DEEPAN JOSHI

THE FRONTLINES OF PEACE

PEACEBUILDING AND POST-CONFLICT RECONSTRUCTION **(VOL I)**

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Table of Contents

PART I

Peace-Building and Political Transition

Understanding State of Peacebuilding

Terence McNamee and Monde Muyangwa

The birth year of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), 1963, is often considered Africa's year of independence. But political freedom did not mean freedom from the repression and violence which had characterized the colonial period. Wars and conflicts have scarred the continent since independence. After the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989, they became more complex and widespread. And so, too, did the international efforts to restore and (re) build peace in Africa. Countries worst affected by violence and conflict included Sierra Leone, Liberia, Rwanda, Somalia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sudan/South Sudan, Central African Republic, Mali, and Libya. In recent years, the quest for sustainable peace in Africa has taken on a new urgency, as instability and insecurity continue

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to negatively impact the lives of millions of Africans and hinder the continent's economic growth and development. This book joins the quest for peace by examining 30 years of peacebuilding in Africa, highlighting key lessons learned and offering some recommendations for making peace stick.

In 2013, the Heads of State and Governments of the African Union (AU) signed the 50th Anniversary Solemn Declaration. To mark a half-century since the formation of the OAU, forerunner to the AU, leaders committed to work for peace and prosperity and end strife on the continent by 2020.

> Our determination to achieve the goal of a conflict-free Africa, to make peace a reality for all our people, and to rid the continent of wars, civil conflicts, human rights violations, humanitarian disasters, and violent conflicts, and to prevent genocide, We pledge not to bequeath the burden of conflicts to the next generation of Africans, and undertake to end all wars in Africa by 2020.[1]

Presumably, none of the signatories genuinely believed that such an ambitious target could be achieved within seven years. In the period since the founding of the OAU, more than half of African states experienced some form of major conflict. Many of those states had reverted to war after periods of relative peace. The signatories knew that. Most were in their 60s or older in 2013; they had lived through some of Africa's bleakest times. Today, the continent cannot be described as "conflict-free."

At the same time, Africa has progressed further down the path of peace than is typically portrayed. State fragility remains an endemic problem across the continent, but incidents of mass violence are increasingly rare. This is in no small part due to African states shedding the tactics of their former colonial masters and taking ownership of the problems within their own borders. As one of our contributors observes, Africa has

> …exhibited a notable readiness to assume the tasks of crisis management and engage in mutual cooperation between states to rebuild stability, through diplomacy, negotiation and the deployment of intervention forces and peacekeepers. The continent's capacity for common action is one of its greatest strengths.[2]

To add weight to the AU's Solemn Declaration, its leaders adopted the "Silencing the Guns" initiative, one of the flagship projects of the wider developmental blueprint "Agenda 2063." The campaign seeks to make

2020 a year of action and mobilization, inspiring all stakeholders to prioritize efforts on peace and effective socio-economic development.

By fitting coincidence, this book is published in the same year—a year which will be forever linked not (seemingly) with peace and security but, instead, the COVID-19 pandemic, which has disrupted life in previously unthinkable ways across all continents. The quest to silence the guns, and build peace and security in Africa, will continue long after this pandemic passes. We hope that this book's insights and lessons will make a small contribution to that goal.

The State of Peacebuilding in Africa

The State of Peacebuilding in Africa looks back on over 30 years of key experiences across numerous aspects of peacebuilding and highlights key lessons learned that could be used to entrench sustainable peace on the continent.

Building on the research and activities of the Southern Voices Network for Peacebuilding (SVNP)[3]—a continent-wide network of 22 African civil society, policy, research, and academic organizations that works with the Wilson Center's Africa Program to bring African knowledge, analyses, and perspectives to U.S., African, and international policy on peacebuilding in Africa—this volume brings together the work of distinguished African and international practitioners, scholars, and decision makers.

Peacebuilding is a complex and multifaceted endeavor, consisting of many different elements. While some elements are not covered as fully as others, most of the core themes are included in this book: conflict prevention and early warning systems; mediation and conflict management; post-conflict reconstruction; disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR); human rights and justice; and the role of women, religion, humanitarianism, grassroots organizations, and regional and continental bodies. The thematic chapters are complemented by six country and region case studies on the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan/South Sudan, Mozambique, and the Sahel/Mali.

The chapter authors were given a common template to work from and asked to address three main questions in the peacebuilding realm in Africa since the end of the Cold War: What changes have occurred in thinking and practice at the thematic or country level? What have been the key lessons learned (good and bad) and best practices to emerge from them? And, what are the top policy options or recommendations you would

put forward to policymakers and practitioners working on this aspect of peacebuilding?

In some respects, of course, this is well-trodden territory. The fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 coincided with changing dynamics of conflict across the world, not least in Africa. A rich literature on peacebuilding arose in this new era—as much out of hope that historic fault-lines might be bridged as fear that states were not equipped to deal with the new threats to peace and stability. The colossal challenges and failings of United Nations (UN) peacekeeping in the 1990s, especially in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia (Srebrenica), led to the landmark "Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations" (informally known as the Brahimi Report), published in 2000, which outlined the need for enhancing the UN's capacity to undertake a wide variety of missions. It was followed five years later by the UN Secretary-General's Report "In Larger Freedom," which emphasized the synergistic relationship of development, security, and human rights in building peace. More recently, the Independent High-level Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) was convened in 2014 by the then-Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon. His thorough review of UN peace operations and the emerging needs of the future, published the following year, popularized the idea of "the primacy of politics." By which the report meant not that UN missions could end conflict and build peace alone, but that their success rested on being part of a "viable process." Many of the themes addressed in this volume can be understood as key parts of such a process.

With ever-deeper attention given to conflict resolution by the UN, governments, and the academic community, robust debates have arisen over what terms and definitions fit realities on the ground best. This is not merely an academic concern: the lack of a common vocabulary can fatally undermine peace missions. Where there is vagueness and confusion over terms, one of the book's contributors writes, contrasting interpretations of mandates by different national contingents in peace operations can always arise.

The concept of "peacebuilding" has been, to say the least, variously defined. For some, it is one of several distinct activities including: conflict prevention and mediation (e.g., early warning and urgent diplomatic measures); peacemaking (e.g., high-level envoys and summits); peace enforcement (e.g., violent and nonviolent coercive measures), and post-conflict reconstruction (including justice, institution-building, and economic development). All of which, in their own way, contribute to

international peace and security. And then there are peacekeepers, who are increasingly mandated—or at least find themselves working—across different realms: protecting civilians, delivering humanitarian assistance, helping to restore the rule of law, even engaging in de facto reconstruction and state-building. Others use the term "peacebuilding" in an instrumental sense: the means to institutionalize peace, and remove the root causes of conflict.

For the purposes of this volume, peacebuilding is understood in a broad sense, an umbrella term that encompasses the activities highlighted above and some others. If a more precise definition is required, perhaps it is worth recalling another important UN document, Boutros Boutros-Ghali's *Agenda for Peace* published in 1992, which describes the concept of peacebuilding as

> the construction of a new environment… which seeks to avoid the breakdown of peaceful conditions. [Only] sustained, cooperative work to deal with underlying economic, social, cultural and humanitarian problems can place an achieved peace on a durable foundation. Preventive diplomacy is to avoid a crisis; post-conflict peacebuilding is to prevent a recurrence.[4]

With a lens on Africa, this definition provides a reasonably accurate frame for the book.

In a growing and increasingly globalized literature on peacebuilding, what sets this volume apart from most others is the amalgam: of contributors from the grassroots and academia, from the practitioner and policymaking worlds; of African and non-African voices. There is richness to this mix. While this book, and the Southern Voices Network for Peacebuilding, the initiative that gave rise to it, privileges African voices, it also includes leading thinkers from outside the continent who have studied and interrogated peacebuilding, and helped shape peacebuilding policies and concepts in Africa.

Key Issues and Themes in Peacebuilding in Africa

One of the contributors, *Ibrahim Gambari*, a Nigerian former military leader and scholar-diplomat, brings a wealth of high-level experience outside Africa—as a UN Special Envoy to conflict-scarred states like Cyprus and Myanmar—to his reflection on how to build sustainable peace in his home continent. Others, like former government minister *Betty*

Bigombe, draw on years as a mediator in her native Uganda—experience that included face-to-face negotiations with Joseph Kony and his Lord's Resistance Army (LRA)—together with time spent at think tanks and the World Bank to explain why policies on the reintegration of ex-combatants into communities need a rethink. *Vera Songwe*, current Executive Secretary of the United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA) and a leading African economist and banking executive, draws on the lessons learned from World War One and Two to argue for earlier sequencing of economic development within peacebuilding frameworks, and for revisiting the role of multilateral institutions.

Readers of this volume will invariably pick up on certain issues that percolate across the thematic chapters and case studies. As you progress through *The State of Peacebuilding in Africa*, these are some of the recurrent themes that we think merit closer scrutiny.

1. ***Frameworks.*** Frequently peacebuilding frameworks are out of sync with realities and needs on the ground. Too often this is due to too numerous, various, and uncoordinated—however well-meaning—"partners." Nor do "one-size-fits-all" approaches work; context matters. Post-conflict reconstruction approaches tend to focus on rebuilding the state while neglecting the reconstruction and healing of the people traumatized by conflict. Both are necessary.
2. ***Mandates and Missions.*** Overloaded mandates—often a laundry list of tasks without commensurate resources in terms of personnel, finances, or logistics—compromise peacebuilding outcomes. Additionally, the growing number of blurred missions—e.g., between humanitarian missions and military peace support operations—is problematic.
3. ***Funding.*** Being overly reliant on external/non-African donors to fund peacebuilding renders key programs vulnerable and unsustainable, as resources are often short-term while peacebuilding needs are long term in nature.
4. ***Civil Society, Grassroots, and Elites.*** Wars are ended by elites; peace is built and sustained at the grassroots. Peace Agreements and peacebuilding efforts need to better reflect that reality, including on matters of transitional justice and on the role played by religion and local infrastructures for peace in African societies. Simply put, local ownership matters and is key to building peace.

5. ***Women's Voices.*** Peace cannot be realized or sustained if women's voices are not included in peacebuilding processes or if issues of sexual and gender-based violence are not addressed within peacebuilding efforts.
6. ***Youth.*** Despite recurrent claims to the contrary by leaders and mediators, young Africans are regularly excluded from peace processes. It is still common for youth to be perceived as potentially dangerous "factors" in peacebuilding, easily manipulated to further one or other side's interests. In reality, young people have agency and are not monolithic actors. They have tremendous potential for driving positive change in Africa where, not infrequently, stale gerontocracies dominate. That soon a quarter of the young people in the world will be African amplifies the need to reimagine the role of youth in peacebuilding.
7. ***Institutions matter: International, African Union, and Regional Economic Communities.*** Peacebuilding achievements should be recognized and built upon. In some cases, core institutions need to revisit their dogmatic approach to peacebuilding. In other cases, the right institutions and processes are in, or being put in place; they just need to be more effective and realized.
8. ***Expectations.*** Peacebuilding is a long-term process, subject to reversals. Potential points of failure are numerous. Too often populations are promised miracles and panaceas. When these do not materialize, resentment can fuel a return to war. Similarly, the international community often expects a sustainable peace but is usually unable or unwilling to make the long-term investment necessary to transform conflict-prone societies.

Organization of the Book

This book is divided into four parts: (i) peacebuilding in transition in Africa; (ii) strategies and tools; (iii) regional and international dimensions; and (iv) country/region case studies.

Part I focuses on the evolution of peacebuilding and begins with a reflection by *Paul Williams* on more than fifty peace operations deployed to nearly twenty African countries during the twenty-first century. He outlines why peace operations need to be part of a viable strategy of conflict resolution and explains what happens when means and ends

are not aligned. Of particular note is his warning that a numbers-centric approach to force generation in peace operations is far less effective than a capabilities and effects-based approach. *Vera Songwe* looks at the economic dimension of peacebuilding reflecting on the failures and successes of international organizations during the first half of the 20th century. She questions the established approach of engaging in economic development only after peace has been restored. This approach, she argues, condemns peacebuilding to failure even before it has started. *Ludovic Lado* examines a vital but under-appreciated factor in the success or failure of peacebuilding: religion. Against a complex and evolving religious landscape, where Christianity and Islam coexist alongside African traditional religions, *Lado* explores the intersection of secular and faith-based processes of peacebuilding, with particular reference to the marginalized role of Muslim-based initiatives. In her chapter on the social imperatives of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR), *Betty Bigombe* draws heavily on her leadership experience of DDR initiatives in Uganda and Burundi, highlighting the myriad ways in which greater attention to war's forgotten noncombatants is essential to heal societies, foster reconstruction and development, and prevent a recurrence of conflict. Similarly, drawing on his own vast experience of UN-led peacekeeping operations in Africa, *Ibrahim Wani* discusses missions' engagement on issues related to human rights and the protection of civilians. He argues that insufficient political support and overloaded peacekeeping mandates have led to a situation in which human rights and the protection of civilians are not prioritized as highly as they should be. It is thus essential, *Wani* observes, for the UN and its member states to move beyond rhetoric to genuine implementation of the HIPPO framework.

The chapters in Part II explore some of the main tools and strategies used in African peacebuilding. *Lisa Sharland* provides a seemingly obvious but necessary reminder: peacebuilding is less likely to succeed without the participation and consideration of women. In a detailed review of two contrasting cases, Liberia and South Sudan, she reveals some of the challenges and opportunities that UN engagement has offered in terms of advancing equality and women's security in each country. As overlooked as women, historically, local peace committees have made enormous contributions to peacebuilding in Africa, as *Fritz Nganje* explains. His chapter charts the recent "local turn" which has given rise to diverse forms of grassroots peacebuilding initiatives.

Returning to DDR, *Anatole Ayissi* finds that in the vast majority of Africa's conflict-affected societies, reintegration remains the Achilles Heel of DDR programs; only a minority of ex-combatants are sustainably reintegrated into their communities. He calls for a strengthening of Africa's ownership of DDR programs, endowing regional institutions with more capacity, expertise, and resources. The thorny subject of African elections is the focus of *Franklin Oduro*'s chapter. He explains why elections, particularly ones that transition societies from autocracy to democracy, are one of the central pillars of peacebuilding in Africa. His chapter concludes with some provisional ideas for mitigating the "winner-takes-all" ethos and other potential triggers for election-related violence in Africa. The last chapter of Part II assesses the contribution of early warning systems to the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), with reference to the experience of the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP). The authors *Chukwuemeka Eze* and *Osei Baffour Frimpong* argue that WANEP's work on early warning—and conflict-related early warning systems in general—will not be able to fulfill its potential without reforms in the areas of funding, partnerships with civil society organizations, and closing the chasm between early warning and early response.

Part III highlights the varied regional and international dimensions to African peacebuilding. *Gilbert Khadiagala* commends the African Union for the significant strides the organization has made in building norms around peace, security, stability, and governance, but warns of tremendous obstacles to realizing the vision and objectives articulated in its Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) policy. He urges national ownership of peacebuilding as well as a deepening and advancing of normative frameworks among various stakeholders. At the Regional Economic Community (REC)-level, the role of the Southern African Development Community (SADC) in attempting to lay the groundwork for peaceful transformation in its region is the subject of *Dimpho Deleglise*'s chapter. In reviewing the cases of SADC mediation and involvement in Lesotho, Madagascar, and Zimbabwe, she explains why the organization has been singularly unable to fulfill its long-term agenda for sustainable peace. *Phil Clark* examines the International Criminal Court (ICC) and its intersections with two widespread domestic conflict resolution processes in Africa: national amnesties and peace negotiations. In doing so, he connects to two overarching scholarly and policy debates, namely the appropriateness and legality of amnesties as opposed to prosecutions for suspected perpetrators of international crimes, and

the "peace versus justice" debate over whether the threat of prosecution imperils peace negotiations that involve high-level atrocity suspects. A practitioner's perspective on the changing role of humanitarian organizations in Africa's conflict zones is provided by *Jens Pedersen*. He traces how humanitarianism has become a highly contested space on the battlefield, where principles of humanitarian relief have been undermined by the major powers and the UN in their pursuit of ostensibly noble objectives. A different kind of firsthand perspective is offered by *Ibrahim Gambari*. His focus is the prevention and mediation of conflicts, drawing on his experience as a senior UN envoy to several conflict zones around the world. His is a global view on lessons learned for peacebuilding in Africa against the backdrop of fundamental shifts in the nature of conflict since the end of the Cold War.

Part IV of the book captures some of the above peacebuilding themes in several country and region studies. *Rachel Sweet* tackles one of the continent's most complex and conflict-prone states, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in a comparative look at two major intervention attempts of the UN Peacekeeping mission in the Democratic Reublic of the Congo (MONUSCO) in different theaters of conflict in North Kivu: one that was seen as a success (against the M23 rebellion, 2012–2013), and the other a failure (against the Allied Democratic Forces [ADF] rebellion, 2014–present). In his detailed account of Mozambique's decades-long, often fraught peacebuilding journey, *Alex Vines* examines the diverse initiatives—from financial and diplomatic to the contribution of church-based mediation and grassroots initiatives for justice and reconciliation—that brought the ruling FRELIMO party and RENAMO to a negotiated settlement, against a backdrop of changing regional and international dynamics. *Adekeye Adebajo* sets out in his chapter to solve a mystery: why has Sierra Leone remained relatively stable 14 years after peacekeepers left the country in 2006, and 18 years after the end of a devastating 11-year civil war in which an estimated 70,000 people died? In doing so, he explains, Sierra Leone has defied the fate of so many fragile and conflict-prone states. The main departure point of *Jok Maduk Jok*'s chapter on Sudan/South Sudan is that, common to most protracted conflicts that relapse into war, there was a profound disconnect between elites and local communities in the once-unified Sudan and subsequently in the two separate countries. Drawing heavily on the apparent failures of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), he asserts that African conflict resolution and peacebuilding

relies too heavily on political agreements between politico-military elites. *Terence McNamee* outlines why Rwanda, a relatively unknown country until 1994, divides opinion among scholars and commentators as perhaps no other state in Africa, if not the world, does. Is it a development success, rising from the ashes of mass ethnic slaughter? Or a case of autocratic recidivism, masked by a bogus narrative of national unity? This chapter tries to find a balance in Rwanda's highly contested peacebuilding journey. The last chapter, by *Paul Melly*, tracks the evolution of local and international efforts to contain the multifaceted threats to peace and security in the Sahel—threats that have become more serious over the past 15 years, despite a steady reinforcement of the national, regional, and international campaign to stabilize the region.

It is our hope that in addressing peacebuilding in Africa from such varying angles and perspectives, this book surfaces insights and lessons that are useful for strengthening the understanding and practice of peacebuilding in Africa.

Notes

1. See https://au.int/en/documents/20130613/50th-anniversary-solemn-declaration-2013.
2. See Paul Melly, Chapter 22 in this book.
3. The Southern Voices Network for Peacebuilding was established in 2011, and is generously funded by the Carnegie Corporation of New York. More information about the SVNP can be found here: https://www.wilsoncenter.org/the-southern-voices-network-for-peacebuilding.
4. See A/47/277-S/24111 June 17, 1992, 'An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping', the Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on January 31, 1992.

An Integrated Study of Peace Operations in Africa

Paul D. Williams

Introduction

This chapter reflects on the experiences of more than fifty peace operations deployed in Africa during the twenty-first century in order to identify some of the most important generic lessons and potential new approaches that have emerged. These peace operations varied across several dimensions with each mission operating in a distinct set of circumstances to achieve a unique set of mandated tasks. Consequently, any attempt to draw generic lessons without a concomitant focus on mission-specific lessons should not be treated as definitive. Nevertheless, there is some value in trying to move beyond mission-specific analysis and draw broader conclusions, as this chapter seeks to do.

For the purposes of this chapter, I define peace operations broadly as the expeditionary use of uniformed personnel (troops, military observers/experts, and police), with or without a United Nations (UN)

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mandate, but with an explicit mandate to assist in the prevention of armed conflict by supporting a peace process; serve as an instrument to observe or assist in the implementation of ceasefires or peace agreements; or enforce ceasefires, peace agreements, or the will of the UN Security Council in order to build stable peace.[1] This excludes what the UN calls "special political missions" as well as "collective defense operations" (such as the Ethiopian intervention in Somalia in 2006) and humanitarian military interventions (such as the NATO-led operation in Libya in 2011).

This chapter starts by providing an overview of the main trends in peace operations in Africa focusing on the record number of missions and peacekeepers deployed; the wide range of mandated tasks given to them; the prominence of civilian protection issues; the intensifying debates over the use of force; and the rise of "partnership peacekeeping." The second section summarizes the major generic lessons that can be identified from these operations. These include the need to ensure peace operations are part of a viable political strategy aimed at conflict resolution; that means and ends are in tune; that a capabilities and effects-based approach to force generation is superior to a numbers-centric approach; and maintaining legitimacy among key international and local audiences can significantly enhance the prospects for success. The concluding section offers six recommendations for improving the performance of peace operations in these areas.

Trends in Peace Operations in Africa

Africa has witnessed more than 50 peace operations during the twenty-first century.[2] Several major trends have emerged: the number of peacekeepers, missions, and budgets has increased significantly with African states and the African Union (AU) playing increasingly important roles but the UN remaining the single most prominent actor; most missions have been given extremely wide-ranging and complex mandates; civilian protection has often risen to prominence among these tasks; disagreement persists over when peacekeepers should use military force; and "partnership peacekeeping" has become the norm in the continent. Each of these characteristics will be discussed more fully below.

Record Levels

First, the twenty-first century has witnessed significant growth in the number, size, and cost of peace operations in Africa (see Fig. 2.1). Since 2002, there have been at least 14 missions across the continent in each calendar year. By the end of 2016, there were over 115,000 uniformed peacekeepers in Africa: over 80,000 from the UN (see Fig. 2.2); over 20,000 from the AU; and approximately another 15,000 in regional and other operations. More than 11,000 were police officers. These figures do not include the estimated 15,500 additional civilian personnel in UN and AU peace operations. The cost of these operations reflects the fact that many of these personnel have deployed into often difficult, remote terrain and are required to come with large numbers of vehicles and other major equipment items and life support systems.

While the UN has deployed the most peacekeepers, there has been a major increase in the number of African personnel in these missions (nearly half of all UN uniformed peacekeepers are African), as well as a growing number of missions led or authorized by African regional



Fig. 2.1 Number and types of peace operations in Africa, 1988–2016 (*Source* Adapted and updated from Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, "Trends in Peace Operations, 1947–2013," in *The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, ed. Koops et al. [Oxford University Press, 2015])



Fig. 2.2 UN uniformed personnel worldwide and in Africa 1990–2019 (*Source* Adapted by author)

organizations. In the 1990s and early 2000s, Africa's regional economic communities (RECs) deployed most missions. Since 2004, however, the AU has played the central role, authorizing the deployment of approximately 70,000 uniformed peacekeepers in 12 missions (see Fig. 2.3).[3] However, there were three important caveats to this trend. First, these deployments required considerable external assistance. Second, the AU



Fig. 2.3 Uniformed personnel deployed by African Union member states in UN and AU missions (31 July annual) (*Source* Providing for peacekeeping database, November 1990–present, International Peace Institute and George Washington University, http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/contributions, and author's calculations)

struggled to deploy sufficient numbers of police and other civilian experts on its missions. And, since 2003, the majority of African peacekeepers came from roughly one-fifth of the AU's members, particularly Burundi, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa, Tanzania, and Uganda.

Wide-Ranging Mandates

The second major trend has been the growing list of mandated tasks given to peace operations in Africa, which range from observing ceasefires; protecting humanitarian relief supplies; supporting disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs; strengthening the rule of law and public security; supporting weak governments, including through extending state authority and security sector reform (SSR); protecting civilians and electoral processes; stabilization; counterinsurgency; to war-fighting. Importantly, each set of tasks generally requires different force requirements, capabilities, and training, but this has not always been catered for during the force generation process. There was also a notable expansion in the importance placed on having police officers deploy in these missions to perform a variety of tasks related to strengthening the rule of law and public security.

Put bluntly, most peace operations in twenty-first century Africa were asked to help build institutions of liberal democratic governance in some of the continent's poorest and war-torn states. For their critics, these mandates had become too broad and unrealistic given the few incentives for conflict parties in Africa to build genuinely liberal institutions.

One problem was the lack of clarity over how peacekeepers should fulfill certain objectives and the meaning of key terms. As the head of the UN's Department of Peacekeeping Operations observed, not only were mission mandates "more complex than ever" but, "there remains a lack of consensus on how certain mandate tasks should be fulfilled."[4] Part of the problem was that even basic terminology used in mandates was often unclear. Peacekeepers were often told to "assist" authorities and "support" processes using "all necessary measures" without being given further specific instructions. "Peacebuilding" and "civilian protection" (see below) were another two widely debated and confusing concepts. The vague nature of such terms encouraged the unhelpful tendency for different national contingents within a peace operation to sometimes interpret their mandates in different ways.

Another problem stemmed from peacekeepers being given contradictory tasks. In both the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) and South Sudan, for example, peacekeepers were told to help host governments extend their authority across the country and protect civilians—in the full knowledge that the government's armed forces were among the principal perpetrators of violence against civilians. Peacekeepers had the legal right to use deadly force against host government forces that committed war crimes against local civilians. However, in practice, things were rarely that simple, either because government forces outnumbered the peacekeepers or because acting against the host government might cause it to expel the peace operation.

A third mandate problem was the tendency to produce long lists of tasks without providing criteria to clearly prioritize among them. The initial mandate for the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), for example, contained a list of well over 40 different tasks with priority given to assisting with state-building and civilian protection, tasks that require very different capabilities and approaches and neither of which have a quick exit strategy. By 2018, the UN Secretary-General was telling the Council that UNMISS "cannot possibly implement 209 mandated tasks."[5] On the positive side, the UN's most recent operation in Africa, the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (the mission is known by its French acronym, MINUSCA, the country is known by its English acronym, CAR), tried to overcome this problem by introducing the notion of "urgent temporary measures," i.e., those tasks that should form the initial priority. The African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) also tried to prioritize tasks—but ultimately suffered from too many priorities, with its post-2016 mandate identifying three strategic objectives, four priority tasks, and six essential tasks.[6] Importantly, two high-level panels on UN peace operations had called for peacekeeping mandates to be sequenced. In 2000, the Brahimi Report called for mandates to remain in draft form until the UN's member states provided the requisite resources.[7] In 2015, the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO) called for a "two-stage sequenced mandating process" with fewer priorities that would allow missions to develop over time, rather than trying to do everything at once.[8]

Protecting Civilians

Arguably one of the most important mandated tasks in twenty-first century missions has been protecting civilians.[9] Although many peace operations in Africa grappled with the problems of civilian protection throughout the 1990s, it was not until 1999 that all UN multidimensional peacekeeping operations in Africa included some explicit element of civilian protection in their mandates. Since 2003, the European Union (notably Operation Artemis and European Union Force [EUFOR] missions in Chad and CAR) and the AU (notably in its missions in Darfur, Mali, and CAR) have also given some of their operations civilian protection tasks. In part, the surge of civilian protection mandates stemmed from the recognition that local civilians usually judged a mission's effectiveness on how well it protected them rather than other more technical criteria. But it was also because several UN high-level inquiries concluded that the inability to distinguish between victims and aggressors and the failure to protect the former was highly damaging to the UN's legitimacy.[10]

But, even when civilian protection mandates were issued to UN peacekeepers, they came with geographic, political, and operational caveats. First, peacekeepers were supposed to protect civilians "without prejudice to responsibility of host nation"—despite the armed forces of some host governments being major perpetrators of civilian harm. Second, peacekeepers were only supposed to protect civilians within their existing "capabilities and areas of deployment." In one sense, this sensibly left key decisions about implementing this mandate to force commanders on the ground. But, on the other hand, it often encouraged peacekeepers not to use force to protect civilians, but rather to remain in their bases which, in turn, encouraged endangered civilians to flock to them.[11] Third, the focus was usually narrowed to protecting only those civilians "under imminent threat of violence" which, by definition, is a point at which it is too late for peacekeepers to succeed. In response to this problem, the UN started using the phrase "threat of violence" without the reference to "imminent" and emphasizing that peacekeepers should actively deter violence against civilians.[12]

Even with these caveats, UN peacekeepers struggled with how to translate this aspirational concept into practical military and policing tasks that could be trained and implemented in the field. It took the UN over

a decade to develop guidelines and training regimes on how its peacekeepers could best operationalize this concept in the field.[13] A big part of the problem was that UN peacekeeping missions had traditionally not been permitted to use intelligence-gathering capabilities because of political disputes within the UN General Assembly and Security Council. And yet, it was impossible for a mission with limited resources to respond effectively to threats against civilians if it did not have access to accurate and timely intelligence about the sources of such threats. As a consequence, some operations, especially the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) and UNMISS, began to innovate their own responses to overcoming this challenge, including by creating Joint Protection Teams, Community Liaison Assistants, and Community Alert Networks. The formation of the All Sources Information Unit (ASIFU) in MINUSMA's early years was the closest a UN peacekeeping operation has come to developing an official intelligence-gathering capability.

Although most media reporting focused on the failures of peacekeepers to protect civilians, even in truly dire circumstances the presence of peacekeepers usually made the overall situation for civilians better, not worse.[14] The basic problem was that there was only so much even well-resourced peacekeepers could do. As one analysis correctly observed, peacekeeping operations could not "protect everyone from everything," nor could they "operate without some semblance of a 'peace to keep' or halt determined belligerents wholly backed by a state."[15]

Using Force

The fourth trend in peace operations in Africa was persistent debate over when peacekeepers should use military force beyond self-defense. This raised fundamental questions about the nature and limits of peace operations and the efficacy of using multinational forces with large numbers of contributing countries to wield military power effectively. In twenty-first century Africa, there have been several examples of peace operations coming close to war-fighting at the tactical level against particular "spoiler" groups, including in Sierra Leone, the DRC, Côte d'Ivoire, Somalia, Mali and Central and West Africa against the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) and Boko Haram. While the AU had no qualms about using a peace operation to engage in war-fighting, the UN's basic

principles of peacekeeping—consent of the main conflict parties; impartiality; and minimum use of force except in self-defense and defense of the mandate—made it much less common in UN-led operations. The formation of the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) within MONUSCO in 2013 generated a novel lexicon from the UN Security Council, which mandated it to "neutralize armed groups" by carrying out "targeted offensive operations."[16]

When the UN Security Council authorized proactive military force beyond self-defense, it was usually in the name of either protecting civilians or defeating spoiler groups such as M23 in the DRC. The AU also regularly authorized its forces to protect civilians and defeat particular spoilers, notably in the Comoros, Somalia, Mali, CAR, and in its multinational task forces authorized to fight against the LRA and Boko Haram.

For the UN, this type of combat operations raised questions about whether it could remain an impartial actor. The UN's response was, "yes, it could," because impartiality permitted the use of force against recalcitrant parties: "Just as a good referee is impartial, but will penalize infractions, so a peacekeeping operation should not condone actions by the parties that violate the undertakings of the peace process or the international norms and principles that a United Nations peacekeeping operation upholds."[17] However, these nuances were clearly lost on some armed groups who did not view UN peacekeepers as impartial and targeted them accordingly.

A key question is whether this was a sensible policy for the UN to pursue given the many difficulties involved with command and control in its peacekeeping operations, which left them poorly designed to fight wars. Moreover, most UN contributing countries did not sign up to fight wars or undertake proactive combat operations against determined adversaries. As a result of these inherent limitations, the latest HIPPO concluded that "extreme caution must guide any call for a United Nations peacekeeping operation to undertake enforcement tasks and that any such mandated task should be a time-limited, exceptional measure."[18] Nor, it wrote, should UN peacekeepers conduct counter-terrorism operations.[19]

Partnership Peacekeeping

The last major trend analyzed here is that "partnership peacekeeping" has become the norm in Africa. This entails collaboration on operations between two or more multilateral institutions and/or various bilateral actors. Several factors have driven this trend, including widespread recognition that no single actor can cope with Africa's security challenges alone and that different actors bring comparative advantages to peace operations. As Fig. 2.1 shows, however, most peace operations have been authorized or supported by the UN Security Council, demonstrating the enduring significance of the UN brand and legitimacy. In Africa, the central partnerships involve relations among the UN, the AU, the RECs, the European Union, and important bilateral actors—principally France, the United States, and Britain.

In Africa, partnership peacekeeping has taken several different forms. There have been sequenced operations, as in Mali, Burundi, and CAR, in which responsibility transitions from one set of actors to another, usually from African organizations to the UN. There have been parallel operations where multiple missions coexist simultaneously within the same theater, as in the DRC, Côte d'Ivoire, and CAR. The UN has also provided a variety of support packages to regional missions using funds from its assessed contributions to peacekeeping, as in Darfur and Somalia. There has also been one joint hybrid mission between the UN and the AU in Darfur, Sudan, the African Union-United Nations Mission in Darfur (UNAMID).

Lessons Identified from Peace Operations in Africa

What are the major generic lessons that can be identified from the numerous peace operations deployed in Africa during the twenty-first century? This section briefly summarizes four such lessons: the need to ensure peace operations are part of a viable strategy of conflict resolution; that means and ends are kept in tune; that a capabilities and effects-based approach to force generation is superior to a numbers-centric approach; and maintaining legitimacy among key international and local audiences can significantly enhance the prospects for success.

