CHADRASHEKHAR RAJE

PERSPECTIVES AND
PROBLEMS OF
DEVELOPING NATIONS
VOLUME 3

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Perspectives and Problems of Developing Nations: Volume 3

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Korean Model: Reflecting on the Korean Experience and Africa's Reality

Lessons of Fundamentals of Economics and Industrialization

Sub-Saharan African countries are still grappling with the issue of how to tackle poverty and move up the economic ladder. For any poor country wanting to break out of its lot and join the ranks of rich nations, realizing structural, wide-ranging and continuous changes in all sectors is a necessity. Those economies that have successfully emerged in a transformative fashion were able to do so because they were progressing on multiple fronts, as was the case in many East Asian and Southeast Asian nations. South Korea pushed forward many social, educational, economic and governmental 'reforms' and launched industrialization and rural development in a 'concurrent' manner.

The worst-case scenario would be where a poor country with no resources remains idle and fails to undertake any significant economic initiatives. Resource-rich countries are better off as they can rely on these resources, but the danger of the Dutch Disease (the problem of production of natural resources causing a decline in other sectors like manufacturing) wrought by a commodity-based monocultural economy

looms in these countries. Hence, an unsavoury recipe for the countries would be a combination of a resource-rich, commodity-dependent structure with bad management, and a lack of sense of ownership or a workable strategy. Evidently, hardly any countries have successfully developed simply by relying on their natural resources.

An IMF report released in April, 2017 confirmed that oil-exporting countries and other resource-intensive countries in Sub-Saharan Africa were showing the worst economic performance in the region.[1] Even countries like Botswana and Zambia that enjoyed a reputation for good governance and were regarded as models in Sub-Saharan Africa experienced problems related to a commodity-dependent economy. Traditionally, African economies which are primarily reliant on agricultural produce like cacao, coffee and tea have experienced vulnerability with the fluctuation of international market prices. While commodity prices have been recovering in 2018, various economic forecasts point to rather sluggish growth for the resource-rich African countries.

And then, of course, we see a preponderance of economic liberalization, free trade and investment in Africa. Somehow, the myth that privatization, liberalization and the influx of foreign companies will, *in themselves*, unleash the full economic potential of their country has settled in Africa. In appearance, this has all the bearings of a positive trend and can certainly help, but it masks the untoward side of the reality. In order or any policy to be successful, the government must assume responsibility and a hands-on posture. All policies have drawbacks as well as advantages, and this should not be forgotten. Furthermore, different policies require different conditions and although trial and error is inevitable, appropriate rectifying measures must follow. However, the tendency seems to be that the authorities opt for convenience and the easy way out.

Basically, in order for any organization to function properly, it would require positive leadership from the top and adherence to its rules or policies by the members. The stronger such traits are, the more efficient the organization will be. And in the case of governmental bureaucracy, this should be all the more evident. The bigger the hierarchical structure of an organization, the greater the 'trickle-down effect' the quality of leadership

will have on the organization. There is an old Korean saying that 'upper stream water must be clean for downstream water to be clean'.

There is also a cliché that says 'action speaks louder than words'. Public services are delivered by actions, and the timely provision of services is of the utmost importance. The credibility, authority and efficiency of the state stem from the everyday performance of the governmental bureaucracy, which is determined by the devotion and actions of civil servants. When we are talking about producing real outcomes, that is, being productive, we mean making an improvement over time. The variables are intrinsically 'change' and 'speed', or how fast this change can be made. Change or improvement can be either quantitative or qualitative, or both. The measure of progress is how much and how fast things can be done.

Myopic vision, which is not looking ahead, and expediency, which is choosing what is convenient now rather than what will yield better results tomorrow, both come with costs. A typical example is when requests are made to build factories, training institutes, etc., but after they have gotten them from development partners, the familiar pattern of mismanagement ensues. Often the training and consulting provided to local officials and operators are rendered futile as soon as they are handed over. Of course, some projects manage to survive and last as intended, proving to be useful, but these are the exceptions to the rule.

Also, in many countries, there seems to be a tendency for people wanting things for the sake of 'possession', as an end in themselves, rather than to utilize them as a means to extract additional or greater benefits. I have met many African officials, businessmen and rural leaders who would say that once they receive investments and factories, everything else will take care of itself. But in order to run a factory, people need utilities, management, maintenance, skills and capacities, funding, etc. Securing a facility in its physical form is one thing, but operating it successfully is another thing entirely.

In the context of addressing poverty, African leaders are urging their rural populace to get out of the subsistence way of life and engage in more productive activities to generate income. For peasants, subsistence means getting by with what they can find around them without being far-sighted

and having a long-term plan in place. However, the problem of 'subsistence' is also inherent in other sectors, including the public sector.

