic objectives.[27]

Later, mostly in the 1960s, the majority of Sub-Saharan African countries gained independence. Since African countries became independent at the height of the Cold War, from a strategic point of view, they could have used the international political dynamics to advance their own economic development. By all accounts, this should have been a golden opportunity for Africa to grasp because the external conditions were benign. In the 1950s and 1960s, the dominant aid strategy was to focus on developing countries' need for investment capital and modern technology so that they could boost their economies.[28] Emphasis was placed on offering financial assistance and expertise to help plan and manage infrastructure and other economic development projects. The expectation was that modern technology and know-how in institutional building and organization would have trickle-down and spreading effects. But not much consideration was given to promoting links between urban and rural areas, and agriculture and industry.

High expectations and optimism can quickly turn into disappointment. In the 1960s, there was growing dissatisfaction with this approach, as the majority of the populace did not benefit from both the aid and economic growth that followed decolonization. Foreign aid was not having the desired effect on all parts of the targeted areas. It was during this time that much self-criticism in the donor community was voiced towards the tendencies of 'dual economy (a division between a modern, urban-based economy and traditional peasant economy)' in the developing countries, and the term 'white elephants' became popular. In sum, the main point of criticism was that the poor got very little out of such assistance and that the technology used was not adaptable to local conditions.[29]

As early as the beginning of the 1970s, when developed countries already have well-established aid programmes, there were talks about 'donor fatigue' and 'crisis of development' within the donor community. What finally came out of all these debates and criticisms regarding the way forward for aid were 'basic human needs' rather than stimulating long-term growth. Immediate and direct benefit for the poor was the focused goal of donors in this period.[30] The fall in primary commodity prices, the mood of détente, the lessening of rivalry between the West and the East, the international oil shock and the responses of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and oil-rich Arab countries may have also contributed to this. In the 1970s and 1980s, the general tendency of donors' approaches was placing greater emphasis on, and distributing more aid towards, the poorest countries, with an increased portion of aid going to Sub-Saharan Africa.

The dominant aid strategy during this time took the form of 'integrated rural development (IRD)' projects, which were aimed at large parts of the local economy, especially small farmers, and engaged much of the central and local government bodies with the goal to reaching out to large parts of the targeted group. Planning units were set up within the central ministries to coordinate multi-sector projects,and international and local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) started to take part in international assistance programmes.[31]

However, the aid strategy of the 1970s encountered various problems, such as the extreme complexity of the integrated development projects demanding a level of coordination that was beyond the administrative capability of most countries and too much faith placed on central planning. Also, the success of the welfare state system that many industrialized countries experienced in the 1960s and the aid strategy that was more or less influenced by such economic development optimism were out of touch with reality, given developing countries' resources and capacity.[32] I think that the international development community was right to bring comprehensive rural development to the forefront of its strategy, but unfortunately this approach lost steam and withered because of the very problem that still haunts Africa today—the lack of initiation for change and corresponding actions on the part of Africans themselves.

While rural development is a fundamental task for any developing country, it is unclear what really ignited the 'integrated rural development approach' to take centre stage in the international development arena in the early 1970s. Interestingly enough, it was in 1970 that Korea's New Village Movement, the *Saemaul Undong*, was launched. But the reason why Korea's movement was successful while IRD projects failed is probably because unlike the former, the latter was driven and assisted by donors and did not induce locals to work voluntarily in a self-help fashion to generate resources and income on their own.

In the 1980s, amid a lack of progress in aid programmes and the looming dangers of further debt crises in developing countries, as the Mexican debt crisis of 1982, soon spread to other parts of the Third World. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank led the structural adjustment programmes that demanded liberalization and the removal of state control for macro-economic stability. The debt crisis turned the 1980s into the 'lost development decade': before the path of development and poverty alleviation could be resumed, they had to implement painful polices of stabilization and structural adjustment.[33]

However, because of the inherent limitations of applying such formulae in rigorous fashion to developing countries and also of the apparent need to continue assistance for building infrastructure and directly targeting those most in need, the structural adjustment programmes were only partially executed, accounting for only a fraction of the total loans. And many bilateral donors and UN organizations continued to work in the same way as they had in the 1970s.[34] From the 1970s to the late 1980s, we can see the aid focus on poverty reduction shifting to structural adjustment and back again to poverty reduction. In the late 1980s, there were growing criticisms in the international development community that adjustment policies neglected the poor.

The end of the Cold War was accompanied by a number of significant changes in foreign aid. Most of all, the disappearance of the East European Communist Bloc and dissolution of the former Soviet Union changed the attitudes of major donor countries' aid policies vis-à-vis their allies and the former Communist Bloc countries. The US and other Western countries were increasingly linking aid to the state of governance of developing countries rather than supporting any friendly countries from a foreign policy standpoint.

As a result of the end of the Cold War, some countries lost the strategic value that the US and others have placed on them, and the amount of aid flowing to them dropped sharply. Also, great attention was given to assisting the political transition processes in former Communist Bloc countries. Therefore, much rhetoric and many efforts were directed towards the governance, democracy and political transition of the developing or newly independent countries in this decade. Amid growing donor fatigue, the total amount of aid funding fell quite markedly, while demands for political reforms became stronger.[35]

The instruments donors used with the focus of aid were sector programme support, capacity-building, policy dialogue, 'selective assistance', etc. All these methods were geared towards responding to the widening scope of aid targets in a more focused manner, with lower amounts of aid available in a bid to achieve greater aid-efficiency. But the development community continued to be dismayed by the lack of progress shown, especially in the poorest nations of Sub-Saharan Africa. Africa's crisis of governance and moral hazard problem were very frequently discussed during this period.[36]

In 2000, the UN adopted the MDGs, which targeted eight areas: (1) eradicating extreme poverty and hunger; (2) achieving universal primary education; (3) promoting gender equality and empowering women; (4) reducing child mortality; (5) improving maternal health; (6) combating HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases; (7) ensuring environmental sustainability; and (8) developing a global partnership for development. Each of these goals has specific targets and set dates for achieving those targets.[37]

In 1999, the IMF and the World Bank initiated the Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper (PRSP) approach, a comprehensive country-based strategy for poverty reduction. This approach was the IMF's and the World Bank's recognition of the importance of ownership and the need for a greater focus on poverty reduction, and it has become integral to the negotiation of development assistance for African countries. Its aim was to support heavily indebted poor countries (HIPCs) and provide the crucial link for aid flows with poverty reduction strategies developed by the aid recipient countries. It was to help the countries meet the MDGs, which aimed to halve poverty between 1990 and 2015. The PRSP has become a key benchmark for most countries in Africa for accessing external finance through bilateral and multilateral sources.[38]

In addition to MDGs and the PRSP, at the turn of the new century, there appeared more new initiatives, including Africa's first self-developed initiative. In 2001, the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (now the African Union (AU)) endorsed the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) for economic regeneration of Africa, with the goal of eradicating poverty, promoting sustainable growth and development, integrating Africa into the global economy, and accelerating the empowerment of women. NEPAD, which is a merger of the

Millennium Partnership for the African Recovery Programme (MAP) and the OMEGA Plan for Africa, was hailed as 'Africa's own initiative, Africa's plan, African crafted and therefore, African-owned'.[39]

It was argued that NEPAD 'constitutes the most important advance in African development policy during the last four decades. Undoubtedly it is an ambitious programme and represents perhaps one last hope for Africa to reverse its slide into irrelevance.'[40] But seven years after its launch, President Abdoulaye Wade of Senegal, who was one of its initial backers, accused NEPAD of wasting hundreds of millions of dollars and achieving nothing.[41]

Following the end of the Cold War, special emphasis was placed on aid effectiveness. Besides donor fatigue, recipient fatigue was also acknowledged. The donor community began to realize that its many different approaches and conditions were imposing a huge burden and costs on developing countries, making aid less effective. It began to consult and coordinate closely among its member states and with developing countries to enhance the impact of the aid given. The aid effectiveness movement, led by the OECD DAC, picked up momentum in 2002 with the Monterrey Consensus reached during the International Conference on Financing for Development held in Monterrey, Mexico. The participants of the meeting agreed to increase its funding for development, but acknowledged that more money alone was not enough. A new paradigm of aid as a partnership, rather than a one-way relationship between donor and recipient, was evolving.[42]

As follow-up measures, a series of High Level Forums on Aid Effectiveness was held in Rome, Accra, Paris and Busan (Korea). The fourth meeting in Busan (2011) is considered to have marked a turning point in international discussions on aid and development. It brought together over 3000 delegates to take stock of the progress made in aid delivery and to come up with collective aid plans for the future. The forum culminated in the signing of the Busan Partnership for Effective Development Co-operation by ministers of developed and developing nations, emerging economies, entities of South-South and triangular cooperation and civil society. This declaration established for the first time an agreed framework for development cooperation that embraces traditional donors, South-South cooperators, the BRICS nations (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa), civil society organizations and private funders.[43]

The UN was involved intensively in drawing up the Post-2015 Development Agenda, playing a facilitating role in the global conversation on this subject and supported broad consultations, leading to its launch during the UN Development Summit in September 2015. The process of formulating the Post-2015 Development Agenda was led by member states, with broad participation from major groups of nations, international bodies and other civil society stakeholders. Numerous inputs have been made to the agenda, producing a set of SDGs. This was an outcome of an open working group of the General Assembly, the report of an inter-governmental committee of experts on sustainable development financing, General Assembly dialogues, etc.

These efforts notwithstanding, the era of full-fledged globalization that began in the early 1990s has not been benign in relation to Africa. Thus, it is caught in a very long stretch of a third dilemma that we can call the 'globalization-industrialization dilemma'. In order to realize economic transformation, countries need to first build and strengthen the basis on which economic growth can take place, and then work on building the manufacturing industry sector along with or based on agricultural sector development.

But ironically, globalization which entails trade-investment liberalization, free market access, global competition, etc. perhaps poses a serious obstacle to this African dream. As such, the task of achieving transformation in the era of hyper-globalization from the perspective of African states is quite a big challenge. Certainly, there is an increasing awareness within Africa of this issue, but there do not seem to be clear ideas and answers in terms of what concrete measures should be taken. Figure 1.1 illustrates Africa's continuing predicament. It shows the increasing gap in the average per-capita income level between Africa and rest of the world.

Figure 1.2 illustrates the points made here with respect to Sub-Saharan Africa's paradox viewed from a historical perspective.[44] It also shows Africa's continuing tribulations and challenges. In the colonial era, Africa was subjected to all-out exploitation. Upon independence,



Fig. 1.1 The growing income gap: Africa versus the rest of the world (1960–2015) (*Source* International Futures (Ifs) v. 7.33, data from World Development Indicators (US$ in constant 2017 values). ISS South Africa 'Made in Africa' report 8, p. 4, April 2018)



Fig. 1.2 The paradox of Sub-Saharan Africa

Table 1.1 Sub-Saharan Africa at a glance

Country	Area (km^2) (thousand)	Population (millions)	GDP per capita	Country	Area (km^2) (thousand)	Population (millions)	GDP per capita
Angola	1247	22.14	6665	Madagascar	592	23.57	464
Benin	112	10.6	825	Malawi	120	16.83	354
Botswana	581	2.04	6575	Mali	1240	15.77	750
Burkina Faso	274	17.42	725	Mauritania	1030	3.98	1370
Burundi	28	10.48	270	Mauritius	2.04	1.25	11,368
Cameroon	47.5	22.82	1398	Mozambique	800	26.47	624
Cape Verde	4	0.5	4010	Namibia	824	2.35	4997
Central African Republic	623	4.71	363	Niger	1267	18.54	421
Chad	1284	13.21	1040	Nigeria	923	178.52	3080
Comoros	1.86	0.75	942	Rwanda	26	12.1	591
Congo	342	4.56	3226	São Tomé and Príncipe	1	0.2	1746
Congo, DR	2345	69.36	474	Senegal	197	14.55	998
Cote d'Ivoire	322	20.81	497	The Seychelles	0.455	0.093	15,540
Djibouti	23	0.89	1833	Sierra Leone	72	6.21	918
Equatorial Guinea	28	0.78	21,629	Somalia	637	10.81	112
Eritrea	118	6.54	592	South Africa	1,220	53.14	6267
Ethiopia	1104	96.51	559	South Sudan	640	11.74	1269
Gabon	267	1.71	11,805	Sudan	1890	38.76	2221
Gambia	11	1.91	586	Swaziland	17	1.27	2988
Ghana	239	26.44	1265	Tanzania	943	50.76	966
Guinea	246	12.04	606	Togo	57	6.99	598
Guinea-Bissau	36	1.75	655	Uganda	241	38.85	673
Kenya	570	45.55	1593	Zambia	753	15.02	2031
Lesotho	30	2.1	920	Zimbabwe	390	14.6	725
Liberia	113	4.4	467				

Source African Statistical Book (AfDB, UNECA, AUC) (2015)

Table 1.2 Country classification by income in Sub-Saharan Africa

Low income		Lower to middle income	High-middle income
Benin	Malawi	Angola	Botswana
Burkina Faso	Mali	Cape Verde	Equatorial Guinea
Burundi	Mozambique	Cameroon	Gabon
Central African Republic.	Niger	Congo	Mauritius
Chad	Rwanda	Cote d'Ivoire	Namibia
Comoros	Senegal	Djibouti	The Seychelles
Congo, DR	Sierra Leone	Kenya	South Africa
Eritrea	Somalia	Ghana	
Ethiopia	South Sudan	Lesotho	
Gambia	Tanzania	Mauritania	
Guinea	Togo	Nigeria	
Guinea-Bissau	Uganda	São Tomé and Príncipe	
Liberia	Zimbabwe	Sudan	
Madagascar		Swaziland	
		Zambia	

Source World Bank list of economies, June 2017

African states had the opportunity to newly shape their destiny, but failed to move on and were held back by inherent 'limitations', such as a lack of true sense of nation. Then, with favourable international settings, Africans aspired to achieve economic development, but the negativities like dependency syndrome and 'backtracking syndrome' deepened so as to offset what was gained.

Africa continued to miss out on the opportunities in the changing international political-economic environment. The end of the Cold War ushered in an era of full-fledged globalization, but the 'readiness' of African nations in terms of nation-building and development mindedness, let alone industrialization and economic competitiveness, is a far cry from what was expected. To this day, many political leaders, policy-makers and economic experts in African do not seem to fully grasp the nature of the problem. As for the income gap shown in Fig. 1.1, the extended projection shows the gap growing into 2030. The question is: when will African countries break out of this dilemma? The basic country profile information of 49 Sub-Saharan African countries is shown in the Tables 1.1, 1.2, 1.3 and in Chapters 2 and 3.

Table 1.3 Country classification by resource abundance in Sub-Saharan Africa

Resource-rich countries		Non-resource-rich countries		
Oil	Metals/ minerals			
Angola	Botswana	Benin	Gambia	São Tomé and Príncipe
Chad	Congo, DR	Burkina Faso	Ghana	Senegal
Congo	Guinea	Burundi	Guinea-Bissau	The Seychelles
Equatorial Guinea	Liberia	Cape Verde	Kenya	South Africa
Gabon	Mauritania	Cameroon	Lesotho	Somalia
Nigeria	Namibia	Central African Republic	Madagascar	Sudan
South Sudan	Niger	Comoros	Malawi	Swaziland
	Sierra Leone	Cote d'Ivoire	Mali	Tanzania
	Zambia	Djibouti	Mauritius	Togo
		Eritrea	Mozambique	Uganda
		Ethiopia	Rwanda	Zimbabwe

Source World Bank, *Africa's Pulse*, October 2017, vol. 16

Notes

1. 1970 World Bank data (data.worldbank.org).
2. Angus Maddison, *The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective* (Paris: OECD, 2001), pp. 98, 242; Bruce R. Gordon, 'To Rule the Earth', www.hostkingdom.net/earthrul.html.
3. European countries' colonization of Africa can be seen in the context of the 'predatory nature' of state-building and its extension—struggle for survival, their rivalry and competition during and after state-building—as viewed by Charles Tilly in *War Making and State Making as an Organized Crime* (1985) and *Coercion, Capital and European States* (1990). According to Tilly, war-making, state-making, protection and extraction were the four activities in which European countries engaged for survival and development.
4. Robert B. Marks, *The Origins of the Modern World*, 2nd ed. (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006). Korean translation by Sa-I Publishing (2014), pp. 91–92.
5. Ibid., pp. 84–86.

6. As for the effects of the African slave trade by Europeans, Warren C. Whatley says that it had a profound effect on Africa's political authority (promoting 'absolutism'), while Nathan Nunn in his 'Long-Term Effects of Africa's Slave Trade', *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 123, no. 1 (2008), pp. 139–176 argues that slaving and slave trade depressed long-term economic growth. See Warren C. Whatley, 'The Transatlantic Slave Trade and the Evolution of Political Authority in West Africa', in Emmanuel Akyeampong, Robert H. Bates, Nathan Nunn, and James A. Robinson (eds), *Africa's Development in Historical Perspective* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014), pp. 463–465. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson in *Why Nations Fail* (2012), pp. 252–253 elaborates on the trade of guns for slaves, which, through increased warfare and conflicts, caused major loss of life and human suffering, besides bringing about changes in political authority.
7. In terms of historical development, it is argued that there was significant heterogeneity in Africa, with the most developed parts being North Africa, West Africa and Ethiopia. There are suggestions that these parts of Africa attained levels of development that were close to those of Eurasia. See Emmanuel Akyeampong et al., *Africa's Development in Historical Perspective* (2014), p. 7.
8. See Robert O. Collins and James M. Burns, *A History of Sub-Saharan Africa*, 2nd ed. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2014).
9. The maritime trade using coercive means at this time could be called a 'gunboat trade', similar to the term 'gunboat diplomacy', which referred to the coercive diplomacy employed by the Western powers against weaker countries.
10. See William G. Clarence-Smith, 'The Textile Industry of Eastern Africa in the Long Duree', in *Africa's Development in Historical Perspective* (2014), pp. 264–266.
11. Robert B. Marks (2006) (Korean translation), p. 138.
12. Robert O. Collins and James M. Burns (2014), p. 201.
13. By all accounts, looking at the history, the universal 'political' values that we take for granted today must have emerged no earlier than the twentieth century. I believe it was in the process of the making of the League of Nations and later the United Nations that the universal values became widely accepted by the global community.
14. See David Olusoga's article 'The roots of European racism lie in the slave trade, colonialism-and Edward Long' in *The Guardian*, 8

September 2015. Olusoga observes that since the fifteenth century, European have viewed Africans as inferior, backwards and barbaric, and this still casts a shadow over the continent.

15. See Jürgen Osterhammel, *Kolonialismus: Geschichte, Formen, Folgne* (Munich: Verlag C.H. Beck oHG, 2003), Korean translation by Yuksa Bipyongsa (2006), pp. 92–97.
16. Karen Barkey and Sunita Karen, 'Comparative Perspectives on the State', *Annual Review of Sociology* 17 (1991), p. 527.
17. Countries in Asia like China, Korea and Japan that were not colonized by the West had achieved a high level of development along with Western Europe prior to the 'Great Divergence' as elaborated by Kenneth Pomeranz in his book *The Great Divergence: China, Europe, and the Making of the Modern World Economy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).
18. Jürgen Osterhammel, *Kolonialismus* (Korean translation), p. 112.
19. Ibid., p. 112.
20. Ibid., p. 113.
21. John Campbell, *Nigeria: Dancing on the Brink* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2011), p. 12, cited in Crawford Young (2012, p. 8).
22. Martin Meredith, *The State of Africa: A History of the Continent Since Independence* (London: Simon & Schuster, 2011), p. 14.
23. Crawford Young, *The Postcolonial State in Africa* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012), p. 5.
24. Ibid., pp. 6–8.
25. Gareth Austin, 'African Economic Development and Colonial Legacies', International Development Policy Series, Geneva: Graduate Institute in Pierre Englebert and Kevin C. Dunn, *Inside African Politics* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2013), p. 215.
26. In the aftermath of the Second World War, various factors like the need to reconstruct Europe, the creation of the United Nations, the emergence of many new independent states and the new international political dynamics (namely the Cold War) are seen as major factors that gave rise to the institutionalization of international aid.
27. Carol Lancaster, *Foreign Aid: Diplomacy, Development, Domestic Politics* (London: University of Chicago Press, 2007), pp. 25–29.
28. John Degnbol-Martinussen and Poul Engberg-Pedersen, *Aid: Understanding International Development Cooperation*, translated by

Marie Bille (London: Zed Books, 2005), p. 44. It was originally published in Danish in 1999.

