ENCOUNTERS WITH THE SOCIALIST PAST

MOORINGS AND (DIS)ENTANGLEMENTS VOL 1

SONAKSHI CHAUHAN

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1

Understanding Socialist Encounters of Africa and East Germany

Marcia C. Schenck, Immanuel R. Harisch, Anne Dietrich, and Eric Burton[1]

The Arusha Declaration of February 5, 1967 confirmed the intention of Tanzania's ruling party TANU (Tanganyika African National Union) to "build a socialist state."[2] The declaration affirmed that TANU planned to pursue a policy of nationalization of major industries, banks, and insurance companies.[3] Two months after the declaration, the Tanzanian trade unionist Salvatory Kaindoah wrote an enthusiastic letter to share the news of developments in his country with the Fritz Heckert Trade Union College, in the East German town of Bernau where Kaindoah had studied:

> Dear Director of the College, Dr. Kampfert,
> I am very glad when I am writing this letter to you now, being in a country which is in a way liquidating the exploitation of man by man and on the way to Socialism. Well done with your daily work. How glad were you, when you heard that our country nationalized all the banks and other big industries?[4]

Kaindoah, at that time employed at the Tanzanian National Institute for Productivity in Dar es Salaam, seemed to suggest that the Arusha Declaration meant the

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1 This introduction is the result of a collective thinking and writing process of all four editors. Given the ongoing benchmarkization of current academia, it is of increasing importance which author's name comes first. In order to mitigate the effects of this development, we have decided to use an alphabetical order for the edited volume and an alphabetically reversed order for the introduction. The introduction also owes much to the valuable comments, corrections, and advice of a number of people. We want to thank the two anonymous reviewers, Nele Fabian, Ingeborg Grau, and Arno Sonderegger for their careful reading and helpful suggestions. We also want to thank the members of the GDR working group at Leipzig University and Innocent Rwehabura for their comments. Last but not least we are grateful to Pieter Cordwell for skillfully editing the text and to Malte Köppen for streamlining the footnotes, cleaning up the bibliography, and creating the index.
2 Tanganyika African National Union, "Arusha Declaration," February 5, 1967, accessed January 29, 2020, www.marxists.org/subject/africa/nyerere/1967/arusha-declaration.htm.
3 Andrew Coulson, *Tanzania: A Political Economy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).
4 Salvatory Kaindoah to Karl Kampfert, Dar es Salaam, April 10, 1967, Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, Berlin (henceforth: SAPMO BArch), DY 79/619.

convergence of the United Republic of Tanzania with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) in a cohesive and growing world of socialism. This was to be Socialism with a capital "S," perhaps optimistically indicating that the policies of TANU and the policies of the GDR's ruling Socialist Unity Party (*Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands*, SED) led to a shared socialist future. Kaindoah's celebratory letter is one of a myriad of examples of dialogue and entanglements between African proponents of socialism, with their multiple visions of African and global futures, and East German individuals and institutions.

Many East Germans, however, were less confident about the viability of Tanzania's policies and converging paths – including those who observed these events from East Africa. Some weeks before Kaindoah's letter was written, East German experts and diplomats gathered at a meeting of the local party branch of the SED in Stone Town, the capital of Tanzania's island region of Zanzibar (it had been a separate country until it merged with Tanganyika in 1964 to create Tanzania). Their discussions revealed the urge to classify and evaluate the Arusha Declaration based on how it conformed to Marxist-Leninist dogma. According to the minutes of the party meeting, several comrades "immediately labeled the program as unscientific" and dismissed its usefulness to building socialism in Tanzania. Other members questioned the suitability of a socialist program to Tanzania. They saw Tanzania as being completely different in material and cultural terms compared to European circumstances, and at least one developmental stage away from being a "Workers' and Peasants' State," like the GDR. One member asserted that the Arusha Declaration was "based on the level of development and the mentality of Africans. Can Africans even build socialism with their ideology?" He further alluded to the fact that the East Germans had not seen the declaration coming, despite their supposedly leading role in guiding Tanzania to socialism: "Why were we surprised by the declaration?"[5] The surprise felt by the East Germans in Zanzibar stemmed from the fact that many of them took for granted the leading roles of the Soviet Union and the GDR on the road to socialist development. Thus, many found it difficult to come to terms with Tanzanian actors who were conceptualizing their own road to socialist development.

In both Tanzania and the GDR, socialism would remain official government policy for the next two decades and beyond. By 1967, both socialisms had al-

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5 Contribution by Comrade O., no place [Zanzibar], no date [March 9, 1967], SAPMO-BArch, DY 30/98149. For a discussion of the role of East German advisers in Zanzibar, see Eric Burton, "Diverging Visions in Revolutionary Spaces: East German Advisers and Revolution from Above in Zanzibar, 1964–1970," in *Between East and South: Spaces of Interaction in the Globalizing Economy of the Cold War*, ed. Anna Calori et al. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019).

ready been connected by newly established modes of intercontinental exchange. These included personal migrations, new institutions, and official initiatives. Tanzanian trade unionists (such as Salvatory Kaindoah), students, and Swahili language teachers ventured to the GDR, while East German teachers, skilled workers, and technical experts were dispatched to build socialism in Tanzania. Beneath the official rhetoric of cooperation, however, ideas of internationalism and the best path to socialism often differed. Tanzania became, in the East German classification, not a "socialist country" but a country of "socialist orientation" that was still at a remove from "scientific socialism."[6] Indeed, Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere, one of the main architects of the Arusha Declaration, always kept Marxism-Leninism at arm's length and publicly chastised as "failures" the "so-called socialist countries" in which a small minority had seized power and privilege.[7]

There was thus never a universally shared or stable understanding of where the socialist world began and where it ended. At least nominally, governments in no less than 35 out of 53 countries on the African continent used the term "socialist" to characterize their politics and policies between the late 1950s and the late 1980s.[8] Many African socialisms in the 1960s and 1970s, though by no means all, shared characteristics. Examples of these traits were nationalization of key economic sectors for raw material exports, state-controlled marketing boards for agricultural produce, and universal and free education and healthcare. Ghana, Guinea, Tanzania, and Zambia are good examples of countries which followed this package of policies. Ethiopia, Tanzania, Mozambique, and Burkina Faso were the countries which attempted the most wide-ranging transformations of the all-important rural sector in the 1970s and 1980s. Many of the socialisms were also marked by "a doubling of the state into party and normal state administration, the concentration of strategic decision-making at the party

6 Eric Burton, "Tansanias 'Afrikanischer Sozialismus' und die Entwicklungspolitik der beiden deutschen Staaten: Akteure, Beziehungen und Handlungsspielräume, 1961–1990" (PhD diss., University of Vienna, 2017), 134–135.
7 Julius Nyerere, "Capitalism or Socialism: The Rational Choice," *New Blackfriars* 55 (1974): 447.
8 Anne M. Pitcher and Kelly M. Askew, "African Socialisms and Postsocialisms," *Africa* 76 (2006): 1. See also Eric Burton, "Socialisms in Development: Revolution, Divergence and Crisis, 1917–1991," *Journal für Entwicklungspolitik* 33 (2017): 5; Priya Lal, *African Socialism in Postcolonial Tanzania*: *Between the Village and the World* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Mark Nash, ed., *Red Africa: Affective Communities and the Cold War* (London: Black Dog Publishing, 2016); Barry Munslow, ed., *Africa: Problems in the Transition to Socialism* (London: Zed, 1986); Edmond J. Keller and Donald S. Rothchild, ed., *Afro-Marxist Regimes: Ideology and Public Policy* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1987).

leaderships, highly centralized decision-making processes and a subordination of ‘mass organizations’ to the party line.”[9]

In view of the variety of socialisms in Africa, which often blended with “Third World” anti-imperialism and diverse forms of African nationalism, African socialist relationships with Soviet and East German Marxism-Leninism were complex. They were marked by both cooperation and tension, particularly as the anti-imperialist strand grew and diversified further.[10] The bipolar Cold War paradigm was and is unable to explain these alliances and frictions.[11] Similarly, the historiography of globalization has also ignored or marginalized these connections until very recently. As James Mark, Bogdan Iacob, Tobias Rupprecht, and Ljubica Spaskovska point out, “[t]he idea of Western capitalism as the sole engine for modernity has left us with a distorted view of socialist states as inward-looking, isolated, and cut off from global trends until the transition to capitalism in the 1990s.”[12] In the globalization discourse of triumphant liberalism which emerged in the early 1990s, and decisively shaped global history as an academic discipline,[13] both Africa and Eastern Europe were neglected world regions. Too many analyses considered globalization to be a Western-led phenomenon in which neither the communist world nor African states – of varying ideo-

9 Joachim Becker, “Anatomie der Sozialismen: Wirtschaft, Staat und Gesellschaft,” in *Sozialismen: Entwicklungsmodelle von Lenin bis Nyerere*, ed. Joachim Becker and Rudy Weissenbacher (Wien: Promedia, 2009), 40. Our translation.

10 William H. Friedland and Carl G. Rosberg, ed., *African Socialism* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964); Allison Drew, “Communism in Africa,” in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Communism*, ed. S. A. Smith (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2014). Jodie Yuzhou Sun explores the influences of the Cold War, the political culture of individual African states (Kenya and Zambia), and their bilateral relations with communist countries, above all China, in Jodie Yuzhou Sun, “Historicizing African Socialisms: Kenyan African Socialism, Zambian Humanism, and Communist China’s Entanglements,” *International Journal of African Historical Studies* 52 (2019).

11 Daniel Speich, “The Kenyan Style of ‘African Socialism’: Developmental Knowledge Claims and the Explanatory Limits of the Cold War,” *Diplomatic History* 33 (2009); Tony Smith, “New Bottles for New Wine: A Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War,” *Diplomatic History* 24 (2000).

12 James Mark et al., *1989: A Global History of Eastern Europe* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 7.

13 Sebastian Conrad, *What Is Global History*? (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2016), 1–2. Sebastian Conrad maintains that “one of the crucial tasks of global history is to offer a critical commentary on the ongoing globalization process.” Conrad, *What Is Global History?*, 212.

logical colors – were thought to be active participants until the late 1980s.[14] There are, however, good reasons to say that they were.

Encounters, Moorings and (Dis)Entanglements

The title of this volume refers to how encounters between people from various African states and East Germany were navigated and negotiated by a multitude of actors, who were pursuing a wide variety of interests. As mentioned above, the meanings of socialism and the substance of socialist relations were unstable and constantly subject to negotiation. Furthermore, in many everyday encounters, socialist goals were relegated to the background, overtaken by pragmatic imperatives. On other occasions, non-socialist ideologies such as nationalism or pan-Africanism took precedence. Inevitably, such a diversity of encounters had diverse outcomes. Above all, there were encounters which led to the establishment of new institutions and the migrations which resulted from those institutions. In many instances, flows and channels between South and East were newly established after the Second World War. In the absence of direct colonial links, there was often no historical precedent from which relations could be resumed. Johanna Bockman has argued that it was this relatively blank slate that made South-East interconnections "much more global than the old hierarchic metropole-colony relations, which the neo-liberal economic policies, often mistakenly labelled as globalization, reinforced."[15] The new ties represented the emergence of "alternative form[s] of global interconnectedness based on anti-imperialist geogra-

14 Anna Calori et al., "Alternative Globalization? Spaces and Economic Interactions between the 'Socialist Camp' and the 'Global South'," in *Between East and South: Spaces of Interaction in the Globalizing Economy of the Cold War,* ed. Anna Calori et al. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019), 7, our emphasis; James Mark and Tobias Rupprecht, "The Socialist World in Global History: From Absentee to Victim to Co-Producer," in *The Practice of Global History: European Perspectives,* ed. Matthias Middell (London: Bloomsbury, 2018); on the repercussions of colonialism and Africa's marginalization in history writing see Táíwò Olúfẹ́mi, "What Is 'African Studies'? African Scholars, Africanists, and the Production of Knowledge," in *Reclaiming the Human Sciences and Humanities Through African Perspectives*, ed. Helen Lauer and Kofi Anyidoho (Accra: Sub-Saharan Press, 2012); David Simo, "Writing World History in Africa: Opportunities, Constraints and Challenges," in *Global History, Globally: Research and Practice Around the World,* ed. Sven Beckert and Dominic Sachsenmaier (London: Bloomsbury, 2018).

15 Johanna Bockman, "Socialist Globalization against Capitalist Neocolonialism: The Economic Ideas behind the New International Economic Order," Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism and Development (2015): 125–127; the quote is also used in Calori et al., "Alternative Globalization," 9.

phies."[16] Parastatal foreign trade companies engaged in barter trade as both sides often lacked the hard currency needed for exchange in a global financial system which was controlled by the United States and the international financial institutions.[17] Transnational networks of youth organizations, trade unions, and political parties had partners in Europe, Africa, the Caribbean, South America, and across Asia. This wide participation formed axes of socialist mobilities, initially envisioned to be independent of the imperial fault lines which characterized the liberal globalization which had risen from the ashes of the colonial empires.[18]

Though the contributions in this volume show a multitude of entanglements, they also demonstrate the ephemeral nature of many of the relationships, several of which were marked by tensions that allowed for rapid disentanglements. The most important rupture was, of course, the end of the GDR in 1990, when many institutionalized connections were abruptly discontinued. Even in earlier decades, however, many exchanges ended promptly and can therefore be aptly described as "temporary friendships" which passed from high hopes and enthusiasm to mutual disillusionment.[19] Pertinent examples for such a course of events include relations between Zanzibar and the GDR in the 1960s (Burgess, this volume), or the coffee trade with Ethiopia in the late 1970s, both discussed below. The temporary and fragmented character of many relations is captured in the metaphor of "moorings." The word describes the anchoring of a ship or the fixing of a moving object more generally. Some authors in mobility studies have emphasized the dialectical relationship between mobility and moorings; they argue that "mobilities cannot be described without attention to the necessary spatial, infrastructural and institutional moorings that configure and enable mobilities."[20] Mobility is only possible through the existence of multiple fixed institutions or infrastructure, and mooring is only possible if there is something

16 Mark et al., *1989: A Global History of Eastern Europe*, 9.

17 Vijay Prashad, *The Poorer Nations: A Possible History of the Global South* (London: Verso, 2014), 25.

18 See e.g. Ismay Milford, "More Than a Cold War Scholarship: East-Central African Anticolonial Activists, the International Union of Socialist Youth, and the Evasion of the Colonial State (1955–65)," *Stichproben: Vienna Journal of African Studies* 34 (2018); Tal Zalmanovich, "From Apartheid South Africa to Socialist Budapest and Back: Communism, Race, and Cold War Journeys," *Stichproben: Vienna Journal of African Studies* 34 (2018).

19 The term temporary friendships is borrowed from the film program "Temporary Friendships – Contract Labor and Internationalism in the GDR", bi'bak, Berlin, October 24 – November 22, 2019, bi-bak.de/en/bi-bakino/freundschaft-auf-zeit.

20 Kevin Hannam, Mimi Sheller, and John Urry, "Editorial: Mobilities, Immobilities and Moorings," *Mobilities* 1 (2006): 3, accessed December 5, 2019, doi:10.1080/17450100500489189.

immobile to moor onto.[21] In this volume, however, we employ the mooring metaphor in a temporal rather than a physical sense. Given that few of the African and East German actors involved in the exchanges stayed abroad for the long-term, most individual experiences were moorings rather than rootings (in the sense of putting down roots). Akin to sailors who reminisce about their journeys once they get home, East German travelers to African countries and African sojourners in the GDR think back to their moorings which allowed them to learn and work abroad for a few weeks, months or even years (Burgess; Machava; Osei, annotated by Harisch; Bodie; Sprute; Bahr; Buanaissa and Piepiorka, all this volume). In the light of this, we frame the encounters between Africans and East Germans as moorings which entangled – and, with time, unmoored and disentangled – two continents through patchy personal, institutional, and linguistic webs. The contributions to this volume show how people and institutions produced new forms of transregional interconnectedness, but also how hierarchies and structures limited the possible impact of these encounters.

Historically grounded limitations impacted relations between Africa and the "East" more generally. In the economic realm, political independence did not much disrupt African dependence on vital trade links between former colonies and their erstwhile colonial powers, as governments of newly-independent states usually kept these dense economic networks with the Western capitalist states intact.[22] Moreover, while the Soviet Union and the socialist states of Eastern Europe helped to diversify the sources for much sought-after foreign assistance, most investment in African economies still came from Western governments or Western multinational corporations. This was also the case in Africa's socialist states.[23] Mining contracts for Guinean bauxite or Zambian copper, or oil exploration in Congo-Brazzaville or Angola, were, for the most part, continued with Western capitalist firms. In the cultural realm, most African countries adopted the colonial language as national language and retained many aspects of the colonial education system. At the same time French, English or Portuguese were rarely taught in Eastern Europe.[24] These limitations, the lack of financial clout with which the Eastern Bloc could penetrate the economies of postcolonial African countries, and the inability to converse in a shared language, were only some

21 Ibid.

22 Iba der Thiam, James Mulira, and Christophe Wondji, "Africa and the Socialist Countries," in *Unesco General History of Africa VIII: Africa since 1935*, ed. Ali A. Mazrui and C. Wondji (California: University of California Press, 1993), 808 – 809.

23 Ralph A. Austen, *African Economic History: Internal Development and External Dependency* (London: James Curry, 1987), chap. 9.

24 Thiam, Mulira and Wondji, "Africa and the Socialist Countries," 809.

of the factors which hampered the establishment of more durable ties between socialist Eastern European countries and Africa. Another factor in relations was that many East German actors also carried, without much self-reflection about it, the cultural legacy of an attitude of superiority vis-à-vis Africa. This mentality dated back at least to the nineteenth century and the period of Imperial Germany's colonial possessions. It was, furthermore, compounded by the even more explicitly racist legacy of Nazi Germany. The GDR officially distanced itself both from its colonial and Nazi past, but both pasts remained largely undiscussed and unexamined with regard to individual family histories and world views.[25] East Germany was the only country in the communist Eastern Bloc with a history of colonial rule in Africa, though it was certainly not the only country whose citizens often bore an (at best) condescending attitude towards Africans. While the SED government successfully managed to distance itself from Imperial Germany in the eyes of many of its African interlocutors, the legacies of racist attitudes permeated cross-continental everyday encounters.

Although they were often of limited duration and constrained by several factors, the South-East exchanges and moorings nevertheless left their marks. During their time in the GDR, African students tried to set up associations which called for East German media to stop portraying modern Africa in the exoticizing manner which prevailed at that time (Alvarado; Angermann, this volume). Mozambican contract workers not only exchanged their labor power for education and pay in the GDR, but also brought home East German goods that changed the war economy in Maputo in ways that lasted for years (Machava, this volume). The East German and Mozambican governments established an agreement for Mozambican workers to migrate to East Germany to work and receive training, which lastingly entangled both countries economically, politically, and socially (Rantzsch, this volume). In the contribution by Schenck and Alberto we read about the personal consequences of the institutional disentanglements and the dissolution of the contract after the GDR ceased to exist. There was, therefore, a complex assemblage of multi-directional processes within these South-East relationships, which led to diverse and at times contradictory outcomes.

25 Peggy Piesche, "Making African Diasporic Pasts Possible: A Retrospective View of the GDR and Its Black (Step-)Children," in *Remapping Black Germany: New Perspectives on Afro-German History, Politics, and Culture*, ed. Sara. Lennox (Massachusetts: University of Massachusetts Press, 2016).

Africa and East Germany: Alternative Forms of Transcontinental Interconnectedness in Global History

The perspectives of actors from both the "South" and the "East" have been marginalized in global history.[26] This volume investigates South-East relations through a focus on global socialism and diverse transregional entanglements between actors from the African continent and the GDR.[27] It places African history into global history by highlighting connections between Africans and East Germans and their institutions during the Cold War. The volume focuses predominantly on non-elite figures and the possibilities and constraints of their agency. In this way, the scholars contributing to this collection highlight Africans' and Eastern Europeans' visions of African and global futures, which were often shaped by socialism in its numerous imaginations and manifestations. The book thus contributes to the discussions about the nature of global socialism(s), and how it shaped and was shaped by African actors and institutions. The contributions foreground "alternative form[s] of global interconnectedness"[28] by showing the many ways in which actors from different vantage points in the socialist world thought about socialism, both locally and globally, and how they navigated the new hierarchies of a global socialism in the making.

Following an interdisciplinary and initially multilingual[29] approach, this volume offers a platform for scholars from three continents (Africa, Europe, and

26 Arno Sonderegger, Ingeborg Grau, and Birgit Englert, "Einleitung: Afrika im 20. Jahrhundert," in *Afrika im 20. Jahrhundert: Geschichte und Gesellschaft,* ed. Arno Sonderegger, Ingeborg Grau, and Birgit Englert (Wien: Promedia, 2011), 9 – 11; Calori et al., "Alternative Globalization?," 7 – 9.

27 For a similar approach regarding entanglements with Vietnam, see Christina Schwenkel, "Socialist Mobilities: Crossing New Terrains in Vietnamese Migration Histories," *Central and Eastern European Migration Review* 4 (2015); see also Alena K. Alamgir, "Labor and Labor Migration in State Socialism," *Labor History* 59 (2018).

28 Mark et al., *1989*, 9.

29 The original contributions were based on work in English, German, and Portuguese. While scholars like Jeremy Adelman and Drayton and Motadel have rightly lamented that English is becoming "globish" and hegemonial in global history, the current publishing rules did not allow the editors of this volume to go ahead with their original plan to publish this book as a trilingual edited volume in English, German, and Portuguese. See Jeremy Adelman, "What is global history now?," Aeon, accessed October 9, 2019, https://aeon.co/essays/is-global-history-still-possible-or-has-it-had-its-moment; Richard Drayton and David Motadel, "Discussion: The Futures of Global History," *Journal of Global History* 13 (2018): 15.

North America) and various disciplines (ranging from history to German studies to education studies) to present their research. They employ a range of methodological approaches to the study of South-East relations, including oral history, the consultation of both Eastern European and African archives, the study of literature and of international academic networks. Throughout, they strive to maintain a balance between African and East German actors' perspectives. In this vein, the open access format of this volume contributes to the international accessibility of knowledge generated across national boundaries, and we invite further transregional cooperation – particularly with scholars from Africa and with researchers using African sources – in investigating the pasts and legacies of these interconnections.

With a special focus on negotiations, entanglements, and African influences on East Germany (and vice versa), the volume sheds light on personal and institutional agency, cultural cross-fertilization, migration, development, and solidarity in everyday encounters. It explores the repercussions and legacies of these South-East encounters and examines in which ways the enmeshed power structures and inequalities remain relevant up to the present day. By demonstrating the diversity of socialisms and connections to the East on the African continent, this edited volume challenges, possibly complicates, but ultimately deepens our understanding of how Africa fitted into what was, for a time, a global socialist world.

Writing South-East Relations into Global History

Global history has been on the rise for the past two decades, but, as set out above, all too often the kind of global history produced has been synonymous with a history of Western-led globalization.[30] However, recent studies have suggested that the study of alternative forms of globalization, spurred by socialism and the process of decolonization, enriches and complicates our understanding of globalization. Oscar Sanchez-Sibony, for instance, has examined the political economy of what he calls "red globalization," highlighting Soviet responses to trade initiatives from the Global South in the 1950s and 1960s.[31] Johanna Bockman has engaged with what she refers to as "socialist globalization," seeing

30 Frederick Cooper, "What Is the Concept of Globalization Good for? An African Historian's Perspective," *African Affairs* 100 (2001); Lynn Hunt, *Writing History in the Global Era* (New York: Norton, 2014).
31 Oscar Sanchez-Sibony, *Red Globalization: The Political Economy of the Soviet Cold War from Stalin to Khrushchev* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014).

it as an alternative political project to "capitalist neocolonialism," in her work about the role of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in negotiating the parameters of the mooted New International Economic Order.[32] In the literature on globalization, the portrayal of state socialist Europe thus underwent a significant transformation: previously seen as an absentee from or a victim of (Western) capitalist globalization, it is now recognized as a co-producer of globalization, or as an instigator of alternative globalization(s).[33] Recent scholarship, produced mainly by historians of East Central Europe and the Soviet Union, has discussed relations between the "Second World" and the "Third World," or the Cold War East and the Global South, under terms such as "internationalism," "red globalization," and "Warsaw Pact Intervention in the Third World."[34]

The contributions to this volume demonstrate that alternative forms and ideas of globalization were about much more than just economic orders and rhetoric of political elites. We examine cultural, social, political, and economic encounters in a global socialist world. In doing so, we build on important works from other scholars who have investigated relations between Africa and the GDR. A first wave of literature arrived in the early 1990s, with many groundbreaking studies based on new archival records as well as valuable first-hand accounts of former diplomats, journalists, students, and experts. These studies generally framed relations between the GDR and Africa in mostly bilateral terms, usually highlighted East German perspectives, and frequently took a

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32 Bockman, "Socialist Globalization," 6.

33 Mark and Rupprecht, "The Socialist World in Global History."

34 Odd A. Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005); Maxim Matusevich, ed., *Africa in Russia, Russia in Africa: Three Centuries of Encounters* (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2007); David C. Engerman, "The Second World's Third World," *Kritika: Explorations in Russian and Eurasian History* 12 (2011); Sanchez-Sibony, *Red Globalization*; Tobias Rupprecht, *Soviet Internationalism after Stalin: Interaction and Exchange between the USSR and Latin America during the Cold War* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Matthias Middell, "Weltgeschichte DDR: Die DDR in globalgeschichtlicher Perspektive," in *Die DDR als Chance: Neue Perspektiven auf ein altes Thema*, ed. Ulrich Mählert (Berlin: Metropol Verlag, 2016); Philip E. Muehlenbeck and Natalia Telepneva, ed., *Warsaw Pact Intervention in the Third World: Aid and Influence in the Cold War* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2018); Matthias Middell, "Auf dem Weg zu einer transregionalen Geschichte des Kommunismus," in *Kommunismus jenseits des Eurozentrismus: (= Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismusforschung)*, ed. Matthias Middell, (Berlin: Metropol, 2019); James Mark, Artemy M. Kalinovsky, and Steffi Marung, ed., *Alternative Globalizations: Eastern Europe and the Postcolonial World* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2020).

comparative view with West German policies and practices.[35] A second wave of historiographical scholarship has investigated relations between Africa (and other regions) and the GDR, focusing on power asymmetries, including reflections on the complex workings of race and the contested and ambivalent meanings of terms such as "solidarity" and "mutual benefit."[36] Works from either wave, however, have not explicitly discussed how relations between Africa and East Germany enrich our understanding of global history and processes of globalization.

Far from subscribing to a point of view that sees globalization as a singular homogenizing process engulfing the world, or as a Western project spreading by diffusion, we conceive of globalizations in the plural. This entails visualizing globalization "as a set of multidirectional processes stemming from different world regions."[37] This includes the African continent, as well as socialist Eastern Europe (in a geopolitical rather than geographical sense).[38] As the contributions

35 Ulrich van der Heyden, Ilona Schleicher, and Hans-Georg Schleicher, ed., *Die DDR und Afrika: Zwischen Klassenkampf und neuem Denken* (Münster: Lit, 1993); Ulrich van der Heyden, Ilona Schleicher, and Hans-Georg Schleicher, ed., *Engagiert für Afrika: Die DDR und Afrika II* (Münster: Lit, 1994); Jude Howell, "The End of an Era: The Rise and Fall of G.D.R. Aid," in *Journal of Modern African Studies* 32 (1994); Brigitte H. Schulz, *Development Policy in the Cold War Era: The Two Germanies and Sub-Saharan Africa, 1960–1985* (Münster: Lit, 1995); Ulf Engel and Hans-Georg Schleicher, *Die beiden deutschen Staaten in Afrika: Zwischen Konkurrenz und Koexistenz, 1949–1990* (Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde, 1998); Hans-Joachim Döring, *Es geht um unsere Existenz: Die Politik der DDR gegenüber der Dritten Welt am Beispiel von Mosambik und Äthiopien* (Berlin: Ch. Links, 1999); Ulrich van der Heyden and Franziska Benger, ed., *Kalter Krieg in Ostafrika: Die Beziehungen der DDR zu Sansibar und Tansania* (Münster: Lit, 2009). One of the few studies based on African archival materials is Haile G. Dagne, *Das entwicklungspolitische Engagement der DDR in Äthiopien: Eine Studie auf der Basis äthiopischer Quellen* (Münster: Lit, 2004).

36 Toni Weis, "The Politics Machine: On the Concept of 'Solidarity' in East German Support for SWAPO," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 37 (2011); Hubertus Büschel, *Hilfe zur Selbsthilfe: Deutsche Entwicklungsarbeit in Afrika 1960–1975* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus, 2014); Young-Sun Hong, *Cold War Germany, the Third World, and the Global Humanitarian Regime* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Quinn Slobodian, ed., *Comrades of Color: East Germany in the Cold War World* (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015).

37 Calori et al., "Alternative Globalization," 9.

38 For a thoughtful review and rethinking of the concept of the "bloc" see also Steffi Marung, Uwe Müller and Stefan Troebst, "Monolith or Experiment? The Bloc as a Spatial Format," in *Spatial Formats under the Global Condition*, ed. Matthias Middell and Steffi Marung (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019). See also the argument by Marcia C. Schenck about the "Black East" constituting a geographic entity with blurry borders as much as a political and social entity in Marcia C. Schenck, "Constructing and Deconstructing the "Black East" – a Helpful Research Agenda: Research Note," *Stichproben Vienna Journal of African Studies* 34 (2018): 136.

to this volume and other works have shown, many instances of South-East entanglement shared certain characteristics (e. g. a focus on education, see Alvarado, this volume). At the same time, actors from countries such as Yugoslavia or China pursued globalizing strategies which differed from, or openly challenged, Soviet leadership of the anti-imperialist camp. These divisions sometimes came into play in encounters on the ground. For instance, in Zanzibar, the GDR and the People's Republic of China competed for the role of the most influential patron (Burgess, this volume). Socialist globalization can therefore be conceived of as a series of political projects in which actors chose to engage in response to global challenges and competitions. In the terminology of world-systems theory, they were often seeking both to catch up with and to challenge the capitalist core from a peripheral or semi-peripheral position.[39] Elites in many African countries were able to decide how much to invest in relations with the West, and where to engage in relations with different actors from the East to increase their bargaining power vis-à-vis the other partner (see, for instance, the example of Egypt in Depta and Hartmetz's contribution, this volume). On other occasions, such as the French retaliation after Guinea's 1958 vote for immediate independence instead of membership in the French Community, or the exodus of mostly white professional staff from Angola and Mozambique in the mid-1970s, Western hostility made stronger links to networks of socialist globalization a matter of economic survival.

While much has been written about elite actors in the Cold War, this volume demonstrates that relations were, in fact, often fostered by non-elite actors and by state projects which brought Africans together with East German partners along socialist axis to shape an alternative vision of global interconnectedness. It follows that the trend seen in the last 70-or-so years, of increasing global interconnectedness, does not automatically go hand in hand with the liberal globalization model with which it is usually associated.[40] As the contributions in this volume demonstrate, studying alternative forms of global entanglements does not have to come at the cost of national histories or "small spaces" and micro histories, and most certainly do not depoliticize these stories, as is sometimes claimed.[41] Quite to the contrary, analysis of concrete complaints about racism (Angermann, this volume), individual photos (Bahr, this volume), or entries in brigade diaries (Sprute, this volume) reveal both the reach and limits of official policies and of the socialist rhetoric of friendship and solidarity. Studying the

39 Mark and Rupprecht, "The Socialist World in Global History."

40 Middell, "Weltgeschichte," 153.

41 Drayton and Motadel, "Discussion," 1–3.

limits and fictions of entanglements tells us as much about their meaning as does studying their existence and achievements.

Writing Africa into Global History

The concept of globalization, when it is used to refer to a universal, Western-led process of integration, easily glosses over the complexities and diversity of actual connections and actors.[42] This does by no means imply a neglect of global dimensions. As Frederick Cooper emphasized, the "and" in DuBois' title *The World and Africa* implies two directions of causality and serves as a reminder that "African history should be studied in all its complexity, but not as if 'Africa' existed independently of the rest of the world."[43] Recent approaches – including this series, *Africa in Global History* – address the global connections which shaped African histories and which aim to fully incorporate the African continent into the "global turn". They usually embrace DuBois' and Cooper's imperative and frame Africa firmly within the study of globalizing processes. Some authors speak of "Africa in the globalizing world," others of "Africa within the global."[44] These formulations also signal that there is no consensus as to whether, and in what ways, Africa may also be seen as a producer of globalization. This is a discussion which will keep the field engaged for a while to come and to which this volume provides empirical research perspectives.[45] It offers avenues towards a global history of socialism by merging two strands of global history: Africa in global history and South-East entanglements. In the process of editing this volume we have come to appreciate the complexities of such an endeavor. It was not easy to achieve a balanced viewpoint, and in the final result more contributors and primary sources speak from the East German than from the African point of view. To a certain extent this was to be expected, given the inherent GDR-centric nature of a volume using the GDR as a unifying feature studying entanglements with socialisms across Africa. However, this volume would be

42 Cooper, "What Is the Concept of Globalization Good for?".
43 Cooper, *Africa in the World*, 9.
44 Ulf Engel et al., "Africa in the Globalizing World – a Research Agenda," *Comparativ* 27 (2017); Pedro Machado, "Repositioning Africa within the Global," *Africa Today* 63 (2016). See also the other insightful contributions to the section "Symposium: African Studies and the Challenge of the 'Global' in the 21st Century" in this issue of *Africa Today*.
45 James Ferguson, *Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order* (London: Duke University Press, 2006), especially chap. 1.

equally hard to be put together in a balanced way if it was, for example, examining Mozambique's entanglements with the Eastern Bloc.

A worthwhile future endeavor, which takes up the Afro-Asian Networks Research Collective's call to examine South-South relations, would be to examine the socialist encounters in networks created and maintained between African actors beyond the trodden paths of diplomatic relations of nation-states.[46] Yet, this volume succeeds in showing how "African actors navigated, ignored, and subverted the power dynamics of the Cold War"[47] and that many contributions actually follow a "research agenda that privileges transnational networks of affinity"[48] – and of friction – across Africa and Europe.

We should not close our eyes to the fact that there is an inequality of research output on the global socialist world that sees many more actors from the Global North engage in this research topic than scholars from the Global South. To our knowledge, current contributions in the field of South-East entanglements rarely include scholars from based in Africa who investigate these relations by drawing on archival materials and oral histories from their region of origin.[49] The multiple reasons for this global inequality of knowledge production and pitfalls of transcontinental partnerships have been discussed elsewhere,[50] but it is worth noting explicitly the effect of the different funding landscapes and intellectual freedoms, especially in the context of writing global history. For this volume we found it difficult to get contributors from African universities, reflecting that the research agendas of global history and South-East relations are currently not well established at most African institutions of higher

46 Afro-Asian Networks Research Collective, "Manifesto: Networks of Decolonization in Asia and Africa," *Radical History Review* 131 (2018).

47 Afro-Asian Networks Research Collective, "Manifesto," 178.

48 Afro-Asian Networks Research Collective, "Manifesto," 177.

49 An account on Ghana's relations with the Soviet Union based on Ghanaian sources by a US-based scholar is Nana Osei-Opare, "Uneasy Comrades: Postcolonial Statecraft, Race, and Citizenship, Ghana–Soviet Relations, 1957–1966," *Journal of West African History* 5 (2019). We are, however, not aware of works which are using archival documents of the MPLA or FRELIMO to examine the relations of Angola or Mozambique with socialist states as of now. Archival access seems to be an impediment to engaging with this research topic from African perspectives. For a recent discussion of Mozambican archives see Ingrid Miethe et al., *Globalization of an Educational Idea: Workers' Faculties in Eastern Germany, Vietnam, Cuba and Mozambique* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019), 34–35.

50 Amina Mama, "Is it Ethical to Study Africa? Preliminary Thoughts on Scholarship and Freedom, "*African Studies Review* 50 (2007); Loren B. Landau, "Communities of Knowledge or Tyrannies of Partnership: Reflections on North–South Research Networks and the Dual Imperative," *Journal of Refugee Studies* 25 (2012).

education.[51] Seen from the African research landscape today, relations with the GDR are a rather marginal topic.[52] This suggests that the impact of the GDR was either not that profound or is a silenced topic in current political discourse, or most likely a bit of both.

Considering this, why should a volume on Africa in global history bring the GDR into the picture? There are many good reasons. Firstly, Africa – both south and north of the Sahara – serves as a crucial vantage point for investigating South-East relations and the alternative futures that these ties promised. There is a growing body of Africanist scholarship with a global history perspective, yet relations with the geopolitical Cold War "East" are often only mentioned in passing.[53] Similarly, connections with Africa have been absent in most of the historiography on East Germany. As Sebastian Pampuch points out, the "idea of a post-colonial world that breaks with the inequalities of capitalism through socialist modernization is one of these repressed histories." Such histories can also resituate the GDR in a transregional perspective.[54] This neglect does justice neither to African countries nor to the heterogenous socialist states. The unfolding decolonization process on the African continent in the 1950s and

51 Generally, one has to acknowledge the research constraints at many public African universities today that are an echo of the IMF and World Bank induced cuts on tertiary education from the late 1970s onward after the "golden age" of knowledge production at a number of African universities in the 1960s and early 1970s. See Esperanza Brizuela-Garcia, "African Historiography and the Crisis of Institutions," in *The Study of Africa Volume 1: Disciplinary and Interdisciplinary Encounters*, ed. Paul Tiyambe Zeleza (Dakar: Codesria, 2006); Mahmood Mamdani, *Scholars in the Marketplace: The Dilemmas of Neo-Liberal Reform at Makerere University, 1989 – 2005* (Dakar: CODESRIA Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 2007).

52 Nonetheless, two Ethiopian exceptions should be mentioned: Dagne, *Das entwicklungspolitische Engagement* and Gebru Tareke, *The Ethiopian Revolution: War in the Horn of Africa* (New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2009). Like the majority of German historical studies on relations between Socialist Ethiopia and the GDR, however, they focus mostly on military and economic aspects and less on everyday encounters. See Hans-Joachim Döring, "*Es geht um unsere Existenz*": *Die Politik der DDR gegenüber der Dritten Welt am Beispiel von Mosambik und Äthiopien* (Berlin: Ch. Links, 1999) and Klaus Storkmann, *Geheime Solidarität. Militärbeziehungen und Militärhilfen der DDR in die "Dritte Welt"* (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2012).

53 Important exceptions include Osei-Opare, "Uneasy Comrades"; Sun, "Historicizing African Socialisms"; Jocelyn Alexander and JoAnn McGregor, "African Soldiers in the USSR: Oral Histories of ZAPU Intelligence Cadres' Soviet Training, 1964 – 1979," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 43 (2017); Jamie Monson, *Africa's Freedom Railway: How a Chinese Development Project Changed Lives and Livelihoods in Tanzania* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009).

54 Sebastian Pampuch, "Afrikanische Freedom Fighter im Exil der DDR: Dekoloniale Wissensbestände einer 'unerwünschten Geschichte'," in *Wissen in Bewegung: Migration und Globale Verflechtungen in der Zeitgeschichte seit 1945*, ed. Stephanie Zloch, Lars Müller, and Simone Lässig (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2018), 325. Our translation.

1960s – and the breakdown of the Portuguese Empire in the mid-1970s – breathed new life into the belief in socialist world revolution as well as postcolonial emancipation. "National democracies" in Africa were to serve as trading partners as well as crucial allies against Western capitalist neocolonialism. African actors were interested in the Eastern Bloc (whose name misleadingly suggests homogeneity and uniformity of interests[55]) as new trade partners, partners for professional and cadre training, and supporters of liberation struggles – most actively against the white minority regimes in southern Africa. These ties sometimes offered radical alternatives, but sometimes only additional elements to Western discourses on development. Colonial legacies continued to shape the opportunities and constraints of postcolonial African governments to varying degrees.[56]

These efforts to overcome peripherality are part of a longer and broader history that also includes connections across the Black Atlantic. African interests and roles in co-producing alternative forms of global interconnectedness have been bound up with the question of how to overcome the peripherality imposed by colonialism, and the asymmetries in the global order that came with it. Already in the first half of the twentieth century, African, African-American, and West Indian intellectuals, such as W. E. B. DuBois, George Padmore, C. L. R. James, Tiemoko Garan Kouyaté, and Kwame Nkrumah set up revolutionary socialist publication organs[57] and established wide anticolonial networks. These networks, at times, included the Soviet Union[58] and Western communist parties and creatively adapted Marxist and Leninist thought for use in their analyses of African affairs and their calls for decolonization.[59] In the aftermath of World War

55 Marung, Müller, and Troebst, "Monolith or Experiment?".

56 Frederick Cooper, "Possibility and Constraint: African Independence in Historical Perspective," *The Journal of African History* 49 (2008).

57 Matthew Quest, "George Padmore's and C. L. R. James's International African Opinion," in *George Padmore: Pan African Revolutionary*, ed. Fitzroy Baptiste and Rupert Lewis (Kingston: Ian Randle, 2009).

58 It is important to note, however, that the relationship of these mostly undogmatic Black Marxist thinkers and activists with Stalin's Soviet Union was an uneasy one; C. L. R. James, for example, favored Trotzky over Stalin and George Padmore had already broke with the Soviet Union during the 1930s. See Hakim Adi, *Pan-Africanism*: *A History* (London: Bloomsbury, 2018); Arno Sonderegger, "Der Panafrikanismus im 20. Jahrhundert," in *Afrika im 20. Jahrhundert: Geschichte und Gesellschaft*, ed. Arno Sonderegger, Ingeborg Grau and Birgit Englert (Wien: Promedia, 2011).

59 Leslie James, *George Padmore and Decolonization from Below: Pan-Africanism, the Cold War, and the End of Empire* (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015); C. L. R. James, *A History of Negro Revolt* (Chicago: Research Associates School Times Publications, 2004 [1938]); Kwame Nkrumah, *Towards Colonial Freedom*: *Africa in the Struggle against World Imperialism* (London: Panaf

II, DuBois took a fresh look at the "old hierarchic metropole-colony relations" mentioned by Johanna Bockman. In *The World and Africa: An Inquiry into the Part which Africa Has Played in World History*, mentioned above, DuBois argued in 1946 that the devastating experience of the Second World War rendered it impossible for colonial business to go on as usual, providing an opening for Africans to redefine their place in the world.[60] For many aspiring African politicians after the Second World War, socialism promised an alluring break with the colonial and neocolonial order. Their experience of capitalist exploitation and institutionalized racism under European colonialism made socialism an attractive foundation on which to build their visions of modernity.

The second reason for bringing the GDR into African global history is that Afro-European encounters, under the banner of socialism, led to a dialectical process of globalizing on both sides of the equation. What Maxim Matusevich and Constantin Kastakioris have postulated for the 1960s Soviet Union[61] was true for the GDR as well. The presence of, and interactions with Africans, alongside South Asians and Latin Americans, modernized and globalized East German society. A number of chapters in this volume demonstrate these adaptive processes in detail. Depta and Hartmetz's contribution examines the institutionalization of teaching and the use of German as a foreign language. Both Alvarado and Angermann show how African student unions tested the limits of regulations laid down by the SED while individual members of these unions criticized the portrayal of Africans in GDR media. Journalists like Ulrich Makosch, as George Bodie's contribution shows, brought the struggle of the *Frente de Libertação*

Books, 1979 [1945]); George Padmore, *How Britain Rules Africa* (New York: Negro Universities Press, 1969 [1936]). See also Arno Sonderegger, "How the Empire Wrote Back: Notes on the Struggle of George Padmore and Kwame Nkrumah," in *Kwame Nkrumah 1909 – 1972: A Controversial African Visionary*, ed. Bea Lundt and Christoph Marx (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2016).

60 W. E. B. Du Bois, *The World and Africa: An Inquiry into the Part Which Africa Has Played in World History* (New York: International Publishers, 1965 [1946]); see also Cooper, *Africa in the World*.

61 Maxim Matusevich, "Expanding the Boundaries of the Black Atlantic: Af, *Africa in the World*.

Maxim Matusevich, "Expanding the Boundaries of the Black Atlantic: African Students as Soviet Moderns," *Ab Imperio* 2 (2012), doi:10.1353/imp.2012.0060. Constantin Kastakioris, "Transferts Est-Sud. Échanges Éducatifs et Formation de Cadres Africains en Union Soviétique Pendant les Années Soixante," *Outre-mers* 94 (2007); idem, "African Intellectuals and the Soviet Union: Internationalism, Pan-Africanism, and Négritude During the Years of Decolonization: 1954 – 1964," *Cahiers du monde russe* 47 (2006); idem, "Students from Portuguese Africa in the Soviet Union, 1960 – 74: Anti-Colonialism, Education, and the Socialist Alliance," *Journal of Contemporary History* (2020), accessed August 1, 2020, doi:10.1177/0022009419893739; idem, "The Lumumba University in Moscow: Higher Education for a Soviet–Third World Alliance, 1960 – 91," *Journal of Global History* 14 (2019).

de Moçambique (FRELIMO) against Portuguese colonial troops into East German living rooms. Conversely, Paul Sprute shows how friendship brigades in Angola aimed to contribute to an Angolan socialist modernity by invoking the "Neuerer movement" (*Neuererwesen*), an approach which encouraged workers to propose ways to increase productivity. As Fernando Agostinho Machava shows in his chapter, East German televisions, fridges, and motorbikes, imported by former Mozambican contract workers, profoundly impacted the consumer landscape of neighborhoods in which they were received. Lastly, the possibility for East Germans to travel abroad marked another aspect of the globalizing effect of the GDR's entanglements with Africa. This is taken up in the contributions of Katrin Bahr, Alexandra Piepiorka and Eduardo F. Buanaissa, and Paul Sprute.

The third reason for the significance of the GDR to African global history is that the richness of available but frequently untapped sources lends itself to exploring the relations between Africa and the GDR in a global history perspective. In terms of archival material – often notoriously hard to come by for the post-independence period in many African countries – the GDR is a treasure trove.[62] The outstanding range and accessibility of archival documents is due to the – for the historian fortuitous – fact that the GDR as a state ceased to exist. The German Federal Republic as successor state, together with activists from the former GDR, ensured the broad availability of archival records pertaining to the state and especially the secret police (*Stasi*). With regards to Africa, the archival records of the GDR constitute a transnational "shadow archive" which holds primary documents of crucial interest for scholars of African history.[63] Several contributions in this volume draw on East German state and party archives as well as records of mass organizations (Depta/Hartmetz; Angermann; Rantzsch; Bodie; Sprute), university archives (Depta/Hartmetz), and the archives of the secret police and the ministry of foreign affairs (Rantzsch).

Of course, this is but a starting point. We believe that the GDR archives on which many of the contributions to this volume are based are useful for carving out the agency of African actors and introduce some African voices, particularly if read against the grain. It is nevertheless evident that research which makes further use of African sources is indispensable for a balanced approach. This includes archival documents on the African continent (Alvarado), oral history interviews (Machava), novels of African authors (Burgess), and African and

62 Steven Ellis, "Writing Histories of Contemporary Africa," *Journal of African History* 43 (2002).
63 Jean Allman, "Phantoms of the Archive: Kwame Nkrumah, a Nazi Pilot Named Hanna, and the Contingencies of Postcolonial History-Writing," *The American Historical Review* 118 (2013): 121; Kate Skinner, "West Africa's First Coup: Neo-Colonial and Pan-African Projects in Togo's 'Shadow Archives'," *African Studies Review* 6 (2019).

diaspora print cultures. The chapters in this volume thus draw on official sources, but also semi-official collective diaries of volunteer "brigades" including poems and drawings (*Brigadetagebücher*, Sprute), photographs from personal collections (Bahr), and personal memories (Schenck with Alberto, Schenck with Raposo). With this variety of sources, the contributing authors approach relations between East Germany and Africa from a variety of perspectives.

The entanglements that the alternative global formations of socialist internationalism afforded may have been marginalized by the ruthless tide of mainstream politics and history, but they are still recalled by many as powerful symbols of aspiration to alternative modernities and futures. The contributions to this volume are divided into three sections. The first section, "Shaping Pioneering Institutions," focuses on the ways in which institutions were set up for and shaped by relations between Africa and the GDR. The second section, "Navigating the GDR: Moorings and (Dis)Entanglements," brings together examples of how temporary stays and engagements led to both long-term legacies as well as rapid disentanglements. The third section, "Sourcing Visions of Solidarity," comprises contributions which discuss sources giving unique insights into the perspectives of non-elite actors, including travel writing, the collective diaries of friendship brigades, private photographs, and oral history interviews. These sources open avenues to rethink the characteristics, relevance, and scope of South-East relations in the history of the twentieth century, as well as how Africa and East Germany fit into the global perspective. The regional focus of the contributions in this volume reflect the close ties that the GDR maintained to socialist countries in Africa, especially the profound relations with Mozambique, but also with Angola, Ghana, and Tanzania – though Ethiopia, another important case study, is unfortunately absent here. The following sketch of an entangled history,[64] from the early 1950s to the late 1980s and beyond, gives an overview of socialist encounters and alternative forms of global interconnectedness.

64 Sebastian Conrad and Shalini Randeria, ed., *Jenseits des Eurozentrismus: Postkoloniale Perspektiven in den Geschichts- und Kulturwissenschaften* (Frankfurt: Campus Verlag, 2002); Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, "Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisée and the Challenge of Reflexivity," *History and Theory* 45 (2006).

A (Dis)Entangled History of Socialist Encounters between Africa and the GDR

The Dual Impulses of Decolonization and the German Division: Bandung and Hallstein in the 1950s

The establishment of the GDR in 1949 provided a zero point for the emergence of new ties between East Germany and the African continent. However, the new state was only nominally independent of the Soviet Union and remained closely tied to Stalinist policies in which the colonial world was seen as an appendage of the imperial powers. Consequently, early contacts in diplomacy, trade, and education did not, for the time being, translate into steady flows of persons, goods or ideas between Africa and the GDR. Egyptian efforts to market their cotton behind the Iron Curtain, as for example when they sent a trade delegation to East Berlin in 1950, were guided by economic concerns and accompanied by resolutely pragmatic and nationalist rhetoric.[65] Similarly, the arrival of 11 Nigerian trade unionists in 1951, the first non-European students in GDR classrooms, did not immediately lead to more intense exchanges with African countries, most of which were still colonial territories at the time.[66] The GDR's internationalism expanded beyond Europe during the early 1950s, but the expansion – involving an increasingly dense web of economic relations, the sending of experts, and the intake of students – remained largely confined to the fraternal communist parts of the world, most notably China and North Korea.[67] Two external impulses lent new diplomatic importance to the Global South. These were West Germany's Hallstein Doctrine, which from 1955 onwards sought to isolate the GDR internationally, and the Bandung moment, also in 1955.

65 See Depta and Hartmetz, this volume; Werner Kilian, *Die Hallstein-Doktrin: Der diplomatische Krieg zwischen der BRD und der DDR 1955–1973: aus den Akten der beiden deutschen Außenministerien* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001), 104–108. For a broader survey, see Anne-Kristin Hartmetz, Bence Kocsev and Jan Zofka, "East-South Relations during the Global Cold War: Economic Activities and Area Studies Interests of East Central European CMEA Countries in Africa," *Working Paper Series of the Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 1199 at the University of Leipzig* 11 (2018).

66 Sara Pugach, "Eleven Nigerian Students in Cold War East Germany: Visions of Science, Modernity, and Decolonization", *Journal of Contemporary History* 54 (2019).

67 Hong, *Cold War Germany*, chapter 2; Tao Chen, "Weathering the Storms: East German Engineers in Zhengzhou,1954–1964," *The China Review* 19 (2019).

The 1955 Bandung conference in Indonesia was an important stimulus for anti-imperialist sentiments across the colonial and postcolonial world.[68] The ideas expressed at the conference were not new, but as Africans across the continent re-emphasized their right for self-government, their importance came to the fore. Despite the initial opportunities for temporary moorings, the institutionalization of South-East links between Africans and East Germans faced serious blockages. Among these obstacles were the colonial powers, who with their anti-communist agendas aimed to keep communist representatives and subversive literature from entering their territories.[69] Anti-communist sentiment was widespread among African educated elites, at least partially a result of colonial and missionaries' education programs. This too hampered contact.[70] Many freedom fighters and students, however, were willing to engage with the communist world to acquire symbolic, material and military resources for liberation struggles and opportunities for education, in some cases also actively searching alternatives to neocolonialism.[71] Contacts with the GDR were often established in the few African countries that were already independent and took an anti-imperialist stand. Cairo and Accra emerged as hubs of decolonization and served, like Conakry or (slightly later) Dar es Salaam and Algiers, as transregional meeting points for Africans from all over the continent and as points of transit to the state socialist countries in Europe.[72] Circumventing the colonial barriers described above, Africans managed to get in touch with representatives of communist countries and migrate to the East. While some traveled to universities, party schools or trade union colleges in Prague and Moscow, others came to moor at

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68 Vijay Prashad, *The Darker Nations: A People's History of the Third World* (New York: The New Press, 2007), 31–50.