As laid out in the African Union (AU)'s Agenda 2063, all African countries aspire to growth and sustainable development, and aim for a 'structurally transformed' economy. And every leader seems to have industrialization in mind. It will be difficult to imagine having structural transformation of economy without industrialization or a manufacturing sector. Figure 9.1 represents manufacturing as a percentage of GDP, comparing Sub-Saharan Africa with East Asia, Southeast Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean. It shows the persistently low level of Africa's manufacturing sector in its post-independence era. Interestingly, in the early 1960s, Sub-Saharan Africa started with a higher percentage compared to East Asia, but now there is about a 15% difference between them: the figure for East Asia is about 25%, while Sub-Saharan Africa is hovering around 10%, and this is even lower than Southeast Asia, and Latin America and the Caribbean.

The challenge, as well as the opportunity, facing Africa's manufacturing is shown in the composition of import and exports in Fig. 9.2. Manufactured goods make up almost 60% of its imports, while energy (mostly oil) constitutes the dominant export. Agriculture makes up


Fig. 9.1 Manufacturing as a percentage of GDP by selected global regions (*Source* calculation in Ifs v. 7.33 (five-year average); ISS South Africa, 'Made in Africa' (April 2018))

Fig. 9.2 Most important import and export sectors: Africa's trade with world (rest) (*Source* calculation in IFS? v. 7.33; ISS South Africa, 'Made in Africa' (April 2018))

around 12% of imports and around 10% of exports. Sub-Saharan Africa has a huge agricultural potential, but its dependence on food imports is growing, with nine countries depending on imports for more than 40% of their demand.[2] The weakness in African countries' manufacturing is closely related to the uncompetitiveness or high cost of its labour force relative to their average income levels, which is the combination of many things: workers' skill levels, poor infrastructure, institutions, health conditions, etc. Hence, it is generally considered that 'African labour cost needs to be cheap enough to compensate for other benefits. South Africa stands out as a middle-income country with particularly high labour costs and a very capital-intensive industrial sector'.[3]

Exports are what African countries have counted on, but their share of global exports has declined over the past 35 years from 4.5% in 1980 to 3.0% in 2015, and the exported items are mainly commodities, with the share of manufacturing exports declining from 0.4 to 0.3% over the same period.[4] Even maintaining their level of exports, let alone expanding and upgrading industrial capacity, is not a simple task. In 2016, Africa's GDP growth fell to 1.4%, its slowest rate for more than two decades.[5]

There is a choice that Sub-Saharan African countries have to make: first, they can either accept the hard reality and make the most of (or do what best they could with) the given economic conditions; or, alternatively, they can make extraordinary efforts to transform and upgrade their industrial and economic structure adopting a set of different and bold measures. But neither of these two options would be comfortable ones for African countries to espouse. The first choice would be difficult for countries to bear because what it really means is resigning to the reality and the status quo, while the second choice entails significant burdens, commitment, endurance, focus and effective mobilization of work.

The choice is up to each Sub-Saharan African nation to make, but most African countries can end up stuck in the middle between these two options. What Africa leaders and elites really have in mind, and what they intend to do, matters. But in any case, what they seem to prioritize is to lure as much foreign investment and companies as possible to stimulate businesses and the economy. However, the possibility of a quick fix in the economy is virtually non-existent if it is to be transformational. Such approach will have inherent limitations without the expected increase in income and employment, and capital accumulation or reinvestment, if many other conditions that Africans themselves need to satisfy are not met. And these are essentially all human factors: strong oversight for business support, a business-facilitating environment, sound corporate governance, a high level of economic-mindedness and rational thinking, a sense of public duty and ownership, discipline amongst officials, etc.

Should African economies undergo structural transformation, the conventional path would be to move from a traditional economy to an industrial economy, and then to a tertiary industry economy. The world is buzzing about 'industry 4.0' or the fourth industrial revolution, which is the new generation industrial revolution that combines manufacturing technologies and ICT.[6] Such a development path is that which developed countries have undergone. The UK was the leader in industrialization, and other European countries and the US followed suit. In Asia, Japan was the first to successfully transform and later South Korea realized unprecedented compressed economic growth.

There is no economically developed country that remains a primarily agricultural economy without a manufacturing industrial capability. Even an agriculture-based economy will need a certain level of manufacturing capability in order to reap meaningful benefits from its agricultural sector. And it requires much greater industrialization to move to the second phase of development, and then to the third phase of tertiary industry or the service sector, which includes commerce, finance, insurance, tourism, public health, mass media, consulting, education, entertainment and logistics.