29. Ibid., p. 45.
30. Carol Lancaster, *Foreign Aid*, pp. 39–40.
31. According to USAID, the Integrated Rural Development (IRD) approach was popular in the 1970s, with the number of and donor allocations to IRD projects increasing rapidly in the mid-1970s and reaching their peak at the beginning of the 1980s. However, follow-up evaluations highlighted the mostly unsatisfactory performance of these projects, resulting in a shift towards broader systemic poverty alleviation initiatives (such as the World Bank's Poverty Reduction Strategies). See 'Integrated Rural Development: Lessons learned', http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/PNADF432.pdf. See also John Degnbol-Martinussen and Poul Engberg-Pedersen, *AID* (2005), pp. 45–47; Susan Chase and Elisa Wilkinson, 'What Happened to Integrated Rural Development?', *The Hunger Project*, 10 August 2015.
32. *Aid* (2005), p. 46.
33. Erik Thorbecke, 'The Evolution of the Development Doctrine and the Role of Foreign Aid', in Finn Tarp (ed.), *Foreign Aid and Development: Lessons Learnt and Directions for the Future* (London: Routledge, 2000), p. 33.
34. *Aid* (2005), p. 48.
35. According to Thorbecke (2000), the development strategy in the 1990s retained most of the strategy that was built in the previous decade, at least in the first half of the decade. But as the decade went on, the adjustment-based strategy of the 1980s came under critical review, leading to major changes. Two contending approaches were put forward: the 'orthodox' view and the 'heterodox' view. The East Asian miracle also provided a convincing case for sound institutions, but the Asian financial crisis of 1997 forced a critical examination of excessive trade and capital liberalization policies (pp. 42–43). See also Carol Lancaster, *Foreign Aid* (2007), pp. 45–46. Lancaster explains that the withdrawal of aid and engagement by the West following the end of the Cold War contributed to the rise in conflicts and violence in Africa in the 1990s.
36. Carol Lancaster points out that by the end of the 1990s, four 'new' aid purposes emerged: promoting economic and political transitions; addressing global problems; furthering democracy; and managing

conflict. Concerns for aid effectiveness were not new, but these gained prominence in the 1990s, due, among other things, to the dismal economic performance of Sub-Saharan African countries. See *Foreign Aid* (2007), pp. 48–50.

37. United Nations, 'We Can End Poverty', http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals.
38. Jim Levinsohn, 'The World Bank's Poverty Reduction Strategy Paper Approach: Good Marketing or Good Policy?', G-24 Discussion Paper Series, UNCTAD, 21 April 2003, pp. 1–3.
39. Jeffrey Sachs and George B.N. Ayittey, 'Can Foreign Aid Reduce Poverty?', *CQ Press* (2009), http://www.earth.columbia.edu: 05-09-2013.
40. Hope, K.R. 'From Crisis to Renewal: Towards a Successful Implementation of the New Partnership for Africa's Development', *African Affairs* 101 (2002), pp. 387–402.
41. Reuters, 'Senegal's Wade Slams Africa Development Body', 13 June 2007.
42. OECD, 'Aid Effectiveness', http://www.oecd.org/dac/effectiveness.
43. Ibid.
44. Fig. 1.1 shows the dilemmas that Sub-Saharan African nations have faced. In the early years of independence, their overarching national goal was nation-building, but the irony is that what should be the driving force behind nation-building, a 'sense of nation', 'national identity' or patriotism, was essentially lacking. Hence, the nation-building process is still largely incomplete in most of these countries. The second phase in the dilemma was when the international development community institutionalized various policies and systems of aid, and was actively engaged in assisting African countries. But what should have been the golden opportunity for Africa was missed because Africans could not take advantage of what was provided, and instead fell back on their dependency syndrome and other regressive traits. Since the 1990s, the third dilemma of globalization vs. industrialization persists for Africa, which raises questions as to whether Sub-Saharan Africa can genuinely transform.

2

Assessing Foreign Aid's and Donor's Contribution to Growth and Development

Criticisms of Foreign Aid

Since the early 1980s, there have been exhaustive debates on foreign aid focusing on its failures in Sub-Saharan Africa. The literature on foreign aid to Africa, especially among intellectuals, is most often critical of its disappointing performance in terms of poverty reduction and economic development. Critics argue that the aid architecture in Africa presents a sad story of hundreds of billion dollars of aid poured into the continent to virtually no avail. A large number of Africans are today even poorer and many African states are less developed than they were before. Despite continuous massive inflows of foreign aid far exceeding debt servicing outflows, Africa has failed to use aid to make significant improvements in its development. It is the last region in the world where official aid inflows outstrip private capital inflows by a very large margin. And Africa is so dependent on aid not only in terms of quantity but also in terms of the institutional mechanisms.[1]

Among many people from various backgrounds, including government officials, diplomats, development experts, scholars, businessmen, NGO workers and journalists, with whom I have had discussions with over the years in Africa, no one seems to refute the fact that aid in itself cannot lead to development. Aid, in the form of financial assistance or material supply, can be easily diverted to be 'consumed' for various purposes. Facilities and equipment that are donated usually become useless or 'white elephants' as soon as they are handed over. The irony is that the more aid that is provided, the more it will be seen as given and its value will decline in the eyes of its recipients. It is as if aid is 'public goods' provided free and without limits. Hence, conditionality is being applied, but the reality of Africa is such that applying conditionality in itself poses challenges. Some critics go as far as claiming that the provision of foreign aid itself contributes to Africa's troubles and underdevelopment by fuelling dependency syndrome and weakening African states' governance or administrative capacity, or even legitimacy.

Peter Bauer, who was considered a pioneering critic of foreign aid, believed that government-to-government aid was neither necessary nor sufficient for development, as it only entailed the danger of increasing the government's power, promoting corruption and the misallocation of resources, destroying economic incentives, eroding civil initiatives and dynamism. Bauer persistently criticized the big push model (Rosenstein-Rodan 1943), which provided the intellectual support for allocation of aid to stimulate economic growth. He argued that donors do not know which investments are appropriate for developing countries and that aid not only fails to jump-start growth, but actually hinders it.[2]

In his book *Emerging Africa*, Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu suggests that perhaps the main element that has caused the underdevelopment of the African continent is foreign aid. He asks whether several decades of huge amounts of development assistance have failed to produce any significant development, and if this is self-evident, why African leaders have not reacted to this in kind. He stresses that development, by definition, is a process that should be driven internally by organizing the production economy in an efficient manner.[3]

Researchers have found out that the per capita gross domestic product (GDP) of Africans living south of the Sahara declined by an average annual rate of 0.59% between 1975 and 2000. Over that period, per capita GDP adjusted for purchasing power parity declined from $1770 in constant 1995 international dollars to $1479.[4] An observation is made that over the past 60 years, at least $1 trillion of foreign aid is said to have been transferred to Africa, but real per capita income today is lower than it was in the 1970s.[5] For critics, aid has not only impeded economic growth in Africa, but has also led to the huge debt burden that many African countries are saddled with today.[6]

Many point out that aid flows into Africa have left the continent worse off: 'Aid cannot be blamed for all the mistakes made in the projects it bankrolls. However, by providing a seemingly endless credit line to governments regardless of their policies, aid effectively discourages governments from learning from and correcting their mistakes. Giving some Third World governments perpetual assistance is about as humanitarian as giving an alcoholic the key to a brewery'.[7] In their paper 'The Curse of Aid', Simeon Djankev and others liken aid to natural resources, in that it provides a windfall of resources to recipients, which may result in the same rent-seeking behaviour as is the case with the 'curse of natural resources'.[8] Abdoulaye Wade, the former President of Senegal, said: 'I've never seen a country develop itself through aid or credit. Countries that have developed … There is no mystery there. Africa took the wrong road after independence'.[9]

Bill Easterly has been perhaps the most pronounced critic of aid since the turn of the twenty-first century and his ideas are expressed in a series of books. The central theme of Easterly's book *The Elusive Quest for Growth* is that 'incentives matter': despite all the efforts and money spent trying to remedy extreme poverty in the developing world, the donor countries have repeatedly failed because they have neglected the fundamental rule that individuals, businesses, governments and donors respond to incentives.[10] In *The White Man's Burden*, he contends that existing aid strategies provide neither accountability nor feedback, but without accountability, the problems are never fixed, and without feedback from the poor, no one will understand what exactly needs to be fixed.[11] In *The Tyranny of Experts*, he claims that development experts consider poverty in technical terms and focus on fixing immediate problems without dealing with the political oppression that caused the problems in the first place.[12]

According to Acemoglu and Robinson, the failure of aid for Africa is not due to a vicious circle of poverty per se. Poverty is instead an outcome of 'economic institutions that systematically block the incentives and opportunities of poor people to make things better for themselves'. In sum, the problematic economic institutions that are extractive in nature are blocking their aspirations today in a similar manner to what South Africa's apartheid regime did to black people.[13]

The basic criticism of aid is that it neither goes where it was intended nor helps those anticipated. Paul Collier, in *The Bottom Billion*, highlights the 'four traps' that contribute to this problem—the conflict trap, the natural resource trap, being landlocked with bad neighbours and having bad governance—but aid can potentially help turn things by incentives, skills and reinforcement.[14] And on the question 'is aid part of the problem or part of the solution?', he points out aid is part of the solution, although it has serious problems and is not in itself sufficient.[15] Of course, there are self-criticisms within donor community that they have taken too much responsibility for solving Africa's problems and that aid-dependency syndrome has become deeply rooted in Africa'.[16]

On the other hand, there are strong advocates of aid like Jeffrey Sachs who think that donor countries should increase the amount of aid to poor countries. In *The Age of Sustainable Development*, Sachs again stresses the need to push for global sustainable development, which 'is a way to understand the world, yet is also a normative or ethical view of the world: a way to define the objectives of a well-functioning society, one that delivers wellbeing for its citizens today and in future generations'.[17]

Foreign aid has had a positive impact on health and humanitarian needs. The issue is what impact it has on economic development. According to Sebastian Edwards, the overall findings of a large body of research have been 'fragile and inconclusive', with some experts concluding that 'in the best of cases, it was possible to say that there was a small positive, and yet statistically insignificant, relationship between official aid and growth'.[18] Meanwhile, Steve Radelet observes that 'the pendulum has swung, with more evidence that aid has a modest positive impact on growth' (Table 2.1).[19]

Table 2.1 Official aid received by Sub-Saharan Africa (US$, million, 2015)

Country	1960	2015	Country	1960	2015
1. Ethiopia	15.35	3233.99	26. Chad	0.03	606.67
2. Congo, DR	82.09	2599.24	27. Guinea	0.16	538.45
3. Tanzania	10.36	2580.47	28. Central African Republic	0.03	486.94
4. Kenya	21.11	2473.78	29. Benin	0.02	430.22
5. Nigeria	32.64	2431.60	30. Angola	−0.05	380.09
6. Mozambique	0.02	1815.03	31. Burundi	7.53	366.54
7. Ghana	2.94	1768.29	32. Mauritania	0.04	318.11
8. South Sudan	-	1674.83	33. Togo	0.11	199.62
9. Uganda	20.6	1628.25	34. Djibouti	-	169.56
10. South Africa	-	1420.64	35. Cape Verde	-	152.57
11. Somalia	2.47	1253.55	36. Namibia	-	142.4
12. Mali	0.08	1200.45	37. Gambia	0.54	107.85
13. Liberia	9.92	1094.46	38. Gabon	0.02	98.77
14. Rwanda	7.53	1081.72	39. Guinea-Bissau	-	95.08
15. Malawi	4.16	1049.39	40. Swaziland	8.49	92.63
16. Burkina Faso	0.2	977.05	41. Eritrea	-	92.11
17. Sierra Leone	6.72	946.39	42. Congo	0.02	88.92
18. Sudan	27.59	899.9	43. Lesotho	1.56	83.14
19. Senegal	0.13	897.2	44. Mauritius	0.53	76.55
20. Niger	0.04	865.87	45. Comoros	-	65.78
21. Zambia	0.92	797.14	46. Botswana	3.43	65.58
22. Zimbabwe	-	788.09	47. São Tomé and Príncipe	0.11	48.95
23. Madagascar	2.65	677.01	48. Equatorial Guinea	-	7.51
24. Cameroon	0.38	663.62	49. The Seychelles	1.1	6.78
25. Cote d'Ivoire	0.13	653.4			

Source World Bank, Data—Net Official Development Assistance and Official Aid Received (2015), https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/DT.ODA.ALLD.KD?locations=ZG

Who Is to Be Blamed? Donors or Recipients?

If aid has indeed failed, then who should be blamed for this? Looking at the dismal state of development of Africa, many intellectuals and experts in this field have fallen into a habit of doing two things: accusing foreign aid of being a failure or even evil, and blaming it all on the donor community, sometimes insinuating that they are evil-doers. But the way I see this issue is that aid is only as good as the recipients' ability to make use of it. Foreign aid itself is just a means, with some good intentions behind it at least. Aid can be made very good use of or can bring about unintended outcomes. Sub-Saharan Africa's continuing woes are caused not by foreign aid, but by all the negative elements and inherent problems that have come into play.

The correct assessment would be that Sub-Saharan African countries are experiencing problems *in spite* of aid, not *because* of it. With all the issues that African countries have had to deal with after their independence, they might have done actually worse without aid. In the absence of aid, there could have been more conflicts and political instability, and this could have fuelled more uncertainty and desperation. Remember, in the 1990s, when aid was significantly curtailed, conflicts were on the rise. There could have been more irregularities, corruption, illegal trading, environment destruction, etc. So, if foreign aid was withdrawn and only 'unfettered free market-ism' prevailed, would Sub-Saharan Africa have fared much better?

It is not that the international aid community did not consider various aspects and approaches to development. As already mentioned, the international development community's track record shows that it worked hard to find the right approaches to make aid more effective and relevant, and there was much trial and error. It should be noted that the donor community actually espoused and quite vigorously pursued an industrial policy approach for Africa in the 1960s, although it had to be shifted towards a poverty reduction approach in 1970s, following great disappointment with the former's performance.[20]

Also, there is another important factor worth mentioning. Various entities give various types of aid to Africa. Some are less liable to diversions, and donors have increasingly sought ways to check against the possibilities of misappropriation of funds or materials provided. On the one hand, we have the 'budget support', which is transferring money directly to recipient governments; on the other hand, there are also wide-ranging programmes like capacity-building that are either fully under the control of donors or under strict supervision regarding use of funds.[21] Soft loans, compared to grants which constitute the majority of the type of aid offered by developed countries, are much more susceptible to irregularities, given the state of governance of the recipient countries.[22]

Most of the reports, studies or commentaries that have been made on African development tend to find fault with either the poor performance of foreign aid or the lack of competence and responsibility of donors and development experts. The perception that what donors do only matters is not only wrong but is also detrimental, because this is in effect giving up on the ability of African countries to play their part in the process.

We can easily be hypocritical and out of touch with reality, and what people seem to be oblivious of is the fact that donors do not bear prime responsibility for the development of poor countries. It is not the donors who hold the key to Africa's development. There are plenty of resources to tap into and enormous opportunities for African countries if earnest efforts are made to utilize them. Adversities that African countries face, like the four traps outlined by Paul Collier (see above) and other elements that have been cited as a hindrance to Africa's development (unfavourable climate, epidemic diseases and lack of basic health care, tribalism, neopatrimonialism, etc.) are actually mostly man-made and thus can be overcome.

The reason to be optimistic about Sub-Saharan Africa's future is that there is open-mindedness and receptiveness to the ideas and policies of the outside world. While the word 'dependency' has negative connotations, in certain circumstances, dependency may not the worst thing; rather, exclusivism, isolationism, dogmatism and radicalism are much more dangerous and self-destructive. In fact, inter-dependence has become the general feature of today's world, and maybe African leaders are seeking regional unity and integration to enhance their collective bargaining power vis-à-vis the world in order to develop more interdependent relationships.

Dependence may not be too big a problem in itself if it is short-lived or transitional; rather, fundamentally the bigger problem may be the lack of ambition. If people have true ambitions in life, they will not be satisfied by being dependants of aids. The reason why many people are not as energetic as they should be is not because they are getting enough from donors, but because they have very limited ambitions in life.

Even when people are talking about their aspirations, the first thing that they are looking for could be the funding source. But without breaking the vicious cycle in which poverty, a weak social fabric and 'bad governance', among other factors, are inter-connected, simply pouring in resources for the sake of assistance will not produce positive outcomes. So, the question reverts back to: 'What are the conditions that justify foreign assistance?'

There is no such thing as all-out altruism in the modern world. Everything good and useful entails human endeavour and hence brings with it costs. Sooner or later, it comes with a price tag. Charity in times of calamities and humanitarian crisis comes naturally. But when altruism is expected to be delivered in everyday life for an indefinite period of time by outsiders, this is a sign of trouble and abnormality. So, an appeal by African leaders, like Paul Kagame of Rwanda, that African countries steer clear of foreign aid and dependence on outsiders only makes sense.

One day, when I was giving a lecture to Ugandan local counsellors in a training institute, I challenged them by asking: 'What is development?' I told them that it is essentially about two things: change and speed. How much positive change you can make in a given period; in other words, how fast you can make changes for the better. I asked them again: 'Who should change?' They were all silent, but seemed to understand what I was trying to convey: *it is you, not the donors*.

Those who are quick to criticize donors for not doing enough had better think first whether they are not being overly harsh or unrealistic in light of what donors can actually do. Yes, donors have their professional commitments, but also their national interests, organizational interests and personal interests, and they tend to become bureaucratized over time, and we have to accept this as a reality.

Critics of foreign aid also point out that a significant proportion of aid money is drained before it reaches its intended beneficiaries, the local populace. Basically, two factors contribute to this. First, projects inevitably entail considerable administrative costs. High costs are incurred because from the standpoint of donors, the costs of bringing projects to Africa are high. Many aid projects involve experts and other human resources, materials and equipment from developed countries, and of course these need to be covered by the budget. Allotting sufficient funds to ensure the proper functioning of aid staff on the ground is also important. The level of dedication and service of aid project managers and workers who face very adverse conditions is perhaps the most important determinant of the success of their projects. This is because in a demanding environment like Sub-Saharan Africa, extra devotion and perseverance are required to get things done.

Second, the relevant government departments of the host country usually try to secure some funds of their own from the donors in the name of necessary administrative funds for collaborative activities. Risks lie not only in the planning phase of projects, but also during their actual operation. Hence, persistence in such efforts as fighting graft and reporting irregularities in the work of officials to their higher authorities is important.

Inherent Limitations of Foreign Aid

Debating whether foreign aid is good or bad in a dichotomic fashion misses the point in terms of what the real issues of development are. The usefulness of aid will depend, first, on what types of aid are used in the given circumstances and, second, on how they are planned and implemented. There should be no ambiguity in the fact that foreign aid has inherent limitations and one should not expect this aid to automatically deliver the desired results. This is because most likely, donors have to undertake their aid programmes in the least favourable or most difficult conditions and circumstances in which they can find themselves to begin with.

The usefulness of aid should be judged in terms of what objective it wants to achieve. In the case of a natural or man-made disaster or crisis calling for humanitarian support or emergency relief, the usefulness of aid is obvious. The more acute the needs, the more appealing they will be. Any forms of support—money, food, materials or various human services (by rescue crew, doctors, aid workers, etc.)—will be appreciated. Then there are casual acts of charity like donating basic goods and materials or providing voluntary services to the poor and needy. Here, the goal is achieved through the delivery of the items or services. But things become more complicated as we move into larger-scale and more sophisticated aid programmes. For such types of projects, the work of planning, constructing, operating and post managing are all difficult tasks. When working with locals, which donors cannot avoid, unforeseen events like the local subcontractor suddenly becoming bankrupt and suspending their work may occur, prolonging the duration and hence raising the overall cost of the project.

Development-oriented aid includes construction projects (building factories, hospitals, vocational schools, etc.), consulting projects, facility or systems upgrading projects, training programmes, physical infrastructure projects, technical cooperation, funding programmes (including budget support) and much more. Because the execution of foreign aid involves two collaborators—donor and recipient—with very different standards, practices and levels of skills and technology, expecting positive outcomes to come from aid is always going to be a tough proposition.

We can compare aid with domestic projects that developed countries carry out in their own countries, like social welfare programmes or public facilities construction projects. The governments have to deal with their regulations, public opinions and various stakeholders, but at least things are predictable and manageable from their standpoint. Yet, for foreign aid or development cooperation, donor governments bear the extra burden of having to conduct activities where they not only do not have administrative or legal authority, but where their working conditions are adverse as well. In addition, lack of personnel and staff on the ground, lack of local expertise, etc. compound the problem.

The biggest hurdle is perhaps the issue of ownership, which is also linked to sustainability. Aid projects are implemented over a given period, ending when the contracted term expires, followed by handovers or completion of programmes. Officially, donors' obligations end there and they no longer have the contractual basis to be responsible. Yet, in order for the projects to produce the desired outcomes and be sustainable, the recipients really need to assume ownership of the project in terms of operation and management, otherwise the projects (as they often do) will end up as 'white elephants'. Herein lies a dilemma. The poorest countries need assistance because they lack the necessary resources and skills, but once they are provided with these facilities by donors, their lack of managerial capacity, discipline, commitment to ownership and accountability makes the project untenable and in many cases useless.

There are expectations both in Sub-Saharan Africa and developed countries that aid will contribute substantively to the former's economic and social development. That is the rationale of aid. The most desired outcome would be that aid helps Africans to reduce poverty and generate income. However, there seems to be a basic misunderstanding that wealth can be obtained by transfers. Yet, the fact remains that the wealth of a nation cannot be amassed by transfers, but rather by *creation*. In order to become wealthy in an economic sense, one has to be productive. Wealth is created by producing additional value, goods and services, but there seems to be a tendency in the region where people want to become better off not by being productive, but by benefiting from the work of others, e.g., through simple redistributions.

Donors, on their part, must also find ways to better carry out their assignments. While gearing towards more pragmatic and result-oriented approaches, they need to think more from the viewpoint of recipients' interests in order to have a greater impact. Thus, many aid experts and workers are dispatched to Africa, and their expertise and know-how accumulated over many years no doubt become precious assets in this field. However, as the work of these specialists becomes more regular, their perspective can also become routinized, leading to a 'fixing' of their views on Africa.