The Primacy of Politics

Arguably the most important lesson is that successful peace operations are those that ensure what the HIPPO called "the primacy of politics."[20] In essence, peace operations are political instruments, sometimes backed by a security guarantee in the form of troops. They are not the same thing as a political strategy aimed at resolving the crisis in question. Instead, as the HIPPO report emphasized, "UN peace operations must be deployed as part of a viable process" to achieve a political settlement to the crisis in question. The same goes for other forms of peace operations too. "Lasting peace," the report concluded, "is not achieved nor sustained by military and technical engagements, but through political solutions." It is, therefore, politics, not military force that is the peacekeeper's primary weapon. As the HIPPO report put it, "political solutions, not military force, are the true force multipliers" for peacekeepers.[21]

A related lesson is that because political primacy ultimately rests with national actors, peacekeepers can only support peace processes; they cannot impose sustainable peace in the absence of local willingness to do so. If the UN, the AU, or other actors deploy peacekeepers without a political pathway to peace, the best-case scenario is that they limit some of the worst negative consequences of the armed conflict in question. But it would be naïve to believe that peacekeepers can deliver peace in a context in which important local actors want war. Political dynamics in New York and Addis Ababa will often push politicians to deploy peacekeepers even in the absence of a viable strategy of conflict resolution, but this only adds to the imperative to learn this particular lesson.

Ends and Means in Tune

A second key lesson is that peace operations will likely fail when their means and ends are not in tune, i.e., peacekeepers are not given the resources necessary to achieve their goals. There are at least two dimensions to this lesson. First, the goals of the operation should be set out in clear, credible, and flexible mandates, and peacekeepers given appropriate Rules of Engagement. Second, once mandated, policymakers must prevent large vacancy rates i.e., discrepancies between the authorized force levels and the actual numbers and types of personnel on the ground (see below on force generation). Such personnel gaps not only hamper a

mission's ability to take advantage of the so-called "golden hour" immediately after the cessation of fighting but also signal to the conflict parties a lack of political will within the authorizing organizations.

Large vacancy rates have damaged the performance of several peace operations, perhaps most notably UNAMID in Sudan and AMISOM in Somalia. This issue is not only important at the mission start-up phase but also when mandates are changed in response to developing circumstances and alter the mission's force strength and/or capabilities. Unfortunately, mandates have often been revised without providing peacekeepers with the necessary additional or different resources. Authorized reinforcements, for example, have become notorious for not arriving as planned, as occurred in eastern DRC in 2008 and South Sudan in early 2014. In perhaps the worst example, it took until December 2016 for AMISOM to receive its first three military helicopters after the UN Security Council authorized twelve of them in 2012.

Effective Force Generation

A third, and related, lesson is that without effective force generation processes peace operations will struggle to achieve success.[22] More specifically, it is clear that a capabilities and effects-based approach to force generation is superior to the traditional numbers-centric approach.[23] Once a peace operation has been established, the authorizing institution must ensure the relevant peacekeepers and capabilities are generated rapidly. Each peace operation requires a unique combination of force requirements and capabilities. Most of these must come from voluntary contributions from states since most international organizations lack permanent armed forces or police.

The UN made significant progress in 2015, when it established the new Strategic Force Generation and Capability Planning Cell to play matchmaker between the UN and its member states who contribute to peace operations. There is also a new Peacekeeping Capability Readiness System to coordinate how and where member states can pledge military, police, and other civilian personnel to participate in UN missions.[24] In addition, high-level political attention at the UN has been maintained by a series of peacekeeping leaders' summits and defense ministerials in 2014, 2015, 2016, and 2017, at which UN member states have pledged over 50,000 uniformed peacekeepers and a wide range of assets and enablers.

Past experiences show that effective force generation (whether at the UN, AU, or elsewhere) is more likely with a broad pool of potential contributing states upon which to draw.[25] Without a broad pool of contributors, authorizing institutions are unable to be very selective when assembling their peace operations and instead have to rely on what capabilities are available rather than what is required for the job. In Africa, particularly important and persistent gaps in the force generation process have included a dearth of female peacekeepers; French-speakers; police and other civilian experts; and a wide range of mobility vehicles and enabling units (especially medical, engineering, and logistics).

Ensure Accountability

A fourth key, generic lesson is that peace operations are less likely to succeed if they do not maintain legitimacy among key international and local audiences. This is often directly connected to ensuring that peacekeepers remain accountable both to their international bosses and the local populations they are supposed to serve.[26] When peace operations are dependent on local support for their legitimacy and effectiveness, misconduct (including causing harm to civilians, engaging in sexual exploitation and abuse, or trafficking in illicit goods) can have negative strategic effects. Indeed, misconduct by peacekeepers can damage the reputation of both the particular mission as well as peacekeeping as a whole.

Key Recommendations

In light of the preceding trends and major generic lessons identified from peace operations in twenty-first century Africa, this concluding section briefly sketches six recommendations intended to enhance the effectiveness of peace operations.

1. ***Enhance peacemaking capabilities.*** In order to create the impression that they are engaged in meaningful responses to crises, political leaders in New York, Addis Ababa, and elsewhere are likely to persist in deploying peace operations to African crises in the absence of a viable strategy of conflict resolution. Assuming this trend is likely to continue, advocates of more effective peace operations should push to invest more resources in developing better international mediation and peacemaking capabilities, including ensuring the full

development of the AU's new Mediation Support Unit. It is the failure to resolve Africa's crises through peacemaking that has placed an impossible burden on peacekeepers.

2. ***Clarify the core tasks of peace operations.*** Political leaders in New York and Addis Ababa should also develop a stronger consensus on the core tasks that contemporary UN and AU peace operations should be able to undertake. So far, too many peace operations in Africa have involved a mix of different, sometimes contradictory, agendas, including peacekeeping (in its traditional sense), peace consolidation (assisting conflict parties after they have committed to a political settlement), civilian protection, atrocity prevention, counter insurgency, counter terrorism, stabilization, state-building and war-fighting. Not only does each of these tasks require distinct capabilities and training regimes, but also some of them may simply be beyond the capacities of peacekeepers. Certainly, neither the UN nor AU is well suited to fight wars against transnational insurgents or carry out counter terrorism campaigns. The UN and AU should both urgently clarify the doctrine that shall govern their own peace operations and develop their force generation and training requirements accordingly.
3. ***Incentivize some aspects of force generation.*** Once the core tasks (and limits) of UN and AU peace operations have been clarified, the authorizing institutions should look to enhance their force generation processes accordingly. Both organizations should clarify whether it is right, and, if so, how to incentivize different types of contributions from their members. Key areas might include incentives for those contributing states that can assume greater than average risk and/or can deploy rapidly into the field. The UN's new Peacekeeping Capabilities Readiness System is already offering premiums in the case of enabling units able to rapidly deploy in 30/60/90 days. This approach should be further developed at the UN and also considered by the AU.
4. ***Develop standards and regularly assess peacekeeper performance.*** The UN and AU should develop agreed performance standards for peacekeepers deployed by their respective organizations. The UN has taken a major step forward in this regard with the release of its Military Unit Manuals and force assessment guidance. First, therefore, the UN should complete the process of identifying operational standards for the tasks its peacekeepers are expected to perform and

devise metrics for ensuring that peacekeepers live up to them in the field. This process should be developed for both rank-and-file peacekeepers and senior mission leadership teams. In the immediate term, the effort should focus on implementing the UN's new policy on "Operational Readiness Assurance and Performance Improvement."[27] This awkwardly titled document is arguably one of the most important in the history of peacekeeping because it details how the UN can improve the performance of deployed military units by ensuring a holistic approach by all stakeholders. Specifically, the UN Secretary-General should ensure that the Performance Improvement Cycle described as part of this process is institutionalized, adequately resourced, and routinely carried out for all UN peace operations. This process would also need a policing equivalent. Once the UN's operational standards are clarified and the organization is able to evaluate them in the field, it must ensure that when peacekeepers fail to perform they should be replaced by those who can. The AU should adopt a similar type of policy fit for its own purposes.

5. ***Ensure sustainable and predictable funding for African peace operations.*** While the UN system of financing its peace operations works relatively effectively, the same cannot be said for African-led missions, which have long struggled to find funds. In order to satisfy the approach to funding operations set out in Article 21 of its Peace and Security Council Protocol (2002),[28] the AU developed a new source of funding for its peace operations that was intended to deliver on its commitment to fund 25 percent of its peace and security activities by 2020.[29] This took the form of the new AU Peace Fund, launched in late 2018. By early 2020 the Fund had generated over $100 million to spend on the AU's peace and security activities.[30] Despite this significant progress, the AU is still far from financially self-sufficient with regard to peace operations, hence the UN and AU must continue to work out how and when African-led missions can access the UN's assessed peacekeeping contributions.
6. ***Stop peacekeepers engaging in sexual exploitation and abuse.*** Finally, all actors engaged in peace operations must ensure that they put a stop to peacekeepers committing sexual exploitation and abuse and hold perpetrators accountable, quickly and transparently. The victims must also be given access to reparations for any crimes committed by international peacekeepers. The most sensible place

to start is to ensure that the commitments set out in UN Security Council Resolution 2272 (March 11, 2016) are consistently implemented. For the AU, it means implementing its zero-tolerance policy. In this sense, the firing of the UN's head of mission in Central African Republic, General Babacar Gaye, over allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse by peacekeepers there has set an important precedent. The same should apply when UN peacekeepers engage in other types of misconduct, including smuggling and other forms of civilian harm. As Ban Ki-moon noted in his farewell address as UN Secretary-General, these episodes "tarnished the reputation of the United Nations and, far worse, traumatized many people we serve."[31]

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Economic Revitalization in Peacebuilding and the Development

Vera Songwe

Peace has been declared at Paris. But Winter approaches.[1]

Introduction

The art of peacebuilding is as old as conflict. In a bell curve manner, conflicts began among families, tribes, nations, kingdoms, and clusters of nations, and have since returned to mostly conflict within nations. As conflicts have intensified, so have conflict resolution mechanisms become more sophisticated and institutionalized. Early on, peacebuilding was achieved through unions between the victor and vanquished. This tradition persisted up to nineteenth-century Europe. In some traditions,

This chapter represents the personal views of the author.

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especially in the East, the armies of the vanquished were handed over as part of the spoils of war; in others, the territory was annexed. These were well-established practices and constituted what could be termed the etiquette of post-conflict agreements and peacebuilding. The League of Nations, set up by Allied nations following the end of the First World War, was the first global institution set up to handle post-war peacebuilding but also aimed to avoid wars. It met with limited success. Two decades later, following an even bloodier war, its predecessor was created, The United Nations (UN), coupled with two development institutions, informally known as the Bretton Woods institutions (The World Bank and the International Monetary Fund [IMF]).

This chapter draws from the contrasting experiences of the League of Nations and the United Nations to highlight the centrality of economic development to peacebuilding. In doing so, the chapter questions the established sequence of peacebuilding: that only when peace is fully restored can the focus move to economic development. This sequence is clearly contrary to all successful experiences. The chapter argues that the near-dogmatic insistence on this sequential process has, in many cases, such as Guinea-Bissau and Libya, undermined peacebuilding before it has even begun.

Most conflicts are about voice, economic equity, inclusion, and access. Today, J. M. Keynes's words at the end of the Treaty of Versailles discussions—"peace has been declared at Paris. But Winter approaches"[2]—still resonate in many peacebuilding situations as one wonders what is being done to guarantee shared economic development as a weapon of peace. The challenge of responding, to more internal conflicts in the case of Africa, also requires an alternative response that is underpinned by economic imperatives rather than by an established sequence of political negotiations. Most of the conflicts on the continent are, in fact, a direct result of economic deprivation, or inflation-induced conflicts. These require rapid economic peacebuilding solutions.

Section one of this chapter will summarize the activities that led to the signing of the Treaty of Versailles and the big omissions and shortfalls of the Treaty. The second section will look at the peace agreement ending the Second World War and compare and contrast this with the First World War. The third section looks at how the lessons from both agreements have been applied to peacemaking and peacebuilding in Africa, with particular attention to the cases of Guinea-Bissau and Côte

d'Ivoire. The fourth section concludes with lessons learned for the future of peacebuilding on the continent.

The Treaty of Versailles—An Ambiguous Peace

In 1920 following the end of the First World War, which cost the lives of more than 20 million people, split roughly equally between military personnel and civilians, the Allied powers came together to agree on the construct of a new world order. In a foreshadowing comment, Keynes lamented the lack of economic vision in the peace plan. He wrote, the Versailles Treaty "includes no provisions for the economic rehabilitation of Europe…nothing to make the defeated Central Empires into good neighbours…. Nor does it promote in any way a compact of economic solidarity."[3] For an economist, the concept of economic solidarity was vital, as it implied jobs and wages—the centerpiece of Keynesian economics.

The peacemakers acknowledged the daunting task that lay before them. "Making peace is harder than waging war," French Prime Minister Georges Clemenceau reflected in 1919 as the victorious powers drew up peace terms, finalized the shape of the new League of Nations, and tried to rebuild Europe and the global order.[4] For Clemenceau and his colleagues, the prospect of crafting a peace agreement was particularly challenging. Unlike in 1815, when negotiators met in Vienna to wind up the Napoleonic Wars, in 1919 Europe was not tired of war and revolution. Nor had aggressor nations been utterly defeated and occupied, as they would be in 1945. Rather, leaders in 1919 confronted a world in turmoil. Fighting continued throughout much of Eastern Europe even as the Treaty was being crafted.

Then-US president, Woodrow Wilson saw the Paris Peace Conference and resulting Treaty as the beginning of a crusade for humankind. The Treaty was to usher in peace and end all suffering. All the Allied leaders believed that the agreement was just and fitting for both the victor and vanquished. Wilson's League of Nations was meant to create an international community of democratic nations. By providing collective security for one another, they would not only end aggression but build a fairer and more prosperous world.

The victorious Allied forces (Britain, France, the United States, and Italy), both their populations and their leaders, had the right intentions but also wanted to ensure that the vanquished (Germany, Austria,

Hungary, Bulgaria, and the Ottoman Empire) paid for their aggression. The tension between restoring peace and making the vanquished accountable is ages old and carries within it a delicate balance, one that proposes a just peace while ensuring there is enough deterrent on the part of the aggressors not to exact revenge or feel completely marginalized.

A couple of elements stand out in the Treaty. While it was signed by all the countries, each country negotiated a separate peace deal with the vanquished nations and then the agreements were brought together; in the end, each country tried to exact individual benefit rather than collectively attempt to ensure that the Treaty promoted peace. The French wanted retribution for the destruction of industry and cities on the Rhine and assurances this would never happen again. The British, led by Lloyd George, largely accomplished their main goal, which was to wipe out Germany's High Seas Fleet as a threat to the Royal Navy and protect the British Empire.

Tens of thousands of German civilians died of starvation or malnutrition-related illnesses before Britain finally lifted the blockade once Germany signed the Versailles Treaty, sowing the seeds of German resentment. The Treaty even added to Britain's colonial empire when it (along with France, Belgium, and Japan) assumed "mandates" (colonies in all but name) over colonies the treaty stripped from Germany and the Ottoman Empire. Britain acquired Iraq, Palestine, and Jordan in the Middle East and former German colonies in Africa: South West Africa (present-day Namibia), German East Africa (present-day Burundi, Rwanda, and mainland Tanzania), Togoland (present-day Togo), and German Kamerun (mainly present-day Cameroon).

Wilson's vision for the League of Nations, codified as part I of the Versailles Treaty, was a "general association of nations established to afford mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity of all nations great and small."[5] The pillars of the League were collective security, disarmament, and settlement of international disputes through arbitration. Yet this was based on voluntary participation by League members—essentially relying on "good will." The League of Nations had no standing military force to back up any decision it made, and if a nation disagreed with the League's decision, it could simply "opt out"—as Nazi Germany (1933), Imperial Japan (1933), and Fascist Italy (1937) eventually did when they withdrew from the League after it tried to oppose their aggression. For want of leadership, among other things, the promise

of 1919 soon turned into the disillusionment, division, and aggression of the 1930s.

Part II of the treaty creating Germany's post-war boundaries (Germany lost 13 percent of its territory and all of its colonies) was seen as dispossessing Germany of its rightful assets and left Germans feeling put upon; part V imposed military restrictions on Germany's armed forces; and part VIII specified war reparations to be paid principally to France, Belgium, Britain, and Italy for civilian damages caused by the German invasion and occupation. The reparations clause was later used by Germany to build national resentment (despite never actually fulfilling their reparation obligations). It provided political fodder for building a new front against the Allied forces.

Glaringly absent from the Treaty of Versailles was any reference to the rebuilding of an economic architecture for trade. The League of Nations focused on the restoration of peace and the protocols for achieving it. The Allied powers stripped Germany of its assets or destroyed trade routes and vessels. There was no attention paid to the economics of peace. Instead, the focus was on the need for Germany to pay reparations and the victors taking over colonies to increase their influence.

The second omission of the Versailles Treaty was that while it purported to end the war there was still fighting going on in Europe further to the East; the appetite for war was not fully quenched. The central theater had been shut down but the continual confrontations in the periphery meant that this could ignite suddenly into a full-blown war again.

The lack of collective enforcement of the Treaty, with the United States not signing onto the final agreement creating the League—an American idea which never found sufficient support at home—weakened the overall peace architecture. The creation of an international body that would help preserve peace and punish those who started wars was lofty in its own right, but many Americans worried the Treaty could inadvertently pull the United States into faraway wars for which it had no direct economic or political interest. The U.S. Congress voted down the Treaty in 1920 leaving the League of Nations without the backing of its founder.

The League and the reparations agreement all proved to be short-lived, as their shortcomings created the opening for renewed aggression in Europe.

An Economic Peace to Begin All Peace

In 1939, exactly two decades after the signing of the Treaty of Versailles, Germany invaded Poland, marking the beginning of the Second World War. Unimaginable in 1919, the casualties from the Second World War were almost double that of the First. Over 70 million people are estimated to have died. This is equal to the current population of Ghana, Côte d'Ivoire, and Senegal combined, or 70 percent of the population of Ethiopia. Following the end of the Second World War, the Allied forces sought to correct three fundamental mistakes of the Versailles Treaty. First, the Allies negotiated the peace collectively; second, the role of the United States was more forceful; and third, the Allied powers listened to Keynes and sought to build an economic recovery plan—The European Recovery Program (ERP), otherwise known as the Marshall Plan.[6]

This is the first time in the history of peacebuilding that a full-fledged economic development plan was linked to a peace treaty, with credible and well-funded institutions attached to the plan. The ERP, which began in 1948, was a massive program of aid from the United States to western and southern European countries, aimed at helping economic renewal and strengthening democracy after the devastation of the Second World War.

Sixteen European countries received about US $14 billion in aid between 1948 and 1951. Britain received the largest share of this support (US $3.2 billion); the next largest amounts went to France (US $2.7 billion), Italy (US $1.5 billion), West Germany (US $1.1 billion), and the Netherlands (US $1.1 billion). These funds comprised about 2.5 percent of the aggregate national income of European countries over the 4 years. They were 1.2 percent of the total gross national product of the United States. In present-day terms, this would be equivalent to about $217 billion for reconstruction. The recovery plan had conditions for the disbursements of aid to address issues of inter alia taxation, budgeting, money, labor markets, and trade. Britain, for example, agreed in 1948 to balance its budget annually, maintain currency reserves at specific levels, and restrict tariffs. The unique element of the ERP was that it was administered entirely by the US government, rather than all the Allied powers. The Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA),

the US agency that administered aid, used 5 percent of these funds for its in-country administrative costs. The remainder was allocated mainly for economic development, as a result of negotiations between officials of the ECA and each European government. The implementation of the plan benefitted from total bipartisan support.

Dividends of the Economic Reconstruction Program

The achievements of the ERP were unparalleled in global economic history. After the First World War, it took seven years to regain the pre-war levels of production in Western Europe. At the end of 1951, three years into the implementation of the ERP, industrial production was 41 percent above pre-war levels, 64 percent above 1947 levels, and well beyond the target originally set for 1952. Agricultural production was 9 percent above pre-war and 24 percent above 1947 levels. Gross national product—the total sum of Western Europe's production of goods and services—had risen 25 percent in real terms in less than 4 years and was 15 percent above pre-war. The transportation system was rehabilitated; electrical output doubled over pre-war levels; steel production doubled between 1947–1951, far exceeding production by Russia and her satellites; and refined petroleum production quadrupled over pre-war levels.

The gains in agricultural production were less striking but also substantial. Cereal production and bread grains almost regained their pre-war levels, and the output of potatoes, sugar, meat, milk, and oils overshot the targets of the ERP program; in every case, except meat, the results were faster. All other outputs were substantially above the targets and pre-war levels.

The ERP was the largest economic development plan implemented following conflict to restore peace. But it was more than a peacebuilding plan. It was also a vast investment program which guaranteed substantial returns for the United States.

Europe was therefore guaranteed sufficient energy to power and revive its industries; while the United States was able to ensure it was guaranteed supply for its industries and demand for its products. For these objectives to be realized, two conditions had to be met: real incomes had to increase, thus increasing domestic savings; and Europe's current account deficit

had to be reduced. The peace plan was, thus, at its heart, an economic plan. By 1951 the UK was fully back on its feet and tensions began to emerge between the UK and United States over the former's development trajectory, especially the national health programs the UK sought to adopt.[7]

Christopher P. Mayhew, then Parliamentary Undersecretary of State for Foreign Affairs, speaking in a debate at the United Nations Economic and Social Council, famously said, "We have not the slightest intention of modifying our economic, our social, or our political plans in order to qualify for this aid." Moreover, he argued, the British economic recovery was a result of according priority to "human welfare and social progress," including a "complete national health service" and "public ownership of industry." As economic activity was restored in the UK, tensions between the United States and UK also rose over economic priorities, resulting in the UK finally deciding to opt out of the plan, even as they continued to receive some support from the United States mainly to ensure they were protected from any aggression from Russia.[8]

Lessons from the Economic Reconstruction Program

The lessons from the successful ERP are important for all subsequent peacebuilding efforts globally. Yet, for reasons that are difficult to explain the world has never been able to replicate the ERP as a tool for peacebuilding anywhere else.

The ERP was administered by one country and agency, and rolled out across numerous countries. Essentially, its main objective was to restore and strengthen the economic might of Europe. But, more critically, the ERP did so without sequencing and conditioning initial recovery support on the need for governments to change their fiscal, tax, or monetary policy. Resources were disbursed even as conversations on reforms took place. Even in the case of the UK, where there was growing criticism that it was building a welfare state, the ERP continued to support the country while trying to negotiate a different approach to the UK's domestic policy stance on its social programs. In response to the demand for raw materials from the United States, an important part of the European reconstruction effort was the agreement by the Steel Committee to manage steel

output in order to control prices to the benefit of the member states. While Europe benefitted from the ERP to recover economically, it was in parallel looking to increase its competitiveness, grow its markets, and strengthen its economic base. To do this, it began to build a European integration plan under French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman. This ultimately led to the creation of the European Union.[9]

As George C. Marshall remarked in his famous "Marshall Plan" speech: "The remedy [to peace] in Europe lies in breaking the vicious circle and restoring the confidence of the European people in the economic future of their own countries and of Europe as a whole. The manufacturer and the farmer throughout wide areas must be able and willing to exchange their product for currencies, the continuing value of which is not open to question."[10] This remains true and pertinent for Africa today.

Economic Development and Peacebuilding in Africa

The preceding sections have summarized the failures and successes of two of the world's most famous peace agreements. The world has not seen destruction on this scale since 1945. However, conflicts persist and the international community in many cases appears incapable of restoring peace. How is it that we have not been able to replicate the ERP? What elements of the plan bear replicating or building on? What ingredients of the plan apply to Africa?

Africa has made considerable progress on the cross-border peace front. At the end of 2019, there were fewer than five active or latent cross-border conflicts on the continent. Post-independence, African countries pledged to respect colonial borders and, with the exception of Sudan/South Sudan, they have largely kept to this promise. The biggest challenge on the continent is that of intra-state conflict. And it is here that peace remains elusive on the continent. Compared to 2005 when there were only 6 countries in active conflict on the continent and 7 armed conflicts, as of 2019 the number of countries with armed conflicts has risen to 17.

The institutional architecture of the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions as initially conceived does not allow these institutions to play their rightful role in peacebuilding. The continuum from peacemaking, to peacekeeping, to peacebuilding is fragmented and often replete with interests that are not aligned, as was the case in 1919.

Inaction in Guinea-Bissau

The case of Guinea-Bissau is instructive. Guinea-Bissau gained independence in 1974. In its short existence, the country has had over 17 *coup d'états* and as many elections, while the three processes of peace making, keeping, and building have been quite separate and not integrated. Peacemaking is mostly run by the UN; peacekeeping is led by Nigeria and Angola as continental interests dictate; and peacebuilding or economic peacebuilding driven by the Bretton Woods institutions. Unlike post-war Europe, no one single economic power—be it Nigeria, Angola, Portugal, or Brazil—has stepped up to design an economic recovery program that would provide a win-win result for both. The mediation by purely international institutions has proved insufficient and inadequate to restore peace fully.

In addition, like Germany after the First World War, conflict in Guinea-Bissau has never been fully quelled. A faction of the population still remains equipped for conflict, believing that conflict can and will provide a better shift of power in their favor. More than 20 years after independence, Guinea-Bissau has not been able to establish a viable peace, as the warring factions remain divided along ethnic, and military versus civilian, lines. To date, the international community has been incapable of launching a sizeable and fully inclusive economic recovery plan that benefits all the citizens, akin to the ERP. Rather, these piecemeal attempts have helped to foster divisions and left Guinea-Bissau with one of the highest rates of poverty on the continent despite its rich natural marine, agriculture, and mineral resources.

Côte d'Ivoire—A Success Story

Though not as successful in magnitude as the ERP, the case of Côte d'Ivoire nevertheless provides some useful pointers on what can be achieved. While the international community, in all its formats, was present in Côte d'Ivoire as the peace was established, following nearly a decade of on-again, off-again civil war in the 2000s, one main economic power, France, decided to underwrite an important part of the peacebuilding plan. As a result, Côte d'Ivoire did not have to wait for years for the economic recovery plan to kick in. Unlike the impressive record within the first four years of the ERP, Côte d'Ivoire did not experience such high rates of growth but nevertheless it registered a consistent

8 percent growth rate, demonstrating its ability to rebound. A strong Côte d'Ivoire allowed for more French investment in the country, similar to the case of the UK and United States during the ERP.

It is often argued that Côte d'Ivoire was able to rebound because the human capital needed to revive production and industry already existed. The success of the ERP rested, in a similar way, on the availability of skilled labor and strong institutions on which to build a recovery plan. Where institutions are weak, replicating the success of the ERP will prove difficult but not impossible. An important element of the ERP was the recognition of some mutual dependence: the United States needed steel and Europe needed coal. In Côte d'Ivoire, the crisis affected cocoa and chocolate prices considerably and there was a need to stabilize supply and prices in order to minimize global market disruptions. International support for the recovery, as in the case of the ERP, focused on improving the balance of payments so Côte d'Ivoire could rely less on aid and more on Foreign Direct Investment and domestic savings for investment. Côte d'Ivoire was able to quickly rebuild its reserves and increase productivity.

The test of the robustness of the peace will come with the electoral process. The ERP focused on the economic peacebuilding because, even in Germany, broad principles of representative governments had already taken hold, thereby reducing the need to emphasize the "democracy" element.

Overall, despite its shortcomings, Côte d'Ivoire's experience of peacebuilding—relying heavily on an economic recovery program underwritten by a single nation, France, and supported by the UN and the Bretton Woods institutions—has proven successful. Essential to peace in Côte d'Ivoire was the fact that the international community negotiated as one; and internally, strong coalitions for peace were able to form, underpinned by the promise of economic prosperity.

Bleak Outlook for Libya and the Sahel

The Sahel, and Libya in particular, do not present any of the elements needed to deliver a long and lasting peace. Similar to Versailles, the victors individually focused on ensuring they benefitted or protected existing investments in Libya or increased their investments. There was not a collective peace deal aimed at restoring the economic potential of Libya. Second, again like Versailles, while the end of the war was declared, the Libyan factions are not done fighting; as peace was declared in some parts of the country, fighting continued in others, opening the door for renewed escalation of conflict. While Libya's exports could have helped

to launch a massive ERP, the lack of cohesion within the international community did not allow for such a solution. In addition, unlike in the Second World War where the United States was able to play a strong leadership role, Italy could not take up this role with Libya and the United States was reluctant to do so, creating a leadership vacuum which still persists in 2020.

Conclusion

The end of the ERP for Europe saw the beginning of the greatest European project: European Integration, which resulted in a stronger and more united Europe, built on clear democratic principles and complemented by principles of macroeconomic prudence and competition and trade openness. With zero interest rates in the West, a young population in Africa and a growing middle class, the economic argument for a peacebuilding partnership with Africa has never been more compelling.

The Marshall Plan was a limited investment that paid incalculable dividends. A situation favorable to American interests was established in Europe. The aid program lifted Western Europe off its knees, launched the American challenge to the Soviet Union, and bolstered the American economy. This last point runs counter to conventional economic wisdom: how could massive government expenditures be a net plus to the domestic economy? The experience of the Marshall Plan shows the answer. Investing to protect prosperity at home generated peace and prosperity abroad, which in turn led to still greater prosperity for the donor.[11]

Africa is a peacebuilding theater. An ERP-type program in some conflict settings could unleash benefits to first movers who dare to take up the challenge.

Key Recommendations

1. **The Economic Reconstruction Program (ERP) is an imperfect but important model**. The ERP is hardly the perfect solution to today's conflicts and peacebuilding efforts in the developing world. Nevertheless, it holds the main ingredients for sustained and inclusive peace. The promise of economic prosperity is a clear prerequisite for peace. Over the last 50 years, the developed world has spent huge sums on development aid and the World Bank and IMF, like the

UN, have been very active. But, the overall results of interventions remain below expectations.

2. **Establish a social contract for economic improvement between peacemakers and peacebuilders**. Numerous case studies reveal that the absence of a social contract between the peacemakers and peacebuilders on a clear economic improvement plan has been a central factor in the failure of efforts to build peace. Where attention has not been paid to the importance of inclusion, it has led, as in the case of Sudan, to the breakup of the country rather than to the consolidation of the positives and creation of economic inter-dependence benefitting both sides.
3. **Committed investment partners and institutions are essential**. A successful ERP plan in Africa needs only one of two conditions to exist: adequate institutions, as existed in Côte d'Ivoire, or a deep entrepreneurial culture, together with a committed bilateral investment partner. Where the possibility of reviving or building economic activity exists, where markets for outputs exist to guarantee that aid will turn into an investment in the short run, and countries can move from being aid-dependent to partners, the ERP model holds great promise. Institutions like the UN and the Bretton Woods duo can then serve as honest brokers of these relationships.

Notes

1. John Maynard Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of Peace* (New York: Harcourt, Brace and Howe, 1920), 235.
2. Keynes, *The Economic Consequences of Peace*, 235.
3. Ibid.
4. "Let American Industry March On!" In *American Industries* (Washington, DC: National Association of Manufacturers, 1918), 19:9.
5. See "Transcript of President Woodrow Wilson's 14 Points (1918)" at https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=62&page=transcript.
6. Forrest C. Pogue, *George C. Marshall: Statesman, 1945–1959* (New York, 1989), 207.
7. Daniel M. Fox, "The Administration of the Marshall Plan and British Health Policy," *Journal of Policy History* 16, no. 3 (2004): 191–211.
8. G. C. Peden, *The Treasury and British Public Policy, 1906–1959* (Oxford, 2000), 418.

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11. Stephen F. Ambrose, "When the American Came Back to Europe," in "The Marshall Plan: A Legacy of 50 Years," *International Herald Tribune*, May 28, 1997, 5; see also Michael J. Hogan, *The Marshall Plan: America, Britain, and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947–52* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

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The Role of Religion Systems in Peacebuilding: Case Study of Sub-Saharan Africa

Lado Tonlieu Ludovic, S. J.

Introduction

Three religious systems dominate the religious landscape in Sub-Saharan Africa today: African traditional religions, Christianity, and Islam. Religion remains a significant component of social life on the African continent; recent projections suggest that this importance will continue for the next four decades.[1] According to a 2016 survey conducted by the Pew Research Center, "The share of Christians worldwide who live in Sub-Saharan Africa is expected to increase dramatically between 2015 and 2060, from 26 percent to 42 percent, due to high fertility in the region. Sub-Saharan Africa is also expected to become home to a growing share of the world's Muslims. By 2060, 27 percent of the global Muslim population is projected to be living in the region, up from 16 percent in 2015."[2]

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But, clear-cut statistics can be misleading when it comes to dynamics of religious identity in Africa, partly because of the complexity of religious practice. In daily practice, religion is perceived and lived primarily as a problem-solving tool. Many believers expect religion to solve personal and social problems such as finding a spouse, bearing a child, curing an illness, finding a job, fighting witchcraft, obtaining a visa, etc. This is especially pronounced in the context of the crisis of the social responsibility of the state.[3] The complexities of the religious landscape paired with the importance of religions in the lives of Africans mean that "to ignore religion, as a matter of obvious political and even economic importance, threatens the credibility of academic investigations."[4] This insight obviously applies to the domain of peacebuilding in Africa as peace, justice, and reconciliation feature prominently among the religious expectations of African believers.