Unfortunately for developing countries, we are now living in the era of globalization that is so much more competitive. Such an environment inhibits the growth of domestic industries in the 'fragile' economies of Sub-Saharan Africa. Rather than moving along each stage in a linear trajectory, developing countries may have to pursue all these three phases concurrently, given the circumstances of today's globalized world.[7]

However, African countries should not give up industrialization because they need to, and actually can, achieve industrialization, even while the age of 'new globalization' of industrial robots and 3D printers is dawning before us: their best chance of industrializing in the coming decades will be to focus on intra-regional trade and targeting agriculture-based industrialization, because these are less affected by global competition and trends. The developing agricultural sector is also crucial in that it can absorb the fast-growing youth population into rural areas.[8]

On the other hand, while Africa's industrialization lags behind, the new global developments may now work to Africa's advantage: the impact of digitization of production and the trend towards locating manufacturing closer to markets—what Baldwin termed the new globalization and the phenomenon of the 'great convergence'.[9] Such characteristics of the 'new globalization' like greater participation by emerging economies and the growing role of small enterprises is I think worth noting from Africa's perspective.

According to the McKinsey Global Institute, the 'new globalization' that has emerged in the twenty-first century is different from the 'old globalization' of the twentieth century, and these two forms of

globalization have contrasting features: tangible flows of physical goods vs. intangible flow of data and information; flows mainly between advanced economies vs. greater participation by emerging economies; capital and labour-intensive flows vs. more knowledge-intensive flows; transportation infrastructure being critical for flows vs. digital infrastructure becoming equally important; multi-national companies drive flows vs. the growing role of small enterprises and individuals; the flow mainly of monetized transactions vs. more exchanges of free contents and services; ideas diffusing slowly across boarders vs. instant global access to information; and innovation flows from advanced to emerging economies vs. innovation flows in both directions.[10]

Some argue that leapfrogging in terms of technology is both possible and desirable for many Sub-Saharan African nations. To a certain extent, this is already happening in the region, like the widespread usage of wireless internet and mobile phones forgoing communication requiring wire connection, and economic transactions using ICT like mobile money services. Others point out the global trend of the expanding service sector and the dwindling manufacturing sector, but this does not negate the need for Africa to continuously pursue industrialization.

Reflecting on the Korean Experience and Africa's Reality

Korea's economic dynamism is a testament to the veracity of the principles of the market economy. As we have seen, Korea did not rely solely on market mechanisms, but it certainly used markets to its full advantage. There are differing views on whether Korea's economic success is due to the adoption of orthodox capitalism and free market-oriented policies, but it is fair to say that Korea utilized other measures to *supplement* and *reinforce* capitalism and markets, and not to substitute them. In hindsight, this was perhaps inevitable and necessary. Otherwise, Korea would not have achieved such a feat if it were not for the extraordinary measures it took, considering the disadvantageous conditions and state of underdevelopment in which it found itself.

All things considered, the Korean model of development does provide good lessons and reference points for emulation for Sub-Saharan African countries. Although the Korean case can be considered an exceptional and dramatic example, and hence difficult for others to replicate with success, this does not diminish its value and relevance—it serves as a forceful reminder of what is possible for developing nations.

One of the lessons to draw from Korea's experience is that development efforts can only work if they are supported by the essential 'foundations' that must be put in place at the early stages of development. This is to say that a sort of 'multi-tasking' is required. The reason why economic and development policies do not work well in Sub-Saharan African countries is that the basic foundations that are necessary to support them are very weak or almost non-existent.

There cannot be a quick fix to economic challenges and the fundamentals must always be observed. If development is to take place nationally and sustainably, then industrialization should go hand in hand with rural-agricultural development and empowerment of the people. The industrial sector cannot be built out of thin air. Even if the physical conditions are favourable for industrialization, there is still a need for human resources to make it work. In order for factories to properly operate, what is required are capital, a skilled labour force, good management, a steady supply of utilities, satisfactory infrastructures, etc. In the region, things tend to degenerate into vicious circles because one thing after another is lacking, and there is little effort made to fix the situation.

Returning to the fundamentals of economics, the basic production factors—land, labour and capital—are all necessary means for industrialization, and technology, which is treated as an exogenous variable in economics, is a key element for enhancing production. In order for any underdeveloped country to modernize, it would need capital in the form of both physical and human capital. So, how can countries amass the necessary capital for development in the first place? The answer is that they should start with utilizing what is already available to them. In the early stages of economic development or industrialization, except for city states or commercial hub cities, the majority of the populace would be living in rural areas, working in the primary sectors that

include agriculture, livestock, forestry, fisheries, etc. Without the development of these sectors, there cannot be wealth creation enabling a transition to the secondary industry of reprocessing and manufacturing, ranging from light industries to heavy industries.