69 Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 436; Adi, *Pan-Africanism*, 138–140.

70 Walter Rodney, "Education in Africa and Contemporary Tanzania," in *Education and Black Struggle: Notes from the Colonized World*, ed. Institute of the Black World (Cambridge: Harvard Educational Review, 1974).

71 Lena Dallywater, Chris Saunders, and Helder Adegar Fonseca, ed., *Southern African Liberation Movements and the Global Cold War 'East': Transnational Activism 1960–1990* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019); Ilona Schleicher and Hans-Georg Schleicher, *Die DDR im südlichen Afrika: Solidarität und Kalter Krieg* (Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde, 1997).

72 Eric Burton, "Hubs of Decolonization: African Liberation Movements and Eastern Connections in Cairo, Accra and Dar es Salaam," in *Southern African Liberation Movements and the Global Cold War 'East': Transnational Activism 1960–1990*, ed. Lena Dallywater, Helder A. Fonseca and Chris Saunders (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019); Eric Burton, "Decolonization, the Cold War and Africans' Routes to Overseas Education, 1957–1965," *Journal of Global History* 15 (2020). See also Bodie, this volume.

Bernau or Leipzig.[73] One of the first relatively large groups of Africans (though they were, like Egyptians, mostly seen as "Arabs") in the GDR were Algerians involved in the war against the French (1954–62), who came, classified as "refugees" or "exiles," to undergo vocational training, attain university degrees, and receive medical treatment.[74]

From the GDR's perspective, the early decolonizers of the late 1950s in Sub-Saharan Africa, such as Guinea and Ghana, were of strategic importance in breaking through the diplomatic and economic isolation which was imposed by the Hallstein Doctrine.[75] As African anti-colonialism gained momentum in the late 1950s, still with a variety of options for postcolonial visions, the GDR stepped up its efforts to become an active and respected part of the growing anti-colonial world. By establishing trade missions, consulates, and cultural institutions, the GDR undermined the Hallstein Doctrine, but still ultimately failed to win diplomatic recognition anywhere on the continent.[76] Still, governments and dominant liberation movements or trade unions were the preferred partners. Few parties in Africa embraced communism; those that did, for example in Algeria, Egypt, Senegal, Sudan, and South Africa, soon found themselves persecuted by the nationalist ruling parties, their influence limited by strong religious, ethnic, and linguistic alliances and the absence of a large working class.[77] Nevertheless, the SED government continued to establish relations with the dominant nationalist movements on the African continent.

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73 Eric Burton, "Introduction: Journeys of Education and Struggle: African Mobility in Times of Decolonization and the Cold War," *Stichproben: Vienna Journal of African Studies* 34 (2018). Regarding military cooperation and training, see Storkmann, *Geheime Solidarität*.

74 Patrice G. Poutrus, "An den Grenzen des Proletarischen Internationalismus: Algerische Flüchtlinge in der DDR," *Zeitschrift für Geschichtswissenschaft* 55 (2007).

75 Gareth Winrow, *The Foreign Policy of the GDR in Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009[1990]), 37–46; Hans-Joachim Spanger and Lothar Brock, *Die beiden deutschen Staaten in der Dritten Welt: Die Entwicklungspolitik der DDR. Eine Herausforderung für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland?* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1987), 164–167.

76 Joachim Scholtyseck, *Die Außenpolitik der DDR* (München: Oldenbourg, 2003), 25. On the GDR's almost breakthrough to achieve diplomatic recognition in Guinea see Ilona Schleicher, "FDGB-Offensive in Westafrika. Der Gewerkschaftsbund im Jahr Afrikas," in *Engagiert für Afrika: Die DDR und Afrika II*, ed. Ulrich van der Heyden, Ilona Schleicher and Hans-Georg Schleicher (Münster: Lit, 1994), 83–84. Regarding the struggles over diplomatic recognition in East Africa, see George Roberts, "Press, Propaganda and the German Democratic Republic's Search for Recognition in Tanzania, 1964–72," in *Warsaw Pact Intervention in the Third World*: *Aid and Influence in the Cold War*, ed. Phillip E. Muehlenbeck and Natalia Telepneva (London: I. B. Tauris, 2019).

77 Thiam, Mulira, and Wondji, "Africa and the Socialist Countries," 800; Drew, "Communism in Africa".

African Decolonization and Pioneering Institutions in the 1960s

The year 1960 – dubbed the Year of Africa by the United Nations (UN) – was a turning point in East German relations with the African continent. The number of politically independent African countries rose from nine to 26, which made Africa a force to be reckoned with in international forums such as the UN. Africa's first wave of political independence evoked a sense of excitement among leading East German politicians and among functionaries in the GDR's mass organizations who imagined the socialist world system in the 1960s "as a growing, transformative object," with the Global South as a reserve of socialism or "proto-socialist" region.[78] A public declaration of the national trade union federation *Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund* (FDGB) enthusiastically welcomed the development that "[t]he 190 million Africans have now shaken off the colonial yoke," believing that the "great successes of their sacrificial struggles are an expression of the new balance of power on our planet, which is determined by the existence and growth of the enormous socialist world system."[79]

African anticolonial liberation movements and the "progressive national democracies" on the African continent were now considered crucial allies in the fight against capitalist imperialism. Updating Lenin's merger of proletarian internationalism and anti-imperialism, theoreticians and some political leaders from the GDR and across the socialist world now argued that the unfolding process of decolonization was an integral part of the world's revolutionary transition from capitalism to socialism.[80] In the euphoric mood of the early 1960s, the expectation was that the support of socialist countries for progressive "young nation-states" would enable their governments to pursue a "non-capitalist way of development," which would eventually meet the "conditions for a socialist revolution."[81]

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78 George Bodie, "'It Is a Shame We Are Not Neighbours': GDR Tourist Cruises to Cuba, 1961–89," *Journal of Contemporary History* (2019): 433.

79 International Relations Department to Warnke, "Erklärung des Präsidiums des FDGB-Bundesvorstandes zum Freiheitskampf der afrikanischen Völker und Gewerkschaften", Berlin, February 10, 1961, 154, SAPMO-BArch, DY 34/16600.

80 Ernst Hillebrand, *Das Afrika-Engagement der DDR* (Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 1987); Hans-Georg Schleicher, "Entwicklungszusammenarbeit und Außenpolitik in der DDR: Das Beispiel Afrika," in *Entwicklungspolitische Zusammenarbeit in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der DDR*, ed. Hans-Jörg Bücking (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1998).

81 H. Amirahmadi, "The Non-Capitalist Way of Development," *Review of Radical Political Economics* 19 (1987); I. Andreyev, *The Noncapitalist Way: Soviet Experience and the Liberated Countries* (Moscow: Moscow Progress Publishers, 1977), 65–69, 101–123; Spanger and Brock, *Die bei-*

This increased interest in the African world, motivated by pragmatic considerations and visionary ideals alike, stimulated the creation of a number of pioneering institutions in the socialist countries of Eastern Europe that shaped, and were shaped by, relations with Africa. These institutions usually emerged from national motivations, rather than bloc-determined efforts, to become part of and intervene in a shared anti-imperialist world connecting South and East. These included institutes for foreigners at the Fritz Heckert Trade Union College in Bernau (founded in 1959/60) and Leipzig's Karl Marx University, the Institute for International Studies (*Institut für Ausländerstudium*, established in 1956, renamed the Herder Institute in 1961), and the Committee for Solidarity with the Peoples of Africa (founded in 1960, in 1963 renamed as the Afro-Asian Solidarity Committee). In the field of health, a newly established sub-unit at the Dorothea Erxleben nursing school in Quedlinburg took in its first students from Mali in 1961. It became the GDR's central institution for non-European nurse trainees and students in the health professions.[82]

Due to blocked diplomatic avenues, but also given ideological preferences for working class organizations, trade union relations had a particular significance. The first courses for African and (to a much smaller extent) Asian trade unionists took place first in Leipzig in 1959–60 and were in 1960/61 institutionalized at the Fritz Heckert Trade Union College in Bernau.[83] As Eric Angermann shows in his contribution to this volume, African participants at the college in Bernau challenged the course contents and institutional set-up of trade union education, although their political demands were quickly diverted. Angermann's micro-historical study looks at the attempts of the African students in Bernau to set up their own Afro-Asian committee to facilitate cultural and political exchange among their co-students. However, as Angermann emphasizes, the trade union college in Bernau was also an institution which connected Africans

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den deutschen Staaten, 114–157; Steffi Marung, "The Provocation of Empirical Evidence: Soviet African Studies Between Enthusiasm and Discomfort," *African Identities* 16 (2018).

82 Hong, *Cold War Germany*, 201–212; Stefan Wolter, *Für die Kranken ist das Beste gerade gut genug: Klinikum Dorothea Christiane Erxleben GmbH. 100 Jahre Standort Dithfurter Weg* (Quedlinburg: Letterado-Verlag, 2007), 265–268. We thank Sebastian Pampuch for the hint to this institution.

83 Eric Angermann, "'Ihr gehört auch zur Avantgarde: Afrikanische Gewerkschafter an der FDGB-Hochschule Fritz Heckert (1961–1963)" (MA thesis, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, 2018); George Bodie, "Global GDR? Sovereignty, Legitimacy and Decolonization in the German Democratic Republic, 1960–1989" (PhD diss., University College London, 2019), chapter 2. See also Immanuel R. Harisch, "'Mit gewerkschaftlichem Gruß!' Afrikanische GewerkschafterInnen an der FDGB-Gewerkschaftshochschule Fritz Heckert in der DDR," *Stichproben: Vienna Journal of African Studies* 43 (2018).

with each other across imperial and linguistic borders. In this way, the GDR was sometimes experienced as a pan-African rather than "Eastern" space. After all, "the opportunity to meet is better here […] than in Africa," as one African student put it.[84] The report of a trade unionist from Ghana, J. A. Osei, who studied in Bernau, is printed in this volume as a primary source annotated by Immanuel R. Harisch. Osei's report points to the shared language of global, anti-Western socialism and visions of socialist modernity.

Another channel to establishing rapport with African audiences and countering Western anti-communist propaganda was through the media. Radio was the best-suited medium for reaching large numbers of people at a fairly low cost. In 1964, Radio Berlin International set up its Africa Service, with broadcasts in European and African languages, with employees from several African countries.[85] Broadcasters included linguistically-trained graduates of area studies courses. The establishment of area studies in the GDR in fact predated the Bandung moment, due to the initiative of academics in Leipzig who used their ties to Western leftists and who made significant advances in colonial history.[86] Africans came to the GDR as lecturers and scientific cooperators, providing the groundwork for effective language courses, co-writing dictionaries, and teaching interpreters and diplomats who would travel to Africa.[87] With the rising interest of the ruling elite, however, African Studies and related disciplines were reorganized in the 1960s in closer alignment with political aims.[88] On the other hand, East German lecturers also received invitations to teach and

84 Angermann, this volume.
85 "Comrade Africa," BBC World Service, Radio Documentary, 53 minutes, November 14, 2019, accessed January 29, 2020, https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/w3ct036t. See also Roberts, "Press, Propaganda"; James R. Brennan, "The Cold War Battle Over Global News in East Africa: Decolonization, the Free Flow of Information, and the Media Business, 1960 – 1980," *Journal of Global History* 10 (2015).
86 Matthias Middell, "Die Entwicklung der Area Studies in der DDR als Reaktion auf die Dekolonisierungsprozesse der 1950er/1960er Jahre," in *Kommunismus jenseits des Eurozentrismus: (= Jahrbuch für Historische Kommunismusforschung 2019)*, ed. Matthias Middell (Berlin: Metropol, 2019).
87 Examples include Stephan Mhando and Joseph Kasella-Bantu from Tanganyika who were involved in building the good reputation of Leipzig's linguistic scholarship on Swahili and other African languages.
88 Ulrich van der Heyden, *Die Afrikawissenschaften in der DDR: Eine akademische Disziplin zwischen Exotik und Exempel. Eine wissenschaftsgeschichtliche Untersuchung* (Münster: Lit, 1999); Middell, "Die Entwicklung der Area Studies"; Waltraud Schelkle, "Die Regionalwissenschaften der DDR als Modell einer Entwicklungswissenschaft?," in *Wissenschaft und Wiedervereinigung: Asien- und Afrikawissenschaften im Umbruch*, ed. Wolf-Hagen Krauth and Ralf Wolz (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, 1998).

establish curricula and institutions in newly independent African countries. The renowned (and headstrong) Leipzig historian Walter Markov, for instance, served as the first Director of the History Department at the University of Nsukka in Nigeria – despite the fact that he had been expelled from the SED in 1951 on charges of "Titoism."[89] These multi-directional flows in the education and media sectors were one of the most comprehensive and durable aspects of relations between the GDR and African countries.[90]

Due to its geopolitical position and diplomatic role, Nasser's Egypt had occupied a special role in the GDR's foreign policy considerations throughout the late 1950s and 1960s. In their contribution to this volume, Jörg Depta and Anne-Kristin Hartmetz demonstrate how actors from both German states strove for hegemony in German language teaching and culture transmission. They focus on the work in Cairo of the West German Goethe Institute and the East German counterinstitution that unofficially became known as the Herder Institute. The competition also enabled Egyptians to exploit these rivalries for their own ends during the maelstrom of the Six-Day War. Language instructors such as those at Cairo's "Herder Institute" exemplified Germans in Africa who combined professional and proto-diplomatic functions. Their encounters and experiences in Cairo, among other places, led to the institutionalization in the GDR of the teaching of German as a foreign language as a tool of foreign policy, before the field was even established in West Germany.

In 1963, the Politburo decided to establish another pioneering institution, the Friendship Brigades (*Brigaden der Freundschaft*) of the Free German Youth (FDJ). These groups of young East Germans, comparable to Western development volunteers, were explicitly seen as "instruments of foreign policy."[91] From 1964 until the end of the GDR in 1990, the FDJ's Central Council (*Zentralrat*) detached more than 60 friendship brigades to 26 countries in Africa, Asia, and Latin

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89 Walter Markov, *Kognak und Königsmörder – Historisch-literarische Miniaturen* (Berlin: Aufbau-Verlag, 1979), 117–121; Matthias Middell, "Manfred Kossok: Writing World History in East Germany," *Review* (ed. Fernand Braudel Center) 38 (2015).

90 Constantin Katsakioris, "The Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, and Africa in the Cold War: The Educational Ties," *Working Paper Series of the Collaborative Research Center (SFB) 1199 at the University of Leipzig* 16 (2019); Alexandra Piepiorka, "Exploring 'Socialist Solidarity' in Higher Education: East German Advisors in Post-Independence Mozambique (1975–1992)," in *Education and Development in Colonial and Postcolonial Africa: Policies, Paradigms, and Entanglements, 1890s–1980s*, ed. Damiano Matasci, Miguel B. Jerónimo, and Hugo G. Dores (Cham: Springer Nature, 2019).

91 Eric Burton, "Solidarität und ihre Grenzen: Die 'Brigaden der Freundschaft' der DDR," in *Internationale Solidarität: Globales Engagement in der Bundesrepublik und der DDR*, ed. Frank Bösch, Caroline Moine, and Stefanie Senger (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2018), 153.

America.[92] The first host countries in the 1960s were Mali (1964 – 79) and Algeria (1964 – 82), followed by Ghana (1965 – 66), Guinea (1966 – 85), and Tanzania/Zanzibar (1966 – 72).[93] The range of activities was broad: the mostly young and mostly male GDR citizens took up tasks in a spectrum of sectors including industry, agriculture, health services, vocational training, and transport.[94] While the early brigades' missions in the 1960s were more focused on increasing the GDR's international reputation through various types of aid projects, the late 1970s and 1980s marked a closer alignment of friendship brigades' solidarity projects with East German foreign trade interests, such as the provision of Angolan coffee or a coal mine project in Mozambique.[95]

It was not only the GDR which set up new institutions and channels of exchange. As Christian Alvarado shows in his contribution to this volume, Kenyans studying in the GDR founded new institutions such as the "Kenya Students Union" to navigate the demands of East German authorities, their sending government's mission, and to help students fulfill their personal ambitions to embark on careers in the rapidly expanding Kenyan bureaucracy. Alvarado's comparative analysis of experiences of student unions in the GDR and Yugoslavia highlights how Kenyan student union members pushed against their racialized reception in Europe by campaigning for a "truer" representation of Kenya in film and other media. While GDR authorities encouraged the organization of African students in single unified national organizations, students could always turn out to be "agents of dissent" who shaped and used associations also in their own ways, sometimes across the Iron Curtain, that contrasted and often conflicted with the objectives of both sending and receiving governments.[96]

92 Ulrich van der Heyden, "FDJ-Brigaden der Freundschaft aus der DDR – Die Peace Corps des Ostens?," in *Die eine Welt schaffen: Praktiken von "Internationaler Solidarität" und "Internationaler Entwicklung,"* ed. Berthold Unfried and Eva Himmelstoß, (Leipzig: Akademische Verlagsanstalt, 2012).

93 Ilona Schleicher, "Elemente entwicklungspolitischer Zusammenarbeit in der Tätigkeit von FDGB und FDJ," in *Entwicklungspolitische Zusammenarbeit in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der DDR,* ed. Hans-Jörg Bücking (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1998), 136 – 137.

94 FDJ, Abteilung Brigaden der Freundschaft, "Historische Übersicht – 20 Jahre Brigaden der Freundschaft der FDJ", Berlin, April 1984, 8, cited in Burton, *"Solidarität"*, 153.

95 Immanuel R. Harisch, "East German Friendship-Brigades and Specialists in Angola: A Socialist Globalization Project in the Global Cold War," in *Transregional Connections in the History of East Central Europe*, ed. Katja Naumann (Berlin: De Gruyter, forthcoming 2021).

96 Sara Pugach, "Agents of Dissent: African Student Organizations in the German Democratic Republic," *Africa* 89 (2019); Quinn Slobodian, "Bandung in Divided Germany: Managing Non-Aligned Politics in East and West, 1955 – 63," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 41 (2013).

At the same time, several African governments also established institutions to deal with global connectedness and positioning in general, and to deal with relations with socialist countries in particular. Some of these were state or party departments specializing in economic and political contacts, such as the Ghanaian State Committee for Economic Cooperation with the Soviet Union, China, and Eastern European Countries (CECEC).[97] Educational institutions also used blueprints or personnel from the GDR and other state socialist countries in Eastern Europe. This included both higher education at universities as well as party and trade union colleges, such as the Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute in Ghana (1961–66). Another example was Mozambique's Faculty for Former Combatants and Vanguard Workers, which was a variation of the blueprint of the workers' and peasants' faculties which had been established first in the Soviet Union, and later in the GDR, Vietnam, and Cuba.[98]

Yet already during the 1960s, some of these institutions ceased to exist as socialist African leaders such as Ghana's Kwame Nkrumah (1966) or Mali's Modibo Keïta (1968) were toppled by right-wing coups. If one were to come up with a periodization of global socialism from an African perspective, there would be no single 1989 moment to mark the end of socialist projects. Rather, there were multiple ruptures and dead ends as well as numerous fresh attempts to set up socialist polities over more than three decades. Even where there were no abrupt regime changes such as in Ghana or Mali, inflated expectations and structural constraints could easily lead to mutual disappointments in relations between Africans and the GDR. A 1967 publication from East Germany critically noted that African governments tended to economically exploit the inter-German scramble, maximizing gains without giving the GDR the recognition it was due. Ironically, with this the authors were displaying the same self-oriented attitude toward the aid competition of which they were accusing the Africans. At the same time, government leaders such as Abeid Amani Karume of Zanzibar, or Jean-Bédel Bokassa of the Central African Republic, complained about East German failures in providing effective economic aid for the modernization of their countries in the late 1960s and early 1970s.[99] As G. Thomas Burgess shows in his contribution to this volume, relations between Zanzibar and East Germany unraveled as quickly as they had emerged. However, they still left consequential

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97 Calori et al., "Alternative Globalization?," 1.

98 Gerardo Serra and Frank Gerits, "The Politics of Socialist Education in Ghana: The Kwame Nkrumah Ideological Institute, 1961–1966," *Journal of African History* 60 (2019), 3, accessed November 25, 2019: Miethe et al., *Globalization of an Educational Idea*.

99 The publication and opinions of African leaders are discussed in Winrow, *The Foreign Policy*, 76–77.

traces such as housing projects and a powerful security apparatus. Less tangible were the narratives and memories of students, technocrats, and teachers traveling back and forth between South and East. Discussing the novel *By the Sea* by Zanzibar-born writer Abdulrazak Gurnah, in which one of the main characters goes to the GDR for training, Burgess shows that sojourners could discover not only the unexpected colonial assumptions of East German citizens, but also the rich humanist heritage that lay hidden beneath socialist rhetoric. In this way, new South-East entanglements in the 1950s and 1960s, brought about by visions of socialist cooperation and anti-imperialist alliances, led to the establishment of new institutions and mobilities, unearthed legacies of colonial exploitation and discrimination, but simultaneously showed the barriers to closer or more durable alliance.

Reconfiguring Solidarity in Times of Global Crisis in the 1970s

Already in the late 1960s, East Germans' enthusiasm for revolution in Africa was waning as attention shifted towards developments in the Middle East, Latin America, and Vietnam. Yet in the mid-1970s, when the Portuguese Empire dissolved, mutual interest increased once more. The chronology of decolonization was highly uneven across the African continent. While most territories ruled by the French, British, and Belgians came to be governed by African politicians by the late 1950s and 1960s, the Portuguese dictatorship under António de Oliveira Salazar and later Marcelo Caetano resisted political decolonization and instead declared the Lusophone territories (Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cape Verde, and São Tomé and Príncipe) to be overseas provinces of the mother country, namely Portugal. Another factor in the uneven chronology of decolonization was the large white population in southern Africa. South Rhodesia declared its unilateral independence under white minority rule in 1965 and South African apartheid was firmly entrenched until the late 1980s. African leaders, soldiers, and students of selected national liberation parties enjoyed sympathies and increasing financial support from the socialist camp. The GDR's Solidarity Committee campaigned for African liberation from colonial rule. Leaders from the Angolan MPLA (*Movimento Popular de Libertação de Angola*), Mozambican FRELIMO (*Frente de Libertação de Moçambique*), South African ANC (African National Congress), Rhodesia's ZAPU (Zimbabwe African People's Union), and Namibia's SWAPO (South West Africa People's Organisation) were frequent

guests in East Germany throughout the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s, often trailed by university students, trainees, and activists.[100]

Given that imagery and iconography strongly shaped the culture of solidarity in the GDR, the role of print media and television in portraying Africa deserves particular attention. Leaders from liberation movements such as FRELIMO had an urgent interest in making their views and struggles known in order to gain legitimacy and get access to resources. In this volume, George Bodie shows how journalist and SED party member Ulrich Makosch depicted Africa as simultaneously close and distant in his writing and documentaries. Relating his wanderings through the bush with the male and female guerilla fighters of FRELIMO, Makosch brought African liberation struggles and testimonies of women's emancipation home to East German living rooms. Bodie challenges the usual assumptions regarding state-led cultures of solidarity in GDR: while Makosch's influence in terms of reaching an East German audience and bolstering the spirit of solidarity was modest, his films and journalism were important weapons in FRELIMO's struggle for international recognition.

The 1970s brought an unprecedented scale of economic and political relations, entailing a mingling of solidarity and commerce. African governments and parties which pursued explicitly Marxist programs, such as in Angola, Mozambique, and Ethiopia,[101] could count on collaboration with political leaderships in the Soviet Union, Cuba, and the state socialist countries of Europe. For the GDR, connections established during the liberation struggles intensified and new opportunities opened up, as African states and independence movements sought international recognition, political and economic development aid, cultural and educational exchange, and military support. 1979, which marked the thirtieth anniversary of the GDR, represented the high point of Africa-GDR relations. A party and state delegation, led by SED General Secretary Erich Honecker, visited Libya, Angola, Zambia, Mozambique, and São Tomé

100 Hans-Georg Schleicher, "The German Democratic Republic (GDR) in the Liberation Struggle of Southern Africa," in *Southern African Liberation Struggles 1960–1994: Contemporaneous Documents Vol. 8*, ed. Arnold Temu and Joel das Neves Tembe (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota, 2014); Anja Schade, "Solidarität und Alltag der DDR aus der Sicht exilierter Mitglieder des African National Congress," in *Internationale Solidarität: Globales Engagement in der Bundesrepublik und der DDR*, ed. Frank Bösch, Caroline Moine, and Stefanie Senger (Göttingen: Wallstein, 2018); Pampuch, "Afrikanische Freedom Fighter im Exil der DDR."

101 Contemporary efforts to grasp these new African varieties of socialism include Carl G. Rosberg and Thomas M. Callaghy, ed., *Socialism in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Assessment* (Berkeley: Institute of International Studies, University of California, 1979); David Ottaway and Marina Ottaway, *Afrocommunism* (New York: Africana Publishers, 1986); Keller and Rothchild, ed., *Afro-Marxist Regimes*.

and Príncipe. They also met with delegations of SWAPO, the Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe, as well as with the ANC. Angola's MPLA and Mozambique's FRELIMO signed friendship treaties with the GDR, "the first contracts of this kind of the GDR with countries outside the socialist community."[102] In the eyes of Honecker and other high-ranking East German politicians, echoing the optimistic mood of the early 1960s, Africa was returning to the center of world revolution. As the Politburo's foreign relations operator Hermann Axen proclaimed, "this huge continent is in the process of awakening, departing from colonialist and neocolonialist exploitation to a life of freedom, independence and social progress. The world-historical transition of the peoples from exploitation to socialism has now powerfully gripped the fourth continent. The national and social liberation revolutions have taken firm root in Africa."[103]

The revived rhetoric of African revolution sugarcoated an important change in South-East relations: an increasing economization and commercialization which resulted from fundamental transformations and shocks in global financial and commodity markets, as well as the constraints of Eastern European consumer societies.[104] In the case of the GDR, the turn towards economic concerns was also facilitated by the admission of both German states to the United Nations in 1973 after which diplomatic recognition ceased to be the primary objective in foreign affairs. In economic terms, the 1970s witnessed a "new phenomenon of interdependence."[105] Price trends on global raw material and international capital markets, recessions, inflation, and banking crises had immediate repercussions in various countries in Europe, Africa, Asia, and South America.

Due to their inflexible, planned economies, many state socialist countries in Europe had difficulties in adjusting to this new situation. The GDR was no exception. On top of this, from the early 1970s socialist European states were promising a new consumer-oriented economy. Even in those regimes that were able to

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102 Wolfgang Meyer and Freimut Keßner, *Kämpfendes Afrika: Begegnungen der Freundschaft und Solidarität* (Dresden: Zeit im Bild, 1979). Our Translation.

103 Hermann Axen at the 10th Meeting of the SED Central Committee, April 1979, cited in Meyer and Keßner, *Kämpfendes Afrika*, Preface. Our translation.

104 Sara Lorenzini, "Comecon and the South in the Years of Détente: A Study on East–South Economic Relations," *European Review of History* 21 (2014); Anne Dietrich, "Oranges and the New Black: Importing, Provisioning, and Consuming Tropical Fruits and Coffee in the GDR, 1971–89," in *The Socialist Good Life: Desire, Development, and Standards of Living in Eastern Europe*, ed. Cristofer Scarboro, Diana Mincyte, and Zsuzsa Gille (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2020), 104–131.

105 Niall Ferguson, "Crisis, What Crisis? The 1970s and the Shock of the Global," in *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective*, ed. Niall Ferguson et al. (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2010), 15.

commit to such expenditure, this required substantial investments into housing and retail and was a costly means to guarantee popular support and maintain a stable political system.[106] Linked to both of these trends, external indebtedness burdened many such national economies and impelled leaders to act. Accordingly, trade officials in the GDR busily sought alternative sources of hard currency or ways of bypassing the world market. Above all, they had an interest in importing mineral resources, coal, and crude oil. This became particularly acute given the Soviet strategy, implemented with other countries in the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (Comecon), of adjusting their highly subsidized oil prices to be more in line with the recent market price increases.[107] Facing skyrocketing world market prices for mineral resources and agricultural commodities like cotton, coffee, and cocoa, the GDR's economic planners intensified the principle of barter trade (*Ware-gegen-Ware*[108]). Their trading partners in Africa received trucks, weapons, turnkey facilities, and agricultural machinery. They also got East German personnel, whose tasks were often related to the GDR's material exports.[109]

Enabling the GDR to receive agricultural and mineral commodities without using precious hard currency, trade with Africa was thus "primarily a matter of the existence of the GDR," as the infamous leader of the GDR's powerful foreign trade section *Kommerzielle Koordinierung* (KoKo), Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski, put it in 1982.[110] Schalck-Golodkowski and Günter Mittag, the secretary for economy at the Central Committee of the SED, were the leading actors in the so-called *Mittag-Kommission*, a high-profile party institution established in December 1977 that came to expand, coordinate, and commercialize the GDR's relations with Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The *Mittag-Kommission* made use of good party relations and newly institutionalized political alliances with regimes

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106 Dietrich, "Oranges and the New Black", 107–108.

107 Winrow, *The Foreign Policy of the GDR*, 160.

108 Immanuel R. Harisch, "Handel und Solidarität: Die Beziehungen der DDR mit Angola und São Tomé und Príncipe unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Austauschs 'Ware-gegen-Ware' ca. 1975–1990" (Master Thesis, University of Vienna, 2018).

109 Anne Dietrich, "Zwischen solidarischem Handel und ungleichem Tausch: Zum Südhandel der DDR am Beispiel des Imports kubanischen Zuckers und äthiopischen Kaffees," *Journal für Entwicklungspolitik* 30 (2014), doi:10.20446/JEP-2414–3197–30–3–48; Immanuel R. Harisch, "Bartering Coffee, Cocoa and W50 Trucks: The Trade Relationships of the GDR, Angola and São Tomé in a Comparative Perspective," *Global Histories* 3 (2017), doi:10.17169/GHSJ.2017.135.

110 Döring, *Es geht um unsere Existenz*, 13. On "KoKo", see Matthias Judt, *Der Bereich Kommerzielle Koordinierung*: *Das DDR-Wirtschaftsimperium des Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski*. *Mythos und Realität* (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2013).

in Africa that embraced Marxism.[111] Following Ethiopia's 1974 revolution and embrace of Marxism-Leninism, the Derg regime desperately needed weapons to fight the Somali invasion of the Ogaden region and to suppress insurgencies within the country. The GDR seized the opportunity and KoKo's foreign traders, in coordination with the *Mittag-Kommission*, started to deliver military equipment on the basis of a barter agreement in exchange for badly-needed coffee.[112]

Economic reconfigurations were also a political matter. According to Odd Arne Westad, the 1970s and early 1980s marked an era in which the conflict between the USA and the USSR in the "Third World" reached its climax.[113] The non-aligned movement, which most African states had joined, continuously expressed its fear of a third world war brought about by nuclear armament.[114] Proxy wars were fought in the Global South, predominantly in Asia and Africa. In 1975 the United States was forced to withdraw from Vietnam. The end of US involvement there served as a fresh inspiration for revolutionaries in Africa and as a source of hope for peace, freedom, and progress.

South of the rivers Congo and Ruvuma, the late phase of decolonization also brought to power governments proclaiming socialist projects. After the Carnation Revolution of April 1974 and the cessation of the colonial war in Lusophone Africa, new independent nation-states were proclaimed, often accompanied by civil war. During the year 1975, when Angola became independent, the power struggle between the competing liberation movements led to a fierce internationalized tussle for political rule in Luanda. While Cuba and the USSR supplied the MPLA with combat troops and arms[115] to fight off the invasion of South African troops allied with UNITA (*União Nacional para a Independência Total de Angola*),

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111 Anne Dietrich, "Kaffee in der DDR – 'Ein Politikum ersten Ranges'" in *Kaffeewelten: Historische Perspektiven auf eine globale Ware im 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Christiane Berth et al. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2015), 230 – 233; Döring, *Es geht um unsere Existenz*, 44; Harisch, "Bartering Coffee," 56.

112 Anne Dietrich, "Bartering Within and Outside the CMEA: The GDR's Import of Cuban Fruits and Ethiopian Coffee," in *Between East and South: Spaces of Interaction in the Globalizing Economy of the Cold War*, ed. Anna Calori et al. (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019), 200 – 201; Dietrich, "Kaffee in der DDR"; Dietrich, "Zwischen solidarischem Handel und ungleichem Tausch"; Berthold Unfried, "Friendship and Education, Coffee and Weapons: Exchanges Between Socialist Ethiopia and the German Democratic Republic," *Northeast African Studies* 16 (2016).

113 Westad, *The Global Cold War*.

114 Prashad, *The Poorer Nations*.

115 Piero Gleijeses, *Visions of Freedom*: *Havana, Washington, Pretoria and the Struggle for Southern Africa, 1976 – 1991* (Chapel Hill: The University of North Carolina Press, 2016); Vladimir Shubin, *The Hot 'Cold War': The USSR in Southern Africa* (London, Scottsville: Pluto Press; University of KwaZulu-Natal Press, 2008).

the GDR continued to support the friendly MPLA government with solidarity shipments[116] and an array of experts in the fields of transport, agriculture, and education.[117] The MPLA leadership made it clear that it would expect “the utmost possible commitment of the socialist community”, and that “fast acting of every country is important.”[118] In the context of the 1977 *Sofortprogramm* (“immediate program”, set up by high-ranked SED and MPLA party officials, including Angolan President Agostinho Neto) for the recovery of Angola’s ailing coffee industry after the Portuguese exodus, a total of 217 GDR citizens, including truck drivers, coffee roasters, civil engineers, and car mechanics, were sent to Angola.[119] The friendship brigades formed the backbone of this solidarity-trade project, and during the 1980s up to eight friendship brigades (out of a total of 19 worldwide) were active in Angola.[120]

As Paul Sprute argues in his contribution to this volume, the diaries of the friendship brigades, authored collectively during the 1980s, show that the young East Germans saw themselves as modernizers for a socialist Angola in the making. In the schematic portrayals in the diaries, Angolans are firmly attributed the role of thankful beneficiaries of East German actions. Their time in Angola justified the East German order in the minds of *Brigadisten* since Angola’s war-torn economy and society assured them of how much material progress had been achieved in the GDR. Emphasizing technical expertise, Sprute identifies the brigades not as a “politics machine” of the GDR’s solidarity discourse (as argued by Toni Weis[121]), but rather as pursuing a “humanitarian mission of modernization” within a contest of competing East-West visions of European modernism.

In contrast to governments espousing African socialism during the 1960s and emphasizing non-alignment, the rulers of Ethiopia, Mozambique, and Angola actively encouraged closer ties to the East. This led to a reconfiguration of the global landscape. As Marcia C. Schenck argues, the socialist world seen from

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116 Schleicher, “The (GDR) in the Liberation Struggle of Southern Africa,” 503 – 507.
117 Bettina Husemann and Annette Neumann, “DDR – VR Angola: Fakten und Zusammenhänge zur bildungspolitischen Zusammenarbeit von 1975 bis 1989,” in *Engagiert für Afrika. Die DDR und Afrika II*, ed. Ulrich van der Heyden, Ilona Schleicher and Hans-Georg Schleicher (Münster: Lit, 1994).
118 “Bericht über den Arbeitsbesuch des Premierministers der Volksrepublik Angola, Lopo do Nascimento, Mitglied des Politbüros und Sekretär des Zentralkomitees der MPLA-Partei der Arbeit, vom 6. bis 8. Februar 1978 in der DDR”, February 10, 1978, 6, SAPMO-BArch, DE 1/57596, cited in Harisch, “East German Friendship-Brigades”.
119 Harisch, “East German Friendship-Brigades”; Dietrich, “Kaffee in der DDR”.
120 Schleicher, “Elemente entwicklungspolitischer Zusammenarbeit FDGB und FDJ,” 137.
121 Weis, “The Politics Machine.”

some places in Africa became closer: "For some Africans the global rise of socialism flattened the geography and led to Havana, East Berlin, Prague, and Moscow becoming likely destinations for students, workers, politicians, and experts from all over the continent; it was thus more likely that a young Mozambican school child would receive its education in geographically distant Cuba or the GDR than in neighboring South Africa or Rhodesia."[122] The plurality of encounters in school and working life – including the establishment of new educational institutions for African students in the Socialist world, the deployment of friendship (SdF) brigades, and the recruiting of contract workers – led to new entanglements between African and Eastern Bloc countries and an intensification of the flow of knowledge and ideas between the "Second" and the "Third" world.

East Germany was particularly active in the area of educational cooperation. For instance, more than 600 Angolan students came to study at institutions of higher learning in East Germany, where they had to negotiate the rigorous academic requirements and strict rules regulating their new East German lives to create spaces that conformed to their expectations of study abroad.[123] Another well-explored example of cooperation in the education sector was the Friendship School (*Schule der Freundschaft*, SdF) in Staßfurt, East Germany, which 900 Mozambican school children attended between 1982 and 1989. They were later joined by Namibian children. Officially between the ages of 12 and 14 upon their arrival, the Mozambicans underwent the equivalent of middle and high school and left the GDR with two years of professional training under their belt, leading to certificates as skilled workers, ranging from electrician to cook.[124]

122 Schenck, "Constructing and Deconstructing," 136.
123 Marcia C. Schenck, "Negotiating the German Democratic Republic: Angolan Student Migration During the Cold War, 1976–90," *Africa* 89 (2019).
124 Marcia C Schenck, "Small Strangers at the School of Friendship: Memories of Mozambican School Students to the German Democratic Republic," *Bulletin of the GHI* 15 (2020); Annette Scheunpflug and Jürgen Krause, *Die Schule der Freundschaft*: *Ein Bildungsexperiment in der DDR. Beiträge aus dem Fachbereich Pädagogik der Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg* (Hamburg: Universität der Bundeswehr Hamburg, 2000); Mathias Tullner, "Das Experiment 'Schule der Freundschaft' im Kontext der mosambikanischen Bildungspolitik," in *Freundschaftsbande und Beziehungskisten: Die Afrikapolitik der DDR und der BRD gegenüber Mosambik*, ed. Hans-Joachim Döring and Uta Rüchel (Frankfurt am Main: Brandes & Apsel, 2005); Uta Rüchel, "'...auf Deutsch sozialistisch zu denken...' – Mosambikaner in der Schule der Freundschaft," ed. Die Landesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen DDR in Sachsen-Anhalt, (Magdeburg, JVA Naumburg – Arbeitsverwaltung, 2001); Tanja Müller, *Legacies of Socialist Solidarity: East Germany in Mozambique* (Lanham: Lexington, 2014).

Francisca Raposo in this volume takes us with her into her own childhood as she reflects on the insecurity, the misinformation, and the weeks and months of waiting to finally leave Mozambique to become a student at the School of Friendship. In this text the reader is invited to relive the anxious anticipation of a Mozambican girl who, when imagining her future schooling in East Germany, dreamt of an unknown future paradise, unburdened by reality. The text, contextualized by Marcia C. Schenck, ends abruptly with the arrival in the GDR, leaving it up to the reader's imagination as to whether the young girl found what she was looking for once moored in the parallel universe of a boarding school in a tiny East German village.

The idea for the SdF was born in FRELIMO leadership circles at the end of the 1970s. President Samora Machel (1975–86) prioritized professional education to provide the industrializing country with skilled labor in the absence of a professional working class. This was important both ideologically and practically. Not only was the working class the revolutionary class in Marxist-socialist exegesis, but the young People's Republic of Mozambique (PRM) lacked people with professional skills. Despite the revolutionary emphasis on the working class, many Mozambicans – including parents, students, and members of the Mozambican Ministry of Education – did not value vocational training as much as general education and advanced degrees.[125] East Germany was not the only country to offer education aid to socialist-leaning African countries. Mozambicans also studied at the Isla de la Juventud in Cuba.[126] Similarly, Angolan workers went to Cuba to work and gain skills and technical training.[127] About 2,500 Angolan workers also went to East Germany between 1985 and 1990.[128] Nevertheless, the largest program of skills training was established between the GDR and Mozambique in 1979. This contract labor and training program saw about 22,000 contracts signed until its dissolution at the end of the

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125 Tullner, "Das Experiment 'Schule der Freundschaft'," 100.

126 Hauke Dorsch, "Rites of Passage Overseas? On the Sojourn of Mozambican Students and Scholars in Cuba," *Africa Spectrum* 43 (2008); Christine Hatzky, *Kubaner in Angola*: *Süd-Süd Kooperation und Bildungstransfer 1976–1991* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), 239–245; Michael H. Erisman, *Cuba's Foreign Relations in a Post-Soviet World* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2002), 100.

127 Christine Hatzky, *Cubans in Angola*: *South–South Cooperation and Transfer of Knowledge, 1976–1991*, (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 2015).

128 Paulino José Miguele, "Sobre o mito da solidariedade: Trabalhadores contratados moçambicanos e angolanos na RDA," in *Projekt Migration,* ed. Kölnischer Kunstverein, Dokumentationszentrum und Museum über Migration in Deutschland, Köln, Institut für Kulturanthropologie und Europäische Ethnologie der Johann Wolfgang-Goethe-Universität Frankfurt/Main, Institut für Theorie der Gestalt (Köln: DuMont, 2005), 817.

GDR.[129] As Franziska Rantzsch shows in her contribution, the negotiation process between the GDR and Mozambique did not reinvent the wheel but rather used pre-existing blueprints from prior labor migration schemes to East Germany (such as the Polish or Hungarian migrations). It also drew on labor migration experience of Mozambicans to South African mines. Initially, the negotiation process sought to arrive at an agreement that combined the interests of both countries in the name of a policy of mutual advantage. This goal became less central in the 1980s as the GDR disengaged somewhat from Mozambique due to disenchantment with the ongoing turmoil and lack of developmental progress there, and the contract labor and training program started to morph into a source of cheap labor for the GDR.

Based on oral history interviews with returned workers, Fernando Machava explores in this volume the contract labor migration and its legacies from a Mozambican perspective. His focus lies on the workers' reintegration into Maputo's various suburbs after their mass return in the 1990s. Exploring the impact of the goods the returnees brought home, he argues that they at first were able to support themselves and their families and even assumed the function of role models in their communities. Due to a lack of integration in the formal labor market the dreams and aspirations of many returnees were disappointed and some Madjermanes, as the returned workers became known in Mozambique, turned to protest as a result. These protests are still ongoing, and, as Machava highlights, are not always supported by the population at large. Solidarity as lived experience and policy came with restrictions, then and now.

Limits to Socialist Development in the 1980s

There were limits to socialist assistance. The East German ideals of anti-imperialist solidarity were challenged by the GDR's growing debt and by dissenting opinions within the heterogenous socialist world on the appropriate scope of socialist development policy. For example, the labor and training programs that were negotiated between the GDR and various countries deteriorated into work programs as numbers rose and training aspects increasingly took a back seat.[130] But it was not only the GDR's political and economic situation that

129 Eric Allina skillfully examines the political aspects of this labor migration in Eric Allina, "'Neue Menschen' für Mosambik: Erwartungen an und Realität von Vertragsarbeit in der DDR der 1980er-Jahre," *Arbeit, Bewegung, Geschichte: Zeitschrift für Historische Studien* 15 (2016).
130 The states from which laborers came to East Germany are listed here with the year of the signature of the bilateral agreements: Poland (1963 und 1971), Hungaria (1967), Vietnam (1973

influenced economic plans. For instance, the escalation of violence in large parts of Lusophone Africa in the first half of the 1980s significantly influenced the outcomes of bilateral efforts.[131] In Angola, GDR citizens were repeatedly saved from UNITA attacks by Angolan, Cuban, and Soviet soldiers. In Mozambique, eight East German development workers were murdered in 1984 by the anti-communist *Resistência Nacional Moçambicana* (RENAMO), which enjoyed financial and logistical support from South Africa and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members such as the US and West Germany.[132] From the early 1980s, the intensifying internationalized destabilization war against the socialist governments in Angola and Mozambique led to an East German disengagement in joint economic projects as security concerns and disillusions with the countries' war-torn economies became paramount. In 1981, Mozambique was refused entry into Comecon as most members saw another "developing country" like Vietnam or Cuba as too much of an economic burden. As Sara Lorenzini has argued, "[t]his event signaled the collapse of the rhetoric of a special East–South solidarity," showing that "[n]ot all Third World countries were equal; not all possessed the right level of development to integrate with the socialist system."[133] Only the GDR clearly advocated for the admission, which illustrates that the so-called Eastern Bloc did not represent a homogenous set of interests and opinions. The GDR had invested in the Mozambican coal mining and textile industries,

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and 1980), Algeria (1974), Cuba (1975), Mozambique (1979), Mongolia (1982), Angola (1985), China (1986) und North Korea (1986). See Dennis Kuck, "Für den sozialen Aufbau ihrer Heimat'? Ausländische Vertragsarbeitskräfte in der DDR," in *Fremde und Fremd-Sein in der DDR: Zu historischen Ursachen der Fremdenfeindlichkeit in Ostdeutschland*, ed. Jan C. Behrends, Thomas Lindenberger und Patrice G. Poutrus (Berlin: Metropol, 2003), 272. The study of these labor programs is most advanced for the Mozambican case. The field of labor migrations to other countries in the Eastern Bloc is still wide open; see for instance Alena K. Alamgir, "From the Field to the Factory Floor: Vietnamese Government's Defense of Migrant Workers' Interests in State-Socialist Czechoslovakia," *Journal of Vietnamese Studies* 12 (2017); idem, "Socialist Internationalism at Work: Changes in the Czechoslovak-Vietnamese Labor Exchange Program, 1967–89" (PhD diss., Rutgers University, 2014).

131 Westad, *Global Cold War*, chapter 9.

132 Ulrich van der Heyden, "'Es darf nichts passieren!' Entwicklungspolitisches Engagement der DDR in Mosambik zwischen Solidarität und Risiko,'" in *Wir haben Spuren hinterlassen! Die DDR in Mosambik: Erlebnisse, Erfahrungen und Erkenntnisse aus drei Jahrzehnten*, ed. Matthias Voß (Münster: Lit, 2005); William Minter, *Apartheid's Contras: An Inquiry into the Roots of War in Angola and Mozambique*, (Johannesburg: Witwatersrand University Press, 1994).

133 Sara Lorenzini, "The Socialist Camp and the Challenge of Economic Modernization in the Third World," in *The Cambridge History of Communism, Volume 2: The Socialist Camp and World Power 1941–1960s*, ed. Norman M. Naimark, Silvio Pons, and Sophie Quinn-Judge (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017).

and planned to get involved in the development of banana plantations and the construction of a pineapple processing plant in the provinces of Sofala and Zambezia.[134] This episode is one of many that show how the GDR tried to situate itself as an independent international actor within the socialist camp by adopting a pioneering role in the Global South.

On the ground, East German friendship brigades and technical experts increasingly reached their own personal limits and faced security challenges due to the expansion of the armed conflicts in Angola and Mozambique. In her contribution, Katrin Bahr touches upon the fear and insecurity among East German experts in Mozambique that followed the aforementioned deadly attack on German agricultural experts in the province of Niassa. Focusing on private photographs taken by East Germans in Mozambique in the 1980s, Bahr shows everyday experiences of the experts and their families abroad, oscillating between working life and private sphere, and unmasking European stereotypes about "Africa" and the predominantly white male gaze of the photographers. The contribution highlights how the private photographs differ from official state photographs and provide a deeper insight into life (work and leisure) in Mozambique. Bahr claims that the private pictures also follow the narratives of the representation of Africa in the context of colonialism and colonial structures. Moreover, women were often absent in the discourse of manual aid work abroad when it came to visual representation. Rather, if portrayed in private photographs, women act within the private sphere of child rearing and leisure time.

The changing role of women that was proclaimed by all socialist regimes, and which indeed enabled female emancipation to a certain degree, remained incomplete, as the contributions to this volume demonstrate. Evenia, an 18-year-old FRELIMO fighter and instructor, assumed a role of prominent military female leadership and gained prominence as a symbol and image in the book *Das Mädchen vom Sambesi* ['The Girl from the Zambezi'] by GDR journalist Ulrich Makosch (Bodie, this volume), but her portrait was stylized. In it, she remained apart from other Mozambican women and their varied relationships with the socialist project in Mozambique. The relative absence of women in many of the histories about South-Eastern entanglements points to the gap between the rhetoric and reality of empowerment. Jörg Depta and Anne-Kristin Hartmetz show in their contribution to this volume that Egyptian housewives were considered of "little relevance" for the GDR and therefore not targeted by German language courses at the East German Cultural Institute in Cairo. In the end, it

134 Mission report of the Director General of the foreign trade company AHB Fruchtimex of December 21, 1978, 3–11. SAPMO-BArch, DL1/25504.

is not that female students, workers, development experts, and cooperators did not exist, but they often took a backseat to male actors in all directions and through all strata of society.

Aside from state actors and government institutions, East German grassroots associations gained more importance during the 1980s. However, they continued to be subjected to highly asymmetrical relationships with state-sponsored aid. These "Third World groups" were mostly rooted in churches and focused on solidarity, for instance with Nicaragua, but also on causes such as the anti-apartheid movement and the situation of students and contract workers in the GDR. As Maria Magdalena Verburg has highlighted, these groups criticized the failures of socialism and objected to the discrepancies between propaganda and the practices of state and party leadership.[135]

Mikhail Gorbachev's policies of *glasnost* and *perestroika* aimed to address at least some of the inherent contradictions of state socialist regimes. Gorbachev's reform attempts did not only affect the Soviet Union, but rather prepared the ground for reforms and radical changes, and ended up bringing about the implosion of the socialist camp and the end of the global order that had been established after the Second World War. The GDR government was reluctant to accept the political and economic reforms initiated by Gorbachev's new policy after 1985. Furthermore, the East German leadership was uneasy with regard to the shifting interests of the Soviet Union's foreign policy towards Africa, wishing to maintain its close relations with Mozambique, Angola, and Ethiopia. In a speech held at the 27th CPSU Congress in 1986, Gorbachev emphasized the significance of political solutions to regional conflicts in the Global South, but did not mention Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia, and other African states. This caused some alarm among the delegates from socialist-leaning states within the region present at the congress, who feared a Soviet withdrawal from political, economic, and military support.[136]

Socialist Disentanglements and Transitions – 1989 onwards

1989 is an iconic date for the history of the Eastern Bloc but it had global implications. Ulf Engel argues that "1989 was a watershed for the African people, too" because it was "part of a 'critical juncture of globalization' in which spatializa-

135 Maria Magdalena Verburg, *Ostdeutsche Dritte-Welt-Gruppen vor und nach 1989/90* (Göttingen: V&R unipress, 2012).
136 Winrow, *The Foreign Policy of the GDR in Africa*, 207.

tions of power [were] renegotiated worldwide."[137] Indeed, the "winds of change," which British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan had famously evoked in Cape Town as many African countries turned to independence in 1960, were once again blowing through the continent in the 1990s. In South Africa, Nelson Mandela was released after 27 years in prison in 1990, President Frederik Willem de Klerk lifted the party ban on the ANC, and together they initiated the "miracle" of the end of apartheid. Among those hailing the miracle were those who had conveniently forgotten that they had supported apartheid as a bulwark against communism.[138] The same year that Mandela was released from prison, Namibia finally became independent.[139] In Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe's one-party state evolved after the merger of ZANU and ZAPU (Zimbabwe African Peoples Union) to the ZANU-PF (Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front) on December 22, 1987.[140] Exactly one year later, in Angola, an – albeit transitory – peace process was initiated with the agreement of December 22, 1988. Cuban and Soviet troops were withdrawn from Africa shortly after.[141]

Overall, in the late 1980s, many regimes across the continent set aside their socialist convictions. Preceded by the implementation of Structural Adjustment Programs (SAPs), financed by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and following the socialist countries' recommendation to accept Western aid and capital, various African governments began to think of – or surrendered after years of resistance to[142] – both economic and political reforms and engagement with new political institutions which mostly brought them closer to a globalizing emerging market-based world order. While 1989 was a key moment in East Germany and the Eastern Bloc, heralding rapid political changes that led to the dissolution of the GDR in 1990 and of the Soviet Union in 1991, the search for communist answers went on in Cuba, North Korea, and China. In Africa, as discussed

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137 Ulf Engel, "Africa's '1989,'" in *1989 in a Global Perspective*, ed. Ulf Engel, Frank Hadler, and Matthias Middell (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2015).