The role of religion in peacebuilding in Africa has to be located within the wider framework of the role of religion in the public space in Africa more generally. Indeed, religion and public policy "intertwine because both claim to give authoritative answers to important questions about how people should live."[5] In a critical appraisal of earlier theories of secularization, José Casanova has argued that although the fusion of politics and religion is no longer an option in modern societies, at least in the West, the social differentiation of religion and politics is not incompatible with the public role of religion.[6] In spite of processes of secularization, religious voices are not absent from public debates—especially those that directly challenge their core beliefs and practices. To begin with, "religion in Africa was never relegated, even superficially, to a space outside politics and current events, or to benign places of private worship. Rather, because of the history of religion and religious transformation in Africa, religion has always been perceived, by a majority of Africans, as having the power to radically change social life and history."[7] It is, therefore, no surprise that people in Africa turn to religion for resources to prevent conflicts or to restore peace.

The past 30 years have been marked by major developments that have determined the role of religion in Africa's public sphere. These include the continent's tilt toward democracy, the decline of the social responsibility of the state particularly following the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programs of the 1980s and 1990s, civil wars, and threats from a variety of non-state armed groups, including terrorist organizations. Given these developments, non-state actors, including religious organizations, have thrived, and some have taken up the challenge of peacebuilding.

The first section of this chapter reviews some of the major developments in the field of religious peacebuilding in Africa in a context of crisis-ridden democratization processes; the second section looks at the case studies of Côte d'Ivoire and the Central African Republic (CAR), and explores some key issues and lessons learned related to religious peacebuilding; the third and final section identifies three issues that require the attention of policymakers.

The Past 30 Years: An Overview of Major Developments in Religious Peacebuilding in Africa

Whereas in Western academic circles there are debates about what some have described as the "return" of religion in the public space, in Africa the reality is that religion has never left the public space, in spite of the rhetoric of the "secular" state.[8] Not only is religion present in the public space, it is eager to make its voice heard in policymaking. Besides their active involvement in the fields of relief services, education, health, human rights, and civic education, religious organizations in Africa have been involved in the three dimensions of peacebuilding—preventing violence, managing conflict, and transforming conflicts.[9] Thomas Banchoff rightly speaks of the "underappreciated" contribution of religious communities to peacemaking: "Less visible, but no less significant, is the peaceful engagement of religious communities in contemporary world affairs. … But it is nonviolent. Less likely to make the newspapers, it has far-reaching, if underappreciated, impact."[10]

Religious Diplomacy

In a number of significant cases, religious diplomacy has succeeded where state actors and international organizations had failed to bring back peace in communities torn by conflicts. The outstanding peacemaking success of the Catholic lay movement of Sant'Egidio in Mozambique is one of the best illustrations of this commitment to peace of religious organizations. Thanks to their quiet and discrete diplomacy, consisting of several rounds of talks between warring factions, they managed to secure a peace agreement in October 1992 which ended decades of civil war between FRELIMO and RENAMO.[11]

Over the past 30 years, religious leaders in a number of African countries have been called upon to act as mediators, especially in times of political transition and conflicts. For example, religious leaders were solicited in the early 1990s to preside over sovereign national conferences in countries such as Benin, Republic of Congo, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, and on the whole, they were quite effective in facilitating peaceful transitions from one-party systems to political pluralism.[12] This was a tremendous contribution to peace and stability. Even in countries, such as Zambia, where there was no national conference, churches played a critical role to ensure a relatively peaceful transition to multiparty politics in the early 1990s. In the late 1980s and early 1990s, they exerted public pressure on Kenneth Kaunda's regime to return to a pluralistic political system.[13] Religious leaders have also been called upon to head national truth and reconciliation commissions. Archbishop Desmond Tutu was in charge of the first commission of this kind in Africa, leading the reconciliation process in post-Apartheid South Africa. Since then a number of clerics have been appointed to such commissions in other countries, including Togo and Côte d'Ivoire.

Islamic Social and Humanitarian Services

Recent decades have also witnessed the growing visibility of Islamic social and humanitarian services in a field previously dominated by Christian and secular social and relief services. One of the major successful Muslim peacebuilding actors in Africa is the Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC), (based in the Wajir district of north-eastern Kenya), which incorporates Muslim traditional mechanisms and values in its conflict resolution initiatives. Some of its achievements include the establishment of a Joint Committee of Clans to monitor tensions and prevent violent conflict in the Wajir district; the increased acknowledgment of the contribution of women to peacemaking in their communities; a change in attitude among local police chiefs; and the incorporation of peace education in schools.[14] Besides Muslim peacebuilding actors, there is also a growing recognition of the contribution of women, and religious women in particular, to peacebuilding in Africa. There are a number of efforts underway to make these contributions more visible.[15] For example, the Sudanese Women's Voice for Peace (SWVP), formed in March 1994, contributed to peacebuilding in Sudan through peace

education programs and campaigns meant to raise awareness and prevent violence at the grassroots level.[16]

Inter-faith Peacebuilding Initiatives and Education for Peace

Another major evolution in this field in recent decades is the multiplication of inter-faith peacebuilding initiatives and the progressive acknowledgment at the international level of their contribution to peacebuilding. In Sub-Saharan Africa, inter-faith organizations exist at the local, national, and international levels. Some of the most notable at the continental level are the African Council of Religious Leaders (ACRL),—Religions for Peace, the Inter-Faith Action for Peace in Africa (IFAPA), the Programme for Christian-Muslim Relations in Africa (PROCMURA), and the Inter-Religious Council of Sierra Leone (IRCSL). Multi-faith associations in peacebuilding have the potential to neutralize attempts to divide communities along religious lines.[17] They also go a long way to help "change the negative perceptions and suspicions that exist between the various religious communities," and to engage in "dialogical action," meaning "organized actions to transform the social structures of injustice within society."[18] The Coalition for Peace in Africa (COPA), based in Kenya, is one such organization. Its activities include advocacy, inter-faith dialogue, education, intermediation based on traditional Islamic justice, and conflict resolution mechanism of *Suluh* (the Arabic word for reconciliation), and traditional African methods of conflict management and resolution involving elders, chiefs, youth, and women.

Case Studies, Key Issues, and Lessons Learned

Since inter-faith initiatives are the most prominent tool of religious peacebuilding in Sub-Saharan Africa, this section probes two case studies: Côte d'Ivoire and the Central African Republic. Over the past two decades, Côte d'Ivoire and the Central African Republic have witnessed political crises involving the use of religion in contradictory ways: to justify violence and to build peace. These cases are a good illustration of what some scholars have termed the "ambivalence of religion."[19] In Côte d'Ivoire, the timely intervention of religious leaders prevented the transformation of a political conflict into a religious one; in the Central African Republic they have been less successful.

Côte d'Ivoire

Côte d'Ivoire, the economic and political locomotive of francophone West Africa, is still trying to recover from the political crisis that consumed the country throughout much of the 2000s. This crisis was essentially fueled by a power struggle tapping into identity politics, which almost took a religious turn. Most of the political and economic life of Côte d'Ivoire is concentrated in the southern part of the country, particularly in Abidjan, the economic capital, leaving the northern part of the country with fewer opportunities. This situation makes Northerners feel marginalized. Also, in popular perceptions, the South is mostly associated with Christianity whereas the North is linked with Islam, in spite of the fact a substantial number of Northerners have migrated to the South in search for economic opportunities. For this reason, the North/South divide is also presented as a Muslim/Christian divide. But, in spite of these underlying perceptions, Muslims and Christians mostly coexist peacefully.

The most recent general population census took place in 2014 and provides some data on the religious demography of Côte d'Ivoire's 22.7 million people (per a 2016 estimate) (Table 4.1).[20] What these statistics show is that although Muslims are the majority population in the country, more than half of them are immigrants from neighboring countries. This reality has sustained the idea of "the Muslim as a stranger" in popular perceptions in Côte d'Ivoire". However, given the intricacies of migration patterns in Côte d'Ivoire, distinguishing an Ivorian from a non-Ivorian, a distinction that is at the heart of nationalistic politics in Côte d'Ivoire, is not obvious. Indeed, a war of succession with nationalistic overtones followed the death of President Félix Houphouët-Boigny, the

Table 4.1 Religious distribution of the population of Côte d'Ivoire

Religions	*Ivoirians*	*Non-Ivoirians*	*Percentage/Population*
All Christians	**39.1**	**17.7**	**33.9**
Muslims	**33.7**	**72.7**	**42.9**
Animists (Traditional religions)	4.4	0.9	3.6
Other religions	0.6	0.2	0.5
Without religion	22.2	8.5	19.1
	100.0	100.0	100.0

Source Institute National de la Statistique, *Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitat 2014* (Côte d'Ivoire, 2014), http://www.ins.ci/n/documents/RGPH2014_expo_dg.pdf

first president of independent Côte d'Ivoire, in 1993. The conflict exacerbated ideological and social cleavages, culminating in an armed rebellion in 2002. The rebellion split the country into two, with the North, associated in collective representations with Muslims, on one side, and the South, linked with Christianity, on the other. Until then, followers of Islam, Christianity, and African traditional religions had, mostly coexisted peacefully in Côte d'Ivoire. But, from 1995 onwards, there were repeated attempts by successive ruling "Christian" presidents to exclude Alassane Ouattara, a Muslim linked to the North and labeled as a non-native Ivorian, from presidential contests. These attempts were the formalization of the policy of "Ivoirianness" (ivoirité) launched by Henri Konan Bédié upon taking office as President after the death of Houphouët-Boigny. The policy of Ivorianness was the embodiment of identity politics meant to distinguish the "true" Ivorian from the non-Ivorian in a country with a large proportion of immigrants (about 25 percent).

The 2000 elections were contested principally by President Gbagbo and Ouattara. During the violent confrontations between the pro-Gbagbo and the pro-Ouattara factions in the aftermath of the elections, a mosque in the city of Abidjan was looted and burned down by youth associated with Gbagbo's party. In retaliation, a group of young people linked with Ouattara's party burned a Christian church in another part of the city. Following this, more Muslim dignitaries suspected to be close to Ouattara's camp and to the rebels in the North were assassinated in the South. In the space of three months, three imams were assassinated.[21] The risk of the conflict taking a sharp religious turn was real. Fortunately, most Muslim leaders never called for retaliation against Christians. Their only public complaint was that they were being targeted because of political feuds. Their restraint played a major role in preventing the conflict from degenerating into further inter-religious violence.

It is in a similar context conducive to religious conflict that the National Forum of Religious Denominations (*Forum National des Confessions Religieuses*) was launched in 1995. Indeed, religious leaders were concerned about the growing threat of the instrumentalization of religion for political purposes and wanted to prevent the transformation of a political crisis into a religious conflict. The Forum attracted around 20 different religious denominations including Catholics, Protestants, Evangelicals, Muslims, adherents of African traditional religions, Bahaï faith followers, and Harrists. Since its creation, the Forum has operated as a structure of religious mediation both between political opponents and

between religious denominations in an effort to promote social cohesion. Its main tools of social intervention include joint declarations to warn the faithful against the political manipulation of religion (especially in the aftermath of the destruction of mosques and other acts of violence targeting religious denominations), joint prayer sessions, and political mediation, as well as training and sensitization programs for the faithful. All these interventions seek to prevent conflict and promote social cohesion.

However, the Forum has faced a number of challenges. As a result of religious differences, some Protestants and Evangelicals refused to join the Forum, arguing that some of its members' religions are witchcraft or diabolical. The Forum has also been plagued by governance issues. For example, the founding text stipulated that the presidency is to rotate among religious denominations, but the first president of the Forum elected in 1995 ended up abolishing the rule thus causing the demission of some of its founding members.

The Central African Republic

The Central African Republic has been plagued by conflict since independence in 1960. It is also one of the poorest countries in the world.

Table 4.2 shows that Christians constitute about 70 percent of the overall population whereas Muslims make up only 10 percent. Most Christians live in the South whereas the North is associated with Islam.

Table 4.2 The religious distribution of the CAR population in 2003

Description	*Overall (%)*
Total	100
Catholics	28.9
Protestants	51.4
Muslims	10.1
Other religions	4.5
No religion	3.6
Unspecified	1.5

Source Bureau Central du Recensement, Direction Générale de la Statistique, des Études Économiques et Sociales, Ministère de l'Économie, du Plan et de la Coopération Internationale, *Résultats du Recensement Général de la Population et de l'Habitation Decembre 2003* (Central African Republic, 2003), https://ireda.ceped.org/inventaire/ressources/caf-2003-rec-o_rca_en_chiffres.pdf

The North is poorer than the South and has become the breeding ground for rebel groups that pose a major threat to the stability of the country.

The 2015 elections aimed to end the sectarian violence that exploded in 2013. The conflict centers on the violence between two militias: the Séléka,[22] linked with Islam, and the anti-Balaka,[23] associated with Christianity. Séléka appeared on the political scene of the Central African Republic in 2012 as a loose coalition of dissident political and rebel groups. The group lacked any clear political agenda—except their common objective to overthrow the then-head of state François Bozizé. Séléka finally succeeded in forcing him out of power in March 2013, and their leader Michel Djotodia took over as the new ruler of the country. Though the group was not predicated on religious affiliation, the rebel groups forming Séléka drew their membership from the country's marginalized North, which is predominantly Muslim. As a result, most of the combatants who overthrew Bozizé's regime were Muslims. Many explicitly targeted Christians and their properties in acts of violence and extortion, exacerbating communal tensions.

The anti-Balaka faction is a loosely structured set of self-defense groups that emerged in 2009, before the current crisis, to counter extortion and insecurity generated by organized armed robbery on the roads. Initially, it had neither a political nor a religious connotation. The group simply embodied a limited community response to a situation of insecurity that the weak state security apparatus was unable to address effectively. People felt they had to take responsibility for their own security. Once these groups emerged in a context of a weak and unstable state such as the Central African Republic, they were hard to control.

Following the *coup d'état* by the Séléka rebels in 2013, the anti-Balaka emerged once again as a grassroots response to the ensuing chaos. Muslims became the main targets for acts of revenge by anti-Balaka, who accused them of being accomplices to the crimes of the retreating Séléka. Since then anti-Balaka groups have terrorized Muslim communities suspected of cooperation with the dismantled Séléka, and thousands of Muslims have fled to neighboring countries.

Having acknowledged the religious tenor of the conflict, it is important to underline the fact that neither Séléka nor anti-Balaka qualify as a religious group from a sociological point of view. Neither of these groups

is institutionally related to a major religious organization. Nor do the groups appear to be pursuing a clear religious agenda, as do terrorist groups such as Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, or al-Shabaab. Furthermore, neither Séléka nor anti-Balaka has the open support of any major religious group inside or outside of the Central African Republic. And, because Christianity and Islam are not a monolithic reality in the Central African Republic, it is just as difficult to link Séléka with a particular Muslim group as it is to connect anti-Balaka with a particular Christian denomination. However, there are some suspicions among the population that some factions of anti-Balaka are being controlled and manipulated for political purposes by allies of the overthrown president, François Bozizé.

When the factional violence erupted in 2013 in the CAR, Cardinal Nzapalainga, the Archbishop of Bangui; Imam Oumar Kobine Layama, the President of the Islamic Community of CAR (CICA); and Reverend Pastor Nicolas Guerekoyame-Gbangou, the President of the Alliance of Evangelicals of CAR, came together to denounce attempts by the main instigators to transform a military and political conflict into an inter-religious conflict. As factional killings intensified, they became ambassadors for peace at the national and international levels. Their efforts led to the creation of the *Plateforme des Confessions Religieuses de Centrafrique* (PCRC) whose motto is, "For an interreligious approach to peace and social cohesion."[24] In June 2016, the PCRC met to draft its foundational documents, including a charter, rules and procedures, as well as a strategic plan. Besides a board of directors, the governing structure of the PCRC comprises a permanent secretariat, various commissions, and regional branches. The three main denominations represented in the PCRC are Catholicism, Protestantism, and Islam. In addition to managing a website and running radio programs to educate the population on peacebuilding, they also intend to establish regional offices for outreach programs and grassroots engagement. The PCRC has become the backbone of the peace process in the Central African Republic. This is an especially critical role given that rebuilding the institutional infrastructure of the country will take years.

It remains to be seen how the PCRC will handle denominational differences within the organization and associated structures. This could also become a weakness that hinders sustainability. The PCRC is probably among the youngest national inter-religious platforms on the continent,

but it is also one of the most structured organizations, underpinned by a clear strategic plan. Its sustainability will depend on the ability of its leaders to maintain a united front around common objectives. But as donors pour in money, it might ignite inter-denominational competition for financial resources that could weaken the PCRC and undermine its credibility.

Religious Pluralism as a Challenge to Peaceful Coexistence

The last three decades in Sub-Saharan Africa have been marked by a degree of political liberalization, leading to a boom in non-state organizations including many tied to Christianity and Islam. Some scholars have described the religious component of this evolution in terms of the fragmentation of the religious landscape of Africa.[25] The multiplication of religious organizations creates new challenges for the postcolonial state as far as the management of religion in the public space is concerned. Furthermore, until recently, Christian missionaries were the dominant religious actor in the public space in most of Sub-Saharan Africa. Today, myriad religious groups of different faiths operate in the public space through politics, social action, or social debates.[26] This competition for control of the public sphere is a major potential source of conflict.

Forms of Intolerance

Religion can be used to promote violence or foster peace. African traditional religions are, however, only rarely associated with the former. Over the past 30 years, only a handful of neo-traditional movements have been associated with violence. These include among others the *Mai-Mai* in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and the *Mungiki* in Kenya.[27] There are two main forms of religious intolerance in Sub-Saharan Africa today: *attitudinal*, which is often conveyed through religious-owned media outlets, propagating negative portrayals of the "other" to increase their following,[28] or aspects of modernity (especially regarding sexuality and family laws)[29]; and *repressive*, which is associated with various religious-inspired terror groups, such as the Lord's Resistance Army in Uganda or Boko Haram in Nigeria.[30]

Muslim Peacebuilding

There is a growing awareness of the differences in peacebuilding across different faiths. Côte d'Ivoire and the Central African Republic are two examples of a broader trend in inter-faith initiatives, where Christians and secular leaders take the lead and Muslims play secondary roles. Indeed, lamenting the low visibility of Muslim peacebuilding actors, Mohammed Abu-Nimer and S. Ayse Kadayifci-Orellana write:

> The lack of systematic studies that identify and analyze the contributions and shortcomings of Muslim peace-building actors working toward peace in their communities creates the impression that there are no peacebuilding organizations or institutions in the Muslim world. … Indeed, there are quite a number of nongovernmental organizations, as well as local leaders around the Muslim world, working in their communities to resolve conflicts, build peace, and encourage interfaith dialogue.[31]

Explaining the reasons for their relative obscurity, they add,

> Muslim peacebuilding organizations have less experience with formally constituted bodies and stable institutions. For that reason, it is not easy to identify Muslim peace-building NGOs or other institutions similar to those in the West. Nevertheless, in many Muslim societies, NGOs in the modern sense are a new phenomenon, evolving because of contacts with Western/Christian institutions.[32]

Issues around Muslim leadership of peacebuilding initiatives have come into sharper focus due to two interconnected trends: groups identifying with Islam are responsible for more violent attacks than those identifying with Christianity, particularly as it relates to violent extremism; and Muslims comprise a higher number of victims of those attacks than Christians.

Most conflicts generally described as "inter-religious" are rarely primarily about religion. More often, religion is used to articulate perceived political, social, and economic marginalization and the related feelings of frustration.[33] In Sub-Saharan Africa, recent terrorist attacks notwithstanding, religious intolerance is, almost always, expressed nonviolently. Peaceful coexistence of Africa's religiously diverse communities is the norm, as it has been for generations. This tradition, exploited wisely, can strengthen a culture of peace and social cohesion in Africa. Moreover, trusted religious leaders can be more effective in peacebuilding,

especially in mediation processes, than secular authorities. "Local religious actors embedded within communities," it is argued, "can often draw on a reservoir of trust not available to secular actors."[34]

Key Recommendations

The politics of inclusion paired with the dispensation of social justice and the respect for human rights remain the cornerstones of any peacebuilding endeavor. In Sub-Saharan Africa, religious leaders and organizations are actively involved in advocacy initiatives for the promotion of social justice and peace.[35] In some Christian circles, for example, advocacy for the just distribution of natural resources is seen as an integral dimension of peacebuilding.[36] Muslim traditions have their own indigenous mechanisms for peacebuilding such as *sulha* (or *suluh*), and African traditional religions are rich in rituals of reconciliation to restore social harmony. These are resources to build on. More specifically, for the purpose of this chapter, there are three key policy issues that demand the urgent attention of policymakers and religious peacebuilders.[37]

1. ***Pay more attention to attitudinal intolerance***. Policymakers tend to focus on violent forms of religious intolerance. More attention needs to be given to how such violence is seeded, through attitudes promoted in communities, schools and, especially, faith-based media. Funding intolerant attitudes also comes into play at the transnational level, where various global networks are responsible for propagating negative depictions of the "other" at the grassroots level. Thus, efforts to counter hate and build comity cannot be restricted to the elite.[38] A focus on inter-religious and inter-ethnic encounters at the community level will enhance societal resilience and help prevent intolerance from gaining a foothold.
2. ***Give more assistance to muslim peacebuilding***. As radicalized interpretations of religious traditions have gained wider attention through social media, the tendency to equate religion, especially Islam, with heinous acts of terrorism—from Somalia and Kenya through to the Sahel and North Africa—has grown in Africa. Greater effort needs to be invested in the communities that are most affected—both in a perceptual sense, by the misconceptions; and in a practical sense, due to suffering disproportionately from such attacks. "One way to counter these radical and militant voices

is," some experts argue, "to engage with and strengthen the peacebuilding capacity of Muslim actors that focus on Islamic conflict resolution and Muslim peacemaking traditions."[39] This means concretely supporting the efforts of these actors in spreading the Islamic culture of peace and conflict resolution and "requires understanding specific characteristic of Muslim peace-building actors, their strengths and the challenges they face."[40]

3. ***Promote inter-religious socialization and leadership for peace.*** Although inter-faith initiatives are mushrooming on the African continent, they need more coordination and networking. In the future national, regional, and continental organizations will need to mainstream inter-religious efforts in a more preventive approach in order to promote tolerance and peaceful coexistence. In most cases, inter-faith initiatives are launched as an ad hoc solution to an escalating conflict. A more sustainable solution would be to establish regional and national offices to coordinate inter-faith efforts for peacebuilding. These efforts should involve continental institutions such as the African Union and sub-regional bodies. Additionally, religious peacebuilders should receive more training in conflict resolution; typically, they know the local terrain much better and are more influential in communities than "outsiders." The professionalization of religious peacebuilders will also make cooperation with secular bodies more effective. It is equally important to educate and sensitize diplomats and international mediators on the place of religion in Africa today, especially in relation to violence and peacemaking.[41]

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The Role of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Programs in Post-Conflict Reconstruction

Betty O. Bigombe

Introduction

War does not end when the guns go silent. Christopher Cramer called this post-violence period, "the Great Post-Conflict Makeover Fantasy," and "the continuation of war by other means."[1] Many war-like frontiers of contestation and negotiation open as soon as the guns fall silent. By the end of violent conflicts, infrastructures are broken down. People's modes of subsistence and access to medical care and education are completely shattered. War disrupts the rhythm of normal life by destabilizing the flow of essential supplies such as food and water. This is exacerbated

This chapter represents the personal views of the author.

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by the disruption of social and cultural securities often found in family and society. The failure to quickly ensure that necessities are restored can result in renewed violence. Post-conflict mediation interventions must, therefore, be underpinned by a singular aim: entrenching sustainable peace.

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

The terms disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) are often deployed in studies and projects relating to peacekeeping in a "post-conflict" environment. Whether any place ever gets into a "post-conflict" moment is an open question. The term "reconstruction" after conflict has also been queried many times, with critics wondering whether societies ever "reconstruct" or simply "transform."[2] By the end of war, it is difficult to return to the exactness, sometimes even the semblance, of what previously existed. New centers of power emerge, and social and cultural norms are often transformed by the end of war, making any claims to "reconstruction" rather difficult. Roger Mac Ginty provides us with a definition that attempts to capture the implications behind "post-conflict reconstruction," in a more comprehensive fashion:

> [R]econstruction encompasses short-term relief and long-term development. It extends far beyond physical reconstruction to include the provision of livelihoods, the introduction of a new or reformed type of governance and repairing fractured societal relationships.[3]

Critically, it emphasizes that reconstruction is not merely a technocratic exercise, but rather

> it is an acutely political activity with the potential to effect profound social and cultural change. Post-war reconstruction holds the capacity to remodel the nature of interaction between the citizen and the state, the citizens and the public goods, and the citizens and the market.[4]

Mac Ginty, thus, seeks to draw our attention to how the lives of ex-combatants and victims can be transformed.

I intend to place my conversation on DDR into the above definition, as a process meant for both short-term relief and long-term development, but with potential for "social and cultural change." Kees Kingma, reflecting on the reintegration element, has noted that "reintegration is

not one general process, but consists of thousands of micro-stories, with individual and group efforts, and with setbacks and successes."[5] These different stories and actors seek, among other things, to repair fractured societal relations as ex-combatants return to their villages and reunite with their families. That is, returning victims to normal civilian lives. The United Nations (UN) says of DDR:

> The goal of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) as a process of removing weapons from the hands of combatants, taking the combatants out of military structures and helping them to integrate socially and economically into society, thereby seeking to support ex-combatants so that they can become active participants in the peace process.[6]

In other cases, the term DDR is used for the long-term goal of ensuring permanent disarmament and sustainable peace. Often, ex-combatants are helped to enter job placement services, participate in skills training and credit schemes, and get the education needed to secure a decent living and livelihood.[7]

At the end of armed conflicts, different sets of victims emerge. These include the main victims of war: ordinary people caught up in the crossfire of warring factions. Many end up either as Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs) in camps or as refugees in another country. Those inside the IDP camps, including children, are often directly impacted by violence—in the form of physical injuries like bullet wounds or broken limbs—or conflict-related stresses such as limited access to food and water or loss of parents and other family members. Children are also exposed to trauma and other forms of stress, diseases, and complications such as malnutrition. Women inside the camps also face very specific sets of challenges, including rape and forced marriages, and the resulting unwanted pregnancies. With their husbands killed in conflict, many women are forced to take on the role of breadwinner. There are also child mothers, especially victims of rape, who will be forever haunted by the horrors of war.

The aftermath of war also presents another set of victims in the form of former combatants on either side of the conflict. Child soldiers—defined as persons under 18 years of age, who are often recruited in times of conflict either as combatants or to perform other support roles[8]—and defeated combatants are especially prone to victimization in the post-conflict period. Civil wars typically draw in fighters from many different parts of society, most of whom would never consider a career in the

military. They have to be reintegrated back into civilian life. For those potentially interested in military careers, rarely are post-conflict armed forces able to absorb all former combatants into its ranks. Aside from budget constraints, there is a normative push to reduce the size of militaries after wartime.

This chapter focuses on post-conflict peacebuilding and reconstruction strategies after conflict has ended. It looks at processes of rehabilitation, demobilization, and reintegration for returning different categories of people victimized by the conflict to civilian life. The normative assumption underpinning the analysis below is that peacebuilding should, among other objectives, seek to return ex-combatants to an existence as close to what they experienced before violence disrupted their lives.

Case Studies: Uganda and Burundi

To highlight some of the challenges, lessons learned, and best practices, this chapter delves into two contrasting case studies of DDR: Uganda and Burundi. Specifically, this author draws heavily on her firsthand involvement in two key initiatives across these countries: the voluntary demobilization of close to 40,000 National Resistance Army (NRA) fighters in Uganda from 1993–1996, and the reintegration of child soldiers after Burundi's civil war in 2001–2004. The concluding recommendations flow from deep reflection on these difficult and complex experiences.

A main contention of the chapter is that the failure of reintegration and rehabilitation is rarely down to one big factor but instead typically involves a number of smaller failings: exclusively "rewarding" combatants in grand schemes while ignoring non-combatant victims; a mismatch between the economic potential of the environment and the intervention packages (e.g., when re-skilling is done without due regard for extant opportunities in the market); cultural nuances, including ethnic rivalries at play; and privileging seniority in economic re-empowerment (which often takes precedence over everything else). Lastly, the chapter illustrates that psycho-social support needs to move hand-in-hand with economic reconstruction. It is neither one nor the other, rather one after the other.

Uganda Veteran Assistance Programme

Between 1992 and 1995, the Government of Uganda embarked on the demobilization and subsequent reintegration into productive civilian life of 36,358 soldiers out of an estimated 90,000-member NRA army. The project was named the Uganda Veteran Assistance Programme (UVAP). The UVAP had a dual mandate: help reduce the size of the army, thereby reducing government expenditure, and help ex-combatants return to productive civilian life as a way of transitioning from conflict to peace. The focus of the analysis here is the latter.[9] The UVAP process of reintegrating the 36,358 soldiers was undertaken in three phases starting with 23,903 soldiers, then 9,308 soldiers, and finally 4,147 soldiers.[10]

According to some analysts, the government intended "to shift the burden of its public expenditure away from its earlier emphasis on defense and security to the promotion of social and economic development."[11] But since this project followed a period of civil war, and many ex-combatants had been integrated into the NRA force as a strategy aimed, in part, at keeping them from returning to violence, the project was then viewed as an initiative in peacebuilding. Indeed, after 15 years of civil war, Uganda was a war-torn and ravaged economy and society.

In terms of financing, emphasis was still on security; national defense expenditure continued to rise, going from 28 percent in 1986 to 43 percent in 1991. This was unsustainable for a country just emerging from war. The World Bank noted that in the same period, capital expenditure on defense rose from 18 to 38 percent of government's contribution to development. At the time, the explanation for this increase was that:

> These expenditure increases initially reflect the assimilation of defeated rebel forces and later the deliberate professionalization of the regular army through, for example, the establishment of a command structure, personnel and logistics systems, training, and the acquisition of necessary equipment and supplies as much as new recruitment.[12]

With most armed insurrections concluded around 1991—except Joseph Kony's Lord's Resistance Army (LRA) rebellion, which was then in its infancy—government sought to reduce expenditure on the military. Veterans, who constituted a "vulnerable group" facing myriad difficulties, would be given a chance to seek voluntary retirement from the army. The problems confronting ex-combatants were often like those of the general public: lack of shelter, lack of self-reliance skills, little money, and so on.

But most of the ex-combatants did not enjoy the social capital of ordinary citizens, gained through being part of rural communities and comparatively broad social and cultural relations. Substantial assistance was thus required to help ex-soldiers cope with life after the military.

As a process aimed at reintegration, soldiers were to receive help toward resettling among their families and would be facilitated socially and economically into a peaceful, productive, and sustainable civilian life. The category "voluntary" and those marked for "reduction in establishment" constituted the largest percentage of veterans who would be returned to civilian life. However, it was also estimated that one in five of those who were demobilized had medical reasons for being discharged (irrespective of the other reasons offered for their demobilization). The program of reintegrating veterans back into the communities was divided into transitional safety nets including entitlements, reintegration initiatives, and administration. Each of these stages was associated with a different package ranging from cash to agricultural input. These were categorized as follows (Table 5.1).

With enormous support from the World Bank, this reintegration process worked well in the beginning but subsequently experienced several challenges. Although most problems stemmed from a lack of resources—e.g., insufficient money to buy cows, pay school fees for their children or bury their deceased kindred—some were conceptual. One erroneous assumption was that the veterans were "homogenous and their needs similar in nature. Individual problems, place of origin, period of

Table 5.1 Components of the Uganda Veteran Assistance Programme

Transitional safety nets	*Reintegration initiatives*	*Administration*
Cash payment	Severely disabled assistance package	Discharge and transport (demobilization)
Clothing allowance	Scholarship training fund	Personal costs (UVAB and districts)
Food allowance	Social communication package	Non-personal costs (UVAB and districts)
Healthcare	Counselling and economic information support	Auditing and accounting
Per diem		Monitoring and evaluation
Agricultural supplies		Institutional development
Shelter (iron sheets and ridges in kind, other support in cash)		
Education fees for children		
Enhanced healthcare fund		

Source Adapted from Nat J. Colletta, Markus Kostner, and Ingo Wiederhofer, "Case Studies in War-to-Peace Transition," World Bank Discussion Papers, no. 331 (1996), https://doi.org/10.1596/0-8213-3674-6

service, and rank were all disregarded as a basis for classifying individual needs."[13]

The Structural Challenges with the Uganda Veteran Assistance Programme

There were several significant challenges with the UVAP system, including challenges relating to the communities to which the veterans were being returned as well as those relating to the packages provided to veterans. Firstly, most of the packages were provided in the form of cash, not in-kind as had been planned. However, most of the packages, especially those under the transitional safety nets, were too small in comparison to the needs of the veterans and often given out in installments.[14] Many veterans grumbled that the USH 150,000 (roughly US $40 in 2020) was not enough to meet their basic needs, let alone invest in something to secure their future.[15]

Most soldiers had health challenges, but many of them were unable to access medical care after they left the military. The number of soldiers discharged on medical grounds was about 75,000, at a time when HIV/AIDS was sweeping through Uganda like a bush fire on a windy day. The World Bank study noted that 1,696 soldiers died due to HIV/AIDS in the immediate aftermath of discharge. The challenge of accessing medical care was further complicated by the difficulties with finding food, as many had to choose between the two—medicine or food—as their financial packages were often insufficient to cover both. That the UVAP budget and cash packages did not include the veterans' families, who had hitherto received help from government, was a big oversight and shortcoming of the program. Further, the many veterans had neither education nor the requisite survival skills for the world they had been plunged into. The World Bank study noted:

> Only slightly more than a quarter of phase II veterans have secondary or higher education; 12 percent had no formal education, and approximately half finished primary school. Of phase I veterans, 70 percent have not progressed beyond primary education. Although more than half of phase II veterans stated that they acquired skills while in the army, most of these skills are not marketable. Only 13 percent possess skills in mechanics, metal work, woodworking, or tailoring. Only 34 percent of phase II veterans

> possess cash cropping skills, whereas 50 percent know how to undertake subsistence farming. No more than 4 percent are familiar with cattle raising.