Aid specialists who think they have a good understanding of how locals think and behave could subconsciously consider such elements to be a 'given', and hence have low expectations of what can be achieved. When they take action accordingly with such a mindset in place, this can encourage the continuation of the status quo rather than promoting change. Unless they exhibit strong passion to bring about change despite the difficult conditions, their expertise and professionalism may in fact contribute to the 'perpetuation' of Africa's underdevelopment.

Unlike natural science, in the realm of social science, over-reliance on compartmental expertise has its dangers. It is just like the problem of deepening bureaucratization. If you are the head of an organization, having many experts at your service can be convenient and encouraging. They can produce various reports or studies that you can circulate or report to your bosses for recognition. But when it comes to producing 'physical' results in terms of implementing what is in the paper, it can be a very different story; that is, you might have as many experts as you want, but still cannot get the job done.

Deepening of expertise alone may not be the solution to problems. Experts are by definition specialists, as opposed to generalists, and their field of speciality is specified. As such, they are inherently limited in terms of their scope of vision and ability to make decisions on multi-dimensional and deep-rooted issues. Then there is always the danger of being immersed in too many technicalities and details. The need to follow so many reviews, procedures and regulations, and to collaborate with so many players also poses great burden on donors, making the delivery of aid projects that much more challenging.

The moral hazard of aid recipients and development partners alike can be understood in the context of 'bureaucracy' that has been formed in this field. Indeed, there are many competent and dedicated people working in this profession, but there are some from developing and developed countries alike who seem to spend more time enjoying their 'privileged' status than working to make a difference with a true sense of mission.

Aid workers and volunteers on the ground commonly admit that the most difficult challenge they face in Africa is the human factor. When things do not go right, time after time, and frustration mounts, one can feel inclined to give in and 'adapt' to the reality. But it is not easy for people on a mission to give up fighting either. As such, the struggle goes on, but in the end the lessons are learned, usually with mixed feelings.

Another challenge arising from the evolution of donors and their policies that affects both aid recipients and donors is 'aid fragmentation'. This refers to the problem of too many donors providing too little aid (or giving aid in so many small pieces) as to undercut the efficiency of aid.[23] According to International Development Association report, over 50 donor countries, including emerging donors, over 230 international organizations, regional development banks, funds, etc., are involved in development activities, with the result that the average number of donors per recipient increased from three in 1960 to 30 in 2006.[24] This problem was acknowledged in the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness (2005), which called for a pragmatic approach to the division of labour to increase complementarity and decrease transaction costs.[25]

The complex and uncoordinated nature of aid allocation patterns can create gaps and duplications of aid for the aid recipient group. Fragmentation of aid entails transaction costs both for donors and partner countries. The principal drawbacks for donors would be the lack of specialization and scale inefficiency. If donors are active in so many places and sectors, then naturally their staff will need to be spread over a wide area. As a result, they will face an inability, in terms of having enough knowledge or expertise and manpower, to carry out all the projects in a successful manner. At the same time, high fixed costs will be incurred for a limited number of projects. As for recipients, bureaucratic costs to meet the administrative requirements imposed by a multitude of donors will be substantial.[26]

However, in recent years, several donors have also taken the decision to concentrate their aid on fewer partner countries. One reason behind this decision is to rationalize aid in order to achieve better results. However, some of these decisions may also have been brought forward by increased fiscal austerity as a result of the economic and financial crisis. It all comes back to the question of national interests versus multilateral governance.

Since aid fragmentation is a reflection of bilateral donors' tendencies and their competitive nature, it will not be easy to rectify it soon, although some measure of improvement may be found.[27] There may be 'recipient fatigue' for the elites or officials in charge of developing countries, but for the people in general, it is a very different story, which justifies the need for the robust involvement of donors in Africa. A study on aid recipients' attitudes conducted in Uganda several years ago showed that elites and the masses have different perceptions towards foreign aid—the masses strongly preferred aid over government programmes, while the elites preferred government programmes.[28] This attests to the widespread corruption, patronizing and clientelism on the part of the privileged class in the region. The local people know that they will get the benefits from foreign aid agencies, but distrust their elites strongly.

If aid has failed, it is not because aid itself is the problem or that donors had other intentions. At best, donors' responsibility for this failure is no more than being ineffective or being not aggressive enough to 'induce' change on the part of recipients. Reckoning must come from within, from the developing countries. It is not a question of a lack of materials, but is essentially about the mindset and the willingness to act.

The Issue of Reciprocal Compliance

Even scholars and practitioners involved in the development of Africa seem to be still baffled by the 'African paradox' after many decades since the world began trying to address Africa's plight. In the history of humankind, no continent has drawn such worldwide, collective attention and support on a sustained basis as Sub-Saharan Africa. This may seem obvious because the majority of the poorest countries on earth, the least developed countries or 'the bottom billion' are to be found in Sub-Saharan Africa.

But let us not forget that the African continent itself is blessed with natural endowments and has huge potential for growth. In terms of geographical size, Africa is colossal, the second-largest continent after Asia, and is the same size as the US, China, India and Europe combined. It has the greatest number of countries with varying conditions as well as commonalities. In Sub-Saharan Africa, the climate and weather are mostly favourable and there are many large areas of land with fertile soil and plentiful water. The negative description of Africa's geographical and climatic conditions by development experts is quite overblown and misleading.[29]

Meanwhile, the amount of aid provided to developing countries reached an all-time high in 2013, rebounding from two years of falling volumes despite continued pressure on budgets in OECD countries since the global financial crisis. Donor provided a total of US$134.8 billion in net official development assistance (ODA), of which US$55.7 billion went to the African continent in 2013.[30]

At the global level, we have turned a new page with the completion of the UN MDGs and the adoption of the SDGs in 2015. The MDGs focused on the alleviation of absolute poverty, as well as social sector/humanitarian assistance, but even by the UN's standards, only three out of the eight goals were on track in the case of Africa.[31] As the title suggests, the post-2015 goals rightly highlight sustainable development with an emphasis on economic development. But the outcome of MDGs and the lessons learned from them were nothing to be very excited about in terms of having more confidence and clarity in the way forward for Africa's development. Rather, the track record of Sub-Saharan Africa over the past 50 years only seems to add to the lingering sense of disillusionment, doubt, scepticism and uncertainty.

The year 2016 was marked by a series of terrorist attacks in Europe, the refugee crisis and the rise of anti-immigration, nationalistic sentiments in the Western world, while the political developments that unfolded in the US and elsewhere in 2017 only added to the uncertainty of the international order, as if we were entering uncharted territory. In 2018, the world continues to be unsettled by various developments in the international arena, but there are also some encouraging signs like a trend for global economic recovery, so the overall picture is mixed. In any case, it is unlikely that the international dynamics will have a major impact on Sub-Saharan Africa and the global donor community.

The international development architecture of Sub-Saharan Africa will likely prevail, despite the shortcomings and criticisms it has entailed. African countries' strong desire for the continuation of aid, coupled with the 'readiness' of donors and the 'short cycle' of response—decision making, formulation and implementation of projects—characteristic of developed countries in order to meet time constraints, perpetuates the existing framework of aid policies. And it would be naïve to discount the national interests—whether perceived or real—that all donor nations pursue, as well as natural competition among donors. Add to this the pressures coming from various opinion leaders, groups and organizations, and the tendency to stay the course becomes quite clear.

If the existing aid architecture cannot be overhauled in the foreseeable future, what are the practical and realistic ways in which the effectiveness of aid to Africa can be improved? The international community and African countries alike should not stomach continued lacklustre performance in Africa's development. There should be a clear awareness on the part of African nations and the donor community that improved measurements must be applied.

However, it is unrealistic to expect 'sweeping' reform to take place across the continent, irrespective of how good the idea might be, as could be seen in the case of NEPAD. Regional initiatives requiring various coordination efforts among member states present themselves as another challenge rather than as readily applicable solutions. This also holds true for trade and investment initiatives like the African Continent FTA (AfCFTA) and the BRICS-Africa collaboration that are now taking shape. Certainly, there is a sound logic behind the consolidation of regional markets in Africa. But the ultimate bulwark of Africa's development is of course its states. Without enhancing the level of governance and capacity of African states, their sustainable development will not be properly achieved. Regional integration initiatives will not succeed if the member states do not have sufficient capability to govern and manage their own affairs.

The best-case scenario for Sub-Saharan Africa would be that success stories of national development emerge one after another, setting examples for others to emulate. Development cannot be bestowed by others. No matter how much aid a country receives, development cannot be attained by external assistance alone. It is essentially an internally driven process of a nation and is not one which can be injected exogenously by outsiders. Thus, it does not really matter what the international development community discusses or plans if the subject or owners of development—the African nations—are not taking the lead in the process.

Like all other forms of partnerships, the donor-recipient partnership must be based on mutual trust in order to be fruitful and lasting. Let us consider this relationship from the standpoint of 'reciprocity'. For instance, a business partnership can be robust when the participating parties are mutually committed to meeting each other's needs.[32] Logically, a low level of or unequal reciprocity will in all likelihood not yield the desired results compared to a high level or equal reciprocity.

The problem with current state of the aid structure for Africa is not only that the level of reciprocity is low, but, more importantly, that the reciprocity is very much asymmetrical. It takes two to tango, and the parties involved—namely the African countries and the donor community—must find ways to significantly upgrade their partnership in terms of strengthening the reciprocity.

Africa's Compliance to Donors' Needs

Figure 2.1 provides an illustration of the matrix of reciprocity in partnership between Sub-Saharan Africa and the donor community. It depicts the level of 'compliance' of donors and Sub-Saharan African countries towards each other. Donors' compliance can be measured in quantitative and qualitative terms. The amount of aid provided would be a basic indicator of the quantitative response. The qualitative response is about how much attention and effort donors put in their aid programmes to meet the needs of recipient countries. Factors such as areas of assistance, content of aid programmes, level of study, preparation, involvement and coordination with host government agencies, input of experts, 'harmonization efforts', etc. should be taken into account. For aid recipients, their compliance can be gauged by the level of various administrative support and facilitation provided to donors and donor programmes, the degree of ownership and accountability demonstrated with respect to the management of aid projects after their handover, etc. But the irresponsibility and lack of sense of duty of government officials, widespread corruption, poor work ethics, the lack of development mindedness of the people, etc. are impeding efforts for development.



Fig. 2.1 Reciprocity in the partnership for African development

Figure 2.1 shows four different combinations of partnerships. The purpose is to gain a general idea of the dynamics in the whole region. The actual situation will, of course, vary depending on each country and project. The present state of partnership between African countries and donor community, in most cases, would correspond to either a no. 1 'low reciprocity' or a no. 2 'donor-active' partnership. Regarding donors' responsiveness towards Africa's needs, they can be seen either as actively engaging or falling short of expectations, depending on how the recipients and others view it.[33]

But the fundamental problem lies in the recipients' attitude. The prevalent low compliance by African countries is what undermines the effectiveness of aid and frustrates the morale of aid officials on the ground, and sows the seeds of doubt. Both donors and African countries seem to have forgotten that the justification of development aid lies in it being temporary in nature. However, things are not as simple as it might appear, and there are clearly limits in terms of how far the donors and African countries can be compliant with each other.

It is true that international organizations and bilateral donors have been struggling with the task of aid effectiveness from their end, while the innate weakness in governance on the part of African countries is cited as a reason for the poor performance of aid. There is a saying that where there is bad governance, aid is ineffective, and where there is good governance, aid is unnecessary. But the governance issue is a matter to be sorted out by African countries.

The 'low reciprocity' partnership represents an untoward state of reality. Aid is provided mostly for the sake of consumption and serves vested interests. A typical feature of this is recipient governments taking aid for granted and making little effort to be forthcoming in relation to the donor's requirements, other than when they see their own interests (such as budget allocation). Donors, for their part, go about 'routinely' with their work, adhering to formalities without worrying much about the outcome (conveniently putting the blame on the environment and recipients) and struggling to make a real impact. However, it is true that the major aid organizations maintain strict guidelines and discipline in their operations in order to try to make them as efficient as possible in the given circumstances.

A 'recipient-active' partnership would be rare in Africa, where countries are highly receptive to donors aid programmes, actively and voluntarily undertaking the necessary measures to make them work (with sound governance), while donors, in comparison, are not as proactive.[34] South Korea in the 1960s may fall into this category. Lastly, a 'high-reciprocity' partnership is an ideal situation where both donors and recipients will get satisfaction and credit for a strong and successful partnership. An example of such a case could be Rwanda.

The most common form of Africa's partnership with mainstream donors is seen to match the 'donor-active' type. In this case, the principal donors, whether multilateral and bilateral, have been making continuous efforts to make their programme more relevant to African countries, while the responsiveness of African countries towards them has more or less remained the same. The compliance gap between donors and African countries must be narrowed so that the partnership status can shift to 'high reciprocity' or 'recipient-active'.

Notes

1. Ravi Kanbur, 'Aid, Conditionality and Debt in Africa', in Finn Tarp (ed.), *Foreign Aid and Development-Lessons Learnt and Directions for the Future* (London: Routledge, 2000), pp. 409–410.
2. Andrei Schleifer, 'Peter Bauer and the Failure of Foreign Aid', *Cato Journal* 29, no. 3 (Fall 2009), pp. 379–382.
3. Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, *Emerging Africa: How the Global Economy's 'Last Frontier' Can Prosper and Matter* (London: Penguin Books, 2014), pp. 25–28.
4. Thompson Ayodele, Franklin Cudjoe, Temba Nolutshungu, and Charle Sunawabe, 'African Perspective on Aid: Foreign Assistance Will Not Pull Africa Out of Poverty', Cato Institute Economic Development Bulletin No. 2, p. 1, 14 September 2005, https://object.cato.org/sites/cato.org/files/pubs/pdf/edb2.pdf.
5. Dambisa Moyo, 'Why Aid Is Hurting Africa', *Wall Street Journal*, 21 March 2009.
6. 'Honest Accounts? The True Story of Africa's Billion Dollars Loses', Health Poverty Action and 12 Other NGOs, July 2014, https://health-povertyaction.org/wp-content/uploads/downloads/2014/07/Honest-Accounts-report-v4web.pdf.
7. James Bovard, 'The Continuing Failure of Foreign Aid', CATO Institute Policy Analysis No. 65, 31 January 1986.
8. Simeon Djankov, José García Montalvo, and Marta Reynal-Querol, 'The Aid Curse', December 2007, http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/206371468155962442/pdf/452540WP0Box331urse1of1aid01PUBLIC1.pdf.
9. Norimitsu Onishi, 'Senegalese Loner Works to Build Africa, His Way', *New York Times*, 10 April 2002.
10. William Easterly, *The Elusive Quest for Growth: Economists' Adventures and Misadventures in the Tropics* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001).
11. William Easterly, *The White Man's Burden: Why the West's Efforts to Aid the Rest Have Done So Much Ill and So Little Good* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006). Easterly points out that the true victories against poverty are most often won not by over-ambitious, top-down enactment of big projects, but through indigenous, ground-level planning and incremental measures.

12. William Easterly, *The Tyranny of Experts: Economists, Dictators, and the Forgotten Rights of the Poor* (New York: Basic Books, 2013). Easterly notes that: 'Despite the trampling of rights by Western governments and development agencies, there are plenty of grounds for hope when we see how much global change in freedom is positive anyway … This book does not say that nothing good will happen until some utopian ideals on rights are attained. No, this book argues the opposite: an incremental positive change in freedom will yield a positive change in well-being for the world's poor' (p. 344).
13. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, 'Why Foreign Aid Fails—And How to Really Help Africa', *The Spectator*, 25 January 2014, http://www.spectator.co.uk/2014/01/why-aid-fails.
14. Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion: Why the Poorest Countries Are Failing and What Can Be Done About It* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp. 104–108.
15. Ibid., p. 123.
16. Kurt Gerhardt, 'Time for a Rethink: Why Development Aid for Africa Has Failed', *Speigel*, 15 August 2010.
17. Sebastian Edwards, 'Economic Development and the Effectiveness of Foreign Aid: A Historical Perspective', *VOX, CEPR's Policy Portal*, 28 November 2014.
18. Jeffrey Sacks, *The Age of Sustainable Development* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), p. 11.
19. Steve Radelet, 'Angus Deaton, His Nobel Prize and Foreign Aid', *Future Development* (Blog), 20 October 2015.
20. Industrial policy occupies a very low profile in the current aid architecture of the mainstream donor community. Major bilateral donors do not seem to have any interest in industrial policy and it is only in UN agencies like UNIDO that the topic is taken seriously. Industrial policy for development was a part of mainstream development economics in 1960s, but later it came under sustained attack by liberal economists who argued that industrial policy had not worked and could not work because government failures were always worse than market failures. See James A. Robinson, 'Industrial Policy and Development: A Political Economy Perspective', May 2009, paper presented at the 2009 World Bank ABCDE Conference, Seoul, 22–24 June 2009.
21. Budgetary support is a way of giving development assistance: the donor country provides money directly to the developing country through a

financial transfer to the national treasury of the latter. Currently, budgetary support is undertaken by EU countries and is conditional on policy dialogue, performance assessment and capacity-building. 'This is a way of fostering partner countries' ownership of development policies and reforms and addressing the source, not the symptoms, of under-development', according to EU Budget support accounts for around a quarter of all EU development aid. In 2011, the percentages were 26% in Sub-Saharan Africa, 16% in Asia, 23% in Latin America and the Caribbean and 30% in Neighbourhood countries. See European Commission International Cooperation and Development section on its webpage (https://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/policies/budget-support-and-dialogue-partner-countries_en).

22. There is a dilemma in budgetary support, in that this type of aid to enhance the ownership of African countries is in fact becoming an easy target for abuse. Hence, some countries are trying to impose a strict conditionality for this when irregularities are reported, but there are inherent limits in terms of what donors can do about it.
23. See Eckhard Deutscher and Sara Fyson, 'Improving the Effectiveness of Aid', *Finance & Development*, a quarterly magazine of the IMF, September 2008, Volume 45, No. 3. Some experts point out that the problem of aid fragmentation is not the fragmentation itself, but the lack of competition among aid suppliers (Javier Santiso and Emmanuel Frot, 'Crushed Aid: Why Is Fragmentation a Problem for International Aid?', *VOX, CEPR's Policy Portal*, 18 January 2010). Others argue that excessive and uncoordinated aid has helped create governance weaknesses in Africa and that donor-driven governance and corruption control initiatives have failed to deliver results (Brian Cooksey, 'Aid, Governance and Corruption Control: A Critical Assessment', *Crime, Law and Social Change* 58, no. 5 (December 2012), pp. 521–531).
24. Eun Mee Kim and Pil Ho Kim (eds), *The South Korean Development Experience: Beyond Aid* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), p. 67.
25. It called for the commitment of partners: ownership, alignment, harmonization, mutual accountability and managing results.
26. '2011 OECD Report on Division of Labour: Addressing Cross-Country Fragmentation of Aid', submitted to Busan, the 4th High-Level Forum on Aid Effectiveness (November 2011).
27. Some experts point out that under the current circumstances, efforts to coordinate aid by donors, however well-intentioned, can backfire and

cause more aid fragmentation and less efficiency. See Kurt Annen and Luc Moers, 'Donor Competition for Aid Impact, and Aid Fragmentation', *IMF Working Paper* (WP/12/204), August 2012, pp. 3, 29.

28. Adam Harris (NYU), Helen Milner (Princeton), Michael Findley (UT-Austin) and Daniel Nielson (BYU), 'Elite and Mass Perceptions of Foreign Aid in Recipient Countries: A Field Experiment in Uganda', 4 April 2013, paper prepared for the annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association Meeting, Chicago, 11–14 April 2013.
29. It is largely outsiders who depict Africa's geographical, climatic conditions as unfavourable. The origin of the negative stereotype of Africa's natural environment may date back to the early period of Europeans' travels to and settlement in Africa. But today, the situation is quite different. By all accounts, one could even argue that Sub-Saharan Africa's weather is more modest and favourable than that in most other regions in the world. The vast majority of foreigners who visit Sub-Saharan Africa share such a view. Many Africans boast that their land is blessed with fertile soils and rich endowments.
30. This figure includes aid provided by traditional/mainstream donors, the OECD members. See http://www.oecd.org/newsroom/aid-to-developing-countries-rebounds-in-2013-to-reach-an-all-time-high.htm.
31. *MDG Report 2015—Lessons Learned in Implementing MDGs: Assessing Progress in Africa Toward Millennium Development Goals*, written by the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa, the African Union, the African Development Bank Group and the United Nations Development Program, September 2015, https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/MDG_Report_2015.pdf. According to the report, goal 1 (eradicate extreme poverty and hunger) was off track; goal 2 (achieve universal primary education) was on track; goal 3 (promote gender equality and empower women) was on track; goal 4 (reduce child mortality) was off track; goal 5 (improve maternal health) was off track; goal 6 (combat HIV/AIDS, malaria and other diseases) was on track; goal 7 (ensure environmental sustainability) was off track; and goal 8 (develop a global partnership for development) was not assessed.
32. As for addressing the 'needs' of recipients or donors, the question can be raised as to what are the *real intentions* of donors; do they want to genuinely help Africa to develop (for instance, to industrialize) or are they more bent on providing assistance in a way that promotes their

own interests (like opening up markets and making African economies dependent on them)?

33. Even in no. 1, 'low reciprocity partnership', the perceived low responsiveness on the part of donors was either brought about by recipients' persistent failure to even meet the minimum level of irresponsiveness or the drastic deterioration of their condition to receive aid. In other words, increasingly bad governance and the dysfunctionality of the state could cause a drop in the level of donors' responsiveness.
34. From the point of view of the 'development attitude' of a nation, no. 3 combination may be more meaningful and desirable than no. 4 combination because it implies that a country is more proactive than donors when it comes to its own development, which is only logical. This means that a country is less dependent on donors to make use of aid resources without the need for donors' strong intervention.