138 Patti Ealdmeir, *Anatomy of a Miracle: The End of Apartheid and the Birth of the New South Africa* (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1997).

139 Henning Melber, *Understanding Namibia: The Trials of Independence* (London: Hurst, 2014).

140 Engel, "Africa's '1989'," 334; D.R. Kempton, "Africa in the Age of Perestroika," *Africa Today* 38 (1991).

141 Piero Gleijeses, "Moscow's Proxy? Cuba and Africa 1975–1988," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 8 (2006).

142 Aili M. Tripp, *Changing the Rules: The Politics of Liberalization and the Urban Informal Economy in Tanzania* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997). For the transformation process of a socialist state in Southern Africa see M. Anne Pitcher, *Transforming Mozambique: The Politics of Privatization, 1975–2000* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).

above, the transition was a more fragmentary and subtle process and did not proceed linearly but extended during the 1980s and early 1990s.

As made abundantly clear throughout this discussion, neither Africa nor Eastern Europe began to globalize in 1989. However, both regions now joined an exclusively Western-led vision of globalization. In doing so, they abandoned alternative projects. Towards the late 1980s in much of Eastern Europe, democratic transformation and the spread of liberal democracy coincided with the consolidation of capitalist market economies. The impact of the formal disbanding of the Comecon and the Warsaw Pact in June and July 1991 was felt in the Global South. Cuba, for instance, suffered immensely from the resulting economic disintegration, the loss of Eastern European markets, and the abrupt ending of Soviet resource flows.[143]

We should, however, resist the temptation to reify 1989 as the only significant moment of global change. What 1989 confirmed was the end of an alternative vision of global interconnectedness that was grounded in socialist, anti-imperialist geographies. This came to mean the regrouping of Europe under Western domination underlined by the decision of Eastern European countries to seek membership in a Western, "white" world replete with its racialized privileges. So it seemed, at least, from some Global South perspectives. Indeed, Gorbachev's "fateful speech in Finland [...] in which he called for a 'common European home'" sent out "shock waves [that] went through the radical Third World", as the Tanzanian leftist Abdulrahman Babu observed in 1991. In his view, Europe was "returning to its pre-World War One imperial menace – the Europe which has done so much damage to the rest of the world in conquest, slavery, colonization, settlerism, distortion and diversion of our national histories, through the massive devastation of world wars, the depletion of our resources, and the endangering of the world's environment."[144] 1989 sounded the death knell for cross-continental decolonization aspirations that had already been crumbling. Fortress Europe slowly emerged as Europe integrated and its borders were shifted outwards as new walls and fences were erected southwards in Africa. In the process borders as barriers to mobility solidified as markers of race and a prosperity gap. The Iron Curtain was lifted in 1989 but new walls emerged between Europe and Africa.[145]

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143 Anne Dietrich, "Exploring Changes in Cuba's Ports and Hinterlands: Transition from US to Socialist Sugar Markets," *Comparativ* 27 (2017): 54.

144 A. M. Babu, "A New Europe: Consequences for Tanzania," *Review of African Political Economy* 18 (1991): 75. Parts of the quote are also cited in Mark et al., *1989*, 247.

145 See Mark et al., *1989*, 9 – 10. We recognize that the history of European exclusionary borders extends back to the creation of nation states.

As several of our contributions demonstrate, the end of Eastern European state-socialism and socialist projects in Africa marked a caesura – but not the end – in the multifaceted relations between people that used to live in those countries that once constituted the socialist world. The reverberations of the experiences that migrants from the Global South and the Global East had while navigating complex socialist encounters continue to impact their lives in the present. For instance, the legacies of the socialist period come to life in the biography of an individual former Mozambican contract worker, Ibraimo Alberto, who migrated to the GDR in 1981, witnessed German reunification, and stayed on in unified Germany as a German citizen (Schenck and Alberto). Ibraimo Alberto's experience was both beautiful and heartbreaking, reassuring and discouraging, as he navigated work and boxing in the two Germanies and encountered people who loved him and people who hated him because of his skin color. Xenophobia and racism have become defining features of Ibraimo Alberto's life; first as a constant negative lived experience for him and his family, and today as a topic about which he seeks to raise awareness in Germany.[146] It is necessary to explicitly state again that racism was always present and a defining feature of the lives of Africans who came to live across the Eastern Bloc.[147] Though forms of expressions varied across local context, the basic contradiction remained: racist thought and practice permeated the everyday in officially anti-racist and anti-imperialist societies, of which only East Germany had direct historical links to colonialism in Africa.[148] Racism did not disappear with the end of the socialist republics and unions but in many cases its expression worsened during the hardships of transition and remains an unsolved issue across the formerly socialist world.[149] The legacies of the socialist encounters explored in this volume

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146 Apart from workers African students also suffered from and resided to racism in their daily lives and systemic racism in the SED regime and media in the GDR, see Sara Pugach, "African Students and the Politics of Race and Gender in the German Democratic Republic, 1957–1990," in *Comrades of Color: East Germany in the Cold War World*, ed. Quinn Slobodian (New York, Oxford: Berghan, 2015).

147 For the context in Czechoslovakia, see Alena K. Alamgir, "Race Is Elsewhere: State-Socialist Ideology and the Racialisation of Vietnamese Workers in Czechoslovakia," *Race & Class* 54 (2013). Further, African students in the USSR suffering from racism are a much-explored topic, see for instance Julie Hessler, "Death of an African Student in Moscow: Race, Politics, and the Cold War," *Cahiers Du Monde Russe* 47 (2006).

148 To understand the workings of racism and socialist chromatism in East Germany see Quinn Slobodian, ed., *Comrades of Color.*

149 For the East German context, see Patrick R. Ireland, "Socialism, Unification Policy and the Rise of Racism in Eastern Germany," *International Migration Review* 31 (1997). Eric and Jessica Allina-Pisano explore how racism permeates the lives of African Students in Russia after the

are complex and the perpetuation of racism and xenophobia in formerly East German states questions the success that international socialist migrations had in provincializing and internationalizing the GDR.

The legacies are also complex on the other side of the globe. Fernando Machava in this volume, for instance, draws out the complicated legacies of the former Mozambican contract workers who returned back to Mozambique in the early 1990s, but whose dreams and aspirations were stifled due to their traumatic reintegration into a Mozambique that remained among the world's poorest states. Back home, the Mozambican returnees from East Germany, whether workers, school students or university students, created their own communities of remembrance, as did Angolan returnees, Vietnamese returnees, and returnees elsewhere. As this volume's emphasis on Mozambique-GDR relations mirrors, the most active continuous interest was expressed by former East German citizens who were sent to Mozambique, by the Mozambican diaspora in Germany and by Mozambicans who went home. This has resulted in an attentiveness, among scholars of African history and Eastern European history alike, vis-à-vis Mozambique. In their contribution Alexandra Piepiorka and Eduardo Buanaissa examine this transcontinental Afro-European memory space from the perspective of historical actors by reading memory literature to explore how the GDR and Mozambique were remembered by Mozambicans who moored in the GDR and East Germans who went to Mozambique during the 1970s and 1980s respectively. The authors focus on the memory of the "other" to explore alternative understandings and lived experiences of socialist exchanges. On the one hand, they introduce individuals like António, a Mozambican student of economics, who bemoaned his disentanglement from East Germans whom he had gotten to know as sociable and friendly in Mozambique but who struck him as impersonal and cold once in the GDR. On the other hand, Dieter, an East German student of Portuguese, felt fully integrated in his dorm at Eduardo Mondlane University in Maputo and became entangled with the lives of his Mozambican fellow students – something for which the other East German expats, who generally did not profit as much from private intercultural exchange, envied him. Both António and Dieter were marked by their respective experiences of navigating these cross-continental socialist encounters enough to care about writing down their memories, years later.

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transition, see Jessica Allina-Pisano and Eric Allina-Pisano, "'Friendship of Peoples' after the Fall: Violence and Pan-African Community in Post-Soviet Moscow," in *Africa in Russia, Russia in Africa: 300 Years of Encounters*, ed. Maxim Matusevich (Trenton: Africa World Press, 2007).

It was not only Mozambican and East German authors who contributed to the new genre of memory literature putting the GDR in a global context. Thomas Kunze and Thomas Vogel have collected stories in their volume "Ostalgie International,"[150] which brings together Cuban, Vietnamese, American, Nicaraguan, Namibian, Chilean, Mozambican, Syrian, Angolan, Palestinian, Iraqi, Afghan, Russian, and Mongolian voices who relate their varying memories of the GDR. In Mozambique, the majority of returned contract workers celebrate what Marcia C. Schenck terms "eastalgia" – a nostalgia for aspects of their experience in the GDR which is both similar and quite different in character and expression from the *Ostalgie* (a portmanteau of the German words for east and nostalgia) felt and expressed by former East German citizens. Many Madjermanes idolize their East German past not least as the carefree time of their youth, but also against the backdrop of their often traumatic reintegration experience in Mozambique, which leaves many struggling in relative poverty today.[151] Most importantly, public eastalgic remembering serves as criticism of the Mozambican government which has not only failed to achieve a transparent process of the repayment of withheld wages and security benefits from the workers' time in the GDR but also – from the perspective of the workers – has failed to provide stable blue-collar working life and living conditions for what was once intended to be the vanguard workforce of the People's Republic of Mozambique. Experiences collected in the GDR continue to shape how the returnees measure their lives in their home countries. The point of view of socialist cosmopolitans continues to impact the post-socialist landscape.

In sum, this edited volume challenges the view of socialism as marked by stagnation, uniformity, immobility, and isolation by investigating diverse visions and practices of socialism from a global history perspective, pointing out how they shaped – and were shaped in return – by African and European actors in numerous encounters. As illustrated by this book, however, socialist ideas and the encounters they inspired in Africa, Europe, and beyond were not dead ends which have nothing to teach; quite to the contrary, they may act as a constant reminder about the life and death of alternative visions of social, political, and economic organizations and alternative notions of globalization. It is thus a fundamental motivation of this edited volume to provide space for fresh perspectives on South-East encounters in global history and to illustrate the plethora of histori-

150 Thomas Kunze and Thomas Vogel, ed., *Ostalgie international: Erinnerungen an die DDR von Nicaragua bis Vietnam* (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2010).
151 Marcia C. Schenck, "A Chronology of Nostalgia: Memories of Former Angolan and Mozambican Worker Trainees to East Germany," *Labor History* 59 (2018).

cally documented ideas and practices of socialism(s) in Africa and East Germany as seen through encounters of non-elite actors, through examining institution building, and through scrutinizing visions of solidarity. In so doing we shed light on processes of (dis)entanglements, moorings, and unmoorings, and demonstrate that the study of how actors navigated the socialist world is best analyzed from several perspectives, based on multiple archives and framed within global history. This volume, therefore, contributes not only to a more complex understanding of global socialisms as well as Africa's place in the world; it also reveals a panorama of different pasts and, perhaps, futures.

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I Introduction of Institution and Their Development

2

German Language in Egypt and the Emergence of DaF: Concept of Herder and Goethe

Jörg Depta and Anne-Kristin Hartmetz

Introduction

On February 27, 1965, Egyptian Deputy Prime Minister Nureddin Tarraf along with Lotte Ulbricht, the wife of East German head of state Walter Ulbricht,[1] opened the East German Cultural Institute (*Kultur- und Informationszentrum*, KIZ) in Cairo.[2] It was situated near Cairo University in a spacious villa with a lush garden. This garden villa at the Western bank of the Nile competed directly with the West German Goethe Institute, which had been established just a few meters from the Tahir Square seven years earlier. In the memories of Egyptians, the East German cultural institute is still called the Herder Institute, although it never officially bore this name. However, it was closely related to the Herder Institute at Leipzig's Karl Marx University which offered language training to international students and other groups of foreigners arriving in the German Democratic Republic (GDR).[3] The opening of the East German cultural institute KIZ

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1 Walter Ulbricht was Chairman of the State Council of the German Democratic Republic.
2 The cultural center has been given various names. It was initially known as the *Haus der Deutsch-Arabischen Gesellschaft*. Later, "Cultural Center of the GDR" was added. In East German sources, it is mostly called KIZ (*Kultur- und Informationszentrum*). We also use this name here.
3 The beginnings of the Herder Institute in Leipzig date back to 1951, when a department for foreign students was founded for thirteen Nigerian students at the Workers' and Farmers' Faculty in Leipzig. In 1956, the department was transformed into the Institute for Foreign Students following a decision by the Council of Ministers. The institute was named after Johann Gottfried Herder in 1961 to distinguish it from the Goethe Institute. The name was based on Herder's humanistic ideas and his theories on language. The full official name was *Herder-Institut – Vorstudienanstalt für ausländische Studierende in der DDR und Stätte zur Förderung deutscher Sprachkenntnisse im Ausland* (Pre-Study Institute for Foreign Students in the GDR and Institution for the Promotion of German Language Skills Abroad). For an overview of the origins of the Herder Institute see Claus Altmayer, "50 Jahre Herder-Institut, 50 Jahre Deutsch als Fremdsprache. Traditionen und Grenzüberschreitungen," *Deutsch als Fremdsprache* 44 (2007), 67–74.

was part of Ulbricht's semi-official state visit to Egypt.[4] This visit was a significant political success for East Germany in its efforts to gain international diplomatic recognition and therefore provoked outrage in West Germany. Because of this violation of the conditions of the Hallstein Doctrine, which saw the establishment of diplomatic relations with East Germany as an "unfriendly act", West German politicians had threatened to cut economic aid for Egypt or even to break off diplomatic relations to prevent the visit. But Egyptian politicians, in particular president Gamal Abdel Nasser, were unimpressed by the threats and in February 1965 Ulbricht and his wife traveled at the invitation of Nasser from Dubrovnik to Alexandria on the ship *Völkerfreundschaft* (Peoples' Friendship).[5]

In this chapter we examine the East German cultural institute KIZ in Cairo as a space for encounters and entanglements between Egyptian and German protagonists and as an experimental field for East German cultural diplomacy in the 1960s. A central part of this cultural diplomacy in the 1960s was language teaching. In the 1950s and 1960s, the teaching of German in Egypt gained importance as hundreds of young Egyptians underwent engineering education and technical training at West German universities and colleges. From 1956 onwards, young Egyptians studied in East Germany as well. It was against this background that the Goethe Institute opened a branch in Cairo in 1959. At the time, it was the largest branch of the Goethe Institute in the world and, alongside London, Paris, and New Delhi, one of the most important foreign branches.[6] When East Germany opened its cultural institute in Cairo and offered German language lessons, the KIZ entered into direct competition with the West German Goethe Institute. We argue that the German-German competition in Egypt, and Egyptian actors pursuing their interests while navigating this conflict, not only influenced and

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4 Egypt formed a political union with Syria from 1958 to 1961. This "United Arabic Republic" (UAR) was also loosely joined by North Yemen at the end of 1958. This entity of states was meant to form the origin of a pan-Arab confederation. The UAR existed only until 1961, when Syria declared its retreat from the Union. Egypt formally called itself UAR until 1971. In this chapter we use the term Egypt, unless UAR is mentioned in (East German) sources.

5 Behind the scenes, however, the West German side struggled hard to deal with the situation. See William G. Gray, *Germany's Cold War: The Global Campaign to Isolate East Germany, 1945–1969* (Chapel Hill, London: The University of North Carolina Press, 2003), 174–182; Young-Sun Hong, *Cold War Germany, the Third World, and the Global Humanitarian Regime* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 187–89; Werner Kilian, *Die Hallstein-Doktrin. Der diplomatische Krieg zwischen der BRD und der DDR 1955–1973: Aus den Akten der beiden deutschen Außenministerien* (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 2001), 123–148.

6 Thomas Kramer, *Deutsch-ägyptische Beziehungen in Vergangenheit und Gegenwart* (Tübingen: Erdmann, 1974), 229.

shaped the teaching of German in Cairo. It also played an important role in the institutionalization and scientification of German as a foreign language (*Deutsch als Fremdsprache* DaF), a field that exists until today, but has its roots, partially, in Cold War competition over influence in wooing the postcolonial world.

Larger and inter-German Cold War rivalries and the West German Hallstein Doctrine are considered here as the decisive background of the events. However, we will show that developments surrounding the East German KIZ cannot be evaluated against this background alone. From an Egyptian point of view the German-German competition and the question of whether or not to fully recognize the GDR were less important. The issue was rather a tactical question for the Egyptian side.[7] Nasserism as a socialist Arab political ideology did not automatically mean that Egypt preferred socialist East Germany to West Germany. Rather, developments in the Middle East conflict played a decisive role in the GDR's relatively successful cultural and language policy in Egypt. Egyptian politicians, notably Gamal Abdel Nasser, demonstrated anti-imperialist sovereignty that did not rely exclusively on socialist countries, but included them as important partners.[8]

Drawing primarily on German archival sources,[9] we show how Egyptian agency influenced the teaching practice in the East German cultural center and back home in the GDR. The actions of Egyptians can be seen in reports from protagonists from both German states only in double refraction because East German and West German reports followed their respective ideological guidelines. Since the special constellation of German-German competition in Egypt brought about a "triangular relationship", West German agency has to be taken into account as well. In the end, however, Egyptian interests determined the scope that the two German states had for their competing cultural diplomacy in North Africa.

In the first part, we will outline the international political background as well as regional and national constellations and motives that were relevant for decisions on cooperation on the Egyptian side and in both German states. We then return, secondly, to Cairo and zoom into the practice of German-German

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7 Hermann Wentker, *Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen. Die DDR im internationalen System 1949–1989* (München: Oldenbourg, 2007), 172–173.

8 The way in which the German-German sensitivities in relations with Egypt were dealt with fits into this model. The construction of the Aswan Dam with Soviet help is certainly the more prominent example.

9 This chapter is based on archival sources from the German Federal Archives (BArch), the Archive of the Parties and Mass Organizations of the GDR (SAPMO-BArch), and the Leipzig University Archive (UAL).

language teaching after Ulbricht's state visit in 1965. Here we trace the effects of political turmoil, such as the diplomatic crisis between West Germany and the Arab states in 1965, the Six-Day War in 1967, and finally the recognition of the GDR by Egypt in 1969 on the practice of language teaching. Thirdly, we will outline how these early experiences with language teaching in Egypt influenced the institutionalization and conception of language teaching in East Germany. Our research shows that the turning of language teaching into an academic subject, and thus the invention of the subject German as a foreign language (DaF), was spearheaded by East Germany—rather than West Germany—in a process of interactions with non-native speakers. Language teaching in Egypt was an important experience in this respect and serves as an example for the impacts of relations between Africa and the GDR despite the KIZ's relatively short "mooring" in Cairo.

Goethe and Herder Go South

At this point the question arises of what interest Egyptian politicians had in the two German states and what the Germans from East and West wanted in Egypt. The long-standing German-Egyptian relations had been broken off by Egypt in 1939. Shortly after the Second World War, Egypt resumed trade relations with Germany (western occupation zones).[10] Following the 1952 revolution, Egypt reoriented its domestic and foreign policy. A decidedly socialist outlook replaced the rather liberal capitalist political orientation of the 1920s to 1940s, when British interests had shaped Egyptian policies.[11] Egypt had already turned to the Soviet Union and the socialist camp when it concluded an agreement on arms supplies with Czechoslovakia in September 1955[12] and further during the Suez Crisis and the financing and construction of the Aswan Dam from 1956 onwards.[13] Nasser admired the Soviet economic system,[14] and, although communists in

10 Wolfgang G. Schwanitz, "Ägypten: Zweierlei Deutsche im Kalten Krieg," *Comparativ* 16 (2006): 11–12.

11 Tarek M. Osman, *Egypt on the Brink: From the Rise of Nasser to the Fall of Mubarak* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), 53–54.

12 For the arms deal see Philipp Muehlenbeck, *Czechoslovakia in Africa 1945–1968* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2016), 91–93. Muehlenbeck emphasizes that connections had already been established between Prague and Cairo before 1955. Czech arms deliveries to Egypt had started in 1946.

13 For Aswan as a paradigmatic case for development projects between the frontlines of the Cold War see Dirk van Laak, *Weiße Elefanten. Anspruch und Scheitern technischer Großprojekte im 20. Jahrhundert* (Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt, 1999), 107–108.

14 Odd Arne Westad, *The Cold War. A World History* (New York: Basic Books, 2017), 453.

Egypt were in a difficult position because Nasser feared their political influence at that time, Nasser emphasized that he was not an anti-communist and that he wanted to further develop relations with the socialist states.[15] So while Egypt did not pursue a declared socialist policy, it was one of the countries that took up socialist ideas and was interested in closer relations with the socialist states of Eastern Europe.

However, the most important orientation that Egypt shared with the GDR was not so much a declared socialism, but rather a strong anti-imperialism. This anti-imperialism shaped Egyptian international policy. Egypt was an important player in Third World movements of the 1950s and 1960s. In the 1960s, it was one of the leading powers in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) and at the same time a hub of Pan-Arabism, a "sanctuary of 'revolutionists' from all over the Arab world,"[16] as well as a supporting power of political Pan-Africanism.[17] At the same time, Nasser initiated an ambitious domestic development program. Therefore, Egypt had a strong economic interest in entertaining good relations with both German states, hoping for expertise and technology as well as foreign exchange and loans.

Since Egypt was a center of political pan-Arabism and at the same time a center of the political decolonization movement in Asia and Africa, relations with Egypt were important for both German states as well. East German officials saw Egypt as an important diplomatic gateway to Africa and the Arab world[18] but were also interested in economic relations, particularly the import of cotton for its textile industry. Despite the Hallstein Doctrine, East Germany succeeded in establishing economic relations with Egypt, which laid the foundation for further

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15 Kilian, *Hallstein-Doktrin*, 114.

16 Osman, *Egypt on the Brink*, 65 – 66.

17 For Egypt as a hub of decolonization and a center of the Afro-Asian movement see Eric Burton, "Hubs of Decolonization. African Liberation Movements and Eastern Connections in Cairo, Accra and Dar es Salaam", in *Southern African Liberation Movements and the Global Cold War "East": Transnational Activism 1960 – 1990*, ed. Lena Dallywater, Helder A. Fonseca, and Chris Saunders (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019); Reem Abou-El-Fadl, "Building Egypt's Afro-Asian Hub: Infrastructures of Solidarity and the 1957 Cairo Conference," *Journal of World History* 30 (2019). For an overview over the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) see Jürgen Dinkel, *The Non-Aligned Movement: Genesis, Organization and Politics, 1927 – 1992* (Leiden, Boston: Brill, 2018). For Egypt in the NAM see Lorenz Lüthi, "The Non-Aligned Movement and the Cold War, 1961 – 1973," *Journal of Cold War Studies* 18 (2016).

18 In East Germany, however, Egypt, like the entire Maghreb, was mainly categorized as belonging to the Arab world, although it is located on the African continent and had close ties to African states, especially in the 1960s. See Martin Praxenthaler, *Die Sprachverbreitungspolitik der DDR. Die deutsche Sprache als Mittel sozialistischer auswärtiger Kulturpolitik* (Frankfurt, Berlin: Peter Lang, 2002), 50 – 51.

cultural and later diplomatic relations. The initiative for trade relations initially came from Egypt. An Egyptian delegation visited East Berlin in July 1950 in search of new markets for cotton. The first trade agreement between the GDR and a non-aligned country was signed with Egypt in 1953 and a GDR trade agency subsequently opened in Cairo in 1954.[19] In October 1958 the German-Arabic Society (DAG) was founded in East Berlin.[20] The foundation of the society was a first step to institutionalize the cultural cooperation of the GDR with the Arab countries. The aim was to support the "Arab peoples' struggle against imperialism".[21]

West Germany wanted to maintain its economic relations with Egypt and at the same time prevent diplomatic success of East Germany by all means, fearing that a break with Egypt over the Hallstein Doctrine would compel other Arab governments to follow the Egyptian example. A crucial issue in Egypt's relations with Bonn was the question of the diplomatic recognition of Israel.[22] The relations of both German states with Egypt remained relatively stable until 1965, when the West German and British press published articles on arms deliveries from West Germany to Israel. The reports triggered a series of events that became known as the "Middle East crisis"[23] of West German foreign policy. It led to the invalidation of the Hallstein Doctrine, and eventually to diplomatic recognition of East Germany by several Arab states. After the West German-Israeli treaties had become known President Nasser saw Egypt's security interests threatened.[24] The Egyptian government now decided to restrict relations with West Germany and to develop a closer cultural and economic relationship with East Germany instead. Egypt suffered from a lack of foreign exchange during this period,

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19 Kilian, *Hallstein-Doktrin*, 104 – 108.

20 SAPMO-BArch, DY 13/3340, Statut der Deutsch-Arabischen Gesellschaft in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik, no date.

21 Liga-Akte 209: Gründungsunterlagen der Deutsch-Arabischen Gesellschaft (DAG), cited in Wolfgang Schwanitz, "Streng vertraulich? Aus den Akten der Deutsch-Arabischen Gesellschaft 1958 – 1969," in *Berlin-Kairo: Damals und heute. Zur Geschichte deutsch-ägyptischer Beziehungen,* ed. Wolfgang Schwanitz (Berlin: DÄG, 1991), 91.

22 For Cold War polarization in the Middle East and the conflict over Israel see Salim Yaqub. "The Cold War and the Middle East", in *The Cold War in the Third World*, ed. Robert McMahon (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

23 *Nahostkrise* (Middle East crisis) was a common term in the West German press to describe the events surrounding the recognition of Israel and the breaking off of diplomatic relations by the Arab states, e.g. "Nahostkrise: Tränen im Waldorf Astoria." *Der Spiegel* 9, February 24, 1965, 25 – 33.

24 "Drahtbericht Federer vom 25.01.1965", in *Akten zur auswärtigen Politik der Bundesrepublik Deutschland*, ed. Mechthild Lindemann and Rainer A. Blasius (München: Oldenbourg, 1999), 192.

and East Germany offered government loans, commercial credits, and experts.[25] Walter Ulbricht was invited to Cairo. In an interview with the West German news magazine *Spiegel*, Nasser replied to the question of why he had invited Ulbricht to Cairo after letting him wait for almost two years: “We felt betrayed by West Germany.”[26]

West German politicians were unsure how to react to Ulbricht’s Cairo visit, discussing options of ignoring and punishing throughout February. “Stalingrad at the Nile”, as a West German magazine called the disaster in a rather shrill headline, caused some turbulence.[27] It was feared that Egypt would ultimately recognize East Germany if West Germany exerted too much pressure. Eventually, this diplomatic confusion was the beginning of the end of the Hallstein Doctrine as West Germany could neither afford to break off relations nor act according to the doctrine.[28]

25 Gray, *Germany’s Cold War*, 172. The credits were granted in the East German convertible currency Valuta Mark (VM) and included VM 200 million (approximately US$50 million) in government credits and VM 130 million in commercial credits. Some of the credit commitments contained old credits from a 1958 agreement that had not been exhausted (VM 40 million). Among other things, these loans had been used to buy GDR machines for cotton processing and to set up a textile combine in Shibin el-Kom.

26 Interview by Dieter Schröder and Conrad Ahlers with Gamal Abdel Nasser, “Sie können sich doch nicht ewig erpressen lassen!” in *Der Spiegel* 9, February 25, 1965, 34. In this interview, Nasser also made it clear that Egypt would probably recognize the GDR if West Germany was to cease its economic aid because of the visit of Ulbricht to Egypt. He also stressed that Egypt would generally not react to Western threats.

27 *Christ und Welt*, February 5, 1965, quoted in Amid Das Gupta, “Ulbricht am Nil: Die deutsch-deutsche Rivalität in der Dritten Welt,” in *Das doppelte Deutschland: 40 Jahre Systemkonkurrenz*, ed. Udo Wengst and Hermann Wentker (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2008).

28 Gray, *Germany’s Cold War*, 173 – 176; Kilian, *Hallstein-Doktrin*, 153. For an analysis of the West German discussions around the Ulbricht visit and its impact on the implementation of the Hallstein Doctrine see also Hong, *Cold War Germany*, 245 – 249.

German-German Kulturkampf[29] in Cairo

1965–1967: "Sprechen Sie Deutsch?" The First Years of Direct Competition

Competition between the two German states in Egypt was carried out through means of cultural diplomacy. Between 1957 and 1960, the Politburo of the East German ruling party, the Socialist Unity Party (SED), had passed several resolutions stipulating that cultural centers focusing on language instruction should be opened in non-socialist countries.[30] From 1965 on, language teaching became an important part of on-site cultural diplomacy in Cairo.[31] Set up in a villa near Cairo University, the newly established East German cultural institute KIZ had five large classrooms, several offices, and a library. A concert grand piano was handed over to the staff at the ceremonial opening. The grand piano later stood in the event hall, which was solemnly called the "grand hall."[32] The first director of the KIZ was the orientalist Klaus Timm, while the first chief instructor was the linguist Gerhard Helbig from Leipzig's Karl Marx University.

When Gerhard Helbig arrived in Cairo together with his wife Agnes Helbig at the end of December 1964—two months before Ulbricht's state visit to Egypt—he encountered a "completely empty, poorly maintained house." He spent the first few months supervising the preparation of classrooms and providing the complete equipment so that German lessons could take place there. At the beginning of February 1965, advertisements for a German course were placed in several Egyptian newspapers. More than 110 Egyptians personally registered with Agnes Helbig in a provisionally furnished office at the center.[33]

Paradoxically, the high number of registrations was a reason for concern rather than joy. The head of the KIZ, Klaus Timm, was originally opposed to admitting so many Egyptians to German lessons in the new institute. Due to a shortage of personnel, he only wanted to approve small courses with a maximum of six to ten participants. Gerhard Helbig, who was the only German in-

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29 Originally the German term *Kulturkampf* (cultural struggle or culture war) refers to Chancellor Otto von Bismarck's sanctions against (political) Catholicism in 1870s Germany, but it is used for cultural conflicts in other times and places as well.

30 The first of these centers was opened in Helsinki in 1960.

31 Praxenthaler, *Sprachverbreitungspolitik*, 233–234, 260–262.

32 BArch, B 307/96, Letter Dr. Klopfer to Dr. Hutter, Goethe-Institut Zentralverwaltung Abt. I, October 21, 1965.

33 SAPMO-BArch, DR3/II/B839, Dr. Gerhard Helbig, Bericht über die Arbeit des Deutsch-Lektorats Kairo im Frühjahrssemester 1965, July 10, 1965.

structor at the KIZ during the first few months, however, managed to keep the German courses open for a larger number of interested people by referring to the competition with West German cultural diplomacy in Cairo. “For the displacement of the Goethe Institute, the effectiveness of the language institute is very important. So far, the Goethe Institute has held all these positions in its hands,” Helbig explained his commitment to the East German Foreign Office (MfAA) and the Herder Institute. German lessons should be offered at more favorable conditions than at the Goethe Institute but not free of charge, as otherwise, Helbig assumed, “the value of teaching would be reduced in Arab eyes.”[34]

The classes started in March 1965. Apart from regular German classes, the KIZ also offered individual lessons for Egyptian personalities considered as especially important, including not only prospective engineers or other specialists who were to study in the GDR but also members of the Egyptian elite who were interested in (East) German lessons.[35] Two state secretaries of the Egyptian Ministry of Education attended private lessons. Another visitor was Mahmoud El-Hefny, the brother-in-law of Deputy Prime Minister Nureddin Tarraf. El-Hefny was one of Egypt’s most respected musicologists and chaired a club for Egyptians that had graduated in Germany (*Klub der in Deutschland graduierten Ägypter*) from 1963 to 1973. In the 1920s, El-Hefny had studied medicine and musicology in Rostock and Berlin. He had received his doctorate in musicology from the Friedrich Wilhelm University[36] of Berlin in 1931. Obviously, El-Hefny already spoke German and wanted to refresh or deepen his knowledge and invested in the maintenance of a social network.[37]

The German courses were an essential part of the KIZ, and they shaped the image of the institute to the outside world. The courses were technically good, which the West German competitors readily acknowledged. Additionally, like the Goethe Institute, the KIZ offered its visitors exhibitions and concerts, and subtitled East German films as well as scientific and political lectures and discussion evenings.

After some hesitations following Ulbricht’s visit to Cairo, the West German government finally decided to impose sanctions against Egypt. West Germany announced that it would cease providing economic aid to Egypt. When Chancel-

34 SAPMO-BArch, DR3/II/B839, Dr. Gerhard Helbig, Bericht über die Arbeit des Deutsch-Lektorats Cairo im Frühjahrssemester 1965, July 10, 1965.

35 Ibid.

36 Now Humboldt University.

37 For biographical information about Mahmoud El-Hefny see Gerhard Höpp, *Texte aus der Fremde. Arabische politische Publizistik in Deutschland, 1896–1945. Eine Bibliographie* (Berlin: Das Arabische Buch 2000), 51–52.

lor Ludwig Erhard on March 7, 1965 announced that West Germany was willing to fully recognize Israel, Egypt and nine other Arab states broke off their relations with the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG). As a result, West Germany was forced to close its embassy in Cairo and recall the ambassador.[38] "Nowhere in the world have I seen such an impudent people as the West Germans", Nasser declared in a speech one day after Erhard's announcement to recognize Israel.[39]

Despite the breakdown of relations, the staff of the embassy's cultural department remained in Cairo.[40] The Goethe Institute and the (West) German Academic Exchange Agency DAAD (*Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst*) were able to continue their work for the time being. The (West German) Federal Foreign Office hoped that the Goethe Institute would be able to take on some of the diplomatic tasks of the embassy that no longer existed.[41] Although West Germany had lost its embassy in Cairo, East Germany was unable to open its own. For Nasser, political pan-Arabism was central and he refused full diplomatic recognition of East Germany not because of West German sensitivities, but to avoid conflict between the Arab states which were divided over this issue.[42]

Thus, the cultural diplomats of both German competitors were finally at eye level. Without diplomatic representation for both German states, cultural diplomacy became more central. This constellation with a "downgraded" West Germany at diplomatic eye level with East Germany is historically unique. It shows that southern agency, in this case Egyptian diplomacy, could influence and limit the scope of action of the northern partners considerably.

Although there were signals from the Egyptian side not to obstruct the work of the Goethe Institute and the DAAD, the political situation nevertheless led to restrictions. The Egyptian government banned Egyptian civil servants from visiting the Goethe Institute without ministerial permission. Appointments that the Goethe Institute had already made with ministry civil servants were cancelled at short notice, Egyptian officials rejected invitations, and the "previously approved use of venues was prohibited."[43] In the months following the diplomatic

38 See Kilian, *Hallstein-Doktrin*, 132, 141 – 148.

39 Nasser, cited in Kilian, *Hallstein-Doktrin*, 142.

40 For a detailed description of the break-off of diplomatic relations see Dalia Abu Samra, "Deutschlands Außenpolitik gegenüber Ägypten: Abbruch und Wiederaufnahme der diplomatischen Beziehungen 1965 – 1972" (PhD diss., Freie Universität Berlin, 2002), 86 – 87.

41 DAAD, Jahresbericht 1965, 158.

42 Schwanitz, "Zweierlei Deutsche," 19 – 20.

43 BArch, B 307/31, Bericht Dienstreise Direktor Werner Ross in den Nahen Osten, April 26, 1965.

withdrawal, it became increasingly difficult for the staff of the Goethe Institute and the DAAD to obtain visas and work permits for their stay in Egypt.[44]

Intra-German competition in language policy created a situation that various actors on the Egyptian side could use to their advantage. They sometimes played both German sides off against each other in order to get free German lessons or instructor positions for Egyptian universities or colleges.[45] Some examples might illustrate how the competition could be exploited for personal ends. In order to keep the Egyptians close to the West German side, the Goethe Institute decided to soften the positions of some state secretaries with small favors. Among others, State Secretary Mustafa Hassan was invited to a longer trip to Germany at the expense of the Goethe Institute, and a two-year scholarship was procured for the son of State Secretary Sayed Mohamed Roha. In addition, they promised a free additional holiday course for Egyptian German teachers in Munich. In another case the Goethe Institute responded to the GDR's offer to the Egyptian Ministry of Education for 12 teachers of German at secondary and high schools in Egypt and 20 training scholarships for German teachers in Leipzig by offering the Egyptian Ministry of Education a two-year training course for four German teachers in Munich and additional further training measures for all Egyptian German teachers with the possibility of taking part in a summer language course in West Germany.[46]

In the summer of 1965, the dean of the German department of the language school in Zeitoun, Antoum Chalaby Maher, approached the Goethe Institute and demanded two additional teachers for his institute. Otherwise he would fall back on the offer of East Germany, which had already, he claimed, promised him two teachers. The Goethe Institute responded favorably to the demand.[47] The fear of an East German breakthrough was deep-seated. The executive board of the

44 Several lecturers reported that the granting of visas was subject to harassing conditions. Large quantities of bribe (*baksheesh*) had to be paid and many forms signed by different authorities had to be submitted. The waiting time, begging, and errands now took several weeks of working time. BArch, B 307/31, Bericht Dienstreise Direktor Werner Ross in den Nahen Osten, April 26, 1965.

45 BArch, B 307/96, Vermerk Klopfer, Aktivitäten SBZ-Institut, April 20, 1966; BArch, B307/96, Betr.: Situation des Goethe-Institut[s] in Cairo, no date; BArch, B 307/96, Italienische Botschaft an das Auswärtige Amt, SBZ-Aktivität in Zusammenhang Deutschunterricht VAR, Lahn, June 16, 1966; SAPMO-BArch, DR3/II/B509, HA Internationale Beziehungen, Brief an Geerhardt, MfAA, October 31, 1967.

46 BArch, B 307/96, Aktennotiz Dr. Klopfer, Betr. Besuch von Dombois im Ministerium für Erziehung und Universität Cairo, February 9, 1966; BArch, B 307/96, Klopfer an Zentralverwaltung, Betr. Versuch SBZ in Deutschunterricht in Oberschulen einzudringen, March 23, 1966.

47 BArch, B 307/96, Betr.: Zur Situation des Goethe-Institut in Kairo, August 10, 1965.

Goethe Institute agreed to do everything in its power to fend off the East German advances: "If the SBZ [Soviet Occupation Zone][48] had succeeded in making a major slump in this direction, the consequences would not be foreseeable. That's why every effort must be made to send as many good people as possible in sufficient numbers."[49]

When a position as a language inspector for German lessons at the Egyptian Ministry of Education became vacant, East Germany proposed to fill it. Until then, three inspectors of the Goethe Institute had been closely involved in the professional supervision of the Egyptian German instructors. Since the Egyptian Ministry of Education postponed the decision for some time, two KIZ employees offered Egyptian German instructors jobs at the KIZ in Cairo and distributed symbolic awards such as "knowledge medals" to the course participants.[50] When the Goethe Institute protested that the previous supervision of German lessons at Egyptian schools was no longer guaranteed and that on the other hand the awarding of "FDJ [Free German Youth][51] medals" by non-authorized East German citizens at Egyptian schools was equivalent to the GDR's recognition under international law, Egyptian state secretaries replied that the West German arms deliveries to Israel had not been forgotten.[52] Here again the Egyptians dealt with the case without showing much interest in the complicated details of German-German competition and rather bluntly asserted their focus on the Israeli case.

The existence of two German language institutes in Egypt and the ideologically charged competition led to the close observation of each other's work. In their *Kulturkampf,* Germans occasionally tried to instrumentalize Egyptians as informers and cultural saboteurs. The Goethe Institute, on the instructions of the Federal Foreign Office, encouraged its Egyptian staff to attend KIZ events in order to report on them and carry out "possible countermeasures."[53] On the

48 *Sowjetische Besatzungszone* (SBZ) was the term used for the sector of Germany which was occupied by the Soviet Union since 1945. Even after the founding of the GDR in 1949, the term was often used in West Germany instead of the abbreviation GDR, since the GDR was not recognized as a sovereign state.

49 BArch, B 307/32, Vorstandsprotokoll Goethe-Institut, March 4, 1966.

50 BArch, B 307/96, Vermerk Dvorak, Aktivitäten SBZ-Institut, April 19, 1966.

51 FDJ was the East German youth organization *Freie Deutsche Jugend*, associated with the ruling party SED.

52 BArch, B 307/96, Vermerk Klopfer, Aktivitäten SBZ-Institut, April 20, 1966. More examples of the various and sometimes absurd West German discussions about whether or not little flags, mentions of the name "GDR" in conference documentations or East German orders meant recognition of the GDR can be found in Kilian, *Hallstein Doctrine*.

53 BArch, B307/96, Schreiben Auswärtiges Amt an Goethe-Institut, Betr. Kontakte von Mitarbeitern der Kulturinstitute mit Vertretern der sowjetisch besetzten Zone, May 5, 1966.

other hand, East German language teachers visited Goethe Institute events and wrote detailed reports on them. In May 1966, the Federal Foreign Office completely prohibited the German staff of the Goethe Institute and the DAAD from contacting members of the GDR Cultural Center. Instead, their own Egyptian local staff was chosen to obtain information. They should apparently respond to the East German offer for a further training course for Egyptian German instructors, in order to learn more about the structures and working methods of the East German Institute.[54] The Egyptian instructors later stated that the East German chief instructor Peter Schumann was approaching them with special offers. He offered them to change to the East German Institute for a better salary and promised the possibility of free further training at the Herder Institute in Leipzig. The Egyptian instructor Samir Boalos, for example, reported that East Germans told him that the KIZ had excellent relations with Egyptian civil servants and secretaries of state, which would certainly benefit the professional career of German instructors.[55] Whether this East German offer really existed can only be inferred from the reports of the Egyptian instructors, but not from the documents of the GDR. It is also possible that the Egyptian instructors, in playing Germans off against each other, tried to increase their wages at the Goethe Institute and hoped for invitations to language courses in West Germany.

The East German KIZ managed to establish itself in Cairo within a few months. By fall 1966, more than 100 language students had enrolled in the courses. In instructor Gerhard Helbig's view, one reason for this was a modern, fully equipped electronic classroom, with television, film projector, and record player. It was not a widespread practice at the time to include these media in language teaching. According to Helbig, the East German classroom was looked upon with envy by West German competitors.[56] If that was the case, this might be one of the rare occasions where East German technical equipment in development cooperation was superior to West German one. From March 1967, the West German television course *Guten Tag* was broadcasted on Egyptian television.[57] The broadcasting was discontinued in the spring of 1968 and replaced by the

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54 BArch, B 307/96, Rundschreiben Auswärtiges Amt an Zentralverwaltung Goethe-Institut, Betr. Kontakte von Mitarbeitern der Kulturinstitute mit Vertretern der sowjetisch besetzten Zone, May 5, 1966.

55 BArch, B 307/96, Aktennotiz Dr. Klopfer, Betr. Besuch unserer Ortskraft Samir Boalos im SBZ, February 7, 1966.

56 SAPMO-BArch, DR3/II/B839, Bericht über die Arbeit des Deutsch-Lektorats Cairo im Frühjahrssemester 1965, Dr. Gerhard Helbig, July 10, 1965.

57 BArch, B 370/41, Aktennotiz, betr. Internationale Erfolge des Fernsehkurses Guten Tag, October 19, 1967.

East German television course *Sprechen Sie Deutsch?* The course was meant to be a pilot project for GDR TV courses in the Arab world and other countries and was given as a gift to the Egyptian television. For a period of three years, this East German course ran weekly on the Egyptian State Channel Five.[58] Accompanying the course, the KIZ offered consultations in its own cultural center as well as in the Egyptian cultural centers in various cities. [59] The rapid successes encouraged the GDR leadership to strengthen its cultural policy work in Egypt on the basis of a decision from the GDR's Council of Ministers in summer 1966 to expand foreign information activities (*Auslandsinformation*), as the propaganda work was called, in the Arab countries. The decision provided for the opening of two new cultural centers in Aleppo and Alexandria.[60] In addition, the training and further education of Egyptian and Syrian German teachers was intensified.[61]

1967: Teaching German after the Six-Day War

The Six-Day War in June 1967[62] was a turning point for the Egyptian-German triangle relationship. Since West Germany supported Israel, the political mood and the opinion of the Egyptian authorities and in institutions quickly changed from suspicious to hostile. Politicians frequently referred to the "anti-Arab Federal Republic" in public.[63] West German instructors wrote about a "hostile attitude" of the Egyptian population in their reports. The staff of the Goethe Institute even reported that they felt a "climate of fear."[64] Egyptian authorities began to put pressure on the Goethe Institute and the DAAD as residence permits were not extended and work permits could only be obtained with great effort. The Egyptian secret service began to openly monitor employees of the Goethe Institute.[65] After Egyptian protesters in Alexandria had set the American and British consulates on fire in the name of anti-imperialism and tried to do the same at the Goethe Institute, which was protected by the police, the Goethe Institute decided to

58 Praxenthaler, *Sprachverbreitungspolitik*, 310 – 311.
59 SAPMO-BArch, DR3/II/B1022c, Tätigkeitsbericht Lektorat KIZ Kairo 1968/69, February 24, 1969.
60 Ibid.
61 SAPMO-BArch, DY30/JIV2/3/1188, Beschluß zur Verstärkung der auslandsinformatorischen Tätigkeit der DDR in den arabischen Schwerpunktländern, June 10, 1966.
62 For the Six-Day War between Israel on one side and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria on the other, which ended in a complete disaster for the Arab side see Westad, *Cold War*, 459 – 461.
63 BArch, B 212/21181, 000219/1 Jahresbericht DAAD Kairo 1969, Eckmann, February 11, 1970.
64 BArch, B 307/222, Tätigkeitsbericht GI Alexandria 01.01.1967 – 30.06.1967, July 13, 1967.
65 BArch, B 307/233, Ferkinghoff, 1. Halbjahresbericht 1967, Kulturarbeit, no date.

close the offices in Cairo and Alexandria temporarily. Language courses were discontinued and the upcoming examinations postponed until further notice. The head office in Munich was firmly expecting both branches to be permanently closed by the Egyptian government and was already planning to transfer the staff to other countries.[66]

East Germany's cultural diplomats took advantage of this situation immediately. The KIZ remained open and classes continued during the war. Just one day after the closure of the Goethe Institute, the East German KIZ advertised in Egyptian newspapers that the examinations planned by the Goethe Institute would be held by the "German Cultural Centre of the GDR – Arab-German-Society".[67] As a result, many of the Goethe Institute's language course participants, especially from the intermediate and advanced levels, moved to the KIZ.[68]

In late 1967, a brochure entitled "In the Name of Goethe – The Goethe Institute, a Weapon of West German Imperialism" appeared in Egypt. The brochure, written entirely in Arabic, was printed in East Berlin by Panorama, a publisher of the GDR's Foreign Press Agency. It was distributed free of charge in large numbers to state authorities, ministries, and the press. Excerpts from the brochure were also published in the Egyptian magazine *Al-Magalla*. The GDR obviously wanted to use the anti-imperialist, anti-Western mood and hoped to convince the supposedly communist, GDR-friendly or anti-imperialist minds in ministries, authorities, and the press of the danger represented by the Goethe Institute.[69] The campaign was seemingly successful, but this was probably due to the political circumstances rather than the persuasiveness of the East German propaganda. In a way the disaster of the Six-Day War achieved what the GDR propaganda had not in the previous years: to demonize West Germany as an imperialist power.

Since West Germany did not want to leave the field to the Eastern competitors, the Goethe Institute re-opened its doors just after a few weeks. But Ludwig Erhard's public support for Israel had taken its toll. The number of participants in language courses at the Goethe Institute dropped rapidly after the war. In September 1967, more than 30 students moved from the Goethe Institute to the KIZ. An Egyptian language student wrote to the Goethe Institute explaining his decision: "I refuse to continue taking language lessons with you. It would be embarrassing and painful for me if I continued to study in your institute which belongs

66 BArch, B 307/10, Protokoll Abteilungsleiterkonferenz Goethe-Institut, July 3, 1967.

67 BArch, B 307/223, H.R. Reinstrom, Vermerk, no date.

68 BArch, B 307/233, Halbjahresbericht Goethe-Institut Kairo, 1.07. – 31.12.1967, no date.

69 The brochure can be found in BArch, B 307/273, Korrespondenz Kairo, no date.

to the West German government, a government that clearly participated in the dirty, armed hostilities against the great Arab homeland."[70]

Egyptian authorities now stipulated that all West German cultural events required a permit from the Egyptian Ministry of Interior and could not take place outside the premises of the Goethe Institute.[71] Additionally, West Germany now had to pay social insurance to all local Egyptian DAAD and Goethe Institute employees which resulted in enormous bureaucratic effort and financial costs. The Goethe Institute, the DAAD and the West German Cultural Department suspected that this compulsory insurance had been introduced under pressure from East Germany.[72] This shows a characteristic pattern that shaped German-German perceptions: in the bipolar logic of system competition, both sides assumed that their (German) rivals orchestrated the restrictions and Egyptians were nothing but puppets. Egyptian initiatives and motives, such as anti-imperialism or anti-Zionism, rarely appear in the reports of both German sides. Once more, the intra-German rivalry provided several advantages for Egyptian course participants. With some skill, it was possible to get free language lessons. The director of the Egyptian Cultural Centre in Zagazig received free German lessons at the East German KIZ by mentioning that the Goethe Institute had offered him free lessons. Other German learners succeeded in enrolling late in courses of the KIZ, arguing that language courses could also be taken at the Goethe Institute.[73]

East Germany attempted to exploit the weak position of West Germany in Egypt as a result of the Six-Day War to gain a foothold in the Egyptian university landscape. In addition to three West German instructors, the Language School at Zeitoun also hired an East German instructor to run its language laboratory in September 1967. This caused problems, because the shift in Egyptian politics in favor of the GDR did not mean that all Egyptians welcomed this change. The Egyptian head of the language school, Antoum Chalaby Maher, did not conceal his sympathy for the Goethe Institute and asked the East German instructor Klaus Neubert to stick to the (West German) curriculum and teaching material. However, since Neubert had been instructed by his superiors not to use West German material for political reasons, he had to produce his own teaching material.[74]

70 BArch, B 307/223, Enclosure in Halbjahresbericht Goethe-Institut Kairo, 1.07–31.12.1967, no date.

71 BArch, B 307/222, Tätigkeitsbericht GI Alexandria 01.01.1968–30.06.1968, no date.

72 BArch, B 307/233, Aktennotiz, May 9, 1967.

73 SAPMO-BArch, DR3/II/B1022b, Bericht des Lektorats am KIZ Kairo WS 1967/68, March 1968.

74 SAPMO-BArch, DR3/II/B1022b, Dietrich Engel, Bericht des Lektorats am KIZ Kairo, March 1968.

1969: Recognition

Egypt turned closer to the Soviet Union and Eastern European States after the Six-Day War. This promoted the diplomatic aims of the GDR. Cultural relations were already deepened at the end of 1968. To this end, a joint cultural commission was founded and a new joint "Working program for cultural and scientific cooperation" was concluded.[75] One of the most important goals of the program was the promotion of GDR German teaching in Egypt. The aim was to replace West Germany from its traditional positions in the field. Abdul Wahab El-Borolosy, Egyptian Minister of Research and Higher Education, and representatives of the Egyptian Ministry of Education promised at a meeting with the Cultural Department of the Consulate General and the KIZ to support the ideas of the GDR.[76]

On July 10, 1969, the Egyptian and East German governments announced the establishment of diplomatic relations. The West German Government's reaction did not contain the threat of countermeasures, which was tantamount to a change in the policy of non-recognition towards the GDR. The recognition of the GDR was still described as a hostile act by West German officials, but no retaliatory measures such as the breaking off of trade relations were used.[77] The breakthrough at the diplomatic level was also the breakthrough in the field of German as a foreign language (*Deutsch als Fremdsprache*, DaF) for the GDR in Egypt. With the opening of the embassy, the DaF working group was immediately founded, which further determined and coordinated the tasks of the cultural center and the work of East German instructors at Egyptian universities.[78] Some West German instructors were replaced by East German instructors. As one of the first measures, the East German instructors introduced GDR teaching material.[79]

The change of mood in Egypt also led to a significant increase in the number of applicants for language courses at the KIZ. In the spring of 1970, the enrolment

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75 SAPMO-BArch, DR3/II/B837, Information über den Stand der Beziehungen auf dem Gebiet des Hochschulwesens mit der VAR, May 19, 1970.