The study goes on to suggest that it is, consequently, hardly surprising that

> 71 percent of phase II veterans intended to go back to farming on resettlement. Nineteen percent envisaged activities in commerce and production. Two months after phase II resettlement, 73 percent were actually active in farming; however, 11 percent ended up as agricultural day laborers or unpaid family workers (against 1 percent intended), suggesting that around 1,000 veterans had to lower their expectations substantially. Economic reintegration, thus, proves the most elusive of all problems facing a veteran on resettlement, although personal and social attitudes can ease this process.[16]

The picture that emerges is one of colossal failure insofar as the economic reintegration of veterans. Many would depend on land to survive yet the UVAP failed to make land available to the demobilized soldiers or to provide them with farming knowledge and skills.

Since the start of the conflict in 1980, many of the veterans had not returned home to visit their families. Long absences made their reintegration difficult; a lot had changed while they were away. Relatives also erroneously believed that due to their military service, the returnees were comparatively well off. In other cases, the violence soldiers experienced traveled, metaphorically, back with them to their old homes, creating fear and suspicion of them in communities. This stigmatization led to high levels of frustration and depression among ex-combatants.

On land and the return to families and communities, Colleta et al. note:

> Forty percent of phase II veterans did not have a house of their own on return to their home community. The majority of this group, a third of the total, lived with relatives. On the other hand, most veterans were able to secure access to land for cultivation. Only 826 cases of landlessness (or 9 percent of phase II veterans) were reported until October 1994. Around one-quarter had private land (23 percent), one-third had family land (34 percent) while another third (31 percent) had both family and private land.

> Under phase I, an estimated 700 veterans could not find access to land (although data may be incomplete).

Overall, the authors suggest that the number of those landless may be less than 3 percent, which

> allays initial concerns expressed mainly by the donor community, although containing severe individual reintegration difficulties. A noteworthy fact is that almost one-third (31 percent) of phase II veterans did not have home contact since 1991. Another 22 percent visited home only once; thus, it can be assumed that knowledge about the specific location of resettlement is limited to nonexistent in many instances, aggravating the challenge of reintegration.[17]

In the end, frustration led many of these demobilized soldiers into either a menial existence or not returning to their communities for months after demobilization.

Although there were fewer cases of failed land access reported in the final two phases of demobilization, a number of veterans did not have land to till. In providing farm equipment, the government assumed that veterans would be returning to familial lands. Often this was not the case. Many veterans tried to avail themselves of public land through an arrangement set up by UVAB at the district level.[18] Long and painstaking, the process of transferring public land proved prohibitively expensive. In cases where veterans could access family land, strife among family members often ensued.

Of deeper, societal significance was the sense that communities were being "punished twice." In contrast to Eritrea, where its soldiers in the early 1990s war against Ethiopia were celebrated as liberators,[19] in Uganda, communities were negatively disposed toward returnees, who were often seen as having been responsible for widespread suffering. The idea that they should be helped (financially and otherwise) to settle back into normal life was anathema to many. This perception greatly complicated the reintegration process.

The dismal experience of the NRA's demobilization is a stark reminder that victims in communities cannot be ignored. Friction between them and veterans is the source of considerable trauma and depression, which can quietly engulf the lives of so many affected by war.

Reintegration of Burundi's Child Soldiers

The conflict and tensions between the ethnic Hutu and Tutsi in Burundi have a long history. Mostly, they spring from the historical privileging of Tutsis over Hutus since independence. Violence escalated in 1993 when the first democratically elected president of Burundi, a Hutu, Melchior Ndadaye, was killed in a coup. This prompted the formation of Hutu militias to fight the Tutsi political opposition, which was backed by the Tutsi-dominated military. Throughout this period, both sides have recruited child soldiers into their ranks. In 2002, the Government of Burundi and then-rebel leader Pierre Nkurunziza signed a ceasefire agreement under the auspices of the African Union, which was headed by former South African President Nelson Mandela.

By the end of the fighting, UNICEF estimated that over 6,000 children had participated in these conflicts, including some as young as eight years old.[20] All of them needed to be disarmed and reintegrated into civilian life. However, to properly reintegrate them, there was a need to understand their motivation for joining the armed ranks. According to Allison Dilworth, for many children, joining the conflict:

> [Was] a way of countering decades of social and ethnic discrimination, and of ending years of repression by the "Tutsi army" with its history of massacring Hutu. Many volunteer recruits had been directly affected by the conflict, either seeing the murder of family and neighbours or being forced to leave their homes. Some children were reportedly encouraged by their families to join, sometimes after receiving payment or in the belief that payment would be forthcoming... Others reportedly joined partly as a result of social or peer pressure.[21]

There were also other forms of recruitment such as coercion and abduction from schools.

> The FDD (*Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie*, the military wing of the leading rebel group) recruited directly from schools, which were also attacked and destroyed, a tactic that may have facilitated the recruitment of children. An already low level of schooling dropped significantly during the war and the majority of child soldier recruits are thought not to have been enrolled in schools.

In addition to recruitment and abduction within Burundi, Dilworth adds

> …the FDD recruited child soldiers from refugee camps, particularly in Tanzania and the DRC… further recruitment and a number of mass abductions took place from schools, including the abduction of nearly 300 children from schools in Ruyigi and Kayanza provinces in November 2001. Most, but not all, returned home shortly afterwards. Children as young as eight are known to have been recruited, sometimes forcibly.[22]

The motivation for recruitment, and the difference in age among the child soldiers, were not factored into reintegration efforts. Those who joined after encouragement from families would be seen as heroes fighting the enemy, and their reintegration had to take an entirely different form. Those who joined when they were too young but had spent years in the conflict would have matured with exposure to adult-like practices and behaviors, and their reintegration needed to take a different approach. As the ceasefire was being signed, the Government of Burundi, with assistance from UNICEF, launched a plan to help disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate child soldiers into civilian life. As Dilworth has noted, there were serious problems with the effort, including:

> [Lack] of focus in programs for the prevention of re-recruitment; treating battle-hardened 18 year olds as children rather than adults; and lack of long-term reintegration strategies including vocational training. At the community level, attitudes towards former child soldiers appear to vary from considering them as victims of the conflict, to fearing them due to their violence and brutalization through involvement in the war. Economic factors were perceived to be key to the successful and sustained reintegration of former child soldiers.[23]

In addition, while work was underway to identify the child soldiers, it never registered that their ethnic kin viewed them as heroes. Relatedly, attention was not paid to child soldiers whom the government had turned into local defense units called Peace Guards, yet this was equally troubling for the impact that it had on these children. This was especially important as the government took the position that it had no child soldiers in its ranks, just children "under its protection." Dilworth suggests further that:

> No significant demobilization or reintegration of FDD child soldiers took place prior to these programs. Child soldiers who deserted from the FDD

were largely incorporated into the Peace Guards militia, exposing them to new dangers and trauma.[24]

In most cases, more time was spent speaking with officials in the capital, Bujumbura, who did not have a good feel for what had happened on the ground, than was spent in communities where child soldiers actually were. Rarely were the child soldiers consulted on what should be done. Many times, child soldiers had been tasked to kill the "other"—for example, a Hutu grandmother of a Tutsi grandson. Yet the reintegration efforts never addressed the issue of intermarriage among the two ethnic groups, which was common. Psycho-social healing for those children who had been involved or had witnessed the killing of family members of the "other" ethnic group was never provided.

The sequencing and timeframe for the reintegration efforts was another key challenge. Often victims were asked to speak about their trauma and suffering at very short notice. For former child soldiers whose indoctrination/conscription into armed conflict often occurred over years, this was wholly misguided. Once again, as in the case of Uganda, the inordinate focus on economic reconstruction meant that key aspects of reintegration at the individual level were all but ignored.

Key Recommendations

Based on the record of DDR efforts in Africa over the last 30 years, and especially the author's engagement with the two case studies outlined above, a few recommendations for improving the reintegration element of DDR are offered below.

1. ***Assess and balance the needs of ex-combatants.*** The assumption that veterans, ex-combatants, and child soldiers need financial support more than other forms of rehabilitation needs reconsideration. There is a need for a more comprehensive and integrated approach that includes personal, educational, and physical and mental health elements. Arguably, the most critical missing component in DDR efforts has been psycho-social well-being. Violent conflicts often cause considerable trauma to victims and combatants. Even if economic reintegration occurs, the mental and emotional scars of conflict will always have the potential to ruin lives if left unaddressed. This is especially important for child soldiers.

2. ***Address the tenuous state of funding for disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration.*** Financing and resourcing of DDR efforts in Africa have been dominated by donor funding. Yet this is often tenuous and unsustainable over the long term. The over-reliance on donors means that the reintegration efforts are often of a much shorter timeline than required by the scale and scope of the challenge. Appropriate re-skilling of veterans, adult education, or offers of education support to younger ex-combatants or child soldiers would be cheaper and more sustainable if African governments provided long-term funding (especially in the absence of donor funding). African countries need to find mechanisms to assume more of the financial burden of continuing reintegration efforts.
3. ***Reconsider a one-size-fits-all approach to disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration***. Reintegration interventions have tended to assume a great deal of homogeneity of target groups. Women and men, boys and girls (child soldiers), young and old, urban and rural, all receive essentially the same assistance packages. Intervention projects should instead seek to disaggregate the different categories of people needing support or impacted by conflict, determine their needs, and structure intervention programs accordingly. In Uganda, for example, veterans returning to Buganda, where land has been properly parceled with a clear tenure system, required a different approach than what was needed by veterans returning elsewhere, where land is still communal and family-owned. Differences in cultures with respect to rituals around cleansing of evil spirits also demand proper attention, as this often determines levels of acceptance in the recipient community.
4. ***Implement better accounting of local opportunities and disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration***. There is a need to understand better the economic and other opportunities that exist in the regions and communities to which people are being reintegrated. For example, it was an oversight for the Uganda Veteran Assistance Programme not to give sufficient farming education to veterans returning to villages, and business education to those reintegrating into urban locations. Interestingly, these items had been planned, but insufficient attention was paid to them since they were deemed of little consequence. This partly explains why some veterans quickly ran out of funds and their businesses collapsed.

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Human Rights and Protection of Civilians in United Nations Peacekeeping

Ibrahim J. Wani

With the increasing trend toward human rights violations and the displacement of civilian populations in conflict, the protection of civilians has become an essential part of peacekeeping.[1] This trend has been dictated by the changing circumstances of conflict and is supported by the international normative order and global human rights framework.[2] Drawing on lessons from United Nations (UN)-led peacekeeping operations in Africa,[3] this chapter discusses the background and evolution of peacekeeping engagement on issues related to human rights and the protection of civilians; the array of norms and institutions that have developed to formalize the mandate in the UN peacekeeping framework; and experiences, lessons, and challenges in its implementation.

Despite some notable achievements, much remains to be done to bridge the gap between rhetoric and concrete actions so that civilians are not, as they all-too-often are, treated as fodder in conflict.[4] It is

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a challenging and complex undertaking, confronting intractable political problems in countries where communities are deeply fragmented, mechanisms for conflict mediation and resolution are lacking, and state institutions barely functioning. This is sometimes complicated by the fact that the state itself may be an enabler, if not directly complicit, in violence against civilians. At the international level, the protection of civilians also suffers from uncertain political support, conceptual uncertainty, and other inherent contradictions in its normative and political framework. On a positive note, there is growing awareness—evidenced by regular reviews and robust debates—that this important undertaking remains a work in progress. Nevertheless, there is a crucial need for a meaningful dialogue to seek consensus and address the fundamental challenges and internal contradictions highlighted below.

The Basis of the Mandate

UN peacekeeping engagement with human rights, and the attendant problems of internal displacement and refugees, was in large part compelled by the horrors of the 1990s, particularly the 1994 Rwanda genocide and the massacre of Bosnians a year later at Srebrenica in the former Yugoslavia. Until then, peacekeeping was largely affixed to its original conception as a limited instrument interposed between conflicting parties and playing a rather passive role. The specter of a noticeable international presence watching or, worse, fleeing while hundreds of thousands of helpless civilians were massacred evoked outrage and shame, challenged the credibility and legitimacy of the UN and the global peace and security order,[5] and triggered critical reviews of peacekeeping.[6]

The result was the pledge to "never again" allow a repeat of such atrocities as Rwanda and Srebrenica and the declaration that the international community had a duty to intervene when such circumstances arose. UN peacekeeping was the obvious instrument of intervention. As the UN Secretary-General noted in his report to the General Assembly at the time,

> [t]he plight of civilians is no longer something which can be neglected, or made secondary because it complicates political negotiations or interests. It is fundamental to the central mandate of the Organization. The responsibility for the protection of civilians cannot be transferred to others. The

United Nations is the only international organization with the reach and authority to end these practices.[7]

Despite these laudable affirmations, civilians continued to suffer gruesome atrocities in conflicts, which, in turn, drew UN peacekeeping into the inevitable undertaking of human rights protection. Recent conflicts in the Central African Republic (CAR), the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, South Sudan, and Sudan illustrate this trend. Since December 2013, the Security Council has progressively reinforced the mandate of the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) as the human rights situation has deteriorated. The glimmer of hope that greeted South Sudan's independence in 2011 following more than five decades of conflict soon faded when another round of conflict, one of the most brutal and destructive conflicts of the twenty-first century, flared up in December 2013. The conflict has been characterized by revenge killings, sexual and gender-based violence, the recruitment of child soldiers, the destruction of homes and other personal property, and the forcible displacement of more than half of the country's population.

South Sudan is perhaps an extreme example, but similar phenomena exist where UN peacekeeper are deployed in large numbers. In the CAR, civilians are caught up in the ferocious conflict between the anti-Balaka and Séléka, thousands have been killed and many are displaced within the country and other neighboring countries. The multiple armed groups and government forces in the DRC continuously target civilians, particularly in the eastern part of the country. In Mali, the Jama'at Nusrat al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) and affiliated insurgent groups have continuously attacked and killed civilians, and in Darfur, for more than a decade now, civilians have been targeted and killed or forced into camps for Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).

The so-called "CNN effect," which projects the horrors of conflict into living rooms around the world in real time,[8] puts pressure on governments, the UN system, and the international community to do something to halt gross violations of human rights. The presence of a UN peacekeeping operation on the ground has often been the logical and most cost-effective response mechanism. Where no peacekeeping mission existed, the UN was compelled to establish one.

Ironically, the presence of the UN on the ground, in turn, has fostered the expectation that it will provide protection to the civilian population. The failure to fulfill this expectation is perceived as a potentially

serious blemish on the credibility and legitimacy of the UN and the international system that could undermine its central purpose to facilitate and support a peace process. In other words, UN peacekeeping has become the instrument of last resort in situations of human rights and humanitarian crises. Beyond this practical dimension, UN peacekeeping engagement on human rights and the protection of civilians and refugees is also considered integral and essential to its primary mission and core purpose of securing peace. Systematic human rights violations and the displacement of populations are not only a result of the conflict; experience also shows that they perpetuate conflict. Peace cannot be realized when civilians do not feel secure and safe, and public confidence, which is essential to the realization of sustainable peace and security, cannot exist when civilians are systematically and consistently threatened or abused.

The Normative and Institutional Framework

In 1999, the United Nations Security Council explicitly mandated the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) to "take the necessary action… within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence."[9] Every UN peacekeeping mission established since then has had an explicit mandate from the Security Council to protect civilians,[10] (only four out of the fourteen active UN peacekeeping operations do not have the explicit mandate to protect civilians).[11] An elaborate body of norms, policies, and institutions across the UN system, which includes the UN Charter and the global human rights and humanitarian laws framework, Security Council resolutions and pronouncements, and internal UN policies and guidelines, supports the formalization and operationalization of human rights and the protection of civilians as priorities for UN peacekeeping.

Implementation and Track Record

Nearly 20 years of UN peacekeeping experience with the protection of civilians and human rights, most of it in Africa, has been extensively documented and reviewed. The most recent such review was by the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (HIPPO).[12] While there have been no incidents of the magnitude of the Rwanda genocide—although conflict in South Sudan has been described

as "genocide" by some—the plight of civilians in conflict has been increasingly brought to the fore through actions by peacekeepers, including when the presence or action by a peacekeeping mission has arguably saved civilians. Overall, however, the experience has been unsatisfactory.

At the political level, the UN Security Council has been more responsive to civilian atrocities and is more likely to deploy a peacekeeping operation when there is widespread violence and systematic human rights violations, as the CAR mission (MINUSCA) illustrates. Enforcement mandates which empower peacekeepers to intervene with armed actors in order to protect civilians are also more common. The Security Council is also frequently engaging on human rights and refugee issues, highlighting their importance in peace and security.

There is some evidence that peacekeeping has reduced the occurrence, duration, and intensity of conflict as well as the likelihood of a resurgence of conflict.[13] The presence of a peacekeeping force has also been cited as an important deterrent and confidence builder, dissuading attacks against civilians and supporting the settlement of displaced civilians and the return and resettlement of refugees.[14]

In Angola, Côte d'Ivoire, Liberia, Namibia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, and Liberia, UN peacekeeping made positive contributions to the protection of civilians. Through mediation and assisting reconciliation processes, supporting elections and democratization, helping establish the rule of law, and facilitating the repatriation and resettlement of internally displaced civilians and refugees, tangible improvements were made to the lives of ordinary citizens in these countries.

At the same time, plenty of data suggests that claims of "peacekeeping successes" may be exaggerated. Often much vaunted successes are short-lived, many conflicts tend to relapse, not least because peacekeeping operations typically do not address the underlying issues which gave rise to conflict in the first place.[15]

Lessons and Challenges

Extensive reviews of the record of UN peacekeeping the protection of civilians identify several important lessons and challenges. Besides the complexity of the mandate and the difficult environment under which peacekeeping operations are deployed,[16] key issues include:

i. The uncertainty of political support for peacekeeping involvement in human rights;
ii. ambiguities surrounding the scope of the mandate; and
iii. lack of coherence and a common understanding around the challenges of multidimensional peacekeeping operations, in particular the problem of overcrowded agendas, resource constraints and limited capabilities and issues related to leadership.

The wide scope of responsibilities and tasks in multidimensional peacekeeping operations has a particular impact on human rights and protection of civilians. In addition to the primary mission of facilitating a peace process, the typical peacekeeping operation is required to support the extension of state authority, capacity building, the rule of law, building a police force, gender integration, child protection, and support to civil society and non-governmental organizations, just to name a few. These are all considered priorities, which means that the protection of civilians and human rights has to compete with dozens of other priorities for attention, political support, and resources. Moreover, the various mandates and tasks require different skills and capabilities and many tend to overlap and are expressed in vague terms, which the different units interpret in different ways.[17]

Budget and resource constraints also have a significant impact on human rights and protection of civilians. There is a legitimate concern about the cost of peacekeeping, which in the last few years has averaged between US $7–8 billion annually, most of which is borne by about ten countries. High as it is, almost every analysis has pointed out that the peacekeeping budget is grossly inadequate for the multitude of tasks that missions are expected to perform.[18] The human rights component of the mandate tends to receive a minuscule share of the budget.

Uncertain Political Commitment and Support

In moral and normative terms, it is tempting to assume a high degree of political support and commitment to the protection of civilians and human rights in peacekeeping. Yet weak political support is the norm. This is partly a function of the way the protection mandate has developed, but it is also a reflection of the general ambivalence at the global level about human rights, sovereignty, and the scope of international action.

Within the UN Security Council, where the peacekeeping mandate is defined, there are manifest misgivings about the human rights and protection undertaking.

Members tend to have different understandings and expectations about individual peacekeeping operations and consensus on the scope of mandates is rare. While, in principle, each mission is supposed to be established after careful analysis and deliberations, that is atypical. Instead, the process is often a "cut and paste" job, with some political "give and take" and minimal deliberation on how the mandate is to be executed. It is left up to the secretariat at implementation to confront the difficult challenge of allocating scarce resources to competing tasks. This results in obfuscation and fruitless debate.

The trend toward partnership and subsidiarity is another dimension of the political challenge. The African Union and its RECs have increasingly assumed greater roles on peace and security matters in the region, including in peacekeeping. This is justified as a necessary complement to the UN's primary role and arguably a more effective approach to conflict resolution because of the proximity of regional organizations to the issues. But it belies a conceptual gap because regional organizations do not necessarily share the same normative perspectives. There is still a lot of reticence about human rights in the AU. Traditional sovereignty still predominates and poses a major obstacle to the realization of consensus on mass atrocities and other challenges emanating from human rights violations. This discordance between global and regional perspectives is a significant obstacle to the human rights agenda.

Political expediency also often overrides human rights niceties. In 2010 the UN shelved a comprehensive report about human rights violations in the DRC because of protests from some of the countries implicated in the report. A year earlier, a Security Council-appointed team opted not to discuss serious concerns about the integration of armed groups into the national army (FARDC), contrary to the UN Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, allegedly because it would upset the host government. On several occasions in South Sudan, sanctions for human rights violations were not pursued because of concern that they might jeopardize efforts to end the conflict.

Despite the huge scale of human rights violations in parts of Africa, the high level of political commitment which characterized past international engagements on human rights concerns in conflict elsewhere, such as Kosovo beginning in 1999, has not been evident. To put it bluntly, Africa tends to attract less attention. This could be a legacy of "conflict fatigue" over Africa or/and the absence of strong political interests on

the continent among the key powers. It is argued by some that the international community lacks a genuine commitment to resolve conflicts in Africa; peacekeeping thus serves as a kind of palliative. The situation is not helped by an insidious paradox: those who fund peacekeeping, largely Western nations, define the mandate, which typically centers on damage limitation rather than substantive attempts to resolve the conflict; the Troop Contributing Countries (TCCs), which are largely from Africa and Asia, have little say in how the mandate is shaped.[19]

As the HIPPO report has pointed out, peacekeeping operations express "different interests and concerns"—of the Security Council, regional neighbors, and TCCs. It is therefore important to have "a shared understanding of the situation, a common political goal and clarity on the level of resolve and resources required to help deliver and sustain a political solution."[20] The lack of political commitment and coherent support is serious and foreshadows most of the other challenges related to the mandate to protect civilians, including the lack of clarity on its scope, the diffusion of tasks and responsibilities, the limited resources and the lack of political support during critical phases of implementation.

Conceptual Ambiguity

Closely linked to the lack of political consensus is the fact that despite the overwhelming sentiment that the UN should do something about the plight of civilians in conflict, the key concepts—protection of civilians, human rights promotion and protection, humanitarianism and responsibility to protect—are used in different and sometimes contradictory contexts. These ambiguities lead to confusion, undermine political support, and negatively impact operationalization and implementation.[21] For example, the UN Security Council has used the concept of "protection of civilians" in different senses, alluding to "physical protection" but also appearing to allow for other broader perspectives including human rights. In Resolution 2448, renewing MINUSCA's mandate, for example, the Security Council authorized it to "protect, without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the CAR Authorities and the basic principles of peacekeeping, the civilian population under threat of physical violence."[22] This is essentially the same formulation that the Council has used since 1999 when it first mandated the protection of civilians in UNAMSIL, with minor but important modifications: deleting the phrase "imminent threat of violence" in earlier resolutions in favor of simply "threat of

violence" apparently because the term "imminent" caused confusion and equivocation.

The formulation in the Security Council resolutions, particularly the use of terms such as "all necessary means," "civilians under threat," and "within area of operation or presence," and the context of the debate around the first mandate have been interpreted to suggest that the Security Council means "physical protection" when it mandates the protection of civilians.[23] But the Security Council does not explicitly say that. Moreover, the language in other parts of the resolutions alludes to broader notions beyond physical protection. The standard caveats used in the resolutions—"consistent with principles of peacekeeping," "within their capabilities and areas of deployment"—seem to limit the scope of the mandate and create further confusion and uncertainty, seemingly permitting a peacekeeping mission to not act if it determines that it lacks the "capability." This may seem reasonable on the surface, but it creates the potential for equivocation, and no assurances that the mission will be held accountable for not acting.

In a bid to offer guidance to peace missions, the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) has developed a policy aimed at clarifying and reconciling the concept.[24] Supposedly, the policy draws from the Security Council's definition of "protection,"[25] from which it elaborates three tiers of activities that encompass the protection of civilians. Tier I includes public information campaigns to promote respect for human rights; dialogue with a perpetrator or potential perpetrator to deter violations; mediation and the resolution of conflicts among the parties to the conflict; persuading governments and other relevant actors to intervene to protect civilians; and other related activities which are intended to prevent human rights violations. Tier II relates to physical protection and involves the show of or use of force by the police and military components to prevent, deter, preempt, or respond to situations in which civilians are under threat of physical violence. Tier III are activities that are intended to create an environment that protects civilians, such as supporting elections and political processes; conflict mediation and resolution; security sector reform; strengthening the rule of law; the promotion and protection of human rights; the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration of ex-combatants; and supporting the return and reintegration of IDPs and refugees. These are medium- to long-term programmatic activities of the entire UN system and partners in the country, including the peacekeeping mission.

Complicating matters is the fact that human rights activists and groups, which play critical roles in the protection of civilians, often have different perspectives. The humanitarian community envisages the protection of civilians to include "all efforts aimed at obtaining full respect for the rights of the individual and of the obligations of the authorities/arms bearers in accordance with the letter and the spirit of the relevant bodies of law."[26] From a human rights perspective, the scope of protection is much broader, covering all the rights and freedoms recognized in international and regional instruments and ensuing obligations, including international human rights law, international humanitarian law, international criminal law, and international refugee law, and applies in times of peace and war to all individuals, not just civilians.[27] The DPKO policy seems to embrace both the humanitarian and human rights perspectives.

It is left up to peacekeeping missions to develop their strategy for the protection of civilians, indicating priority areas of focus. This may seem pragmatic but it is not prudent. Mission strategies tend to be a laundry list: clearly articulated, concrete goals and priorities are absent. The differing and sometimes competing perspectives on the key concepts has made it challenging to articulate "protection of civilians" in implementable terms.[28] There is no consensus in the Security Council on when it should be triggered and what the circumstances warrant. The various components in UN peacekeeping missions can become embroiled in disagreements over concepts, which impede the development of a decisive, unified approach. Humanitarian partners, for instance, eschew the carrying of or use of arms for physical protection. This can create tension with, as well as uncertainty and indecision for, the military component (and TCCs). The consequent inaction is then exploited by the host country and those not fully supportive of human rights and the protection of civilians.

Compatibility with the Original Idea of Peacekeeping

Although it is generally conceded that UN peacekeeping has evolved from its traditional underpinnings, its original architecture remains in place. The idea behind UN peacekeeping was to position "neutral" UN troops between belligerents who had agreed to stop fighting in order to limit the risk of resumption in the fighting while a peace process was progressing.[29] It was considered a limited instrument, premised on a peace agreement

and the commitment of the parties, and the UN as a peace broker and a neutral party with no stake in the conflict. The core UN peacekeeping principles—impartiality, consent, and the restriction on the use of force—derive from this general context and premises.[30]

Much of the original conception no longer holds. And yet, it continues to dominate the architecture of peacekeeping. As African experiences demonstrate, UN peacekeeping is no longer just deployed where fighting has ended; in fact, it is usually deployed where active hostility is still on-going, often involving multiple actors. Furthermore, the typical peacekeeping mandate today is also expansive, comprising mediation, extending and supporting state authority, and protecting civilians, sometimes against their own governments.

Finding the Right Balance Among the Tools

An important policy issue that has not received much attention concerns the order of priorities among the various peacebuilding tools. The relationship between the relative investments in physical protection and diplomatic engagement is a case in point. In practice, military and police components receive far greater resources and attention than the political aspects. Yet it is the politics on which so much else, including the physical, turns.[31]

Physical protection, in the sense outlined in Tier II of the DPKO Policy, involving "…those activities by police and military components involving the show or use of force to prevent, deter, pre-empt and respond to situations in which civilians are under threat of physical violence"[32] is important and necessary as a protection tool. It is this idea which dominates the Security Council's thinking when it mandates the protection of civilians. Peacekeeping missions need a force not only to protect the mission's assets and personnel but also, as recommended in the Brahimi report, "to protect civilians in imminent risk of violence." Hence, the trend toward enforcement mandates and the robust initiatives such as the Force Intervention Brigade (FIB) within the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), which was mandated to carry out "targeted offensive operations" to "neutralize armed groups"[33] and the Regional Protection Force in UNMISS.

Heads of missions and TCCs regularly complain that they lack the resources to properly equip the military and police for the mandated tasks,

especially for its physical protection responsibility. As Hilde Johnson has pointed out, the glaring mismatch between the UNMISS' mandate and its resources made it "close to impossible" for the mission to deliver on its mandate to provide physical protection to civilians under threat.[34] Objective assessments confirm that almost all are woefully equipped for the challenge that they confront. On the other hand, the military and police components consume the bulk of the resources of the mission. They are expensive. The civilian components of peacekeeping missions receive very little in relative terms, and most of their resources are allocated to staff salaries and benefits. Very little, if any, is devoted to programs.

The argument is not that the allocation for the military and police should be reduced. On the contrary, there is a very good case to be made that they ought to be properly equipped and staffed to meet the requirements of the mandated tasks. But in the current scenario, where the military are inadequately equipped and there is under-investment in the diplomatic and political spheres, success is all but impossible. Along with strengthening the military component, therefore, it will be important to invest commensurately in the diplomatic and political dimensions, and to strengthen more explicit synergy among the three. Clarity is also needed on the relevance of the peacekeeping principles, especially consent and the use of force.

Enforcing the Primary Responsibility of the Host State

Under international law, the state bears the primary responsibility to protect human rights. This is concretized in the "Responsibility to Protect" doctrine: the idea that sovereignty entails the responsibility to protect, which came out of the same movement and sentiment that spurred the protection of civilians mandate in UN peacekeeping. The state's responsibility entails the duty to ensure that its institutions and citizens, and those under its control, do not violate human rights.

All Security Council resolutions mandate peacekeeping operations to protect civilians "without prejudice to the responsibility of the state." In practice, the state is best placed to protect human rights. As HIPPO rightly points out, however, peacekeeping, even in ideal circumstances, is no substitute for an effective state.[35] A necessary part of a strategy for the protection of civilians should be to ensure the state fulfills its primary responsibility.

In most peacekeeping situations, the state is either unable to provide protection or often complicit in, if not responsible for, perpetrating human rights violations and undermining the rule of law. In South Sudan, for example, the state is implicated in violent attacks against civilians; in CAR, some of the armed groups that are accused of human rights violations are supported by the state. In these circumstances, the responsibility of the international community is to remind the state of its responsibility and to support the state as necessary to enable it to fulfill its responsibility; failing that, the international community must intervene through diplomatic *demarches* or even armed intervention.

UN peacekeeping missions have not been very effective in holding the state to its primary responsibility—using any of these tools—and do not consistently use their political leverage. The failure to act has had the impact of emboldening governments and other perpetrators, perpetuating impunity and possibly worsening the human rights situation. The most intransigent countries, such as the DRC and South Sudan, ignore Security Council resolutions and ultimatums because they are confident that there will be no repercussions. In turn, this tends to disempower and undermine the peacekeeping mission's human rights efforts. Cognizant that they are unlikely to get strong support from the Security Council and from the UN, mission leadership treads very carefully around human rights issues.

Key Recommendations

1. ***Reinvigorate UN peacekeeping focus on the protection of civilians and human rights.*** Without this, its core mission of ending conflict and restoring peace and stability is unlikely to succeed. Despite some notable accomplishments, overall the UN's record on the protection of civilians and human rights is poor. Mandates have almost invariably promised more than they have delivered. There are far too many reports of civilians being attacked, sometimes in the presence of UN peacekeepers, and cases where the system has not responded adequately or failed to respond in the face of threats to civilians. Reviews of UN peacekeeping performance identify formidable challenges: weak and unreliable political support; conceptual and normative ambiguities; differing interpretations by key actors on the scope of the mandate; structural and systemic contradictions, and inadequate resources and capabilities.

What is clear from this record is that the current state of affairs is no longer tenable. UN peacekeeping must move beyond rhetoric and improve its performance. A genuine commitment to implement the recommendations of HIPPO, which member states seem to support, would be an important first step.

2. ***Strengthen political consensus around human rights and the protection of civilians***. The assumption that the fundamentals of peacekeeping and protection of civilians are sound is false. Equivocation, politicization, and a weak consensus persist around critical issues. It is therefore important to have an honest debate to seek fresh consensus on the purpose, relevance, and scope of the protection of civilians mandate and its place in peacekeeping, including a realistic assessment of what peacekeeping can—and cannot—deliver.[36] That will not be easy in the context of the current erosion of the international global order, but the issue must be addressed more candidly for meaningful change to take place in a process involving all key actors—General Assembly member states, regional groups and neighbors, TCCs, etc.—in order to close the gap between the Security Council where mandates are defined and the other actors who bear some of the responsibility for implementation.
3. ***Address the apparent incompatibility between traditional peacekeeping and deference to national sovereignty.*** The apparent incompatibility between the traditional principles of peacekeeping, particularly with respect to the requirement for consent and the underlying deference to sovereignty, and what is required to protect human rights needs to be resolved. The obstinacy of the host state, in delaying requests for patrols, restricting the movement of peacekeepers and visits to sites of human rights violations, perpetually frustrate efforts to protect civilians and are indefensible. Waiting for consent in such circumstances undermines the protection of civilians. The privilege of sovereignty does not seem warranted in such cases. On the contrary, a more concerted effort is needed to uphold and enforce the primary responsibility of the host state to defend and protect human rights. Peacekeeping can only do so much and will not succeed without this. The Security Council needs to demonstrate that it has the resolve to follow through. Moreover, that it will take action if its resolutions are not respected or cooperation is absent. Strongly worded resolutions and threats are not enough and

could even be damaging to international order and the credibility of the Security Council if they can be ignored with impunity.