Part II

Underdevelopment of Africa: Uncovering the Main Root Cause

3

Conventional Explanations for Africa's Underdevelopment

Overview

Dismayed by Africa's seemingly never-ending troubles amid concerns that the region may be entrenched in an ever-deepening fix, people from both the region and the development community may be inclined to either find scapegoats to take the blame or to come up with excuses. When things go right, everybody wants some credit for it, but when things go badly, the blame game is on. Passing the buck is particularly serious in Africa, and this is also a problem in itself. In intellectual circles, many observers, experts and academics are seen to come up with standardized, textbook-style explanations in keeping with the line of their thinking rather than searching for fundamental reasons and exploring new ideas or solutions.

What seems to be an insurmountable state that African countries find themselves in may give cover for foreign countries and international organizations, as well as African leaders and the privileged class, to follow the status quo as if nothing can be done to change Africa's fortunes. Unfortunately, in many instances, Africa's political leaders in effect take advantage of the entangled situation to hold on to power. And in some cases, an unexpected and ironic political situation emerges. I was quite appalled to watch *BBC News Africa* (8 October 2017) reporting on Liberia, which aired on the eve of the nation's presidential elections, showing Liberian citizens expressing how much they missed their imprisoned former leader Charles Taylor and that they would vote for him should he run again.

Despite how much conundrum the African issues may pose, the goodwill and enthusiasm on Africa's development on the part of the global community has not been lost, and numerous internationally based private entities are robustly engaged in activities to help tackle Africa's fundamental problems with their professional expertise and international network.[1]

This chapter is a prelude to the next chapter, which will unearth the root cause of Africa's underdevelopment. But identifying or agreeing on the root cause(s) has been very elusive as there have been so many different views and interpretations on this subject. Nonetheless, the objective of this book is to make the case that there is indeed such a thing as a principal root cause for Africa's underdevelopment and to provide ideas on how it can be redressed.

In this chapter, I will very briefly discuss conventional explanations or arguments that are frequently made as to what constitutes a fundamental cause or a set of fundamental causes for Africa's continuing poverty and other troubles. These include: colonial legacies; ethnicism and neo-patrimonialism; institutions, governance and democracy; the role of government; natural conditions like climate and geography; and other factors (geography, corruption, globalization and China).

Colonial Legacies

Can historical experiences have a profound impact on the nations to the extent that they leave a permanent imprint in their lives and determine their fate? Certainly, our civilization, cultures and traditions, social behaviour patterns and even the way in which we view the world can be affected by the events of the past. How much impact they will have will depend on many things, including the scale, intensity, duration and nature of historical events, and how they have been perceived.

But what is also true is that people and nations have the ability and resilience not only to react to various phenomena or forces, but also to 'interpret' them in a context that is variable. The negativities of history can also bring about the opposite in later generations, like renewed positive resolve. And we can see many such examples in our history, both recent and old. It may be more accurate to say that this is not the exception but the rule in our lives.

The history of humanity bears two facets: being subjected to difficulties (adversity, survival, tribulations, struggles and conflicts) on the one hand, while also overcoming hardships (adopting, persevering, creating new things and making progress) on the other. Individuals, people, societies and nations have the ability not only to tame natural conditions but also to respond and overcome various obstacles. Action leads to reaction, and that is how life has evolved. Nothing is static about human beings and their lives. It is one thing to say that European colonizers were utterly exploitive towards Africa, which they were, but quite another to say that Africans are 'bound' by the colonialism of the past and its legacies, even to this day.

The slave trade and the inflow of weapons in exchange of slaves on a grand scale for many centuries must have had a devastating effect on Africa, both economically and socially. And then, during the later stages of colonization, European powers arbitrarily imposed their artificial criteria of creating states in Africa. This, along with the manner in which they managed their colonies, is deemed to have inhibited national identity or nation states from properly emerging and developing in Africa.

In his book *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Colonialism,* Mahmood Mamdani argues that colonialism led to systems that impeded the development of democracy in African states. The colonialists' indirect rule in Africa produced 'decentralized despotism', giving rise of new chiefs who become more despotic as they were empowered by colonial authority that was not embedded in local societies, which undermined the existing mode of accountability.[2] Mamdani explains that this led to a 'bifurcated' system: direct rule was exercised in the urban centres where civil powers (mostly the expatriate colonial community) prevailed, while indirect rule was maintained by the rural tribal powers (native authority).[3] Mamdani argues that politicized ethnicity is the source of much of the political-social problem in Africa today and that the colonial politicization of indigeneity was the greatest crime of colonialism.[4]

The colonialists arranged their rule in Africa so as to keep indigenous people separate and under political control. Due to European colonizers' policy of dividing the indigenous population along perceived ethnic lines, the latter's sense of citizenship or individual national identity was never fostered during the colonial era. And when independence was finally achieved, their tendency was towards expanded politicization of the 'ethnic community' rather than pushing for politics at the national level.[5]

Meanwhile, Englebert and Dunn note that the European colonial conquest of Africa was remarkably brief. It took just a few years to bring down the African political systems, some of which had endured for centuries. But the European institutions they introduced were surprisingly shallow and 'the colonial reengineering of African politics was haphazard and superficial'.[6] Interesting but all important point they are making is that while European colonization of Africa is often criticized for 'dividing' the continent and hampering African unity, in reality 'there never was any political African unity, and colonisation actually consolidated a myriad of diverse political systems into some fifty territorial states, dramatically reducing the already Balkanized nature of the continent'.[7]

All in all, it would be fair to say that while Western colonialism had a profound impact on Sub-Saharan Africa, it is too far-fetched to hold it principally accountable for the region's current state of development. The colonial period, the post-colonial era and the period of more than half a century since independence should not be bunched together as one. Some might like to think in terms of historical determinism, but the reality is that the colonial legacy is only one of many factors that have had consequences. Exaggeration of the influence of past history carries with it the danger of vastly underestimating the voluntarism, spontaneity, subjectivity and will of the population. In this regard, 'constructivism' is deemed an instrumental tool to be used alongside conventional method of study.[8]

Proponents of neo-colonialism argue that Europe's colonization of Africa continues even after independence and, similarly, a group of leftist ideologists and scholars influenced by Marxian class theory have forwarded such theories as dependency theory and world-systems theory explaining the systematic exploitation and manipulation of the Western powers in Africa and other developing countries through international trade and economic systems.[9] But with the end of the Cold War and the disintegration of the Communist Bloc and socialist regimes alongside the rise and success of Asian economies, these theories lost their appeal, persuasiveness and relevance. In the post-Cold War era, the topics that draw international attention are globalization, climate change, terrorism, humanitarian crises and so forth, and these pose important challenges to both the developed world and developing countries alike.

Crawford Young sums it up well: 'the explanatory power of colonial legacy, initially compelling, becomes less central as time goes by. The half century of postcolonial existence now matches the historic duration of effective colonial rule'. In other words, the number of Africans having a personal recollection of 'being colonized' is dwindling.[10]

Ethnicity and Neopatrimonialism

Much has been made of ethnicity and neo-patrimonialism when it comes to the problem of Africa's development, and they are interesting themes. Generally, the discourse on Africa's ethnicity and neo-patrimonialism tends to treat these negatively, suggesting that they are inimical to Africa's development. 'Colonial legacy' is more or less an 'imagined' factor, but ethnicism and neo-patrimonialism certainly can have more relevance to real life, in that they are social elements. Certainly, ethnicism can play out to undermine social cohesiveness. For its part, neo-patrimonialism, which is generally understood as the practice of leaders and state officials parasitically using their state offices and resources for the furtherance of informal patron–client relationships in which they are engaged, can also be problematic.

It is true that the prominence of ethnicity is markedly high in Sub-Saharan African compared to the rest of the world. For the entire

Sub-Saharan African region, the probability that two randomly picked individuals belong to different ethnic groups is 66%, compared to 36% for the whole world.[11] However, it should be noted that there are wide variations in ethnic heterogeneity among the Sub-Saharan African countries.

Another salient feature that is observable in the region is the tendency to espouse what seem to be incompatible or contradictory aspects of their perception, to the point that it is mystifying. For example, people basically identify themselves primarily in terms of their ethnicity, but they also show in no ambiguous terms a sense of national identity. Experts of Africa's ethnicity point out that subnational citizenship and national citizenship coexist in Africa. It is pointed out that: 'The simultaneous display of subnational and national identity is one of the most puzzling dimensions of identity politics in Africa.'[12]

In general, people's attachment to their nation seems to fall short of what we call patriotism; rather, it appears to be more associated with opportunism. Perhaps it can also be understood in terms of 'realism', 'openness', 'flexibility' or 'pragmatism'. In other regions, the term 'sense of nation' may mean being patriotic in terms of sacrificing oneself and serving one's country. But the situation seems quite different in Africa. When I was attending a seminar on history in Kampala, we had a chance to discuss Ugandans' perception of their national identity and sense of nation. A Ugandan participant expressed that 'since we already belong to this country, we might as well get along'. His lukewarm response towards nationhood did not sound out of the ordinary under the circumstances. After more than 50 years since Uganda became independent, I thought that at least the Ugandan intellectuals would have a stronger sense of nation. One panellist, a scholar, even said that life in Uganda was better before independence.

As many have pointed out, the duplicity of people's adherence to different identities is common in Sub-Saharan African nations. Moreover, the characteristic of ethnicity is that it is malleable rather than immutable and exclusionary, as different ethnic groups coexist and live peacefully with one another most of the time. A high degree of ethnicity can even have a mitigating effect on the potential division at the national level. The openness and accommodative attitude of Africans with respect to other ethnic groupings and different identities are evident.[13] Ethnic clashes mostly surface in relation to issues concerning land rights and government policies or interventions (or the lack thereof). Ethnic tensions or conflict are also exacerbated when leaders try to use ethnicity for their own political purposes. In the case of 'kingdoms', the issue can relate to local autonomy and authority vis-à-vis the state.

The pursuit of self-interest and opportunism seems to be the prevalent motivation for society. One might be perplexed to see many Africans 'display both ethnic polarization and nationalistic fervour'.[14] Tim Kellstall points out how the tendency of Africans to have multiple identities has led to a 'fragmentation of the self', and in their quest for survival, people develop links to potential patrons in a bid to garner as many favours as possible: 'The ways in which people make a living in Africa encourages them into plural identities, which prevents them from organizing collectively over time, thereby foreclosing certain types of social movement and power.'[15] It may be even called a 'multiple personality'.

Edmond Keller notes that in Sub-Saharan Africa, 'one's social identity is fluid, intermittent, and experimental' and that two forms of citizenship exist in the minds of people in their daily lives: 'a form of communitarian citizenship and a form based on residence in a national community largely created as a by-product of colonialism'.[16] Keller observes that among the most common causes of inter-group conflict in Africa today are disputes over identity and citizenship, exacerbated or prompted by bad politics. And they are inherently linked to land rights and immigration issues, as was the case in Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Rwanda and Kenya.[17] 'Ethnic groups are not closed corporate communities, bouncing off each other like billiard balls; rather, they are permeable at the margins and are entangled with 'the other' in numerous ways. Crawford Young observes that ethnic consciousness can vary widely in its intensity, depending on the depth of cultural resources on which it draws and its degree of mobilization'.[18]

Is Africa's ethnicity the cause or consequence of what is taking place in Africa? Does it negatively impact nation-building or is it like many other factors, being essentially *neutral*, depending on how it is employed? I think what we need to be careful of in this discourse is the possibility of having a 'Eurocentric bias'. From the perspective of Western countries, a sense of national citizenship, civic society, good institutions and governance, and a free-market economy are considered to be factors that are conducive for development. But from the standpoint of developing countries, many feel that these are the features of the end results, not the causes, of development. How can we reconcile such differences?

The identity and ethnicism of Africans seem to be a reflection of how Africans are adapting to reality. The ethnic community, considered as an expansion of one's family and relatives, constitutes a basic foundation or system of people's life. But confronted with the reality of deepening 'dualism' in every aspect of life—the economic, social and political gap or discrepancy between rural and urban areas—people have come to realize the limits of what their ethnic communities can provide to them, in contrast to the opportunities and benefits that can be sought from the state or foreign partners. For Sub-Saharan Africans, differences in terms of religion and political views do not seem to matter and they are rarely made into an issue, except in some isolated cases. For ordinary people, their fundamental concern has been subsistence or survival, while the privileged class has sought the maintenance of the status quo or the protection of their vested interests.

Ethnicism should not be viewed as the primary motivator for people's actions; there are many other elements that account for social dynamism. When problems seemingly taking on an ethnical dimension arise, it is usually the outcome of a combination of various factors at play and is not solely due to ethnicism.

A landmark paper on ethnicity published by the Harvard Institute of Economic Research in 2002 revealed that the Sub-Saharan African nations were the most ethnically diverse in the world.[19] Since many Sub-Saharan African countries are seen as fragile, conflict-ridden and poor, there may be a natural inclination to presume that ethnic diversity leads to more conflicts and hinders economic development and democracy. There have also been quite a number of studies purporting to back such a view, but it is also true that there are many different ways to conduct research and interpret the data.

On the question of whether there is a correlation between ethnical diversity and development, including stability and governance, the more prudent and objective studies seem to suggest that it is inconclusive or conditional at best. Ethnicity is just one factor among many that have an impact. If we think of ethnicity in terms of the 'fragmentation' of a nation, it is all relative. Ethnicity depends on how we define it conceptually and technically. The 'diversity' and 'fragmentation' of a nation is common all over the world. Even if a nation is racially homogeneous, there are sub-regional or socio-cultural divides in most countries. Even in developed countries, cases of regional animosity, stereotyping or even discrimination are not uncommon.

Korea is acknowledged as probably the most homogeneous nation on earth. But ethnical homogeneity does not make democracy or development any easier to come by. Despite being the same homogeneous nation, the two Koreas could not be more different from each other in so many aspects. As the example of North Korea shows, political ideology and the type of regime in place can eclipse all other factors.

There are many examples all over the world where ethnical homogeneity does not guarantee development. In Africa, Somalia exhibits unusual national homogeneity, with the same languages, religion and race,[20] but unfortunately it suffers from extreme internal conflict, destabilization and divisions due to clan warfare and rivalry. On the other hand, Uganda, which is considered one of the most ethnically diverse countries in the world, has enjoyed relatively positive political stability, security, economic growth and business prospects for a Sub-Saharan country. And political and social tensions within homogeneous societies cannot be always less than those of heterogeneous societies.

Rather, I think that conflicts and other problems in Sub-Saharan Africa are not caused by ethnic diversity or 'fractionalization' per se, but fundamentally by the 'concentration' of power that inordinately favours one particular group over others. Paul Collier also notes that except for a few specific cases, ethnic diversity neither increases the likelihood of civil war nor obstructs economic growth: 'multi-ethnic societies can usually be socially and economically fully viable'.[21]

Surprisingly, many African intellectuals that I have met have stressed that in Africa, ethnicism is not the fundamental cause of troubles; instead, it is being used as a rationalization or means to enhance one's leverage whenever political leaders are faced with problems. The conflict in South Sudan that started in December 2013 is a telling example of this. What started as a power struggle between President Salva Kiir and the former Vice President Riek Machar developed into a broader conflict of seemingly 'ethnic' proportions. But as the conflict continued, it became increasingly evident that its nature was more of a personal power struggle rather than a civil war between different ethical groups.

Along with ethnicism, neo-patrimonialism is another distinctive feature of Sub-Saharan Africa. Neo-patrimonialism is a term that is mostly used to characterize the state of Africa and can be defined as 'a system whereby rulers use state resources for personal benefit and to secure the loyalty of clients in the general population'.[22] A more elaborate definition of this term is given by Michael Bratton and Nicolas van de Walle: in a neo-patrimonial state, 'relationships of loyalty and dependence pervade a formal political and administrative system, and officials occupy their positions less to perform public service, their ostensible purpose, than to acquire personal wealth and status'.[23]

There are scholars of primordialism who believe that ethnicity is a deep-rooted, non-negotiable element defining one's identity in Africa. According to primordialism, Africa's ethnic diversity is seen to be a cause of conflict and the reason for the poor functioning of its states.[24] Because there is widespread corruption and continual economic-business failures and poverty in black Africa, it is easy for Afropessimists to blame the region's 'cronyist-neopatrimonial' tendencies for such problems. As a result, 'stressing the cultural or neopatrimonial dimension of African business (and states) promotes a determinism about African business whereby it is ineluctably corrupt: the very nature of patron-client ties in Sub-Saharan Africa would appear to render the expansion of legitimate commerce extraordinarily difficult, if not impossible'.[25]

A typical social culture in many countries in the region is that ordinary people do not distinguish their immediate family members from their relatives (even distant relatives) when it comes to referring them as 'brothers', 'sisters', 'mothers' and 'fathers'. The tradition of 'extended family' persists, and those individuals who have acquired the means or power are expected to help out the other members of the extended family who are in need. Critics would see such cultural elements as making Africa's neo-patrimonial practices even more detrimental to development.

But just like ethnicism, being fixated on neo-patrimonialism without taking into account the wider picture of interacting elements poses the danger of exaggerating or misrepresenting its significance. Based on his case studies on Kenya, Côte d'Ivoire, Malawi, and Rwanda, Tim Kelsall argues that neo-patrimonialism can be harnessed for developmental ends, provided that mechanisms can be found to centralize economic rents and manage them in the long term.[26] Neo-patrimonialism embodies aspects that breed corruption and are not consistent with the practices of developed nations, but it cannot be singled out as a determinant for underdevelopment. Similar traits existed in Asia, Latin America and even Europe. Botswana is a model country for democracy and governance in Africa, despite its patrimonial politics.[27] Rather, it should be viewed more as a sign or outcome of a failure on the part of African countries to meet the challenges and properly adapt to the new environment brought about by their independence.

Theoretically, we can trace the concept of patrimonialism back to Max Weber's famous three types of legitimate authority or rule: traditional, charismatic and rational-legalistic authority. Weber defined patrimonialism as a component of traditional authority, a system in which personal relations dominate in the political and administrative power relations between the ruler and the ruled. Many Africanists observed that traditional patrimonialism has endured into contemporary African regimes in the post-colonial era. Alongside African leaders' essentially patrimonial behaviour coexist formal institutions, laws and bureaucracies, making the task of comprehending Africa ever more complicated. Hence, the notion of neo-patrimonialism was developed to cope with the two dimensions of African states: essentially patrimonial rule coexisting with legal-rational authority.[28]

Neo-patrimonialism is a testament to the lack of or weakness of an authoritative mechanism for the impersonal and rational allocation of state resources, and hence to the disappointing state of nation-building. The crux of the matter is that leaders in general have used the modern state apparatus to serve their personal and immediate interests instead of being 'bound' by it to advance the public interest. Hence, the opposite of modernization or nation-building has been taking place: the state institutions have been adapted to the existing socio-cultural practices instead of institutions bringing about changes and progress in society by making the people conform and adapt to them.

Goran Hyden, Julius Court and Kenneth Mease identified three dimensions of governance from the development context: economic, political and administrative.[29] In order for a nation to properly follow the path of development, a clear separation between the public domain and the private domain must be observed. Equally, economic, political and administrative governance should be pursued 'independently', without their boundaries becoming blurred by personal interests and short-term political considerations. This would require a strong commitment and moral authority from the top. But what is probably more important is the 'empowerment of people' not only as an effective check against the abuse of power and mismanagement by the authorities and the privileged, but also to *make things work* in terms of the everyday business of the nation.

There may be various reasons why neo-patrimonialism is so prevalent in Sub-Saharan Africa, but I think the big issue here is the absence of a critical turning point or occasion to 'break away' from the past and 'shift' the mindset of the people so that it fits into the developmental mode. Western countries underwent political struggles and upheavals, and many Asian countries experienced national movements or political uprisings, both during and after colonization. The political consciousness of the people, the sense of socio-political rights expressed in actions, movements and campaigns that constitute the bedrock of nation-building and development were feeble in Sub-Saharan Africa. To this day, African leaders and elites are largely unable (whether willingly or unwillingly) to change the unwholesome syndromes typical of Africa, a subject I will address in more detail later in this book.

Institutions, Governance and Democracy

Debates on Africa's institutional problems can be taxing to both the proponents and critics of Western institutions. It boils down to the question of what makes institutions work and who is responsible for the weakness or failure of Africa's institutions. There is no question that democracy, the rule of law, human rights and good governance are universal values and principles to which virtually every nation would aspire. The challenge for developing countries is how these goals can be realistically and substantively attained. This is a fundamental task that calls for open-mindedness on the part of all stakeholders.

Is adopting Western-style modern state institutions, good governance and democracy the surest way for Africa to realize development? In other words, are weak institutions, bad governance, and undemocratic and authoritarian rule chiefly responsible for Africa's shortcomings? The mainstream donor community would think that it is a matter of course. However, this seems to be misperception or oversimplification of such a premise, which needs to be viewed in a more objective light.

Much has been made about institutions, but 'institution' itself is a vague term. Sub-Saharan Africa has emerged as a prototype case of the mismatch between 'having' and 'doing'. This mismatch shows no sign of dissipating and the institutional problem is a good example of this reality in the region. Having good institutions is one thing and making them serve their purpose is another. What makes institutions work are the actions of people who uphold them.