76 SAPMO-BArch, DR3/II/B1048 Brief von Dr. Konschel an Dr. Merkel (MfAA), February 18, 1969.

77 Rainer Büren, "Die arabischen Staaten in der außenpolitischen Konzeption der Bundesrepublik Deutschland," in *Araber und Deutsche. Begegnungen in einem Jahrtausend*, ed. Friedrich Kochwasser and Hans Roemer (Tübingen/Basel: Erdmann), 22; see also Kilian, *Hallstein-Doktrin*, 162–163.

78 SAPMO-BArch, DR3/II/B1507/1a, Cheflektor Steinecke, Arbeitsplan des Lektorats Kairo für das Studienjahr 1971/72, October 13, 1971.

79 SAPMO-BArch, DR3/II/1507/1b, Erika Endesfelder, Die Einflußnahme auf den Fremdsprachenunterricht Deutsch in der VAR durch die DDR und die BRD-Institutionen, Anfang 1971, no date.

for the courses had to be stopped after only two days due to the large number of applicants. Since East German officials demanded to enroll preferably those Egyptians who "appear to be important for the foreign information objective," the tuition fees for "students and housewives" were increased by 50 percent because the DaF working group considered these to be of little relevance.[80] It becomes clear here that the main objective of the language courses was to achieve political goals. Propaganda for the GDR, the above mentioned "foreign information," was a mandatory part of the language courses.[81] The aim was to convince Egyptian society of the advantages of the socialist GDR over the "imperialist" FRG. In contrast, "housewives" and "students" were obviously not regarded as important multipliers and were therefore excluded as far as possible.

In the 1970s, however, East German propaganda became less important in language teaching and made way for a more pragmatic approach. Already in spring 1970, the KIZ began to offer the opportunity to acquire language diplomas which served to "enable the holder to take up a scientific qualification in the GDR without further linguistic preparation."[82] The course load for the language diploma comprised 480 hours and was to become mandatory in the future for an entry visa to study in East Germany. During a visit to East Germany by Abdul Wahab el Borolosy, the Egyptian minister of higher education, it was agreed that language training at the KIZ should be concentrated on those who would study in the GDR. In the future, language training should also focus on technical disciplines.

This change in the orientation of German teaching can be seen as an East German paradigm shift in the teaching of DaF. In the 1970s language teaching became more and more a tool to support educational programs. The aim was now a pragmatic preparation for university education in East Germany. Propaganda was no longer in the foreground, although the indoctrination of Egyptian instructors did not disappear completely. For economic reasons, more Egyptian instructors were hired for the teaching of beginners' and basic courses, but for political reasons they were to be "regularly instructed and controlled by East German instructors, as well as politically and methodically supervised." These

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80 SAPMO-BArch, DR3/II/B1022d, 1. Tätigkeitsbericht des Lektorats Kairo, Studienjahr 1969/70, February 20, 1970. We found no explanation in the sources to whom the term "housewives" refers and how many of them wanted to enroll in the courses. Unfortunately, there is a general lack of information in the sources about gender of Egyptian students and teachers.

81 SAPMO-BArch, DY 13/2020, Beschlussprotokoll der Sekretariatssitzung der Deutsch-Arabischen Gesellschaft, August 3, 1966.

82 SAPMO-BArch, DR3/II/B1022c, Tätigkeitsbericht des Lektorats am Kulturzentrum in Kairo, August 12, 1969.

instructors had to attend a further training course in East Germany every two years in order to report on the GDR from their own experience.[83]

East Germany's relative superiority vis-à-vis West Germany in the realm of cultural diplomacy was quickly ended by another change in Egypt's political scene. After Nasser's sudden death in 1970, Egyptian foreign policy under Anwar Sadat changed fundamentally. Egypt moved closer to the West without giving up cooperation with the socialist countries.[84] 1972 saw the resumption of diplomatic relations between West Germany and Egypt. With Egypt's diplomatic recognition of the GDR, cultural diplomacy in North Africa became less central for the two German states. The situation reversed, and less and less visitors were drawn to the East German cultural center.[85] German lessons continued, but while the Goethe Institute in Cairo still exists today, the GDR closed its cultural and information centers in Cairo and Alexandria in 1977. The closure of the centers was probably not only related to the diplomatic recognition of the GDR, which led to a decline of investments in cultural diplomacy, but also to the deterioration in relations between Egypt and the socialist countries under Anwar al-Sadat. From 1974, Sadat clearly moved closer to the West and, among other things, withdrew from the Treaty of Friendship with the Soviet Union in 1976.[86]

German Language Courses in Egypt and the Emergence of DaF

The German-German *Kulturkampf* in Egypt played an important role in the emergence of the academic subject German as a foreign language (DaF). Egypt was the second non-socialist country after Finland in which the GDR experimented with the teaching of German as a foreign language abroad with its own instructors at its own language centers. Until then, there had been little experience with

83 SAPMO-BArch, DR3/II/B1022d, 1. Tätigkeitsbericht des Lektorats Kairo, Studienjahr 1969/70, February 20, 1970.

84 For an overview of the events after Nasser's death and the political change in Egypt see Westad, *Cold War*, 463–469; Christopher Andrew and Vasili Mitrokhin, *The World Was Going Our Way: The KGB and the Battle for the Third World* (New York: Basic Books, 2005), 141–142.

85 SAPMO-BArch, DR3/II/B1507/1b, Kurzbericht über das Herbstsemester 1972/73 am Lektorat des KIZ Kairo, March 13, 1973.

86 Praxenthaler, *Sprachverbreitungspolitik*, 237; Schwanitz, "Zweierlei Deutsche," 26.

teaching in a non-German-speaking environment.[87] The GDR's German classes in Egypt were also successful and attractive because they were carried out by well-trained instructors.

East German instructors were carefully selected to ensure that they had language skills in the host country. A guideline of the East German Ministry of Higher and Technical Education (MHF) for the selection of instructors stated that they should have sufficient foreign language skills "in order to be able to carry out foreign information at a high level in beginners' lessons."[88] In Egypt, this meant that almost all East German instructors were experienced language instructors or German studies experts with knowledge of English and in most cases also with Arabic language skills. Almost all the instructors had previously studied or taught at the Herder Institute in Leipzig. Egyptian authorities often pointed out to West German representatives these qualitative differences between East and West. The Federal Foreign Office therefore insisted that West German instructors should have acquired knowledge of the national language before their assignment. In reality, this could rarely be implemented. There were simply too few West German instructors with knowledge of Arabic who would have been willing to go to Egypt, either out of concern for their careers or out of fear of crisis situations flaring up again and again.[89]

In September 1966, the East German Council of Ministers decided to "establish a comprehensive system of German language teaching for foreigners." This decision formed the basis for further development of language policy as a focal point of the GDR's cultural diplomacy in order to counter West German language policy. According to the Council of Ministers of the GDR, West Germany only used language courses to "gain political influence in the developing countries and to bind the leaders in these countries to the FRG." The resolution clearly states how the influence of West Germany was to be reduced. The aim, according to the Council of Ministers, should be "to gradually reach firm contractual agreements [...] and political and cultural centers [...] through the secondment of individual instructors."[90] The decision of the Council of Ministers therefore directed that

87 For GDR cultural policy in Finland see Olivia Griese, *Auswärtige Kulturpolitik und Kalter Krieg. Die Konkurrenz von Bundesrepublik und DDR in Finnland 1949–1973* (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz, 2006).

88 SAPMO-BArch, DR3/II/B1022b, AG Deutsch als Fremdsprache, Bericht des Lektorats am Kulturzentrum Kairo der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik in der Vereinigten Arabischen Republik, Sommersemester 1968, no date.

89 Lothar Reinermann, "Die Außenstellen des DAAD in London und Kairo," *Spuren in die Zukunft* 1 (2000), 186.

90 SAPMO-BArch, DC20/I/4/1412, Ministerratsbeschluss, September 8, 1966.

German as a foreign language should be underpinned theoretically and practically and had to be developed into an "independent scientific discipline."[91] In a conceptual paper on the development of German as a foreign language, the director of the Herder Institute in Leipzig, Johannes Rößler, stressed that the quantitative superiority of West Germany in the field of DaF could be countered by the qualitative superiority of the GDR. According to Rößler, this lead should be maintained at all costs.[92] It becomes once again clear at this point how much language teaching was used as a strategic weapon under the conditions of ubiquitous system competition.

Here we can see several factors that influenced German language teaching. The paradigm shift in language education from ideological to technical made it necessary to scientifically underpin language teaching. At the same time, East German party and state leaders noticed that language policy enabled them to compete with West Germany with relatively scarce resources.

In general, teaching German in Egypt was an important step for East German instructors, in their career and at the same time an opportunity to experience life abroad, as can be seen in the case of Gerhard Helbig. It was either a starting point for an international career or a once in a lifetime opportunity. Some used this opportunity for a more radical change. Although authorities took care to ensure that only well-established "cadres" were allowed to travel abroad, it was not possible to prevent the "Republikflucht" [desertion from the republic, i.e. GDR] of instructors completely.[93] For example, a married couple of instructors who had been employed in Egypt as well as the GDR instructor in Conakry in Guinea used their stay abroad to "defect" to the West.[94] This sparked a debate between the Herder Institute, the MHF, and the Foreign Office on how to prevent similar events in the future.[95]

The success of the GDR in Egypt promoted the emergence of DaF as an academic subject in the GDR. From a practice increasingly needed during the 1950s

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91 SAPMO-BArch, DC20/I/4/1412, Beschluss Aufbau eines umfassenden Systems für den deutschen Sprachunterricht, June 8, 1966.

92 UAL, HI 028, Johannes Rößler, Problemskizze zur Entwicklung des Gegenstandes "Deutsch als Fremdsprache," August 28, 1973, 140.

93 SAPMO-BArch, DR3/II/B1022e, Günther Hänse and Horst Nalewski, Halbjahresbericht über die Arbeit an der Universität Kairo für die Zeit vom 10. Februar bis 10. Juni 1970, June 10, 1970.

94 The names of the couple are not mentioned. The lecturer from Conakry, however, became lecturer at the Goethe Institute in Munich and later Professor for DaF in Saarbrücken.

95 SAPMO-BArch, DR3/II/B1426d, Brief Leiter des Referats für Wirtschaftliche Auslandsbeziehungen MLU Halle an MHF, January 27, 1969. How many lecturers exactly used their assignment in Egypt as an opportunity to turn their backs on the GDR cannot be determined from the available sources.

and 1960s it developed into an independent scientific discipline in the GDR, several years before it was established in West Germany. On the one hand, the aim was to offer better German lessons than those of the Goethe Institute or the DAAD in countries like Egypt and thus to convince the students that the GDR was the "better Germany". On the other hand, scientific research was meant to improve and shorten the obligatory German lessons for foreign students in the GDR. At the center of these efforts was the Herder Institute in Leipzig, which from the beginning of the 1950s was the training center for the obligatory preparatory German lessons for foreign students wishing to study in the GDR. Here at the Institute, the foundations were laid for the academic subject of German as a foreign language. In 1967, a research department was founded at the institute, and in 1968, Gerhard Helbig, the former first instructor in Cairo, was appointed as the first chair for German as a foreign language.[96]

Conclusion

Cultural cooperation between Egypt and the two German states during the Cold War period was a new chapter in the long-standing Egyptian-German relations, which affected the institutions in both German states. This is particularly evident in language policy and in the genesis of the subject German as a foreign language. The debate on language teaching in Egypt had a particular influence on East German language policy, and shaped pioneering institutions like the Herder Institute and Goethe Institute in the Global North on both sides of the Iron Curtain.

The competition of the East German and West German cultural institutes in Cairo shows that Egyptian actors and institutions were in charge and shaped the discourse. For Egyptians, German-German competition was sometimes ignored but, in most cases, instrumentalized or used for tactical maneuvers in the conflict over Israel. Learning German had a long tradition in Egypt[97] and German was also needed by Egyptians who wanted to study in one of the two German countries. In this respect, teaching German in Cairo was a small piece of the puzzle in the great development project of socialist modernization under Nasser.

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96 SAPMO-BArch, DC20/I/4/1412, Beschluss Aufbau eines umfassenden Systems für den deutschen Sprachunterricht, June 8, 1966; SAPMO-BArch, DR 3/5938, Herder-Institut der KMU Leipzig, Perspektivplan 1966/70.

97 For this tradition see Aleya Khattab, "Deutsch in Ägypten," in *Deutsch als Fremd- und Zweitsprache. Ein internationales Handbuch*, ed. Hans-Jürgen Krumm (Berlin, New York: De Gruyter, 2010), 1602–1606.

Egypt under Nasser was on its own path of socialist development and maintained close relationships with the USSR and other socialist countries. Like many non-aligned Third World countries it carefully avoided to choose one side in East West Cold War competition but rather followed its own agenda and interests. The increasingly strong relations with the socialist GDR fit into this pattern. From the Egyptian side they might have been a result of practical and strategic considerations rather than an expression of deeply felt socialist solidarity. Ideological consensus with the GDR was most likely to be found in Egypt's pronounced anti-imperialism.

Solidarity between the GDR and Egypt is perhaps better understood if it is seen not so much as political or economic altruism. Both states were interested in meeting at eye level and wanted to benefit from the exchange. This anti-imperialist win-win situation may not always have existed in practice. Nevertheless, it shaped the decisions on both sides. The East-West side of the triangular relationship described in this chapter was not central for Egypt, but system competition between East and West Germany was used by Egyptian actors to deal with both sides successfully. This is also reflected in the German-German struggle for sovereignty over the teaching of German and the changing reactions of Egyptian actors, be they learners, teachers or political functionaries, which determined the scope of action of the two German states.

In retrospect, however, the decisive question is not whether "Herder" or "Goethe" won the German-German competition in Egypt. Rather, we are challenged to examine a facet of the conflicts in the Cold War. We see the economically unequal two German states competing in one of the leading countries of the Third World movement, without diplomatic recognition by this country and at eye level to each other. We see them engaging in their tough and sometimes seemingly ridiculous cultural struggle over who should be allowed to teach German to Egyptian interested parties. German-German competition had an important side effect on the genesis and institutionalization of the subject of German as a foreign language in East Germany and subsequently also in West Germany. This shows that external missions of projecting cultural soft power in the Global South sometimes had stronger effects on the northern cultural missionaries themselves than on their southern counterparts.

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3

Competing Visions: KSU, its Activities, and Nationalism

Christian Alvarado

"We Beg to Remain in the Name of Harambee!"[2]

Situated above the signatures of the newly-minted executive committee, this phrase concludes the first official record of correspondence of the Kenya Students Union (KSU) in the German Democratic Republic (GDR). At the core of this phrase was a request: to retain, and in some ways expand, the nature of their status as Kenyan students studying abroad while also articulating a more robust and charged vision of the significance of their education to the nation-building program at home. Dated October 1, 1964, the letter was addressed to none other than Prime Minister Jomo Kenyatta himself. In naming *harambee* (a Kiswahili term typically translated as "pull[ing] together") the authors invoked the official rhetoric of the nascent Kenyatta regime, which had the year prior began using the term as "an appeal not only for self-help but for national unity as well."[3] The purpose of the KSU's letter was to notify the independent Kenyan government, only a year and some months old at this point, of the formation of a new students' union whose membership was open to all Kenyans studying in the GDR.

The KSU was not the first students' union to service Kenyans studying in East Germany. It is unclear in the historical record exactly when and how the Kenyan students whose lives this chapter explores had arrived in their respective

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1 I am extremely grateful to Immanuel R. Harisch and Dr. Eric Burton, whose generous insight has played a central role in shaping this chapter. Their own research, tireless and careful reviews of drafts of this piece, and recommendation of wonderful literature on the topic has benefited my work enormously. Any errors that might present are, of course, the responsibility of none other than myself. I would also like to thank The Humanities Institute at UC Santa Cruz for their generous support of this research, without which it would have been impossible.

2 "Announcement of the Kenya Students Union in the GDR," October 1, 1964, XJ/12/24, Kenya Students Union in East Germany, Kenya National Archives, Nairobi, Kenya (henceforth "KNA").

3 Robert Maxon, "Social & Cultural Changes," in *Decolonization and Independence in Kenya*, ed. B.A. Ogot and W.R. Ochieng (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1995), 137.

Eastern European host countries, but their arrival likely followed established routes taken by African students embarking for Europe during this period. To this end, Eric Burton has shown that, in general: "In the 1950s and early 1960s, South-East travels were shaped to a large extent by individual agency as a variety of trade unions, political parties, and other non-state organisations were involved in sending and receiving students and some even came on their own accord."[4] It may well be that, like their Tanzanian counterparts, these students arrived via the so-called "Nile route," "which East Africans used to get from Uganda to Sudan and Cairo, and from there to the Eastern bloc."[5] What can be said with certainty is that in East Germany a group called the Kenya Students Association (henceforth: KSA-GDR) had been founded as early as 1960 to organize and serve such students, and was chaired by a student of political economy named Owilla Olwa.[6] This organization was relatively short-lived, and by 1964 found itself marginalized within the student union landscape in the GDR. In fact, the KSU was to be a consolidation of sorts, the product of political pressure exerted by the government of the GDR who had pushed for the older union "to dissolve and join the KSU, preserving a 'united front'."[7] The dissolution of the KSA-GDR and the establishment of the KSU was also tied to domestic politics in Kenya. "By this point," writes Sara Pugach, the Kenya African National Union (KANU) "was also fracturing internally, as leading figures Jomo Kenyatta, the country's president, and Oginga Odinga, its vice president, were increasingly at odds with each other."[8]

That Kenyatta and Odinga were at odds with each other during this period puts it mildly, and the ramifications of political tensions in Nairobi extended far beyond the borders of Kenya. Contemporary observers cited the ethnic composition of both the KSU and the KSA-GDR as an extension of political strife at home, with the latter's leadership having been dominated by Luo students, the ethnic group with which Odinga was also affiliated. The creation of the KSU was thus a project responsive to the political landscapes of both the GDR and Kenya, each of which viewed student exchange programs as an aspect of diplomatic and

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4 Eric Burton, "Navigating Global Socialism: Tanzanian Students in and beyond East Germany," *Cold War History* 19 (2019): 67.

5 Eric Burton, "Decolonization, the Cold War, and Africans' Routes to Higher Education Overseas, 1957–65," *The Journal of Global History* 15 (2020): 175.

6 Sara Pugach, "Agents of Dissent: African Student Organizations in the German Democratic Republic," *Africa* 89 (2019): 98–99.

7 Pugach, "Agents of Dissent," 101.

8 Pugach, "Agents of Dissent," 99.

foreign policy.[9] Moreover, it is worth noting that Kenyan students now studying in Eastern Europe were profoundly shaped by their earlier lives, particularly childhoods lived during the Mau Mau era and the waning days of British colonialism. Thus, these students found themselves situated between not only the distinct racialized landscapes of the late British Empire and the GDR, but also the domestic political and social dynamics of the country they planned to return to.

The archival materials upon which this chapter is based are quite limited, consisting largely of partial records of correspondence and internal government documents, a number of which have no clear authorship.[10] As one can imagine, the limitations of such an archive leave a great many questions unaddressed. Moreover, the inclusion of a chapter about Kenyan students in a volume focused on the history of exchanges between African societies and the GDR raises certain questions of its own. Despite the Kenyatta regime aligning itself explicitly with an ideal of "democratic African socialism" after independence, the Kenyan state consistently managed to cultivate the reputation of being both pro-Western and friendly to capitalist interests, be they Kenyan or foreign. "Despite the rhetoric of non-alignment and African Socialism," writes Branch, "Kenyatta's government was generally pro-West and pro-capitalism."[11] The period of study encompasses a time when Kenyatta and his allies successfully suppressed political opposition from the left. Indeed, by the early days of 1966 Kenyatta had effectively ousted Odinga (who harbored socialist and Maoist sympathies) from structural political influence. Thus, a chapter examining Kenyan students studying in Eastern Europe (particularly one based on rather sparse materials) appears odd on multiple fronts. I will argue, however, that it is precisely this position of these students, existing in a liminal space both in their host country and the one they called home, which makes their story particularly valuable for historians of decolonization and developmentalism.

Among other important threads, examining the experiences of these students troubles the orthodox historical ontologies about the relationship of African states and professional networks to the global Cold War, and ultimately allows for a better understanding of the contingencies of African lives during this period. This historiographical bias is nowhere clearer than in the relatively exten-

9 For more on the role of these programs in the realm of foreign policy, see Paul Kibiwott Kurgat, "Education as a Foreign Policy Tool: Kenyan Students' Airlifts to the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Eastern Europe, 1954–1991" (PhD Diss., Moi University, 2013).
10 As much as possible, I have identified documents which reflect these absences and partialities in their corresponding footnotes, including the maximum amount of information available.
11 Daniel Branch, *Kenya: Between Hope and Despair, 1963–2011* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2011), 38.

sive amount of literature focusing on the "student airlift" coordinated by Tom Mboya and the John F. Kennedy administration, a program which shepherded hundreds of Kenyan students (including Barack Obama Sr.) to universities in the United States. Rather than reproduce such dualistic historiographical alignments, this chapter follows to an extent Marcia Schenck's articulation of "the term 'Black East' to denote the lived reality of a Black diasporic network in East Germany (German Democratic Republic, GDR) and beyond. This African diaspora owed its existence to socialist entanglements."[12] The trajectories of the students in this chapter highlight the importance of questioning the ways in which broad, national "ideological alignments" can overdetermine the manner in which we approach African intellectual history, and also show how ambiguous Kenyan futurity was felt to be during the early days of an independent Kenya. Moreover, by examining students' experiences in both the GDR and non-aligned Yugoslavia, this chapter demonstrates that a shared set of concerns and ideas existed for Kenyans completing their studies outside of more favored universities in Europe and the United States.[13] These were, broadly-speaking, the ability to play a meaningful role in Kenyan society after returning home and a sharp awareness of the significance of the cultural dimensions of national consciousness. In order to explore the significance of this dual desire, this chapter situates the KSU in the GDR in relation to both the domestic project of Kenyan nationalism and the student unions' distinct Eastern European contexts. It also examines a sister organization (a different "Kenyan Students Association," henceforth KSA-Y) which operated during roughly the same period in Yugoslavia, with the analytical aim of exploring how similar concerns were expressed in different contexts across socialist Europe.

The KSU, its Activities, and the Project of Kenyan Nationalism

The KSU in the GDR operated from 1964 to late-1967, primarily as an organization attempting to provide a bridge between Kenyan students studying in their host

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12 Marcia C. Schenck, "Constructing and Deconstructing the 'Black East' – A Helpful Research Agenda?", *Stichproben. Vienna Journal of African Studies* 34 (2018): 136.

13 For more on the hierarchy imposed upon degrees according to geography see Eric Burton, "African Manpower Development during the Cold War: The Case of Tanzanian Students in the Two German States," in *Africa Research in Austria: Approaches and Perspectives*, ed. Andreas Exenberger and Ulrich Pallua (Innsbruck: Innsbruck University Press, 2016): 111–113.

country and the government at home. Its activities were most robust during the first two years of its existence, when it worked to gather information on its members in an effort to provide the Kenyan Ministry of Education with details that might allow them to facilitate employment after students completed their studies. Yet the KSU was also viewed by its members as a cultural institution, hosting Independence Day celebrations and attempting to gain access to media produced in Kenya to showcase in the GDR. It is these socio-cultural dimensions of the union that are the primary focus of this chapter, as they not only expand our understanding of the visions Kenyans studying abroad had for their country, but also highlight how these students challenged dual processes of objectification: on the one hand as commodified workers by their home government, and on the other as racialized subjects in European locales.[14]

One year after Kenya's national independence in 1963, both fluid imaginaries of what the postcolonial state could be and the nascent status of postcolonial Kenyan state ideology played pivotal roles in shaping the KSU as a political and educational formation. The tensions that existed between Kenyatta and his allies in relation to Odinga and his necessitated the careful and strategic crafting of union rhetoric about its function and operations.[15] The KSU's displacement of the earlier KSA-GDR (not to mention political strife at home) contributed to a deep and protracted emphasis on rhetoric of unity on the part of the organization, in the service of which terms in both Kiswahili and English were deployed. "Under stable Government," wrote the KSU in an early communiqué, "we feel then that we should mobilize and employ the energies of all sections of such Unity, as we took it as a noble cause everyone to consider it a privilege and duty to unite on a national basis."[16] Here, the organization positioned itself relative to the Kenyatta administration through its articulation of the "privilege" and "duties" which came with being an aspiring member of the Kenyan intelligentsia. It also suggests that, despite the fact of their studying in the GDR, it was their loyalty to Kenya that held central importance, rather than any international

14 The racialized experience of African students studying in the GDR has been explored in depth by (among others) Sara Pugach. For more, see Sara Pugach, "African Students and the Politics of Race and Gender in the German Democratic Republic," in *Comrades of Color: East Germany in the Cold War World*, ed. Quinn Slobodian (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015).

15 For readers interested in exploring these tensions more thoroughly, see Oginga Odinga, *Not Yet Uhuru: The Autobiography of Oginga Odinga* (London: Heineman, 1968); Tom Mboya, *Freedom and After* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1963); Poppy Cullen, "'Playing Cold War Politics': the Cold War in Anglo-Kenyan relations in the 1960s," in *Cold War History* 18 (2018).

16 "Announcement of the Kenya Students Union in the GDR," October 1, 1964, XJ/12/24, KNA. No individual author listed.

allegiance. This was, however, no simple act of pandering to the administration or a demonstration of blind and uncritical loyalty. It was tempered by laying claim to a more robust role within the project of Kenyan nation-building than had previously been offered to students in the KSU. In the same letter from October 1, 1964 mentioned above, union leadership wrote:

> the Kenya Students Union, a body consisting of both the students and the apprentices [in the GDR], so as to find out the solutions in which to implement to our constituted task in a sense of strengthening our Unity and at the same time promote our Studentship-talents in order to reflect Kenya in a lively way to the rest of the Students from different Nations as well as to the friendly country which are our hosts while abroad.[17]

While the letter goes on to outline a variety of more concrete and administrative functions of the KSU, the rhetorical emphasis on the notion of national unity is maintained throughout. So too is the idea that these students were to play a part in both the "strengthening of our Unity" and the effort to reflect Kenya "in a lively way" – this latter phrase targeting not only East Germans, but also students hailing from other European, Asian, and African nations. This sentiment was also expressed in other terms which explicitly underscored the importance of presenting Kenya as a nation among nations, rather than the mythologized entity which was the product of coverage of Mau Mau in international media. "The Kenya students in the GDR," wrote Secretary Mbianu in May of 1965, "are now about or more than 100 as the list of the Kenya Students Union shows, and we would like to participate in any Kenya National day so as to reflect Kenya as the other students from other nations do, but the arrangement of such celebrations or meetings come late and of course inadequate furthermore from too much toil."[18] This critique of the Kenyan government's unwillingness to provide support for such activities will be returned to later. For now, I wish to highlight the emphasis on national identity and unity manifested primarily through its deployment of three terms: *uhuru*, *harambee*, and "unity" itself. The first two of these, both Kiswahili, were often used in a largely symbolic manner. While they did appear within prose penned by the KSU and its members, they manifest far more frequently in signing phrases, letterhead, stamps, and to articulate particular ideas or claims to the official rhetoric of Kenyan nation-building.

"The *Uhuru* of Kenya," writes the KSU, "is no more than a prelude to the mobilization of our energies and resources aimed at freeing ourselves from hunger,

17 "Announcement of the Kenya Students Union in the GDR," October 1, 1964, XJ/12/24, KNA. No individual author listed.

18 Miano, Mburu, "General/5/65," May 1965, KNA.

sickness, ignorance and divisionism, etc."[19] Here, the usage of *uhuru* seems to refer specifically to formal independence as an epoch-making stage (thus its ability to serve as a "prelude"). It is used in exactly such a way elsewhere in both KSU correspondence and contemporary Kenyan political discourse more generally. Yet it is noteworthy that this understanding of the concept would make other appearances within the KSU's own time, perhaps most notably in the very title of Odinga's 1968 autobiography and critique of the Kenyan postcolonial order: *Not Yet Uhuru*.[20] Indeed, the very title of this work can be thought of in contrast to Tom Mboya's proximate work *Freedom and After*. Daniel Speich suggests that in terms of the competing political visions which dominated contemporary Kenyan thought, "the two positions are reflected in the titles of the autobiographies of the two leading politicians."[21] In other words, whether or not the country had achieved a state of *uhuru* at all remained the subject of debate throughout the 1960s (and, indeed, long afterward). While both of these usages are clearly situated within the register of national unity, they require us to think about whether a given group of Kenyans would have understood *uhuru* as having been attained with formal independence (as argued by the likes of Kenyatta and Mboya) or as something remaining to be actually realized through the destruction of what we might now identify as the neocolonial order (the perspective held by Odinga). In sum, such usages imply that the definitional status of even the most core of the organizing concepts of postcolonial Kenya were fundamentally dynamic and political, a crucial point for considering the rhetoric and experiences of Kenyan students in Eastern Europe.

Though less explicitly reliant on the stagist underpinnings of the KSU's deployment of *uhuru*, *harambee* functions in much the same politically-dynamic manner within the union's rhetoric and was also articulated to the ideal of national unity. Like *uhuru*, it is often positioned ambiguously, possibly to the end of allowing readers at the Ministry of Education to interpret it in whatever way might be most favorable to union interests (a wise maneuver in a time of tumultuous domestic politics). Typically translated as "pulling together", *harambee* held a high currency within the KSU's correspondence. This is most notable in the phrase "In the Spirit of *Harambee*," which official KSU correspondence often concluded with. On September 21, 1963, the eve of Kenyatta's departure for London to negotiate the formal process of Kenyan independence, he spoke these words: "The new era that Kenya will enter as an Independent nation—in

19 Miano, Mburu, "General/5/65," May 1965, KNA.
20 Odinga, *Not Yet Uhuru*.
21 Daniel Speich, "The Kenyan Style of 'African Socialism': Developmental Knowledge Claims and the Explanatory Limits of the Cold War," *Diplomatic History* 33 (2009): 454.

the spirit of '*harambee*'—in December, is one which will call for dedication, hard work and unity."[22] From here, "the spirit of *harambee*" came to be a foundational concept upon which the Kenyan postcolonial order was constructed. "Pulling together" meant an attempt to manufacture a national whole from diverse and often contentious ethnic, racial, religious, and class identities. Yet even Jomo Kenyatta himself employed a notoriously slippery and vague usage of the term. In the fall of 1964, for example, he expounded on the concept at a rally by stating: "Unless the country can help itself, then it cannot develop. We must make systematic efforts to harness the spirit of self-help, and of national unity."[23] At the level of quotidian political discourse, this vagueness left open the possibility for Kenyans to articulate this concept as they saw fit. It is worth noting here that, from the earliest days of KANU, *harambee* had been connected to another phrase ("Freedom and Work" or *Uhuru na Kazi*) and conveyed a strong overtone of capitalist-oriented economic achievement.[24] Still, through the persistent invocation of the term it is reasonable to suggest that the KSU attempted to position itself as responding to the call to "harness the spirit of self-help" through serving as embodiments of Kenya abroad, rather than serving flatly as an economic resource for "the nation" as understood by the top officials of the Kenyan state.

Most frequently deployed in the actual prose of KSU communications, however, is the word "unity" itself. It often reads as almost interchangeable with *harambee*, signaling many of the same semiotic dimensions as its Kiswahili counterpart. "The future of us and of Kenya is for Kenyans to plan," wrote the KSU in October 1964, "and our judgement shall be our destiny. The Union will take a colossal measure against individualists and sectionalists, who may, in any way attempt to curtail such Unity."[25] Here, the deployment of "unity" harbors a sharp political edge. And, yet again, we see an appeal to national cohesion by Luo students during a time when tensions were flaring between Kenyatta and Odinga, and indeed between Kikuyu and Luo communities. Like *harambee*, "unity" was a core ideological concept in the service of which the KSU imagined itself as playing a crucial role. In the context of the power struggle between Kenyatta and Odinga at home, as well as the "divisionism" that had characterized the brief life of the KSA-GDR, the salience of such an emphasis on rhetoric of

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22 Jomo Kenyatta. *Harambee!: The Prime Minister of Kenya's Speeches 1963–1964*, ed. Anthony Cullen (London: Oxford University Press, 1964), 12.

23 Kenyatta, *Harambee!*, 12.

24 Branch, *Between Hope and Despair*, 248.

25 "Announcement of the Kenya Students Union in the GDR," October 1, 1964, KNA. No individual author listed.

unity is clear. The KSU sought to position itself as an organization whose aim was to represent Kenya as a united nation as much as, if not more than, it was concerned with the individual academic achievements of its members.

Together, the KSU's deployment of *uhuru*, *harambee*, and the rhetorics of unity more generally suggests that the union considered itself to be facilitating not only the economic advancement of the home country but also the articulation of the broader, markedly cultural dimensions of a Kenyan national identity. Also noteworthy in this regard is the characterization of the intellectual composition of the KSU; both "students" at universities and "apprentices" at technical and vocational schools were eligible for membership and were considered equal members, at least in formal terms. This voicing of solidarity across the lines of class and status appealed to different rhetorical registers. Explored further below, one such example is the organization's positioning of itself under the banner of "African Democratic Socialism,"[26] though it is not further clarified in the archived correspondence what this orientation entailed for the KSU membership. Yet the union did far more than situate itself rhetorically as an integral component of the Kenyan postcolonial project; it necessarily pressed beyond this as it found its way through serving as the primary facilitator of relations between students studying abroad and their home government.

In organizational terms, the KSU positioned itself to play a significant role both in serving as an intermediary for communication between students studying in the GDR and the Ministry of Education in Kenya as well as in providing practical services to its members. This entailed a variety of distinct activities, including but not limited to: petitioning for increased levels of student funding from their home government, keeping track of the courses of study its members were pursuing, updating the Ministry in Kenya on conditions of life in the GDR, working to secure employment following the completion of students' degrees, and a host of miscellaneous administrative practicalities.[27] The KSU thus simultaneously served a reporting function and advocated, though often in vain, for remedies that would address particular problems faced by Kenyan students in the GDR. Perhaps the most emblematic examples of such a function were the efforts at tracking the experiences and courses of study for the 125–odd students present in the country during 1965. These efforts simultaneously highlight both

26 On Kenya's African socialism see, more generally, Speich, "The Kenyan Style of 'African Socialism'".

27 While allusions to forms of documentation such as those listed here are frequent in the papers of the KSU and KSA-Y, I have thus far been unable to locate many of them in archival collections.

the urgency of the KSU's requests and the immense difficulties involved in information gathering faced by the organization.

Throughout 1965, Mburu Miano, as the General Secretary of the KSU, made numerous appeals to the Ministry of Education in Kenya for both higher levels of pecuniary assistance and more robust efforts toward securing positions of employment in Kenya following the completion of students' studies. J.R. Sheffield, a prominent figure in the Ministry in Kenya, eventually responded to Miano's requests: "I am also enclosing under separate cover 150 record forms which you requested. We will be very grateful for your assistance in this important exercise since an accurate registry will help government planners and will help you and your colleagues find suitable employment upon completion of your studies."[28] While it appears that Miano did indeed undertake extensive attempts to gather the information requested (which included courses of study, institutional affiliation, and expected year of completion), his efforts ultimately bore little fruit. "I, the Secretary of the Union," Miano replied to Sheffield, "wrote to all students and supplied all copies (each to everyone) to them, but sorry to say that only 15 copies have been successfully filed and we hope to see many filled and dispatched to you soon."[29] This level of student response, no doubt at least in part a product of both the dispersion of students throughout the GDR and unsystematic paths taken by students to reach the country, is typical of such efforts conducted by the KSU during its existence.

Like student unions in the present, these types of activities (and the accompanying drudgeries of bureaucracy) were no small part of the KSU's activities, and in fact constituted the bulk of the labor performed by union leadership. Yet these administrative functions would have played a relatively limited role in shaping understandings of the KSU for the union rank-and-file. For them, interacting with the KSU primarily meant two things. First, filling out forms and paperwork (such as that lamented by Miano above) that provided insight for the government as to the courses of study of Kenyan students abroad. Another function seemed equally prominent, and indeed appears even more frequently than the information gathering efforts undertaken by the KSU: making requests for and receiving news and cultural materials from home by way of the Kenyan government. These types of resources were typically extremely limited. For example, after receiving a KSU request for 125 copies of a periodical titled *Kenya Calling*, the Ministry of Education responded: "We will only send you 50 copies of this publication which we think would be sufficient if students living together

28 "Letter to Mburu Miano from J. R. Sheffield," December 9, 1965, XJ/12/24, KNA.
29 "Letter to J. R. Sheffield from Mburu Miano," February 26, 1966, XJ/12/24, KNA.

shared the copies."[30] This was a solution proposed by the Ministry in Kenya without knowing even such basic information as whether it was the case that Kenyan students actually did live together, as housing arrangements varied by locale and student background.

Responses such as this suggest that, in large part, non-board members of the KSU would likely have interfaced in a very limited way with their home government, and on the occasions when they did (such as receiving copies of Kenyan periodicals or gathering personal information) faced an ambivalent ministry interested only in the nature of their studies and the occasional dissemination of extremely sparse resources. In the union's own phrasing: "Kenya Students take their different courses in different institutions of learning, but it seems to them, that, the Ministry of Education in Kenya never establish [sic] contacts with them."[31] The overarching sentiment was, then, that the home government seemed to have little interest in interacting with Kenyan students abroad and even less in assisting with the coordination of events not deemed to be properly "educational." For example, in response to the KSU's letter announcing the foundation of the organization and requests for pecuniary support of an upcoming national independence celebration, an administrator named D.K. Ngini wrote in an internal Ministry of Education circular: "I do feel that if the students want to qualify as well and as widely as they can as a stepping stone towards contributing to the Kenya Nation building, the best course is for them to concentrate primarily on their studies."[32]

Kenyan students in the GDR had other aims, even if the project of nation-building remained the ultimate guiding star. Taking seriously the intervention that the organization understood itself to be making by "reflecting Kenya in a lively way" allows for a reading of the KSU as consciously serving a pedagogical function. By describing it as an organization seeking to project a lively vision of Kenya to other students and comrades in the GDR more generally, union leadership explicitly positioned the organization as disruptive of what, by extension, must have been felt to be a static and problematic conception of life in Kenya. This is perhaps unsurprising, given the temporal proximity of the KSU to the events of the Mau Mau Emergency, during which a great deal of European media coverage had presented Kenya as a place rife with tribal antagonisms and "primitive" traditions.[33] And, while the narratives about the rebellion that

30 "Correspondence from J. H. Wanyoike to Mburu Miano," December 15, 1965, XJ/12/24, KNA.
31 "Correspondence from KSU to Ministry of Education," May 1965, XJ/12/24, KNA.
32 "Circular written by D. K. Ngini," October 28, 1964, XJ/12/24, KNA.
33 See, for example, Melissa Tully, "All's Well in the Colony: Newspaper Coverage of the Mau Mau Movement, 1952–56," in *Narrating War and Peace in Africa*, ed. Toyin Falola and Hetty ter

circulated in the socialist world were certainly different than those in the West, abstractions about Africa and Africanness fundamentally informed each. We might think about the KSU, then, as having understood themselves to be making a crucial correction to the narratives about Kenya that circulated in the Eastern Bloc, and perhaps Europe more generally. Moreover, the KSU's consistent appeals to national unity implies a connection between the ideological construction of Kenya as a cultural and national entity and the unique position that Kenyans studying abroad considered themselves as inhabiting: ambassadors of a certain sort.

In this light, requests for Kenyan-produced ephemera and cultural materials (and in particular films, as will be explored further later) were viewed as a means of disrupting residual mythologies attached to Kenyanness. And while I am unaware of any existing scholarship examining media representations of Mau Mau specifically in the GDR, the fact that Kenyans expressed similar sentiments in other European spaces (coupled with Pugach's work on racialization in East Germany) lends credibility to the idea that these students viewed themselves as doing a certain type of ideological work. The pedagogical core here, then, was an attempt to intervene in the channels through which information about Kenyan society in the wake of independence travelled. Moreover, this was an intervention that would present Kenya as a united and "modern" nation with the right to control its own destiny, an understandably common sentiment in the rhetoric of many African people and states in the 1960s. When the KSU positioned itself "against individualists and sectionalists, who may, in any way attempt to curtail such Unity," it did so as a means of positioning itself squarely within this national destiny.[34] Again, the idea that the Union could be a force for remedying the divisionism that had plagued both the student community in the GDR and the political landscape at home is made manifest. The KSU was thus ultimately an organization with a membership that conceived of itself as a group of politically-conscious students who sought to influence both the articulation of national identity and, in addition, the future role of Kenyans who accessed higher education in socialist Europe.

Haar (Rochester, NY: University of Rochester Press, 2010); A.S. Cleary, "The Myth of Mau Mau in its International Context," in *African Affairs* 89 (1990).

34 "Announcement of the Kenya Students Union in the GDR," October 1, 1964, KNA. No individual author listed.

Competing Visions: The Idea of Education in the KSU

In recent years, educational trajectories of Africans sojourning in the socialist world—like the GDR—have been the subject of much interest, as the compilation of this volume itself attests to.[35] With regard to the GDR's own articulation of these programs, Tanja R. Müller's recent monograph *Legacies of Socialist Solidarity* traces the contours of the complex ways in which the hegemonic ideological ethos of the GDR drew from the rhetorical registers of socialist internationalism in its construction of policies targeting relations with African states.[36] Recent work such as Müller's underscores the centrality of discourses of "development" within contemporary socialist thought. The concept has also been explored deeply within Africanist postcolonial theory, and importantly by V.Y. Mudimbe. Mudimbe has written extensively about the teleological nature of the notion of development in postcolonial Africa, calling particular attention to its ubiquity within political rhetoric across the continent. In *The Invention of Africa*, he goes so far as to agree with B. Vergaegan's characterization of this line of thinking as a "theology of development."[37] The GDR's emphasis on development should thus also be understood in relation to the concept's even greater salience for postcolonial Kenya, for whom the stakes of implementing any notion of development were felt to be far higher and operated at exactly such a quasi-theological level. The Kenyan Ministry of Education's emphasis on development, and its relation to the very idea of "education," was predicated on an understanding of education as the production of skilled "manpower."[38] Here, it is worth draw-

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35 See, for example, Eric Burton, "Journeys of Education and Struggle: African Mobility in Times of Decolonization and the Cold War," *Stichproben. Vienna Journal of African Studies* 34 (2018): 1–17; Marcia C. Schenck. "Negotiating the German Democratic Republic: Angolan Student Migration during the Cold War, 1976–90," Africa 89 (2019); for more on African students in Yugoslavia see Nedžad Kuč, "Southern African Students in Southeast Europe: Education and Experiences in 1960s Yugoslavia," in *Southern African Liberation Movements and the Global Cold War 'East': Transnational Activism 1960–1990*, ed. Lena Dallywater, Chris Saunders, and Helder Adegar Fonseca (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2019).

36 Tanja Müller, *Legacies of Socialist Solidarity: East Germany in Mozambique* (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2014).

37 V. Y. Mudimbe, *The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1988), 179.

38 Elsewhere, Eric Burton has explored Tanzanian discourses of "manpower" and their relationship to both the creation of an elite and positioning of education as a consumable good. For more on this, see Burton, "African Manpower Development".

ing upon the KSU's peers studying in Yugoslavia during the same period. In a 1967 exchange with the KSA-Y, for example, J.R. Sheffield wrote that: "As part of the government's programme of manpower planning and Kenyanization of both the public and private sectors, it is extremely important for us to know the supply of high-level manpower which will be returning from study overseas."[39] As we will see, the members of the KSA-Y were not particularly fond of such a one-dimensional understanding of what, exactly, their "education" was to be. Moreover, each organization rejected (sometimes explicitly, but more frequently tacitly) the purpose of an education abroad being articulated within the relatively narrow project of "Kenyanizing" the national economy.[40]

In broad strokes, during the years the KSU was active—from 1964 to 1968—the Kenyan government thus pursued an educational policy primarily concerned with increasing its intellectual manpower while students such as those involved in the union conceived their studies abroad as both this and the work of consciousness-raising. The emphasis on political consciousness was stated often and clearly by the organization. In fact, the emphasis on "consciousness" as an organizing concept more generally played an important role in the KSU's intellectual framing. In their foundational letter to Kenyatta referenced above we read that: "The Union has brought Students to the consciousness that the stage is now set for us to embark upon the next phase in our struggle for advancement."[41] Here, the relationship of students to "consciousness" functions within a somewhat stagist vision of historical development. As seen above, formal *uhuru* had served as a "prelude" which had allowed for the emergence of such a consciousness. KSU leadership insinuates that, once attained by themselves, it was the task of intellectuals such as those in the union (regardless of their field of study) to assist in proliferating political consciousness throughout the Kenyan social fabric. When considered in relation to their outline of the functions of the KSU, it is evident that the notion of "advancement" held by union members exceeded the instrumentalizing, flatly economic one being pur-

39 "Letter to the President, Kenya Students Association in Yugoslavia from J.R. Sheffield," May 25, 1967, XJ/12/28, Kenya Students Association in Yugoslavia, KNA.

40 Of course, the critique that the simple replacement of white colonial administrators with Africans did little to disrupt the political economy of colonialism was common in socialist thought of the era. Indeed, few political leaders in Kenya expressed this concern more frequently than Odinga. This perspective could also suggest the possibility that students in socialist Europe had perhaps taken some of their "ideological training" more seriously than has typically been thought to be the case, as such ideas certainly would have circulated in classrooms discussing Marxist theory and left politics.

41 "Announcement of the Kenya Students Union in the GDR," October 1, 1964, KNA. No individual author listed.

sued by the Kenyan state. It included the role of the intelligentsia as a cultural vanguard. However, this type of function implied activities which the Ministry in Kenya was skeptical of students abroad pursuing. Moreover, the expression of this idea was also rather subtle, perhaps due to the possibility that any perceived affiliation with communist politics would have jeopardized the position of students who returned to an increasingly pro-capitalist Kenyan state.

The differences between visions of the role of the educated Kenyan was a constant site of contestation along with allegations of underfunding, poor communication, and general mismanagement.[42] What underwrote all of these tensions were two different (if deeply-entangled) conceptions of the idea of "education," what such a concept entailed and the role the foreign-educated Kenyan would play after returning home. In other words, this represented a continuous and extensive debate about the relationship between contested ideas of education within the Kenyatta regime's project of *harambee*. These contestations found themselves expressed in a variety of ways, but few were felt as acutely by KSU students as that of entering a status of commodified intellectual-laborers, toward which the state took an attitude at once ambivalent and instrumentalizing in ethos. This was not a sentiment restricted to students in the GDR, and indeed Kenyans in other European locales articulated it far more explicitly than through the "consciousness-raising" rhetoric of the KSU.

From a comparative standpoint, the KSA-Y alleged in a similar manner of their primary Ministry of Education contact that "he considers us as just 'mere trading instruments.'"[43] This was a perspective that understood the instrumentalization of students in two ways: as both pawns in international diplomacy as well as fungible workers crafted solely for the smooth operation of the postcolonial order in Kenya. The expression of such a sentiment across two different Eastern European contexts, each explicitly socialist in orientation, is intriguing. Whether couched in the affirmative terms of political unity or articulated through direct critique, it seems evident that both the KSU and the KSA-Y hoped for a far more robust vision of the role to be played by Kenyans educated in socialist Eu-

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42 Employment following the completion of one's course of study was a particularly robust point of concern. A general lack of communication and mismanagement in this regard produced sentiments such as the following, merely one of dozens of such inquiries: "We would like to know our positions towards our communal aim in Kenya, that is relationship between qualified manpower and Ministry of Education, at the same time Ministries which offer employment and other institutions." ("Letter to Mr. G. R. M'Mwirichia from Mburu Miano," November 5, 1965, XJ/12/24, KNA).

43 "Letter to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Education from George S. Owuor and Arthur K. Owuor," February 3, 1966, XJ/12/28, KNA.

rope than was held by the Ministry of Education in Kenya. More preferable for these students was a position as harbingers of an improvement in economic circumstances, the disruptors of European mythologies about Kenya, and the articulation of an African socialist politics (however imprecisely it was defined) all at once.

Aside from direct statements—such as Ngini's insistence that "the best course is for them to concentrate primarily on their studies"[44]—the Kenyan government's aversion to student activities not considered to be part of their education-proper was expressed through the consistent rejection or inadequate fulfillment of requests for the financial support of cultural events. In a letter from November of 1965, the KSU made an appeal to the Ministry of Education in Kenya for pecuniary and material support to fund a string of events celebrating the second anniversary of Kenyan national independence. They made their case on the grounds that: "The matter of facts [sic] is that, KSU represents an image of Kenya in the front line in celebrations, advertisements, speeches and in newspapers during such national occasions."[45] This, they argued, meant that their home government had both a responsibility and a vested interest to support their activities. The response the KSU received from the Ministry was disheartening (to put it mildly) and summarized in one line: "Unfortunately, our budget does not permit our support of groups such as yours."[46] While this position loosened over time and small requests were granted on occasion, the government's assertion that they bore no real responsibility for supporting student groups focused on cultural activities and consciousness-raising remained a site of contention throughout the history of KSU-governmental relations. Thus, while the Ministry of Education in Kenya consistently displayed a preoccupation with tracking and managing the production of "manpower," they showed far less in taking seriously the political and ideological dimensions of the KSU's activities.

While visions of corrective approaches to this problem are rarely explicit, the KSU's emphasis on unity and the positioning of their organization as a cultural vanguard is telling. By articulating themselves as central to the cultural dimensions of Kenyan nationalism, it is clear that they envisioned a position relative to the Kenyan nation-building project that exceeded a status as commodified (if educated and well-paid) labor. Exacerbating this was a perception that their colleagues studying in other locales did not experience such frustrations as acutely. Daniel Branch argues that:

44 "Circular by D. K. Ngini," KNA.
45 "Correspondence from Mburu Miano to G.R. M'Mwirichia," November 5, 1965, XJ/12/24, KNA.
46 "Letter to J.R. Sheffield from Mburu Miano," KNA.

> [Students who studied in socialist Europe] expected to be the nation-builders, the economic planners and technocrats at the heart of the process of state-formation. But they found themselves excluded from the vital early stages of this process, marginalized in favour of their contemporaries who studied in Kenya itself, neighbouring Uganda, the UK and, particularly, the USA.[47]

Kenyan students in the GDR and Yugoslavia were no exception. They each had a record of communicating this precise frustration to their home government. In the KSU's phrasing: "It is to the benefit of Kenya as a Nation to see to it that, those students qualifying themselves in various fields of studies receive equal eligibility as those others in other parts of the globe."[48] The KSU's rhetoric thus suggests something of a dual-mandate for their home government: they hoped to be involved in the cultural and political dimensions of nation-building while simultaneously expressing their right to the same economic positions as Kenyan students studying in other foreign countries. Given that degrees from the "Second World" were often perceived by African governments as "second class" degrees, the KSU's request clearly demanded a position of equality in this regard.[49]

The understanding of education held by the Kenyan state thus existed in a state of deep tension with that of an organization such as the KSU, which was tacitly expressed in its foundational mission and conceptual ethos. The government's mission of creating a class of educated clerks and administrators who would serve as so many parts in the machinery of the Kenyan economic structure was a far cry from the understanding of education articulated within the cultural dimensions of KSU rhetoric, which did not shy away from fiery language. This rhetorical style was, however, tempered in order to reaffirm the organization's commitment to supporting KANU:

> We are in the mind that Party is the rallying-point of our political activities and such, we support every measure to lead to a stability of Kenya African National Union, in order to maintain African personality of every-man-Jack in both politics and economics which facilitate the building of an integrated Nation with a social structure of an African Democratic Socialism.[50]

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47 Daniel Branch, "Political Traffic: Kenyan Students in Eastern and Central Europe, 1958–1969," *Journal of Contemporary History* 53 (2018): 831.

48 Mburu Miano. "General/5/65," May 1965, KNA.

49 Burton, "African Manpower Development," 111–113.

50 "Announcement of the Kenya Students Union in the GDR," October 1, 1964, KNA. No individual author listed.

Through simultaneously expressing their support for KANU and the nebulous project of "African Democratic Socialism," the KSU walked a fine line that both acknowledged the authority of the Kenyatta regime and challenged it to take seriously some of its own positions. It should be no surprise, then, that the sense on the part of students that they were being commodified through educational programs in the interest of a state that relegated them to an apolitical space was difficult to accept.