4. ***Close the gap between mission mandates and resources required to achieve the missions***. As others have recommended, the Security Council needs to more seriously consider the operational implications of mandates and the resources and other capabilities required to follow through and implement the mandate; doing more with less is a failing strategy. UN missions should be properly staffed and equipped and a more explicit link between the military, political and diplomatic aspects of the mandate should be cultivated. The UNSC should also continue to be involved at all stages of the mandate's implementation and, in particular, to continue to lend political support, including to heads of missions, who must be accountable. The Security Council should approach subsidiarity with caution, remain closely engaged and insist on adherence to agreed international norms—to deter regional organizations and neighbors from acting as spoilers, as they sometimes do.

Notes

1. United Nations, *Uniting our Strengths for Peace, Politics, Partnerships and People, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on United Nations Peace Operations,* A/70/95-S/2015/446 (June 17, 2015), 9 (HIPPO).
2. Ibid., para 80 (protection of civilians in armed conflict is a core principle of international humanitarian law and a moral responsibility for the United Nations).
3. There have been more than 50 peace operations in Africa in the twenty-first century as Williams points out, but not all of them are UN-led. See Paul D. Williams, *War and Conflict in Africa*, 2nd ed. (Malden, MA: Polity, 2016), 279–281.
4. See, e.g., the most recent statement by the President of the Security Council, May 14, 2018, S/PRST/2018/10, reiterating that peacekeeping complements the UN's peace and security strategy and affirming the Security Council's commitment to the protection of civilians.
5. United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/35: The Fall of Srebrenica*, A/54/549 (November 15, 1999), para 49; and United Nations, *Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda*, S/1999/1257 (December 16, 1999), paras. 50–52.
6. United Nations, *Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the Brahimi Report),* A/55/305 (2000) and S/2000/809.

7. United Nations, *Report of the Secretary-General to the Security Council on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict* (1999).
8. Piers Robinson, *The CNN Effect: The Myth of News, Foreign Policy and Intervention* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002).
9. Haidi Wilmont, Ralph Mamiya, Scott Sheeron, and Marc Weller (eds.), *Protection of Civilians*, 1st ed. (Oxford University Press, 2016). Protection of civilians existed since the beginning of the UN although it was not explicitly mandated.
10. The only UN peacekeeping operation deployed since 1999 without a protection of civilians mandate was the UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS). See SC Res. 2043 (April 14, 2012), https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7b65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7d/Syria%20SRES%202043.pdf.
11. For an overview of the protection of civilians mandate in UN Peacekeeping, see generally Victoria Holt and Glyn Taylor with Max Kelly, "Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations, Successes, Setbacks and Remaining Challenges," Independent Study Jointly commissioned by the Department of Peacekeeping Operations and the Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (2009), Chapter 2, 33–88, https://www.unocha.org/sites/dms/Documents/Protecting%20Civilians%20in%20the%20Context%20of%20UN%20Peaceke eping%20Operations.pdf; For a list of current peacekeeping operations, see https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/where-we-operate and for a timeline of Peacekeeping Operations, see https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/past-peacekeeping-operations.
12. HIPPO.
13. Harvard Hegre, Lisa Hultman, and Havard Mokleiv Nygard, "Peacekeeping Works: An Assessment of the Effectiveness of UN Peacekeeping Operations," *Conflict Trends* 1 (2015), https://www.prio.org/utility/DownloadFile.ashx?id=96&type=publicationfile.
14. Lisa Hultman, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon, "United Nations Peacekeeping and Civilian Protection in Civil War," *American Journal of Political Science* 57, no. 4 (2013): 875–891; and Alexandra Novosseloff, "Can We Make Peacekeeping Great Again?" *Global Peace Operations Review* (May 9, 2017). "UN peace operations are helping to protect thousands of civilians on a daily basis through monitoring and advocacy of human rights, supporting the development of the rule of law, and political engagement with the conflict parties, as well as through physical presence, deterrence and protective action."
15. E.g., Séverine Autesserre, "Crisis of Peacekeeping: Why the UN Can't End Wars," *Foreign Affairs* (January/February 2019).
16. See Paul D. Williams, Chapter 2 on "Learning Lessons from Peace Operations in Africa" in this book.

17. Both the Brahimi (UN doc. A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 21, 2000) and the HIPPO reports (UN doc. A/70/95-S/2015/446, June 17, 2015) acknowledged 15 years later the serious impact of overcrowded mandates and urged realistic prioritization.
18. Hilde Johnson, "Capacity to Protect Civilians: Rhetoric or Reality?" International Forum for the Challenges of Peace Operations, Policy Brief 2015:4. Introduction: Protection of Civilians Norms and Frameworks
19. Autesserre, "Crisis of Peacekeeping."
20. HIPPO, para 58.
21. Betrand Ramcharan (ed.), *Human Rights Protection in the Field* (London: Routledge, 2006), 102. The lack of a "common, system-wide … understanding of the concept of 'protection' has given rise to problematic inconsistencies in both usage and practice."
22. Similar language was used in the initial resolution which established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) (Res. 2149) which mandated it to "protect, without prejudice to the primary responsibility of the Central African Republic authorities, the civilian population from threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, including through active patrolling."
23. Wilmont, Mamiya, Sheeron, and Weller, *Protection of Civilians,* 97. The language and the discussion surrounding the first adoption of the protection of civilians mandate indicate that the Security Council conceived the protection of civilians narrowly in terms of physical protection from the threat of imminent violence.
24. United Nations, *Policy on Protection of Civilians*, S/RES/2382 (2017). An update of the first version developed in 2010 after recommendation for UN system wide guidelines in OCHA/DPKO study.
25. "all necessary means, up to and including the use of deadly force, aimed at preventing or responding to threats of physical violence against civilians, within capabilities and areas of operations, and without prejudice to the responsibility of the host government."
26. Inter-Agency Standing Committee, "Policy on Protection in Humanitarian Action" (2016), https://interagencystandingcommittee.org/protection-priority-global-protection-cluster/documents/iasc-policy-protection-humanitarian-action.
27. UN Human Rights Council, *Protection of the Human Rights of Civilians in Armed Conflict*, Res. 9/9, 2008; Statement of Navi Pillay, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, at the UN Security Council Debate on the Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict (June 25, 2012) https://newsarchive.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=12288; and OHCHR staff, "Protection in the

Field: Human Rights Perspectives," in *Human Rights Protection in the Field*, Betrand Ramcharan (ed.) (London: Routledge, 2006), 119, 121.

28. Ramcharan, *Human Rights Protection in the Field*.
29. Wilmont, Mamiya, Sheeron, and Weller, *Protection of Civilians*. Missions such as UNTSO (Jerusalem); UNMOGP (Kashmir); UNFCIYP (Cyprus); UNDOF (Golan Heights); UNIFIL (South Lebanon); MINURSO (Western Sahara); and UNISFA (Abyei) represent this notion of peacekeeping.
30. United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations, *United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines,* Principles of UN Peacekeeping (2008), https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/peacekeeping/en/capstone_eng.pdf.
31. HIPPO, para 107. Lasting peace is not achieved or sustained by military and technical engagements, but through political solutions—"political solutions, not military force, are the true force multipliers' for peacekeepers."
32. See http://civilianprotection.rw/wp-content/uploads/2015/05/2015-07-Policy-on-PoC-in-Peacekeeping-Operations.pdf.
33. United Nations, *The Situation in Democratic Republic of the Congo,* UNSCR 2098 (March 28, 2013), para 12b.
34. Johnson, "Capacity to Protect Civilians."
35. HIPPO, para 27.
36. HIPPO, para 41, urges consensus on the future direction and needs of UN peace operations to be restored, and a genuine collaboration and commitment by the General Assembly and Security Council to go "beyond the diplomatic trench lines of the last decade and to find solutions on how best to deal with today's threats and how to strengthen United Nations peace operations for tomorrow. This will require a spirit of genuine collaboration and inclusion so as to establish a common purpose and resolve."

PART II

Exploring Peacebuilding Strategies and Tools

Catalyzing Women, Peace, and Security through UN Peace Operations in Africa

Lisa Sharland

Introduction

In May 2000, the Government of Namibia hosted a workshop focused on mainstreaming a gender perspective into the work of multidimensional peace support operations. The workshop set out to examine practical ways that the United Nations (UN) and member states could strengthen the principles of gender equality, through the vehicle of peace operations, as a means to ensure a "situation of political stability in which women and men play an equal part in the political, economic, and social development of their country."[1] It was a timely discussion in Namibia, as the workshop marked ten years since the country had hosted a UN peacekeeping mission.[2] One outcome from that workshop was the Windhoek Declaration and Namibia Plan of Action on Mainstreaming a Gender

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Perspective in Multidimensional Peace Operations.[3] That outcome document contributed to the eventual adoption of the UN Security Council's first resolution (UNSCR1325) on women, peace, and security (WPS) in October 2000.[4] As such, the council recognized that women's equality and security was linked to the maintenance of international peace and security. UN peace operations had an important role to take forward the agenda in areas where they were deployed.

More UN peacekeeping missions have deployed to Africa than any other continent. As of October 2019, seven UN peacekeeping missions were deployed on the African continent, with more than 80,000 blue helmets serving across large multidimensional missions in contexts such as Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, South Sudan, Sudan, the Central African Republic, and Western Sahara. Two long-term missions, in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire, recently transitioned and exited the country after nearly fifteen years.

Although there has been progress with women's political representation in Africa, women remain disadvantaged in many parts of the continent due to patriarchal attitudes and cultural norms. Women have disproportionately borne the consequences of conflicts across the continent. They have been targeted through sexual violence as a tactic of war, kidnapped and instrumentalized by terrorist groups, and been limited by attitudes that marginalize their voices in conflict resolution. This is despite the fact that women's participation and engagement in conflict resolution efforts are likely to contribute to a more sustainable peace.

UN peacekeeping has provided an important vehicle for progressing the WPS agenda, with mandates focused on strengthening women's participation in peace processes, ensuring the protection of women and girls, and integrating gender considerations into the approach of missions aimed at building sustainable peace.[5] These missions have subsequently influenced efforts in parts of the continent to improve women's equality and strengthen their participation in the security sector, government, and political life. Research has shown that peacebuilding is less likely to succeed without the participation and consideration of women, and that gender inequality can be an indicator of conflict.[6]

Consequently, the role of UN peace operations in advancing WPS is worthy of further examination when it comes to examining lessons for peacebuilding efforts in Africa.

This chapter explores the opportunities and challenges that emerge from the efforts of UN peacekeeping missions advancing WPS in Africa.

The first section examines how UN peacekeeping missions can advance WPS and whether these efforts within Africa have aligned with the efforts of continental, regional, and national approaches in Africa to build peace through women's participation and the integration of gender perspectives. The second section draws on the case studies of Liberia and South Sudan, as past and present hosts of UN peacekeeping missions, to highlight some of the different opportunities and challenges that are presented through the deployment of UN peacekeeping missions when it comes to furthering WPS. And the third section identifies some opportunities, limits, and constraints of UN peacekeeping as a tool to advance WPS, particularly when assessed against many of the initiatives already underway on the continent and the different types of reforms required at the national and subnational level to support implementation.

Catalyzing Women, Peace, and Security through UN Peace Operations in Africa

The women, peace, and security agenda has been codified through the adoption of ten resolutions by the UN Security Council over the last two decades.[7] Yet efforts to link women's participation and engagement in conflict prevention efforts, as well as their protection, had been underway across the globe for decades before it came to the fore of the Security Council. Women-led civil society organizations had been championing a feminist peace agenda and their right to have a voice in such discussions long before the adoption of Resolution 1325. Indeed, the resolution had some origins in the work of African feminists and regional institutions on the continent in the years prior. As Toni Haastrup notes, the current Special Envoy on WPS for the African Union, Bineta Diop, spearheaded this work as the founder of *Femmes Africa Solidarite*. The WPS agenda is consequently considered by some to have been midwifed by Africa, with the adoption of the Windhoek Declaration in May 2000, which was championed by Namibia and laid the foundations for the comprehensive globalization of the agenda.[8]

Early lessons on the value and importance of women's participation and the consideration of gender perspectives in efforts to address conflict had emerged from some of the peacekeeping missions deployed in the decades prior to the adoption of Resolution 1325. But as the Windhoek Declaration noted, women had been "denied their full role in these efforts" and the gender aspects had "not been adequately addressed."[9]

The Declaration identified a number of reforms and improvements related to UN peacekeeping that were included in Resolution 1325, such as urging an expanded role and contribution for women through their participation in peacekeeping missions (including their appointment into senior leadership positions), and integrating gender expertise into peacekeeping missions through training and a gender component.

With more than a dozen UN peace operations deployed to the African continent since the adoption of Resolution 1325, peacekeeping has consequently served as a modest vehicle for operationalizing some aspects of the agenda through WPS in Africa.[10] Similarly, African troop and police contributions to UN peacekeeping missions have offered an important vehicle for operationalizing aspects of the agenda through fostering women's participation and delivering training on integrating gender considerations. Yet those efforts have yielded mixed results, reflecting some of the broader challenges. There have also been limits with regard to how effectively peacekeeping missions have worked to build on existing national and local processes so that they are likely to be sustainable beyond the deployment of the peacekeeping mission.

Evolution of Women, Peace, and Security in Peacekeeping

Efforts to integrate different aspects of the WPS agenda into the mandates of UN peacekeeping missions have progressed significantly over the last two decades. When the Security Council authorized the deployment of the UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) in 1999, it simply included a reference to the importance of training on "child and gender-related provisions." As the adoption of a suite of resolutions on WPS has expanded, so has the initiative of the Security Council to include more detailed and specific provisions in its mandates, for instance to:

i. Address a wider range of different provisions to respond to women's protection needs, including from sexual and gender-based violence through mechanisms such as women's protection advisors;
ii. encourage host authorities to facilitate women's participation in electoral and political processes;
iii. consider women's needs in disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration processes;

iv. increase women's participation in the security sector (including through improved representation of women in peacekeeping missions); and
v. more comprehensively integrate gender into all aspects of the work of peacekeeping missions (including through the deployment of gender advisers).

The significant number of UN peacekeeping missions deployed across the African continent over the last two decades has resulted in their use as a driver for WPS in some country-specific contents. For instance, missions have included mandates to:

i. Protect women from physical violence and the widespread use of rape and sexual violence as a weapon of war (e.g., MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of the Congo and UNMISS in South Sudan);
ii. elevate the voices of women and civil society actors who may have been largely absent from government and the security sector (e.g., UNMIL in Liberia and UNOCI in Côte d'Ivoire); and
iii. ensure that women have a meaningful voice in peace forums and negotiations (e.g., MINUSCA in the Central African Republic).

In many instances, these efforts have been complemented by the work of regional and sub-regional organizations on the continent, whether it be through engagement in peace processes, joint United Nations-African Union (AU) visits by envoys, or the work of AU peace operations, which have mirrored many of the approaches of UN peacekeeping missions. For instance, in AMISOM "gender" is one of the six units of the civilian component. While these efforts have been directed at advancing women's participation and gender equality, they also contribute to furthering the sustainability and likelihood of peace long after a peacekeeping mission has transitioned and departed the country.[11]

The "Declaration of Shared Commitments on UN Peacekeeping Operations," agreed to by more than 150 members states and regional organizations, including 41 African Union members and the African Union Commission, captures many of these developments on WPS and commits to ongoing reforms. It does so in four areas:

i. Ensuring the full, equal, and meaningful participation of women in all stages of the peace processes;
ii. systematically integrating a gender perspective into all stages of analysis, planning, implementation and reporting;
iii. increasing the number of civilian and uniformed women in peacekeeping at all levels and in key positions; and
iv. tailored, context-specific peacekeeping approaches to protecting civilians, in relevant peacekeeping operations, emphasizing the protection of women and children in those contexts.[12]

If implemented effectively, through prioritization, member state commitment, and sufficient resourcing, these measures will ensure that UN peacekeeping missions advance women's role in peace and security in their countries of deployment. Efforts to work closely with the UN Country Team (UNCT) when it comes to gender may also be critical in supporting national efforts. But there are still limits as to how far such initiatives may influence domestic reforms within their countries of deployment, as ultimately it is up to the host authorities to ensure that these reforms are being integrated through governance, justice, and the work of the security sector. For those efforts to be sustainable, peace operations must promote local, national, and regional ownership of the WPS agenda.

Intersection with Continental, Regional, and Domestic Approaches

The African Union has taken a leading role in implementing the WPS agenda in parallel with the developments globally through the UN Security Council. The formation of the African Union, building on the Organization of African Unity (OAU), contemporaneously with the adoption of Resolution 1325, meant that many of the African Union's foundational documents and institutions incorporated aspects of the WPS agenda into their formation.[13] For instance, gender equality and female participation are included in the African Union's founding documents including the African Union Constitutive Act (2002). As Haastrup notes, Africans have been engaged in WPS from the beginning, therefore "it is thus unsurprising that the African Union has also taken up the discourse that aims to prioritize gender perspectives in the institutionalization and practice of peace and security on the continent."[14]

In the last twenty years, the African Union has institutionalized WPS and ensured it is embedded across a range of continental, regional, and national policy instruments.[15] In 2014, the Chair of the AU Commission appointed a Special Envoy on Women, Peace, and Security, with a mandate "to promote and echo the voices of women in conflict prevention, management and resolution, as well as advocate for the protection of their rights, including putting an end to impunity on sexual and gender-based violence."[16] The African Union has developed a Gender Policy (2009) and a strategy for Gender Equality and Women's Empowerment (2017–2027). In 2017, the AU launched the Network of African Women in Conflict Prevention and Mediation (Femwise). The Peace and Security Commission continues to hold open sessions on women, peace, and security.

The continent has, at times, been lauded for the levels of women's political representation as well. For instance, Rwanda continues to have over 60 percent representation of women in parliament, a figure of envy for many in Europe and the West. Countries such as Kenya have constitutional quotas for women's representation (one third) in appointed and elected bodies. There have also been efforts to implement quotas as part of peace agreements. For example, the Revitalized Agreement on the Resolution of the Conflict in South Sudan requires 35 percent women's representation in governance and transition structures in South Sudan. But results have been mixed, with many targets continuing to fall short and women being negatively impacted in their efforts to engage in political life.

Many countries have also demonstrated political commitment to WPS through the development of National Action Plans (NAPs). As of 2019, 23 African member states have adopted NAPs on WPS.[17] Similarly, at the regional level, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the Mano River Union, and the Great Lakes Region have all adopted regional action plans. Yet as the African Union Commission has noted, implementation often remains poor, with NAPs being viewed as an end for the achievement on WPS, rather than a means to transform the lives of women.[18] Several of the countries that have developed NAPs have hosted UN peacekeeping missions, with some working with the UN peacekeeping mission to develop their NAP (e.g., Liberia). As Sabrina Karim and Kyle Beardsley argue, there is some evidence that peacekeeping missions can encourage the creation of NAPS that focus on "domestic

gender reforms."[19] But like the flaws identified in other NAPS, their effectiveness and sustainability require political will, financial support, and accountability mechanisms.[20] This has often been in short supply. Nonetheless, there are risks that UN peacekeeping missions might overlook the already existing mechanisms on the continent for addressing women's participation, their engagement in conflict prevention, and their protection.

Furthering Women, Peace and Security Through UN Peacekeeping Missions: Case Studies

Each UN peacekeeping mission deployed to the African continent offers different lessons when it comes to examining efforts to progress WPS. This section examines two different mission contexts—UNMIL in Liberia and UNMISS in South Sudan—to identify some of the different opportunities and challenges for advancing gender equality and furthering the participation of women in politics and the security sector. Each case study represents a mission at different stages (one transitioned, one still deployed), different conflict situations (one emerging from civil war, one a newly independent nation now grappling with the consequences of civil war), and different geographic locations.

Liberia: Lessons from Integrating Gender and Transitions

UNMIL completed its deployment in March 2018, after close to 15 years on the ground. UNMIL had deployed in October 2003, following the signing of the August 2003 Comprehensive Peace Agreement. Liberia had been ravaged by civil war throughout the 1990s. What makes UNMIL such an interesting case study, is that it was one of the first missions to incorporate significant provisions from Resolution 1325, following its adoption a few years earlier. As a result, the mandate for UNMIL picks up on many of the themes that were included in that resolution. Consequently, UNMIL has been viewed as one of the more successful missions when it comes to implementing key provisions of the WPS agenda.[21] Throughout the fifteen years that the mission was deployed, it supported Liberia's efforts to advance WPS domestically in several ways. This section will examine the mission's role in facilitating women's participation in government and politics, advocating and modeling a role for women in the security sector, and facilitating processes

to develop a national and domestic approach through the development of Liberia's first National Action Plan on WPS.

Women bore a significant brunt of the conflict throughout the 14-year civil war in Liberia. The economic decline had limited their rights, there was widespread victimization making women more susceptible to sexual and gender-based violence, and women had lost critical access to different types of infrastructure across society, disempowering them.[22] The first mandate authorizing the deployment of UNMIL in October 2003 consequently included a heavy focus on women's protection from violence. Resolution 1509 deplored "all violations of human rights, particularly atrocities against civilian populations, including widespread sexual violence against women and children," and referred to the importance of considering the "special needs of child combatants and women" in terms of disarmament, demobilization, reintegration and rehabilitation programs, as well as protecting and promoting human rights. Perhaps most importantly, it reaffirmed "the importance of a gender perspective in peacekeeping operations and post-conflict peace-building in accordance with resolution 1325 (2000), recalled the need to address violence against women and girls as a tool of warfare, and encouraged UNMIL as well as the Liberian parties to actively address these issues."[23] This mandate enabled the establishment of a gender adviser function within the mission, which facilitated ongoing initiatives across the mission.

Despite the disproportionate impact that the civil war in Liberia had on woman, this had not stopped their efforts to ensure their voices were heard when it came to the political processes in the country. Prior to the deployment of UNMIL in 2003, women had engaged through initiatives such as the Liberian Women Initiative, the Mano River Women Peacebuilding Network, and Women in Peacebuilding Network, to develop constituencies of support and insert themselves into the peace negotiations.[24] This ultimately meant that the will of women was captured in the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, which also set quotas for representatives in the Transitional Legislative Assembly. Similarly, the Ministry of Gender and Development was established in 2001, serving "as the primary vehicle on all matters affecting the protection, promotion, participation and advancement of women in Liberia."[25]

Notably, much of the groundwork on women's participation and gender mainstreaming had been laid before the deployment of a UNMIL.[26] Many of the reforms that contributed to the environment that fostered women's participation and contributed to the election of

the continent's first female President in 2005, for instance, is therefore attributable to the work of women's civil society organizations in Liberia, although this was amplified by the work of UNMIL in investing in gender training and providing support to the Ministry of Gender.[27] Notably, as the best practices study by the UN indicated in 2009, the key to success up until that point had been a "multi-stakeholder" process, which engaged with the government, civil society organizations, and community-based organizations, "harnessing the existing political will for gender issues in the country."[28] The emergence of key women leaders was also fundamental to these efforts.

Also notable was the focus on women's participation in the security sector in UNMIL's mission mandate. UNMIL is often lauded for being one of the first missions to facilitate the deployment of an all-female Formed Police Unit (FPU) from India, with this being identified as an important enabling factor in encouraging and modeling women's participation in the security sector.[29] However there are mixed views on how effective the deployment was in encouraging greater participation of women in the security sector and engaging with local women, given that restrictions on their mobility and interactions may have limited them reaching their potential.[30] As Karim argues, while the deployed FPUs may have contributed to important overall goals within the peacekeeping mission (such as increased ratios of female peacekeepers and their engagement in protection efforts), those achievements still largely focused on largely "feminized work," meaning female peacekeepers continue to face barriers to their engagement.[31] Consequently, if these deployments of female peacekeepers are to serve as role models, then it is a narrow scope for the women seeking to serve in the Liberian security sector.

Efforts to increase women's participation in the national police in Liberia extended beyond simply mirroring the representation of female peacekeepers in missions. UNMIL worked closely with the Liberian National Police (LNP) to deliver on targets for women's participation, and develop educational support programs to ensure women met the basic standard for qualification and recruitment.[32] Numbers consequently increased, although efforts to generate more sustainable reforms remain hampered by many of the challenges facing women in defense and police sectors globally, including family pressures, pregnancy, and health issues. Nonetheless, UNMIL's engagement expedited efforts to increase the participation of women in the security sector, including through working

with donors and other partners to implement security sector reform programs.

In support of more comprehensive engagement on WPS, UNMIL also engaged in supporting the development of Liberia's first National Action Plan on WPS. In fact, the plan, adopted in 2009, recognized the support not only of UNMIL, but other UN agencies and donor countries in supporting its development. While there has been no second national version to follow after the NAPs initial period of 2009-2013, Liberia now has in place 11 localized plans on WPS.[33] Although NAPs are not the only indicator of government commitment to WPS (and indeed, can often serve as a smokescreen to conceal other failings), the presence of a NAP is often viewed as a starting point.

There is no doubt that UNMIL and the engagement of stakeholders brought resources to bear that supported Liberia's engagement on WPS over the last two decades, demonstrating that UN peacekeeping missions, in particular, can contribute to the advancement of WPS in countries affected by conflict. For Liberia, the challenge will be ensuring that those gains are sustained going forward.

South Sudan: Navigating Politics and Protection Concerns

Women were actively engaged in the independence movement for South Sudan. However, since then, they have continued to struggle to have a more formal role in peace negotiations as the country has struggled to resolve decades of internal divides, particularly since the outbreak of civil war in the country in December 2013.

UNMISS was established in July 2011, following the country's independence. Unfortunately, after decades of conflict with the north, South Sudan fell into civil war in December 2013, and women have disproportionately suffered as a consequence, through mass displacement and unprecedented levels of sexual violence, with the latter often being used to reward fighters for their engagement in the conflict.[34] With these developments, UNMISS' WPS mandate shifted from an initial focus on women's participation and engagement in political processes, to one that is focused on women's protection.[35] With that change, the mission also disengaged in its capacity-building efforts with the host government as it had largely become complicit in human rights abuses and atrocities, including against women. Needless to say, the operating environment for UNMISS when it comes to advancing WPS has been challenging.

Efforts to progress women's engagement in political participation and representation across government have, similarly, continued to face obstacles throughout the deployment of UNMISS. Women have continued to be underrepresented in formal peace negotiations, despite commitments to minimum levels of women's representation as part of transitional governance arrangements and peace agreements. Culturally, some of the gendered roles continue to drive the dynamics of localized conflicts, with the underage marriage of girls common and bride price (an amount paid by the husband to a woman's family) driving cattle-raiding and conflict across the country. Women also have considerably less access to education, meaning an overwhelming proportion of the female population is illiterate. Nonetheless, women have been actively engaged in many informal and localized conflict resolution efforts across the country, despite their lack of access to formal peace processes.[36]

The Security Council has recognized that many barriers exist to the full realization of Resolution 1325 in South Sudan:

> "[they would] only be dismantled through dedicated commitment to women's empowerment, participation and human rights, concerted leadership, consistent information and action, and support, to build women's engagement in all levels of decision-making, and through ensuring that the full and meaningful participation and involvement of women in all spheres of political leadership."[37]

Yet part of the challenge for UNMISS is that the government's largely authoritarian approach continues to limit the voice of women in peace efforts. Women-led organizations have to formally register with the government. With many of them being viewed as opposed to government, often they are stymied.[38] Following a march in the capital, Juba in 2018, many of the leaders of different women's groups were summoned and subjected to threats and intimidation by the government's security agencies. UN peacekeeping can have a big role in strengthening the advocacy of women's groups in these environments, through their high-level engagement with the government.

While the current mission mandate, renewed through Resolution 2459, includes a focus on women's participation, particularly the requirement for 35 percent women's representation in parliament as part of the most recent peace agreement, there is considerably more language devoted to sexual and gender-based violence and women's protection by

the mission. Impunity, lack of established rule-of-law mechanisms, and a poorly governed and supported security sector, have contributed to an environment where sexual violence is rife in parts of the country.[39] Through its protection of civilians mandate, UNMISS has afforded some protection to vulnerable groups, including women, in designated sites (referred to as "POC sites" or protection of civilian sites), and in areas where it has been able to project force. However, without significant reforms across the security and justice sectors, as well as political commitment, any initiatives undertaken by UNMISS are unlikely to remain sustainable beyond the deployment of the mission.

Like many countries on the continent, South Sudan has also developed a National Action Plan on WPS, with a duration from 2015–2020. Similar to Liberia, the plan was developed with the support and consultation of the peacekeeping mission, as well as other donors and stakeholders. But the plan has had a very limited impact on addressing some of the challenges that women continue to face.

Conclusions

Over the last two decades, UN peacekeeping operations have offered an important vehicle to facilitate the engagement of countries in Africa on women, peace, and security. They have:

i. Supported efforts to amplify women's voices in political processes, in government, and as part of conflict resolution initiatives;
ii. modeled the importance of engaging women in the security sector and positions of leadership;
iii. supported host governments in their efforts to respond to women's protection needs (and intervened when they have been unwilling to do so); and
iv. sought to mainstream the importance of gender across programs directed a long-term peace, including disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration, reform of the security sector, justice and the rule of law, and longer-term peacebuilding initiatives.

Of course, there are limits to what UN peacekeeping can and should do when it comes to advancing women, peace, and security. Peacekeeping is not a panacea when it comes to WPS and has its own flaws in its effort

to integrate WPS across its work. Peacekeepers often come with a limited understanding of the cultural context they are deploying into or the local and regional mechanisms that may be available to them when it comes to WPS. Furthermore, there are some countries that are actively working *against* the work of gender advisers in peacekeeping missions, despite the successes that these roles and functions have been shown to have in contexts such as Liberia. As the Global Study on Resolution 1325 identified in 2015,[40] these measures are often not prioritized. Gender advisers are not deployed at appropriate levels of seniority, women's civil society organizations are not funded adequately and many of the governments where UN peacekeeping missions have been deployed have continued to trample on women's rights and their role in society. These are all different challenges that countries are likely to continue to face, long after a peacekeeping mission has transitioned and departed.

It is difficult to measure progress when it comes to WPS in domestic contexts. Efforts to put in place effective monitoring and evaluation systems as part of the development of National Action Plans have remained a challenge for many countries. Nonetheless, there are some elements and areas of change that reflect whether a country is moving forward, including the levels of women's participation across political, electoral, and governance institutions, whether the levels of their engagement in the security sector are increasing (and if so, whether this is taking place at different levels and roles throughout the organization), and the overall perceptions of women's security across the country, including whether they are feeling safe, whether there is impunity, and whether their rights are being upheld. This is not an exhaustive list. There are many other indicators that can be drawn on.[41] But these highlight some of the pillars where peacekeeping missions tend to engage when it comes to participation, prevention, and protection.

The case studies of Liberia and South Sudan highlight some of the different challenges when it comes to UN peacekeeping missions supporting countries' commitments to WPS. UNMIL and UNMISS had different priorities and experiences in garnering government support and the engagement of civil society. Even with the progress that has been made in Africa at the continental and regional level, each approach by UN peacekeeping missions to WPS at the national and local level in-country must be context-specific to the circumstances on the ground.

Ultimately, UN peacekeeping missions offer an important but limited vehicle for advancing WPS on the African continent. Efforts will need to be increasingly focused on regional and sub-regional approaches to conflict. Similarly, the African Union will increasingly need to invest in its own regional and sub-regional peace operations, including some of the gender mechanisms that have already been deployed in contexts such as Somalia and elsewhere. Africa is well placed with a range of regional and continental mechanisms available to facilitate women's engagement across the continent. Countries on the continent have shown a willingness to lead and engage on the agenda, including through the work of the UN Security Council and multilateral institutions. Perhaps most importantly, women's civil society organizations have shown the way when it comes to leadership and advocacy to take forward reforms to advance women's participation and amplify their voices in peacebuilding initiatives on the continent. Those lessons and experiences offer an important roadmap for the way forward for UN peacekeeping as it continues to work with African partners to advance women's peace and security.

Key Recommendations

1. ***Listen to women, then engage, and build upon the networks that already exist in civil society organizations across the country.*** This requires ongoing, meaningful engagement with women. Women need to have influence and be heard. This should be captured in mission assessment and planning processes, as well as peacekeeping mission mandates. It is imperative that UN peacekeeping missions avoid becoming another form of colonialism that neglects the views of those they seek to serve, particularly when it comes to women and their role in society.
2. ***African governments and civil society need to be involved at the outset of programs focused on Women, Peace, and Security by UN peacekeeping missions***. Missions need to ensure that programs they develop—often in conjunction with UN country teams, agencies, and international and local non-governmental organizations—build sustainable approaches to WPS within institutions across government and mechanisms to engage effectively with civil society. National Action Plans on WPS offer one approach to facilitate this engagement.