In essence, good institutions and governance, the rule of law, freedom of speech, human rights and democracy are essentially ultimate goals or the end state of development rather than the means to achieving development. These are the features that emerge from successful development through the process of 'embodiment', which in itself requires arduous endeavours. They are not what can be simply 'introduced' and 'adopted' upon wish. The same applies to economics. Many seem to be unaware or have forgotten that economic growth and income generation cannot come about by transfers of wealth, but by the creation of wealth or the production of goods and services. Their preoccupation is mostly with the distribution of wealth rather than the creation of wealth.

Another important aspect that may be overlooked is that democracy, the rule of law and good governance are in reality 'modes' rather than 'substance'. In Sub-Saharan Africa, democracy is viewed too much in terms of 'freedom', while the sense of 'responsibility' and citizenship, which is just as important as freedom, is woefully neglected. In a mature democracy, freedom does not mean unfettered liberty that does harm to others, but that is responsible. Freedom of speech and individuals' rights alone cannot guarantee progress, and the obsession to 'duplicate' Western-style institutions and norms only superficially could hinder Africa's path to genuine democracy.

Developed nations and the established international community regard politics and development premised on the notion of 'rationality'. Because in the West 'rational' thinking prevails in life, Westerners may take it for granted that others will think in the same terms. This applies in relation to universal values and norms, business and the market economy, development, science and technology, global challenges, etc. However, as people will soon discover, the reality of Africa seems to be quite removed from such expectations.

The Sub-Saharan African countries have maintained the state system that is the continuation of the former colonial establishments. The introduction of the European rational-legal state has led to a Westernization of the political order in Africa and around the world. But Bertrand Badie states that a crucial consequence of this is the failure in terms of 'loss of meaning' in the relationship between rulers and the ruled which 'discourages the individual in his effort to adapt to an institutional life of no concern to him'.[30]

Not only have Western political institutions and values failed to take firm root in most African countries, but the manner in which they have been pursued or applied is also seen to have inhibited the growth of the very fabric that makes them work. After independence, Sub-Saharan African political leaders 'adapted' to the reality in the way they saw convenient, resulting in the formation of 'hybrid (or mixed) regimes' which are neither true liberal democracies nor the kind of outright dictatorial regimes.[31]

Basil Davidson suggested that the Western colonization of Africa actually held Africa back from forming nation states in its own way: it is the imposition of the European nation state rather than an intrinsic African characteristic that is at the root of the most of Africa's political problems, and colonialism promoted the rise of alienated African elites largely trained in Europe and oblivious to their historical foundations of political legitimacy.[32] According to Davidson, what Africa's leaders inherited was 'a crisis of social disintegration' from which sprang the current problems of Africa: while it was commonly assumed that Africa had no indigenous models for ruling nation states, it was in fact well into the process of evolving its own models for the nation state. The Asante kingdom of modern-day Ghana, for example, was 'manifestly a national state on its way to becoming a nation-state with every attribute ascribed to a Western European nation-state' and even after Africa's independence, the adherence to African tradition was still derided as 'tribalism' and viewed as an obstacle to development.[33]

So what we see today in Sub-Saharan Africa is the perennial gap between what is in spirit and what is actually being practised. African countries all have modern executive, legislative and judicial branches modelled after the Western political system and over many decades, their leaders and political elites were orientated in this modern model of statehood. Every nation should follow good governance, the rule of law, accountability and democracy—the standards that are now taken for granted as global norms. But these values or standards have been achieved over centuries of historical progress in the West through many internal and regional conflicts and social, political, economic turmoil and evolutions. And it was only in the twentieth century that these Western ideas and norms gained the status of being 'universal values'.

There is no denying that Africa's fate and development rests squarely with Africans, not the Western world or the international development community. How deep an impact the colonial legacies have had on Africa is matter of debate, but what is not debated is who are the owners and subjects of development. No matter how convenient and tempting it may be to place the blame on 'outsiders', these 'outsiders' only play a secondary role at best, and the unshakable truth is that the protagonists of Africa's development are none other than Africans themselves. And Africa's development is inexorably tied to nation-building, which is a process that is still very much in the making. But nation-building is not about just 'adopting' or 'adapting'—it should be about carrying out the arduous tasks of making and undergoing change. If African countries have not been able to do this up to this point, after half a century of independence, who should they blame for this other than themselves?

In the meantime, the political dynamics in Africa are seen to follow their own unpredictable course. As stated by Dani Rodrik, according to Freedom House's count, more than 60% of all the countries in the world are electoral democracies, meaning that their regimes have emerged through competitive multi-party elections. But the majority of these 'democracies' are in fact 'illiberal democracies' that brought about the rise of popular autocrats with little regard for the rule of law and civil liberties. Rodrik reminds us that liberal democracy rests on distinct sets of rights—property rights, political rights and civil rights—and that democratic bargaining can work only when the masses are able to organize and mobilize around common interests. And, historically, such mobilizations have been the product of industrialization and urbanization, wars or anti-colonial struggles. But in the developing world, these bargains, by their very nature, produce electoral democracies rather than liberal democracies, so that in practice, the emergence of liberal democracy is rarely seen today.[34]

The 'irregularity' of political developments is common in Africa. For example, in Burundi in May 2015, people took to the streets to protest against the removal of term limits for the President, and a military coup was attempted against President Pierre Nkurunziza, who wanted to remain in power. On the other hand, in Rwanda, with two years left before the next elections, people were petitioning Parliament to amend the Constitution, which limits presidents to two terms, in order to allow President Kagame to stand for President again. Even the second-largest political party, the largest opposition party, has backed the removal of term limits for elected political leaders.[35]

David Booth and Diana Gammack's observation is a telling reminder of the reality in Africa: the reason why the 'development business' most often fails in Africa is because much of the effort of the development community is predicated on false assumptions about how progress takes place in human societies. For the last two decades, development efforts have been based on the thinking that good governance provides a universally valid prescription for economic transformation and social advance, but this 'ahistorical view takes insufficient notice of the fact that Western states did not become economic powerhouses (from the 1750s onwards) … by adopting good governance institutions. Full-blown capitalism creates the social structures and organisational capabilities that lead to democratic governance, not the other way around'.[36]

Brian Levy also makes a case that over the long term, good governance may indeed be a final destination where developing countries can see their governance systems converge. However, he argues that 'the ability to describe the characteristics of effective states does not conjure them into existence out of thin air. Best-practices approaches assume that all policies and institutions are potentially movable and can be aligned to fit some pre-specified blueprint. But they cannot. The central question has less to do with the end point than with the journey of getting from here to there'.[37]

Those who have lived in Africa long enough will agree that one of the syndromes plaguing Africa today is that people by and large are good at expressing their views, but there is very little corresponding action or responsibility taken to make good on the words spoken. Liberal democracy, the rule of law and good governance will bear fruit when they become the way of life and are embodied in the leaders and the people alike. We should not forget that liberal democracy was not bestowed by the rulers, but was earned by the people who struggled for it. Democracy is something that cannot be 'provided for', but which has to be 'won'. What seems to have been forgotten during the course of liberalization and globalization is that democracy cannot be realized by 'free expressions' alone, but requires concrete deeds and toil.

The problem in Africa is that the mismatch between 'lofty expectations' and continued 'disingenuousness' on the ground persists in a kind of vicious cycle, only to breed disappointments and ill feeling without actually getting things done. This has produced the problem where African elites, whether in government or the private sector, talk the talk but do not walk the walk. Often, their motive is to present a good face to donors and receive aid or benefits, whilst knowing they will fall short in their obligations. Despite the challenging environment, efforts to attain sound institutions and governance should not be stopped. Recent studies have shown that the vast majority of people surveyed in Sub-Saharan African countries thought that democracy was preferable to any other kind of government. Obviously, it would be in the best interests of the African countries if they can espouse and 'internalize' these values as much and as early as possible.

Critics may find fault with the way in which the Global North is trying to 'impose' its values, but the Global North will be criticized even more if it was not seen to be steadfastly upholding the universal values. Isn't the European Union referred to as the 'normative power'? But an important thing for Western countries to realize is that it is not enough to only 'assert' these values; equal weight should be given to addressing how to reach the goals, while taking into account the local conditions, indigenous elements and socio-cultural characteristics of African nations.

While most African countries inherited democratic constitutions in the decolonization process, few maintained them. Botswana and Mauritius are just about the only countries that were born democratic and have remained so over the years, although in the case of Botswana, the same political party has been in power since independence. The vast majority of other African countries followed a path that consisted of a few years of democratic multi-party systems, followed by the progressive establishment of single-party regimes or a military takeover.

But most often in this process, there have been frequent political deadlocks and crisis. By and large, formal democratic institutions proved incompatible at the time with the rise of personal rule and neo-patrimonialism. Formal institutions lost their importance and power became concentrated in a close circle around the personal ruler. Many of these rulers then organized single parties, mass mobilization movements that were then seen as plausible instruments of nation-building. The rapid failure of democracy in African is a sobering reminder of its inherent drawbacks to democracy, particularly in light of the fact that in the post-Cold War era, donors made extensive efforts to promote democracy in Africa.

What transpired from this for the majority of African states was the rise of authoritarianism and the deterioration of citizens' rights. Many rulers argued that traditional African values such as consensus-seeking and loyalty justified the adoption of regimes that were seen as dictatorial across the continent. Within a few years of independence, most of the region's democratic aspirations had been stifled. Whatever the merits of the cultural arguments of some African elites to justify their domination, the relative ease with which African dictatorships persisted for decades suggested that many countries shared conditions favouring this type of regime. So what caused this? There must have been some commonalities in effect for the countries to produce such similar results across the continent. I believe that the problem is caused not by the failure of institutions themselves, but rather by the inertia and noncommittal attitude when it came to upholding institutions.

Institutions do matter. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson's book *Why Nations Fail* is an inspiring work that tries to explain why some nations become prosperous, but others remain poor. The authors argue that the answer lies in the difference between inclusive institutions and extractive institutions. The former 'are those that allow and encourage participation by the great mass of people in economic activities that make best use of their talents and skills and that enable individuals to make the choices they wish', while the latter have the opposite properties 'designed to extract incomes and wealth from one subset of society to benefit a different subset'.[38] They argue that nations that develop inclusive institutions have far greater potential for growth than those that support extractive institutions that transfer rather than create wealth.

The authors have also pointed out the stark contrast between South and North Korea. They described the former as having inclusive economic institutions, while the latter has extractive economic institutions. Koreans are homogeneous people with a history of many thousands of years of sharing a national identity, language and culture. No doubt, it was the nature of North Korea's institutions—its regime and ideology—that turned North Korea into a failed state.

However, despite their appeal, the terminology of 'inclusive' and 'extractive' institutions comes with some question marks. I cannot help thinking that the term sounds tautological, as if to say 'what is good (inclusive) is good (prosperity) and what is bad (extractive) is bad (poor)'. 'Institution' is instead an abstract term that implies many things like ideologies, policies and actions of the state besides formal governing bodies. The question remains as to why such institutions came about in the first place and what drives them to continue functioning in this way. And the authors seem to have come up short in proposing specific mechanisms for encouraging better institutions.[39]

Institutions, however well thought out and meticulously stipulated into law, are only as good as the intention, persistence and capacity to 'operationalize' them. The success of institutions depends not on the existence of seemingly good institutions, but rather on the commitment and ability to make those institutions work, including continuous efforts to improve or reform public service mechanisms. The majority of Sub-Saharan African countries may have the 'right' institutions, but the pace of moving ahead with governance and development is all but gratifying.

Perhaps from a developmental perspective, what should draw our attention the most is the Human Development Index (HDI): out of 188 nations in the world that were surveyed, the bottom ten countries are all Sub-Saharan countries, and among the 'low human development' group of 41 countries having the lowest scores, 36 nations are from Sub-Saharan Africa. The Fragile State Index (2018) shows the top ten most fragile states and includes seven Sub-Saharan African countries (South Sudan, Somalia, the Central African Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan, Chad, Zimbabwe). In Freedom House's Country Freedom Index (2017), five Sub-Saharan African countries were included in the top ten least-free countries (Eritrea, South Sudan, Somalia, Sudan and Equatorial Guinea). Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (2016) found that four countries in the region ranked in the top ten most negatively perceived states (Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Guinea-Bissau).

As Pierre Englebert and Kevin C. Dunn explain, what is troubling for both the donors and Sub-Saharan African countries alike is that there has been no visible progress in the region's governance during the period from 1985 to 2012 over which the study was conducted, no matter what indicators (Country Policy and Institutional Assessment, World Governance Indicators, the Ibrahim Index or the Political Risk Service) were used.[40] The World Bank's latest Country Policy and Institutional Assessment (CPIA), which measures four areas (clusters) of governance—economic management, structural policies, policies for social inclusion and equity, and public sector management and institutions—illustrates that there was a slight downward trend in the regions' governance over the period from 2008 to 2016.

However, there are countries in the region that usually rank in the top ten in most of the indicators—the usual suspects like Mauritius, Botswana, Cape Verde, the Seychelles, Namibia, South Africa, Ghana, Senegal, São Tomé and Príncipe, Benin and the new rising star Rwanda—that should also be given due attention. An exception might be Ethiopia, which is the fastest-growing economy in the region, sustaining around 10% growth per annum in recent years.

Lastly, what cannot be stressed enough is the importance of governance in Sub-Saharan Africa. From a worldwide perspective, while debates on the correlation between democracy and economic development remain largely contentious and inconclusive in the light of the Asian experience, and notably China, which is a recent example, in Sub-Saharan Africa things seem to be quite different. In this region, it is clear that the countries exhibiting a high level of democracy and governance also fare well economically. For example, countries that are categorized as 'free' by Freedom House like Mauritius, Namibia, Botswana and South Africa are all ranked as 'high-middle income countries', and other countries scoring high in governance like Cape Verde, the Seychelles, Ghana, Rwanda, Senegal, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Benin are some of the fastest-growing economies in the region.

The reason for this may be found in the difference in the level of the work ethic: in Asia, a strong work ethic and government's role, and discipline in bureaucracy are seen to offset the negativities of weak democracy and corruption, but in the case of Africa, which is seen to lag behind in such traits in comparison to Asia, there is an extra burden posed by rampant corruption, ethnicism, nepotism, neopatrimonialism, rent-seeking, etc., and here, as a result, democracy and governance must make up for such drawbacks in order to catch up with other regions. Yes, institutions, governance and democracies should be fervently upheld, but the path to reaching the point where these become effective would require a massive endeavour by society as a whole, entailing enhancement of performance in virtually every segment and sector of the nation (Tables 3.1, 3.2, 3.3).

The Role of the State

According to Irma Adelman: 'No area of economics has experienced as many abrupt changes in the leading paradigm during the post-WWII era as has economic development. These changes have had profound implications for the way the role of government has been viewed by development practitioners and their advisors in international organizations' (see Note 40). The issue of the role of government regarding development is nothing new, but it continues to plague African countries and must be re-examined.

On the face of it, African governments have a high degree of centralization and strong presidential systems. Apparently, out of 49 states in Sub-Saharan Africa, no less than 40 have presidential executives. The centralization bias is considered both the colonial legacy as well as the reflection of reality: the inclination of the colonial administrations was to retain central authority and personal rule prevailed, while African societies were forcefully integrated into the post-colonial mold.[41] Another distinct feature of African governments is that they have a rather large number of ministerial posts.

However, despite their large 'horizontal' government structure, African executives do not have big 'vertical' bureaucracies in terms of formally employed civil servants. More importantly, African governments suffer from weak capacity to undertake given tasks in terms of implementing policies, solving problems and providing public services. The Fragile States Index (formerly called the failed states index), published annually by the Fund for Peace, assesses states' vulnerability to conflict and collapse, using a total of 12 indicators that fall into one of the following three groups: social (4), economic (2) and political indicators (6). Among the political indicators are state legitimacy, public services, human rights and the rule of law, security apparatus, etc. The

Table 3.1 The Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance (2016)

Country		2015 score	Trend 2006–2015	Country		2015 score	Trend 2006–2015
1.	Mauritius	79.9	+2.3	28.	Liberia	50.0	+8.7
2.	Botswana	73.7	−0.5	29.	Swaziland	49.7	+1.0
3.	Cape Verde	73.0	+1.9	30.	Sierra Leone	49.4	+3.8
4.	The Seychelles	72.6	+4.0	31.	Ethiopia	49.1	+7.0
5.	Namibia	69.8	+3.6	32.	Gabon	48.8	+1.5
6.	South Africa	69.4	−1.9	33.	Madagascar	48.5	−7.6
7.	Tunisia	65.4	+3.4	33.	Togo	48.5	+9.7
7.	Ghana	65.4	−2.1	35.	Gambia	46.6	−3.9
9.	Rwanda	62.3	+8.4	36.	Djibouti	46.5	+2.3
10.	Senegal	60.8	+3.7	36.	Nigeria	46.5	+2.5
11.	São Tomé and Príncipe	60.5	+2.9	38.	Cameroon	45.7	−2.1
12.	Kenya	58.9	+5.1	39.	Zimbabwe	44.3	+9.7
13.	Zambia	58.8	+4.3	40.	Mauritania	43.5	−2.7
14.	Morocco	58.3	+5.7	41.	Guinea	43.3	+1.9
15.	Lesotho	57.8	+0.3	42.	Congo, Rep.	43.0	+2.6
16.	Benin	57.5	+0.7	43.	Burundi	41.9	−2.1
17.	Malawi	56.6	+1.1	44.	Guinea-Bissau	41.3	+4.0
18.	Tanzania	56.5	−0.6	45.	Angola	39.2	+5.0
19.	Uganda	56.2	+3.4	46.	Congo, DR	35.8	+2.7
20.	Algeria	53.8	−0.6	47.	Equatorial Guinea	35.4	+2.0
21.	Cote d'Ivoire	52.3	+13.1	48.	Chad	34.8	+2.3
21.	Mozambique	52.3	−1.8	49.	Sudan	30.4	−0.6
23.	Burkina Faso	51.8	+1.0	50.	Eritrea	30.0	−5.6
24.	Egypt	51.0	+3.5	51.	Libya	29.0	−18.0
25.	Mali	50.6	−4.7	52.	Central African Republic	25.7	−4.9
26.	Comoros	50.3	+3.7	53.	South Sudan	18.6	
27.	Niger	50.2	+5.9	54.	Somalia	10.6	+0.3

Source Mo Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIAG) 2016
Governance as the provision of the political, social and economic goods that citizens have the right to expect from their state
The IIAG assesses progress under four main conceptual categories: safety & rule of law, participation & human rights, sustainable economic opportunity, and human development

Table 3.2 Freedom country scores for Sub-Saharan Africa (2017)

Not free			Partially free			Free		
Country	Rating	Score	Country	Rating	Score	Country	Rating	Score
Uganda	5.5	35	The Seychelles	3.0	71	Cape Verde	1.0	90
Gabon	5.5	32	Lesotho	3.0	64	Mauritius	1.5	89
Mauritania	5.5	30	Malawi	3.0	63	Ghana	1.5	83
Congo	6.0	27	Burkina Faso	3.5	63	Benin	2.0	82
Djibouti	5.5	26	Liberia	3.5	62	São Tomé and Príncipe	2.0	81
Rwanda	6.0	24	Sierra Leone	3.0	61	South Africa	2.0	78
Angola	6.0	24	Tanzania	3.5	58	Senegal	2.0	78
Cameroon	6.0	24	Zambia	3.5	56	Namibia	2.0	77
Gambia	6.0	20	Madagascar	3.5	56	Botswana	2.5	72
Congo, DR	6.5	19	Comoros	3.5	55			
Burundi	6.5	19	Mozambique	4.0	53			
Chad	6.5	18	Cote d'Ivoire	4.0	52			
Swaziland	6.5	18	Kenya	4.0	51			
Ethiopia	6.5	12	Nigeria	4.0	50			
Central African Republic	7.0	10	Niger	4.0	49			
Equatorial Guinea	7.0	8	Togo	4.0	48			
Sudan	7.0	6	Mali	4.5	45			
Somalia	7.0	5	Guinea	5.0	41			
South Sudan	7.0	4	Guinea Bissau	5.0	40			
Eritrea	7.0	3	Zimbabwe	5.0	32			

Source Freedom House, Freedom on the World 2017 country scores
Freedom rating is an average of political rights (PR) and civil liberties (CL): 1 = most free and 7 = least free
Above score is aggregate: 0 = least free and 100 = most free

Table 3.3 Other state performance indicators

Country	Human development	Corruption perception	Fragile states	Country	Human development	Corruption perception	Fragile states
Angola	0.533 (150)	18 (164)	91.1 (32)	Madagascar	0.512 (158)	26 (145)	84.0 (55)
Benin	0.485 (167)	36 (95)	77.6 (73)	Malawi	0.476 (170)	31 (120)	88.0 (44)
Botswana	0.698 (108)	60 (35)	63.8 (120)	Mali	0.442 (175)	32 (116)	92.9 (31)
Burkina Faso	0.402 (185)	42 (72)	88.0 (44)	Mauritania	0.513 (157)	27 (142)	93.7 (28)
Burundi	0.404 (184)	20 (159)	98.9 (17)	Mauritius	0.781 (64)	54 (50)	41.7 (148)
Cameroon	0.518 (153)	26 (145)	95.6 (26)	Mozambique	0.418 (181)	27 (142)	89.0 (40)
Cape Verde	0.648 (122)	59 (38)	70.1 (106)	Namibia	0.640 (125)	52 (53)	70.4 (103)
Central African Republic	0.352 (188)	20 (159)	112.6 (3)	Niger	0.353 (187)	35 (101)	97.4 (20)
Chad	0.391 (186)	20 (159)	109.4 (8)	Nigeria	0.527 (152)	28 (136)	101.6 (13)
Comoros	0.497 (160)	24 (153)	84.8 (52)	Rwanda	0.498 (159)	54 (50)	90.8 (34)
Congo, Rep.	0.592 (135)	20 (159)	93.4 (29)	São Tomé and Príncipe	0.574 (142)	46 (62)	72.1 (97)
Congo, DR	0.435 (176)	21 (156)	110 (7)	Senegal	0.494 (162)	45 (64)	82.3 (60)
Cote d'Ivoire	0.474 (171)	34 (108)	96.5 (21)	The Seychelles	0.782 (63)	55 (47)	59.4 (125)
Djibouti	0.473 (172)	30 (123)	88.9 (41)	Sierra Leone	0.420 (179)	30 (123)	89.1 (39)
Equatorial Guinea	0.592 (135)	19 (163)	85.0 (51)	Somalia	NA	10 (175)	113.4 (2)
Eritrea	0.420 (179)	18 (164)	98.1 (19)	South Africa	0.666 (119)	45 (64)	72.3 (96)
Ethiopia	0.448 (174)	34 (108)	101.1 (15)	South Sudan	0.418 (181)	11 (174)	113.9 (1)
Gabon	0.697 (109)	35 (101)	73.8 (91)	Sudan	0.490 (165)	14 (170)	110.6 (5)
Gambia	0.452 (173)	26 (145)	89.4 (37)	Swaziland	0.541 (148)	43 (70)	88.8 (42)
Ghana	0.579 (139)	43 (70)	69.7 (108)	Tanzania	0.531 (151)	32 (116)	80.3 (65)
Guinea	0.414 (183)	27 (142)	102.4 (12)	Togo	0.497 (166)	32 (116)	83.9 (56)
Guinea-Bissau	0.424 (178)	16 (168)	99.5 (16)	Uganda	0.493 (163)	25 (151)	96.0 (24)
Kenya	0.555 (146)	26 (145)	96.4 (22)	Zambia	0.579 (139)	38 (87)	87.8 (46)
Lesotho	0.497 (160)	39 (83)	81.7 (62)	Zimbabwe	0.516 (154)	22 (154)	101.6 (13)
Liberia	0.427 (177)	37 (90)	93.8 (27)				

Source UNDP Human Development Index (2016); Transparency International CPI (2016); Peace Foundation Fragile States Index (2017) Parenthesis: ranking (HDI 188 countries, CPI 176 countries, FSI 178 countries)

2017 Index showed that 32 Sub-Saharan African countries were ranked in the top 50 most fragile.[42]

A conspicuous feature of Sub-Saharan African countries is the weakness of their governing power and hence their weakness in performing the basic functions to serve the public and realize economic development that is worthy of their potential. Many African governments apparently lack the drive and persistence to achieve short and mid to long-term national goals. And as is often the case, well thought-out national policies are rendered nominal when confronted by hard realities.