Through a comparative perspective, we can see that the experiences of organizations similar to the KSU in other areas of socialist Europe suggest that this perception of apathy toward (and fungibility of) students was not confined to the GDR alone. The KSA-Y also found itself perpetually frustrated by the lack of material support and the poor quality of communication between the Kenyan Ministry of Education and students abroad. In the records of the KSA-Y this manifests not only as inadequate material assistance, but also as an utter lack of knowledge on the part of the Kenyan authorities about the educational institutions they were supposedly "partnering" with. In response to a KSA-Y request for information on securing employment after completing their studies, Deputy Secretary of Education G.R. M'Mwerichia wrote: "I am writing direct to Belgrade to get a full description of the type of school you are attending and the final award you expect."[51] It should be no surprise that this statement, which constituted an open acknowledgement that the Ministry of Education lacked even such basic information as the types of schools students were attending and the degrees they could expect to be awarded, was not well received. It is worth noting that such an idea would have been completely out of line with the attention paid to those participating in the Mboya-Kennedy airlift. In a scathing retort, the KSA wrote back: "Your inquiry now into the type and system of education in Yugoslavia is a direct proof that you never cared to know why and how we were sent here."[52] In another point of consonance with the frustrations experienced by those in the KSU, the letter also argued that: "You cannot wait for a student to finish his studies and then when he comes back to Kenya you start saying you do not recognize his degree in spite of the fact that you are the one who sent him here."[53]

Contemporaries of the KSU in the GDR, the frustrations of KSA-Y members speak to the broad and deeply-rooted discontent of young Kenyan scholars studying in Eastern Europe. Namely, these shared frustrations (voiced almost

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51 "Correspondence from G.R. M'Mwirichia to KSA leadership," February 23, 1965, XJ/12/28, KNA.

52 "Correspondence from KSA to G. R. M'Mwirichia," March 8, 1965, XJ/12/28, KNA.

53 "Correspondence from KSA to G. R. M'Mwirichia," March 8, 1965, XJ/12/28, KNA.

contemporaneously a thousand kilometers apart) underscore the experiences of cohorts of scholars who felt marginalized by the national government that they hoped so dearly to play a significant role in. It should, of course, be mentioned that the level of opacity encountered by the Kenyan Ministry of Education was due in part to the absence of embassies in the GDR during this period and an ambivalent relationship to the Yugoslavian state. That the particular channels through which Kenyan students arrived in Europe were not standardized, but varied widely and occasionally even operated without the knowledge of the Kenyan state should also be understood as a source of confusion. The fact that this was apparently a widely-shared experience, however, did little to console the memberships of the KSU and KSA-Y. They perceived the Kenyan Ministry of Education as being (at best) inept, though this word understates the strong sense of exploitation and fungibility felt by the students it was allegedly responsible for supporting. These feelings toward their own government are, however, only one part of a larger picture. Equally prevalent, if even more cautiously and tacitly expressed, was the strong sense of alienation felt by African students as they navigated the landscapes of Eastern Europe.

Film and the Idea of Self-Representation

In the years following national independence, existing in European space as a Kenyan student was a lived experience fraught with tension, which laid bare the contradictions of the contemporary contours of socialist internationalism.[54] I argue that the emphasis which the KSU placed on film represented an attempt to disrupt residual forms of mythologies about Kenyans, and Africans more generally, that continued to circulate even under self-proclaimed anti-racist regimes of state socialism. To be clear, frank and explicit accusations of experiencing racial prejudice are few and far between in the limited records of these organizations to which I have access. Nonetheless, it is telling that both the KSU and KSA-Y embarked on sustained campaigns to gain access to materials that would allow for a degree of self-representation within the cultural frameworks in which they found themselves. From their home government they requested magazines, pho-

54 A particularly illustrative example of this is Sara Pugach's exploration of gender dynamics in the GDR and the relation African students had to them. The antiracist posturing of the state, Pugach argues, unravels when one considers the manner in which African students were marginalized within the social body and the low-esteem in which East Germans who had sexual relations with them were held. Again, see Pugach, "African Students and the Politics of Race and Gender".

tographs, newspapers, and cultural products of all sorts with an urgency not extended even to securing employment after completing their studies. Requests for cultural materials are numerous, clear, and (this cannot be emphasized enough) expressed more emphatically even than petitions for financial support.

The final part of this chapter explores students' interest in, and perhaps even affinity for, the medium of film through extremely close analyses of the demands they made for access to these materials. This section is consciously speculative, a product of both the archival collections from which it is derived (as well as the Kenya National Archive itself) and the informational voids that existed even for those who actually participated in the experiences it examines.[55] Nevertheless, it is worthwhile to highlight what is an undeniable feature of the records that do exist, and to gesture toward the cultural and intellectual implications present within them. It is noteworthy that a preoccupation with the medium of film was by no means unique to the members of the KSU. Sarah Pugach has argued elsewhere that in 1965 the *Union der Afrikanischen Studenten und Arbeiter in der DDR* (Union of African Students and Workers in the GDR) had advocated for the relevance of film to challenge the static mythologies of Africa that circulated in East Germany.[56] In a letter from that year, the UASA argued for "compelling the *Deutsche Film-Aktiengesellschaft* (German Film Corporation or DEFA) to produce movies on contemporary Africa, since most of what they were currently making reflected only 'colonial barbarism.'"[57] As we shall see, both the KSU and the KSA-Y experienced similar debates that underscored the pedagogical utility of film.

The first mention of film in KSU correspondence dates from May of 1965, only a few months after the UASA's letter mentioned above and the second year of the Union's existence.[58] Broadly, the document in which it appears voiced frustrations felt by members of the organization which tacks between specific complaints and arguments for the importance of the work being done by the KSU. The main grievance articulated in the text, which we have already encountered, questions the equity with which students in the GDR were being treated relative

55 It should be re-emphasized here that the materials examined are located at the Kenya National Archives. This institution, and the records which it houses, has been subject to colonial and neocolonial power dynamics, dynamics pertinent to contextualizing its existence and composition. I mean this not only in terms of the presence or absence of materials (the "silences" produced by what is deemed "worthy" of cataloguing in all archival bodies, and what a given Kenyan regime has believed should be made available in this institution), but also in terms of its chronic underfunding and limited (though heroic and dedicated) staff.

56 Pugach, "Agents of Dissent," 93.

57 Pugach, "Agents of Dissent," 103.

58 "Correspondence from KSU to Ministry of Education," May 1965, XJ/12/24, KNA.

to Kenyan students studying in Western European and American institutions. Eric Burton has observed that African countries "sent young citizens wherever possibilities for academic training opened up, no matter if 'East', 'West', or 'South' – although Western degrees continued to enjoy the greatest prestige."[59] In their letter, the KSU claimed that in other European contexts where Kenyans studied, the impending completion of a course of study was accompanied by dialogue between would-be-graduates and the Kenyan government in order to place them in employment. This practice was rumored to be orthodox in the U.K., for example. "We remember very well," wrote KSU leadership in a circular addressed to the Ministry of Education in Kenya, "that [the] City Council of Nairobi sent its delegation to England to interview those students who were about to finish their courses (studies) so that, when they finished, they could go straight to their employment. But nothing has been done so far regarding those students in the GDR."[60] That the City Council of Nairobi would have taken a direct interest in recruiting students who had been educated in the capitalist West is striking, especially considering the Kenyatta regime's contemporary amenable positioning toward the capitalist powers of the West.

The aim of securing employment after completing one's course of study was, however, only one aspect of a much broader set of concerns for Kenyan students expressed in this letter. A special level of emphasis was reserved for underscoring the dire need for cultural materials from home. In the organization's own phrasing, the request made in their May 1965 letter was for "Financial-assistance + material assistance such as FILM in order that Kenya Students may show other people how Kenya is."[61] What exactly is meant by the phrase "how Kenya is" is not clear. Like other Kenyans studying abroad, many amongst the KSU membership would likely have hailed from privileged backgrounds. Yet it is reasonable to suggest that the trope of a "backward," violent, and "tribal" Kenya was what was being challenged here. To this end, it is worth mentioning once again that the bulk of the KSU's activities occurred scarcely a decade after the height of the Mau Mau insurgency, an event which captured the imaginations of people across the globe (both out of fear or in solidarity) and placed Kenya in a position of international notoriety.[62] What is certain in the passage above is the high degree of

59 Burton, "Navigating global socialism," 64.
60 Mburu Miano, "Circular, General/5/65," May 1965, KNA.
61 Mburu Miano, "Circular, General/5/65," May 1965, KNA.
62 The international legacy of Mau Mau is a phenomenon that has garnered a great deal of interest in recent years. For example, Gerald Horne has explored the legacy of the insurgency within the context of the United States. For more on this see Gerald Horne, *Mau Mau in Harlem? The U.S. and the Liberation of Kenya* (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2009).

emphasis placed on the word "FILM," a feature found elsewhere in the requests put forth by the KSU. In this document the word is located on the edge of the right margin, and the actual shape and place of the word itself is striking. While its specific location on the page was incidental, its impact on the reader is indicative of the importance it held for its authors. It appears as a solid block in a sea of small letters, impossible to avoid and disruptive of the measured tone and flow of the larger document. That this degree of emphasis was deemed appropriate even when requests for such basic necessities as financial sustenance were also present is particularly striking.

A second, even more explicit appeal for government-produced films to be shown at independence celebrations would find its way to the Ministry of Education in Kenya several months later. By then, the emphasis on this particular demand had grown. In November of 1965 the KSU sent the following message:

> The KSU in the GDR wish to demonstrate our standpoint and ours is for the Kenya as a whole, and therefore we would expect from you papers, photographs, maps, magazines, and even a F I L M about Kenya. Any material despatch [sic] from you, which may need preservation, the Kenya Students Union may take responsibility, such as FILM etc.[63]

Here, the high degree of emphasis experimented with in the first document comes to full fruition. Not only does the word occur twice in all capital letters, but one of these sees the insertion of a space between each letter. The effect of creating a solid visual block, absolutely impossible to ignore for the reader, cannot be overlooked as incidental or unimportant. It is, after all, not the only material requested. It is not even the only visual material on the list. Yet photographs and maps seem to hold a relatively limited importance for the KSU. Exactly why this might be the case is not, however, stated explicitly within the Union's records.

Here, it is perhaps useful to recall very briefly the history and role of the medium of film in mid-twentieth century Germany. Under the Nazis, cinema had been a staple of propaganda efforts. Racist imagery was ubiquitous, and the importance of visual contrast maintained a currency well after the fall of the regime. In his famous 1947 text *From Caligari to Hitler*, the film historian Siegfried Kracauer wrote that a primary feature of the Nazi film was: "The exploitation of physiognomical qualities by contrasting, for instance, close-ups of brute Negroes with German soldier faces."[64] The deployment of the visual dichotomies of dark

63 "Correspondence from Mburu Miano to G. R. M'Mwirichia," KNA.
64 Sigfried Kracauer, *From Caligari to Hitler: A Psychological History of the German Film* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1947), 279.

and light continued well into the period of KSU activities, and the practice and idea of contrast continued to hold a currency for film critics and audiences. As Pugach has noted, the notion that a dichotomy existed between Germans and "brute Negroes" was not erased with the establishment of an "anti-racist" regime committed to socialist internationalism. Nor was the idea that the nature of film, as a medium, held a unique ability to intervene in popular narratives of the nation. In Germany and elsewhere during the postwar era, this rested on the figural creation of outsiders, and race was a common modality deployed in their assembly. In line with this, Pugach has shown that an educative impulse extended beyond the walls of the universities that hosted African students. "The students were subject to a 'moral' education in the GDR," she writes. "This education was based on supposedly 'primal' characteristics that had been assigned to Africans much earlier, in the colonial era. It contradicted state claims that race did not matter, as well as state efforts to include blacks in the body politic."[65] More generally, these students' experiences in Germany would have been informed by what George Steinmetz has called the "devil's handwriting," or how "the inherited archives of precolonial ethnographic representations provided the ideological raw materials for almost everything that was done to colonized peoples in the modern era."[66] Such a line of analysis can easily be extended to think about how continuities in racist mythologies manifested in different areas of life in the GDR, film being only one embedded within a broader cultural landscape.

In tracking the maneuverings of the KSU and its membership, it is evident that the disruption of these mythologies was of great concern for Kenyan students in the GDR. Requests for films were made "in order that Kenya Students may show other people how Kenya is."[67] They were also made in a context wherein multiple students had been either expelled from school or jailed under questionable circumstances.[68] The attempt to resist these processes of overdetermination was at the core of requests for films depicting life in Kenya. Deploying the rhetoric of national unity, and targeted at those primarily respon-

65 Pugach, "The Politics of Race and Gender," 148.
66 Steinmetz, George, *The Devil's Handwriting: Precoloniality and the German Colonial State in Qungdao, Samoa, and Southwest Africa* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2007), xiv.
67 Mburu Miano, "General 5/65," KNA.
68 Over the course of the KSU's existence, it saw one student expelled from school due to a minor alcohol infraction and two others tried and imprisoned on charges of rape. Allegations of police brutality were also made by the Union against the East German authorities. For details about this see "Correspondence from E.N. Gicuchi to The Rector of Dresden Technical University," January 25, 1966, XJ/12/24, KNA; "Correspondence from J. Mwema to Ministry of Foreign Affairs," February 9, 1966, XJ/12/24, KNA; "Correspondence from J. N. Muimi to Ministry of Education," February 24, 1966, XJ/12/24, KNA.

sible for fostering such a sentiment within the nascent Kenyan republic, the desire to disrupt the existing pedagogical channels through which information about the homeland travelled found an affinity with the medium of film. It follows that the KSU may have understood it as a technology through which Europeans and Africans in the audience would receive the voice of Kenya (at least as it was portrayed by the government) without the distortions of a European lens or gaze. A Eurocentric vision of Africa would have at least some chance of being "pushed against" or "corrected." To be clear, this is not to suggest that such a representation was unproblematic, "authentic," or even an accurate analysis of the pedagogical dynamics of film. Nor was the project of Kenyan nationalism organic or untethered from colonial legacies and massive disparities in ethnic and class representation within government. Instead, the aim here is to suggest that the KSU harbored a powerful understanding of the possibilities held by the medium of film and its value for them as they navigated life in the GDR and their relations to the government at home.

While (in line with their political rhetoric more generally) the KSU signaled the importance of the medium film in a carefully coded manner, Kenyan students in Yugoslavia were less reserved. Their debates on the subject depart from the KSU's in important ways, but bear striking similarities with regard to at the level of conceptualizing the medium of film itself, and especially its ability to shape perception. As in the GDR, I suggest that it was the pedagogical power of the medium of film that served as the defining feature of these debates, although the contours of the specific circumstances are notably different. In January 1967, a bitter dispute emerged between two groups of Kenyan students within the KSA-Y over a series of films that had been screened for the previous year's independence celebrations. On January 26, Gonzaga Opundo (a rank-and-file member of the KSA) wrote to the Kenyan Ministry of Education alleging that "three foreign Embassies have engaged themselves in what seems to us a joint-work for corrupting Kenya students in Yugoslavia."[69] The three foreign powers mentioned were Britain, the United States, and West Germany, and Opundo alleged that they had targeted KSA-Y leadership. "The British and the American Embassies," wrote Opundo, "do invite 'selected' number of Kenya students to their respective Consulates or sometimes in their private homes to talk over a cup of tea. After the talks the students are shown some propaganda films and they are also provided with free newspapers."[70] Opundo went on to claim that

69 "Correspondence from Gonzaga Opundo to Ministry of education: Re – Corruption by foreign embassies over Kenya students in Yugoslavia," January 26, 1967, XJ/12/28, KNA.
70 "Correspondence from Gonzaga Opundo to Ministry of education: Re – Corruption by foreign embassies over Kenya students in Yugoslavia," January 26, 1967, XJ/12/28, KNA.

this was essentially a recruitment operation on the part of these foreign powers, which offered promises of work and financial support in exchange for information on Kenyan students studying in Yugoslavia. He also argued that these operations were based on students' political orientations, as their talks and information-gathering efforts included "Kenya politics and the parties which individuals prefer."[71] Such an attention to party affiliation must be contextualized in relation to the Kenyan political landscape, where the year prior Odinga had formally split from KANU and played a formative role in the organization of the Kenya People's Union. That Britain, the United States, and West Germany would have been interested in securing such information is to be expected. More surprising is that the particular items mentioned (films and newspapers) are the same ones petitioned for by the KSU in the GDR, is key, and underscores the widespread existence of concerns around sets of cultural materials that were understood to be "accurate" or not.

Opundo's allegations did not go unchallenged. Less than a month later, a response arrived at the Kenyan Ministry of Education from the leadership of the KSA-Y. Fadhili Lugano (the organization's Chairman) and John Omudanga (Secretary) excoriated Opundo's letter, calling his claims "baseless" and "extremely serious."[72] Opundo was, apparently, not fond of Lugano or Omudanga either, adding the phrase "whom they use as a tool" in brackets next to each of their names when listing out the students he believed had been corrupted.[73] Nevertheless, the KSA's leadership responded in-depth to his "baseless" claims. "The truth is," they wrote, "the Kenya Students Association decided to have as part of the Kenya Independence Celebration, 1966 a Kenya film, photographs and the National Anthem. We wrote to the Kenya High Commissioner in London to help us acquire some of these things."[74] They received a total of four different films for their celebration, and "nearly all Kenya students in Zagreb including Mr. Opundo saw these films."[75] Along with their rebuttal to Opundo, Lugano and Omudanga sent the titles of the films screened, writing that "It is for the Gov-

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71 "Correspondence from Gonzaga Opundo to Ministry of education: Re – Corruption by foreign embassies over Kenya students in Yugoslavia," January 26, 1967, XJ/12/28, KNA.

72 "Letter to the Permanent Secretary, Ministry of Foreign Affairs from Fadhili B. Lugano and John Omudanga," XJ/12/28, KNA.

73 "Correspondence from Gonzaga Opundo to Ministry of education: Re – Corruption by foreign embassies over Kenya students in Yugoslavia," January 26, 1967, KNA.

74 "Letter to the Permanent Secretary from Fadhili B. Lugano and John Omudanga," February 14, 1967, XJ/12/28, KNA.

75 "Letter to the Permanent Secretary from Fadhili B. Lugano and John Omudanga," February 14, 1967, XJ/12/28, KNA.

ernment of Kenya to judge whether the above four films are propaganda films."[76] At the heart of these debates was, in essence, the question of what constituted propaganda within the medium of film. It is not the aim of this chapter to serve as arbiter to whether or not such films did indeed serve such a function. Rather, I wish only to underscore that competing understandings of Kenyanness within the medium of film clashed not only in the GDR and the Eastern Bloc, but in places such as non-aligned, socialist Yugoslavia as well. Moreover, these contestations were not simply a question of "European" representations versus "African" ones, but were suspended within a political space in which one's alignment to domestic politics in Kenya was considered to be an equally (if not more) important factor.

Conclusion

In their relatively brief periods of tenure, both the KSU and the KSA-Y established themselves as intermediaries between their members in relation to both the Kenyan government and the authorities of their host states. In a number of different ways, they sought to carve out a more expansive role for its membership in relation to each. However, with the exception of a brief influx of nursing students in late 1966 which it helped organize, the KSU witnessed a significant decline in membership after its first two years. By the beginning of 1967 the union had merged with the Kenya Students Association (a similar, smaller organization) to create the Kenya Students Organization (KSO), which at its foundation comprised only 96 members. This figure is striking when considered in relation to the fact that at its height the KSU alone had boasted a membership of over 150 students. Moreover, the activities of that organization appear to have been short-lived, and in large part consisted of collecting data about the students and (more importantly for the KSO) advocating on students' behalf for transfers to educational institutions in West Germany. The explicit rationale is only provided for two of these students, both studying agriculture, who requested to continue their education in West Germany "to develop their both theoretical and practical knowledge" at a level not offered in the GDR.[77]

The medium of film occupied a prominent space in the intellectual and political imaginaries of Kenyan students studying in both the GDR as well as other

76 "Letter to the Permanent Secretary from Fadhili B. Lugano and John Omudanga," February 14, 1967, XJ/12/28, KNA.
77 "Correspondence from Kariuki K. Njiiri to Lother [Lothar] Metw [?],"May 9, 1968, XJ/12/24, KNA.

areas of socialist Europe like Yugoslavia. The KSU's objective to "show other people how Kenya is" accounts for this in part, but their petitions for access to film produced in Kenya must also be considered alongside the manner in which they articulated their organizational politics. In treading carefully between displaying loyalty to KANU and advocating for a more robust vision within a Kenyan version of "African Democratic Socialism," the Union worked to carve out both a political and economic place for students educated in the GDR within the postcolonial order at home. So too did their comrades in Yugoslavia. The experiences of students in the KSU and the KSA-Y are thus only two episodes embedded within a much broader landscape wherein African students simultaneously pushed against both an alienated existence in Eastern Europe and the constraints and demands of their government at home. This ethos was at the heart of their project to both "represent Kenya in a lively way" and jockey for position within the Kenyan economic landscape. Following experiences abroad defined by both hope and frustration, members of these organizations would eventually return home to a Kenyan state increasingly critiqued as deeply neocolonial in practice and inattentive to its people in the wake of formal "*Uhuru*." Through their activities and rhetoric, the leaders of the KSU (out a sense of both historical destiny and necessity) had attempted to chart a different path through the postcolonial order as they struggled in the spirit of *harambee*. More broadly, the careful analysis of groups such as the KSU and KSA-Y pursued here offers a largely unexplored avenue through which we might examine the complexities of African postcolonialisms, socialist imaginaries in the Global South, and the experiences and expressions of intellectual communities of color in white spaces during the global 1960s.

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4

Study of Constant Paternalism: Elitist Vanguard and its Representatives

Eric Angermann

On January 30, 1961, Werner Raase's term of office ended abruptly. Raase had served as the first director of the *Institut für Ausländerstudium* (Institute for Foreign Students), the most recent institution added to the East German trade union college, the *Hochschule der Deutschen Gewerkschaften "Fritz Heckert"* in Bernau near Berlin. Only one day earlier, the responsible federal executive of the central trade union federation which ran the college, the *Freie Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund* (FDGB), had decided to dismiss four persons: Raase and his deputy, a teacher and an interpreter.[2]

The FDGB executive criticized not only the theoretical and didactic shortcomings in the teaching of state-socialist Marxism-Leninism, for which Raase was held responsible. The decision to dismiss him was also based on an intervention by 17 African students, whose request for a talk led high-ranked members of the *Abteilung Internationale Verbindungen* (International Relations Department) of the federal executive to travel to Bernau.[3] The accusations subsequently collected were serious. In addition to the criticism of insufficient "political leadership" of the institute's directorate,[4] the second major point of critique were racist statements made by Raase and other teachers. For example,

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1 This essay is based on my MA thesis published in 2018, in which the third Afro-Asian course at the FDGB college from 1961 to 1963 is analyzed in a praxeological and microhistorical investigation. With regard to African students, the analysis focuses not only on their agency, but also on their social background and motivations for studying in the GDR as well as their actions. Passages of the work are also contained in this essay; see Eric Angermann, "'Ihr gehört auch zur Avantgarde': African trade unionists at the FDGB's academy Fritz Heckert (1961–1963)" (Master's thesis, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, 2018). I thank Tenzin Sekhon very much for his support in the translation of my contribution into English and Immanuel R. Harisch for his helpful remarks.

2 "Sekretariatsvorlage: Maßnahmen zur Verbesserung der Arbeit am Ausländerinstitut der Hochschule der Deutschen Gewerkschaften", January 19, 1961, 1, Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, Berlin (henceforth: SAPMO-BArch), DY 79/406.

3 Ibid., 3.

4 "Abschlußanalyse des 2. Lehrgangs für afro-asiatische Studenten an der Hochschule der Deutschen Gewerkschaften 'Fritz Heckert'", September 1960 – Mai 1961, June 2, 1961, 5, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/406.

whilst drunk, he had supposedly claimed that in order to receive a suit in the GDR, one had to come from Africa. Similarly, the teacher who was also dismissed had allegedly said: "You come with empty suitcases and leave with full suitcases".[5] These hostile remarks pointed to the fact that the incoming students of the FDGB's trade union college were provided with clothing such as suits – a policy which aggravated social envy and xenophobia.

The "existence of nationalist arrogance", as the FDGB executive called the racist remarks, was one of the decisive reasons for their dismissal.[6] Even though the responsible FDGB offices had already criticized Raase beforehand, it was apparently the intervention of African students that was the immediate cause for his sacking. Some students had explicitly threatened to abandon their studies.[7]

It was precisely this threat by the students from Ghana and Mali, whose respective home countries were promoting socialist policies at the time, that would probably have meant a foreign policy setback for the GDR. In times of the West German Hallstein Doctrine—and several years before the GDR succeeded in establishing places of socialist encounters in the Global South[8]—was the provision of study places at the FDGB college for foreign trade unionists, mainly from African countries, who came to the GDR at the beginning of the 1960s, a significant project in East Germany's international solidarity work, in which the FDGB assumed a "leadership role".[9] The course in Bernau targeted a social group in which the FDGB invested political hopes. This was based on the ideology of Marxism-Leninism – according to George Bodie, a fundamental factor of the "pedagogical model of the GDR"[10] – which, in its historical determinism, assigned a central, progressive role in the struggle for world socialism to the trade unions prominently involved in decolonization struggles in the Global

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5 "Sekretariatsvorlage: Maßnahmen zur Verbesserung der Arbeit am Ausländerinstitut der Hochschule der Deutschen Gewerkschaften", January 19, 1961, 4, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/406.

6 Ibid.

7 Ibid., 3.

8 See Jörg Depta and Anne-Kristin Hartmetz, this volume.

9 Gregory Witkowski, "Between Fighters and Beggars: Socialist Philantrophy and the Imagery of Solidarity", in *Comrades of Color: East Germany in the Cold War World*, ed. Quinn Slobodian (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015), 75. For the role of the FDGB as an instrument in the foreign policy recognition efforts of the GDR see Ilona Schleicher, "Elemente entwicklungspolitischer Zusammenarbeit in der Tätigkeit von FDGB und FDJ", in *Entwicklungspolitische Zusammenarbeit in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland und der DDR,* ed. Hans-Jörg Bücking (Berlin: Duncker & Humblot, 1998), 112–113.

10 George Bodie, "Where Do Correct Ideas Come From? The FDGB Institute for Foreign Students and the Coming of the Sino-Soviet Split" (paper presented at the conference *Socialist Educational Cooperation with the Global South*, Gießen, Germany, May 11–12, 2018), 6.

South. The assessment was based on the marginal spread of communist parties, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. Furthermore, the orthodox notion of historical materialism necessitated an expectation that the working class should be united primarily in trade unions as the "class organization[s] of the proletariat".[11]

Thus, in this case it was not only a matter of the diplomatic recognition of the GDR as a sovereign state, but also of the projection of a vanguard onto the African trade unionists, who in this sense played an important role in the state-socialist ideas of a socio-political transformation.[12] In the so-called *afro-asiatische Lehrgänge* (Afro-Asian courses) of the Bernau institute, then, "class-conscious, modest, sacrificial trade union functionaries" were to be instructed on how to organize and educate the "working class of Africa as the vanguard of the African peoples [...] for the improvement of working and living conditions".[13] Furthermore, these "solidarity measures" were linked to the goal of "effective support for the anti-imperialist, anti-colonial, national liberation struggles".[14]

This contribution focuses precisely on this alleged vanguard of Africa, which in the early 1960s went to study at the FDGB college as one of the most important East German places of transnational socialist encounter. In contrast to aspects of their social mobility, discussed by Immanuel R. Harisch,[15] the analysis focuses on the agency of the African trade unionists vis-à-vis the institute's directorate and the FDGB officials on the ground. I argue that, on the one hand, the (almost exclusively male) African course participants[16] knew how to use the vanguard-concept they were studying, as well as the unstable foreign policy situation of

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11 Friedrich Engels, "Brief an Bebel", in *MEW vol. 19* (Berlin: Dietz, 1973), 6.

12 Immanuel R. Harisch, "'Mit gewerkschaftlichem Gruß!' Afrikanische GewerkschafterInnen an der FDGB-Gewerkschaftshochschule Fritz Heckert in der DDR", *Stichproben. Vienna Journal of African Studies* 34 (2018): 82–83; Schleicher, "Elemente entwicklungspolitischer Zusammenarbeit", 111–112.

13 "Sekretariatsinformation: Analyse der Arbeit im 3. afro-asiatischen Lehrgang an der Hochschule der Deutschen Gewerkschaften 'Fritz Heckert'", May 6, 1963, 2, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.

14 "Präsidiumsvorlage zur Arbeit des FDGB und seiner Gewerkschaften nach Afrika", January 11, 1960, 3–4, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/406.

15 Harisch, 'Mit gewerkschaftlichem Gruß!', 97–100.

16 Most of the course participants (hardly surprisingly) came from the working class. Most of them were originally office workers (in public service, as teachers or in the health sector) or dock and port workers, "trade workers" or railroad workers in the transport industry. However, in retrospect it is not possible to reconstruct which trade unionists already worked as functionaries at the beginning of the course. But after their studies in Bernau, several participants took over high positions in their trade unions. For more details on their social background see Angermann, 'Ihr gehört auch zur Avantgarde', 53–61.

the GDR, to improve the teaching and living conditions at the FDGB college to their benefit. As the introductory example shows, the trade unionists of the Global South were also able to intervene against racist incidents with some success.

On the other hand, the African trade unionists, who, in their role as students in Bernau, appropriated such projections (stubbornly or *eigen-sinnig*[17]) as self-images, also had to face the limits of their agency. Although they were able to protest openly against the responsible functionaries without the risk of having to suffer repressive measures – in contrast to the East German population, which as a rule had only "silent forms of defiance"[18] at its disposal – the scope of action of the African course participants and that of the autochthonous inhabitants of the GDR were similar in terms of political options. Regardless of social origin and temporary or permanent residence, "small people" in the GDR only had "power and regulatory competence" in the surrounding life-worlds.[19] The possibilities of influence beyond one's own, social everyday life were severely limited due to the "all unifying central power"[20] of the ruling *Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands* (SED) and its mass organizations – such as the FDGB. Given this context, the participants in the third Afro-Asian course were not in a position to water down the all-encompassing and universally valid claim to power of one party and initiate political activities that bypassed official institutions. On the contrary, despite all proclamations of international solidarity and equality, they also experienced the power techniques of SED rule. Consequentially, they were treated more as subjects of paternalist protection than as trade unionist *Kollegen* (colleagues).[21]

This will be demonstrated through a microhistorical analysis of a concrete conflict between students of the third Afro-Asian course and the institute's directorate. After half a year of study, the vast majority of the course called for an independently operating *Afro-asiatisches Komitee* (Afro-Asian Committee) to establish, amongst other things, anti-racist educational work for East German workers. In so doing, they implicitly questioned the SED's top-down claim to

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17 For an English definition of *Eigen-Sinn* see Alf Lüdtke, *The History of Everyday Life: Reconstructing Historical Experiences and Ways of Life* (Princeton: University Press, 1995), 313–314.

18 Raul Zelik, "Nach dem Kapitalismus: Warum der Staatssozialismus ökonomisch ineffizient war und was das für Alternativen heute bedeutet", *Prokla. Zeitschrift für kritische Sozialwissenschaft* 39 (2009): 213.

19 Thomas Lindenberger, introduction to *Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn in der Diktatur: Studien zur Gesellschaftsgeschichte der DDR* (Köln: Böhlau, 1999), 31.

20 Lindenberger, *Herrschaft und Eigen-Sinn*, 36.

21 This is the common jargon used to address course participants or trade union representatives. *Kollege* is the common form of address within or between trade unions; it symbolizes the idea of equality of all trade union members. The English equivalent is *brother* or *sister*.

sole leadership and its claims over the interpretation of social conditions in the GDR.

The presentation of this conflict outlines the different ways of interpretation of the African course participants at the college, which were heterogeneous, ambivalent, and not always consistent. Last but not least, I will show to what extent the FDGB functionaries, together with the institute's directorate, reacted to the criticism of the students they called the vanguard and made (or had to make) concessions to them, but also how they worked out disciplinary measures and partially adapted and appropriated the content of the protest.

The central arena of the conflict was the *Rat der Delegationsleiter* (Council of Heads of Delegation), which was established by the institute as a result of the intervention against the former institute's leader Werner Raase. The emergence of the council is evidence of an appropriation of agency by African trade unionists. The council was the only body through which course participants could participate in decision-making processes through their delegation representatives.[22] At first, however, they were only allowed to "help" the institute's directorate to successfully run the course by communicating "wishes".[23] The African representatives were also initially not allowed to set their own agenda items at the meetings.[24]

Even though the institutionally granted competencies were extremely limited, the Council of Heads of Delegation was nevertheless a site for voicing complaints about the institute's directorate's actions. The social conditions experienced by the African students were articulated and their objections, in some cases, even led to success. The close connection of the council to the new head of the institute, Heinz Deutschland,[25] and the institute's directorate, how-

22 Each national trade union federation represented at the college by students provided a delegation. The heads of delegation were to be elected by their *Kollegen* or had already been appointed by the sending trade union in advance; see "Schulordnung der Hochschule der Deutschen Gewerkschaften 'Fritz Heckert'", no date, 7, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/270.

23 Ibid., 6.

24 "Protokoll über die Sitzung des Rates der Delegationsleiter", March 20, 1962, 4, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.

25 Shortly before the beginning of the third Afro-Asian course, Heinz Deutschland started his work as institute director. The historian, who was only 27 years old at the time, had a model East German career to this point. Born in Bernau, he came from a working class family and first learned the profession of a lathe operator. After joining the SED and the FDGB he studied economics and history in Berlin and Moscow and was a research assistant at the FDGB college, until he finally took over the directorate of the Institute for Foreign Students; see Hella Karden, "Deutschland, Heinz", in *Biographisches Handbuch der SBZ/DDR: 1945–1990. Bd. 1: Abendroth – Lyr*, ed. Gabriele Baumgartner and Dieter Hebig (München: De Gruyter Saur 1996), 119.

ever, made apparent the goals of the FDGB to control and discipline all initiatives.[26] This was also evident in the largest protest during the third course.

"Vanguardist" Complaints

On March 17, 1962, the heads of delegation of the course met informally, deliberately excluding the institute's directorate, to discuss several problems within the course.[27] The primary reason for the meeting was the discussion on the "formation of a committee" which, according to the Nigerian representative, would enable the student body to act independently "as a collective" and implement measures in the future.[28] Furthermore, his colleagues argued for a joint place for understanding trade union work,[29] "political issues", and for informing one another "about the situation of the working class in our countries"; after all, pan-

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26 However, Heinz Deutschland, who lives in Berlin today, emphasizes retrospectively that discussions generally took place on an equal footing under his leadership; for example, about different ideas of socialism, see Heinz Deutschland, e-mail message to Immanuel R. Harisch, September 2, 2018. Further references in the written sources also speak for a more empathetic and collegial climate under Heinz Deutschland. For example, after the end of the course, there was a regular correspondence between him, who was hardly older or even younger than many of the participants in the course, and some of the graduates for several years; see Angermann, 'Ihr gehört auch zur Avantgarde', 46–47, 75–76. Of course, these friendships could not dissolve the structural power relations at the institute.

27 Nevertheless, there is a protocol written in German, which appears to be official. According to Heinz Deutschland, this was based on the notes of two of the institute's interpreters who were present at the meeting: "I remember that the transcript of the meeting of the heads of delegation on March 17, 1962 was made on the basis of the notes of the two interpreters Ursula Hofmann (English) and Christel Herz (French), after we […] had heard about this meeting. Apart from their mother tongue, the African colleagues only spoke the language of the respective former or still colonial power, English or French. They had therefore asked the interpreters they knew to help them. Both colleagues had become accustomed to writing down key points or even longer sentences for their translations, because the African colleagues were not used to taking breaks and giving the interpreter the opportunity to translate. This was also necessary in this case because the explanations had to be translated first into German and then as precisely as possible into English or French. Thus, on the basis of these notes of the two colleagues, a basis existed for the reconstruction of the essential content of the explanations of the heads of delegation, partly in indirect speech and partly even literally." Heinz Deutschland, e-mail message to Immanuel R. Harisch, August 23, 2020.

28 "Niederschrift über eine Zusammenkunft der Delegationsleiter", March 17, 1962, 1, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.

29 "Protokoll über die Sitzung des Rates der Delegationsleiter", March 20, 1962, 13, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.

African "unity" to fight together against Western capitalist "imperialism" was the proclaimed goal.[30]

For African students adhering to a socialist-influenced pan-Africanism continental unity was paramount compared to the unity of the state-socialist camp which was propagated at the college. Thus, the dominant idea of pan-Africanism was clearly a central, thought-provoking impulse for the debate on sense and purpose of the committee. This was demonstrated at the subsequent council meetings where the heads of delegations clarified their ideas. The head of the Ghanaian delegation J. A. Osei[31] stated that "Africa in its entirety" was to be represented by the committee,[32] uniting the "builders" of the African continent.[33]

Such self-positioning revealed that the political designation as vanguard was also, in part, a self-perception. Although the political conditions in their home countries varied strongly,[34] the delegation leaders saw their role in developing "a common political strategy" for the respective "national liberation struggle" in their home countries and "against capitalism" in general. They thereby also saw their studies as an opportunity for future political struggles – after all, "the opportunity to meet is better here [...] than in Africa".[35]

The few Asian delegations, which provided just five percent of the course,[36] were also in favor of the committee. It is noticeable, however, that their African

30 "Niederschrift über eine Zusammenkunft der Delegationsleiter", March 17, 1962, 1, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.

31 For the Ghanaian unionist J. A. Osei see Osei, annotated by Immanuel R. Harisch, this volume.

32 "Protokoll über die Sitzung des Rates der Delegationsleiter", March 20, 1962, 12, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.

33 Ibid., 7.

34 The African students at the Bernau college came from a wide range of countries. A number of the politically independent states endured a rather peaceful transition to the postcolonial government, while others had to experience military violence and oppression of the colonial powers, Furthermore, there were the still colonial territories where African liberation movements were starting to be engaged in guerilla wars alongside the colonial settler regimes like South Africa and South-Rhodesia, where political participation and independence seemed to be far away. The independent African states which had a presence of students in Bernau varied in their political orientation – some were closer to the state-socialist countries, others to the Western-liberal bloc.

35 "Protokoll über die Sitzung des Rates der Delegationsleiter", March 20, 1962, 18, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.

36 "3. Lehrgang – September 1961–März 1963", n. d., 1–2, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/439.

fellow students rarely made reference to Asia when they spoke of "unity".[37] Furthermore, only the Sri Lankan delegate is cited as a participant in the discussion in the protocol.[38] The East German teachers, too, generally only referred to their African students during the entire course. The social and political upheavals in Africa at the beginning of the 1960s were the most likely places of social-revolutionary imaginations for East German trade union functionaries of that period, highlighting Africans as (supposedly) revolutionary subjects.

Therefore, the broadly supported proposal of the committee is by no means to be understood as a fundamental opposition against the East German institute's directorate or state socialism in general. At the first informal meeting, several heads of delegation stressed that they did not want to openly oppose the Institute for Foreign Students and praised the commitment of their teachers. Only Tanganyika's unidentified representative, who emphasized his union's membership in the ICFTU,[39] openly criticized the situation. In his view, the students of the course had been used as a "tool" for "propaganda [...] against West Germany and America", which in the future had to be stopped by the committee.[40] His view was quickly contested by other heads of delegation who claimed that the major common enemy was imperialism.[41]

Still, a large number of other course participants were also annoyed at being objectified in the FDGB's declaration of *International Solidarity* as part of the East German state socialist agenda, which subsequently confirmed an identity-forming self-image.[42] This concerned, first and foremost, the instrumentalization of students during public events such as solidarity conferences. The institute did not even "ask" the students to participate, but "instructed" them to do so.[43] At

37 One of the rare examples for the reference to the Asian fellow students is the already described statement of J. A. Osei, see "Protokoll über die Sitzung des Rates der Delegationsleiter", March 20, 1962, 7, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.

38 As an example see "Protokoll über die Sitzung des Rates der Delegationsleiter", March 20, 1962, 29, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.

39 This refers to the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU), which brought together the Western-oriented trade unions worldwide. The ICFTU competed with the Communist World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) from which it split in 1949 due to strategic Cold War considerations.

40 "Niederschrift über eine Zusammenkunft der Delegationsleiter", March 17, 1962, 2, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.

41 Ibid., 3.

42 See for the problems of the East German *solidarity work* Toni Weis, "The Politics Machine: On the Concept of 'Solidarity' in East German Support für SWAPO", *Journal of Southern African Studies* 37 (2011): 352.

43 "Protokoll über die Sitzung des Rates der Delegationsleiter", March 20, 1962, 29, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.

the same time, the heads of the institutes had not communicated any information about the content of the public events in advance, while the students present on site were introduced as official representatives of their trade unions without prior notice. The South African representative Gilbert Hlabukana pointed out why this put the course participants at risk. The reporting of the conferences by the state media would endanger "50 % of all the colleagues studying here" who "live in illegality" and whose "necks are put on the line".[44] Additionally, Hlabukana argued, he himself had been commissioned by his trade union confederation[45] to speak at conferences about the conditions in his country, which was "in the depths of fascism", but only on the condition that "published photos of himself were to be avoided".[46]

In the course of the discussion, it became evident that experiences of racism were the primary reason for the attempt to initiate an Afro-Asian committee as an independent institution. African course participants criticized the representation of the social conditions in their home countries in East German publications.[47] The Guinean Daouda Camara singled out a brochure entitled *Bei Freunden im freien Afrika* (With friends in free Africa), which described "an outdated state of Guinea" as a country without any car traffic.[48] The Senegalese delegation leader Amadou-Lamine Diop was angered by the racist imagery of a caricature depicting a sleeping child on the back of an elephant particularly, claiming that this was "the same propaganda" that "the imperialists spread about Africa".[49] With the planned committee, however, a possibility for intervention could be created, "in order to enlighten the people here about the real circumstances" and to enforce "that such nonsense is no longer published", the Moroccan representative announced.[50]

In this sense, not only future stereotypical representations were to be prevented, but involvement "in the upbringing and development of the masses in the GDR" with regard to the conditions in Africa was to be implemented[51] – al-

44 Ibid., 10.
45 This was the ANC-affiliated South African Congress of Trade Unions (SACTU).
46 "Protokoll über die Sitzung des Rates der Delegationsleiter", March 20, 1962, 10, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.
47 On this issue, see also George Bodie's contribution in this volume.
48 "Protokoll über die Sitzung des Rates der Delegationsleiter", March 20, 1962, 17, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.
49 Ibid., 32.
50 "Niederschrift über eine Zusammenkunft der Delegationsleiter", March 17, 1962, 3, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.
51 "Protokoll über die Sitzung des Rates der Delegationsleiter", April 3, 1962, 5, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.

though certain reservations also appeared in light of past experiences of racist ways of thinking, acting, and representing. A colleague from Cameroon, for example, expressed his disappointed hopes. Upon his arrival in the GDR, he would have believed "to come to a paradise" – but that was "not so", because "the European" would "always remain a European".[52] Such incidents were by no means isolated. Black students from Sub-Saharan Africa described racist behavior which they encountered on a daily basis. For example, "anonymous letters" were circulating in the vicinity of the college in which "German girls" were called upon to not "flirt with their African colleagues".[53] The Togolese representative Benoît Agbetrobu complained that the girlfriend of a fellow student from his delegation had received such a letter, an event which he called "very strange in a socialist or communist country".[54]

But even the college itself was not free of discrimination. At the beginning of the course, students had already complained to the head of the institute, Heinz Deutschland, about an employee of the school restaurant. In this specific instance, the annoyance stemmed from the fact that no consequences were noticeable.[55] Even fellow East German students stood out negatively. For example, Osée Mbaitjongue from Cameroon recalled a meeting with a guest of his *Betreuer* and room-mate,[56] who accused him of "becoming a minister and having several women" upon his return to Cameroon, and that he could provide these women if he came to visit. On top of that, another East German student at the college had grabbed his hair without offering an explanation.[57] Daouda Camara also reported on fellow East German students who had asked him whether people carried "a rifle" in Guinea "because of all the predators".[58]

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52 "Niederschrift über eine Zusammenkunft der Delegationsleiter", March 17, 1962, 3, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.

53 "Protokoll der Sitzung des Rates der Delegationsleiter", April 10, 1962, 2, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.

54 Ibid., 6.

55 Ibid., 6, 11.

56 These mentors were students from the GDR with whom the course participants shared their double rooms; see Ilona Schleicher, "FDGB-Offensive in Westafrika: Der Gewerkschaftsverbund im Jahr Afrikas", in *Engagiert für Afrika: Die DDR und Afrika II*, ed. Ulrich van der Heyden et. al. (Münster: Lit, 1994), 89.

57 "Protokoll der Sitzung des Rates der Delegationsleiter", April 10, 1962, 22, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.

58 Ibid., 7.

These examples reveal the dominant role sexualized perceptions played in the context of racist behavior towards fellow African inhabitants in the GDR.[59] In general, and despite all official negations and an anti-fascist and anti-colonial self-idealization, they refer to the lingering effect of colonial imagery and racist ways of thinking about the exotic or original people of Africa in the GDR.[60]

Responding Hosts

Throughout the course of the conflict over the Afro-Asian Committee, the institute's directorate and the responsible representatives of the FDGB executive tried to settle the matter as quickly and quietly as possible. To this end, they engaged in lengthy discussions with the heads of delegations and made substantial concessions to them on some points. The Council of Heads of Delegation was given more time on a weekly basis in future, starting with its first official meeting after the informal meeting. In addition, the institute's directors Heinz Deutschland and Gerhard Hans expanded the opportunities for student participation by allowing delegations to submit their own agenda items.[61] Furthermore, the status of students at international solidarity events, whose central role the East German hosts repeatedly emphasized for the common "struggle" against imperialism and for the "solidarity movement" in the GDR, was to be changed to the role of "observers".[62] This could prevent them from being publicly seen as representatives, which then could have led to repression in their home countries, as the South African representative Gilbert Hlabukana had pointed out above. The institute's directorate also accepted criticism of representations in East German magazines and specialist journals voiced by the Guinean and Senegalese delegation.[63] Addressing the FDGB executive responsible for media relations, college director Karl Kampfert subsequently ordered that "all photos or other pic-

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59 For the distribution of the image of the "lascivious African man" see Sara Pugach, "African Students and the Politics of Race and Gender in the German Democratic Republic", in *Comrades of Color: East Germany in the Cold War World*, ed. Quinn Slobodian (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015), 137–138.

60 Quinn Slobodian, "Socialist Chromatism: Race, Racism, and the Racial Rainbow in East Germany", in *Comrades of Color: East Germany in the Cold War World*, ed. Quinn Slobodian (New York: Berghahn Books, 2015), 26.

61 "Protokoll über die Sitzung des Rates der Delegationsleiter", March 20, 1962, 4, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.

62 Ibid., 5.

63 Ibid., 6.

torial material depicting Afro-Asian students from our institute for foreigners must be approved by the head of the institute before they can be published".[64]

The institute's directorate thus took up politically justifiable aspects of the students' demands, but from the outset it did not allow for the Afro-Asian committee to become an independent student initiative – even though its representatives avoided an official positioning at the first council meeting during the conflict.[65] The Council of Heads of Delegation, to which the students only wanted to assign competencies concerning the organization of studies,[66] was to be the only representative body for student interests. The "formation of such a committee", on the other hand, was supposedly unjustifiable – for it would have to subordinate itself to the "instructions of the institute's directorate", thereby limiting their right to make any independent decisions, as noted in a report on the first meeting addressed to the FDGB executive.[67] This also highlighted the concern about a loss of political control. It was strictly rejected that a possible committee run by the African students could "uniformly impose demands on the directorate of the institute" and enforce them.[68] The reason for the widespread "demand for such a committee" was not seen in the continuation of colonial relations between East Germans and the students of the Global South. Instead, those responsible in Bernau claimed that the ICFTU was trying to influence the course.[69]

The lack of self-reflection here and the reference to external manipulative forces can be explained by looking at the weaknesses of the Marxist-Leninist state doctrine.[70] This is also indicated by the fact that the report quoted here was addressed to the FDGB executive, which in the centralist structure of the

64 This was based on "justified complaints"; see "Brief der Hochschuldirektion an den Sekretär der Kommission für Koordinierung und Qualifizierung des FDGB-Bundesvorstands", May 4, 1962, 1–2, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/183.

65 "Protokoll über die Sitzung des Rates der Delegationsleiter", March 20, 1962, 35, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.

66 Ibid., 12.

67 "Einige Bemerkungen und Erläuterungen zum beiliegenden Protokoll und den damit verbundenen Problemen", March 22, 1962, 4, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.

68 Ibid., 1.

69 Ibid., 3.

70 This "is based on a great optimism of progress and idealism. The idea of acting in accordance with historical laws, however, also reduces the willingness for reflection and self-criticism if the expected forecasts are not realized. If history is not understood as an open process, the absence of revolutions or even the emergence of authoritarian instead of emancipatory tendencies [or the emergence of intra-societal contradictions, note d. A.] can hardly be explained other than by manipulation of the masses and conspiracy of the ruling elites [...]"; see Moritz Zeiler, *Materialistische Staatskritik: Eine Einführung* (Stuttgart: Schmetterling Verlag, 2017), 42.

GDR Federation of Trade Unions had the final decision-making power also with regard to the Institute for Foreign Students.[71] Its directorate, with its very own motivation to create a good impression vis-à-vis the next highest authority, was itself looking for starting points for the rapid implementation of state socialist guidelines. This was accompanied by the fact that it was not so much the actual intentions of the protesting students that were at the center of the institute's own search for solutions, but rather exploring possibilities to homogenize the student collective. An external enemy had to be constructed, who would be held responsible for the "'disturbances' [...] from outside".[72] In addition to the speculations about the role of Western influence, in their criticism the institute's directorate singled out the Guinean Daouda Camara, who had been himself one of the sharpest critics of the institute's reaction, in its report from the protesters' camp. In the institute's view, Camara had allegedly tried to split the collective.[73]

The Paternalism of Comradeship

But Camara was by no means alone with his criticism. The apparent reluctance of the East German functionaries to give in to the demand for an Afro-Asian Committee was followed by incomprehension, indignation, and, in the end, intensified forms of protest on the part of the students. In the first council meeting, the heads of delegation involved in the discussion criticized the lack of approval for the committee by the institute's directorate, though some isolated voices were raised in appreciation of its efforts "to conduct the course and create favorable conditions for us".[74] In this context, Camara implicitly threatened to leak information to the West. He stressed that it was not really in the interest of the protesters to read that "you are with so-called friends who oppose your unity in the imperialist press".[75] De facto, however, he threatened to pass on the institute's

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71 "Einige Bemerkungen und Erläuterungen zum beiliegenden Protokoll und den damit verbundenen Problemen", March 22, 1962, 4, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.

72 Alf Lüdtke, "'... den Menschen vergessen'? – oder: Das Maß der Sicherheit: Arbeiterverhalten der 1950er Jahre im Blick von MfS, SED, FDGB und staatlichen Leitungen", in *Akten. Eingaben. Schaufenster. Die DDR und ihre Texte. Erkundungen zu Herrschaft und Alltag*, ed. Alf Lüdtke and Peter Becker (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1997), 208 – 209.

73 "Einige Bemerkungen und Erläuterungen zum beiliegenden Protokoll und den damit verbundenen Problemen", March 22, 1962, 3, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.

74 "Protokoll über die Sitzung des Rates der Delegationsleiter", March 20, 1962, 13, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.

75 Ibid.

disastrous assessment to the West German media if it were to oppose the formation of a committee. Camara's statement exemplifies how the students strategically used their socio-political position during the height of the Cold War to assert their own interests in the GDR.