3. ***Ensure that missions are making themselves obsolete in order to advance gender equality.*** This requires that equality becomes "business as usual" for the country's political leaders. In some countries, there is still much to do. But where leaders are not supportive of this agenda, regional and continental mechanisms to compel change need to be enforced.

Notes

1. United Nations Security Council, *Letter dated 12 July 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Namibia to the United Nations address to the Secretary-General,* UN Doc S/2000/693, July 14, 2000.
2. United Nations Transition Assistance Group (UNTAG) was deployed to Namibia from April 1989 to March 1990.
3. United Nations Security Council, *Letter dated 12 July 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Namibia to the United Nations.*
4. Sabrina Karim and Kyle Beardsley, *Equal Opportunity Peacekeeping: Women, Peace and Security in Post-Conflict States* (Oxford University Press, February 2017), 14.
5. Lisa Sharland, *Women, Gender and the A4P Agenda: An Opportunity for Action?*, Background Paper, Challenges Annual Forum 2018.
6. World Bank and United Nations, *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict* (Washington, DC: World Bank, 2018), xxiii.
7. Resolutions 1325 (2000); 1820 (2009); 1888 (2009); 1889 (2010); 1960 (2011); 2106 (2013); 2122 (2013); 2242 (2015), 2467 (2019), and 2493 (2019).
8. Toni Haastrup, "WPS and the African Union," in *The Oxford Handbook on Women, Peace and Security,* Sara E. Davies and Jacqui True (eds.) (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019), 378; and African Union Commission, Implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda in Africa, Addis Ababa, 2016, 6.
9. United Nations Security Council, *Letter dated 12 July 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Namibia to the United Nations*, 2.
10. Missions that have deployed to the continent since the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 include MINUCI (Côte d'Ivoire), UNMIL (Liberia), UNOCI (Cote d'Ivoire), ONUB (Burindi), UNMIS (Sudan), UNAMID (Darfur), MINURCAT (Central African Republic/Chad), MONUSCO (Democratic Republic of the Congo), UNMISS (South Sudan), UNISFA (Abyei), MINUSMA (Mali) and MINUSCA (Central African Republic).

11. United Nations-World Bank, *Pathways for Peace: Inclusive Approaches to Preventing Violent Conflict* (2018), 117.
12. United Nations, *Declaration of Shared Commitments on UN Peacekeeping Operations* (2017), paras 8 and 9.
13. Haastrup, "WPS and the African Union," 378.
14. Ibid., 379.
15. African Union Commission, *Implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda in Africa* (July 2016), 6.
16. African Union Commission, *Continental Results Framework—Monitoring and Reporting on the Implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda in Africa (2018–2028)* (Addis Ababa, 2019), 3.
17. Côte D'Ivoire, Uganda, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Sierra Leone, Ghana, Rwanda, Guinea-Bissau, Guinea, Burundi, Senegal, Burkina Faso, The Gambia, Mali, Togo, Nigeria, Central African Republic, Kenya, South Sudan, Niger, Angola, Cameroon, and Mozambique.
18. African Union Commission, *Continental Results Framework—Monitoring and Reporting on the Implementation of the Women, Peace and Security Agenda in Africa (2018–2028)* (Addis Ababa, 2019), 4.
19. Karim and Beardsley, *Equal Opportunity Peacekeeping*, 20
20. United Nations, *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325* (2015), 14.
21. Sabrina Karim, "Delivering WPS Protection in All Female Peacekeeping Force: The Case of Liberia," in *The Oxford Handbook on Women, Peace and Security, The Oxford Handbook on Women, Peace and Security,* Sara E. Davies and Jacqui True (eds.) (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019), 451.
22. United Nations, *Gender Mainstreaming in Peacekeeping Operations: Liberia 2003–2009,* 3.
23. United Nations S/RES/1509, operational paragraph 11.
24. United Nations, *Gender Mainstreaming in Peacekeeping Operations: Liberia 2003–2009,* 3.
25. Ibid., 4.
26. Although ECOWAS had been engaged in peace operations in the country through ECOMOG at the time.
27. Karim, "Delivering WPS Protection in All Female Peacekeeping Force," 451.
28. United Nations, *Gender Mainstreaming in Peacekeeping Operations: Liberia 2003–2009,* 30.

29. United Nations, "In a First for UN peacekeeping, All-Female Police Unit Arrives in Liberia," January 30, 2007, https://news.un.org/en/story/2007/01/207362-first-un-peacekeeping-all-female-police-unit-arrives-liberia.
30. Karim, "Delivering WPS Protection in All Female Peacekeeping Force," 458.
31. Ibid.
32. See, for instance, Laura Bacon, *Liberia's Gender Sensitive Police Reform—Starting from Scratch? Improving Representation and Responsiveness* (UNU Wider, October 2013); and United Nations, *Gender Mainstreaming in Peacekeeping Operations: Liberia 2003–2009,* 30.
33. United Nations, *Report of the Secretary General, Women and Peace and Security*, S/2019/800, October 9, 2019, 24.
34. Helen Kezie-Nwoha and Juliet Were, "Women's Informal Peace Efforts: Grassroots Activism in South Sudan," CMI Brief Number 7, November 2018.
35. United Nations Security Council Resolution 2996 (2011).
36. Kezie-Nwoha and Were, "Women's Informal Peace Efforts: Grassroots Activism in South Sudan."
37. UN Resolution 2459.
38. Kezie-Nwoha and Were, "Women's Informal Peace Efforts: Grassroots Activism in South Sudan."
39. UN News, "Endemic Sexual Violence Surging in South Sudan: UN Human Rights Office," February 15, 2019, https://news.un.org/en/story/2019/02/1032831.
40. See United Nations, *Preventing Conflict, Transforming Justice, Securing the Peace: A Global Study on the Implementation of United Nations Security Council Resolution 1325*, 2015, 279.
41. Georgetown Institute for Women, Peace and Security and Peace Research Institute Oslo, *Women, Peace and Security Index 2019/20: Tracking Sustainable Peace through Inclusion, Justice, and Security for Women*. Washington, DC, 2019.

8

Evolution of Local Peace Committees as Mechanisms for Grassroots Peacebuilding in Africa

Fritz Nganje

Introduction

This chapter analyzes the role of local peace committees (LPCs) as mechanisms for microlevel peacebuilding in Africa. Since the end of the Cold War, LPCs have been used globally as mechanisms to promote sustainable peace, against the backdrop of changing conflict dynamics and a new peacebuilding discourse that valorized the local context, local initiatives, and local agency in peacebuilding processes. The so-called "local turn" in peacebuilding inspired support for diverse forms of grassroots peacebuilding initiatives, not least in Africa, which have generally been identified with the generic term of "local peace committees." In taking stock of the practices and evolution of LPCs in Africa over the past 30 years, this chapter seeks to highlight the key issues that have animated

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grassroots peacebuilding during this period, while also identifying valuable lessons and best practices that could form the basis for improving this approach to peacebuilding in Africa.

The chapter is structured in four sections. The first section provides an overview of the peacebuilding the role of LPCs in Africa over the past three decades, coinciding with the ascendancy and evolution of the global discourse on "peacebuilding from below." The second section identifies and analyzes some of the key issues, lessons, and best practices that stand out from 30 years of grassroots peacebuilding through a variety of LPCs. The third and final section offers three policy recommendations for unlocking the full potential of LPCs.

Evolution of Local Peace Committees as Mechanisms for Grassroots Peacebuilding in Africa

Local peace committee is a generic name for a variety of local structures established for purposes of peacemaking and peacebuilding, using both traditional and modern conflict resolution mechanisms. LPCs are envisioned as organic, inclusive, participatory, and non-threatening social spaces that facilitate dialogue and mutual understanding, and allow for constructive problem-solving and joint action to prevent violence.[1] They have, therefore, been described as instruments that strengthen social cohesion and the resilience of local communities, thereby contributing to the search for sustainable peace beyond the immediate local environment.[2] Local peace committees are founded on the premise that individuals in communities affected by violent conflict have greater incentives than any external actor to resolve such conflict. They are also thought to be better placed to build and sustain peace through their intimate knowledge of the local culture, as well as community relations and dynamics. In this regard, the concept of LPCs resonates with the "peacebuilding from below" discourse, which gained prominence in the 1990s and argued for local communities affected by violent conflict to be recognized as resources and not just recipients of peacebuilding efforts that are largely driven from the outside.[3]

Emergence of Local Peace Committees in Africa as Self-Help Community Initiatives

In Africa, "local peace" committees arose as mechanisms for grassroots peacebuilding in the 1990s when local communities affected by violent conflict resorted to diverse self-help structures to facilitate dialogue, manage conflict and promote peaceful coexistence. Local peace committees in this context were essentially self-organizing community initiatives that emerged organically to fill the void left by national and international peacebuilding efforts, and generally drew on traditional African conflict resolution practices. In Kenya, for example, the Wajir Peace and Development Committee (WPDC) was established in 1995 through the efforts of a small group of women in response to recurrent violent conflict that had virtually crippled life in Wajir County. As Kaitlyn Hedditch noted, this homegrown peace initiative was the last resort to restoring some degree of normalcy in the Wajir district after international actors working to bring peace in the area pulled out following the killing of a United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF) pilot and aid worker in September 1993.[4] Although it would eventually engage with district authorities, the Wajir peace initiative originated with and was led by peace crusaders within the conflict-affected communities, who through sensitization campaigns and mediating among clan elders "succeeded in implementing and maintaining peace in the district."[5] The relative success of the Wajir peace committee in arresting the tide of violence in the district inspired the establishment of similar structures in other districts in northern Kenya in the 1990s. Local peace committees also became the preferred mechanism for resolving cross-border disputes along Kenya's borders with Somalia and Ethiopia.[6]

Similar examples of indigenous peacebuilding initiatives were recorded during this period in other African countries, such as Ghana and Burundi. In the case of the former, local peacebuilding initiatives spearheaded by civil society formations, based primarily on a methodology that combined community dialogue, mediation, and reconciliation, were credited with contributing to restoring relative peace and stability in the northern part of the country which had experienced high levels of inter- and intra-communal violent conflict between 1990 and 2002.[7]

In Burundi, LPCs emerged in the mid-1990s as informal mechanisms for dialogue, conflict management, reconciliation, and social rehabilitation to complement the official Arusha Peace Process that ended a decade-long civil war. The first of such structures, the Kibimba Peace Committee established in 1994, inspired the formation of LPCs across Burundi by playing an effective role in restoring trust among rival Hutu and Tutsi, and rebuilding the social fabric of a community that had been torn apart by inter-ethnic atrocities during the civil war.[8]

Toward the Formalization of Local Peace Committees in Africa

Arguably, it was in South Africa that local peace committees were first institutionalized and given a formal mandate to localize a national peace process in an African country. Following the signing of the National Peace Accord (NPA) in 1991 as part of South Africa's political transition, a nationwide network of peace committees was established. Within this framework, LPCs were charged with facilitating dialogue, building tolerance, and addressing issues of conflict through mediation and problem-solving approaches.[9] Andries Odendaal argued that, thanks in part to their institutionalization and the material and technical support that came with this, LPCs played an important role in mitigating the violent effect that South Africa's volatile transition had on local communities. However, he also observed that as part of a top-down peace process, LPCs did not always enjoy the support of local actors. What is more, their peacebuilding role was constrained by the deep polarization that characterized the transition, and the fact that both the NPA and LPCs were ill-equipped to resolve the greater structural conditions of inequality that caused conflict within the South African society.[10] As a result of these and other challenges, South Africa's formal LPCs fell into disuse after the country's political transition in 1994.[11]

The trend toward the formalization of LPCs in Africa became more prominent in the first part of the twenty-first century, amidst new and intractable peacebuilding challenges, which had prompted African leaders to adopt a resolution in 2002 requesting African countries to establish national frameworks to prevent, manage, and resolve conflicts.[12] New thinking within the "peacebuilding from below" discourse, which cautioned against taking for granted the peacebuilding potential of the local context, and questioned the dichotomy often maintained between local, national, and international peacebuilding initiatives,[13] also

contributed to efforts at institutionalizing LPCs by giving prominence to ideas such as Infrastructure for Peace (I4P). As a concept, I4P is loosely defined as "a network of interdependent systems, resources, values and skills held by government, civil society, and community institutions that promote dialogue and consultation; prevent conflict and enable peaceful mediation when violence occurs in a society."[14] Proponents of I4P argue that it affords local actors and communities the opportunity to "call on political and infrastructural resources at national [and international levels]," while still rooting their peacebuilding initiatives in the relevant local context, history, and culture.[15] It is, therefore, seen as an alternative peacebuilding approach with the potential to transform the power dynamics inherent in, and harness the positive aspects of, the relationship between local, state, and international actors.

Ghana is the first African country that has in recent years taken steps to recognize, formalize, and incorporate LPCs into a national peace infrastructure. Inspired by the relative success of local peacemaking and peacebuilding processes, the Ghanaian government, with the support of the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), established a peace architecture in 2005 composed of national, regional, and district peace councils with mandates to facilitate dialogue, problem-solving, and reconciliation processes throughout the country. Peace councils are supported administratively and technically by a Peacebuilding Support Unit within the Ministry of the Interior. Although it is yet to be fully institutionalized, Ghana's national peace architecture is believed to have contributed to defusing political tension during the highly contested 2008 and 2012 elections, and is seen as a model for harnessing local peace processes to promote peace and security at the national level.[16]

In Kenya, early attempts to formalize LPCs can be traced to 2001 when the government established the National Steering Committee on Peacebuilding and Conflict Management, which was tasked with formulating a national conflict management and peacebuilding policy, and coordinating various peacebuilding initiatives, including LPCs. However, it was in the aftermath of the 2007 post-election violence that a concerted effort was made to institutionalize a national peace architecture on the back of existing local peace structures. Odendaal argued that "the fact that districts with peace committees reported much less violence than others considerably raised awareness of the importance of enhancing local capacities for peace."[17] The 2008 National Accord and Reconciliation Agreement that ended the violence recommended the establishment

of district peace committees throughout the country. With the support of external donors such as the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), peace committees have since been created and capacitated in almost every district in Kenya, and have become key components of an evolving national architecture for peacebuilding and conflict management, albeit with mixed outcomes.[18]

Ethiopia represents a rather unique case of the formalization of LPCs in Africa. Since 2009, LPCs have become an integral part of the state's conflict prevention and resolution mechanism. What is more, LPCs in Ethiopia's border areas that form part of East Africa's Karamoja and Somali clusters have also been integrated into the subregional mechanism for conflict early warning and early response under the auspices of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD). IGAD's early warning and early response mechanism relies on the activities of a network of governmental and non-governmental stakeholders in each of its member states, coordinated by national Conflict Early Warning and Early Response Units (CEWERU). In Ethiopia, local peace committees play a significant role in localizing the mandate of the subregional mechanism for preventing, de-escalating, and resolving pastoral and related conflicts along the country's borders with Kenya, Somalia, and South Sudan. LPCs in turn receive financial, technical, and material support from IGAD's Rapid Response Fund.[19]

The Ascendancy of NGO-Sponsored Local Peace Committees

In those African countries where persistent social conflict has generated a strong need for concerted efforts to capitalize on grassroots mechanisms for peacebuilding and social cohesion, but there has not been an appetite to institutionalize these structures, it is often local and international NGOs that have stepped in to support and, in some instances, create LPCs. This is the case in Burundi where despite the relative successes of LPCs in restoring the social fabric of communities in the war-torn country, local peace processes have unfolded without governmental support or an overarching peace architecture. Instead, it is national and international NGOs, such as the Ministry for Peace and Reconciliation Under the Cross (MI-PAREC) and the British-based Agency for Cooperation and Research in Development (ACORD), that have been instrumental in creating and supporting LPCs as part of their peacebuilding and reconciliation strategies in the country.[20] Inspired by the

first LPC established by the residents of Kibimba in 1994, it is estimated that by 2012 NGOs had established and were supporting about 450 local peace committees in over 30 percent of the communes in Burundi.[21]

A similar trend can be observed in South Africa against the backdrop of increasing violence and social unrest in the country's impoverished townships and informal urban settlements, including xenophobic intolerance against migrants from other African countries. For example, in response to the large-scale xenophobic violence that killed more than 60 people in major urban areas across South Africa in 2008, the Action Support Centre (ASC), a Johannesburg-based NGO, launched an initiative in 2010 to harness the positive legacy of LPCs that were created during South Africa's transition but had since become defunct. The ASC has worked to revive LPCs in major hotspots of xenophobic conflict in townships and impoverished suburbs around Johannesburg, Pretoria, and Durban. It provides continued technical, logistical, and moral support to LPCs, mostly in the form of training in mediation and conflict transformation, but also through initiatives such as the Local Peacebuilders Awards, which recognize individual and community efforts dedicated to promoting peace and social cohesion in these townships and suburbs.[22] Local peace committees in this context have used a combination of community dialogues, mediation, as well as education and awareness campaigns to attempt to resolve differences and foster mutual understanding and reconciliation between foreign nationals and their South African hosts.[23] They have also reportedly been instrumental in arresting the spread of violence during the recent 2019–2020 episodes of xenophobic unrest, playing a major role in alerting the police and other relevant authorities to potential attacks, and mobilizing communities to protect foreign nationals and their properties.[24]

Three Decades of Local Peace Committees: Key Issues and Lessons Learned

For the purpose of highlighting pertinent lessons that could assist in strengthening local peacebuilding processes on the continent, this section identifies and discusses five key issues and best practices that stand out from the preceding review of the peacebuilding role of LPCs in Africa. These relate to the formalization, or lack thereof, of LPCs; their relationship with formal institutions and processes of governance; the scope of

intervention of; contradictions in the peacebuilding role of LPCs, as well as the issue of external funding and support.

To Formalize or Not to Formalize?

Perhaps the major issue that has defined the peacebuilding role of LPCs in Africa is how to reconcile the dilemma: between retaining the essentially informal character of these structures and reaping the benefits that come with formalization. As pointed out earlier, the value proposition of the notion of local peace committee rests primarily on the argument that peacebuilding initiatives that are anchored in the resources and everyday experiences of local communities, as opposed to being externally imposed, have a greater chance of success and sustainability. The relative success of pioneering LPCs in countries like Kenya, Ghana, and Burundi has, therefore, been attributed largely to their informality, which encouraged dynamism in, as well as local participation and ownership of, peacebuilding processes. Informality also means that the work of LPCs is not hamstrung by the politicking that often undermines the effectiveness and efficiency of formal peacebuilding processes.

However, as the South African case suggests, informality can also pose a challenge to the effectiveness of LPCs. In the post-apartheid period, LPCs operating as informal community structures have been constrained in their peacebuilding role by their lack of institutional legitimacy and the corresponding inability to influence the formal processes of governance. Local peace committees in this context have also received little support and cooperation from state agencies, making it difficult for them to effectively address local conflicts that are embedded in the broader political, social, and economic structure of the state. The present situation contrasts with the experience of LPCs that operated in South Africa in the 1990s. Because these earlier structures were institutionalized as part of a national peace architecture, and were endowed with a formal mandate to localize the transitional peace process, they had access to material, technical, and institutional support from the state. This formalization was crucial in empowering LPCs to play an important role in mitigating the violent effect that South Africa's volatile transition had on local communities, even though the top-down nature of the peace process meant that LPCs did not always enjoy the support of local actors.[25]

It is partly in an attempt to reconcile this dilemma that the idea of I4P has gained prominence in discourses on peacebuilding in Africa. National

and regional peace architectures that have been established in Ghana, Kenya, and other parts of East Africa hold the prospects of "[creating] sufficient space for local leaders to establish structures and processes that suit their situation best and that will enhance their sense of local ownership and achievement… [while allowing] local communities to call on political and infrastructural resources at national [and regional levels]."[26] However, the existence of national peace infrastructures is no guarantee that LPCs will have a constructive relationship with the formal institutions and processes of governance.

Relationship with Formal Institutions and Processes of the State

Whether operating as informal or institutionalized mechanisms, local peace committees cannot escape the influence of formal institutions and processes. The effectiveness of the peacebuilding role of LPCs, therefore, depends to a large extent on the nature and quality of their relationship with the formal institutions and processes of the state. This relationship takes on various forms. Firstly, LPCs often rely on their association with state institutions to legitimize and garner broad support for their peacebuilding activities. However, the involvement of local authorities in the work of LPCs has sometimes had a constraining rather than an enabling effect. Elected officials, in particular, have tended to infiltrate LPCs for purposes of using these structures to promote their narrow political ends. Because LPCs generally lack enforcement capacity and often rely on their moral authority, the absence of a cooperative relationship with local officials and other state agencies such as the police has, in some instances, also undermined the efficacy of their peacebuilding initiatives. In other cases, LPCs have been forced to assume a subordinate and largely ineffective role because their mandate and functions overlap with those of local state structures.

The complementarity between the methods used by LPCs and existing institutional processes is also a key determinant of the peacebuilding effectiveness. For example, in South Africa where a Mozambican national was gruesomely murdered during the wave of xenophobic violence in 2015, the local peace committee in the township of Alexandra was able to complement the formal judicial process of prosecution with a traditional process of forgiveness and healing, which, according to a member of the Alexandra LPC, brought some degree of reconciliation to the affected

families. A member of the Alexandra local peace committee describes the relationship of their intervention to the formal judicial process as follows:

> Two of the families of the boys who killed Sithole [the murdered Mozambican national] wanted to talk to the bereaved family. All the families wanted was to say "sorry," but that process was not allowed because according to our formal justice system the two parties should be separated. I told the families to write a letter expressing their apology which I took to the Sithole family. Sithole's family read the letter and said they forgive them, but the total and true forgiveness will come when the family of Mthethwa [one of the accused] goes to the grave of the deceased and apologises according to our culture.[27]

Where this complementarity is lacking, the tension between the preferred peacebuilding methods of local peace committees and the institutional processes of the state has tended to constrain the role of LPCs. This is the case in Kenya, where the use of customary conflict management and peacebuilding methods by LPCs has sometimes come up against the constitutional values and justice system of the state.[28] There have been instances where court orders have been used to challenge and inhibit the work of LPCs.[29] A legal and policy framework that clearly defines the role and mandate of LPCs in relation to the formal institutions of the state is, therefore, critical for the effectiveness of these structures.

Scope of Local Peace Committee Intervention

Another important lesson that stands out from the review of local peace committees in Africa over the past three decades relates to what LPCs can do and what they cannot be expected to achieve. As the cases highlighted above suggest, LPCs are most effective in the context of low-key community conflicts that can be addressed using dialogue, mediation, or other problem-solving approaches. LPCs are generally ill-suited for conflict situations that require the enforcement of peace, as they are often designed to be essentially consensus-building forums. This is particularly true for informal LPCs, which lack institutional legitimacy and depend largely on their moral authority for acceptance in the local environment in which they operate.

Even in cases where LPCs are formalized, it would be naïve to expect them to make any significant contribution to resolving conflicts that are

rooted in the socio-economic and political structure of the state, especially in the absence of a commitment by the relevant authorities to address the underlying causes of conflict. As Odendaal has observed, "LPCs will not be successful when there is a lack of political will toward peace at national level [and] it cannot be expected of LPCs to address the root causes of conflict, namely the larger political, social, or economic systems."[30] In this regard, LPCs can play a role in mitigating the effects of violent conflicts in their communities, but are often powerless in transforming the dynamics of the conflict and bringing about sustainable peace.

Likewise, although in countries like South Africa local peace committees have been instrumental in resolving disputes arising from inefficiencies and perceived corruption in the processes of local governance, LPCs cannot be expected to assume the service delivery and community safety functions of local governments for which they have no mandate. They can collaborate with relevant local government structures and facilitate the efficient and equitable delivery of social services, but should, at all times, resist the temptation of taking on local government functions that would dilute their core peacebuilding role.

Local Peace Committees as Sites for Social Contestation and Normative Contradictions

In principle, LPCs are intended as inclusive and non-threatening social spaces that promote broad stakeholder participation in the common search for peace and harmony. However, a closer look at the history of LPCs on the continent suggests that these same characteristics can be an impediment to micro-level peacebuilding. The imperative for inclusiveness means that LPCs sometimes include local actors who have no vested interest in peace, but see these structures primarily as forums for extending their influence and promoting their narrow political and economic interests.

In this context, LPCs become sites for power struggles between different social interests, often at the expense of efforts to foster peace and social cohesion in the respective communities. In the aftermath of the 2015 xenophobic unrest in major urban areas across South Africa, efforts by the Orange Farm LPC to promote reconciliation between foreign nationals and their South African counterparts were held hostage by political party posturing within the committee. Community dialogues convened by the local peace committee "were marred by political jostling

by ANC members who refused to allow the meetings to continue unless the ANC branch chairperson facilitated proceedings."[31]

Moreover, while LPCs draw significant strength and legitimacy from being rooted in the local culture and processes, this local embeddedness also means that they almost invariably replicate the power structures that prevail in the communities in which they operate. Working through, instead of attempting to transform, traditional power structures that are oppressive and discriminatory may enable local peace committees to earn the cooperation of local power brokers, but this compromise has implications for the nature of the peace that LPCs are able to create. For example, Kaitlyn Hedditch noted that accounts of the success of the Wajir peace committee in Kenya often mask "the challenging circumstances through which [the women at the center of the initiative] were forced to both assert and compromise their agency," in an attempt to simultaneously accommodate and challenge traditionally ascribed gender roles.[32]

In South Africa, where a xenophobic attitude is entrenched in the dominant power structure prevailing in townships and informal settlements, some LPCs have tended to embody and reproduce the marginalization of, and discrimination against, migrants from other African countries. For example, the LPC in Orange Farm has been used by local politicians, business people, and other dominant interest groups to informally exercise control over the existence and activities of migrants residing in the township.[33]

These inherent contradictions in the role of LPCs do not only undermine their peacebuilding effectiveness, but also raise questions about their accountability. LPCs often lack formal accountability mechanisms, and tend to rely on the principles of inclusiveness, participation, and transparency to safeguard the integrity of their activities and outcomes. The restraining effect of these principles is sometimes trumped by contending norms and unequal power relations in the local communities in which LPCs are embedded.

Funding and External Support

The issue of funding and external support has been a contentious theme in the evolution of LPCs as peacebuilding mechanisms in Africa. Although many LPCs in Africa started their work relying almost exclusively on community resources, they have tended to depend on external support to sustain their peacebuilding activities. Financial, technical, institutional, or

even moral support for LPCs in Africa has come from local and national governments, donor agencies like USAID, intergovernmental and multilateral development organizations such as IGAD and the UNDP, as well as a variety of international and local NGOs.

Historically, external support for LPCs in Africa has produced mixed outcomes. On the one hand, some LPCs established by NGOs have become so dependent on external funding and support that they have been unable to operate on their own. Similarly, it has been reported that in countries like Kenya and Liberia where NGOs have paid so-called "sitting fees" to peace monitors, this has destroyed the spirit of volunteerism and undermined the very essence of local peace committees as community-inspired and community-owned initiatives.[34] On the other hand, as noted above, it has been thanks to the involvement and support of external actors that many LPCs have been able to sustain their activities over an extended period of time. The centrality of external support is underscored by the recent trend in which some LPCs in South Africa and Kenya have opted to transform themselves into NGOs in order to be eligible for donor funding. There is a need for more empirical research to better understand the implications of external support for the autonomy and effectiveness of local peace committees. It is, however, clear from the cases discussed above that LPCs could, at the very least, benefit from some financial, logistical, and technical support. The lingering challenge is how to ensure that external involvement does not compromise their indigenous character.

Conclusion

Grassroots initiatives for peacebuilding and social cohesion have a long history in African societies. However, it was the post-Cold War local orientation in peacebuilding, embodied in the concept of peacebuilding from below, that gave greater prominence to these initiatives within "mainstream" peacebuilding discourses and practices. The prevalence of LPCs as mechanisms for micro-level peacebuilding across the continent should be seen in this context. The experience of three decades of LPCs discussed in this chapter can be summarized in two overarching lessons.

First, the principles of local initiative and local agency that underpin the idea of LPCs are necessary but not sufficient peacebuilding requirements. This is because the local context itself is as much a terrain for the reinforcement of oppressive and violence-breeding tendencies as it is a catalyst

for building sustainable peace. The fact that LPCs are embedded in these complex local environments presents both opportunities and challenges for peacebuilding.

Second, the effectiveness of LPCs is strengthened when these initiatives are conceived as a complement to broader national, regional, or international peacebuilding processes. Against the backdrop of the complex and multi-level nature of contemporary conflicts, it is naïve to imagine that grassroots initiatives can, on their own, resolve the multiple threats to local peace and social cohesion. In many instances, local conflicts and insecurity are intertwined with national, regional, and even global dynamics so that even with the best of intentions, local actors often lack the authority and capacity to act decisively. This then calls for a collaborative peacebuilding framework that links local, national, regional, as well as global initiatives and resources, although care must be taken to ensure that local agency is not stifled in the process.

Key Recommendations

1. ***Create an enabling legal and policy framework for local peace committees.*** African governments can contribute to creating an enabling environment for local peace committees by putting in place appropriate legal and policy frameworks that clearly define the role and mandate of LPCs in relation to existing peacebuilding and governance institutions. While the formalization of LPCs is not a prerequisite for their effectiveness, and in some instances can even be an impediment, it is still imperative for these structures to be institutionally recognized and protected. This will not only provide institutional support for LPCs, but will also eliminate potential overlap and conflict between LPCs and state institutions. An appropriate legal and policy framework will also help to address the accountability deficit that many LPCs face. This is particularly useful in those countries that are yet to establish a national peace infrastructure.
2. ***Incorporate local peace committees into all new post-conflict peacebuilding initiatives.*** Subsequent United Nations (UN) and African Union (AU) post-conflict peacebuilding missions should include a mandate to support and integrate LPCs into their respective national peacebuilding strategies. As observed earlier, local peace committees can be effective mechanisms for localizing national peace efforts.

Recognizing LPCs as an integral part of the post-conflict peacebuilding frameworks of the UN and the AU, while also respecting their autonomy and uniqueness, will assure these local structures of the resources as well as the institutional legitimacy and support needed to make a meaningful contribution to the peaceful and sustainable transformation of post-conflict environments in Africa.

3. ***Establish national and regional networks of local peace committees.*** International actors like the UN and Western donors can contribute to developing the peacebuilding capacity of local peace committees in Africa by establishing and supporting national and regional networks of LPCs to serve as platforms for facilitated peer learning and support, as well as the sharing of experiences and best practices. These mechanisms can be used to strengthen the capacity and performance of individual LPCs without directly interfering in their operations or making them dependent on outside support.

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Thirty Years of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in Africa: Contexts and Contents

Anatole Ayissi

We are living in dangerous times. Protracted conflicts are causing unspeakable human suffering. Armed groups are proliferating, equipped with a vast array of weapons. As armed conflicts grow more deadly, destructive and complex, we need a new focus on disarmament that saves lives.[1]

Introduction

This chapter is an analysis of three decades of efforts to disarm, demobilize, and reintegrate former combatants as part of conflict resolution

This chapter represents the personal views of the author.

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and post-conflict peace consolidation, particularly in contexts of peacekeeping operations carried out by the United Nations. The chapter reviews the evolution of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs in Africa over the last 30 years, highlighting, in particular, trends and challenges relating to their implementation as well as the lessons learned and the best practices recorded. It concludes with a few observations on the future of DDR in Africa, as well as practical recommendations to policymakers and practitioners, taking expressly into consideration the prevalent conflict landscape in Africa, made up of "the continuing volatility of local conflict dynamics,"[2] which is aggravated by the mounting scourge of violent extremism, terrorism,[3] and the "democratization of armed violence" in a number of countries and areas.

DDR is defined as an operation that consists of the assembly and cantonment of ex-combatants, consistent with the provisions of a peace agreement, with a view to collecting their weapons, disbanding their formal military framework, and assisting them in reintegrating into society, either as civilians or formal members of national armed or security (e.g., national police, gendarmerie) forces.[4]

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in Africa: Contexts and Contents

The "Disarmament, Demobilization, Reintegration, and Rehabilitation" (DDRR[5]) of ex-combatants has emerged as a major pillar for post-conflict peace consolidation in Africa. For a number of peace processes and operations on the continent, the quality of DDR implementation ranks high on the list of the criteria against which the probability of a country recovering from crisis to relapse into violence is assessed. As stated by Colonel (rtd.) Prosper Nzekani Zena of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), experience shows that "incomplete or poorly conceived disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) initiatives have been key factors to high rates of conflict relapse in Africa."[6] Successfully implemented DDR programs, however, give the stronger chances to conflict resolution and post-conflict peace. Indeed, the rationale behind the need to respond urgently to the challenge of ex-combatants after conflict is that "DDR programs are essential in helping to prevent the recurrence of war in post-conflict situations."[7]

An overview of DDR programs in Africa over the last three decades shows that these programs have been carried out in two broad crisis

contexts. Some DDR programs are initiated as part of efforts toward addressing a security crisis provoked by inadequacies and deficits in the national security sector, with a view to implementing a national security sector reform (SSR) strategy. Though a significant number of African countries have carried out such programs, especially southern and West African countries, experience shows that the vast majority of DDR programs in Africa are, instead, carried out in the context of the implementation of a peace agreement, generally concluded between the protagonists of a civil war.