Unfortunately, corruption, bad governance and inefficiency have become almost synonymous with African governments, so that donors and the African people may be wary of the notion of governments being 'strengthened'. Yet, for developing countries that are still in the midst of nation-building, discrediting the need for strong government and giving up on the state could be extremely detrimental.

European countries built their nation-state system with centralized government and a highly developed bureaucracy over a long period in their tumultuous history. On the other hand, in comparison, Sub-Saharan African countries lacked a strong social fabric, political norms and systems that form the basis of state. And such elements as tribalism and neo-patrimonialism, while they cannot be branded as definitive causes of underdevelopment, are still very much prevalent and pertinent. Under the circumstances, if African leaders, elites and people are serious about developing their country, it is imperative that they find ways to make their government much more functional, and naturally this will take some time to achieve. But what is more disconcerting is that Africans themselves may not be well aware or concerned about this problem. And development partners do not seem to be particularly interested in helping 'empower' African governments either.

However, the donor community tried various approaches in the early stages of development assistance for poor countries, including efforts to empower the state with optimism. As John Harris notes: 'In the 1950s and 1960s, the centrality of the role of the state and the need for regulation of markets was hardly questioned. It was generally understood that economic development must involve industrialization.'[43] In the

1960s, donors indeed espoused such a stance in their aid policy, putting trust in working with African governments so that the latter would follow the course of state-building and economic development, counting on a trickle-down effect for rural development and industrialization. But the approach was short-lived, due to unforeseen disappointing results and also because of the inherent restraints in the political dynamics of the donor community that was impatient with ongoing failures and was under pressure to seek alternative measures.[44] Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu also notes that: 'In the 1960s, the main focus of aid was on large-scale industrial and infrastructure projects. This was the golden age of foreign aid; one which could be justified as a catalyst of growth and development. Dams, roads, bridges and railways were constructed across the continent. But this phase didn't last long.'[45]

The approach that focused on building infrastructures and creating local industries, preferably starting with the agricultural sector, should have been pursued for far longer, instead of quickly shifting to poverty reduction programmes in the 1970s. The policy choice was right and timely. However, what was lacking was commitment as well as fundamentals like 'internalization' efforts and a sense of ownership on the part of developing nations.

The golden opportunity for African countries seems to have been missed in this period encompassing the 1960s and 1970s. If they had indeed capitalized on this opportunity and exerted themselves, many success stories would have emerged in the region, as was the case in Asia. While African countries today have registered high economic growth, this masks many worrying features: overdependence on raw materials; continued underdevelopment and low-value addition of the agricultural sector; the 'curse of resources' and the extractive industry; the dominance of foreign companies; a lack of industrialization; over-reliance on foreign, multi-national companies and negligible indigenous manufacturing industries; rapid population growth and youth unemployment, etc.[46]

Turning to the international development architecture, the world has witnessed transitions in mainstream development theories and policy orientations: the structuralist/modernization theory-dominant period (from the end of the Second World War to 1979); the neo-liberalism ascendency period (1979–1996); and the 'revisionist' or 'Post-Washington Consensus' period from 1996 onwards. The 'revisionist' school advocates a dynamically changing mix of state and market interactions. The World Bank published a report, 'The State in a Changing World (1997)', in which it stated that development without an effective state is impossible, stressing the need to find a balance between the market and the state, and recognizing that there are market failures as well as state failures.[47]

The Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) was introduced into African countries in the mid-1980s to reduce the role of the state in the development process and give market forces a greater role in the allocation of resources, but ended in failure and worsened Africa's economy. As a result, an overall policy shift was made, and the New Orthodoxy Era (1996–2010) unfolded for Africa.[48] But, apparently, African countries have not yet learned to 'right' the role of the government.

The global economic and financial crisis of 2008–2009 was another turning point in the thinking on economic development. Following the crisis, there appears to have been a convergence of ideas, at least within the African Union Commission (AUC) and the United Nations Economic Commission on Africa (UNECA), on the imperatives of economic development. The two reports, the 'UNECA/AUC Economic Report on Africa (2011)' and 'Governing Development in Africa: The Role of the State in Economic Transformation (2011)', suggest that the state has a crucial role to play in meeting the development challenges in Africa. Their recommendation is that the 'developmental state' approach should be used through disciplined planning, while avoiding the pitfalls of state intervention.[49] The notion is quite sound, but putting this into practice this still remains a big challenge in the absence of concrete actions.

African countries missed the golden opportunity discussed above because successful development through industrialization is becoming increasingly difficult for developing countries to achieve. Dani Rodrick reminds us that historically, rapid growth has always been associated with industrialization. But today, even BRICS countries, including China and India, have not realized the full-scale development (in terms of percentage of employment by economic sectors) of the manufacturing industrial sector that characterizes the growth path of Western economies, but instead have prematurely dipped in the industrial structure, that is, deindustrialization. Rodrik mentions that only South Korea succeeded in achieving sufficient industrialization before, making a transition to an advanced industrial structure that we see in Western economies. He points out that 'less room for industrialisation will almost certainly mean fewer growth miracles in the future' and that 'today's developing countries will possibly have bumpier paths to democracy and good governance'.[50]

Capitalism's most important components include private property, production factors, capital accumulation and competition.[51] Private property rights are a central tenet of capitalism, and the land ownership question can be most problematic but crucial for developing countries. In classical economics, labour, land and capital constitute production factors, but today elements such as technology, entrepreneurship and innovations are considered as crucial means for enhancing production. This is all the more so in the increasingly competitive international environment under globalization.

According to Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, the fundamental requirements for successful capitalism are innovation, property rights, and financial and capital markets, but none of these is present to any significant extent in Africa.[52] This is a fair assessment, but the interesting thing is that these three fundamental factors—innovation, property rights, and financial and capital markets—all invariably demand focused, disciplined and 'intrusive' government intervention. Hence, on the question of whether African countries need strong government, the answer seems to be self-evident. First of all, regarding land reform, only the government can authoritatively certify, allocate and regulate land ownership for the people. Technical innovation requires active, systematic and long-term investment and support of the state. Developing, regulating and reforming financial markets, and operating capital resources to assist the private sector are all rudimentary tasks of the government.

The responsibility for the lacklustre development of African countries rests with Africans themselves, not the donors or the international environment. And 'to imply that entrepreneurs can carry on in environments in which governments are failing in their duty to provide an enabling environment for value-adding business activity is to make a case for failed states dominated by stunted entrepreneurs'.[53] But few people in the region seem to take this seriously enough. The reality is that both market failures and government failures are commonplace. As long as we are talking about the development of 'nation states', mindful that Sub-Saharan African countries are still a long way from completing the task of nation-building, it is imperative that strong, functioning governments must be zealously sought. And the scope of governance that is required is not what the international community can provide on behalf of African states.

The international community must also be reflective and understand that in order for African states to properly tap into and implement policies, and to enhance their output, the latter need to have an effective government. In light of all the problems that African states have experience up to now, it could be argued that it would be better to have as little government as possible. But outsourcing just about everything that the government should be doing while forgoing their task of 'learning by doing', which is the case in most African countries, is tantamount to the state's self-denial of its raison d'être.

Sub-Saharan states are marked by the weak functioning of the government and an inappropriate or 'wrong' policy orientation for economic growth. Many Sub-Saharan African regimes have the facade of authoritarian power, but in reality they lack the focus and determination to get things done and to push the agendas through, as East Asian countries were able to do. The Asian experience provides fertile ground for sober reflections on the part of both African countries and the donor community. In this vein, not enough lessons have been learned, while some experts are dismissive of the East Asian examples, claiming that the 'conditions are different' and they are not applicable. We need not simply stick to the examples of the East Asian Tigers, since there are also good case studies in other Southeast Asian countries.

In his book *Asia-Africa Development Divergence: A Question of Intent*, David Henley explains why Southeast Asian countries have become much more prosperous over the last half-century compared to African countries, which have stumped without visible signs of a major turnaround. Regarding the scope of divergence, he points out that:

> [I]n [the] 1960s, South-East Asians were on the [sic] average much poorer than Africans; by 1980 they caught up, and by 2010 they were two and a half times richer. In South-East Asia the whole of the intervening half-century was a period of almost continuous growth, apart from a brief hiatus at the turn of the century caused by the Asian financial crisis. In Africa, per capita income stagnated in the 1970s, declined in the 1980s, grew weakly in the 1990s, and in 2010 was still barely higher than it had been in 1975.[54]

Henley argues that state-led rural and agricultural development that led to higher incomes for peasant farmers has been central to Southeast Asia's economic success, while its absence in Sub-Saharan Africa was critical for the continent's failure. The policy prescriptions by the world development agencies like the World Bank and IMF demanding liberalization, deregulation, and privatization and austerity measures in Africa were contradictory to the reality of strategic planning of the national economy that underpinned the success in East Asia. For developing countries, the weaker the government, the more it is likely to be dependent on outside forces, jeopardizing their chances of development.

When coming up with initiatives, especially in multilateral forums, African leaders did show a certain level of energy and enthusiasm. For example, in 1980, African governments adopted their own economic blueprint—the Lagos Plan of Action for the Economic Development of Africa 1980–2000 (LPA)—calling for collective self-reliance. But this was scarcely implemented and, moreover, did not sit well with the international development community, as it repudiated the logic of neo-liberal thinking, ending up in failure.[55] After the aborted LPA, African leaders launched a second major attempt to reclaim African development agenda and adopted the New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) in October 2000. But again, African countries failed in this endeavour, drawing considerable criticism because it was never properly implemented.

The reason why Sub-Saharan African countries continue to struggle with economic transformation and remain poor while being heavily dependent on foreign aid and capital may be attributable to the inability to push for development or a lack of determination and willingness.

Natural Conditions

The geographical and natural conditions of Sub-Saharan Africa, characterized by the existence of many landlocked countries and vast inland territories that are very difficult to access due to very poor and sparse roads, the harsh tropical climate and widespread diseases like malaria, are often cited as obstacles to development for the region. The narrative of the history of colonization of Africa by the Western powers that we are familiar with might have contributed to the stereotypical worldview of the continent.

However, two things must be pointed out: first, foreign explorers and settlers back then must have faced great hardships, but the geographical condition for development should be judged not from the outsider's point of view but from the locals' position; and, second, objective assessment should be made based not on historical documents, but on the present situation.

In *The Age of Sustainable Development* (2015), Jeffrey Sachs, a pioneer in the research on geographical differences between places, reiterates that the geography of Africa and adversity of the African climate matter for development. Paul Collier similarly views that being 'land locked with bad neighbours' makes African countries' development harder. In his book *Prisoners of Geography*, Tim Marshall depicts Africa as a historically remote and isolated continent cut off from the centres of trade and disadvantaged in terms of lack of navigable rivers and having too large a land mass to be effectively connected as a single region or even as sub-regions.[56]

The effects that geographical and climatic factors can have on the development of countries should not be downplayed and it is a fact that landlocked countries face huge challenges in making their economy competitive in terms of exporting commodities and attracting foreign investment. For the majority of foreigners who have never been to Africa, the mere notion of travelling to this region would entail great adventurism and a psychological challenge.

But this is just one aspect of Sub-Saharan Africa in its natural form, and to a certain degree it is deceptive, masking the overall, accurate picture of Africa. When the Ebola epidemic broke out in West Africa in 2014, it alarmed the international community and travel to and from Africa was greatly curtailed. However, I remember an international health expert telling CNN that people should not be panicking because Africa is not a country but a very big continent.

We must bear in mind that Africa is a huge continent with diverse geographical and climatic features. I know all too well that Africa is not only attractive for foreigners to live in, but undeniably also has a huge potential for growth and development due to its rich natural resources and many other things. Thus, we should be careful not to be simplistic and prejudiced when talking about the 'conditions' of Africa. If there are places where the conditions are adverse, there are also places where the conditions are most favourable. And when one visits Sub-Saharan Africa, it doesn't take long for one to realize that here so many places are far more 'favourable' than other parts of the world.

The geographical and natural conditions of Sub-Saharan Africa should not be construed as a root cause of its underdevelopment. Instead, it is the human factor, the failure to deal with these conditions that has led to the perpetuation of the problems. Strictly speaking, even endemic and epidemic diseases are largely man-made. But sadly, we tend to attribute the failures of human beings not to humans, but to what we think is convenient. We do not need to mention Arnold Toynbee's famous axiom 'challenge and response', as it is apparent that human endeavour to overcome adversities makes all the difference. Many rich nations had to tame geographical and natural conditions much harsher than those in Africa in order to arrive at where they are now.

Uganda provides a good example at this point. Its nature—the weather, agricultural conditions and natural resources—provides all that one could ask for. It is no wonder that it is called the 'Pearl of Africa'. Other East African countries like Rwanda, Burundi, Tanzania, Kenya, Ethiopia and even South Sudan all boast wonderful natural conditions. We need not mention countries in the south like South Africa, Zimbabwe, Mozambique, Botswana, Zambia and Namibia. And there are so many countries in western Africa that are richly endowed. I have not heard of instances where great natural calamities such as earthquakes, volcano eruptions and tsunamis have occurred in Sub-Saharan Africa. Because of global warming and climate change, the whole world is suffering from unexpected or extreme weather conditions. In sum, it is Africa's negative and stereotyped image, along with many other things, rather than the actual workings of the geographical and natural conditions that has far more debilitating effects. Unduly exaggerating the given conditions will only breed despair and dependence.

Other Factors (Population, Corruption, Globalization and China)

We also could conceive of various other factors that may not necessarily be the root cause of Africa's underdevelopment, but can affect the region's development. Corruption readily comes to mind, but there can be other elements like population size and the effects of globalization that also have a bearing.

Regarding population size, conventional wisdom would suggest that it will be easier to foster and run democracy in a smaller nation than a larger one. Direct democracy like the Athenian democracy would only be possible if the size of the community of the people is limited. It could also be argued that the formation of identity and consensus of the people and maintaining of social order will be easier when communities are small. Certainly, in Sub-Saharan Africa, the least-populous nations, such as the Seychelles, São Tomé and Príncipe, Cape Verde, Mauritius, Botswana and Namibia, are among the highest scorers in governance and freedom. But countries like Djibouti, Guinea-Bissau and Equatorial Guinea, which have very small populations, score very low in terms of governance and freedom, so this is not a reliable criterion. Another factor that may need to be considered along with population is the size of the territory or the sparseness of the population.

The correlation between the size of the population and economic development in Sub-Saharan Africa is not easy to gauge either. GDP and per-capita income are generally in a trade-off, hence it is difficult to rank highly in both. GDP represents economic influence or market size, while per-capita GDP represents the level of wealth enjoyed by the people. For developing economies in particular, both of these matter, and the degree of income or social inequality should also be counted in assessing a nation's overall economic performance. In terms of GDP, the top five countries are Nigeria, South Africa, Angola, Sudan and Ethiopia in that order; however, the top five in per-capita GDP are the Seychelles, Equatorial Guinea, Mauritius, Gabon and Botswana.

A major issue for Sub-Saharan Africa is the population explosion that has produced an extraordinarily large youth population, which poses huge social economic challenges, given that most of the countries experiencing such phenomenon are the poorest and most fragile countries. It is pointed out that the SSA's population, which is currently over 1.0 billion (that of the entire African continent is over 1.25 billion) may double by 2050.[57] The population of Nigeria, the biggest in the continent, is expected to grow from 191 million in 2017 to 411 million in 2050 to become the world's third-most populous country, behind India and China. However, it would all come down to how the population is managed. The youth population can turn out to be an asset or a huge liability depending on how the state and society respond to this, which in turn hinges on their ability, commitment and mindset for development.

Compared to the demographic timebomb, corruption is viewed as being outright negative, and many suggest that this is the biggest reason for Africa's problems. But corruption can also be viewed as a reflection or outcome of more fundamental problems, in addition to being a reason for underdevelopment. Corruption exists everywhere, in any society and country, but is more conspicuous and widespread in developing countries and is seen as a general attribute of a weak social fabric. But in Sub-Saharan Africa, corruption is so rampant that it is relentlessly exposed time after time in the news.

As a continent, Africa continues to top the list in the category of having the most highly corrupt countries, with 12 countries ranking in the top 20 and five in the top ten, according to Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index (2016), which surveyed 177 countries worldwide. An African Union study conducted in 2002 estimated that corruption cost the continent roughly \$150 billion a year. The foreign aid that Sub-Saharan Africa received from developed countries amounted to \$22.5 billion in 2008, according to the OECD.[58] According to the East African Bribery Index of 2009, compiled by Transparency International, over half of East Africans polled paid bribes to access public services that should have been provided for free. Corruption in Africa, which ranges from high-level political graft to low-level bribes given to public officials, has a hugely corrosive effect on basic institutions and unduly increases the cost of doing business. It is argued that academic research shows that curtailing corruption can drastically enhance the economic productivity of a country, and some economists propose that African governments need to fight corruption instead of relying on foreign aid.[59]

There are several reasons why corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa is particularly detrimental to the region's development. Its regularity and rampancy are unmatched. Corruption can be defined simply as 'the abuse of entrusted power for private gain'.[60] Hence, discussions on corruption usually centre on 'public sector corruption', but corruptive behaviours or 'irregularities' are not confined to political leaders and public officials; they extend far beyond to include the private sector and the public in general.

Except for a very small number of countries, Sub-Saharan African nations experience corruption as the 'norm' rather than the 'exception', with people taking advantage of the 'opportunities' whenever they arise, political graft and systematic extortion by the powerful (leaders and their inner circles) being deeply entrenched and persistent without being challenged, politicians and top officials routinely and incessantly engaging in private business, officials at various levels in government departments and public offices frequently being involved in 'organized' irregularities, and police, customs officers and other officials in public service taking bribes. And this is not the end of the story.

Another form of corruption is 'absenteeism', which is also a very serious problem in the region: government organizational (central and local) officials, teachers, doctors, etc. frequently being absent from their offices to the detriment of the public interest. Corruption in Africa is linked to many other facets and problems inherent in African societies and therefore its scope and impact is as much far-reaching. And the negativity of neo-patrimonialism, ethnicism and other issues related to various syndromes, the mindset and ethics, etc. all contribute to corruption.

While 'corruption' is broadly defined to mean all the 'irregularities' taking place in a society, corruption is also widespread in the private sector as well. It is difficult to distinguish between corruption and theft, and maybe it is meaningless to make the distinction. Especially for foreigners, the difficulty in countering corruption in Africa is that one doesn't know who is involved and at what level. The widespread and common practice of seeking 'commission' is another good example of how corruption can take many forms in the region. Not only are the most fundamental public services that are taken for granted in the developed world not properly provided, even those expensive utility installation services, for instance, that users have to pay high cost to access do not come automatically.