At the following delegation council meeting two weeks later, the East German hosts nevertheless rejected the committee in the proposed form. Again, a representative of the International Relations Department of the FDGB executive was present. This "colleague Fischer" announced "on behalf of the federal executive" that, following agreements with FDGB Chairman Herbert Warnke and African trade union officials in Berlin and Prague, a "binding" decision had been made that the Council of Heads of Delegation was sufficient as the "only organ" for the institutional representation of the students.[76] Although the committee could be founded, it would only carry out a cultural function and could not deal with the FDGB directly, as this would endanger its "principle of non-interference".[77] It is obvious that Fischer here was referring to internationalist principles of Marxism-Leninism, which in terms of foreign policy included – officially – the "free self-determination" of nations and precisely "non-interference in the internal affairs of other states".[78] Therefore, the committee could only address "matters of the African colleagues among themselves"[79] and should not interfere in the home affairs of the GDR. Finally, it was argued that the Afro-Asian Committee would not have the right "to make any demands on school regulations".[80] Fischer explicitly denied discussing the position of the FDGB executive.[81]

The East German representatives were met with a wave of indignation. Hamidou Diallo from Mali called for a discussion and explained that the students

76 "Protokoll über die Sitzung des Rates der Delegationsleiter", April 3, 1962, 1–3, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.

77 Ibid., 18.

78 See as an exemplary contemporary source G. N. Zwektow, "Die Leninschen Prinzipien der sowjetischen Außenpolitik", *Gesellschaftswissenschaftliche Reihe* 19 (1970).

79 "Protokoll über die Sitzung des Rates der Delegationsleiter", April 3, 1962, 1–3, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500, 9.

80 Ibid., 3.

81 Ibid. Looking back, Heinz Deutschland formulated an objection, which is more technical and bureaucratic than substantive: "The FDGB had contracts or agreements with the heads of the delegating organizations. These did not provide for the colleagues delegated to study in Bernau [...] to join forces with representatives of other organizations in an 'Afro-Asian committee'. We felt bound by these agreements." Heinz Deutschland, e-mail message to Immanuel R. Harisch, August 23, 2020.

felt like they were treated as "children" who did not know what they wanted.[82] This was supported by Luc Bissay from Cameroon. The students in Bernau were themselves (partially full-time) trade unionists. For them, it was therefore irrelevant what African trade union officials in Berlin or Prague thought of the idea of a committee.[83] Diallo also questioned the alleged talks with African trade union representatives and instead, together with other heads of delegation, referred to a core competence of the committee, namely educational work on life in Africa, a bottom-up approach for "the friendship between our peoples and the people of the GDR".[84] In the permitted form, however, the committee would only be a "glass bowl" with no contact to its surrounding.[85] Furthermore, it would be virtually impossible for the FDGB not to have any contact whatsoever with the committee, since without its assistance it could not be set up. Several heads of delegation also mentioned obvious distrust towards the students shown by the FDGB executive.[86] In this sense, the FDGB was apparently "afraid" of the students, as soon as they would assume an active role.[87]

Despite all objections, the institute's directorate insisted on the refusal to establish the proposed Afro-Asian committee. Heinz Deutschland responded to the broad criticism by stating that "interference in the internal affairs of the GDR", which according to the FDGB included the establishment of "relations with the workers of the GDR", was unacceptable.[88] The decision had been made "in accordance with the hundred-year-old principles of the German labour movement in relation to other foreign organisations".[89]

Other explanations for the actions of the institute's directorate and the FDGB executive appear more plausible. It is more likely that the desire to intervene in the powers of the centralist party and trade union apparatus could not be permitted. The institute's directorate was well aware that "the demand for assistance in the education of the working class in the GDR" resulted from the statement – or "accusation", as it was called by the college – "that racism exists in the GDR, and not enough was being done from the official side against it".[90] The

82 "Protokoll über die Sitzung des Rates der Delegationsleiter", April 3, 1962, 1–3, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500, 4.
83 Ibid., 10.
84 "Protokoll über die Sitzung des Rates der Delegationsleiter", April 3, 1962, 5, 11, SAPMO-BArch DY 79/2500.
85 Ibid., 11–12.
86 Ibid., 12.
87 Ibid., 18.
88 Ibid., 6–7.
89 Ibid., 19.
90 "Einschätzung", n. d., 4, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.

creation of the committee in the form proposed by the protesters would have meant an admission of social reality in the GDR with regard to widespread racism and of the fallibility of the prevailing ideology declared as true, which consequently questioned the party's leading role in state and society. The limitation of agency of the African trade unionists to act as students in Bernau was revealed at just this point, when they had in mind a self-organized political practice without constant paternalistic subordination to the SED organs.[91]

The council meeting further escalated after this. It ended abruptly after a dispute between several heads of delegation[92] and an attempt at appeasement that was not further commented on: students were also offered to become members of the German-African Society, which was in line with the ruling party SED. They could inform them about the social conditions in Africa, without, of course, questioning positions of the SED and its associated mass organizations.[93]

As a response, the disappointed students turned to other means. The following day, the protesters declared a boycott of an excursion to the Brandenburg steel and rolling mill; apparently not a single student took part in the excursion.[94]

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91 Two years earlier, four African students from Nigeria, Uganda, and Togo had the same limitation of their agency in the Soviet Union. The students of the state Lomonosov University in Moscow founded in September 1960 the independent "Black Africans' Student Union", for which they were expelled by the university. After returning to their home countries, the four scandalized their experienced restrictions and received great attention in Western print media; see Maxim Matusevich, "Expanding the Boundaries of the Black Atlantic: African Students as Soviet Moderns", *Ab Imperio* 2 (2012): 339 – 340.

92 The Congolese representative Joseph Safily, who in the previous council meeting had been the only one to express criticism of the committee's demand (see "Niederschrift über eine Zusammenkunft der Delegationsleiter", March 17, 1962, 4, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500), came into the focus of his African Council colleagues. Safily accused the others of showing no real solidarity with their compatriots in times of the Congo crisis. As a result, the majority of the heads of delegations, some of whom had previously reported on trade union colleagues who had fallen in the Congo ("Protokoll über die Sitzung des Rates der Delegationsleiter", April 3, 1962, 16, SAPMO-BArch DY 79/2500), left the meeting "under loud protest"; see ibid., 20. Even after this premature end, the situation at the institute did not calm down. According to other students, Safily himself acted aggressively (see "Protokoll über die Sitzung des Rates der Delegationsleiter", April 10, 1962, 4, 20, 23, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500) and was ultimately expelled from the college for this; see "3. Lehrgang – September 1961 – März 1963", n. d., 2, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/439.

93 "Protokoll über die Sitzung des Rates der Delegationsleiter", April 3, 1962, 19, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500

94 "Einschätzung", n. d., 3, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.

In order to pacify the protest at the institute and at the same time prevent the "formation of the committee as an official organ", which could potentially influence "internal affairs" and act as "appointed political representation",[95] the institute's directorate around Heinz Deutschland decided to take two steps. First, it attempted to socially "isolate" the most prominent protesters.[96] These included the delegations from Ghana and Nigeria, which had advocated for a collective refusal to take part in regular classes the day following the boycott of the excursion, but were no longer able to mobilize the majority of the course participants. Clearly, proven forms of struggle from work experience as trade unionists were used by the students in the dispute. They called their actions a "strike" and claimed that the institute directors were "capitalists", while they themselves were oppressed "workers".[97]

The isolation of the main actors of the protest was supposed to happen primarily in class by the teachers; every "attempt at further political provocation" would be criticized "sharply and unequivocally".[98] This is related to the second measure adopted, namely the launch of a "comprehensive political offensive" in the course, whereby those deemed "the good forces" by the institute's directorate, essentially a large majority of the course without a clear position, would have their "back" strengthened in order to "assure their solidarity and support".[99] To this end, the institute's directorate also decided to strengthen "cultural activities" with regard to the leisure time of the course participants.[100] Last but not least, it planned to convene another meeting of the Council of Heads of Delegation, in order to prevent informal meetings of students which were described as "illegal".[101] But it was also a large number of the students themselves who wanted to prevent further escalation of the committee dispute. Several representatives therefore went to one of the two deputy directors of the institute, Gerhard Hans, for a discussion in which they described the racist incidents they had experienced as one of the main reasons for their protest. This discussion, in which

95 Ibid., 1–2.
96 Ibid., 5.
97 "Einschätzung", n.d., 3, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.
98 Ibid., 5.
99 Ibid.
100 Ibid. This decision was also taken to prevent the West Berlin visits already criticized at this time, which were considered a bad influence; for the possibilities of visits to West Berlin see Harsch, "'Mit gewerkschaftlichem Gruß!'," 97.
101 "Einschätzung", n. d., 5, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.

the students present called for a meeting, also resulted in further unscheduled council meetings.[102]

The Triumph of Dogma

The meeting which was thus convened, and which lasted for a total of nine hours, clearly had the character of a debate. In addition to two representatives of the FDGB executive, Karl Kampfert, director of the whole FDGB college in Bernau, was present for the first time. With one exception, all heads of delegation attended the council meeting.[103]

Most of the meeting was devoted to finding a compromise on the committee question and discussing racist incidents at the college. Rolf Deubner, as one of the FDGB's executive representatives, made a clear separation between a political and a cultural sphere. He confirmed on the one hand the view that "political activity in the GDR" was not possible for the students; after all, this contradicted the "principles of proletarian internationalism", which also included "non-interference in the internal affairs of trade union organisations".[104] On the other hand, he announced that the FDGB was now quite willing to support a committee with regard to possible events – as long as it only facilitated "cultural life".[105]

Subsequently, he answered the requests of some students and, as representative of the FDGB executive, took a stand on the various accusations of racism.[106] He explained that "of course there are still numerous petty bourgeois people"—singling out people with their own small businesses and thus in possession of private property—"who are afflicted with the idea of the capitalist era".[107] According to the ruling SED's state doctrine, this population group was regarded as the manipulated mass basis which had historically given rise

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102 "Protokoll über die Sitzung des Rates der Delegationsleiter", April 10, 1962, 13, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.

103 The Congolese student Safily was only invited as "observer" and no longer as head of delegation; see Ibid., 8.

104 Ibid., 2.

105 Ibid., 2–3.

106 One week earlier, despite an urgent request to address this issue, the institute's directorate had still ignored the complaint of the Moroccan representative about an assault in the urban area of Bernau – at least the pedantic protocols allow this evaluation; see "Protokoll über die Sitzung des Rates der Delegationsleiter", April 10, 1962, 1, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.

107 "Protokoll über die Sitzung des Rates der Delegationsleiter", April 10, 1962, 2, 24, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.

to fascism.[108] Deubner made them responsible for the existing racism in orthodox Marxist fashion; they still had to be educated in the socialist sense to abandon their racist worldview.[109]

In doing so, he admitted the existence of racism in the GDR, but externalized it to a social group that was not yet socialist enough. The heads of delegation then described their own experiences at the college in an attempt to explain that racism had become a general problem of everyday life. The Cameroonian Luc Bissay tried to make his East German colleagues aware of this fundamental problem. They "should for once take our black skin, our hair" and would then "realize what problems are still open, what educational work still has to be done".[110]

In the further course of the meeting, the East German representatives insisted on their one-dimensional economist analysis of racism. Nevertheless, in response to these reports and requests, Kampfert and Deubner promised to hold talks with conspicuous employees and students.[111] "German colleagues" acting in a discriminatory way have "no place at the school", they argued.[112] The East German announcements in this council meeting, which ultimately concluded the conflict, were a result of the protest practices of the African trade unionists studying in Bernau. They first made it possible to address racist incidents, and also achieved partial success with other demands, even if the constitution of a Afro-Asian committee was not initiated. This is illustrated by the measures announced by Heinz Deutschland as head of the institute. He reaffirmed the active participation in council meetings, which had been promised at the start of the whole conflict, and distributed a discussion paper containing suggestions for "improving cultural work and student care".[113] Amongst other things, this included students "reporting on their countries" once a month, in alphabetical order.[114] Furthermore, the institute's directorate proposed to increase the number

108 See Georgi Dimitroff, "Arbeiterklasse gegen Faschismus", in *Die Offensive des Faschismus und die Aufgaben der Kommunisten im Kampf für die Volksfront gegen Krieg und Faschismus. Referate auf dem VII. Kongreß der Kommunistischen Internationale (1935)*, ed. Institut für Marxismus-Leninismus (Berlin: Dietz, 1957), 91.
109 "Protokoll über die Sitzung des Rates der Delegationsleiter", April 10, 1962, 24–25, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.
110 "Protokoll über die Sitzung des Rates der Delegationsleiter", April 10, 1962, 18, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.
111 Ibid., 12.
112 Ibid., 26.
113 Ibid., 23.
114 "Protokoll über die Sitzung des Rates der Delegationsleiter", May 11, 1962, 2, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.

of excursions, such as "sightseeing and theatre trips", and announced the establishment of a club room explicitly intended for the participants of the courses, which was also intended for political discussions amongst one another.[115] Contact with the East German population—generally supervised with East German workers of certain selected workers' brigades—was also to be strengthened from now on.[116] Just like at the beginning of the conflict, the institute's directorate carefully took up politically justifiable aspects of student demands without allowing independent student initiatives to be created; yet, subordination to the political control of the East German confederation of trade unions had to be maintained.

In the comments on the offers made by FDGB board member Deubner, one can see that despite all the disciplinary motives the imagination of a progressive – or even revolutionary – role of African trade unionists also determined the actions of their East German colleagues. According to Deubner, the "friends" from Africa "also belonged to the vanguard of the working class", which, according to the Leninist credo, stood for the "future" of their homelands.[117] It was therefore essential that trade unionists inform each other "mutually" about their "countries", "cultures", and their respective "working classes" by means of the proposals submitted.[118] It can be assumed that this political assessment of the visiting students was also a central aspect for the East German hosts' approach, which was by no means punitive and repressive, but always aimed at closer political integration.

Ultimately, the students accepted the solutions presented here.[119] Some heads of delegation even praised the institute's efforts to create a calm atmosphere for discussion and to respond to their criticism.[120] From this point on, the protocols and reports of the institute's directorate no longer contained any dissenting votes or demands for a committee; instead, several references to

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115 "Protokoll über die Sitzung des Rates der Delegationsleiter", May 11, 1962, 2, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.

116 Ibid.

117 Ibid., 23–24.

118 Ibid., 25.

119 At the following council meeting, the heads of delegation present approved the collected proposals without dissenting votes; see "Protokoll über die Sitzung des Rates der Delegationsleiter", May 11, 1962, 2, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.

120 "Protokoll über die Sitzung des Rates der Delegationsleiter", April 10, 1962, 15–17, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.

the real implementation of the institute's proposals can be found in the corpus of sources.[121]

Conclusion

The results and the course of the conflict at the Bernau Institute for Foreign Students illustrate that African trade unionists were both seen as revolutionary subjects of Africa and treated as objects of constant paternalism. Their treatment as well as their political classification in East Germany resulted from the Leninist conception of a vanguard, in the shape of a leading party as the motor of social progress, upon which the GDR's power structure rested. Therefore, practices of all social milieus and groups were constantly subject to the "reservations of an elitist vanguard and its representatives"[122] as well as the "authoritarian-paternalistic social structure"[123] of the state-socialist one-party system.

This also applied to the African trade unionists, with their specific cadre training and their supposed vanguardist position during their temporary stay in Bernau. As one of the social groups with an ascribed special historical role on the path to world socialism, the national trade union federation FDGB, acting as the transmission belt of the SED, attempted to politically bind the course participants to this doctrine, the supposed universal validity of which lay in the "historical violence"[124] of the successful October Revolution. This motive for praxis illustrates the non-acceptance of any autonomous organizations beyond state-supporting structures, since these could have seen independent develop-

121 Regular contact with selected *Socialist Brigades* "in important production plants" was also implemented (see "Vorlage für die Institutsleitungssitzung am 25.5.62", May 24, 1962, 2, SAPMO-BArch DY 79/409), as was the prompt establishment of the promised clubroom, which was available in the evening with a small library and magazines in several languages; see "Schulordnung der Hochschule der Deutschen Gewerkschaften 'Fritz Heckert'", n.d., 7, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/270. In addition, they were more actively involved in the evaluation of teaching; see "Einladung zur Sitzung der Institutsleitung mit dem Rat der Delegationsleiter am 15.11.1962 in Lektionssaal 4", n.d., SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500; Protokoll über die Sitzung des Rates der Delegationsleiter, December 13, 1962, 2, SAPMO-BArch DY 79/2500.
122 Lindenberger, *Herrschaft*, 31.
123 Bernd Wagner, "Zu rechtsextremen Entwicklungen in den neuen Bundesländern", in *AfrikaBilder. Studien zu Rassismus in Deutschland*, ed. Susan Arndt (Münster: Unrast, 2006), 110.
124 Hans-Jürgen Krahl, "Zu Lenin, Staat und Revolution", in *Konstitution und Klassenkampf. Zur historischen Dialektik von bürgerlicher Emanzipation und proletarischer Revolution. Schriften, Reden und Entwürfe aus den Jahren 1966–1970*, ed. Hans-Jürgen-Krahl (Frankfurt: Neue Kritik, 1971), 182.

ments, enabling political dissidence or oppositional attitudes. It is important to note that in the conflict analyzed here, those responsible in East Germany did not opt for repressive measures but for an even more intensive political integration that incorporated selected demands. However, this decision was not only based on the special position of the African trade union students, but also on their ability to make use of the unstable foreign policy situation of the GDR, thereby highlighting a particularly fragile aspect of the political control they faced. Nevertheless, the majority of the Africans studying in Bernau recognized the role of the East German trade unionists as esteemed[125] providers of "political ideas"[126] and as profound experts of socialism as an exemplary developmental model, even if a considerable part favored alternatives such as a pan-African-influenced socialism.[127]

This also points to the reproductive character of the protests. Not only did the concessions obtained help the students to interact and communicate, they also expanded the institute's directorate course repertoire. It used these new structures for propagandistic work, for example to spread the image of an imperial West Germany, which certainly did not convince all course participants.[128] They treated these new possibilities as another option for teaching Marxism-Leninism and ensuring a following in opposition to the inner-German opponent in the West. Last but not least, the protests shown here were an important step for the further establishment of studies for foreigners at the FDGB college, which 4,400 trade unionists, especially from the Global South,[129] made use of until the end of the GDR.

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125 Letter from Bernard Obua to Heinz Deutschland, August 8, 1964, 1, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2511.

126 Letter from Abdelkader Djoudi to Helmut Lehmann, August 27, 1963, 1, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/616.

127 In general, so-called "Maoist" ideas were also widespread; see Bodie, "The FDGB Institute," 22–23.

128 "Bericht über die Ergebnisse der Westberlindiskussion im 3. afro-asiatischen Lehrgang," October 9, 1962, 5, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500.

129 Alfred Förster, *Die FDGB-Bundesschule "Theodor Leipart" Bernau bei Berlin* (Bernau: Verein Baudenkmal Bundesschule Bernau, 2007), 47.

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Planning and Shaping of Contract Labor Accord

Franziska Rantzsch

In October 1980, the Berliner Zeitung, one of the biggest dailies in the German Democratic Republic (GDR), published an article written by their popular economic journalist Dr. Karl-Heinz Gerstner about a visit by Mozambique's President Samora Machel:

> The encounters with Samora Machel will be remembered for a long time. I am not only referring to the warmth of our friendly feelings. It was also nice to hear from our African friend that the GDR has really helped Mozambique so far. At the meeting with the workers of the "Schwarze Pumpe" one saw in the first rows workers from Mozambique, who received their training here. In Halle, our friend met students from his homeland studying at the Martin Luther University. In the LPG [*Landwirtschaftliche Produktionsgenossenschaft,* agricultural production cooperative, F. R.] Lützen, he watched the potato harvest with modern farm machines. At the same time, 200 harvesters from Neustadt brought in the potato harvest in the Limpopo valley in Mozambique. Specialists in the blue shirts of the FDJ [*Freie Deutsche Jugend,* Free German Youth, F. R.] helped.[1]

The article presented a general view of the various kinds of development cooperation between the GDR and Mozambique for GDR citizens. For example, the state combine "Schwarze Pumpe" Gerstner referred to was involved in the coal mining project in Moatize, in the Mozambican province Tete, which started in 1978.[2] The FDJ's Friendship Brigades helped to construct accommodation for

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1 Original quote: "Die Begegnungen mit Samora Machel werden uns noch lange in Erinnerung bleiben. Ich meine nicht allein die Herzlichkeit unserer freundschaftlichen Gefühle. Es war uns auch angenehm, von unserem afrikanischen Freund zu hören: Was die DDR bisher für Mocambique getan hat, ist wirklich eine Hilfe. Bei dem Meeting mit den Arbeitern der Schwarzen Pumpe sah man in den ersten Reihen Arbeiter aus Mocambique, die hier ihre Ausbildung erhalten. In Halle traf unser Freund Studenten aus seiner Heimat, die an der Martin-Luther-Universität studieren. In der LPG Lützen beobachtete er die Kartoffelernte mit modernen Rodeladern. Zur gleichen Zeit fuhren im Tal des Reises bei Limpopo in Mocambique 200 Mähdrescher aus Neustadt die Ernte ein. Spezialisten im Blauhemd der FDJ halfen dabei". See Dr. Karl-Heinz Gerstner, "Hilfeleistung bei Lichte besehen," *Berliner Zeitung*, October 11, 1980, 9. Own translation.

2 Heide Künanz, "Das Steinkohleprojekt Moatize zwischen solidarischer Hilfeleistung und kommerziellen Anspruch," in *Die DDR und Afrika: Zwischen Klassenkampf und neuem Denken*, ed. Ulrich van der Heyden et al. (Münster: Lit, 1993), 174 – 191.

miners at Moatize.[3] Especially interesting is the fact that the article mentions the recruitment of contract workers from Mozambique among the numerous joint activities by the GDR and Mozambique that actually benefit Mozambique. In this respect, the article differs from the historical research on this subject. Most studies that focus on the economic history of the GDR read the recruitment of foreign workers as a strategy pursued solely to benefit the domestic economy of the GDR, not as part of a broadly conceived cooperation between the GDR and its allies in Africa and Asia.[4] This approach has recently been questioned more frequently in historical research and instead analyses concentrate on the recruitment of contract workers from Mozambique in the context of the broader relations between the GDR and its partners.[5] Admittedly, economic motives were crucial for the GDR's recruitment of contract workers, but nevertheless, in the Cold War era political-ideological motives were also important.

On February 24, 1979, the People's Republic of Mozambique and the GDR signed an accord on the temporary employment of Mozambican workers in socialist enterprises of the GDR in Maputo.[6] This bilateral contract included nine-

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3 Eric Burton, "Solidarität und ihre Grenzen: Die 'Brigaden der Freundschaft' der DDR," in *Internationale Solidarität: Globales Engagement in der Bundesrepublik und der DDR*, ed. Frank Bösch et al. (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 2018), 152 – 185; Landolf Scherzer, "Meine Ankunft in Mosambik," in *Mosambikanische Vertragsarbeiter in der DDR-Wirtschaft: Hintergrund – Verlauf – Folgen*, ed. Ulrich van der Heyden et al. (Münster: Lit, 2014), 143 – 149.

4 Cf. Sandra Gruner-Domić, "Zur Geschichte der Arbeitskräftemigration in die DDR: Die bilateralen Verträge zur Beschäftigung ausländischer Arbeiter, 1961 – 1989", *Internationale wissenschaftliche Korrespondenz zur Geschichte der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung* 32 (1996): 204 – 230; Mirjam Schulz, "Migrationspolitik in der DDR: Bilaterale Anwerbungsverträge von Vertragsarbeitnehmern," in *Transit. Transfer: Politik und Praxis der Einwanderung in die DDR 1945 – 1990*, ed. Kim Christian Priemel (Berlin: be.bra wissenschaft verlag, 2011), 143 – 168; Andreas Müggenburg, *Die ausländischen Vertragsarbeitnehmer in der ehemaligen DDR: Darstellung und Dokumentation* (Berlin: Die Beauftragte der Bundesregierung für die Belange der Ausländer, 1996).

5 Cf. Ulrich van der Heyden, *Das gescheiterte Experiment: Vertragsarbeiter aus Mosambik in der DDR-Wirtschaft (1979 – 1990)* (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2019), 394; Marcia Schenck, "Between Hammer, Machete, and Kalashnikov: Contract Labor Migration from Angola and Mozambique to East Germany, 1979 – 1990," *Europe Now* 15 (2018), accessed March 2018, https://www.europenowjournal.org/2018/02/28/between-hammer-machete-and-kalashnikov-contract-labor-migration-from-angola-and-mozambique-to-east-germany-1979-1990/.

6 Agreement between the Government of the GDR and the Government of the People's Republic of Mozambique on the temporary employment of Mozambican workers in socialist enterprises in the GDR (February 24, 1979) [Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der DDR und der Regierung der VR Mosambik über die zeitweilige Beschäftigung mosambikanischer Werktätiger in sozialistischen Betrieben der DDR (24. Februar 1979)], Political Archive of the Federal Foreign Office, Archives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the GDR [Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes,

teen articles and was amended or supplemented by annual protocols and subsequent agreements. The content of the accord was broad and supposed to regulate almost every detail of the procedure. Next to the scope and duration of the assignment, it also determined the precise definition of the areas of application, the organization of health checks for the workers, and the allocation of repatriation costs in case of death. This detailed subdivision can also be found in other contract labor accords, which the GDR concluded with Poland (1963) and Hungary (1967), but also with Cuba (1975) and Vietnam (1980).[7] The historical research often uses the finalized versions of the international accords as an analytical starting point. That the GDR profited from the contract labor accords cannot be denied, but it is also important to take a closer look at the interests of the sending country or in this case the Mozambican workers themselves.[8] As Ulrich van der Heyden noted in his extensive analysis of Mozambican contract workers, neither state has been outright forced to sign a contract labor accord. Nor were the Mozambican workers physically forced to report for deployment in the GDR. Instead, he pointed out that this was a project of development policy that was intended to benefit both sides.[9] I argue that an examination of the drafting and the process of negotiation of these accords as evidenced in the East German archives can contribute to a broader perspective on contract labor practices in the GDR. In this way, one can trace the range of possibilities in these negotiations, which allows us to draw conclusions about diplomatic relations between the GDR and Mozambique. Therefore, this analysis not only examines the intentions and demands that were made on both sides of the agree-

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Archiv des Ministeriums für Auswärtige Angelegenheiten der DDR], Berlin (henceforth: PA AA, MfAA), ZR 970/87.

7 Cf. Rita Röhr, "Die Beschäftigung polnischer Arbeitskräfte in der DDR 1966–1990: Die vertraglichen Grundlagen und ihre Umsetzung," *Archiv für Sozialgeschichte* 42 (2002): 211–236; Katalin Jarosi, "Umschwärmte Kavaliere und gewinnbringende Ehemänner: Ungarische Vertragsarbeiter in der DDR," in *Arbeitsmigration: WanderarbeiterInnen auf dem Weltmarkt für Arbeitskraft*, ed. Thomas Geisen (Frankfurt a. M.: IKO, 2005), 197–216; Sandra Gruner-Domić, *Kubanische Arbeitsmigration in die DDR 1978–1989: Das Arbeitskräfteabkommen Kuba – DDR und dessen Realisierung* (Berlin: Ed. Parabolis, 1997); Christina Schwenkel, "Socialist Mobilities: Crossing New Terrains in Vietnamese Migration Histories," *Central and Eastern European Migration Review* 4 (2015): 13–25; Damian Mac Con Uladh, "Die Alltagserfahrungen ausländischer Vertragsarbeiter in der DDR: Vietnamesen, Kubaner, Mosambikaner, Ungarn und andere," in *Erfolg in der Nische? Die Vietnamesen in der DDR und in Ostdeutschland*, ed. Karin Weiss and Dennis Mike (Münster: Lit, 2005), 51–67.

8 See Machava, and Ibraimo and Schenck, this volume.

9 van der Heyden, *Das gescheiterte Experiment*, 394.

ment, but also, as far as possible, under what conditions the diplomatic negotiations were conducted.

In the first section, I discuss the historical precedents in creating labor migration agreements for both the GDR and Mozambique. Especially for the Mozambican side it is necessary to recognize, that the negotiation process of the contract labor accord constitutes a socialist encounter that stood at the end of the entangled labor history with South Africa and at the beginning of a new history of entanglement between the GDR and Mozambique and entailed new moorings, linked to the resulting labor migration to East Germany. After that, I focus on the role of the contract labor accord as part of a process of intensifying political relations between those states. In addition, it is important to take into account the development politics of the GDR in the "Third World,"[10] and especially in states that officially proclaimed a socialist political course, as this deeply influenced the ideological conceptions of contract labor accords. Thus, the meaning of "international solidarity" as an expression of mutual advantage as part of the creation of the bilateral accord will also be questioned. The analysis is based on negotiating guidelines and reports from the Secretariat for Labor and Wages and the related decisions of the Council of Ministers of the GDR, as well as agreements signed by the Secretariat for Labor and Wages and the Ministry of Labor of the People's Republic of Mozambique. These documents primarily help to reconstruct the intensions of the GDR, but they also give limited insight into the demands and reactions of the Mozambican side. Unfortunately, these documents cannot reflect the planning processes of the Mozambican government. The analysis takes place from the perspective of the GDR and its dealings with the Mozambican side in the negotiation process. What demands did the GDR make on Mozambique and how did the GDR deal with the demands of the Mozambican side? In this context, it will be demonstrated that Mozambique had a voice in shaping the agreement and that controversies arose on both sides due to a lack of knowledge about each other, which had a lasting impact on the negotiations. Finally, a brief outlook on the further course of the labor agreement will be given.

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10 In the GDR, and elsewhere in the post-war era, the term "Third World" was used to denote new states that emerged in Asia, Africa, and Latin America as part of the decolonization process that did not clearly fit into a bipolar Cold War division of the world. Based on theories of modernization these countries were also considered as being economically backward and thus "underdeveloped"; see Jürgen Dinkel, "'Dritte Welt' – Geschichte und Semantiken, Version: 1.0," *Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte* (2014), accessed October 6, 2014, doi:10.14765/zzf.dok.2.596.v1.

Previous Labor Migration Agreements

By 1978, the GDR was able to look back on extensive experience in the negotiation of labor migration agreements. The first accord on the employment of foreign workers was concluded by the Socialist Unity Party (*Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands*, SED) with Poland in 1963. After that, a whole series of other bilateral agreements with socialist or at least socialist-leaning states followed: Hungary (1967), Algeria (1974), and Cuba (1975).[11] Although the authorities had gained some experience in dealing with foreign workers since the 1960s, the specific characteristics of every country forced the responsible bureaucrats to adapt individually to the new foreign workers after each agreement – a task that involved the Ministry of State Security (MfS or Stasi), especially in monitoring the foreign workers. Thus, it was not unusual for the Stasi to prepare an evaluation of the planned agreement with Mozambique.[12] Since the surveillance of foreigners fell within the remit of state security, the so-called "Foreigners Working Group" (*AG Ausländer*) was created as part of the Department of Counterintelligence in 1980 to centralize this task. According to the Stasi, foreigners (*Ausländer*) were defined as "all people, who are not GDR citizens who reside in the territory of the GDR."[13] This included Soviet occupying forces, political emigrants, foreign students, and also contract workers from Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The special observation status was justified by the SED government, on the one hand, based on the almost paranoid fear of hostile attacks against the GDR and, on the other hand, the concerns for GDR prestige abroad.

For Mozambique, state-induced temporary labor migration was also not a novelty. Since the nineteenth century, labor migration between southern Mozambique and South African mines was one of the most significant aspects of the

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11 Cf. Röhr, "Die Beschäftigung polnischer Arbeitskräfte in der DDR 1966 – 1990," 211 – 236; Jarosi, "Umschwärmte Kavaliere und gewinnbringende Ehemänner: Ungarische Vertragsarbeiter in der DDR," 197 – 216; Gruner-Domić, *Kubanische Arbeitsmigration in die DDR 1978 – 1989*; Mac Con Uladh, "Die Alltagserfahrungen ausländischer Vertragsarbeiter in der DDR," 51 – 67.

12 Opinion on the draft decision about the deployment of Mozambican workers in the GDR (March 26, 1979) [Meinungsäußerung zum Beschlussentwurf über den Einsatz mosambikanischer Werktätiger in der DDR (26. März 1979)], Federal Commissioner for the Records of the State Security Service of the former German Democratic Republic Stasi Records Agency [Bundesbeauftragte für die Unterlagen des Staatssicherheitsdienstes der ehemaligen Deutschen Demokratischen Republik], Berlin (henceforth: BStU), MfS, Abt. X, Nr. 812, sheet 129 – 130.

13 Lecture as part of a political-technical training by the Ministry of State Security (undated) [Vortrag im Rahmen einer politisch-technischen Ausbildung durch das Ministerium für Staatssicherheit (undatiert)], BStU, MfS, HA II, Nr. 28659, sheet 7 – 49. Own translation.

two countries' economic and social relationship. During Portuguese colonial rule, nearly one third of the male population in the south of Mozambique was contracted to the mines for between 12 and 18 months at a time; the vast majority of the migration took place within a state-managed framework, a few migrants found their way to South Africa along different routes.[14] The migration of Mozambican miners was an important economic factor for the Portuguese and also for the British colonial rulers in South Africa. For example, in 1928, it was agreed that at least 65,000 Mozambican workers should work in the mines in South Africa. This number increased to nearly 100,000 by the mid 1930s. The Great Depression of 1929, however, had a negative impact on almost all sectors of the South African economy and gold mining was no exception. As a result, many South Africans sought work in the mines, which eventually led to a decline in demand of Mozambican labor.[15] However, the number of Mozambicans working in the mines was still very high. That did not change until the mid 1970s. After Mozambique gained its independence under the leadership of the Mozambique Liberation Front (Frente de Libertação de Moçambique, FRELIMO) in 1975, the bilateral contracts for labor migration with South Africa remained basically in place, although the number of recruits dropped significantly. The main reasons for this were the consequences of investing in the mechanization of work, the will of mine operators to be less dependent on migrant workers, and the increased price of gold, which made it possible to pay higher wages and make work more attractive to the local population. While not all Mozambican migrant workers were dismissed because their experience could not be easily replaced, hardly any new workers were recruited.[16]

After independence, Mozambique faced major economic problems. The colonial economy the Portuguese rulers had built primarily based on the production of agricultural goods was labor export-oriented. Also the rapid exodus of the formerly Portuguese settlers—including many skilled workers—during and after the independence process left the Mozambican economy in disarray and was anoth-

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14 Barry Munslow, "State Intervention in Agriculture: The Mozambican Experience," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 22 (1984): 200; see also Sara Mercandalli, Christopher Changwe Nshimbi, and Inocent Moyo, "Mozambican Labour Migrations, Remittances and Development: Evidence, Practices and Implications for Policy," in *Migration, Cross-Border Trade and Development in Africa: Exploring the Role of Non-State Actors in the SADC Region*, ed. Sara Mercandalli et al. (Cham: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 18.

15 Napoleão Gaspar, "The Reduction of Mozambican Workers in South African Mines, 1975–1992: A Case Study of the Consequences for Gaza Province – District of Chibuto" (PhD diss., Universidade Eduardo Mondlane, 2006), accessed May 16, 2008, hdl.handle.net/10539/4839, 31–32.

16 Gaspar, "The Reduction of Mozambican Workers in South African Mines," 41–42.

er obstacle to the industrialization of the country.[17] The decline in the use of migrant labor in the 1930s had already shown how much Mozambique was dependent on the South African economy, especially its labor market. Therefore, the leaders of FRELIMO initially stuck to this concept, because they were unable to create employment alternatives for migrant workers in the south of the country after taking power.[18] In the long term, however, FRELIMO decided that sending miners to South Africa should be discontinued. The Mozambican government, especially after the party congress in 1977, pursued a Marxist-Leninist policy that explicitly aimed to break away from dependence on the South African economy. Its new leaders believed that industrialization, strengthening of the public sector, and the development of collective peasant structures would finally raise Mozambique to the status of a developed socialist state.[19] To this end, FRELIMO aimed to change the dynamics that created labor migration, mainly focused on the migrant workers to South Africa, and to productively reintegrate them into the Mozambican economy. Nevertheless, new methods had to be found to sustainably relieve the pressure on the domestic labor market and the intensification of relations with the GDR offered the Mozambican government an opportunity in this area. The sending of workers to the GDR was intended to remove unemployed unskilled workers from the domestic labor market for a certain period of time and then to reintegrate them after that as skilled workers into the domestic economy. Unlike the previous migrations to South Africa this time skills training was an important factor for the Mozambican government preparing to build a more industrialized country. After independence and the resulting departure of Portuguese skilled labor, it was urgently necessary for the Mozambican economy to make up for the ensuing shortage.[20]

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17 Allen Isaacman and Barbara Isaacman, *Mozambique: From Colonialism to Revolution, 1900–1982* (Boulder et al.: Westview Press 1983), 145.

18 Ramos Cardoso Muanamoha, "The Dynamics of Undocumented Mozambican Labour Migration to South Africa" (PhD diss., University of KwaZulu-Natal, 2008), accessed March 2008, http://www.repositorio.uem.mz/handle/123456789/278, 39–40.

19 Hector Guerra Hernandez, "Cooperación para el desarrollo en tiempos de internacionalismo: Los hombres nuevos de Machel," *Vibrant – Virtual Brazilian Anthropology* 9 (2012): 567; Grete Brochmann, "Migrant Labour and Foreign Policy: The Case of Mozambique," *Journal of Peace Research* 22 (1985): 337.

20 Cf. Hector Guerra Hernandez, "Ma(d)jermanes: passado colonial e presente diasporizado: reconstrução etnográfica de um dos últimos vestígios do socialismo colonial europeu" (PhD diss., Universidade Estadual de Campinas, 2011), accessed August 19, 2018, http://www.repositorio.unicamp.br/handle/REPOSIP/280790; Hector Guerra Hernandez, "RAND à RDA? Modernização compulsória e práticas sociais e estratégias de mobilidade social," *(con) textos: Revista d'antropologia i investigació social* 3 (2009): 61–83.

Intensification of Foreign Relations

After the official founding of the People's Republic of Mozambique in 1975, the country faced numerous problems. Although FRELIMO had prevailed, a civil war lasting over 15 years against the anti-communist Mozambican National Resistance (Resistência Nacional Moçambicana, RENAMO), backed primarily by South Africa, the USA and West Germany, followed formal independence.[21] Apartheid South Africa, an important trading partner of the former colony Mozambique, also tried to undermine the new state and its economy. Furthermore, after the exodus of Portuguese settlers, Mozambique required skilled workers to develop its industries.[22] Thus, the new government under the leadership of FRELIMO sought supporters. It focused mainly on the states of the Eastern bloc and, to an extent, to Scandinavian countries and their solidarity committees, because the NATO members had—if not officially, at least in their de facto politics—sided with their partner Portugal in the struggle over who was to rule Mozambique. Since the middle of the 1960s, the GDR had financially supported FRELIMO as a liberation movement against Portuguese colonialism. Based on this early financial aid FRELIMO hoped for a deepening of economic and political ties with East Berlin after it seized power. Around that time West Germany had abandoned its claim to be the only representative of Germany (in accordance with the so-called "Hallstein Doctrine"). In 1973, both states were admitted to join the United Nations and consequently East Berlin started opening embassies all over the world. At first, however, the GDR hesitated to upgrade its relations with Mozambique, because FRELIMO had not so far announced its economic and social orientation now that it had taken control of the former colony. Only in February 1977, after President Samora Machel clearly declared his support for socialism to the SED envoy Werner Lamberz[23] at the Third FRELIMO Congress

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21 Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 207–218; Margaret Hall and Tom Young, *Confronting Leviathan: Mozambique since Independence* (London: Hurst & Company 1997), 131–133.

22 Peter Meyns, *Konflikt und Entwicklung im südlichen Afrika* (Opladen: Leske + Budrich, 2000), 181.

23 Werner Lamberz (1929–1978): since 1967 Lamberz was secretary of the Central Committee and since 1971 member of the SED-Politburo. He was founding vice president of the German-African Society and had considerable influence on the re-profiling of the Africa policy of the GDR. He died in a helicopter crash in Libya on March 6, 1978; see Ulf Engel and Hans-Georg Schleicher, *Die beiden deutschen Staaten in Afrika: Zwischen Konkurrenz und Koexistenz 1949–1990* (Hamburg: Institut für Afrika-Kunde, 1998), 110–113.

did the GDR agree to forge closer ties.[24] With its official commitment to socialism, Mozambique became one of the most important countries for the GDR's foreign policy of international solidarity in the ideological conflict between capitalism and socialism.

As a result, an "immediate program" (*Sofortprogramm*) was agreed upon by the two nations that same year at the Leipzig Autumn Trade Fair, which set in motion the deepening of economic ties between the two states. In November 1977, an "Agreement on Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation", signed by Horst Sölle (Minister of Foreign Trade) and Marcelino dos Santos (Minister of Planning and Development), followed. It included a variety of joint projects for the extraction of raw materials in Mozambique, especially pit coal. Among other things, the GDR was supposed to send experts and advisors to provide and set up industrial equipment. The culmination of this partnership were Erich Honecker's trips to Africa in February and November 1979, visiting Libya, Angola, Zambia, Mozambique, and Ethiopia. He was accompanied by a high-ranked delegation consisting of Willi Stoph (Chairman of the Council of Ministers), Hermann Axen (Secretary of the Central Committee, foreign policy commission), Günter Mittag (Secretary of the Central Committee, economic issues), Oskar Fischer (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Julian Hollender (Ambassador of the GDR to the People's Republic of Mozambique, 1978 – 1981) and also by a group of "experts" from the Department of International Connections of the Central Committee of the SED, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Foreign Trade.[25] At the end of their visit to Mozambique, a "Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation" was signed in Maputo. The conclusion of further agreements of a political or economic nature, including an agreement on the temporary employment of Mozambican workers in the GDR, followed during Honecker's stay in Mozambique.[26]

24 Hans-Joachim Döring, *"Es geht um unsere Existenz." Die Politik der DDR gegenüber der Dritten Welt am Beispiel von Mosambik und Äthiopien* (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2001), 143 – 150.

25 Schedule for the visit of the GDR party and state delegation headed by Erich Honecker in the People's Republic of Mozambique (February 1979) [Zeitplan für den Besuch der DDR-Partei und der Staatsdelegation unter der Leitung von Erich Honecker in der Volksrepublik Mosambik (Februar 1979)], PA AA, MfAA ZR, 2288/89.

26 Döring, "*Es geht um unsere Existenz*," 159 – 161.

Planning and Shaping of "International Solidarity"

In view of diplomatic relations and the contracts concluded up to that point, at this time—from a GDR perspective—it was possible to speak of an "equal partnership" between the GDR and Mozambique. Though Mozambique was not indeed on the same level of experience in the negotiation of labor migration as the GDR, according to the official discourse, their economic relations would be following the principle of mutual benefit. According to the GDR Foreign Policy Dictionary of 1980, the term "international solidarity" encompasses an extension of the class-based behavioral principles of "togetherness, consensus, mutual support and commitment, support and sacrifice." "International solidarity" in this context stood for the "fraternal cohesion of the revolutionary department of a country with the international revolutionary labor movement, with all allies in the anti-imperialist struggle." In the correlation with development policy, priority has been given to the principle of so-called "socialist economic aid," which according to the dictionary definition was founded "on the basis of equality, non-discrimination and mutual benefit" and should serve "free of exploitation, acquisition of property and sovereignty-infringing conditions [...] political independence, development of the national economy in general and social progress of young states."[27] Socialist economic aid was closely linked to the concept of "international solidarity." However, with the Commercial Coordination Division (*Bereich Kommerzielle Koordinierung*, commonly known as KoKo), under direction of Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski and responsible for the procurement of convertible foreign currency, there was another level that had a lasting impact on the GDR's economic cooperation with countries in the Global South. As Berthold Unfried shows, it is difficult to draw a clear dividing line between regular economic relations and development policy measures, since the two levels often influenced each other.[28] That is what happened in regard to the contract labor accord between the GDR and Mozambique – educational aid merged with economic interests.

27 Institut für Internationale Beziehungen an der Akademie für Staats- und Rechtswissenschaft der DDR, ed., *Wörterbuch der Außenpolitik und des Völkerrechts* (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1980), 150 – 152, 528. Own translation.
28 Berthold Unfried, "Instrumente und Praktiken von 'Solidarität' Ost und 'Entwicklungshilfe' West: Blickpunkt auf das entsandte Personal," in *Die eine Welt schaffen: Praktiken von 'Internationaler Solidarität' und 'Internationaler Entwicklung'*, ed. Berthold Unfried and Eva Himmelstoss (Leipzig: AVA, 2012), 77.

Already at the beginning of the 1980s, the GDR was facing rapidly increasing economic problems and Mozambique was no longer able to adhere to the terms of the treaties due to its intensifying civil war. This was the beginning, when the balance ran aground. Mainly because the railway connecting the pit coal mining complex Moatize with the port of Beira suffered from continuous sabotage from RENAMO rebels, Mozambique was not able to fulfill its coal delivery agreements; so as a result, debt began to accumulate towards the GDR.[29] Also, the GDR faced increasing economic problems and actively pursued the acquisition of foreign exchange. Thus, both states were confronted with problems that came to have a lasting effect on the further course of the contract labor migration.

The international development policy commitments of the GDR consisted of several branches: First, in the realm of foreign trade, there were preferential price contracts, awarding of favorable loans, bartering, and free services. This was intended to strengthen the economic relations between the GDR and Mozambique and, in accordance with the socialist principle of trade, both sides should benefit. As a result, the GDR countered its counterparties' lending terms and paid amounts well above normal market prices due to closed preference price agreements for commodity imports. Because of constant shortages of foreign exchange, which resulted mainly from the existing import surpluses, trade with Mozambique was mostly based on a direct exchange of commodities for commodities.[30] It is important to emphasize that bartering with countries of the Global South was in many cases beneficial for the GDR, as it enabled to cheaply buy raw materials, thus saved important foreign exchange.[31] In addition to GDR development policy involvement, such as the supply of agricultural machinery and the assistance of Free German Youth (FDJ) brigades, the support also included "educational aid."[32] For example, the GDR Solidarity Committee promoted the training of foreign students with scholarships.[33] However, the training

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29 Künanz, "Das Steinkohleprojekt Moatize zwischen solidarischer Hilfeleistung und kommerziellen Anspruch," 179 – 184.

30 Verburg, Maria Magdalena, *Ostdeutsche Dritte-Welt-Gruppen vor und nach 1989/90* (Göttingen: V & R Unipress, 2012), 24.

31 Cf. Anne Dietrich, "Kaffee in der DDR – 'Ein Politikum ersten Ranges'," in *Kaffeewelten: Historische Perspektiven auf eine globale Ware im 20. Jahrhundert*, ed. Christiane Berth et al. (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2015), 225 – 247; Immanuel R. Harisch, "Bartering Coffee, Cocoa and W50 Trucks: The Trade Relationships of the GDR, Angola and São Tomé in a Comparative Perspective," *Global Histories* 3 (2017): 43 – 60.

32 See Piepiorka and Buanaissa, this volume.

33 There was no overarching ministry in the GDR that coordinated development measures. Instead, the management of the projects and the negotiation of agreements with the countries concerned fell within the area of responsibility of the respective state authorities, such as the Min-

of Mozambican workers was a mixture of development aid and economic benefits. Already in the run-up to the "Agreement on Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation," concluded on November 15, 1977, the Mozambican government asked the GDR, if it is possible to send 50 to 100 Mozambican workers to the GDR for vocational training. Thus, from September 1978, the first group of 65 workers came to the GDR and was trained to work in the cement industry, the transporting sector, and in the sugar industry. This sector selection was based on the key industries of the Mozambican economy. The trainees had to complete a five-month language course in German before starting the two-year vocational training. The Ministry of Foreign Trade and the relevant Ministries of Economic Affairs were primarily responsible for the organization, financing, and implementation of the vocational qualification.[34]

At this point, it is important to emphasize that the vocational training of workers based on the "Agreement on Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation" – was not the same type of vocational training that was later part of the contract labor accord from 1979. Instead of vocational training, the contract labor accord stipulated that the assignment was linked to the simultaneous provision of practical work experience as a part of providing productive activity and vocational education and training in the context of in-company adult qualification.[35] In contrast to direct financial support, this form of "development aid" was feasible for the GDR since it was resource-efficient enough to be financed on the

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istry of Foreign Affairs or the Secretariat for Labor and Wages. Despite this division of competence areas, all positions were subject to the instructions of the Central Committee of the SED. The only institution that commanded a concentrated coordination center for "development aid" was the Solidarity Committee of the GDR. This social organization was primarily responsible for the implementation of "international solidarity". The area of responsibility of the committee included the procurement of financial and material funds for development policy projects as well as the support of anti-imperialist liberation movements in Asia, Africa, and Latin America; see Hans-Joachim Spanger, and Lothar Brock, *Die beiden deutschen Staaten in der Dritten Welt: Die Entwicklungspolitik der DDR – Eine Herausforderung für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland?* (Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag, 1987), 214 – 217.

34 Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the GDR, resolution on the proposal on the professional qualification of citizens of Mozambique in the GDR (October 27, 1977) [Präsidium des Ministerrats der DDR, Beschluss zum Vorschlag über die berufliche Qualifizierung von Bürgern der VR Mosambik in der DDR (27. Oktober 1977)], BStU, MfS, HA II, Nr. 32490, sheet 4 – 8.

35 Agreement between the Government of the GDR and the Government of the People's Republic of Mozambique on the temporary employment of Mozambican workers in socialist enterprises in the GDR (February 24, 1979) [Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der DDR und der Regierung der VR Mosambik über die zeitweilige Beschäftigung mosambikanischer Werktätiger in sozialistischen Betrieben der DDR (24. Februar 1979)], PA AA, MfAA, ZR 970/87.

limited East German budget of convertible currencies. Moreover, such an approach was seen to be not only economically, but also ideologically useful.[36]

In the first draft of the contract labor accord it was already stated that the vocational qualification was oriented both to the existing technical installations in Mozambique and to the key industries of the national economy. Furthermore, workers should only be employed in areas in which they had already gained practical experience.[37] This was intended to ensure that the workers could actually use the acquired knowledge after their return to Mozambique. It was also stipulated that workers should be given the opportunity to continue their professional education at GDR enterprises after their regular working time. In general, however, the Secretariat for Labor and Wages did not undertake any obligation to achieve specific qualification goals in its concept paper.[38] These were instead ultimately determined between the workers and the companies through respective qualification contracts.[39] This practice gave the contract workers a certain degree of individual responsibility, which was, however, fundamentally dependent on the actual implementation of the requirements of the enterprises.

Since the civil servants in the Secretariat for Labor and Wages, like Horst Rademacher (1967–1977), and later Wolfgang Beyreuther (1977–1989) already had some experience in the preparation of such negotiations, it took only a few months to finalize the negotiation plans with Mozambique. In September 1978, initial calculations were made internally to determine and optimize the economic value of the contract labor. In a letter to Wolfgang Beyreuther, an employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs indicated that the "additional financial burden of training a foreign citizen to become a skilled worker" would cost between 8,000 and 9,000 East German Marks (DDM) per year, with the extra output generated in production amounting to 12,000 to 15,000 DDM. As a result, Beyreuther was ad-

36 Eric Allina, " 'Neue Menschen für Mosambik.' Erwartungen an und Realität von Vertragsarbeit in der DDR der 1980er-Jahre," *Arbeit, Bewegung, Geschichte: Zeitschrift für historische Studien* 3 (2016): 66.

37 Concept paper for the temporary employment of working people from developing countries in the production process of national enterprises of the GDR (September 6, 1978) [Konzeption zur zeitweiligen Beschäftigung von Werktätigen aus Entwicklungsländern im Produktionsprozess volkseigener Betriebe der DDR (6. September 1978)], BStU, MfS, HA II, Nr. 32493, sheet 63–67.

38 Ibid.

39 See article 9, paragraph 2 in Agreement between the Government of the GDR and the Government of the People's Republic of Mozambique on the temporary employment of Mozambican workers in socialist enterprises in the GDR (February 24, 1979) [Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der DDR und der Regierung der VR Mosambik über die zeitweilige Beschäftigung mosambikanischer Werktätiger in sozialistischen Betrieben der DDR (24. Februar 1979)], PA AA, MfAA, ZR 970/87.

vised to suggest to the Council of Ministers "that it would be more expedient for the GDR from 1982 onwards—and with a lower foreign exchange burden—to aim for two years of vocational training followed by 2–3 years of work in the GDR."[40] A more detailed breakdown of these calculations can be found in an appraisal of the economic costs and benefits of using Mozambicans in GDR enterprises in the formal decision to implement the agreement of May 1979. It calculated that, for 2,000 Mozambican contract workers, the cost for the GDR would be around 15 million DDM, whereas the annual production value of the additional labor force was estimated to be 20 million DDM. Thus, the letter concluded: "Expenditure and economic benefits of the employment of Mozambican workers for the GDR are likely to balance each other."[41] The GDR would not make a large profit, but would be able to maintain its own production.