When adopting its standards and operational rules pertaining to the implementation of DDR programs ten years ago, the United Nations took note of the growing demand for DDR, stressing that especially since the late 1980s, the international community had "increasingly been called upon to support the implementation of DDR programs in countries emerging from conflict,"[8] including African countries in particular. Indeed, as of 2019, over two-thirds of the 54 African countries have implemented DDR programs in the context of a peace process, often with the assistance of the United Nations.[9]

Thirty Years of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in Africa: Issues, Trends and Lessons Learned

One of the major lessons learned from these programs is that the fate of DDR is shaped by changes and evolutions in UN peace operations. In a keynote address delivered during a meeting on DDR in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire in 2017, the UN High Representative for Disarmament Affairs, Izumi Nakamitsu, emphasized this connection between "the nature of DDR operations and peacekeeping."[10] She recalled "how crucial the disarmament, demobilization and reintegration processes are to sustaining peace." She stressed that "over the past three decades, DDR has become an integral part of peace operations across the globe [and] has played a key role in violence prevention, stabilization and support to political processes." She noted that "this crucial contribution to sustaining peace is manifested in successful DDR programs, as witnessed in Central America, Angola, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and—of course—Côte d'Ivoire."[11]

Africa, a Major Host of Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Programs

The fact that four out of the five examples cited above are from Africa is not a coincidence. Since the inception of the first major United Nations DDR programs in Central America about three decades ago,[12] the African continent has been the most important host for DDR programs.[13] In 2006, the Secretary-General of the United Nations revealed that between February 2000 and March 2006, "six peacekeeping operations have included disarmament, demobilization and reintegration as part of their mandate," among which five were in Africa: the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO); the United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL); the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI); the United Nations Operation in Burundi (ONUB); and the United Nations Mission in Sudan (UNMIS).[14] Three years later, in 2009, the World Bank estimated that two-thirds of the over 30 countries where DDR programs have been implemented over the last 20 years are in Africa.[15]

As of 2020, there were 13 peacekeeping operations active globally, many with a DDR component. Half of these operations are in Africa: Western Sahara, the Central African Republic, Mali, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Darfur, Abyei (the border between Sudan and South Sudan), and South Sudan.[16] DDR is a major priority for all of these operations. For many of them, DDR has proved to be a strong imperative for a timely and efficient implementation of signed peace agreements.

From the quantitative standpoint, hundreds of thousands of ex-combatants have been disarmed and demobilized in Africa over the last decades, thus contributing significantly to increasing chances for sustainable peace and recovery after crises.[17] Overall, available data show that close to one million ex-combatants have gone through formal DDR programs since the late 1980s. In the Democratic Republic of the Congo alone, 209,605 ex-combatants had gone through DDR by March 2011,[18] while over 100,000 ex-combatants were disarmed, demobilized, and sent back to regular life at the end of the civil war in Liberia, and about 93,000 ex-combatants were the subject of DDR in Mozambique.[19] In addition, 72,490 and 80,000 ex-combatants underwent DDR in Sierra Leone and Angola, respectively.[20] The most recently concluded DDR program in Africa was in Côte d'Ivoire, where a total of 69,505 ex-combatants were disarmed and demobilized between October 2012 and June 2015. Thus, in terms of numbers, DDR has achieved tremendous success in Africa.

This is good news for peace and recovery, since the "process of disarmament, demobilization and reintegration has repeatedly proved to be vital to stabilizing a post-conflict situation" and "to reducing the likelihood of renewed violence."[21]

However, the analysis in the next section will show that this success has to be appreciated against the background of a great deficit of qualitative outcomes in many DDR programs. In practice, many DDR programs have essentially been about the "DD," while the most critical "R" generally remains unaddressed. Many DDR programs have also suffered a lack credibility stemming from the inherent fragility of the peace agreements which gave rise to them. Yet when done well, the evidence is clear that DDR can "make a key contribution to strengthening confidence between former factions and enhancing the momentum toward stability."[22]

Africa as a "Living Laboratory"[23] for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

Africa has also proved to be an important "laboratory" for DDR experiments, in particular in the context of rapidly changing post-Cold War conflict settings. In the 2000s, as new conflict landscapes were emerging in Africa—and the rest of the world[24]—many DDR programs increasingly faced difficulties and could not be implemented as provided for in peace agreements. The then Secretary-General of the United Nations, in a report to the General Assembly, noted that "while the scale, complexity, scope and type of the United Nations work in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration have changed, our means of planning and implementing such operations have not." He warned that this has ultimately led "at worst […] to disillusioned ex-combatants returning to arms." The resurgence of armed violence amidst peace processes in these countries led the Secretary-General to recognize that "the narrow focus on short-term security goals," when it comes to implementing DDR programs, was inefficient, if not counterproductive, for post-conflict recovery and peace consolidation. He recommended "to capture systematically lessons learned from previous disarmament, demobilization and reintegration programs and to ensure that the lessons are rigorously applied in future operations."[25] The exceptionally tough challenges that UN peacekeeping operations met in Africa, including in places such as Sierra Leone and Somalia, greatly informed the thinking that followed

these recommendations and which, in 2010, led the UN to develop "the 'second generation' DDR."[26]

A major emerging trend in the "transformation of conflict" taken into consideration when crafting the second generation of DDR was the mounting threat of what Jairo Munive and Finn Stepputat called "Armed Non-Statutory Actors" (ANSAs), i.e., those spoilers who were neither part of national armed forces nor "non-state" (rebel) armed groups formally part of the process of implementation of peace agreements. An ANSA was defined as an "organized group with a basic structure of command operating outside state control that uses force, or the threat of force, to achieve its objectives […], ranging from insurgent armies and militias to vigilantes and urban gangs, exercise some degree of control over territory and populations, and they may develop levels of organization similar to or even surpassing that of statutory armies."[27]

In line with this analysis, when crafting the second generation of DDR, Munive and Stepputat underscored that while "in the 1990s, international DDR programs were used mostly to deal with statutory and insurgent armies following peace accords to which the warring parties were signatories, since then, however, other types of armed actors, such as militias, have grown in importance and have influenced the stability of governments and the security of civilian populations by demonstrating a high degree of flexibility and […] adaptability to shifting circumstances."[28] The ongoing conflict in the eastern DRC, which has now lasted over 20 years, is one of the most emblematic illustrations of this situation.

As a "response to the shifting anatomy of armed conflict," the DDR concept was radically reconfigured, especially "to deal with armed groups while conflict is still ongoing and without a negotiated peace accord being in place," and also to address "situations of armed conflict that involve hybrid forms of violence as well as a range of armed actors that control, or influence significantly, populations and territories, without being part of peace negotiations or under direct state control," as is the case, for instance, in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Sudan, and Somalia, where "militias have become one of the main agents of political violence."[29]

One of the reasons behind the advent of the second generation of DDR was to "contribute to a secure environment and help build the foundation for longer-term peacebuilding." But more than a decade after the adoption of the UN's DDR standards and the advent of the second generation of DDR, there is still a strong sense in Africa that many

conflicts/crises on the continent will not be solved unless the international community changes how peacekeeping and DDR are done. To highlight only a few examples:

i. In January 1999, in Sierra Leone, a failed peace and DDR process led to armed rebels from the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) launching a brutal attack on Freetown, the capital city. By the time the peace operation regained control of the situation, more than 5,000 people had been killed.[30]
ii. In the DRC, where more than 200,000 ex-combatants were disarmed and demobilized in the early 2010s, dozens of armed groups were still active in the eastern part of the country at the end of the decade, resulting in thousands of deaths annually over the period. More than two million people were newly displaced in 2017 and 2018 alone.[31]
iii. The Central African Republic (CAR) has hosted more than 13 international or regional peace missions over the last 20 years,[32] and as many, if not more, DDR programs. Yet as of early 2019, over 80 percent of the country was controlled by armed groups.[33]
iv. For many years, the UN peacekeeping mission in Côte d'Ivoire was highly supportive of DDR endeavors deployed by the government and much was accomplished. On June 28, 2017, the Secretary-General of the United Nations welcomed "the closure of the United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire (UNOCI) [scheduled] on 30 June 2017, after having successfully achieved its mandate."[34] Unfortunately, three months later, supposedly disarmed ex-combatants launched a series of attacks or mutinies (for those reintegrated in the national armed forces) in Abidjan and other localities of Côte d'Ivoire, threatening to "set the country on fire," claiming that the government had yet "to pay" the full amount of money promised to each combatant as a component of the DDR package.[35] This was the second time in six months that Ivorian ex-combatants had rebelled against state authority and wreaked havoc in their respective neighborhoods.

It is worth noting that in all of these cases, civilian populations in the affected communities were the first and main victims of the recurring waves of DDR-related violence.

From Combatant-Focused to Community-Based Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration

There is a major lesson that emerges from these and other DDR experiences[36]: the most effective way to guarantee the success and sustainability of DDR programs is to make sure that these programs serve not only ex-combatants, but also, and above all, all the populations and communities affected by violent conflict, including the most vulnerable among them. As such, as many African countries emerging from crisis continue to deal with the impact of armed violence on civilian populations, it has become common practice to assess the efficiency of a DDR project holistically: how well has it served the whole community that has been devastated by armed conflict? Fifteen years after the very first DDR programs were launched on the continent, *Africa Renewal*, a publication of the United Nations that focuses on African economic and social issues, recalled that this concern had become one of the most pressing challenges that DDR programs faced in the majority of the countries in which they were being implemented. In a special issue, released in October 2005, which undertook a comprehensive assessment of DDR implementation programs, a wide range of practitioners and academics spoke about their respective experiences with DDR. The majority of them deplored the fact that "because of their specific mandates [which focus on ex-combatants], most DDR programs concentrate on ex-combatants, and less on the communities to which they will return." They recommended that these projects "should do more to help broader community recovery."[37]

Five years earlier, in 2000, as the counterproductive effects of ex-combatant-focused DDR were being increasingly felt amidst countries and communities recovering from conflict, Victor Odame Asiedu published a PhD dissertation entitled "A Study of How Community-based Approach to Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR) can Contribute More Effectively to Peacebuilding" in Africa.[38] His analysis highlighted the fact that "whilst the use of DDR continues to grow, it has been criticized for its focus on ex-combatants rather than communities."[39] He concluded that a major consequence of such narrowly focused DDR is that it "sometimes creates divisions among community members and strains the entire peacebuilding process."[40] Asiedu further observed that "in view of this limited approach to DDR, academics and practitioners alike are increasingly arguing for a community-based (CB) approach, especially during the reintegration

process, as a way of addressing resentment among community members, which impedes more effective peacebuilding."[41] His analysis echoed the work of two experts from the Danish Institute for International Studies, who argued that DDR should "comprise communal development projects in order to diminish resentment from non-combatants in the 'home communities.'"[42]

The initial DDR programs implemented in African countries emerging from armed conflict were exclusively intended for "those bearing arms." These "weapons-users" were considered and treated as a distinctly specific group, different from the rest of the community. Consequently, instead of strengthening social cohesion after conflict, DDR programs became one of the most divisive factors in communities affected by armed conflict, re-fueling conditions that led to armed violence. The disruptive effects of DDR were both domestic and cross-border/regional.

On the domestic side, DDR packages offered to ex-combatants included, among other features, in-kind compensation, free vocational training, and resources for income-generating projects. In addition, each ex-combatant was provided with a significant amount of cash; for instance, in Liberia it was US $300 per ex-combatant, and in Côte d'Ivoire, US $1,000. In the post-war environment of acute scarcity and dire poverty, in which the vast majority of peoples live on less than half a dollar a day, these payments were relatively generous. In the eyes of those populations excluded from DDR programs because they neither carried guns nor killed people, such a comparatively large amount of money offered to ex-combatants was morally and economically unjust. They viewed ex-combatants as the privileged few who benefited from the tragedy of war. This situation generated widespread frustration and anger, further complicating the relationship between returning ex-combatants, the civilian population, and the international community that funded and implemented DDR programs. In some cases, international partners were accused of "rewarding violence." The challenges raised here mirror those highlighted by Bigombe in her case studies of DDR in Uganda and Burundi in this volume.

On the regional side, combatant-focused DDR also had important regional and cross-border consequences. In countries where armed conflicts are recurrent, one of the grimmest effects of combatant-focused DDR was that every recurring wave of armed violence generated an increasing number of people, especially the young, taking up arms and

fighting, some with the hope of benefiting from post-crisis DDR packages. Hence, ironically, DDR became yet another incentive to violence, especially in those parts of Africa where armed conflicts easily spread across state borders. The cross-border impact of violence culminated in a phenomenon the United Nations calls "foreign combatants." Their implications for DDR are significant.

"Foreign combatants" are nationals from a country crossing the border to participate in an armed conflict in another country, generally for political or economic reasons. In terms of the rules governing armed conflict, African "foreign combatants"—also called "negative forces" in the DRC—are a distinctive type of "soldiers of fortune" with a gray legal status between a "mercenary" and a "transnational criminal." For instance, while many young Sierra Leoneans fought in the civil war in Liberia, there are also many young Liberians who were recruited by Sierra Leonean rebel groups to fight in Sierra Leone; likewise, nationals from Chad fought in the civil war in the CAR, while many Sudanese "foreign combatants" are found in both Chad and the CAR.[43] The situation in the DRC, where spoilers of one kind or another are pervasive in the eastern part of the country, illustrates how DDR can serve to incentivize the regionalization of both armed conflict and armed combatants. Many ex-combatants could easily cross state borders and fight multiple wars, thus benefiting from DDR packages from two to three countries as happened during the wars that raged in the West African Mano River Basin (Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Côte d'Ivoire) between December 1989 and April 2011.

DDR experts and practitioners have learned from these experiences. Today's DDR programs enable countries to foster community-based development, social cohesion, post-conflict reconciliation, and peacebuilding. According to the UN's new Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS), such community-based DDR lays the groundwork "for safeguarding and sustaining the communities" in which ex-combatants "can live as law-abiding citizens, while building national capacity for long-term peace, security, and development."[44]

Over the last decade, many governmental and non-governmental actors who committed to rebuilding peace in African countries recovering from armed conflicts have been consistently adjusting their DDR programs in the field with the objective of addressing the concerns and priorities of local communities. This is, for instance, the case for the

United States Agency for International Development (USAID) and its "Community-Focused Reintegration" (CFR) project,[45] which takes into consideration the need "to promote reintegration by creating a safe environment in which elements of divided communities could interact." Likewise, Pax Christi, a Rome-based NGO helping communities affected by armed crises to respond to the challenging issue of transitional justice, has crafted a "Community Based Reintegration and Security" (CBRS) program that recommends that DDR efforts should "take root at local levels, which is essential to their legitimacy and sustainability."

In order to disseminate knowledge and build the skills of practitioners in the area of community-based DDR, the United Nations, in synergy with other partners, has developed a specialized training course on "Community-Based Reintegration and Security (CBRS) for practitioners." The course teaches "an innovative approach for more comprehensive context and community-driven reintegration, integration, resilience, and community security programming," focusing in particular on "how community-based economic development can increase economic opportunities" for both ex-combatants and the larger community, thus "encouraging acceptance amidst those hosting communities" of ex-combatants.[46] The course also explores new ways to design more "gender responsive programming."[47] In terms of information and experience sharing, the course offers the opportunity to bring together "experienced practitioners from around the world to learn about cutting-edge approaches and theories, to share experience, and develop their skills to effectively plan and deliver community-based reintegration and security programmes."[48]

Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration in Africa: The Achilles Heel, and the Iron Rules

The Achilles Heel: The Challenge of Incomplete Reintegration

DDR is a hugely complex operation, especially in Africa's conflict settings. One of the early lessons to emerge from the UN's first comprehensive review of DDR on the continent is that "the disarmament, demobilization and in particular the reintegration processes extend beyond the life of a peacekeeping operation."[49] Nearly 15 years after that assessment, it seems clearer still that whether a peacekeeping operation concludes its mandate successfully or not, DDR should continue regardless.

The good news is that thinking on DDR in the UN and other institutions is not static. It is, in fact, almost constantly under scrutiny, with considerable attention given to reforming its practice to align with rapidly evolving conflict dynamics in Africa. As the then-Secretary-General of the United Nations observed, "While the scale, complexity, scope and type of the United Nations work in disarmament, demobilization and reintegration have changed, our means of planning and implementing such operations have not."[50]

The implementation of "Integrated DDR Standards" (IDDRS) in 2006 greatly improved cooperation and synergies among the various UN and non-UN actors in charge of the implementation of DDR. Nearly 15 years after the adoption of the IDDRS, the transformation of conflicts—especially in the CAR, the DRC, the Sahel, the Great Lakes region, and the Horn of Africa—continues to challenge our assumptions and hypotheses. The most recent reconceptualization by the UN on DDR puts new emphasis on violent extremism and threats posed by terrorism[51]; as well as what the Rift Valley Institute calls "the democratization of militarized politics" (the case of the eastern DRC and the Great Lakes region).[52]

A major qualitative improvement in DDR practice is how women and female ex-combatants are now central considerations, manifest in the "Standard Operating Procedures on Gender and DDR," where once they were all but ignored.[53] In the same vein, the specific situation of ex-child combatants, notably, what the UN Secretary-General calls "the moral imperative to disarm children," is also duly considered during the implementation of DDR programs.

The prospects for conflict and violence in Africa show that DDR will continue to be a key parameter for conflict resolution and peacemaking in the coming years. Many African countries—Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Liberia, Côte d'Ivoire amongst them—previously in widespread conflict face challenges from significant "remnants of war" comprising non-disarmed or inadequately demobilized ex-combatants. In these countries, like in the vast majority of Africa's conflict-affected societies, the "R" ("Reintegration") remains the Achilles heel of DDR programs. Although ex-combatants are most often fully disarmed and demobilized, those who are sustainably "reintegrated" are a minority.

There is, therefore, a need to boost the "reintegration" component of DDR with more resources, not only to address the concerns of ex-combatants, but also to enhance economic growth, create jobs,

and open more opportunities for business and entrepreneurship.[54] The funding trend is moving in the opposite direction, however. Budgets for many peace operations, especially for reintegration efforts, have been reduced. This is most notable for MONUSCO, one of the UN's longest and biggest missions.[55] One response to the conundrum of growing demand but dwindling resources would be to strengthen Africa's ownership of DDR programs, endowing regional institutions (African Union and regional economic communities) with adequate institutional capacities, expertise, and resources. This is a path that the African Union has been following, with its Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Capacity Program (DDRCP), initiated in 2012, which aims "to strengthen the capacities within the AU, its Member States and regional partners, to support national and regional DDR initiatives on the continent."[56]

The AU DDRCP program, which, if adequately handled, could become the best hope for the future of DDR in Africa, comprises three fundamental objectives:

i. Institutionalize DDR capacities within the African Union;
ii. establish an AU DDR Resource and Research Centre; and,
iii. facilitate AU engagement and assistance to DDR activities of member states.[57]

The AU DDRCP is strongly supported by the AU's major partners, including, among others, the World Bank and the United Nations.[58]

Conclusion

In May of 2018, UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres outlined the new context of global conflict, arguing that many populations continue to live "in dangerous times, protracted conflicts are causing unspeakable human suffering. Armed groups are proliferating, equipped with a vast array of weapons"; as these conflicts "grow more deadly, destructive and complex, we need a new focus on disarmament that saves lives."[59] The United Nations General Assembly, alarmed by this deteriorating situation, has thus requested the Secretary-General "to explore options for strengthening the United Nations–World Bank collaboration[60] in conflict-affected countries" and create "an enabling environment for economic growth,

foreign investment and job creation, and in the mobilization and effective use of domestic resources, in line with national priorities and underscored by the principle of national ownership."[61] Relating specifically to DDR, such an initiative could be considered in the context of Sustainable Development Goal 16, whereby African and world leaders pledged "to foster peaceful, just and inclusive societies which are free from fear and violence. There can be no sustainable development without peace and no peace without sustainable development." The African Union, which Guterres considers as the United Nations' "most relevant partner in peace and security in the world"[62] should play a key role in this global partnership for sustainable DDR in those African countries and regions[63] recovering from or affected by the crisis of the proliferation of armed groups and weapons of war.

Key Recommendations: Three Iron Rules

The following policy recommendations are inspired by analyses and action-points relating to post-crisis recovery and sustainable peacebuilding contained in recent relevant reports, policy papers, and strategic frameworks from the African Union, the United Nations, the World Bank, and the African Development Bank.[64] The recommendations are crafted as practical action-points leading to more effective and sustainable forms of peacemaking and crisis recovery measures, including in particular, DDR.[65]

1. ***Secure adequate and timely funding for Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration***. The need for adequate, timely, and predictable funding, especially for the "reintegration" component, remains the Achilles heel of DDR programs. There is, therefore, need to guarantee reliable, predictable, and sustainable sources of funding for the "reintegration" component to reduce the risk for countries recovering from crisis to relapse into violence.[66] The difficulties of securing funding for the reintegration of demobilized ex-combatants are partly explained by the fact that while the disarmament/demobilization of ex-combatants are accounted for in the assessed budget for peacekeeping operations, the reintegration of disarmed and demobilized combatants relies on voluntary funding. Unfortunately, experience shows only part of the funds pledged by donors is disbursed in an effective manner. Moreover, even when

pledges materialize, "In most cases there is a six- to eight-month gap from the time funds are pledged to the time they are available for use. The failure to follow through on promises made due to the lack of reliable funding could result in violence, re-recruitment of those already disarmed into local and regional conflicts, and a breakdown of the peace process."[67]

2. ***Address the paradox of successful peacekeeping operations followed by collapse in countries recovering from crisis***. There is need to bridge the gap between short-term emergency funding for peace and longer-term investment financing for economic and social development, including job-creation, income-generating activities, and business opportunities for youth and ex-combatants. Many countries where the United Nations has successfully completed a peacekeeping operation continue to be threatened by "remnants of war," often poorly reintegrated ex-combatants. Since DDR extends "beyond the life of a peacekeeping operation," it is critical for the viability of the peace and crisis recovery process to continue to strengthen relevant national capacities. DDR requires human and financial resources sufficient for a successful transition from emergency peacekeeping and humanitarian action to financing economic and social development activities that create jobs and provide real alternatives to war for ex-combatants and youth. Among others, the United Nations' Peacebuilding Fund, which was established precisely to "assist countries in their transition from war to peace" and prevent state collapse and the slide to armed conflict,[68] should be endowed with adequate resources to assist countries "in the transition from the immediate post-conflict phase to longer-term reconstruction and development."[69]
3. ***Frame and develop a regional response to the challenges of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration in Africa***. The African Union, within the framework of its "Silencing the Guns in Africa"[70] initiative, should work in partnership with the UN, the World Bank,[71] the African Development Bank, and any other relevant stakeholders, to frame a regional response to the challenge of DDR in African post-conflict countries, focusing on peacebuilding and Sustainable Development Goal 16.[72] Though the global impact of armed conflict has lessened, available data show that "more countries have recently experienced violent conflict than at any time in nearly three decades."[73] Many of the ongoing conflicts are in Africa,

which hosts 40 percent of all United Nations peacekeeping operations in the world. "With a decline in civil wars ending in military victory," Sebastian von Eisendel cautions, "the conflict relapse rate has increased" on the continent.[74]

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The Role of Elections in Peace Process in Africa

Franklin Oduro

Introduction

Elections remain central to the development of democratic and inclusive societies in Africa. Not only do elections provide means to economic growth and development since citizens can elect leaders based on their campaign promises and policies on socio-economic development, regular elections also contribute to peacebuilding by conferring authority on leaders, facilitating peaceful transfers of power, and promoting citizens' participation and inclusion in governance. Indeed, regular and credible elections have been recognized by various global, regional, sub-regional, and national entities and infrastructures as critical for sustainable peacebuilding. In Africa, through the African Union (AU) Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA), and the African Governance Architecture (AGA), among others, member countries have been provided guidelines

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to ensure that the conduct of elections promotes good governance, and ensures peace and stability.[1]

Notwithstanding the general recognition of the centrality of elections to sustainable peacebuilding efforts, many elections have resulted in less peace and more destabilization. The continent has recorded several cases of pre- and post-election violence that have threatened stability in some countries, and generated prolonged civil wars, conflict, and violence in others such as Ethiopia (2005), Togo (2005), Kenya (2007 and 2017), Zimbabwe (2008), and Nigeria (2007 and 2011),[2] to cite only a few examples. Even in countries, such as Ghana, Zambia, and Senegal where peaceful election outcomes have been recorded, the (flawed) conduct of elections has stoked fears of instability and violence, which could flare up at any time. Except for a few countries characterized by single party and/or candidate dominance, such as Rwanda, there remain uncertainties about how sustainable "peaceful outcomes of elections" are in many African countries.

This chapter provides an overview of elections and their contributions to peacebuilding in Africa. The argument is made that while elections should be viewed as a central part of peacebuilding, their impact is dependent on the regularity, inclusiveness, integrity, and credibility of election processes and outcomes. Drawing on key lessons and international best practices, this chapter highlights challenges and emerging threats to the conduct of peaceful elections in Africa. They include the increasing cost of financing elections, abuse of presidential term limits, and the increasing use of technology in the administration of elections. The final section provides four recommendations for addressing the key drivers of election-related violence and instability. These recommendations, informed by three decades of election experiences in Africa, are advanced in order that elections may contribute positively to peace on the continent.

Elections and Peacebuilding

The role of elections in peacebuilding is recognized globally. Rather than viewing them as ends in themselves, they are viewed as one (important) tool in broader efforts to promote peace and stability. Elections are part of democratic political transitions and are critical during the implementation of peace agreements. As argued by Matanock, "Post-conflict elections can greatly enhance the durability of peace agreements…specifically, [peace] agreements that enable rebel and government parties to

participate in elections."[3] Accordingly, international assistance for peacebuilding programs, including deployments by the United Nations (UN) and its affiliated agencies, invariably have an election component. This is particularly true of post-conflict and/or transitional settings, which are common in Africa.[4]

Post-conflict or transitional elections create the opportunity for all stakeholders to contribute to building legal and constitutional frameworks, as well as democratic institutions that advance a sustainable peacebuilding agenda. In addition, because election periods provide a path—for many citizens, the only path—to political participation, they create the feeling of belonging, thereby fostering inclusion and unity which, in turn, promotes peace. In other words, the electoral imperative, the opportunity for citizens to periodically participate in leadership change through a credible and competitive process, offers the promise of peace and stability in societies.[5] Fundamentally, the link between elections and peacebuilding is premised on the belief that regular and credible elections offer the most promising instrument for addressing and managing societal tensions and conflict without the use of violence.[6]

Three Decades of Elections in Africa: What Do We Know About Their Impact on Peacebuilding?

Whereas the nexus between elections and peacebuilding is widely understood in its positive manifestations—e.g., allowing citizens to choose their political leaders freely and, thus, allocate power peacefully—there is also clear evidence to suggest that elections have often triggered violence and undermined peacebuilding on the continent. Mostly, this is due to the way elections are conducted. A poorly conducted election can ignite the underlying tensions in societies, already amplified by the very high-stakes—e.g., "winner-takes-all"—associated with electoral competition in Africa. Studies on electoral violence in Sub-Saharan Africa highlight a number of factors and threats to electoral peace.[7] For example, Straus and Taylor, examining data from 1990 to 2007, suggest a typology of election violence that ranges from low intensity to violent harassment and large-scale violence, which results in death and instability.[8]

Election-related violence on the African continent has been variously influenced by:

i. Intense competition—"winner-takes-all" mentality—among political elites for state power and resources[9];
ii. weak election management bodies (EMBs);
iii. flawed electoral registers; and
iv. a lack of transparency and/or inadequate pre-election preparations.

These and other factors[10] contribute greatly toward a deficit in trust in elections among citizens and electoral opponents.

The story is not all negative, however. Regular elections have increasingly become the norm in Africa. Acceptance by citizens[11] and political elites that the ballot box is the only legitimate means for electing leaders is now widespread. This is a far cry from the past when leaders ruled through the barrel of a gun in many parts of Africa. Not anymore. The compliance of ACDEG protocols regarding regularity of elections in member countries is growing. A recent study assessing compliance of six AU-member countries (Ghana, Ethiopia, Rwanda, South Africa, Zambia, and Nigeria) on regular elections confirmed as much, although capacity to conduct elections varied across the studied countries.[12] While regularity of elections is improving, their quality remains a serious concern. Even with this concern, the fact that political elites and citizens prefer elections, rather than other methods, for choosing leaders and allocating power is beneficial to peacebuilding efforts in Africa.

Gradually, election management bodies are getting better and becoming more professionalized. This has helped to drive even more demand for transparency in election preparations and management. The application of technology is also helping EMBs to address other concerns and build societal trust in electoral processes. EMBs in Africa have been the test-bed for biometric technology in registering potential voters. Where it has been introduced effectively, it has improved the integrity of voter registers and enhanced transparency in the collation and declaration of results. All of this has helped to make elections in some countries more credible and thus minimize their potential for triggering violence and instability.

As a result of the improvement in election administration and increasing professionalism of EMBs, the continent is also experiencing increasing (even if sometimes difficult) acceptance of election results by losing candidates, and thereby effecting peaceful election outcomes.[13] The accompanying leadership transitions recorded in Benin, Senegal, Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone, and Liberia are significant success stories

that are contributing to reducing tensions surrounding the conduct of elections.

Finally, the contributions of elections to peacebuilding processes in Africa cannot be discussed without acknowledging the role of election monitors and observers, both domestic and international. Despite some limitations, the short- and long-term observation activities of election observers, are contributing to and supporting peaceful election outcomes. The AU's electoral assistance division within the department of political affairs has played a critical role and continues to provide critical support and observation missions (both long-term and short-term) to African countries in compliance with ACDEG. The AU's presence and role in elections in Nigeria (2015 and 2019), Ghana (2016), Kenya (2017), Liberia (2017), and Sierra Leone (2018) are clear cases for reference, where their role in promoting peace before, during, and after elections was critical. As Lappin argues, while admitting limitations, "…international election observation missions (IEOMs) remain essential elements to peacebuilding…"[14] Those limitations were most starkly evident during the 2019 elections in Malawi, where the African Union Election Observationer Mission reported that "…the elections took place in a peaceful, transparent and orderly manner, and thus met national, regional, continental and international standards for democratic elections…"[15] For their part, the European Union's Election Observation Mission, which covered 27 of the 28 voting districts of Malawi in its preliminary report, concluded that despite an unlevel playing field, the election was "Well-managed, inclusive, transparent and competitive."[16] However, Malawi's own Constitutional Court concluded in 2020 that this assessment was flawed, thus confirming allegations of widespread irregularities. It ordered new elections, which resulted in the defeat of the winner of the annulled 2019 vote.[17]

Both positive and negative voting experiences have served to heighten Africa's focus on developing best practices and institutional reforms to ensure elections that better serve the interests of peace. Among many lessons learned, two stand out: first, the negative consequences of the persistent "winner-takes-all" mentality; and second, that the timing and sequencing of elections are crucial, particularly in transitional periods.

Winner-Takes-All Politics

The "winner-takes-all" nature of African politics can be especially insidious come election time, owing to the high stakes involved. The desire of African political elites to capture state power, and by extension state resources for themselves and their cronies, has fueled the quest to secure election victory at any cost. As Atta-Asamoah notes, "Such [winner-takes-all] politics, if left unchecked in the context of the complex cocktail of development and security challenges in Africa, could derail the sustainability of democratic gains, development strides, and the maintenance of peace and security in many fragile states."[18]

To curtail this trend, reforms should be made to key governance institutions—such as the legislature as a countervailing force to the executive branch of government; constitutions to foster broad-based inclusive politics—and to electoral systems (e.g., move away from "first past the post" and toward "proportional representation" and "mixed plurality").[19] With particular reference to electoral systems, and as argued elsewhere with respect to the Southern African Development Cooperation (SADC) region, Khabele Matlosa, for example, recommends that "SADC states must make deliberate efforts to address election-related conflicts and war by, among other things, reforming their electoral systems."[20] Observations seem to suggest that the "first past the post" systems tends to amplify the "winner-takes-all" approach. This, in turn, raises the potential for election-related violence.

Sequencing and Timing

A badly timed election can, sometimes, be worse than having no election at all. Promoters of democracy and good governance, whether foreign or local, tend to push for elections at the first opportunity during transitional settings. This is not always good for building sustainable peace.[21] Where peace is still fragile and trust is lacking, EMBs are usually poorly resourced; basic legal and institutional reforms have not been implemented; new and opposition political parties have not been given sufficient time to prepare; and elections are often hurriedly organized. All of these factors can impede democratic progress.

As Fath-Lihic and Brancati argue, the ability of national and international policy actors to understand and assess the complex political, legal, technical, operational, participatory, and security-related challenges

in determining the ideal timing for the conduct of transitional elections is critical for peacebuilding processes. A "one-size-fits-all" election solution, they add, does not exist. Every transition is different. Much depends on historical context, the nature of the conflict, and what the elections are designed to achieve, which is not always as straightforward as it seems.[22]

"Elections are often the final stage of a peace process, if not the ultimate objective," observe McNamee et al. "The hope is that elections can have a stabilizing effect on a fractured society. Done well and timeously, they can. But conducted too early, before security problems have been converted into political problems, they can have the opposite effect: exacerbate divisions and foment violence."[23] Fostering local ownership and inclusivity, building trust and promoting broad-based popular support for electoral processes are vital. The benefits to peace of encouraging a national tone of mutual respect and tolerance during the electoral phases (pre, during, and post) are also not to be underestimated.