Foreign aid projects can also (and often do) become the targets of corruption. They can be subtle in their approach, but it is customary for officials who are involved to explicitly or implicitly ask donors to give them some kind of 'commission' for receiving aid. It is true that donors often feel they have to 'pay' for the good deeds they are trying to do, instead of being fully embraced and appreciated.

What makes Africa's corruption more nuanced compared to that in other regions is that it is combined with many other negative factors. The case in point is that although corruption was widespread in Asian countries, this did not prevent these countries from achieving fast economic growth. Hence, we need to look at the whole picture, taking into account all the relevant factors and the reality on the ground. An interesting observation has been made that 'corruption in African countries tends to be of the decentralised and disorganised type in which paying a bribe to one official does not guarantee that a service will be provided. This type of corruption may be more deleterious to growth and development than the centralised and organised type found in Asia. For all these reasons, it is most likely that corruption could have a different effect on economic development in African countries than elsewhere'.[61]

The state of Africa's corruption is a reflection of the African reality. Fundamentally rectifying this problem will by no means be an easy feat and would require all-out and sustained responses. Nonetheless, various supervisory, sanctioning mechanisms to enforce transparency and discipline in the relevant institutions and offices, along with pressure exerted by the development community, should be stringently applied.

Another subject that deserves our attention, I believe, is the consequences of globalization on Sub-Saharan African countries. While globalization can in general be seen in a positive light in terms of Africa's business and cultural connectivity with the world, its overall impact is anything but simple to assess, and it can entail various risks and side-effects, depending on the capacities of the countries. There is no denying that today African countries find themselves in a quite different international setting compared to when they gained independence. And globalization—inter-dependence and inter-connectivity among economies—may be the most potent force affecting developing and developed countries alike in today's world.

The impact of globalization is clearly felt in Sub-Saharan Africa, as this was reinforced by the acts of both the international community and the African countries. Perhaps the first major shockwave of globalization to hit the continent came in the form of policy measures: the neo-liberalist policies prescribed by international financial and development institutions during the period of structural adjustment and the Washington Consensus. In order to obtain aid and loans from donors, African countries had to show commitment to market-oriented economic reforms and good governance. And while African countries did not have much choice but to conform to donors' terms, they actually opted for a pro-business liberal economy for a number of reasons.

The elites of Sub-Saharan African countries are pragmatists, who are keen to obtain wealth by seeking business opportunities with foreign companies and partners. The limited financial resources and capabilities of African states is understandable, but the major problem is really the lack of entrepreneurship, commitment and perseverance to successfully pursue business demonstrated in African business circles, and their inability or hesitation to make the necessary investments for future returns. This has left a huge vacuum that foreign investors and partners have had to fill. In many instances, even in remote provinces, landlords and local communities are willing to sell off chunks of land they possess at low prices to foreign investors. Since the locals do not have the means to make use of their land in any case, it would make sense to find an option with those who can develop it. For landlocked African countries in particular, the need to remove trade barriers and make their markets more accessible and appealing is deemed to be crucial in order to offset their disadvantages.

Obviously, there are also downsides to globalization, which are the ultimate price developing countries have to pay for being integrated into the global economy. For example, over the years, East African currencies have undergone a continuously sharp drop in their value against the US dollar, but the East African governments have admitted that there is not much that they can do to counter this phenomenon.

The deepening of liberalization over recent decades and the way in which African countries have 'adapted' to it have no doubt undermined their economic 'autonomy'. For them, the window of opportunity to approach the ranks of industrialized economies has been narrowing because of the slow pace of structural changes and the absence of strategic thinking and genuine efforts to 'catch up', amid increasing international competition and faster cycles of technological ratcheting-up. Confronted with the economic tasks at hand, African leaders have opted for convenient solutions like inviting foreign capital and expertise to fill their financial and capacity gaps, without concurrently taking competitiveness-enhancing measures at their end. This is mostly true throughout the region, including South Africa, where there is a juxtaposition of the 'First World' and the 'Third World', making it an interesting testing ground for 'radical economic transformation'.

For developing countries, continuously relying heavily on foreign firms and capital would not be the best solution in relation to economic development. The goal should be for African countries to build an industrial economy that is suited to their own specific situation in which they enjoy ownership, even while they trade freely with the outside. Unfortunately, many Sub-Saharan African countries have opened up and sold off their precious economic rights too soon to foreign companies, without even realizing their long-term value. The prospect of earning immediate profits, perhaps with 'premiums', can override consideration for the long-term national interests. A good example of this is the telecommunications market. African countries easily gave away their frequency usage rights to foreign companies, unaware that this is tantamount to giving up their strategic leverage and valuable economic sovereignty that could be used for many decades to come.

Lastly, as a feature of globalization, China's increasingly proactive economic engagement with Africa deserves our attention. But the impact that China has on the landscape of Africa's development, the ODA policy of traditional donors and the overall economic dynamism of Africa are uncertain. What is clear is that China's method of economic cooperation is quite different from the mainstream donor community, so African countries tend to think of China as an alternative to Western partners.

China's greatest strength lies in its financial capability and readiness to do business with Africa. China, employing generous assistance and sumptuous loans as tools, has made tremendous inroads in infrastructure-building and the energy development market in particular, based on their price competitiveness of labour, which is unmatched. For African countries desperate to find any financial resources for large-scale construction and engineering projects, China's partnership becomes handy. As both China and African countries will point out, these come with 'no strings attached'.

However, while there might not be any strings attached, various socio-economic costs may be incurred. The impact on the already-fragile governance and business practices in Africa comes to mind. Furthermore, it is no secret that Chinese goods and work that are found in Africa often turn out to be substandard, while Chinese merchants' businesses in retail frequently attract complaints from local competitors.

A latest report by the McKinsey Global Institute shows the profile of China's economic footprint in Africa in comparison to other countries, including the US, Germany, France, the UK and India, in terms of trade, FDI, aid and infrastructure financing. We can see that China's lead is absolute in trade and infrastructure financing, and while China's FDI is comparatively low, it is registering fast growth; its ODA level is also considerable, on a par with the UK.[62]

In the past, corruption scandals involving Chinese firms appeared frequently in the African news, and the region's overall perception of China's economic expansion and mode of doing business in Sub-Saharan Africa is mixed, as is captured by surveys. However, we should not be unduly critical. Many Chinese firms enter African markets taking risks in the areas where no one else is likely to venture. Contrary to conventional thinking, aggressive as they may seem, Chinese companies are not necessarily successful in Africa. In fact, they commonly face stiff competition even among themselves and many withdraw from African markets after incurring losses. Maybe the biggest downsides to such a 'no-strings-attached' way of doing business with Africa lies in the possibility that it can make African countries more complacent and exacerbate the already-serious dependency syndrome, moral hazard and poor governance. And it is my impression that there is still a considerable misperception amongst African leaders and elites about the situation of their markets and economies, and how companies do business and operate to make profit.[63]

In this regard, the presence of big multi-national corporations and aggressive Chinese firms may have had an undesirable impact in terms of making people overestimate the capacity of these entities and to have inaccurate views on how business works. For instance, they seem to think that big foreign companies can operate and make a profit for as long as possible and can do anything.

Notes

1. Among many private entities involved in international development, a notable example that I encountered is the Geneva Institute for Leadership & Public Policy based in Switzerland. The Institute organized, jointly with South Korea's Science & Technology Policy Institute and with its partners Kumi University and the Uganda National

Council for Science & Technology, the Conference on National Transformation with special focus on science & technology, business & industry, in Kampala, Uganda, 5–7 October, 2017 (Africana Hotel). The special guest speaker was David Beasley, Executive Director of the World Food Programme.

2. Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Colonialism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1996).
3. 'Native authority' refers to the indigenous chiefs or black elites who were granted power by the colonialists according to Mamdani. In a way, the vestiges of this remain in many parts of Africa as dual legal systems, in which power is divided at both the national and local levels.
4. Mahmood Mamandi, 'Beyond Settler and Native as Political Identities: Overcoming the Political Legacy of Colonialism', *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 43, no. 4 (2001), pp. 651–664.
5. Edmond Keller, *Identity, Citizenship, and Political Conflict in Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014), p. 23.
6. Pierre Englebert and Kevin C. Dunn, *Inside African Politics* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013), p. 25. The authors point out that new states were created without much attention and resources being devoted to them. It is argued that, fearful of the expense, colonial offices were rather reluctant and lacked a master plan.
7. Ibid., p. 27.
8. Constructivism is a philosophical viewpoint about the nature of knowledge and is widely applied in various social science disciplines like education, sociology and cultural studies, including studies on ethnicity, international relations, etc. According to Englebert and Dunn, constructivism has displaced primordialism as the mainstream approach to ethnicity among Africanists. Constructivists view ethnic identity as something that can be invented or constructed, and they stress perception, an interactive process, mobility or evolution of behaviourism and relationships among individuals and people. See Englebert and Dunn, *Inside African Politics*, pp. 70–71.
9. The idea of neo-colonialism was created by Kwame Nkrumah, Ghana's first post-independence president, in his book *Neo-colonialism, the Last Stage of Imperialism* (1965). Dependency theory makes the point that through economic transactions and international systems, resources flow from the 'periphery' of poor and underdeveloped countries to the 'core' of wealthy countries, enriching the latter at the expense of the

former. Dependency theory originates with Singer-Prebisch thesis on comparative advantage. Dependency theorists include Latin American Marxists like Celso Furtado, Aníbal Pinto, other Americans like Paul Baran, Paul Sweezy and Andre Gunder Frank, and many others. Immanuel Wallerstein refined the Marxist aspect of the theory to form the world-systems theory.

10. Crawford Young, *The Postcolonial State in Africa* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012), p. 339.
11. Englebert and Dunn, *Inside African Politics* (2013), p. 65.
12. In East Africa, for instance, even after the nations gained independence, different people of different ethnicities or tribes have been 'migrating' or seeking refuge regularly in one another's territory without any noticeable opposition from the host tribes. The massive inflow of South Sudan refugees into Uganda has not changed such attributes on the part of Ugandans.
13. Englebert and Dunn (2013), p. 75.
14. Ibid., p. 74.
15. Ibid., p. 75.
16. Edmond Keller (2014), p. 27.
17. Ibid., pp. 147–150.
18. Crawford Young (2012), p. 320.
19. Alberto. F. Alesina et al., 'Fractionalization', *Harvard Institute Research Working Paper* No. 1959, June 2002.
20. However, there is an argument that in Somalia, despite such racial and social homogeneity, division of clans or sub-clans was always existent. See Max Fisher, '5 Insights on the Racial Tolerance and Ethnicity Maps, from an Ethnic Conflict Professor', *Washington Post*, 17 May 2013, https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/worldviews/wp/2013/05/17/5-insights-on-the-racial-tolerance-and-ethnicity-maps-from-an-ethnic-conflict-professor/?utm_term=.48cfd79a2c28.
21. Paul Collier, 'Implications of Ethnic Diversity', *World Bank Working Paper* Report No. 28127, vol. 1, World Bank, 17 December 2001, p. 2. See also Paul Collier, 'Ethnicity, Politics and Economic Performance', *Economics and Politics* 12, no. 3 (2000), p. 225. Collier points out that '[ethnic] diversity is highly damaging to growth in the context of limited political rights, but is not damaging in democracies'.
22. Daniel C. Bach and Mamoudou Gazibo (eds), *Neopatrimonialism in Africa and Beyond* (New York: Routledge, 2012).

23. Michael Brandon and Nicolas van de Walle, *Democratic Experiments in Africa: Regime Transitions in Comparative Perspective* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997) in Crawford Young, *The Postcolonial State in Africa-Fifty Years of Independence 1960–2010* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 2012), p. 68.
24. Englebert and Dunn (2013), p. 68.
25. Scott D. Taylor, *Globalization and the Cultures of Business in Africa* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012), pp. 5–6.
26. Tim Kelsall, 'Rethinking the Relationship Between Neo-patrimonialism and Economic Development in Africa', *IDS Bulletin* 42, no. 2 (2011, March 2).
27. Anne Pitcher, Mary Moran, and Michael Johnston, 'Rethinking Patrimonialism and Neopatrimonialism in Africa', *African Studies Review* 51, no. 1 (April 2009), p. 145.
28. Englebert and Dunn (2013), p. 132.
29. Goran Hyden, Julius Court, and Kenneth Mease, *Making Sense of Governance: Empirical Evidence from 16 Developing Countries* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004).
30. Bertrand Badie, *L'État importé: l'occidentalisation de l'ordre politique* (Paris: Fayard, 1992), p. 227.
31. Other terms describing typical African politics, I believe, are 'electoral democracies' and 'semi-democracy'.
32. Basil Davidson, *The Black Man's Burden: Africa and the Curse of the Nation-State* (New York: Times Books, 1992), pp. 9–24, 99–161.
33. Ibid.
34. Dani Rodrik and Sharun Mukand, 'The Puzzle of Liberal Democracy', *The Independent*, 22–28 May 2015, p. 40. Rodrik writes that this is because 'the dispossessed minorities who have the strongest stake in civil rights play no role during the democratic transition for the simple reason that they cannot normally bring anything to the bargaining table'.
35. President Kagame commanded the rebel force that ended the 1994 Rwandan genocide and is noted for steering his country towards socio-economic transformation.
36. David Booth and Diana Gammack, *Governance for Development in Africa* (London: Zed Books, 2013), Introduction.
37. Brian Levy, *Working with the Grain: Integrating Governance and Growth in Development Strategies* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 8.

38. Daron Acemoglu and James A. Robinson, *Why Nations Fail: The Origins of Power, Prosperity, and Poverty* (New York: Crown Business, 2012), pp. 74–76.
39. Homi Kharas, 'Development Assistance', in Bruce Currie-Alder, Ravi Kanbur, David M. Malone, and Rohinton Medhora (eds), *International Development: Ideas, Experience, and Prospects* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), p. 858.
40. Irma Adelman, 'The Role of Government in Economic Development', in Finn Tarp (ed.), *Foreign Aid and Development: Lessons Learnt and Directions for the Future* (London: Routledge, 2000) p. 48. According to Adelman, there have been three phases in the dominant view concerning the optimal role of government in development: the prime mover phase (1940–1979); the problem phase (1979–1996); and rehabilitating government (1996 onwards, in the making).
41. Englebert and Dunn (2013), p. 156.
42. Failed State Index, http://fundforpeace.org/fsi/data.
43. John Harris, 'Development Theories', *International Development* (2014), p. 39.
44. John Degnbol-Martinussen and Poul Engberg-Pedersen, *Aid: Understanding International Development Cooperation*, translated by Marie Bille (London: Zed Books, 2005). This was originally published in Danish in 1999.
45. Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, *Emerging Africa: How the Global Economy's 'Last Frontier' Can Prosper and Matter* (London: Penguin Books, 2014), p. 30.
46. Regarding the emergence of indigenous or black-owned firms in Sub-Saharan Africa, Kenya and Nigeria are frequently cited as examples. South Africa, on the other hand, is seen in a negative light, as locals continue to struggle in comparison to white businesses, which are dominant in the country. But even for Kenya and Nigeria, more detailed and accurate data needs to be accumulated and analysed in order to come to a better understanding of their situation.
47. John Harris, 'Development Theories (2014)', p. 45.
48. Olu Ajakaiye and Afeikhena Jerome, 'Economic Development', in Bruce Currie-Alder, Ravi Kanbur, David M. Malone, and Rohinton Medhora (eds), *International Development—Ideas, Experience, and Prospects* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 786–787.
49. Ibid., p. 745.

50. Dani Rodrik, 'The Perils of Premature De-industrialisation' in the *Opinion*, *The Independent* (Uganda), 18–24 October 2013, p. 8.
51. Greg DePersio, 'What Are the Most Important Aspects of a Capitalist System?' *Investopedia Academy*, 7 April 2015, http://www.investopedia.com/ask/answers/040715/what-are-most-important-aspects-capitalist-system.asp.
52. Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu (2014), pp. 64–66.
53. Ibid., p. 67.
54. David Henley, *Asia-Pacific Development Divergence—A Question of Intent* (London: Zed Books, 2015), p. 5.
55. Olu Ajakaiye and Afeikhena Jerome, 'Economic Development (2014)', pp. 742–743.
56. Tim Marshall, *Prisoners of Geography: Ten Maps That Tell You Everything You Need to Know About Global Politics* (London: Elliot and Thompson, 2015), pp. 116–139.
57. 'World Population Prospects the 2017 Revision', ESA.UN.org (custom data acquired via website), United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division. It was retrieved on 10 September 2017.
58. See the article written by Stephanie Hanson, 'Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa' for the Council on Foreign Relations, 6 August 2009.
59. Ibid.
60. Huguette Labelle, 'Corruption', in *International Development* (2014), p. 240.
61. Kwabena Gyimah-Brempong, 'Corruption, Economic Growth, and Income Inequality in Africa', *Economics of Governance* 3 (2002), pp. 183–209, 185.
62. McKinsey Global Institute, 'The Closest Look Yet at Chinese Economic Engagement in Africa', June 2017 report, https://www.mckinsey.com/featured-insights/middle-east-and-africa/the-closest-look-yet-at-chinese-economic-engagement-in-africa.
63. Some Western experts who have long served in Africa have expressed the view that many African leaders still run their economy following the socialist mindset.

4

The 'Mindset Change' Issue in Sub-Saharan Africa

The Forgotten 'Mind Over Matter'?

As we grapple with the question of what went wrong with Africa's development and what the way forward should be, it is no surprise that so many studies have been done on Africa in wide-ranging fields by various experts and organizations. However, in the eyes of the global community at large, Africa is still very much an unknown, yet-to-be-discovered region and hence much academic, scientific and fact-finding research on Africa will follow suit. In business circles, Sub-Saharan Africa is described as 'the last frontier' but the region is already open for the outsiders to take advantage of its potentials.

Africa's development can be an interesting and fascinating subject to ponder on. What makes the field of development most challenging is that, in sum, it is about carrying out the task of bringing about changes where normally the conditions are the least favourable for doing so. Development bears an aspect of international relations and is an inter-disciplinary field, but it is unlike any other, especially from the practitioners' perspective. For example, development cooperation has a fundamentally different working structure compared to other areas of engagements or dealings, including conventional diplomacy, public diplomacy, trade and investment, security, the environment, etc. In these fields, countries participate as 'equal entities' and each party focuses on advancing its position from its own end. Whether it is about negotiating or carrying out PR activities, the process is simple and predictable. It is not necessary to worry about the situation of one counterpart or its capacity to play its part; the responsibility that one bears is confined to one's own responsibility.

However, in development cooperation, things are very different and practitioners cannot go about conducting their own business in a matter-of-fact fashion, paying no attention to the situation of others. It is not enough to have shared goals and reach an agreement, and doing well on your part: one has to involve one's counterpart or partner in doing the difficult and necessary things. Development projects are conducted and assessed over the long haul, and for donors, their assignment is not substantively fulfilled until the collaborative work bears fruit in the end. People cannot feel lighthearted when things break down or become white elephants immediately after they have handed over the facilities or programmes to African countries.

Hence, 'rationality' and standard procedures that we are used to following in most fields in international relations do not necessarily apply in development cooperation. If aid projects are to be responsibly carried out in order to produce tangible results, then extra 'human toil' is required, such as a greater level of patience, perseverance and devotion. Frustration and stress levels can become very high when officials in charge in the aid recipient country do not properly respond and follow up.

I think development as a specialized field in its own right has, over time, lost the zeal it needs to have and has settled for the pursuit of human needs and stability. This was driven largely by the unmitigated challenges that the development community has faced in its conventional domain, but current events have also played a part. For instance, what could have been a promising second decade for the world in the new millennium began with an uncertain and troubling international landscape: political destabilization, the eruption of new conflicts, a new form of international terrorism, and a refugee crisis impacting Europe and having global ramifications, among others.

We could be overwhelmed by the challenging developments and contingencies around the world, but development initiatives must be focused on the development agenda instead of following the fickle of times. The more the current situation appears to be entangled, the greater need there is to focus on the fundamentals, root causes and 'ultimate solutions'. This is because development is possibly the best answer to most of the ills and problems we face today. As such, it was heartening when, recently, even David Beasley, the Executive Director of the World Food Programme (WFP), said that 'humanitarian dollars should be turned into development dollars'.[1]

We need to have a better misunderstanding of what foreign aid can do. Not all aid is geared towards economic development and, all things considered, the actual portion allotted to economic development is quite small. This is because the spectrum of foreign assistance has expanded over decades to include just about everything, as is reflected by the adoption of universal Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). The clear phenomenon observable in African development is that the distinction between 'economic development' and 'economic welfare' is increasingly blurred, which I think is a big problem in itself.

To simplify matters, foreign aid can be broken down into four categories: (1) humanitarian assistance; (2) 'social welfare'-type assistance; (3) development assistance; and (4) the promotion of democracy and governance. Humanitarian assistance is for the emergency relief of those suffering as a result of disasters and crises. Social welfare-type programmes target the socially vulnerable or disadvantaged, providing various services to meet their basic needs. While the first two types of assistance are meant to serve the immediate or basic requirements of the recipients, development assistance is for the mid- to long term sustainable development of the recipient nations. These include various types of cooperation like capacity-building, technological cooperation, the construction and handover of facilities and infrastructures, the provision of materials and equipment, the injection of funds, etc. in multiple sectors. Lastly, the promotion of governance, democracy and human rights, and regional security are also important areas in which Western donors provide assistance.