The training of workers was also an important aspect of the FRELIMO policy program.

> Increasing training of workers and peasants in the field of the science and technique of the productive process is a decisive front in the battle for complete independence. On a par with the development of education, all structures—state or private—should, in a co-ordinated way, launch permanent and successive professional training activities for the nation's workers.[42]

Overcoming colonial structures and building up an independent economy was the top priority for Mozambique. In this context, especially the integration of young people into the labor market was particularly important.

> We must give special attention to involving young people who have completed their studies in productive activity. To put an end to anarchy in the labour market, a body must be set up

40 Note on the draft accord (September 19, 1978) [Anmerkung zum Abkommensentwurf (19. September 1978)], Federal Archives, Foundation Archives of Political Parties and Mass Organizations in the GDR [Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv], Berlin (henceforth: SAPMO-BArch), DQ3/1026. Own translation.

41 Decision of the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the GDR on the implementation of the Agreement (February 24, 1979) with the Government of the People's Republic of Mozambique on the temporary employment of Mozambican working people in socialist enterprises in the GDR (May 31, 1979) [Beschluss des Präsidium des Ministerrates der DDR vom 31. Mai 1979 über die Durchführung des Abkommens vom 24. Februar 1979 mit der Regierung der VR Mosambik über die zeitweilige Beschäftigung mosambikanischer Werktätiger in sozialistischen Betrieben der DDR], BStU, MfS, HA II, Nr. 32490, sheet 32–44.

42 Samora Moisés Machel, "Central Committee Report [to the Third Congress], Maputo" (published June 6, 1978. Translation into English by the Mozambique-Angola-Guiné Information Centre (MAGIC), London), 56–57.

to make sure these young people are employed in a planned way, taking into consideration their technical and political qualities, and the priorities for the country's development.[43]

The labor accord with the GDR promised to carry out the economic plans, which were formulated on the Third Congress of FRELIMO, held in February 1977.

The agreement was supposed to benefit both sides. Mozambique profited from the training of its workers, the relief of the domestic labor market and the creation of professional prospects for young people. For the GDR, it solved the labor shortage that seriously threatened economic production. To maintain and increase production was a central aspect of the SED government's claim to power. After all, with his program of "unity of economic and social policy" (*Einheit von Wirtschafts- und Sozialpolitik*) Honecker had promised an increase in the standard of living in the GDR.[44] In addition, the training of skilled workers in the designated workers' and peasants' state GDR represented a form of truly "international solidarity" for the SED leadership and its propaganda machine.

The Negotiations of the Contract Labor Accord

On October 12, 1978, one month after the initial calculations, the Presidium of the Council of Ministers of the GDR decided to enter into negotiations with the Mozambican government for a contract labor accord that worked independently of the "Agreement on Economic and Scientific-Technical Cooperation."[45] These documents formed the basis for the first talks on the draft accord with a delega-

43 Ibid., 64.
44 Joint decision of the Central Committee of the SED, the Federal Executive of the FDGB and the Council of Ministers of the GDR on social policy measures in the implementation of the main task of the five-year plan decided on at the 8th SED Party Congress, (April 28, 1972) [Gemeinsamer Beschluss des Zentralkomitees der SED, der Bundesleitung des FDGB und des Ministerrates der DDR über sozialpolitische Maßnahmen zur Umsetzung der Hauptaufgabe des auf dem 8. SED-Parteitag beschlossenen Fünfjahresplans (28. April 1972)], printed in Günter Benser, ed., *Dokumente zur Geschichte der SED, Vol. 3: 1971–1986* (Berlin: Dietz Verlag, 1986), 73–74.
45 Decision on the guideline for negotiations with the Government of the Republic of Mozambique about the preparation of an intergovernmental agreement on the temporary employment of Mozambican workers in socialist enterprises in the GDR (October 12, 1978) [Beschluss zur Direktive für die Verhandlungen mit der Regierung der VR Mosambik zur Vorbereitung eines Regierungsabkommens über die zeitweilige Beschäftigung mosambikanischer Werktätiger in sozialistischen Betrieben der DDR (12. Oktober 1978)], BStU, MfS, HA II, Nr. 32490, sheet 9–22.

tion from Mozambique, under the direction of Amandio Chongo[46] (Ministry of Labor, Department for Vocational Training), held in East Berlin.[47] As part of these negotiations, some questions, for example the determination of health suitability, early termination of the employment contract and vacation trips of the workers to Mozambique, remained open and had to be clarified internally by the SED. In addition, the Mozambican representatives had made some new proposals, like a vacation day for Mozambican workers on the Mozambican national day and the supply of workers with press products from Mozambique, which also needed to be discussed.[48] At the beginning of February 1979, a delegation of the Secretariat for Labor and Wages, consisting of Ingolf Noack (deputy), Ernst-Otto Jacobs (head of inspection) and Lutz Hoepner (interpreter), traveled to Mozambique to continue the negotiation of the agreement with the Mozambican Ministry of Labor, under direction of Alberto Cassimo (Minister of Labor).[49] Based on the revised version of the negotiating guideline, it is easy to understand which critical points had to be discussed in detail during this

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46 Amandio Rafael Moises Chongo (*1945) joined FRELIMO in Tanzania in the mid-1960s. There he received his first military training, which he perfected especially in the field of artillery with a training period in the Soviet Union in 1966. After that he was then an active military fighter but also took care of the military and political training of guerrillas. In the summer of 1970, he lost a leg during a fight and worked until 1976 as a diplomatic relations manager for FRELIMO in Italy. Then he joined the Ministry of Labor, Department for Vocational Training; source: "Amandio Rafael Moises Chongo", Archive portal of the IBC network of Emilia-Romagna, accessed July 26, 2020, http://archivi.ibc.regione.emilia-romagna.it/ibc-cms/cms.find?&id=produttori&.titolo=chongo&numDoc=8&munu_str=0_1_2&.date=&archType=auther&perpage=30&realTemplate=templateRicercaProduttori&flagfind=customXdamsFindProduttori&.q=&fromId=y&qrId=3se4482248f8810101&physDoc=961&pos=0&archType=auther#nogo.

47 Joint minutes of the delegation visit by representatives of the Mozambican Ministry of Labor in Berlin (November 6, 1978) [Gemeinsames Protokoll zum Delegationsbesuch von Vertretern des mosambikanischen Arbeitsministeriums in Berlin (6. November 1978)], SAPMO-BArch, DQ3/1026.

48 Guideline for the negotiations with a delegation of the Ministry of Labor of the Republic of Mozambique in Maputo (February 1979) about the preparation of the intergovernmental Agreement on the temporary employment of Mozambican workers in the GDR (undated) [Direktive für die Verhandlungen mit einer Delegation des Arbeitsministeriums der Volksrepublik Mosambik in Maputo (Februar 1979) über die Vorbereitung eines zwischenstaatlichen Abkommens zur befristeten Beschäftigung mosambikanischer Werktätiger in der DDR (undatiert)], BStU, MfS, HA II, Nr. 32490, sheet 23–30.

49 Telegram from the GDR ambassador Julian Hollender about the preparation of the delegation talks between the Secretariat for Labor and Wages of the GDR and the Ministry of Labor in Mozambique (January 17, 1979) [Telegramm des DDR-Botschafters Julian Hollender über die Vorbereitung der Delegationsgespräche zwischen dem Staatssekretariat für Arbeit und Löhne der DDR und dem Arbeitsministerium in Mosambik (17. Januar 1979)], SAPMO-BArch, DQ3/1026.

time. In it, individual paragraphs of the first draft accord were listed and clearly formulated along with how many concessions could be granted by the GDR representatives to the Mozambican delegation. These formulations were partially supplemented with detailed justifications.

As a first example, the GDR demanded a joint medical commission to determine the fitness of prospective contract workers. The primary aim was that Mozambique should cover all costs for East German doctors to travel to Mozambique as well as their room and board once they arrived. If this proposal was not approved by Alberto Cassimo, the delegation members could propose to share the costs, so that the GDR took over the travel expenses while Mozambique would finance the accommodation. If this should be rejected by the Mozambicans as well, it could also be agreed that the investigation be carried out by doctors from Mozambique alone. The guideline stipulated, however, that this provision should then be carefully enforced and that an involvement of foreign doctors presently deployed in Mozambique, mainly Chinese or Portuguese, should be excluded.[50] The results of the negotiations can be found in the report of the Secretariat for Labor and Wages from February 23, 1979, one day before the accord was signed: In the end, the Mozambican side agreed to take over the subsistence costs of the GDR doctors, which meant that the Mozambican government had rejected assuming the full cost of the inspections.[51] This point shows that the GDR was willing to compromise, and that the SED negotiators did not aim to impose its demands by any means necessary, especially because the GDR economy would also benefit from the envisaged contract.

As we can see on the basis of the archived protocols of the negotiation process, the Mozambican representatives of FRELIMO were not merely reactive players during the phase of negotiations, and they brought their own interests and

50 Guideline for the negotiations with a delegation of the Ministry of Labor of the Republic of Mozambique in Maputo (February 1979) about the preparation of the intergovernmental Agreement on the temporary employment of Mozambican workers in the GDR (undated) [Direktive für die Verhandlungen mit einer Delegation des Arbeitsministeriums der Volksrepublik Mosambik in Maputo (Februar 1979) über die Vorbereitung eines zwischenstaatlichen Abkommens zur befristeten Beschäftigung mosambikanischer Werktätiger in der DDR (undatiert)], BStU, MfS, HA II, Nr. 32490, sheet 23–30.

51 Report of the Secretariat for Labor and Wages on the negotiations on the Agreement between the Government of the GDR and the People's Republic of Mozambique (February 13–20, 1979) about the temporary employment of Mozambican working people in the GDR in Maputo (February 23, 1979) [Bericht des SAL über die Verhandlungen zum Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der DDR und der VR Mosambik (13.–20. Februar 1979) über die zeitweilige Beschäftigung mosambikanischer Werktätiger in der DDR in Maputo (23. Februar 1979)], BStU, MfS, HA II, Nr. 32490, sheet 91–96.

ideas to the discussion. In the draft prepared by the GDR, the section on premature termination of employment contracts stipulate that this could be done if the worker made himself liable to punishment, violated so-called "socialist labor discipline,"[52] or if he was out of work for more than three months due to illness.[53] In return, Alberto Cassimo demanded, that it should be possible to initiate a premature termination of the employment contract in the event of a breach of duty by GDR enterprises or due to extenuating Mozambican state interests. Cassimo justified this demand with the fact that the party leadership of FRELIMO decided that workers who do not stick to their revolutionary mandate should be sent back immediately.[54] The GDR agreed to this proposal without protest. The report also stated, however, that further arrangements still had to be made in this regard. They decided that if an East German company does not fulfill its obligations, the employment relationship could but did not necessarily have to be dissolved. In cooperation with the Mozambican partner, it should be explored if the transfer of a worker to another enterprise could possibly solve the problem instead.[55]

In retrospect, the contract's paragraph on extenuating state interests introduced by Mozambican officials seems to have been a kind of back door that allowed the Mozambican state to bring home workers from the GDR without a specific substantiation. The reason why the GDR did not oppose the installation of

52 In the GDR labor code (Gesetzbuch der Arbeit, § 106), the term "socialist labor discipline" was defined as: "Socialist labor discipline manifests itself in the conscious action of the working people in asserting the common interests of all working people in the socialist society. It is based on the fundamental correspondence between the interests of society and the individual, and includes comradely cooperation, mutual help and respect, and the conscientious fulfillment of all work tasks for the realization of the operational plans. It is a crucial basis of the socialist organization of labor." Own translation.

53 See article 5, paragraph 4 in Agreement between the Government of the GDR and the Government of the People's Republic of Mozambique on the temporary employment of Mozambican workers in socialist enterprises in the GDR (February 24, 1979) [Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der DDR und der Regierung der VR Mosambik über die zeitweilige Beschäftigung mosambikanischer Werktätiger in sozialistischen Betrieben der DDR (24. Februar 1979)], PA AA, MfAA, ZR 970/87.

54 Report of the Secretariat for Labor and Wages on the negotiations on the Agreement between the Government of the GDR and the People's Republic of Mozambique (February 13 – 20, 1979) about the temporary employment of Mozambican working people in the GDR in Maputo (February 23, 1979) [Bericht des SAL über die Verhandlungen zum Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der DDR und der VR Mosambik (13. – 20. Februar 1979) über die zeitweilige Beschäftigung mosambikanischer Werktätiger in der DDR in Maputo (23. Februar 1979)], BStU, MfS, HA II, Nr. 32490, sheet 91 – 96.

55 Ibid.

such a back door could probably be found in the previous paragraph. With the undefined passage "violation of socialist labor discipline," the GDR also had the option of dissolving an employment relationship without stating specific reasons. Whether and to what extent these two loopholes were actually used in practice cannot be reconstructed, but it ultimately leads to the question of whether they were deliberately used for concealment. After all, both sides were interested in making the agreement a success.

A question that—in the view of Mozambique—was actually not a real question arose in relation to the leave entitlement. According to the GDR's understanding of the labor law, Mozambican workers were to be given one paid vacation back home during the four-year operational period of their contract. Based on the experience of designing earlier bilateral contract labor agreements, it was also required from GDR representatives that the holiday entitlements should be clearly regulated on the intergovernmental level, especially since this was ultimately about the payment of travel expenses. At this point, differences in the conception of labor law between the GDR and Mozambique came to the fore. For the GDR, it was logical to guarantee the foreign workers a paid holiday to return home during their vocational training period. For the Mozambican representatives, however, this practice was not particularly relevant in their understanding of the draft of the contract labor agreement. Thus, the report of the Secretariat for Labor and Wages stated, that the Mozambican side was not in a position to express a binding position on these issues.[56] It cannot clearly be identified, whether paid leave was simply seen as a luxury or whether considerations such as associated costs of getting the workers to their home provinces were seen as obstacles. Maybe there were concerns about security of internal travel and drafting of workers during the civil war in Mozambique. In order to avoid an unnecessary delay during the negotiations in Maputo, the request of the Mozambican representatives was accepted and no clear formulation regarding the regulations about paid vacations was included.

The last section of the negotiation report reveals how important the conclusion of the contract labor accord was for the Mozambican government. During their visit, the members of the GDR delegation were taken to a cement factory

56 Report of the Secretariat for Labor and Wages on the negotiations on the Agreement between the Government of the GDR and the People's Republic of Mozambique (February 13–20, 1979) about the temporary employment of Mozambican working people in the GDR in Maputo (February 23, 1979) [Bericht des SAL über die Verhandlungen zum Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der DDR und der VR Mosambik (13.–20. Februar 1979) über die zeitweilige Beschäftigung mosambikanischer Werktätiger in der DDR in Maputo (23. Februar 1979)], BStU, MfS, HA II, Nr. 32490, sheet 91–96.

and some railway repair centers in Maputo. This excursion shows that on site the Mozambican representatives repeatedly pointed out how urgently trained workers were needed. They emphasized that there was a large backlog, especially in the repair and maintenance of plant installations, since usually only one sufficiently qualified worker was available at any given point in time.[57] For the Mozambicans, it was important to demonstrate the social and economic needs that the deal would fulfill as part of the socialist revolution taking place in the country during the negotiation process.

The Further Course of the Contract Labor Accord

This contract labor accord was never fixed; instead it was subsequently amended or supplemented only by annual protocols and subsequent agreements that were negotiated in cooperation with the Mozambican Ministry of Labor. The first annual protocol from 1979 determined that only 440 Mozambican workers should be employed in the GDR. 300 of them were sent to the coal industry, where they were able to get a skilled worker training as a maintenance mechanic, electrician, motor vehicle repairman or vulcanizer – which was especially important for the pit coal project in Moatize. Another 100 workers should be employed in the smelting industry to get qualifications as metal craftsmen.[58] Before the training started, the Mozambican had to attend a compulsory language course in German. Of these, 40 people had to attend an intensive language course so that they could later be used as "language mediators" in the companies. The fulfillment of this condition was very important for the further course of the labor migration accord. The recruiting of more workers in this year was dependent on how quickly the training of Mozambican translators progressed.[59] The deployment of the contract workers should be carried out in groups of 50 people, a size that often varied in reality. In each group one worker was assigned by the Mozambican representative in East Germany as a so-called "group leader". Ac-

57 Ibid.

58 Annual protocol 1979 of the Secretariat for Labor and Wages on the agreement between the Government of the GDR and the Government of the People's Republic of Mozambique on the temporary employment of Mozambican workers in socialist enterprises in the GDR (undated) [Jahresprotokoll 1979 des Staatssekretariats für Arbeit und Löhne über das Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der DDR und der Regierung der Volksrepublik Mosambik über die befristete Beschäftigung mosambikanischer Werktätiger in sozialistischen Betrieben der DDR (undatiert)], BStU, MfS, HA II, Nr. 32490, sheet 49–52.

59 Ibid.

cording to the agreement, the group leaders must contribute to the close cooperation between Mozambican workers and the East German company manager. They also should take care of the fulfillment of the tasks, the observance of the work discipline and the political and cultural education in the group.[60] According to the 1980 annual protocol, another 2,000 Mozambican workers should enter the GDR, and this time 100 of them should be trained as a language mediator.[61]

However, the numbers on the size of the recruited workers agreed on within these protocols, did not correspond to reality, because in 1980 over 2,800 and, in 1981 over 2,600 Mozambican workers arrived in the GDR. But during the three following years, the total number of new arrivals was just 382.[62] In 1985 there were about 5,000 Mozambican contract workers in the GDR. Because of the planned rotation principle and the maximal duration of four years enshrined in the agreement, many contracts were about to expire in the mid 1980s. Thus, the GDR created an agreement, which should regulate the procedure in the case of contractual extensions, in October 1984.[63] Both, the East German government and the employed contract workers in the GDR had an interest in contractual extensions. As a result, the Mozambican government agreed to an extension of deploy-

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60 Agreement between the Government of the GDR and the Government of the People's Republic of Mozambique on the temporary employment of Mozambican workers in socialist enterprises in the GDR (February 24, 1979) [Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der DDR und der Regierung der VR Mosambik über die zeitweilige Beschäftigung mosambikanischer Werktätiger in sozialistischen Betrieben der DDR (24. Februar 1979)], PA AA, MfAA, ZR 970/87.

61 Annual protocol 1980 of the Secretariat for Labor and Wages on the agreement between the Government of the GDR and the Government of the People's Republic of Mozambique on the temporary employment of Mozambican workers in socialist enterprises in the GDR (undated) [Jahresprotokoll 1980 des Staatssekretariats für Arbeit und Löhne über das Abkommen zwischen der Regierung der DDR und der Regierung der Volksrepublik Mosambik über die befristete Beschäftigung mosambikanischer Arbeitnehmer in sozialistischen Unternehmen in der DDR (undatiert)], BStU, MfS, HA II, Nr. 32490, sheet 54–59.

62 Secretariat for Labor and Wages: Overview on the development of the contract labor accord between Mozambique and the GDR (April 1989) [Staatssekretariat für Arbeit und Löhne: Überblick über die Entwicklung des Vertragsarbeitsabkommens zwischen Mosambik und der DDR (April 1989)], SAPMO-BArch, DQ 3/1813.

63 Arrangement on Article 1 (3) on the agreement between the Government of the GDR and the Government of the People's Republic of Mozambique on the temporary employment of Mozambican workers in socialist enterprises in the GDR (October 26, 1984) [Vereinbarung zu Artikel 1 Absatz 3 des Abkommens zwischen der Regierung der DDR und der Regierung der Volksrepublik Mosambik über die befristete Beschäftigung mosambikanischer Werktätiger in sozialistischen Betrieben der DDR (26. Oktober 1984)], PA AA, MfAA, ZR 2331/89.

ment with a maximum of operational time of up to ten years.[64] Although at this time the decline in foreign trade relations between Mozambique and the GDR began, the number of contract workers continued to increase from the mid 1980s. Since 1987, the temporary employment of Mozambican workers in East German enterprises had been used as the primary clearinghouse for Mozambique's debt reduction to the GDR. As a result, from 1987 to 1989, a total of over 11,500 additional workers arrived, a number of which consisted of workers returning on a second contract.[65]

In their internal correspondence, the responsible actors[66] in the GDR did not stop to emphasize that the mission should continue to be linked to professional qualification, as this was of "high political and practical importance" for the People's Republic of Mozambique.[67] Until the collapse of the GDR, the promise of vocational training formed an integral part of the contract workers' agreements. Testimonies by former contract workers, too, reported that they had always received training. Though, the quality of training and the tasks of the workers greatly varied from monotonous factory work to excellent vocational training opportunities.[68] And even if a worker could not complete his training successfully, he was offered opportunities in the GDR to achieve further "partial qualifications."[69] But previous research has argued that, with the increase in contract

64 Information on the situation among Mozambican workers in the GDR economy (September 24, 1987) [Information zur Situation der mosambikanischen Werktätigen in der DDR-Wirtschaft (24. September 1987)], BStU, MfS, HA XVIII, Nr. 19422, sheet 9 – 14.

65 Döring, "*Es geht um unsere Existenz*," 237.

66 Paul Gerhard Schürer (Chairman of the State Planning Commission at the Council of Ministers of the GDR and member of the Politburo), Kurt Singhuber (Minister of Heavy Industry), Gerhard Beil (Minister of Foreign Trade), Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski (Head of the Commercial Coordination Division at the Ministry of Foreign Trade), Oskar Fischer (Minister for Foreign Affairs), Wolfgang Beyreuther (Secretary of State for Labor and Wages), and Ernst Höfner (Minister of Finance).

67 Measures for the organization of the economic relations between the GDR and the VR Mozambique until 1995 in the sense of a mutually satisfactory solution to the reduction of the credit of the GDR (June 23, 1988), quoted according to Müggenburg, *Die ausländischen Vertragsarbeitnehmer in der ehemaligen DDR*, 63 – 73.

68 Marcia C. Schenck, "From Luanda and Maputo to Berlin: Uncovering Angolan and Mozambican Migrants' Motives to Move to the German Democratic Republic (1979 – 1990)," *African Economic History* 44 (2016): 214 – 216.

69 Julio Mussane, "Es war immer jemand da, der half, Probleme zu lösen: Interview mit Julio Mussane am 29. April 2013 durch Ralf Straßburg," in *Mosambikanische Vertragsarbeiter in der DDR-Wirtschaft: Hintergrund – Verlauf – Folgen*, ed. Ulrich van der Heyden et al. (Münster: Lit, 2014), 229; Jose Reis, "Keine leichten Lebensumstände in der DDR: Interview mit Jose Reis am 31. Mai 2013 durch Ralf Straßburg," in *Mosambikanische Vertragsarbeiter in der DDR-*

workers from the mid 1980s on, the vocational qualifications defined in the agreements were no longer fully met.[70]

Furthermore, the integration of workers trained in East Germany into GDR-financed enterprises in Mozambique continued to be a decisive factor. To illustrate this point, I would like to quote an internal letter from the Commercial Coordination Division from November 9, 1984. In this letter, its leader Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski was informed by Klaus-Dieter Uhlig[71] that a textile combine plant built by the GDR in Mocuba, a town in central Mozambique, was still under construction and would not be operational until two years later.[72] In case their stay in Germany was extended, the trained Mozambican skilled workers could immediately start their work in this company after their return. He also warned that if the request to extend the period of residence was rejected, the returnees would not find work in Mozambique. Instead, they would be integrated into the armed forces, leading to a loss of skilled workforce.[73] This letter also stressed that Mozambique was also very interested in extending the period of residence because of its own economic problems. The arguments made demonstrate that the GDR was interested in furthering and securing its projects in the spirit of "international solidarity" and of course, it was also to boost exports as the machinery was usually bought by the recipient countries, either through barter with local goods or through credit lines with interest. However, it also clearly demonstrates that the recruitment policy of the GDR cannot be explained solely in the context of the GDR's domestic economic history. Instead, all joint activities with Mozambique need to be taken into consideration to properly analyze the GDR's contract labor policy.

Wirtschaft: Hintergrund – Verlauf – Folgen, ed. Ulrich van der Heyden et al. (Münster: Lit, 2014), 235.

70 Müggenburg, *Die ausländischen Vertragsarbeitnehmer in der ehemaligen DDR*, 10; Andrzej Stach and Saleh Hussain, *Ausländer in der DDR: Ein Rückblick* (Berlin: Ausländerbeauftragte des Senats, 1994), 11; Gruner-Domić, *Geschichte der Arbeitskräftemigration*, 228.

71 Klaus-Dieter Uhlig was head of the trade policy department at the Commercial Coordination Division, responsible for the foreign offices in Tehran, Maputo, and Cairo.

72 See Bahr, this volume.

73 Internal letter from the Department of Commercial Coordination Division regarding the extension of the period of residence for Mozambican workers in the GDR (November 9, 1984) [Internes Schreiben der Abteilung für Kommerzielle Koordinierung über die Verlängerung der Aufenthaltsdauer für mosambikanische Werktätige in der DDR (9. November 1984)], SAPMO-BArch, DL 226/1682.

Conclusion

Relations between the GDR and Mozambique date back to the time before the declaration of independence of 1975 when the GDR aimed to gain international recognition as a sovereign state in the 1960s and the SED regime sought diplomatic contacts with FRELIMO. The early support of the Marxist-oriented Mozambican liberation movement meant that once FRELIMO was in power, the two states moved closer to one another in the 1970s. On the part of the GDR, this was mainly due to the prestige-oriented idea of class struggle within the context of the East-West conflict. The Mozambican government was faced with the exodus of skilled personnel and simultaneously had to overcome the colonial legacies in the economic realm. The "Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation" concluded in February 1979 laid the foundation for further cooperation between Mozambique and the GDR. At the same time, the treaty formed the basis for a number of arrangements, including the agreement on the employment of Mozambican contract workers at GDR state-owned enterprises. According to the identity of the GDR's ideological conception of "international solidarity," the labor agreement had to be linked to a vocational qualification, but economic interests have always been part of the considerations. The education and training of workers should benefit Mozambique in the long term, whereas the GDR was able to counteract its shortage of labor in industrial production in the short term. For the Mozambican government, the sending of workers to the GDR provided an opportunity to further its economic development. The long tradition of sending miners to South Africa was to be discontinued and replaced by the transfer of these workers to the GDR instead. This practice not only made it possible to relieve the pressures on the Mozambican domestic labor market in the short term, but also contained the potential to develop much-needed skilled workers for their own economy.

The central requirement of the agreement was that both sides should benefit. On the part of the GDR, the drafting took into account a balanced cost-benefit principle. From a financial point of view, the GDR was not to incur any additional burden that could not be offset by the economic benefits. Although the framework agreements provided for the possibility of acquiring qualifications, successful completion of vocational training was not compulsory. The workers had to gain such qualifications through academic achievements; they were not awarded automatically at the end of their employment in the GDR. In this way, the workers were given personal responsibilities, which ultimately absolved the GDR from further obligations to the Mozambican government. Alberto Cassi-

mo[74] also emphasized that Mozambican workers who do not stick to their revolutionary duty should be sent back immediately. This ideological claim was a decisive aspect of the labor agreement, which the Mozambican side took very seriously. In the selection of the areas in which this would be applied, however, the decision lay on the Mozambican side. The negotiators of the ruling party FRELIMO were able to decide which economic sectors skilled workers were needed for, and thus could also participate in shaping the transfer of its labor force.

As shown by the examples, the path to the accord was characterized on the one hand by mutual willingness to compromise and on the other hand by different understandings of the nature of certain aspects of contract labor migration. Both negotiating partners were able to bring their own ideas and even build in arbitrary loopholes that made early termination of contracts possible. The workers themselves, however, had no voice at this point in the process. In retrospect, the recruitment of foreign workers combined with vocational training was certainly a concept with potential and the agreement was supposed to benefit both sides. Mozambique was to profit from the training of its workers, the relief of the domestic labor market and the creation of professional prospects for young people. For the GDR, it contributed to addressing the labor shortage that seriously threatened economic production. In theory, the advantages outweighed the disadvantages for both sides according to the concept of "mutual benefit." In practice, however, the implementation of the agreement was influenced by political and economic constraints that came with the end of the Cold War on both sides.

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74 Alberto Cassimo's commitment is still recognized in Mozambique. On November 1, 2016 the *Instituto de Formação Profissional e Estudos Laborais Alberto Cassimo / Institute of Vocational Training and the Labor Studies Alberto Cassimo* was founded. IFPELAC is a public vocational training institution headquartered in Maputo and overseen by the Ministry of Labor, Employment and Social Security.

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II German Democratic Republic: Perplexity and Bewilderment

6

East Germany–Zanzibar Relations and the Rise of a Socialist Vanguard

G. Thomas Burgess

Less than a month into its existence, the People's Republic of Zanzibar in January 1964 opened a relationship with the German Democratic Republic that would have far-reaching consequences, particularly for Zanzibaris.[1] In competition with the Chinese, who also saw their relationship to the incipient island state as a means by which to break out of their diplomatic isolation, East Germany offered a generous package of aid and expertise. Although in late April 1964 Zanzibar federated with Tanganyika—its much larger neighbor on the East African mainland—and although this meant the downgrading of the newly-established East German embassy in the islands, the new union did not short-circuit GDR-Zanzibar relations. Throughout the 1960s Zanzibar retained most of the accoutrements of an independent state: its own president, ruling party, bureaucracy, and security forces. Zanzibar also continued to enjoy some autonomy in foreign affairs. And so with a relatively free hand, islanders leaned heavily on East German aid and advice, which played an influential role in shaping Zanzibar's revolutionary experiment.

East Germany sent a regular flow of experts to Zanzibar, and in turn received a steady stream of Zanzibari students in search of training and education. Such encounters were sustained by a common vision of the solidarity of like-minded socialist nations, all supposedly sharing the same uplifting image of a future world characterized by equality, selflessness, and abundance. Officials in both Eastern Europe and Africa believed Zanzibar, with its relatively small size and population, could serve as a showcase for this future-in-the-making. At relatively

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1 For East German relations with Zanzibar during the Cold War, see Abdulrahman Mohamed Babu, "I Was the First Third World Minister to Recognize the GDR," in *I Saw the Future and It Works: Essays Celebrating the Life of Comrade Abdulrahman Mohamed Babu, 1924–1996*, ed. Haroub Othman (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: E & D Limited, 2001), 48–58; Eric Burton, "Diverging Visions in Revolutionary Spaces: East German Advisors and Revolution from Above in Zanzibar, 1964–1970," in *Between East and South: Spaces of Ineraction in the Globalizing Economy of the Cold War*, ed. Anna Calori et al. (Berlin, Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2019); Antony Clayton, *The Zanzibar Revolution and its Aftermath* (Hamden, CT: Archon Books, 1978); Heinz Schneppen, *Zanzibar and the Germans: A Special Relationship, 1844–1966* (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: National Museums of Tanzania, 1998).

little cost, a small nation like East Germany could make a highly visible impact by rendering decisive assistance to an even smaller territory struggling to achieve a better life for its citizens. Together East Germany and Zanzibar could realize the socialist vision of a society free of capitalist exploitation and neo-colonial domination. Zanzibar could serve as a revolutionary model to neighbors still dependent on the West for aid, trade, and expertise.

As historians turn to the study of East-South relations during the Cold War, and recover an often forgotten and yet highly consequential world of linkages, moorings, entanglements, and disentanglements, we should consider the ideas that animated such encounters.[2] This essay demonstrates that at least on one level the East Germans and Zanzibaris were in agreement: the future would be one in which Africans would not only enjoy the blessings of freedom and sovereignty in islands where many of their ancestors once toiled as slaves. They would also experience “development,” and enjoy such modern amenities as electricity, running water, and indoor plumbing. Throughout the 1960s, this future sustained a relationship between two nations separated by thousands of miles of land and sea, as well as highly dissimilar cultural traditions.

Such cooperation between Zanzibar and East Germany may be placed within the context of an historic moment when socialist internationalism appeared to possess real promise in orienting recently decolonized territories in Africa and Asia towards the socialist East. The East beckoned with aid, friendship, and discursive support, and was an emerging and enticing counterpoint to Western nations implicated by colonialism. Later in the Cold War, East Germany would form close ties with other movements and nations of the developing world, and Zanzibar would look to China for aid and expertise. Nevertheless, for both Zanzibaris and East Germans, their once close relationship contained all the romance, frustrations, and misunderstandings of a first love.[3] Believing socialism and African nationalism were natural allies in the struggle against imperialism, racism, and inequality, they rushed into a relationship that seemed to offer a bright future and benefits to both sides, and yet which led instead to mutual disillusionment.

This chapter will discuss why Zanzibar’s ties with East Germany quickly waxed, and eventually waned. It will examine East Germany’s influence on Zanzibar’s fledgling revolution, the initial violence of which had only recently been

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2 For a broad picture, see Philip Muehlenbeck and Natalia Telepneva, eds., *Warsaw Pact Intervention in the Third World: Aid and Influence in the Cold War* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2018).

3 Soviet-Cuban ties also contained a strong element of romance in the 1960s. For a study that emphasizes how Soviets imagined the relationship, see Anne Gorsuch, “‘Cuba, My Love:’ The Romance of Revolutionary Cuba in the Soviet Sixties,” *American Historical Review* 120 (2015).

brought under state control by the time GDR representatives made their first appearance in the islands in early-1964. In addition to oral and archival sources that give some indication of the impact of this relationship on the popular level, I will examine the novel *By the Sea*, in which Zanzibari author Abdulrazak Gurnah provides a compelling narrative of Latif Mahmud, who at the age of 18 sets out to study in the GDR.[4] Latif is something of a composite character, inspired by the memories and narratives of Gurnah's former classmates who set out with high hopes to study in East Germany in the 1960s.[5] Their experience is emblematic of an era of inflated expectations, when Africans newly-liberated from colonial rule hoped to achieve all their nation building ambitions, and turned to wise men from the East bearing gifts of credit, scholarships, and technology. After the end of colonialism and before the onset of the African debt crisis of the 1980s there were relatively few limits on futurist discourses. In the 1960s, the "socialist transnational imaginary"[6] was in full swing, producing a series of images of the future that animated a steady stream of students, technocrats, and teachers traveling back and forth between East and South. Such encounters, linkages, and connections helped shape Zanzibar's revolutionary experiment, and were but one component of a project of socialist globalization that forged new and consequential ties between Africa and the East.

The Rise of a Socialist Vanguard

When in the early twentieth century the British began to establish schools in Zanzibar along western lines it had to overcome considerable resistance among parents and village leaders convinced such institutions would corrupt the minds of the next generation, and undermine their faith in Islam. Only after the colonial state moved in the 1940s to incorporate Islam into the curriculum did the schools begin to gain widespread favor and acceptance.[7] The experiment proved so successful that after World War II more and more Zanzibaris began to look further afield for opportunities to pursue higher education. Those who came to physical maturity in the Cold War era were uniquely advantaged in

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4 Abdulrazak Gurnah, *By the Sea* (New York: New Press, 2001).

5 Personal email communication from Abdulrazak Gurnah to the author, August 14, 2019.

6 James Mark and Péter Apor, "Socialism Goes Global: Decolonization and the Making of a New Culture of Internationalism in Socialist Hungary, 1956 – 1989," *The Journal of Modern History* 87 (2015): 890.

7 Norman Bennett, *A History of the Arab State of Zanzibar* (Cambridge, MA: Methuen and Co., 1978), 222 – 33, 244.

this respect; not only were the British offering more scholarships—primarily to study at Uganda's Makerere University, or in the United Kingdom—families were also more willing than ever to sponsor promising children anxious to acquire higher education overseas.[8] And by the late 1950s a rising generation of young Zanzibaris could also look to the East for patronage and support. Recognizing an opportunity to influence an emerging Third World elite, the socialist fraternity of nations began to arrange for a growing number of Africans to visit carefully stage-managed tours, or to stay for longer periods of study and training. The GDR was one of a constellation of states that also included the Soviet Union and China willing to invest scarce state resources in an attempt to inculcate Third World nationalists in socialist theory and belief.[9]

By the late 1950s the British also signaled their intention to eventually withdraw from Zanzibar, which triggered a bitter partisan dispute over the colonial inheritance. Two rival nationalist party coalitions emerged, and access to foreign scholarships was just one of the ways in which they competed. Of the two, the Zanzibar Nationalist Party (ZNP) was more aggressive in obtaining and disseminating scholarships; indeed, the party could not find enough applicants to fill the number of offered scholarships.[10] Party leader Ali Muhsin persuaded Gamal Abdel Nasser to sponsor dozens of Zanzibari students to come and study in Egypt.[11] Sent to Cairo in 1960 to represent the ZNP and supervise the students, Ali Sultan Issa contacted Eastern Bloc embassy officials, and requested scholarships. He estimates that through his and others' efforts over 300 Zanzibaris went to the GDR in the 1960s for short courses in trade unionism and cooperatives, or for full degree programs in such fields as medicine and engineering.[12]

The presence in the islands of a small but increasingly significant cohort of youth who had been exposed to life in the East had far-reaching consequences,

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8 See G. Thomas Burgess, "Youth and the Revolution: Mobility and Discipline in Zanzibar, 1950–80" (PhD. diss., Indiana University, 2001), 84.

9 The Bandung Conference of 1955 was a major stimulus to Chinese efforts; see G. Thomas Burgess, "Mao in Zanzibar: Nationalism, Discipline, and the (De)Construction of Afro-Asian Solidarities," in *Making a World After Empire: The Bandung Moment and Its Political Afterlives*, ed. Christopher Lee (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2010).

10 Burgess, "Youth and the Revolution," 84.

11 Ali Muhsin Al Barwani, *Conflicts and Harmony in Zanzibar (Memoirs)* (no publisher: 1997), 98–105.

12 G. Thomas Burgess, *Race, Revolution, and the Struggle for Human Rights in Zanzibar: The Memoirs of Ali Sultan Issa and Seif Sharif Hamad* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2009), 66. Most went after independence, when the GDR became Zanzibar's leading educational patron.

which will only be outlined here.[13] It encouraged a growing divide within the ZNP between the more conservative party mainstream and a leftist faction led by Abdulrahman Mohamed Babu, the party's secretary general and principal founder of the ZNP youth wing, known as the Youth's Own Union (YOU). In mid-1963 Babu resigned from the ZNP to help found the Umma Party, which gained the support of most of those who had returned from the East. The new party was based overwhelmingly in Zanzibar Town, and accommodated members who espoused everything from Maoism to anarchism, nationalism, and social democracy.[14] Umma began to criticize the ZNP as a party of reactionary feudalists and capitalists; it also formed a tactical alliance with the ZNP's main rival, the Afro-Shirazi Party (ASP), even though in previous years Babu had repeatedly attacked that party for its divisive racial polemics.[15]

As Zanzibar approached independence these three parties presented widely contrasting electoral appeals. In a society in which a large majority of voters were poor Muslims of at least partial African ancestry, they disagreed as to how that majority ought to be identified, and from what it ought to be protected. The ZNP claimed Zanzibaris were first and foremost Muslims who needed to be protected from the political domination of newly independent states like Kenya and Tanganyika lacking clear Muslim majorities. They also needed to preserve Zanzibar's unique Muslim culture from "hordes" of unwanted migrants from the African mainland. The ASP, meanwhile, claimed most Zanzibaris were Africans who needed to defend themselves from Arab cruelty and domination.[16] And for its part Umma claimed most islanders were members of downtrodden classes that required protection from exploitative capitalists and feudalists. The three parties also differed dramatically when it came to which global leaders they found most inspiring, and to which they looked for material support. The ZNP claimed to eschew racial politics, and yet aligned itself with Gamal Abdel Nasser's version of anti-colonial Arab nationalism. The ASP for its part openly embraced racial politics, yet drew inspiration from Julius Nyerere, the non-racialist

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13 See G. Thomas Burgess, "An Imagined Generation: Umma Youth in Nationalist Zanzibar," in *In Search of a Nation: Histories of Authority and Dissidence from Tanzania: Essays in Honor of I.M. Kimambo*, ed. Gregory Maddox et al. (London: James Currey Publishers, 2005), 216–249.

14 For a particularly laudatory account, see Amrit Wilson, *The Threat of Liberation: Imperialism and Revolution in Zanzibar* (London: Pluto Press, 2013). Wilson draws heavily from Babu's writings and recollections.

15 The ASP, in turn, criticized the ZNP for its "communist" element. Jonathon Glassman, *War of Words, War of Stones, Racial Thought and Violence in Colonial Zanzibar* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011), 271–272.

16 See Glassman, *War of Words*.

leader of Tanganyika's independence movement. Umma, meanwhile, looked further afield for allies and ideological cousins, revering socialist nations as sources of inspiration and support.[17]

Umma's very existence was only possible through Eastern patronage; despite the triangular symmetry of the partisan contest, socialism was not an organic plant that sprouted naturally from an island population that traditionally saw the world in terms of class struggle. The only thing "traditional" about socialism in Zanzibar was its cosmopolitanism; socialism drew much of its strength and vitality from the travel experiences of a rising generation precocious in its cultural and intellectual appropriations. While Zanzibaris coming to maturity during the height of the Cold War were uniquely eager and able to go abroad, and while they ventured much further than their predecessors, for at least a thousand years Zanzibar had been a key link in a cosmopolitan network of trade and migration encompassing the islands and coasts of the western Indian Ocean.[18] In the waning years of colonialism the GDR and other socialist nations of the East managed to attract a growing number of aspiring young islanders, many of whom upon their return to Zanzibar gravitated towards Umma, and embraced "scientific" solutions to the islands' chronic racial and class divisions. Never a party that enjoyed mass appeal, Umma may be described as a small but effective party in the Leninist vanguard tradition. In the mid-1960s Umma would play an instrumental role in pushing Zanzibar towards the GDR and other nations of the East.

A New East-South Partnership

After a final round of elections, in December 1963 the British transferred power to the ZNP and its sister party, the Zanzibar and Pemba People's Party (ZPPP). Barely a month later the independent ZNP-ZPPP coalition government was overthrown in an ASP uprising that triggered weeks of violence. The seizure of power quickly captured international headlines, in part because it was not clear who was behind it, or whether the new regime would align with the East, the West, or remain neutral in the Cold War. While the violence was definitely racialized, and directed primarily against Arabs as the allegedly arrogant descendants of slave owners, Umma comrades were also active in the revolution, including

17 See Burgess, "Mao in Zanzibar."
18 See, for example, Randal Pouwels, *The Horn and the Crescent: Cultural change and traditional Islam on the East African Coast, 800–1900* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1987).

those of Arab ancestry. And since over a dozen had received military training in Cuba, and could be heard shouting Spanish revolutionary slogans over the radio in Zanzibar, there was even brief media speculation that the revolution was the work of Fidel Castro's regime.[19]

Umma cooperation with the ASP in early 1964 was a function of their common opposition to the ZNP-ZPPP alliance; but it also stemmed from the fact that race and class identities were slippery, and easily, conflated. It was not difficult for ASP revolutionaries to recast Arabs as feudalists and South Asians as capitalists—especially when, in the context of the Cold War, such an appropriation of socialist vocabulary earned the new regime a modicum of international respect, as well as inclusion in the global narrative of the dawning of a new and more equitable socialist epoch. A further reason for the willingness of ASP leaders to accept Umma comrades into their ranks was a desperate manpower shortage caused by the death or flight of so many supporters of the former regime, some of whom were among the islands' more educated citizens.

Umma officially merged with the ASP in March 1964, by which time Babu and his cohort of leftists had assumed positions of influence in the new regime. In fact, as Minister of External Affairs and Trade, Babu was instrumental in Zanzibar's decision to recognize the GDR in late January 1964.[20] According to West Germany's Hallstein Doctrine, no nation except the Soviet Union could have relations with both West and East Germany. By siding with the GDR, the new regime clearly signaled its intentions to depart from the general trend of African non-alignment in the Cold War. Markus Wolf, who at the time was the GDR's director of foreign intelligence in the ministry of state security, reasoned that diplomatic recognition came about through the influence of Zanzibaris who studied in the GDR, and returned with positive feelings towards the East.[21] Those who visited other socialist lands instead were also in support of recognition.

Relatively uneducated, and a moderate when it came to the global contest between East and West, President Abeid Karume was encircled by ministers like Babu who had traveled to the East and embraced a socialist vision of the future. Though they sometimes disagreed as to what that would actually entail,

19 Keith Kyle, "The Zanzibar Coup," *The Spectator*, January 25, 1964; Keith Kyle, "How it Happened," *The Spectator*, February 14, 1964; cf. Piero Gleijeses, *Conflicting Missions: Havana, Washington, and Africa, 1959–1976* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2002), 59–60; cf. Burgess, *Race, Revolution, and the Struggle for Human Rights*, 84.
20 Schneppen, *Zanzibar and the Germans*, 12. See also Babu, "I Was the First Third World Minister," 53.
21 Markus Wolf, with Anne McElvoy, *Man Without a Face: The Autobiography of Communism's Greatest Spymaster* (New York: Random House, 1997), 252.

at least some were convinced of the need to oust or at least sideline Karume in order for their cherished People's Republic to take its rightful place in the progressive march of humanity. After considerable maneuvering on all sides, as well as continual American and British strategizing as to how to best neutralize the perceived communist threat in the islands, in late April 1964 Karume consented to a federation with Tanganyika, Zanzibar's closest neighbor on the continent. This allowed him to transfer to the mainland men like Babu and Vice President Kassim Hanga considered to be hostile and/or actively plotting against him.[22]

If the federation purchased Karume some short-term political security, it set up an immediate confrontation with Tanganyika over the issue of Zanzibar's recognition of the GDR. The GDR had already offered a generous aid package, which Karume saw as vital to his ambitions for nation building and racial uplift. He was not prepared to abandon such aid in order to placate Julius Nyerere, his partner in the union and now president of the United Republic of Tanzania. Tanganyika, meanwhile, was the largest recipient of West German aid in sub-Saharan Africa, and among other projects the Bonn government provided key technical and material assistance to the air wing of the Tanganyikan army. All of this was now in jeopardy due to the Hallstein Doctrine. The issue was so serious it threatened to break the union; Karume refused to abandon his East German "friends," and Nyerere was convinced the GDR was trying to sabotage the union.[23] He eventually persuaded the East Germans to accept the demotion of their embassy in Zanzibar in exchange for the right to open a consulate general in Dar es Salaam. When the West Germans interpreted this as a violation of the Hallstein Doctrine, and announced in early-1965 they would be withholding their military aid, Nyerere renounced all aid ties with the Federal Republic.[24] Karume was the only real winner in all these negotiations, since the East Germans were forced to increase their aid pledges so as to keep him on their side.

The New Zanzibar

From 1964 to 1968 the GDR competed with China as Zanzibar's leading patron. In his vivid memoir, Markus Wolf describes the beginnings of a relationship that would fall into a familiar pattern of East-South relationships during the Cold

22 See Burgess, "Youth and the Revolution," 258 – 275.
23 Issa Shivji, *Pan-Africanism or Pragmatism? Lessons of Tanganyika-Zanzibar Union* (Dar es Salaam, Tanzania: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, 2008), 103.
24 Schneppen, *Zanzibar and the Germans*, 14 – 20; Clayton, *Zanzibar Revolution*, 147 – 148.

War. It included farcical moments, as when upon his arrival in February 1964 Wolf was asked to inspect a guard of honor to the "lilting strains" of a police orchestra playing Viennese waltzes. In celebration of May Day, he watched as singers "praised the beauty and richness" of the GDR as a kind of "fairytale land of plenty."[25] Clearly, Zanzibari officials saw the GDR as a potentially endless source of patronage. And the GDR did nothing to disabuse such notions, but instead offered an aid program that would have gone a long way towards "developing" Zanzibar, and realizing a modernist vision of the future shared by President Karume and his new East German friends.

Though the GDR did not deliver on all its initial promises, it did send medical personnel and secondary school teachers to help make up for the exodus of British expatriates and skilled Zanzibaris victimized by the revolution.[26] Officials of the *Freie Deutsche Jugend*, the East German youth organization, also advised the ASP on how to mobilize the younger generation in support of socialist nation building imperatives. Abdulla Said Natepe and Aboud Talib traveled to the GDR to receive training in how to establish their own version of the Young Pioneers, an institution first established in the Soviet Union in the early-1920s, which over the decades had become ubiquitous in the socialist East. Rajab Kheri told a Zanzibari student audience in 1965 that "our problem is that we are backward, and we have to be in harmony with our friends who are the long time founders of these children development programs. … their children have achieved high development levels. We have to construct a bridge of friendship with them and unite with them. In this way we can achieve that same level of development."[27] The youth labor camp was another fixture of life in the socialist East, and the GDR assisted Zanzibar in establishing its own set of camps by sending tractors

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25 Wolf and McElvoy, *Man Without a Face*, 253–254. Wolf reasoned Zanzibaris had chosen the GDR as a major patron so as to not offend neighboring states like Kenya still economically tied to Great Britain, and who might be anxious about too close of ties with the Soviet Union: "We were economically advanced enough to be a useful supplier of advice … but small enough not to annoy any other sources of income." Ibid., 255.

26 Clayton, *Zanzibar Revolution*, 144, 146. To compare East German aid with that of the USSR and China, see also Burton, "Diverging Visions;" Burgess, "Mao in Zanzibar"; and G. Thomas Burgess, "A Socialist Diaspora: Ali Sultan Issa, the Soviet Union, and the Zanzibari Revolution," in *Africa in Russia, Russia in Africa: Three Centuries of Encounters*, ed. Maxim Matusevich (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2007).

27 Thomas Burgess, "The Young Pioneers and the Rituals of Citizenship in Revolutionary Zanzibar," *Africa Today* 51 (2005): 10.

and instructors to impart practical skills in plumbing, for example.[28] Finally, the GDR ramped up the number of scholarships on offer; in 1966, for example, 123 Zanzibari students were in the GDR—more than in any other foreign country, and nearly double the combined number of those studying in China and the USSR.[29]

While the GDR sponsored the construction of a dairy plant it had a more significant economic impact in the realm of finance. The Moscow-trained Abdul Aziz Twala, Zanzibar's Minister of Finance, leaned heavily on the advice of Martin Gentsch, who although East German was asked to chair the Public Finance Control Commission. In early 1966 the commission was instrumental in establishing the People's Bank of Zanzibar (*Benki ya Wananchi wa Zanzibar*). As Eric Burton describes, Twala and Gentsch were close personal friends, and agreed that Zanzibar needed to reduce its dependency on the capitalist West, while also maintaining financial autonomy from the Tanzanian mainland. They were also convinced of the need for East German instruction in the principles of socialist economics, management, and bookkeeping. In addition to arranging for islanders to receive such training in the GDR, Gentsch and Twala collaborated on the opening of a "School of Economics," which when it opened in Zanzibar in April 1967 boasted over a hundred students.[30]

While the GDR had an impact in the realms of finance, education, and youth mobilization, East Germany is especially remembered for its assistance in housing and security. From early-1964 Karume was an enthusiastic supporter of East German plans to house the entire population of the islands in massive new apartment blocks that would boast modern amenities such as running water, indoor plumbing, and electricity.[31] As an African nationalist who cut his political teeth in the streets of Zanzibar Town, it is not hard to imagine Karume's rapturous response to such proposals. By the mid-twentieth century the capital was divided between the largely Arab and South Asian neighborhoods of Stone Town, and the mostly African area known as Ng'ambo, or literally "the other side." Stone Town enjoyed cooling sea breezes and close proximity to the palaces of the sultans, high colonial officials, and wealthy grandees of island society.

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28 G. Thomas Burgess, "To Differentiate Rice from Grass: Youth Labor Camps in Revolutionary Zanzibar" in *Generations Past: Youth in East African History*, ed. Andrew Burton and Hélène Charton-Bigot (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2010), 227.

29 Burgess, "A Socialist Diaspora," 281.

30 Burton, "Diverging Visions," 91–92, 95, 109. See also Shivji, *Pan-Africanism or Pragmatism*, 133–141; Clayton, *Zanzibar Revolution*, 144.

31 Garth Andrew Myers, *Verandahs of Power: Colonialism and Space in Urban Africa* (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 2003), 109.

It also boasted an array of cafes, movie theaters, and public gardens. Meanwhile the African residents of Ng'ambo rented housing of widely varying quality and amenity.[32] Thus if East Germany followed through on its promise to provide Africans with "modern" housing it would rectify one of Zanzibar's most visible, galling, and visceral reminders of racial inequality.