Challenges and Emerging Threats to Election Peace in Africa

In addition to the failings highlighted above, elections during the past decade have revealed new and emerging problems which can serve to undermine peace and stability. These emerging issues, including failures in the (increasing) application of technology during elections, mounting legal challenges to election results by contenders, incumbents ignoring term limits, and the rising cost of elections, merit closer scrutiny.

Technology and Elections

In some cases, the use of biometric technology by EMBs in the registration and authentication of voters has helped to counter voter fraud and enhance the credibility of electoral registers. Recently, EMBs have also been scaling up efforts—notably in Ghana, Kenya, and Nigeria—to use information technology to increase transparency in election results transmission.[24] In other instances, however, the introduction of new technologies has led to myriad problems, with negative consequences for stability and peace. Questions about the procurement and management of the equipment, equipment breakdowns, unreliable devices, and the suspect integrity and poor handling of these devices by election officials

have been common.[25] Failures in the collation and transmission of election results in Kenya resulted in a period of grave uncertainty, as the "defeated" opposition successfully disputed the results of the election, then withdrew from the subsequent re-scheduled vote. Many feared that the political turmoil sparked by the 2017 election saga would trigger a repeat of the 2007/2008 election violence. Fortunately, this did not happen.

All the evidence suggests that, despite these and other problems such as weak transparency and inclusion in procurement practices, Africa's EMBs are pushing for more information technology in election management. But that push, in itself, can be detrimental to situations where elections become a tool for promoting peacebuilding. Recent electoral processes and outcomes have exposed weaknesses in the methods and conduct of election observers. Their ability, for example, in the era of tech-driven elections to detect potential manipulation at results collation centers seems limited. As Judd Devermont points out, "Most observers do not have the technological expertise to counter… [and] circumvent government internet controls, safeguard election results from hacking, or detect digital tampering."[26] Hacking and other digital attacks can effectively undermine many of the key ingredients of election integrity: voter registration, vote casting, and vote tabulation. As many analysts have also observed, the timing and context in which election-related information, communication, and technology are introduced often do not allow for adequate time for familiarization by opposition parties.[27] The risks of politicization become high at a very early stage, meaning that many election results have already been effectively rejected by the opposition well before the election itself is actually held.

Litigating Election Results

Recent elections in Nigeria (2011 and 2019), Ghana (2012 and 2016), Kenya (2017), Liberia (2017), Sierra Leone (2018) and Malawi (2019)[28] gave rise to new dynamics in election dispute management and potential threats to stability. The resort to judicial processes to contest election results in these cases is, obviously, a progressive step forward from the extra-judicial means used in the past to contest and change electoral outcomes. That said, this trend presents its own challenges to peacebuilding.

When the judiciary is put at the center of *deciding* election outcomes, it also ends up *pronouncing* on them. Though the difference in language is subtle, the implications can be significant. Judicial pronouncements on election outcomes will be based on interpretations of the law, technicalities, procedures, and legal principles which may contradict vote tallies. Citizens who feel that their votes have been overturned by seemingly abstract judicial rulings may be more susceptible to joining violent forms of resistance and mass mobilization. They may even be given succor by alternative swearing-in ceremonies (as recently witnessed in Kenya) where the opposition candidate claims "victor status" despite official results not going his or her way.[29] Civic education in Africa has not sensitized people to the idea that one's chosen candidate can "win" the election at the ballot box but lose it in court.

The length of judicial litigations on election outcome disputes could also serve as potential triggers for election violence. The decision by the Kenyan Supreme Court after the 2017 election is a case in point. The relative speed (within a month) with which the court concluded on the petition brought before it by the opposition parties raised concerns that the court did not spend adequate time examining the case and competing arguments before deciding to annul the election results. In Ghana, the opposite occurred: the post-2012 election petition to the Supreme Court on the results of the presidential election took too long. The eight-month delay created a wellspring of anxiety across society, which could have boiled-over in a country where the declared winner was in office but not yet confirmed as legitimate.

On the face of it, there is nothing wrong with the judiciary playing a greater role in ensuring elections are sound. The Malawi Constitutional Court's decision to order a re-run of the 2019 election has generally been viewed as a boost for Malawi's journey toward democracy. But as more disgruntled politicians and parties try to exploit potential loopholes in electoral laws in African countries, weak election administration infrastructures are exposed. Judiciaries cannot be expected to fill this gap—balancing interpretations of rules and technicalities and legal principles against the will of the people, however that might be determined. A recent study illustrated some of the dangers: in the case of Nigeria, it argues that its judiciary has been complicit in perpetrating electoral fraud in Nigerian elections.[30] The authors conclude that, while the Nigerian political class sees the judiciary as another platform for resolving election disputes, the manipulation of the judiciary and its associated process to

perpetrate electoral fraud has resulted in a high level of public mistrust of the judiciary.[31] Resolving this electoral conundrum will be critical to the future of peacebuilding in Africa.

Abusing Presidential Term Limits

Another emerging threat to election peace relates to attempts by ruling elites to extend their stay in office through removal of constitutional term limits, mostly against the wishes of their populations.[32] In the post-Cold War era, approximately 30 African leaders have attempted to change constitutional impositions to extend their rule—in perpetuity, in some cases—and almost half of these attempts have succeeded.[33] The idea of "third termism" can sometimes be described as lawful, due to the constitutional procedures adopted to legitimize the changes in the law, but the popular opposition to such moves stores up considerable potential for violence and instability. Moreover, attempts by African political leaders to extend their stay in power typically precludes opportunities for multi-party electoral engagements.

The absurd corollary of the "president for life" trend—that opposition parties aren't allowed to compete for office—foments myriad extra-legal/judicial means of seeking power. As Taylor et al. argue, election-related violence is more likely in situations where incumbents have unfettered right to contest elections; conversely, where incumbents don't run, violence becomes less likely.[34]

Increasing Cost of Financing Elections and Elective Politics

The increasing cost of financing African elections is another potential threat to peacebuilding.[35] Due to limited resources, African countries have turned more and more to donor partners, especially Western partners, to fund their elections. This trend raises stark questions about resilience and sustainability: what happens if traditional funding streams suddenly dry up? Will governments be more inclined to suspend or delay elections, or indeed not have them at all? And what will be the consequent impacts on peace and stability? Through logistics and (putative) funding-related delays in holding scheduled elections over more than two years, from 2016–2018, the government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC)[36] was perhaps lucky to have escaped with only minor eruptions of violence by discontented Congolese.

It is not just the cost of the elections themselves that is problematic; campaign financing can also seed security problems. The increasing cost of electoral campaigns makes it difficult for opposition parties to compete on a level playing field. Ruling parties and candidates often raid state coffers to fund their campaigns; opposition parties might not be able to secure private funding, owing to fears of the private sector, especially companies, that opportunities for business with the state will be closed if they are found to be funding the opposition. Significantly, electoral politics in much of Africa has become the sole preserve of the rich. A study in Ghana revealed that around US $86,000 was spent on average by members of parliament in their election campaigns.[37] This is completely out of reach for the vast majority of Africans, adding to concerns of inclusivity. If money alienates ordinary Africans from electoral politics, this is bad for peacebuilding in the long-term.

Africa needs to take a hard look at its electoral systems and decide whether to encourage peace or promote division. The "winner-takes-all" politics common across Africa are a significant trigger of election-related conflict.[38] Any system that encourages political exclusion, Gyampoh argues, "can, potentially, jeopardize the fragile election peace."[39] Alternatives such as proportional representation have their own shortcomings, but to the extent that proportional representation lessens the marginalization of losers and spreads the benefits of victory more widely, it can reduce the likelihood of elections undermining peace and peacebuilding.

Key Recommendations

Strengthening the integrity and quality of electoral processes in Africa will contribute positively to peacebuilding. This requires a multifaceted response on the part of local, national, and international stakeholders, including organizations specializing in elections and democratic assistance and consolidation. As part of this holistic response, four specific policy recommendations are offered below.

1. ***Re-examine electoral laws in African Union-member countries.*** There is a need to re-examine electoral laws in order to ensure that these laws are in compliance with provisions in the African Union Charter on Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG). The recurring challenge in deepening democratic governance in Africa

has, generally, been the failure of African Union member countries to domesticate various protocols and charters to which they are signatories. After three decades of operating transitional electoral laws, there has yet to be an adequate sifting of the policies and protocols which have worked from those that have not. The reforms should address electoral processes as well as rules and legislation that promote a level playing field, reducing the unfair advantage held by incumbents. Such a review must take into account gaps and non-compliance that result in electoral disputes and litigations, as well as a lack of transparency and inclusiveness. Given the regularity of elections and their changing dynamics, Africa needs new or updated mechanisms to address election-related threats to peace and stability. Pro-democracy organizations working to strengthen election management bodies should be at the forefront in engaging with these growing threats.

2. ***Confront the challenges related to the growing use of technology in the administration of elections***. There is a critical need to stimulate global and continental discussions on emerging challenges to election observers' work in an era of technologically driven election administration. Independent and non-partisan citizen election observation groups, who are already incorporating information technology in their observation as well as international election observer missions, must begin to find ways of including verification protocols in electronic transmittal and collation of election results in their observation programs. With increasing sophistication in election administration, election observer groups must also align their protocols to the emerging threats to election peace. "…like modern-day police chasing cyber-thieves instead of masked bank robbers, international observers must adapt to new technologies."[40] Accordingly, it may be prudent to review the Declaration of Global Principles for Non-Partisan Election Observation and Monitoring by Citizen Organizations, and Code of Conduct for Non-Partisan Citizen Election Observers and Monitors to take into account protocols for addressing gaps in the more obscure aspects of election technology processes, i.e., the back-end. By addressing this gap, the reports of election observer groups will be more reliable and better received by host countries. Creating spaces for observer groups to engage election management bodies in this area of election administration is critical for enhanced transparency, trust-building, and inclusiveness.

3. ***Assure sustainable financing of elections***. Stakeholders, especially international democracy promoters, must engage on the issues of financing. In order to forestall opportunities for leaders to use a lack of resources as an excuse to suspend elections, it is imperative to develop ways for instituting sustainable financing of elections. Such mechanisms could include the establishment of national election funds designed in a manner that the ruling government does not have a say in its management. The policy response should also include instituting predictable national and international sources of funding, and accountable mechanisms to ensure transparent and judicious use of resources for election administration. In this instance, groups such as the International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), regional economic communities (RECs) in Africa, the African Union Department of Political Affairs, and other global democracy promoters must lead in advocating for such a fund. Exploring ways to address sustainable financing of elections must be accompanied by campaign finance reform to create a more level playing field, and to assure inclusiveness and integrity of elections.
4. ***Counter the trend to eliminate presidential term limits***. A continental and sub-regional response is required to address the trend toward serving beyond constitutionally mandated presidential term limits. This will require sustained, long-term advocacy from all corners, but perhaps especially the African Union and the regional economic communities. For instance, the Economic Community of West Africa (ECOWAS) was close to instituting such a protocol for its members but failed when two members, Togo and The Gambia, objected to the decision.[41] With the exit of president Yahya Jammeh in The Gambia and the reforms that have occurred in Togo, there is a window of opportunity for civil society actors to begin a campaign for ECOWAS to revisit the subject.

Notes

1. The African Charter for Democracy, Elections and Governance (ACDEG), adopted in 2007, articulates the universal values of democracy and respect for human rights that are founded on supremacy of the constitution and the holding of democratic and credible elections.
2. Dorina A. Bekoe (ed.), *Voting in Fear: Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2012).

3. Aila M. Matanock, "How Elections Can Lead to Peace: Making Negotiated Settlements Last," *Foreign Affairs*, April 25, 2018.
4. Annette M. Fath-Lihic and Dawn Brancati, *Elections and Peacebuilding: Why Timing and Sequencing of Transitional Elections Matter* (Geneva: Electoral Integrity Initiative Policy Brief no. 4, Kofi Annan Foundation, 2017).
5. Adelaja Odukoya, "Democracy, Elections, Election Monitoring and Peace-Building in West Africa," *African Journal of International Affairs* 10, no. 1–2 (2007): 147–160.
6. Richard Lappin, "Why Observe Elections? Reassessing the Importance of Credible Elections to Post-conflict Peacebuilding," *Peace Research: Canadian Journal of Peace and Conflict Studies* 41, no. 2 (2009): 86–117.
7. Dorina Bekoe, "Africa's Electoral Landscape: Concerning Signals, Reassuring Trends," *African Center for Strategic Studies*, May 16, 2016, https://africacenter.org/spotlight/sub-saharan-africas-electoral-landscape-concerning-signals-reassuring-trends/.
8. Scott Straus and Charlie Taylor, "Democratization and Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa, 1990–2008," in *Voting in Fear: Electoral Violence in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace Press, 2012).
9. For detailed discussions on the implications of "winner-takes-all" phenomenon on inclusive governance and peacebuilding, see Ransford Gyampoh, "Winner-Takes-All Politics in Ghana: The Case for Effective Council of State," *Journal of Politics and Governance* 4, no. 1–4 (December 2015): 17–24; and Andrews Atta-Asamoah, "Winner-Takes-All Politics and Africa's Future," *Institute for Security Studies*, https://issafrica.org/amp/iss-today/winner-takes-all-politics-and-africas-future.
10. Such as unfair electoral rules and unfair playing field, technical incompetence of members of EMBs, and appearance of incumbent control and influence of EMB.
11. Interviews conducted by the Afrobarometer Research Network between 2016 and 2018 reported that 75 percent of Africans (across 34 countries) preferred to use regular, open, and honest elections to choose country leaders. See "Africans Want High-Quality Elections-Especially If They Bring Change, Afrobarometer Surveys Show," *Afrobarometer*, June 26, 2019, https://afrobarometer.org/sites/default/files/pressrelease//ab_r7_pr_africans_want_high_quality_elections_especially_if_they_bring_change.pdf.
12. Anne McLennan, "Democratic Governance," in *Civil Society Perspectives on African Union Member States Commitments to Democratic Governance* (Johannesburg: Wits School of Governance, University of Witwatersrand, 2017).

13. Judd Devermont notes that since 2015, 13 opposition parties have won elections and defeated incumbent parties, which is contrary to experiences in the past two decades. See Judd Devermont, *The Game Has Changed: Rethinking the U.S. Role in Supporting Elections in Sub-Saharan Africa* (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2019).
14. Lappin, "Why Observe Elections?" 87.
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Successes and Challenges of African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA)

Chukwuemeka B. Eze and Osei Baffour Frimpong

Introduction

Since the end of the Cold War, the peace and security environment of Africa has been notably fragile. Throughout this 30-year period, the continent has been burdened with myriad security threats. At its outset, states such as Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Rwanda, and Burundi, to name only a few, descended into brutal intra-state conflict. While these countries have emerged out of these conflicts and embarked—however slowly or erratically—on a democratic path, the nature of threats to security has oscillated from large-scale intra-state

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conflicts to insurgencies by armed groups and transnational organized syndicates, including human and drug trafficking and the proliferation of Small Arms and Light Weapons (SALW). Equally alarming is the convergence of terrorist and violent extremist groups into a new hybrid threat that recognizes no borders. They continue to exploit weaknesses and vulnerabilities of fragile states and conflict zones to unleash violence against civilian populations, and seize and control territories to challenge the legitimacy of the state. The consequences of these conflicts are evident in a cocktail of humanitarian crises that continue to exacerbate the fragility of states and human security on the continent.

The African Union (AU) established the African Peace and Security Architecture (APSA) to address a multitude of existing and emerging security challenges facing the continent. Essentially, the APSA is premised on preventing, managing, and resolving conflicts in Africa through the African Union's established institutions—the Peace and Security Council, African Standby Force, Panel of the Wise, African Peace Fund, and Continental Early Warning System.

Given the weaknesses in conflict early response mechanisms in states, which have partly contributed to the continent's susceptibility to conflicts, the Continental Early Warning System (CEWS) of the APSA was designed to enhance anticipation, preparedness, and early response to conflicts across Africa.[1] Civil society organizations (CSOs) are recognized as strategic partners in bolstering the operationalization of the continental early warning systems at the regional and continental levels by providing early warning analysis and sharing information relevant to the mitigation of potential threats to peace and security.

It is against this background that the West Africa Network for Peacebuilding (WANEP), through its strategic partnership with the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and the AU since 2002 and 2015, respectively, has been a key partner in developing and operationalizing conflict early warning systems to support peace and security at the national, regional, and continental levels.[2] Through the partnership, WANEP has contributed to the operationalization of ECOWARN, the ECOWAS Early Warning and Response Network (WARN) which covers all ECOWAS member states. The WARN works to enhance human security in West Africa by monitoring and reporting socio-political situations that could degenerate into violent and destructive conflicts, and to inform policymakers on options for response. Over the years, the program has developed National Early Warning Systems (NEWS) in all

of its national networks in West Africa to help strengthen ECOWARN by providing more robust grassroots engagement and information into the systems. Given WANEP's years of partnership with ECOWAS and the AU in the area of conflict early warning and peacebuilding interventions in bolstering APSA, it is pertinent to bring such experiences into the body of literature on peace and security in Africa. Importantly, there are lessons to be drawn from the experiences of WANEP for Regional Economic Communities (RECs) across the continent.

This chapter begins with a brief overview of the post-Cold War security context of Africa, highlighting the existing and emerging threats. The second section highlights the APSA, with particular emphasis on the early warning mechanisms and their utility in enhancing peace and security in Africa. The third section assesses WANEP's experiences in the area of conflict early warning and its contribution to the APSA. As a corollary to this, the lessons learned from WANEP's experience are examined with the view of promoting robust CSO partnerships with RECs. The final section argues that in order for the APSA to realize the value of early warning in peacebuilding, states, RECs, and the AU must strengthen and sustain APSA's partnership with civil society organizations as key agents in developing and operationalizing conflict early warning interventions.

Overview of the Post-Cold War Security Context of Africa

The security challenges facing Africa in the post-Cold War era are a combination of old and new issues. Although there has been a considerable decline in the number of armed conflicts, the underlying issues that gave rise to a host of violent intra-state conflicts in the late 1980s and the 1990s continue to prevail in parts of the continent.[3] The challenges of exclusion, marginalization, inequality, and the weakening of the state through corruption, nepotism, patrimonialism, and clientelism remain key drivers of insecurity in Africa.[4] In this regard, some contemporary threats are actually old issues under new labels. The end of the Cold War unleashed a number of factors that have underpinned insecurity on the continent. Prominent among them was a shift in superpower interests, which resulted in changes in policies that had promoted and preserved repression, exclusion, and dictatorships in several developing countries.[5] This rendered erstwhile military dictators susceptible to internal contestations over their legitimacy.[6] Greater external support for democracy

promotion, easy access to SALW, as well as enhanced interconnectedness between individuals and communities facilitated by globalization, provided the impetus for discontented groups to organize themselves and demand change through various means, including the use of force.[7]

These factors unleashed an unprecedented surge in intra-state armed conflicts in the region. In addition to old threats, many new threats have been occasioned by advancements in technology, increased mobility of persons, proliferation and movements of arms, religious and ethnic militancy, as well as global climate change. The spread of violent extremism and transnational organized criminal networks has become acute, especially in the Sahel, East Africa, and West Africa. In Nigeria, a previously latent Islamic fundamentalist group, Boko Haram, has exploited the challenges of weak state capacity to gain notoriety as one of the most violent extremist groups in the world. Boko Haram and its faction, the Islamic State West Africa Province (ISWAP), pose a grave threat to human security and stability in that region. Since Mali's independence in 1960, a series of armed insurgencies have been launched by Tuaregs—a politically and economically marginalized group—in the northern part of the country. As an ethnic group with a pastoralist lifestyle who are found in the Saharan parts of Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Algeria, and Libya, the Tuaregs have been able to mobilize such affinal relations to confront the central government in Bamako in their bid to establish a separate state.[8] Since 2012, Tuareg secessionists have been joined by extremists claiming to wage jihad for the creation of an Islamic state in northern Mali, where arms, drugs, hostage-taking, and human trafficking have become a source income for criminal networks.[9]

The fall of Libyan leader, Muammar Gaddafi, in 2011 led to a constellation of challenges that have added to the insecurity and instability in Mali and the Sahel, in general. It has provided the impetus for a host of armed groups, mercenaries, terrorist, and violent extremist groups including Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), the Movement for Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), Ansar Dine, Ansaru, and Al Mourabitoun, further compounding insecurity in the Sahel. The spillover effect of security fragility in northern Mali is manifesting in extremist and armed attacks in neighboring Niger, Côte d'Ivoire, and Burkina Faso.[10]

Porous borders have also facilitated smuggling of SALW, human and narcotics trafficking, and illegal immigration on an unprecedented scale. The influx of SALW, in particular, has been fueling ever-more

violent actions by local armed groups, mercenaries, and bandits, causing enormous human security challenges.[11]

Furthermore, election-related violence has increasingly become a prominent threat to stability in most of Africa's nascent democracies. While elections are a key driver of democracy and good governance, the exigencies of power contestations coupled with electoral irregularities, continue to ignite animosities, tensions, and violence across Africa.

Farmer-herder conflict is another threat to peace and security in the West African sub-region. Though the phenomenon is not new in the security environment, it remains protracted, often unleashing tensions and violence between pastoralists and farmers in communities. Farming and herding activities are complementary and, together, they have constituted the basis of the economy of most states in the region for many centuries.[12]

Yet climate change has led to droughts, floods, and warming that has contributed to a significant reduction in resources such as water, land, and food, which support livelihoods in communities. This, in turn, has led to increased competition that often triggers ethnic and intercommunity violence.[13]

The African Peace and Security Architecture: Early Warning and Conflict Prevention

Owing to its realization of the importance of proactive measures to confront Africa's diverse security challenges, the AU, in Article 12 of its Peace and Security protocol, provided for the establishment of a Conflict Early Warning (CEWS).[14] The CEWS is responsible for facilitating the anticipation and prevention of conflicts and works closely with regional organizations to gather early warning information which is then submitted to the situation room at the AU headquarters in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.[15] Operationalization of CEWS is achieved through collaboration with the early warning elements of the eight AU RECs, with each REC using conflict indicators premised on the peace and security context in its region.

However, in terms of the development of early warning, the various RECs are not at the same level. So far, ECOWAS and the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) operate with data collection and analysis, which feed into the AU's CEWS for response strategies, while other RECs are still in the process of creating mechanisms for implementation.[16] In addition, there are also differences in the implementation

of conflict early warning at the regional level. IGAD's early warning, for example, operates as an open information center while SADC's National Early Warning System (NEWC) is highly linked with the intelligence community within the region,[17] making the latter more state-centric. There are also variations in focus. Whereas ECOWAS places a heavy emphasis on human security through a broad range of thematic areas, SADC, on the other hand, focuses on threats emanating from socio-economic dynamics. Similarly, IGAD's early warning system, CEWARN, is mandated to mitigate escalation of violent conflicts, especially cross-border pastoral conflicts, through collaboration with established national early warning systems, while the East African Community (EAC) looks at security among member states, inter-state defense, intra-state conflicts, poverty, and issues arising from the sharing of cross-border natural resources, among others.[18]

Another integral element of CEWS is preventive diplomacy. Despite the challenges associated with its early response to some conflict situations, preventive diplomacy has been utilized by both the AU and RECs as a tool for intervening in conflicts, including election-related instability in Zimbabwe and Kenya in 2008.

Recognizing the imperative of non-state actors in developing and operationalizing early warning, Article 12 (3) of the AU's Peace and Security protocol calls for collaboration between RECs and CSOs in early warning activities.[19] Rarely is the need for cooperation with NGOs expressed so explicitly in official policy. Accordingly, IGAD relies on field monitors and local NGOs in pastoralist communities for early warning information.[20] In a similar vein, ECOWAS, through its Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) with WANEP, relies on early warning information and data analysis from the latter, amongst other sources, to respond to threats to security in various parts of the region. Through its partnership with WANEP, ECOWARN relies on open source information, focusing on human security. ECOWARN consists of an Observation and Monitoring Centre (OMC) based at the Early Warning Directorate at the ECOWAS Commission in Abuja, Nigeria and National Early Warning Centers currently in the process of being deployed to replace the original four Zonal Bureaus in Benin, Burkina Faso, Liberia, and The Gambia. Each zone generates daily peace and security reports emanating from WANEP's Community Monitors to the OMC. WANEP's Peace Monitoring Centre (PMC), in collaboration with the OMC, is responsible for

collating and analyzing the early warning reports from Community Monitors before transmission to the President of ECOWAS for consideration and intervention.

ECOWAS's ability to foster strategic partnerships and cooperation with WANEP as a key agent of a sub-regional early warning system has contributed to making ECOWAS's early warning one of the most comprehensive and integrated systems for conflict prevention and management on the African continent.[21]

WANEP's Early Warning Contributions to Peace and Security in West Africa

Beyond WANEP's collaboration with ECOWAS in the area of conflict data gathering, analysis, and reporting into ECOWARN, there are several conflict early warning intervention programs and activities aimed at enhancing peace and security in West Africa and, thereby, contributing to the APSA at the regional level.

Through its MOU with ECOWAS and the AU, WANEP has institutionalized NEWS in almost all ECOWAS countries. This regional reach plays a key role in determining threats to security, analyzing them, and providing recommendations for early response and mitigation. Moreover, WANEP's comprehensive array of early warning and response reports—situation reports, thematic reports, policy briefs, quarterly reports, and yearly security projections for West Africa—continue to influence national and regional responses and mitigation of threats to security.

WANEP also provides technical support for community peacebuilding through the institutionalization of dialogue, mediation, and strengthening of existing traditional peacebuilding infrastructure in communities across the region. This helps to increase resilience against threats to peace and security and promotes local community ownership in peacebuilding in states within the region. In this regard, WANEP has been building the capacity of stakeholders in farmer-herder conflicts through dialogue and mediation in Burkina Faso, Ghana, Nigeria, Mali, and Niger. Additionally, WANEP supports national infrastructures for peace, especially the National Peace Councils (NPCs) in Ghana, Nigeria, Liberia, and Sierra Leone through capacity-building and collaborative peace projects. The NPCs have become a model for enhancing national resilience and are being replicated in other West African countries.

Democratic transitions remain a challenge to peace and stability across West Africa. Given the enormously high stakes involved in Africa's

"winner-takes-all" elections, electoral periods are often characterized by deep tensions, occasioning fears for life and property among the populace. In response, WANEP developed the Election Monitoring, Analysis and Mitigation program (E-MAM) to support regional and states' efforts to mitigate electoral violence. E-MAM monitors, analyzes, and reports on election-related violence in order to enable early response, and works to harness and develop local capacity for averting election violence. The program further enables ECOWAS and WANEP to gain access to community-based conflict information which is necessary for conflict prevention but was hitherto uncollected and unreported.

The program is currently implemented in all 15 ECOWAS member states to support the peaceful conduct of elections. In Côte d'Ivoire, for instance, WANEP, in support of the Ministry of Interior, trained and deployed over 2,000 monitors and observers across the country to provide incidence reports at polling centers during the 2015 election.[22] An Election Situation Room (ESR) was also set up to support the ECOWAS Election Observation Mission to serve as an information management center to disseminate reports to stakeholders on potential threats. Similarly, in Nigeria, WANEP's E-MAM project created a space for validation of specific election violence and hotspot-mapping of potential risk areas across all 36 states in the country ahead of the 2019 elections.[23] Since its inception, E-MAM has contributed to enhancing local community ownership of peacebuilding and supporting existing local infrastructure for peace. A notable example is WANEP's support to Ghana's National Peace Council (NPC) in the area of preventing election violence.

WANEP designed the capacity-building project on dispute management for Election Management Bodies (EMBs) in West Africa to boost effective electoral dispute resolution. Participants from both Anglophone and Francophone countries including Ghana, Liberia, Nigeria, Guinea-Bissau, Mali, Niger, Senegal, and Benin have benefited from the program.[24]

In response to growing violent extremism as well as increased exploitation of children and youth, WANEP initiated peace education to inculcate the culture of non-violence, co-existence, tolerance, and respect for diversity. The program focuses on children and young people both in the formal and informal education sector to strengthen community resilience across the region. It also engages teaching and non-teaching staff as well as other duty bearers in communities—chiefs, elders, religious, and

opinion leaders, as well as family members—in the training of young people and children through dialogue and mediation clubs in schools and communities. In collaboration with governments, WANEP has also developed contextualized peace education curricula and teaching manuals and guides.

Of particular note is the incorporation of strategies for Countering Violent Extremism (CVE) into peace education curriculum for schools in Nigeria and the Sahel. The CVE curriculum seeks to educate a critical mass of resilient citizens who can participate in the sustainable development of the Sahel region and Nigeria through good citizenship and contributions to the fight against violent extremism.[25] The peace education program in the Sahel also adopts a community mobilizing approach to achieve better social cohesion and resilience. WANEP has trained over 200 teachers in the application of the peace education manual and the establishment of peer mediation clubs.[26] Peer mediators have also experienced positive changes in their own lives,[27] and aggressiveness and bullying among students have reduced.[28]

Lobbying, advocacy, and sensitization are also pronounced in the non-formal approach WANEP adopts in its quest to create a broader space for youth engagement in decision-making at the community, national, and regional levels. This is aimed at bridging the chasm between youth and decision-making processes in their communities and mitigating intergenerational conflicts. Over time, this has helped integrate the "youth factor" into emerging discourses on peace and security in West Africa, as well as national and regional policies.[29]

In line with the growing recognition of the centrality of women to African peace and security, WANEP works through the Women in Peacebuilding Network (WIPNET) and West Africa Peacebuilding Institute (WAPI) programs to enhance the role and capacity of women in peacebuilding. It also supports the ECOWAS Gender Directorate in line with the Women, Peace, and Security component of the ECOWAS Conflict Prevention Framework (EPF). The program was instrumental in mobilizing Liberian women as a pressure group to force the warring parties into signing a peace agreement in Accra during the ECOWAS-led mediation process. The WIPNET initiative also preceded the UN Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 1325, demonstrating the flexibility and foresight of CSOs in promoting women's participation in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. However, not all ECOWAS members have developed National Action Plans (NAPs) and strategies for effective

implementation of UNSCR 1325.[30] It has been noted that a lack of political will and technical know-how are some of the impediments confronting the development of the NAPs. In this regard, and in collaboration with the ECOWAS Gender Directorate as well as the Women, Peace and Security Institute (WPSI) of the Kofi Annan International Peacebuilding Training Centre (KAIPTC), WANEP developed guidelines for the development and implementation of NAPs on UNSCR 1325 and Related Resolutions in October 2012.[31] WANEP has also developed indicators in its early warning systems to monitor, report, and analyze various threats to security of women and children, which helps inform peacebuilding interventions at the national and regional levels. This contributes to filling the gaps in ECOWARN, which does not have specific indicators for the security of women.

More collaborative research is key to bridging the gaps between peacebuilding and policy-making, which has limited the effectiveness of early warning and conflict prevention across the continent. New platforms for engagement have been established with the University of Ghana, University of Ibadan, University of Cape Coast, KAIPTC, Ghana Centre for Democratic Development (CDD-Ghana), and the African Peacebuilding Network (APN) of the Social Sciences Research Council, but more are needed to better understand and develop best practice in African peacebuilding.

The post-Cold War security environment of Africa continues to be dogged by varied threats. As noted at the beginning of this chapter, these threats are a mixed bag of old and new, but often the underlying causes of instability are the same. Governments and RECs need to do more to foster the key partnerships which allow CEWS to effectively respond and mitigate threats to peace and security at the local, national and international levels on the continent.

Key Recommendations

1. ***Mend the gap between early warning and early response.*** The persistent chasm between early warning and early response is one of the key lessons emerging out of WANEP's relatively short history. The effectiveness of a conflict early warning system is contingent on its capacity to anticipate real or imagined threats and inform appropriate institutions for early response and mitigation. However, this remains a challenge for CSOs operating in political environments

where power and decision-making are often viewed in zero-sum terms, and political calculations and sensitivities get in the way of action. Too often, early warning is not acted upon until it is too late.

2. ***Motivate and sustain the ground-level elements of early warning systems***. As WANEP's experience has shown, effective early warning must be a "bottom up approach" whereby the community is engaged. Efforts should be made to link community to the state and regional elements of early warning in a more systemic way. Too often, the community level is under-resourced with many at this level serving as volunteers. The lack of funding at the community level often disempowers locals and limits the consistency of reporting incidents and evolving situations. Given that data is key to the effectiveness of early warning, this undermines the effectiveness of Africa's early warning systems.
3. ***Ensure regular and long-term funding for early warning***. Funding has also been problematic insofar as it is mostly from external donors. Too often, the funds are short-term and limited in scope, and donors tend to demand results within unrealistic timeframes. More should be done to engage the African local private sector in supporting early warning in particular, and peacebuilding activities in general.
4. ***Address the gender and youth dimensions of peacebuilding, and mainstream peace education in national curricula***. Gender, age, education, marriage, and access to resources all play a critical role in how power is distributed and performed at all levels of society. Despite the political rhetoric, patriarchy and the gerontocratic nature of politics at the local, national, and regional levels, continue to hinder the participation of women and youth in peacebuilding activities in Africa. African governments should develop, implement, and report out on the development and implementation of their National Action Plans in support of UN Resolution 1325. Furthermore, more must be done to mainstream peace education in national curricula across Africa in order to advance a strong culture of peace.
5. ***Enhance collaboration among regional civil society organizations and regional economic communities***. Collaboration is essential to effective early warning and peacebuilding activities. But different, and at times competing, objectives among CSOs has limited their

cooperation, and thus weakened CSOs various platforms for engagement in peacebuilding. In addition, more could be done to enhance CSO collaboration with regional economic communities.

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