Therefore, foreign aid that directly supports economic development in African countries is not particularly apparent. And this is further 'compromised' by how the recipient countries utilize this aid. The problem is that various economic projects often turn out to be short-lived programmes that mainly benefit the officials of counterpart agencies or a limited number of the people concerned. In sum, even these have turned into 'welfare' programmes instead of acting as sustainable means to assist economic development.

Basically, universal economic activities can be considered as either wealth creation or wealth distribution. Wealth creation is about realizing additional production and value that drives economic growth, leading to overall development. Wealth distribution, in policy terms, is the act of 'correcting' market failures from a socio-political standpoint like addressing income inequality and providing public services. If there is no wealth creation, then there is no wealth to distribute. Thus, for Sub-Saharan African countries, the priority should be 'enlarging the pie' through wealth creation, but their general mindset is fixated on the transfer of wealth. Under such circumstances, various assistance programmes are likely to fail. The 'welfare mentality' is so widespread in the region that everyone is looking for solutions to come from somewhere else, while readily blaming outsiders and external factors for their own poverty and troubles. More troubling is the failure or unwillingness to take action, and the deep-seated practice of 'non-implementation' poses the biggest mystery, obstacle and threat to development in Sub-Saharan Africa.

The 'mindset' of people should be brought to the forefront of our attention and considered as a key term in the discourse on Africa's development. If people were to ask what the single most important root cause is of underdevelopment of Sub-Saharan Africa, the best answer I can think of is the 'mindset'. Among the myriad of things that can be considered, the ultimate solution to break the impasse lies in a change of mindset. It is one thing to find reasons for past failures, which is what everybody has been doing, but quite another to make things right in practice, which seldom takes place in the region.

The 'mindset change approach' beings with it great benefits, in that it is conducive to the 'internalization' of development, enhancing awareness for ownership, and is action-oriented. It brings home what people have forgotten: the plain and simple truth of *mind over matter*. 'Mindset' can be an elusive term, but it would be useful to confine its meaning to what is relevant to development. Bringing the 'mindset' to the fore in discussion propels search for answers 'from within', which is what development ought to be about in the first place. Too much energy has been spent on secondary and peripheral issues without addressing the core issue of *mind over matter*.

To make this kind of attitudinal change will not be an easy task, but it is not impossible. It is certainly achievable and there are precedents to prove it. The most prominent example, I would argue, is South Korea. In Africa, Rwanda is seen as an emerging case, following a similar model. Uganda has already adopted this mindset change programme, although it is still in the initial, exploratory phase of doing so. Sub-Saharan African nations should go beyond acquiring knowledge and capacity to espouse mindset change if they are indeed serious about 'radical transformation', and rightly so.

The good news is that in some places in Sub-Saharan Africa, people are beginning to at least be aware and are talking about the mindset issue in an open manner. Uganda is one of those where Korea's experience and know-how in this field has had an influence. Since 2009, the Canaan Farmers School, an institution in South Korea which specializes in mindset change and agriculture programmes, has worked with Uganda. Born out of the destruction of the Second World War and the subsequent Korean War, the Canaan School is reputed to have played an instrumental role in leadership and agriculture training in the early stages of Korea's economic development. The objective of this institution was to eradicate poverty and attain sustainable development through changing the mindsets of rural leaders, who, in turn, would spearhead the change of mindsets in their communities. The School's methodology was adopted later in the model of the New Village Movement (*Saemaeul Undong*) that became a national campaign in South Korea from 1970. The *Saemaul Undong* became an icon of a successful community-driven, self-help rural development endeavour of Korea that contributed to its overall success in economic development.

The 'Mindset Change' Issue in Sub-Saharan Africa

Few international experts and observers know that South Korea's economic miracle began with the mindset change campaigns conducted at a national level. When you see various books and articles on Korea's rapid economic growth or 'miracle' written by economists, both Korean and foreign, there is hardly any mention of the mindset change campaigns like the *Saemaul Undong*. It is only in recent years that the *Saemaul Undong* was recognized and promoted internationally as a development model, and the *Saemaul Undong* archives were added to UNESCO's Memory of the World Register in 2013.[2] In the international development community, UN bodies like the UN Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) are the pioneers in embracing this approach.[3]

There may be many reasons for this, but two things come to mind. One is the tendency or influence of mainstream economics and the other is the fundamental 'political' propensity or bias. First, mainstream economists do not deal with 'extraneous' factors like the people's 'mindset'. What approximates 'mindset' according to scholars is the 'hard work' or 'work ethic' of Koreans. Even Alice Amsden's *Asia's Next Giant* (1992) does not mention the *Saemaul Undong* at all. Also, it might be that orthodox economists would have shunned such an 'interventionist' movement.

Another reason why the *Saemaul Undong* has not received universal praise inside Korea is because of the 'political divide' in the nation. No sooner had Korea achieved rapid economic development, the process of its socio-political evolution, democratization began to unfold. Despite the fact that the *Saemaul Undong* had a substantial impact on rural development, because it was initiated by the authoritative government, the progressive-minded population half-heartedly admitted, or were even critical of, its outcomes. Also, as times have changed and people have become wealthier and more self-centred, they tend to be dismissive of things done in the past and do not enough thought to the situation back then, regarding these things as 'outdated' or 'irrelevant'.

Korea and Sub-Saharan African countries share many similar historical experiences. No sooner had Korea been liberated from Japanese colonial rule in 1945 than it became divided. The subsequent Korean War that started in 1950 devastated the nation. But the great turnaround started with the public programmes to empower the people in the 1950s, and the story of South Korea that unfolded provides valuable lessons for Africa's development.

No one will disagree that without a fundamental change in the mindset of the leaders and the populace, there cannot be real progress. Setting up goals and expressing aspirations is an easy part, but this would be of no avail if they are not followed up with concrete actions. There have been serious misperceptions, negligence or intentional 'looking the other way' on the subject. Development is not a 'stock' but a 'flow' concept in economics, and it is all about change and dynamism, not the maintenance of the status quo. But many in the region seem to mistakenly believe that national wealth can be transferred and stocked up like material goods. But even materials and equipment need proper usage and maintenance in order to be useful. Many facilities built to serve the public, like medical clinics, factories, schools and welfare centres, become useless shortly after they are opened and handed over due to a lack of care and ownership, accompanied by corruption.

Although many factors come into play, the real issue is not the lack of resources or means, but the mindset of the people who are involved and responsible for undertaking the work. Evidently, poor work ethics—the habit of not thinking ahead and making necessary preparations, not being focused and devoted in relation to one's work, easily quitting one's task, not keeping to deadlines and promise, etc. does so much harm, but this is not mentioned enough. When people imagine poverty in Africa, they tend to think of poverty in terms of lack of means, but one has to think further that poverty can be caused or sustained by the failure to manage oneself, like saving money and having plans for making a living and for spending.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, it is customary to see people attributing their problem to outside elements. One East African journalist writes:

> [W]hat is it that inhibits our ability to produce our own technologies? Note that most sub-Saharan nations possess political institutions and public policies that (we are told) ensure prosperity. Is it, therefore, our education system which is the problem? Is it our social organization? Is it our colonial history that destroyed our self-belief in our ability to produce our own technologies? Is it the hegemonic ideology of global capitalism that keeps us looking outward for the solutions to our problems?[4]

There are different ways to deal with these needs and problems. People can be introspective, inclined to seek answers and solutions from within, or can have the opposite tendency and put blame on others or expect others to solve their problems. If we had two distinctly different societies, one being 'introspective' and the other having 'disowning' tendencies, which one would fare better? The answer is obvious.

The value of being 'introspective' is that over time, individuals are likely to improve and achieve something because of the 'know thyself' kind of effect that it will have. Skills and technologies can be gained when one strives for them. On the other hand, knowledge and institutions are of no consequence when people are idle and irresponsible. Worse, this 'disowning' tendency breeds a 'don't care' mentality. Because people are not the drivers of their own life, they cannot have high expectations of what can be achieved.

It is baffling as to why people should be reluctant to do the things that will only benefit them, particularly in the longer term. This is not limited to the economic field. Institutions, the rule of law, governance and democracy are only worth anything if they are put into practice. We studied at school that the essence of democracy was deeds and practice. It can be a hollow echo of rhetoric which can degenerate into endless political strife if democracy is not properly understood and embodied by the people.

Development is about making difficult changes, and admitting and targeting one's own weakness and problems rather than trying to conceal them, so that they can be overcome. Development is what is earned and not what is bestowed by others, and there is no magical formula for it, except that people and the government all have to work conscientiously with a common purpose. In this regard, much more harm is done by being ambiguous, disingenuous, hypocritical and manneristic than being honest, straightforward and practical. Being politically and diplomatically correct all the time may not be a good thing for the sake of development, and straightforwardness could yield better outcomes.

Fortunately, within Africa, people are showing an increasing awareness that the mindset needs to be changed. The call for mindset change has been aired in various regional bodies including the African Union (AU), and it is not uncommon to see African leaders and intellectuals speaking out on this.[5] Everyone seems to agree that people's mindset should change, but when it comes to how this should be done, people seem to be at a loss and lack clear ideas. This is where we need to break out of the box. Rather than give up or try to avoid the matter, it should be tackled head-on. The ideal scenario would be that the African people themselves take the initiative and make full-fledged efforts in this regard. Development partners can approach this issue with good intentions and without prejudice, being circumspective in relation to the nature of the matter.

Efforts to this end have already been made in Uganda through such projects as the establishment of the National Farmers Leadership Centre (NFLC), which is a training round for mindset change and agricultural development.[6] Perhaps the best way to break the yoke of the inaction or powerlessness of the people is to 'provoke' them to change. This is because as far as human behaviour is concerned, 'voluntarism' is the surest way forward. The 'mindset change' of the people, if effected, can have far-reaching and 'explosive' repercussions on their lives and society.

There are a number of parallels between Korea's experience and the situation in which Sub-Saharan African countries currently find themselves. One of the areas that Korea identified as crucial for national transformation was the mindset of the people, and the campaign for mindset change was essentially about empowering the people. The Korean experience will be examined in Part 4 of this book.

With respect to the substance of the problematic mindset in Sub-Saharan Africa, I believe that the following can be identified as the syndromes or traits that commonly exist in the region: (1) the dependency syndrome; (2) the 'what's-in-it-for-me' syndrome; (3) the 'backtracking syndrome'; (4) expediency or short-sightedness; (5) a lack of action and implementation; (6) a weak sense of responsibility or ownership; (7) a weak sense of nation or patriotism; and (8) a 'commission culture'.[7]

First, we are all so familiar with the talk of a 'dependency syndrome' in Sub-Saharan Africa that it sounds like a cliché. It is so widespread throughout the region, at all levels in society and the state. For instance, at the provincial level, the general tendency is that the locals wait indefinitely, hoping that the government will come to their aid for the most basic things that they can do for themselves. I had the opportunity to participate in a series of 'community clean-up' exercises in and around Kampala, and on one occasion I was appalled to see first-hand the scene of total negligence and irresponsibility. The site was not a slum by any measure, but apparently the residents were waiting for the city authority workers to show up and remove the rubbish. Even on the very day we were conducting clean-up exercise, many locals, particularly young men, were sitting idly and gazing at us, smiling but declining to take part in the exercise. It was an awful state to witness because this had nothing to do with the people lacking knowledge, capacity or financial resources (the reasons frequently cited for people failing to act), but was a simple matter of willingness.[8]

The 'what's-in-it-for-me?' syndrome is also a widespread phenomenon among the population in the region. This is a tendency to consider one's own interests at all times before anything else. In Sub-Saharan Africa, it is a well-known fact the poor delivery of public services wrought by civil servants who are devoid of any sense of duty and responsibility is a major hindrance to development. It is a common practice for government officials to engage in personal businesses, and even in their official duties their priority is often misplaced, putting their personal interests over the public interest. There is a tendency to put the official assignments on the back-burner or neglect them altogether if they fail to see what is in it for them. Such practice not only breeds conflict of interests and corruption, but also, more fundamentally, drastically undercuts the government's performance. Economic loss due to disruptions and delays in public service, not to mention outright acts of corruption, is said to be enormous.

The 'backtracking syndrome' is the tendency to hold back or back pedal instead of moving forward to build on what has already been achieved. I have always thought of this as a great paradox. It is the problem of failing to 'keep pace', stopping short of meeting the target, and not being consistent and living up to expectations. Where dynamic economic growth is enjoyed, people take it for granted that things improve over time. But this is generally not the case in Africa. There are actually many things that get worse over time, the most noticeable being the deterioration of physical infrastructure and facilities, but it goes well beyond that.

The backtracking syndrome is observable on many fronts and it has huge accumulative or multiple effects at the national level. What is so disheartening is that in many cases, local employees, if they are not placed under the 'special attention' of the management, end up causing problems or missing out on the opportunities that will definitely benefit them (like long-time employment). What we can call the 'self-regulating' or 'self-disciplining' ability of workers is visibly poor. Overall, their will to 'appeal' to their bosses in terms of diligence and performance is short-lived and they do not respond well to the continuing pressures of work. Because Africa's organizations and companies have a weaker management or governance structure compared to foreign entities, their overall organizational output or efficiency is also weaker. In contrast, those who do receive greater recognition in foreign organizations enjoy many benefits and opportunities. They can even be headhunted by higher-paying government organizations and companies.[9]

In any organization, local workers can only benefit if they are attuned to maintaining their level of work because normally, over time, they will gain expertise and productivity in relation to their work. Their pay will increase and it should be a win-win situation for the organization and the employees. But, to our dismay, many show 'regression' instead of steady progress, with the result that they are eventually fired from their job. The strange phenomenon is that when rewards and incentives are given to employees, one should expect them to perform more positively, but often the opposite occurs—rather than responding in kind, employees become spoilt, complacent and ask for more. This results in an ironic situation where the good intentions of one party are met by the negative reaction of the other party, which defies logic and rationality.

The next trait is expediency or short-sightedness. This is quite evident in daily work practices. Cutting corners is a tendency of most technicians and workers in the region, meaning that in order to avoid this as much as possible, customers' intervention in terms of continuous on-site 'supervision' is required. This applies to a whole variety of work, ranging from menial chores to construction projects. Sloppy work, the habit of leaving things undone, a failure to keep to deadlines and promises, etc. are the 'norm' rather than the exception.[10] Generally, there is a lack of attention to detail and thinking ahead, so that even the most basic things to expect like the standardization and linear, geometric correctness of products are not met most of the time.

The lack of implementation or action is another distinctive feature of Sub-Saharan Africa. Ian Clarke, an Irish missionary doctor who became the Mayor of Makindye Division in Kampala, gives a vivid account of such a problem:

> Uganda was a great country to live in: the weather was lovely, the vegetation beautiful, and the people friendly and outgoing. Some foreigners came to work in Uganda and were at first enthralled by what they found, particularly by the social life and by how articulate people are, but they often got a rude awakening when it came to the work practices and work ethic. If people could talk their way into making things work, Uganda would have been the best developed country in the world. Donors were impressed with people's grasp of problems and understanding of the steps which should be taken in finding solutions, but then confused as to why so many basic issues on the ground remained unresolved. The problem lay in implementation: many public servants were good at analysing and talking about what should be done, as if the very talking was the same as doing it, but then nothing happened. This lack of implementation of simple things in the public domain was so common that it was accepted as the norm, and one only remarked when anything actually changed.[11]

The disinclination to act is a very serious problem under any circumstances. Everybody seems to agree that there has been too much talking and too little action. There is the saying 'easier said than done', but the wise have admonished us against frivolity and talkativeness: 'silence is golden', 'an empty wagon makes more noise', 'action speaks louder than words', 'the superior man acts before he speaks, and afterwards speaks according to his action', etc.[12]

Lack of responsibility and ownership is also a serious obstacle to development. Institutional mechanisms to enforce accountability are important, but what is much more needed is a greater sense of responsibility of the people. The seriousness of the problem is frequently expressed:

> It's very hard to get things done, even at the smallest level. But it is very easy to sit and complain about things. Reading social media, one gets the sense that we have increasingly become a complaining nation, not a doing nation. Everywhere complaints abound about our failing healthcare and education system, of corruption and abuse of office. But one hardly reads a story of what those complaining are doing to change the situation. Are we waiting for intervention from God?[13]

What I also see as typical of Sub-Saharan Africa is the practice of offering amnesty in the name of national reconciliation. Political leaders are quick to call for amnesty, thereby promoting impunity. Betrayal and treachery are also common. When I was in West Africa, I saw internal conflicts in many countries where the military as well as political leaders conveniently 'switched sides'. Opportunism prevails, and this leads to a protraction of conflicts because there is no clear will for or path towards its closure. In eastern Africa, South Sudan provides the latest worst-case scenario of what personal greed for power and impunity of leaders can do to a nation.

Weakness in the sense of nation and patriotism is another general trait in the region. The weak sense of nation and patriotism correlates with the weak functioning of states and these two feed off each other. From a national standpoint, the spread of patriotism that transcends tribalism and sectarianism will be an ideal goal to achieve. Many

African countries suffering from internal strife and disunity ought to realize the fact that this could easily be exploited, engulfing the whole country and the region into a state of crisis.

So how can a sense of nation, national identity, solidarity or patriotism be fostered? The greatest responsibility rests with the political leaders and elites, who should be leading their nation forward by example. But this need not be top-down only—it can work both ways, from top-down and bottom-up, in an interactive fashion with people's voluntarism. Sometimes tragic events can serve as a critical turning point for nations. A good example is the case of Rwanda. What the country has been able to achieve in the aftermath of the genocide is remarkable and has set a high bar for other African countries to match. For an African country, Rwanda has tackled seemingly improbable tasks: good governance, the civic-mindedness of the people, social order and discipline, national solidarity, etc. Most surprising is the cleanliness and orderliness of the capital city Kigali to the extent that it makes one wonder if it is indeed a city in Sub-Saharan Africa. What developing countries desperately need is the government setting an example to 'empower' the people rather than simply trying to curry favour with the people, but without enacting essential reforms.

Lastly, there is a widespread practice of people at all levels wanting to be given 'commission' as if they are entitled to it. Foreign investors are the easy targets and can be hassled by various people, including high-level government officials, who are hell-bent on rent-seeking. The 'commission culture' is one of the many facets of corruption, but because it stands out so prominently in Sub-Saharan Africa, it can be regarded as a syndrome.

Notes

1. David Beasley, speaking at 'Geneva Conference on National Transformation—With Special Focus on Science & Technology, Business & Industry', 7 October, Africana Hotel, Kampala, Uganda. The conference was jointly organized by the Geneva Institute for

Leadership & Public Policy and the Science & Technology Policy Institute (STEPI) of South Korea.

2. UNESCO, Memory of the World, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/communication-and-information/memory-of-the-world/register/full-list-of-registered-heritage/registered-heritage-page-1/archives-of-saemaul-undong-new-community-movement.
3. Internationally, UN development bodies are believed to be the pioneers of recognizing and accepting the *Saemaul Undong* as a model for rural development. For instance, the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (ECA) chose the *Saemaul Undong* as a base model for the Sustainable Modernization of Agriculture and Rural Transformation (SMART), programme in 2008, and the *Saemaul Undong* was officially introduced to the UNDP in 2015 at the same time as the adoption of the SDGs. Edward Reed, the former country representative of the Asia Foundation to Korea, is a noted international scholar who had studied and written about the *Saemaul Undong*.
4. Andrew Mwenda, 'Africa Through North Korean Eyes', *The Independent*, 6 April 2017, https://www.independent.co.ug/columnists/andrew-mwenda.
5. For instance, Dr. Nkosazana Diamini-Zuma, the African Union Chairperson, stressed the need for Africans to change their mindsets to achieve development while briefing the Speakers of the African Parliament regarding Agenda 2063 in August 2014. When I came to Uganda in 2011, I noticed that the term 'mindset change' was already a familiar term in government circles perhaps due to Korea's Canaan Farmers School's activities in Uganda.
6. The National Farmers Leadership Centre was formally opened in Uganda in May 2016. This centre, which focuses on mindset change (*Saemaul Undong*) and agricultural training, is the first of its kind to be created by the Korean government in Sub-Saharan Africa. It is dealt with more in detail in other parts of this book.
7. The observations and propositions made in this book, including the description of typical syndromes in Sub-Saharan Africa, are based on my own experiences in Africa. My personal involvement in development cooperation, including the planning and implementation of development projects in Uganda, provided the inspiration and the empirical grounds for my work.

8. However, I was very pleased to learn later on that this community did indeed turn itself around and became one of the recognized examples of community environment improvement.
9. Africa's prominent executive bodies that are highly sought-after by white-collar workers also struggle to keep their employees disciplined and in check. So, those who have had a 'good training' and a track record of working in foreign organizations are often preferred by those offices.
10. African countries approach this issue from the viewpoint of 'skilling', but I think this is a fundamental mindset or work ethics problem. The advocates of skilling have the point of correcting identifying the problem as essentially vocational rather than academic in most African countries. But limitations in 'skilling programmes' is that skilling alone cannot address what skilling is purported to achieve; it has to be complemented with work ethics and social ethics.
11. Ian Clarke, *How Deep Is This Pothole?* (London: Ian Clarke, 2010), p. 195.
12. 'An empty wagon makes more noise' is a Korean proverb and 'the superior man acts before he speaks, and afterwards speaks according to his action' is a saying of Confucius.
13. Andrew Mwenda, *The Independent*, 20–26 February 2015, p. 9.