Such grandiose plans were, however, soon scaled down to the demolition and reconstruction of two Ng'ambo neighborhoods, Kikwajuni and Kilimani. In 1968, however, architect Hubert Scholz and a team of East German experts proposed to extend these pilot projects over the rest of Ng'ambo. The plan called for the construction of 6,992 flats in an area that already included 5,163 homes deemed to be in good or fair condition.[33] Ultimately, through GDR support and the forced and unpaid labor of urban Zanzibaris citizens, the regime managed to construct only 1,102 flats. These new units in the urban area Michenzani suffered from chronic problems with water pressure, and along with those in Kikwajuni and Kilimani represented an addition of less than a thousand flats to Ng'ambo's pre-existing housing stock.[34] Yet in terms of square footage the Michenzani apartment blocks were the largest buildings ever constructed in Zanzibar, and their sheer scale did manage to impress some islanders, and grant the regime's development schemes a measure of legitimacy. For many islanders, however, the massive apartment blocks are stark reminders of the thousands of hours of forced labor required for their construction. And according to this author's own subjective aesthetic, they have aged about as well as most of their modernist Eastern European predecessors.[35]

A plan to demolish homes, relocate citizens, and force them to contribute unpaid labor to the construction of flats intended for only a relative few was controversial enough; even more so was the GDR's central role in setting up Zanzibar's notorious security apparatus. Markus Wolf recalls that almost as soon as diplomatic relations were established the Zanzibaris requested training in intelligence gathering—no doubt due to the GDR's excellent reputation in such matters. Karume's regime hoped to employ such expertise against potentially disloyal islanders. Wolf recalls:

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32 See Laura Fair, *Pastimes and Politics: Culture, Community, and Identity in Post-Abolition Urban Zanzibar, 1890–1945* (Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 2001).

33 Myers, *Verandahs of Power*, 111–112.

34 Ibid., 115, 123.

35 The regime's dependence on forced labor to build the new flats in Ng'ambo, as well as for other public works projects, is one of the most vividly remembered and well known facets of the revolutionary project. See, for example, Burgess, *Race, Revolution, and the Struggle for Human Rights*.

> In many ways we were naïve about the effects of our intervention in Third World countries. Our intelligence-gathering skills, honed by the experience of the Second World War and the Cold War, were transferred through our well-trained liaison officers and specialists. Prompted by their diligence, the security service in Zanzibar reached ridiculous dimensions. Relative to the size of the population, it was soon far bigger than our own, and it rapidly acquired a dynamic of its own over which we had no more influence.[36]

In hindsight, Wolf is defensive and apologetic about the consequences of such training. He must certainly have been aware of the willingness of people like Seif Bakari, Zanzibar's director of intelligence, to resort to torture and extra-judicial murder. Until research is undertaken in the *Stasi* archives, much will remain unknown about this murky relationship.[37] It is known that Seif Bakari and other islanders received security training in the GDR,[38] and that under Bakari's direction thousands of Zanzibaris were arrested in the decade following the 1964 Revolution. Many were tortured, and some were killed. Citizens were kept in a permanent state of fear; informants were believed to be everywhere, continually feeding information to security agents. Ali Sultan Issa, who served Karume's regime as Minister of Education, recalls:

> In those days, we could not trust even our own wives because they sometimes informed on their husbands to the state security, trained by the East Germans. And we all know how the East Germans controlled their people, so almost the same system applied here. … We used to have a saying that "among three people one is not yours." We thought the walls had ears, they could be bugged.[39]

Kjersti Larsen notes that in her anthropological fieldwork, "elderly people recall the system of denunciation … where neighbors, even family members, informed on each other."[40] Charles Swift, an American mental health officer assigned to Zanzibar in the late-1960s, recalls the atmosphere as "heavy with suspicion and apprehension. … About the only people who spoke their minds were the patients at the psychiatric hospital."[41] While in popular memories the GDR is usu-

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36 Wolf and McElvoy, *Man Without a Face*, 256.
37 See Anna Warda's project on The Ministry of Security in the "Third World", which includes a case study on Zanzibar: https://zzf potsdam.de/de/forschung/projekte/die-tatigkeiten-des-mfs.
38 Interview by author, Seif Bakari, Dodoma, Tanzania, May 1, 1995.
39 Burgess, *Race, Revolution and the Struggle for Human Rights*, 126 – 127.
40 Kjersti Larsen, "Silenced Voices, Recaptured Memories: Historical Imprints Within a Zanzibari Life-World," in *Social Memory, Silenced Voices, and Political Struggle: Remembering the Revolution in Zanzibar*, ed. William Cunningham Bissell and Marie-Aude Fouéré (Dar es Salaam: Mkuki na Nyota Publishers, Ltd., 2018), 259.
41 Charles Swift, *Dar Days: The Early Years in Tanzania* (New York: University Press of America, 2002), 98.

ally remembered as the patron and mentor of this hated security apparatus, locals tend to blame its cruelty on officials like Bakari, animated as they were by a lethal combination of paranoia and racial animus.

East-South Encounters in Memory

In oral histories of the revolution, Zanzibaris remember East Germany mostly for its investments in housing and security. Those who studied in the GDR, however, often have more vivid, personal memories. Such recollections inspired Abdulrazak Gurnah—Zanzibar's most respected novelist and twice a nominee for the Booker Prize—to provide us with the evocative story of Latif Muhammed, who in *By the Sea* obtains a scholarship to study dentistry in the GDR in the 1960s, and thus escape a series of tragedies that have engulfed his family.[42] His father is considered the town drunkard, and his mother is indiscrete in her infidelities. His older brother, meanwhile, is seduced by a visiting Persian merchant, who convinces him to board a dhow and follow him over the horizon. To compound the family's shame, the Persian merchant also tricks the father into relinquishing ownership of his house; the family suffers eviction, and the loss of their possessions.

Latif is laconic about his family's descent into poverty and disgrace. He merely notes that he wants to escape from his parents, to never "see them again, to leave them to their indignant decline and their poisoned lives."[43] Literature becomes a refuge—the books and magazines available at his school library, and at the United States Information Service (USIS). He praises America for offering air-conditioning, jazz recordings, and "beautiful" books he could actually borrow, and return. Through such American largesse Latif becomes exposed to Emerson, Hawthorne, Melville and other authors who excite "a noble curiosity," and which—unlike British authors—are unconnected to "a discourse of [colonial] tutelage and hierarchy." As "the Emperor of Hollywood and rock'n'roll," President Kennedy also impresses him. America's glamorous image is tainted, however, by the murder of Patrice Lumumba, footage of American police roughly handling black civil rights activists, and the CIA's reputation for "manipulating and controlling every small and big thing that caught their attention."[44]

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42 Gurnah interviewed his former classmates who studied in the GDR in the 1960s. Personal email communication from Abdulrazak Gurnah to the author, August 14, 2019. It bears notice that in *By the Sea* Latif's story represents only a fractional component of a much larger narrative.
43 Gurnah, *By the Sea*, 115.
44 Ibid., 106–107.

In his hunger for the cultural and intellectual capital of distant lands, Latif also visits the East German "Information Institute," where he discovers Schiller, Chekov, and Mikhail Sholokhov. And then as the mistress of the Minister of Education, Latif's mother manages to secure for her son a coveted scholarship to the GDR. Having sworn off alcohol, and become deeply religious, Latif's father worries Latif will lose his religious beliefs among the communist atheists of the East. He takes him to the mosque, where he leads the men in prayer, and then dispenses some fatherly advice: "When you get to that godless place, don't forget to pray. ... Whatever else you do, don't lose God, don't lose your way. There's darkness there." Blaming his father for his family's dissolution, Latif finds his newly found piety laughable.[45]

Latif's first impressions of the GDR are not favorable; the place strikes him as wet and gloomy, and his student hostel is cramped and poorly heated. It is a "catacomb" set aside for "dark" male students from Africa like himself. Uprooted and thrust into this artificial environment, the students jostle one another for respect and primacy. They create "an order of precedence and exclusions and dislikes" that is "detailed and precise, despite the appearance of raucous, romping disorder." Having never "lived amid such noise and play and violence before," Latif relishes "most of it cautiously, without questioning or wonder."[46] His roommate, Ali, hails from Guinea and immediately demonstrates his "sneering dislike," and need for deference. Full of "scorn and mockery and knowingness," Ali has a low opinion of the GDR's rank among the nations. "This is Eastern Europe," he says. "They don't have anything here. It's just as bad as Africa." He speculates that the meat in the cafeteria stew is not really meat, but goat feces, or asbestos.[47]

In such cynical company, Latif quickly loses any belief he may have had of being on a personal mission to help realize his country's future as a "developed" socialist society. Early on he declares to Ali: "I came to GDR to study, to learn a skill. As soon as I've done that, I'll go back home and do what I can to help my people." Ali just laughs, and dismisses Latif's attempt at idealism:

> Is that why you came, you Young Pioneer? I did not want to come here. I wanted to go to France, but the only scholarships available were to fraternal socialist countries, either to come here or go to the Soviet Union to learn to drive a snow plough. I think all the students here would prefer to be somewhere else.

45 Ibid., 111.
46 Ibid., 114.
47 Ibid.

Latif then concedes: "We all wanted to be in the land of Coca-Cola and blue jeans, even if it wasn't just for those refined pleasures that we wanted to be there."[48]

Though Latif is an avid student, and earns the respect of his German instructors, he observes a relationship between them and the rest of the students rife with "misunderstanding and insolence and mischief."[49] As a whole, the teachers are neither very fond of nor impressed by their African charges. And in turn, the students

> acted superior to the teachers, as if we knew about things which the teachers had no inkling of – useful and complicated things, not just a couple of wedding songs or a sonorous prayer or how to play a harmonica. I wondered then, and still wonder now, who did we think we were? Perhaps we knew that we were beggar pawns in somebody else's plans, captured and delivered there. Held there. Perhaps the scorn was like the prisoner's sly refusal of the gaoler's authority, stopping short of insurrection. Or perhaps most of us were reluctant students, and reluctant students are always like that with their teachers. Or perhaps still, something stern and unyielding and despising in our teacher's demeanor made us resistant to them. Or perhaps even further still, as one of the teachers told us, the heat in our countries and in our food had sapped our motivation and drive, and made us prisoners to instinct and self-indulgence.[50]

Thus despite the rhetoric of socialist solidarity Latif's German instructors possess attitudes and draw conclusions about their "dark" students that mirror colonial and Orientalist tropes of equatorial idleness and hedonism. They see their students' less than stellar academic performance as indicative of broad cultural and racial norms. The students, meanwhile, do not view their instructors as comrades in the great progressive march of humanity, but rather as curmudgeonly and mean-spirited prison guards, whose austere and often disdainful attitudes deserve only mischief and mockery in return. And yet Gurnah goes further than merely setting out a well-worn dialectic between European paternalism and post-colonial pride. Through Latif he asks: "who did we think we were?" Did the students really know more than their teachers?

Though Latif includes himself in this question, he is clearly open to new understandings. For him, East Germany is "like a gleaming new order, intimidating in its earnest and brutal self-assurance."[51] He does not, however, expound much further on his personal impressions of this socialist new order, other than to note

48 Ibid., 119.
49 Ibid., 115.
50 Ibid.
51 Ibid., 104.

the local town's unwelcoming architecture and wind-swept emptiness, which may be read as a metaphor for sterile bureaucratic central planning. He also refers to the "authoritarian degradations of the GDR," but without elaboration.[52] Otherwise, his interpretations of life in the East are free of socialist references, and could be the impressions of any African traveler coming to Germany long before or after the Cold War. Accompanying Ali on a walk around town on a Sunday afternoon, they encounter racist or at least socially obtuse behavior. A clutch of male German youths approach on the sidewalk; Ali tenses for an altercation, but the boys merely laugh and exclaim, "*Afrikernische*."[53] Latif remarks: "their swagger and their laughter made the word ugly. It was shocking, that casual mockery, but there would be time to get used to that and worse, to learn to recover from such smug disregard."[54]

Later, while riding a nearly empty bus a German man "wearing a dark, heavy workman's coat" leans over the back of his seat and stares at Latif "for about five minutes without interruption." When Latif eventually "glanced back into the bus, it was to find the man's liquid eyes resting watchfully on me, unraveling a deep mystery. … After his five minutes were up, the man made a snorting noise and turned to face the front again."[55] Aside from whatever may be deduced from a snort and a stare, Latif's encounters with ordinary East Germans are devoid of violence and overt abuse. And on a trip to Dresden Latif is amazed to learn of the city's "medieval triumphs, its great industries, its beautiful buildings," as well as devastation suffered in the recent war. He regrets that his colonial education was limited to the historic doings of the British, and made no mention of Dresden, "or a multitude of other Dresdens. They had been there for all these centuries despite me, ignorant of me, oblivious of my existence. It was a staggering thought, how little it had been possible to know and remain contented."[56]

Latif's visit to Dresden figures as part of a growing awareness of a very humanist side of the socialist East, first glimpsed in the works of Schiller and Chekov. Further nurturing this awareness is a pen pal relationship with a young German woman named Elleke, who sends Latif a photo of herself wearing a leopard-

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52 Ibid., 135–136.
53 This might refer to the German adjective "afrikanische."
54 Ibid., 119.
55 Ibid., 135.
56 Ibid., 122.

skin coat and a "friendly satirical smile."[57] The two agree to meet; and Ali begs to come along as a sort of bodyguard, in case he is harassed by "German thugs." Ali says "You are so young. ... So inexperienced. Such a sad creature from the bush. You'll need some worldly advice when you meet up with the leopard-skin coat."[58]

Latif goes alone, however, and is approached by a young man named Jan, who announces he is Elleke—that he impersonated a young woman in their correspondence as a prank that went further than intended. It all began when a speaker came to his college "to talk about the work that the GDR was doing in Africa," which Jan dismissed as "the usual campaigning rubbish about fraternal relations." He decided to invent Elleke as a sort of secret slap against the authorities, but which to his surprise yielded a letter from Latif, and the beginning of a very satisfying correspondence.[59] A student of automobile design at a local college, Jan introduces Latif to his mother who is tall, graceful, and a former beauty. Both he and his mother are well read, fluent in English, and pepper their conversation with literary allusions rather than socialist rhetoric. Indeed, though having lived through two world wars, and seen the rise of both fascism and socialism, the mother is remarkably independent in her thinking. Above all, she may be described as an irrepressible humanist, who through life's many vicissitudes retains a passionate attachment to literature and philosophy.[60]

Latif is surprised to discover the mother also has her own deep well of African stories to tell, as well as scathing ruminations on the morality of settler colonialism. Before World War One her parents were wealthy landowners in Austria; when Austria lost the war the family booked passage to Kenya, and purchased a coffee farm. They felt they had a right to "places that were only occupied by people with dark skins and frizzy hair." Her parents didn't inquire much into the "duplicity and force" of colonial rule; all that mattered was "the natives were pacified and labour was cheap." And life continued that way until 1938, when they were informed that if war erupted in Europe they would be interned. So they sold their farm, moved to Dresden, and with their

57 Ibid., 117. For Gurnah, this pen pal relationship was autobiographical. However, unlike in *By the Sea*, he and Elleke never met in real life. Personal email communication from Abdulrazak Gurnah to the author, August 14, 2019.
58 Gurnah, *By the Sea*, 122–123.
59 Ibid., 124. For a thoughtful examination of Hungary's contemporaneous attempts to nurture a youth culture of international socialist solidarity, see Mark and Apor, "Socialism Goes Global."
60 Gurnah, *By the Sea*, 125–128.

life's savings bought a large and imposing home. After the war the new socialist regime confiscated their home and divided it into smaller apartments.[61]

When Jan mentions his mother wrote a memoir of her time in Africa, she dismisses it as "lying nostalgia." She says,

> If I were writing it now, I would also tell the horrible stories and depress everyone, like a boring old woman. … My father was fond of saying that our superiority over the natives was only possible with their consent. … Poor Papa, he didn't think that it was torture and murder that were committed in our name which gave us that authority in the first place. He thought it was something mysterious to do with justice and temperate conduct, something we acquired from reading Hegel and Schiller, and going to Mass. Never mind the exclusions and expulsions, and the summary judgements delivered with contemptuous assurance. … It was our moral superiority which made the natives afraid of us.[62]

If anything in East Germany strikes Latif as especially admirable, it is this sort of ruthless honesty. Years later, Latif recalls the way Jan and his mother "treated every question as if it tested their integrity, as if they had to guard against the duplicitous revision which alters the balance of a story and turns it into something heroic." He praises their "sustained passion for ideas that could not be destroyed completely, not even by living through the obscenities of colonialism, nor the inhumanities of the Nazi war and the Holocaust, nor by the authoritarian degradations of the GDR."[63] Latif admires their obstinate belief in humanist values, and unwillingness to conform to hegemonic narratives and ways of seeing the world.

While initially willing to at least try and sound like an idealistic Young Pioneer, Latif comes to see the great distance between the transcendent rhetoric of fraternal East-South relations and the depressing realities of life in the GDR, including an ever-present fear of arrest and imprisonment. He becomes an accomplice in Jan's elaborate plan of escape. The two pose as tourists visiting Yugoslavia; from there they board a train to Austria, where the authorities send them on to Munich. The two then separate, with Jan staying in Germany, and Latif continuing on to further studies in England. Thus we see how, in an effort to escape his tragic family circumstances, a shy and precocious young Zanzibari male accepts an opportunity to study in the GDR, and there loses any faith he may have had in the socialist project. Within a few months he takes an opportunity to travel to London, the capital of British imperialism, and yet also a center of humanist learning and scholarship.

61 Ibid., 131–132.
62 Ibid., 132–133.
63 Ibid., 135–136.

Although a work of fiction, Latif's story is inspired by Gurnah's own life experiences, in that he left Zanzibar in the 1960s to study literature in Great Britain, where he has resided for most of his adult life. Like Latif in *By the Sea*, Gurnah eventually became a university lecturer, as well as a noted author of both novels and literary criticism. While he did not spend time in the GDR as a student, Gurnah developed his account of Latif from the recollections of fellow Zanzibaris who had. And although highly mediated, *By the Sea* nevertheless proposes a way for us to view the Zanzibari encounter with East Germany in the 1960s as one in which African students were on the surface willing to respect the basic tenets of the socialist project. Yet because they were not consulted in the role they were to play in this project, they sometimes felt they were "beggar pawns in somebody else's plans."[64] And though their presence in the GDR was meant as living proof of the socialist fraternity of nations, for some this fraternity remained abstract, and less real or impactful than the personal connections they made with German citizens while abroad.[65] Anxious over where such unscripted encounters might lead, the GDR's notion of "solidarity" did not actually encourage such personal associations. As Toni Weis observes, the GDR was far more interested in the solidarity of abstract peoples than of real, flesh-and-blood people.[66] And yet some Africans were able to leave their student hostels and form associations with East Germans, through which they were introduced to a surprising world of private passions and subjective experience.[67]

Conclusion

Back in Zanzibar, the effort to turn the theory of socialist internationalism into the reality of modernist development was facing unforeseen obstacles. When Wolf first arrived in the islands in 1964, he soon realized Zanzibaris had exaggerated ideas of what sort of aid the GDR could provide: "They would mournfully

64 Ibid., 115.

65 For another perspective, based upon oral histories of Tanzanian students in the GDR, see also Eric Burton, "Navigating Global Socialism: Tanzanian Students in and Beyond East Germany," *Cold War History* 19 (2019); Eric Burton, "Introduction: Journeys of Education and Struggle: African Mobility in Times of Decolonization and Cold War." *Stichproben. Vienna Journal of African Studies* 18 (2018).

66 Toni Weis, "The Politics Machine: On the Concept of 'Solidarity' in East German Support for SWAPO," *Journal of Southern African Studies* 37 (2011).

67 For other perhaps less mediated perspectives on how African students remembered their time in the GDR, see Alberto and Schenck; Osei, annotated by Harisch; Piepiorka and Buanaissa; Schenck and Raposo, all in this volume.

show us crumbling boats, old radios, and fraying telephone cables left behind by the British, hoping that we could restore the infrastructure of their entire country."[68] If islanders saw the GDR as a source of endless munificence, and if East Germans saw their relationship with Zanzibar as a means by which to break out of their diplomatic isolation, and build idealistic ties with a state that met their standards of socialist authenticity, the disillusionment was on both sides. By 1968 President Karume was increasingly upset with the poor results and/or high cost of GDR-sponsored fishing and dairy projects, the poor English skills of East German instructors, and the amount Zanzibar was expected to pay back on interest-bearing loans. He became impatient with any foreign expertise that could not be obtained at minimal cost—and by "minimal cost" he meant the Chinese, who offered grants and interest-free loans, and sent experts and advisors willing to subsist on very little. Some of Karume's frustration with the East Germans percolated down to the popular level. An East German biology teacher, when asked by his students in 1967 about the size of his salary, was duly informed that for the same amount Zanzibar could support five or ten Chinese instructors, all of whom could live in the house he alone occupied.[69]

Karume's attitude became one of suspicion of all forms of technocratic expertise; hence his closure of the short-lived GDR-sponsored "School of Economics," and decision in the late-1960s to dramatically curtail the numbers of Zanzibaris sent overseas for training and education.[70] He began to say at rallies, "*Tumesoma hatukujua, lakini tumejifunza tulijua,*" which roughly translates as "We studied and didn't understand, but then we learned through practical experience."[71] Karume's disdain for experts was an extension of his general dislike for educated persons, since from the 1950s they were the ones in the ASP most likely to challenge his authority. Yet Karume also parted ways with the GDR over his unwillingness to follow any "scientific" blueprint for socialism that entailed collectivization of agriculture, for example, or curbing the privileges of the political elite. And as Eric Burton observes, the East Germans were sometimes put off by the racial animosity that animated many of Karume's

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68 Wolf and McElvoy, *Man Without a Face*, 254. For an engaging American perspective on the Cold War rivalries playing out in Zanzibar, see Don Petterson, *Revolution in Zanzibar: An American Cold War Tale* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2002).

69 Interview by author, Eckhart Schultz, Zanzibar Town, July 22, 2004.

70 Burton, "Diverging Visions," 108 – 109.

71 Interview by author, Rubesa Hafidh Rubesa, Mtambwe Nyale, Zanzibar, June 21, 2010. These words were featured on a large banner strung up on the government-built Michenzani flats, suggesting Zanzibaris did not need East German expertise to complete the project (photograph in author's possession).

most cherished initiatives. Though they once viewed him as an "anti-imperialist progressive," by 1970 he was a "nationalist conservative" who "artificially fuelled racial tensions for personal interests."[72] By then China had supplanted the GDR as Zanzibar's leading foreign patron, and about 200 East German teachers and "experts" in Zanzibar had already left, or were on their way home.[73]

The disillusionment was mutual—East Germans were convinced Karume was not a true socialist, and Karume felt that other than in the realm of security the GDR had failed to live up to expectations. It wasn't only the obstacles of language, culture, and distance that eventually brought an end to the flow of students, technicians, and teachers between East Germany and Zanzibar. By 1970 it was clear to both sides their shared vision of a socialist future was hollow, superficial, and unable to paper over serious differences of interest and ideology. The political elite of both countries felt it was time to be more selective in their international partners, and to be more aware of the potentially shallow quality of an imagined future that, while possessing immense appeal, was unable to reconcile diverging concepts of revolution, development, and solidarity.[74]

Thus just as Zanzibar achieved sovereignty during the height of the Cold War, the GDR was poised and ready to break out of its diplomatic isolation and conduct its first major development projects in Africa. Believing they were part of a global drama in which one people after another would embrace socialism and achieve modernist development, East Germans felt they were playing a significant and honorable role in advancing the irreversible progressive momentum of history. By 1990, however, the GDR had merged with West Germany, and Zanzibar had lost key aspects of its sovereignty: its presidents were now selected by Tanzania's ruling party based overwhelmingly on the mainland. Severe economic decline had also compelled Zanzibar to roll back one revolutionary initiative after another, and to abandon anything more than lip service to socialism. Instead of gazing eastward, state officials now looked to the West and Middle East for aid, expertise, and tourists to fill the many hotels now clustered along Zanzibar's fine white sand beaches. And Abdulrazak Gurnah was now asking his friends and former classmates who studied in the GDR—caught up as they were in an era of high idealism and socialist solidarity—how they managed to negotiate the disparate avenues of opportunity suddenly presented to them.

72 Burton, "Diverging Visions," 111.

73 Burgess, "A Socialist Diaspora," 282; Clayton, *Zanzibar Revolution*, 148.

74 For the difference between "development" and "solidarity," see Weis, "The Politics Machine," 352, 357.

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7

Socialist Construction of Life at the time of German Democratic Republic

J. A. Osei, with an annotation by Immanuel R. Harisch[1]

Editor's note

J. A. Osei's report of his sojourn in the GDR, which is fully reproduced below, is to be found in J. A. Osei to Heinz Deutschland, Accra, July 22, 1964, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/615. The original title Osei had chosen for his report – "My impression of the German Democratic Republic" – was crossed out by one (anonymous) member of the editorial board of the journal *Correspondence* and changed to "Life itself exposes lies". Ultimately, Osei's contribution was printed in *Correspondence* under the title "Reality exposes lies" without, to my knowledge, any further queries by the editorial board.[3] *Correspondence* was the quarterly bulletin of the Faculty for Foreign Students[4] at the Bernau college. From 1964 to 1966 it was edited and published in both English and French by the staff of the faculty, with the editorial team usually consisting of six to eight members. It was sent to all alumni of the trade union college and was "meant to report on your and our

1 I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer as well as my colleagues and co-editors Eric Burton and Marcia C. Schenck for their encouragement and valuable comments on this annotation. My gratitude also goes to Esther Asenso-Agyemang from the University of Legon for discussing Osei's letters and for help in obtaining literature on the Ghana TUC, and to Nana Osei-Opare for sharing his manuscript on workers' discontent in Ghana with me.

2 The undertaking to have African and Asian alumni write about their experiences in East Germany was linked to the fifteenth anniversary of the GDR. In June 1964, the Institute for Foreign Students (*Ausländerinstitut*) of the FDGB's trade union college Fritz Heckert in Bernau, close to Berlin (see Angermann, this volume), had actively contacted 42 alumni of the first three courses and asked them to send back a paper on the topic "I lived and studied 18 months in the GDR". Twenty-four former students, among them Osei, responded to the call. In 1964, a selected number of them were published in the third issue of *Correspondence* in both English and French. See Heinz Deutschland to Karl Kampfert, n. d. [1964], Stiftung Archiv der Parteien und Massenorganisationen der DDR im Bundesarchiv, Berlin (henceforth: SAPMO-BArch), DY 79/403.

3 See J. A. Osei, "Reality exposes lies," *Correspondence. Informationsbulletin Nr. 3 der Fakultät für Ausländerstudium an der Hochschule der Deutschen Gewerkschaften "Fritz Heckert" Bernau* (1964).

4 Also commonly referred to as Institute for Foreign Students.

activities. It is meant to convey aid and instructions to assist you in your further studies and to tighten the bonds of friendship connecting us forever."[5]

In order to give our readers an impression of the original source, Osei's report is reproduced here without corrections. Mistakes are not indicated with [sic!] so as to facilitate a smoother reading. I believe that the handwritten comments by the East German members of the editorial board of *Correspondence*, which are marked in the letter by square brackets and strikethrough, offer interesting insights into what the editorial board in the GDR deemed unacceptable and where they polished phrases for the final version.

* * *

In September, 1961 the Trade Union Congress of Ghana[6] sent a number of students to be trained in the College of the Confederation of Free German Trade Un-

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5 See "Editorial," *Correspondence Informationsbulletin Nr. 1 der Fakultät für Ausländerstudium an der Hochschule der Deutschen Gewerkschaften "Fritz Heckert" Bernau* (1964), 3. Digital copy in the possession of Immanuel R. Harisch. I thank the former director of the Institute for Foreign Students, Heinz Deutschland, for allowing me to digitize several issues of *Correspondence*.

6 The predecessor of the Ghana TUC was founded in 1943 under the name of the Gold Coast Trade Union Congress (GCTUC) and was modeled after British industrial relations. In 1950, during the early struggle for self-government, the GCTUC organized a general strike which decisively shaped the outcome of the campaign for the benefit of the Convention People's Party (CPP) led by Kwame Nkrumah. During the 1950s, however, the CPP joined the British colonial office in the crusade against left-wing, Marxist trade unionists who sought to establish contact to the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). Internationally, the GCTUC remained in the Western, anticommunist camp of the rivalrous International Confederation of Free Trade Unions (ICFTU). Accra was host to one of the two ICFTU informational centers on the African continent as well as to the ICFTU's first African Regional Conference. With the passing of the Industrial Relations Act (IRA) in parliament in 1958, however, the Ghana TUC prepared the ground for its disaffiliation from the ICFTU in 1959 and was reorganized, now to consist of 16 industrial unions – the Timber & Woodworkers' Union, of which J. A. Osei was deputy general secretary after his return from the GDR, being one of them. The changes due to the IRA, criticized by the ICFTU and International Labour Organization (ILO), were far-reaching: to be a member of the Ghana TUC became obligatory for workers; Ghana's industrial unions had to affiliate with the TUC central in Accra, where the TUC had built a new headquarters with money lent from the CPP government; the "check-off" system was introduced, which allowed the companies to deduct membership fees from the workers' salary; and the right to strike was severely curtailed. The Ghana TUC general secretary was a minister of the CPP government at the same time. As a result, the Ghana TUC became severely restricted in its agency, although it profited from a strong financial and organizational base after the integration into the CPP's political machine. See Douglas G. Anglin, "Ghana, the West, and the Soviet Union," *The Canadian Journal of Economics and Political Science / Revue Canadienne d'Economique et de Science Politique* 24 (1958): 161, 164; Imanuel Geiss, *Gewerkschaften in Afrika* (Hannover: Verlag für Literatur und Zeitgeschehen, 1965), 197–

ions in Bernau/Berlin. I happened to be one of the luckiest chaps selected for this course.[7] The time of our journey coincided with the closing down of the border between the East and West Berlin which happened on 13th August, 1961. [i. e. the erection of the antifascist protection wall].

It is an admitted fact that any attempt by any state to obstruct capitalist intrigues and wicked machinations, designed to undermine the progress and development of that state, is always repulsed by the capitalist press with vile and slanderous propaganda. Immediately after the closing down of this border, an attempt to safeguard the G.D.R.'s economy, the newspapers of the Western Al-

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198; Ioan Davies, *African Trade Unions* (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 1966), 174–180; John Kraus, "The Political Economy of Industrial Relations in Ghana," in Industrial Relations in Africa, ed. Ukandi G. Damachi, Dieter H. Seibel, and Lester Trachtman (London: Macmillan, 1979), 132; Paul Tiyambe Zeleza, "Pan-African Trade Unionism: Unity and Discord," *Transafrican Journal of History* 15 (1986): 182; Peter Blay Arthiabah and Harry Tham Mbiah, *Half a Century of Toil, Trouble and Progress: The History of the Trades Union Congress of Ghana 1939–1995* (Accra: Gold-Type Publications, 1995), 55–98; Frederick Cooper, *Decolonization and African Society. The Labor Question in French and British Africa* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 432–438; Naaborko Sackeyfio-Lenoch, "The Ghana Trades Union Congress and the Politics of International Labor Alliances, 1957–1971," *International Review of Social History* 62 (2017): 194, 203, 213.

7 During his stay in the GDR, Osei acted as leader of the 13-person Ghanaian delegation, which was delegated by the Ghana TUC. Following a cooperation agreement with the East German national trade union federation *Freier Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund* (FDGB), the Ghana TUC dispatched between 10 and 15 students to study on each course at the trade union college in Bernau. Prior to his stay abroad, Osei had completed 10 years of primary and secondary schooling. At college in the GDR, the Ghanaian unionist graduated from an 18-months long-term course, taking political-ideological subjects such as "The socialist world system," "The revolutionary international workers' movement," "The national liberation movement" and "Inquiries into problems of socialist economics." The program was complemented by more practical lessons on "Problems of trade union organization" as well as by a polytechnic education and internships in GDR companies, an accordance with the students' interests. See "Jahresarbeitsbericht für die Zeit vom 1.9. Bis 31.12.1961," n. d. [January 1962], SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/83; "Lehrplan des 3. afro-asiatischen Lehrgangs 1962/63, " n. d. [1962], SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/271. For the traineeships see e.g. "Zur Auswertung des praktischen Einsatzes vom 12.–26. Januar 1963," February 7, 1963, SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500, among others; for an analysis of the third course (1961–63) at the college, consult Eric Angermann, "'Ihr Gehört Auch Zur Avantgarde': Afrikanische Gewerkschafter an der FDGB-Hochschule Fritz Heckert (1961–1963)" (Master's thesis, Georg-August-Universität Göttingen, 2018) and Chapter Two "Where do Correct Ideas Come From? The FDGB Institute for Foreign Students and the Coming of the Sino-Soviet Split" in George Bodie, "Global GDR? Sovereignty, Legitimacy and Decolonization in the German Democratic Republic, 1960–1989" (PhD diss., University College London, 2019). For a micro-historical analysis of African students' agency at the college and their attempts to set up an independent committee, see Angermann's chapter in this volume.

lies carried false news perpetrated against the Sovereign State of the German Democratic Republic. One of such news was captioned: "Running from Hell to Heaven." This news gave horrible account of the G.D.R. as how the inhabitants were not free and how they could not get food sufficiently to feed themselves and their families, and therefore were escaping from East Berlin to the West and so on and so forth. Really, it was only the person who was determined in purpose who could defy those wicked propaganda to go to East Germany at that moment.

Determined as we were to train and harden ourselves to oust the final remains of capitalism from our new state of Ghana[8] we were not disturbed at all by these news. Finally, therefore, on 6th September, 1961 we flew from the Accra International Airport to ~~for~~ Democratic Berlin ~~and~~ to hear, see and learn for ourselves what the European Capitalists had been saying of that country.

8 Osei's witty writing style and his socialist rhetoric were certainly shaped both by his stay in the GDR and by the socialist modernization project that Ghana's CPP, led by Kwame Nkrumah, was undertaking at the time of writing. That Osei strongly identified with the CPP's aims and policies becomes evident in his personal correspondence with the faculty's staff. See the correspondence between Osei and the director of the Institute for Foreign Students, Heinz Deutschland, in the signatures SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/615, DY 79/614, DY 79/615, DY 79/616 and DY 79/617, which contain thousands of letters between the mainly African alumni of the college and the institute's employees. Historian Sara Pugach has noted that these letters present crucial insights into the lifeworlds of the returning students in their home contexts. See Sara Pugach, "African Students in Cold War Leipzig: Using University Archives to Recover a Forgotten History," in *Sources and Methods for African History and Culture: Essays in Honour of Adam Jones*, ed. Geert Castryck et al. (Leipzig: Leipziger Universitätsverlag, 2016), 551–552. Works which have made use of these letters are Angermann, "Ihr Gehört auch zur Avantgarde" and Immanuel R. Harisch, "'Mit Gewerkschaftlichem Gruß!' Afrikanische GewerkschafterInnen an der FDGB-Gewerkschaftshochschule Fritz Heckert in der DDR," *Stichproben. Vienna Journal of African Studies* 18 (2018). For a look on the CPP's mobilization strategies for the "labouring masses towards work and happiness", see Kate Skinner, "Who Knew the Minds of the People? Specialist Knowledge and Developmentalist Authoritarianism in Postcolonial Ghana," *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 39 (2011). A recent panorama on the Nkrumah years can be found in *Kwame Nkrumah 1909–1972: A Controversial African Visionary*, ed. Bea Lundt and Christoph Marx (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2016). For Ghana's relations with the USSR during the Nkrumah years, see Nana Osei-Opare, "Uneasy Comrades: Postcolonial Statecraft, Race, and Citizenship, Ghana–Soviet Relations, 1957–1966," *Journal of West African History* 5 (2019): 85–111; on workers' discontent with the CPP and the Ghana TUC, see Nana Osei-Opare, "'If You Trouble a Hungry Snake, You Will Force It to Bite You': Rethinking Archival Pessimism, Worker Discontent, and Petition Writing in Ghana, 1957–66," *Journal of African History* (forthcoming).

First Lie Nailed Down:

The Polish two engined plane which took us from Amsterdam touched the beautiful Berlin Schönefeld Airport at exactly 4.30 p. m. We were in a different country with different people with different language. Contrary to our expectations a member of the Airport Unit of the People's Police of the G.D.R., who could not speak English approached us and by his action seemed to ask as to whether he could help us. He was smart and neat, wearing a cheerful countenance which depicted his kindness. This gentle Officer led us through all the custom formalities without any of my Comrades encountering any inconveniences.

Just as we ~~could~~ [had] finish[ed] with the Airport and Custom Officials, a 6 foot tall and well built man arrived at the Airport and hastily came to us. He introduced himself as Comrade Horst Thomas, a lecturer of the Fritz Heckert College, where we were to go and that he was to be our guide. The simple but impressive receptions accorded [to] us by Comrade Thomas and the Airport Authorities were quite sufficient to disbelieve the lies told in the Western Press about the G.D.R.

At the College

After some minutes drive we arrived at the "Fritz Heckert ~~Institute~~" [College]. Contrary to the assertion that the College is a "Concentration Camp"[9] I found to my amazement magnificent buildings with beautiful surroundings; this environment alone is quite sufficient to satisfy the whims of any ambitious student.[10]

9 Unfortunately, I was unable to retrieve this particular report, allegedly from a media outlet in a Western capitalist country.

10 Since the Weimar Republic, the German Trade Union College (*Hochschule der Deutschen Gewerkschaften*) Fritz Heckert offered various courses for German trade unionists in Bernau, a suburb of Berlin. The college, which was inaugurated in 1930, was designed by the Swiss architect Hannes Meyer, director of the *Bauhaus* in Dessau. In 1933, the national socialists converted the school into a training center for fascist leaders (*Reichsführerschule*). From 1947 onward, the newly founded FDGB held seminars in the Soviet occupation zone. After the foundation of the GDR in 1949 and under the directorship of anti-fascist trade unionist Hermann Duncker, the college expanded to train union functionaries of the FDGB. In 1960, the Institute for Foreign Students was moved from Leipzig-Leutzsch to the site of the Bernau college where new facilities had been constructed and additional staff was hired. See Alfred Förster, "Zur Geschichte der Gewerkschafts-Schule in Bernau (1928–90)," in *Der Freie Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund. Seine Rechte und Leistungen. Tatsachen, Erfahrungen, Standpunkte*, ed. Horst Bednarek, Harald Bühl, and Werner Koch (Berlin: Verlag am Park, 2006).

In the Institute's Dining Room both the Whites and the Blacks dined together.[11] The mixture of both Whites and Blacks in such a room reminds one of the keyboard of a piano. This completely relieved us of any fear that haunted our minds because of those obnoxious publications about the G.D.R.[12]

After seeing all these and many more I said to myself that "HELL" is an imaginary place of permanent torment of fire, (with apology to the Bible) and if one is to believe that the G.D.R. is a "HELL", as indicated by the Western Press, then to me Hell is a comfortable and happier place to live.

11 As Yevette Richards has shown for the ICFTU's own trade union college, the African Labour College in Uganda's capital Kampala, the fact that a trade union college's dining room like the one in Bernau was shared by black and white students and staff was by no means universal in the late 1950s and early 1960s. In the early period of the ICFTU college, the white personnel dined in the main dining hall of Kampala's exclusive Imperial Hotel while the black students, the Kenyan deputy principal Odero-Jowi, and the black U.S.-American teacher McCray sat at tables in another hall, close to the kitchen. In January 1959, when two African students were refused entry to the main dining hall and the white racist hotel management threatened them with expulsion, the students collectively refused to eat and asked for airline tickets home. They fiercely criticized the hypocritical ICFTU, which campaigned for "free trade unionism" and "democracy." See Yevette Richards, *Maida Springer: Pan-Africanist and International Labor Leader* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2000), 154.

12 In his report, Osei omits the fact that racist incidents did repeatedly happen in the socialist states of Europe and the USSR in the early 1960s. For scholarly accounts, see, for example, Ilona Schleicher, "FDGB-Offensive in Westafrika. Der Gewerkschaftsbund im Jahr Afrikas," in *Engagiert für Afrika. Die DDR und Afrika II*, ed. Ulrich van der Heyden, Ilona Schleicher, and Hans-Georg Schleicher (Münster: Lit, 1994), 89 – 90; Sara Pugach, "African Students and the Politics of Race and Gender in the German Democratic Republic," in *Comrades of Color: East Germany in the Cold War World*, ed. Quinn Slobodian (New York: Berghahn, 2015); Young-sun Hong, *Cold War Germany, the Third World, and the Global Humanitarian Regime* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015); Daniel Branch, "Political Traffic: Kenyan Students in Eastern and Central Europe, 1958 – 69," *Journal of Contemporary History* 53 (2018); Maxim Matusevich, "Expanding the Boundaries of the Black Atlantic: African Students as Soviet Moderns," *Ab Imperio* 2012 (2012); Julie Hessler, "Death of an African Student in Moscow," *Cahiers Du Monde Russe* 47 (2006). Moreover, as leader of the Ghanaian delegation during his stay, Osei regularly attended the council of the delegations' leaders (*Rat der Delegationsleiter*), where the African delegates discussed xenophobic behavior of some shopkeepers in Bernau or anonymous letters sent to East German women telling them not to engage with the African students. See "Protokoll der Sitzung des Rates der Delegationsleiter am 10. April 1962", n. d. [April 1962], SAPMO-BArch, DY 79/2500. For the council of delegation leaders' meetings, see also the chapter by Angermann in this volume.

Care for the Foreign Students

All Foreign Students have the same right as the German students in the College. Every Foreign Student receives for every month, a stipend of 400 ~~Deutsch~~ [German] Marks and it is made as follows: 150 D. M. for food and 250 D. M. for books and other minor expenses.

~~Major meals are served 3 times a day and in addition intermediate meals are served at every 10 a. m. between breakfast and lunch at 3 p. m. between lunch and supper.~~

Freedom of Movement

All foreigners, respectable of their color or creed, are free to move everywhere and see anything as any other German citizen. As students, who were willing to learn and know everything, we joined German families at week-ends in their homes. We found to our amazement that every average family has sufficient food to feed upon. They live in spacious flats at very low rentage.

The German Democratic Republic has no unemployment questions to solve. All ~~and sundry~~ work to earn a decent living.[13] I was mostly impressed to see graduated young women engineers in the "Sachsenwerk" Electric Motor Factory in Dresden. Their agile fingers doing and undoing parts on electric motors are delightful to the eye to watch.[14]

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13 The idyllic picture Osei painted of the East German workers can be brought into dialogue with the concept of relative deprivation – "the idea that how one judges one's own situation and circumstances depends on the person or group to whom or to which one is comparing oneself." See Andrew I. Port, "'Awkward Encounters': East German Relations with the Third-World 'Other'," *German History* 35 (2017): 630. A 1962 report, written by two FDGB labor advisors who were dispatched to the Ghana TUC for eight months in order to act as Ghana TUC general secretary John K. Tettegah's right-hand men, stated that 65 % of the workers and 36 % of white-collar workers earned a salary below the minimum subsistence level as defined by the Ghanaian government. See "Bericht über einige Fragen der Entwicklung Ghanas und des Ghana TUC", Berlin, 11.1.1962, 54, SAPMO-BArch, DY 34/3475. Richard Jeffries has examined the declining real wages for Ghanaian railwaymen in detail; see Richard Jeffries, *Class, Power and Ideology in Ghana: The Railwaymen of Sekondi* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). To summarize, in Imanuel Geiss' words, the austerity measures introduced by the CPP in 1961 made the toiling masses suffer. See Geiss, *Gewerkschaften in Afrika*, 195.

14 Osei's admiration for the female engineers – expressed in the above paragraph with an erotic and somewhat belittling undertone – paralleled the CPP's progressive policies with regard to women in the Nkrumah years. Female traders had been a crucial pillar of support for Nkrumah's

Socialist Construction

In that modern model city of Eisenhuttenstadt[15], which I call the city of "Socialism", we were highly impressed to see how every worker works willingly, freely and diligently without any emotion. Prior to the Second World War this city which is situated in a heart of a thick forest, did not exist. After the war the G.D.R. workers under the banner of the Socialist Unity PARTY built this industrial city with its most modern Steel Factory. The city is therefore the workers city. What I gathered from this city of Eisenhuttenstadt is the oneness of purpose with which the workers work and live. Workers families, previously unknown to one another, are joined together in a common alliance which is the mood of production. They meet in club houses to discuss how best they can produce and to produce abundantly to enable them to create more to improve their own living condition. "Each worker is not for himself and ~~gold~~ [god] for them all" as it is said in the Capitalist countries but rather every worker in this Steel Factory is his brother's keeper. This means that the concern of one worker is the concern of all workers. They are knitted together by the steel they produce and "behold how good and how pleasant it is for workers to live together in Socialism".[16]

CPP during the anti-colonial struggle and since then had contributed considerably to its success through their financial and organizational efforts. During the CPP's rule, women entered institutions of higher learning in increasing numbers and soon gained access to male-dominated domains such as aviation and engineering. See Edzodzinam Tsikata, "Women's Political Organisations 1951–1987," in *The State, Development and Politics in Ghana*, ed. Emmanuel Hansen and Kwame A. Ninsin, (London: Codesria, 1989), 77; June Milne, *Kwame Nkrumah – a Biography* (London: Panaf Books, 2006), 109.

15 The East German model city of modernity, Eisenhüttenstadt (literally "ironworks city" in German, from 1953 to 1961 named Stalinstadt), which Osei called the "city of 'Socialism,'", was designed on the drawing board. It was founded in 1950 in order to provide the workers of the nearby steelworks with housing. Located in the state of Brandenburg close to the Polish border, the city had roughly 25,000 inhabitants by 1960.

16 Osei's idea of workers' unity is guided by a productionist language echoing the CPP's understanding of labor. Work was meant to "unite Ghanaians of all walks of life in the party-led and party-defined nation-building project." See Jeffrey S. Ahlman, *Living with Nkrumahism: Nation, State, and Pan-Africanism in Ghana* (Athens, Ohio: Ohio University Press, 2017), 116.

Seeing is Believing

We had the pleasure to visit the port of Rostock. This is the shipping port of the G.D.R. with its modern Harbour. It has also a fishing harbour attached and employs about 30,000 workers. The Workers of the German Democratic Republic have every cause to be happy. The Government and the people chose the socialist order of living and they are enjoying the fruits of their toils and sacrifices.

~~Many Holiday and Convalescent Homes are built for the workers and their families. After every 12 continuous months' work a worker chooses one of these Holiday Homes where to relax for just 30 D. Marks for the days of his leave. All kinds of entertainments and modern clinics as well as Post Offices are attached to each home. We had the opportunity of visiting and staying in some of these Homes; Klink-on the-Müritz near Waren in the region of Neubrandenburg and also in Friedrichsroda in the Thuringen Forest in the region of Erfurt.~~

We had [also] trips ~~also~~ to Heringdorf at the Baltic Sea near the Polish border. There we met thousands of workers and their families from many Socialist countries enjoying their holidays together with the G.D.R. workers.[17]

Our trip also took us to the Spreewald in the District of Cottbus. This is one of the most interesting places for tourist's attraction. The cruise on the long, narrow, winding stream offers a frolic spree [for] fine recreation. And least I forget: The voyage on the Muritz Lake through series of canals to the village of Plau cannot be short of enjoyment. These and many others are reserved for the workers

17 Here Osei affirms the official script of socialist internationalism, the idea of one socialist community made up of socialist brother countries. With regard to the recreational sphere, the FDGB's holiday service (see note below) aimed at providing its members with affordable enjoyment as a constitutive part of its mission to raise overall productivity. In Ghana, the CPP perceived the trade unions as the vehicle of the government's productionist dreams within the discourses of development and progress. The TUC also engaged in a number of socio-economic activities for its members, like workers' recreational centers with sports facilities, cinemas and bars, vegetable farms, housing projects, and two professional dance bands "for the entertainment of workers in compliance with the Convention People [sic!] Party's slogan of 'WORK AND HAPPINESS'." See Arthiabah and Mbiah, *Half a Century of Toil, Trouble and Progress*, 127–37. While Ghanaian workers, grosso modo, could secure some social and security benefits, real wages, however, stagnated and the CPP government cracked down on the right to strike and to protest in the early 1960s, most prominently after the 1961 strike. See Osei-Opare, "'If you trouble a hungry snake,'" 36, and Jeffries, *Class, Power and Ideology in Ghana*, 71–101. See also footnote 13.

and [the] people of the G.D.R. for their enjoyment.[18] Who then can say that the citizens of the G.D.R. are not free? Can there be any other freedom and liberty more than these? Away then! Mr. Capitalist, with your intrigues and wicked machinations. We have seen and we bear testimony of the good things in the German Democratic Republic.

"Some people went to the G.D.R. to sit and stink; But we went there to sit and think."

Respect of Colour

The people of the German Democratic Republic are kind and loving. Wherever we went during our 18 months' stay, either in groups or in singles, ~~either officially or privately,~~ we were accorded with warm reception and hospitality.

In the drinking bars, restaurants and in the dancing rooms too, the Black is as well welcome as the White. Unlike the capitalist countries in Europe, people of all races are regarded as equal.

Peace Loving

The German Democratic Republic is a peace-loving country. The Government and people of this country have endured series of provocations from the people of West Germany without reiteration. This patience of the people of the G.D.R. has saved the whole world and mankind from what would had flared up to another dangerous World War. One could recollect the cold murder of the G.D.R. soldiers on the Jerusalem Strasse on the Border ~~in East~~ Berlin [to West] and other places.[19] The killing of the Prince of Sarajavo [Sarajevo] in 1914 kindled

18 The FDGB, as the umbrella organization of all trade unions in the GDR, also played a crucial social and cultural role. The FDGB's *Feriendienst* (holiday service) provided roughly half of the GDR's population with recreational facilities for their holidays, like the holiday villages in Waren-Klink at Lake Müritz. A series of canals connects Lake Müritz with Lake Plauen with the village Plau on its Western shore. See Fritz Rösel, "Der Feriendienst des FDGB," in *Der Freie Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund. Seine Rechte und Leistungen. Tatsachen, Erfahrungen, Standpunkte*, ed. Horst Bednarek, Harald Bühl, and Werner Koch (Berlin: Verlag am Park, 2006); Bodie, "Global GDR?," 45–48.

19 Here Osei is probably referring to the killing of GDR soldier Reinhold Huhn at the Berlin Wall in June 1962. Huhn was patrolling the German-German border in the center of Berlin. From the West Berlin side, the frequent border trespasser (*Grenzgänger*) Rudolf Müller and his aides dug a tunnel to a cellar in East Berlin with the aim to bring Müller's wife, their two children, and his

the first World War and would not the killing of more people by another people justify a Great War? But the G.D.R. Government bore these provocations ~~cooly and collectedly~~ for the interest of mankind. This alone is a living testimony that the Communist detests war.

Friendliness

The large number of German Students of the College of the Confederation of Free German Trade Unions and friends and families from many parts of the country who saw us off on Sunday March 24th, 1963 at the Berlin Schönefeld Airport, wailing and weeping because of the friends they would perhaps see no more is a good sign of the friendliness of the people of the German Democratic Republic.

I have never stop[ped] recollecting the happy days I had in this wonderful country and I have every ambition to visit this country in the near future to pay homage to my Alma Mater and to meet also friends and families of auld langsyne.

I have every hope that the German Democratic Republic will grow in strength and might to accomplish its ultimate task of building complete socialism where continuous abundance will flow for the people and their dependents and where greed, avarice, fraud and exploitation will never exist.

J. A. Osei

Deputy General Secretary Timber & Woodworkers Union of T. U. C. (Ghana)

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sister-in-law to West Berlin. After Müller had picked up his family at a meeting point, the group was examined by Huhn on their way to the entrance of the tunnel. Müller pulled a pistol and shot Huhn in the chest. Huhn died and Müller's family managed to escape. In the Federal Republic, Müller denied that he had shot Huhn; the West German court closed the investigation in November 1962. The case was reopened after German reunification in 1996 and Müller confessed to shooting Huhn. Müller was sentenced for involuntary manslaughter in self-defense, which, was changed to homicide upon appeal at the Federal Court in 2000. See Hans-Hermann Hertle and Maria Nooke, *Die Todesopfer an der Berliner Mauer 1961–1989. Ein Biographisches Handbuch* (Berlin: Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung Potsdam und der Stiftung Berliner Mauer, 2009) and Dietmar Arnold and Rudolf Müller, *Kein Licht am Ende des Tunnels. Berlin 1962. Die tragische Flucht einer Familie* (Berlin: Ch. Links, 2018).

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