As we have already seen, the Korean government laid the groundwork for industrial transformation with rural reform, namely land reform and pro-poor empowerment of people policies, before embarking on an export drive in the early 1960s. The *Saemaul Undong* was launched in 1970, and following this, urban and rural development was concurrently pursued, while export promotion and the *Saemaul Undong* produced synergistic effects.

The ideal for developing countries would be to push for agricultural-rural sector development and industrialization at the same time in a way that results in these two producing mutually reinforcing effects. But in Africa, the primary industry largely remains 'traditional agriculture'. A sensible path for economic development would be prioritizing industrialization in the agricultural sector, where their comparative advantage lies. This makes sense not only economically but also politically, because the vast majority of people are villagers and farmers. Today, as the marginalization of the rural populace continues amid a population explosion and worsening income disparities, the countries should have no choice but to deal with this challenge more proactively.

The example of Korea is not the only case of vindication of the pro-poor rural-agricultural policy for developing countries. Unlike many African countries, Korea is resource-poor and has unfavourable natural conditions. Africa, with its vast arable land, fertile soil and abundance of natural resources, has all the more reason to be enthusiastic and focused on rural-agricultural development. Scholars who have studied the divergence in development between Asian and African countries will notice what is underlying the situation, as David Henley does:

> In South-East Asia, elite attitudes to village life, although condescending, are often also marked by nostalgia and a degree of admiration. Although Africa has had no lack of rulers with rural origins, their attitude to rural life has mostly been much less positive. Consequently they have tended to see development not as a matter of improving the living conditions of the

peasant masses in situ, but rather as a question of accelerating the transition from rural backwardness to urban modernity, of which their own lives have been a microcosm. This has led them to favour elitist development strategies aimed at acquiring symbols of developed-country status (universities, steelworks, information technology, human rights) rather than meeting the urgent practical challenge of making poor people richer by whatever means lie immediately at hand.[11]

It is understandable that in Africa, frustrations are vented by those who follow the news on global trends like 'the fourth industrial revolution'. A Ugandan intellect asks:

Why Sub-Saharan Africa has never undergone an industrial and manufacturing revolution, despite repeated declarations and summit communiqués by heads of state during the past 50 years? … we must try to look for the root causes, while acknowledging that the failure to industrialise is not due to absence of blue prints or elaborate government policy documents in the ministries, like that of industry. Today, we live in an era of national visions, with target dates, to which we add international blue prints issued by the United Nations.[12]

He went on to admit that the role of the government is central for industrialization, but blamed the dictates of the World Bank and the IMF's liberalization for greatly undermining the role of the state.

The tasks for latecomers to industrialization were to learn, emulate and adopt the know-how and technology of advanced industrial economies. Under the circumstances, Sub-Saharan African countries need a combination of technologies: hi-tech, modern, conventional and appropriate. The benefit of being developing countries is that it is easy to get technical transfers from other countries. These and so many other things should have already been done by African countries. And let us not forget that before contemplating the 'industrial revolution' and developing the manufacturing sector, rural-agricultural development initiatives should have been undertaken.

Speaking of the capitalist economic system, there were a number of different types of capitalism in the world history. A crude form of market economy had existed since the beginning of world civilization, and

agrarian capitalism, mercantilism and industrial capitalism existed well before modern free-market capitalism.[13] What should be noted is that nearly all the currently existing capitalist economies are mixed economies, which combine elements of free markets with state intervention and, surely in some cases, economic planning. There is no such thing as a 100% liberal market economy in our reality, as pointed out by Ha-Joon Chang (2002, 2008, 2010). On 'transformative industrial policy for Africa', Chang stressed that industrialization must remain at the centre of African development, despite the prevailing economic orthodoxy, and that manufacturing and agriculture can work to support each other. He saw that African countries can still find room amid World Trade Organization regulations and the penetration of monopoly producers to achieve high levels of development through industrialization.[14]

No doubt, as was argued by Joseph Schumpeter, capitalism is the most effective economic system that the world has seen, as it creates wealth through the continuous process of advancing levels of productivity and technological sophistication. Therefore, in order to advance the state of economic development of African countries, due attention must be paid to advancing their 'capitalistic system' in terms of economic performance. However, amid vague expectations that somehow the free market will get things working, the fundamentals have been ignored. And what happened to innovations and 'creative destruction' that are supposed to come about following the progression of capitalism in Africa?

For decades, the Washington Consensus, the imposition of the neo-liberalist approach and even the giving of foreign aid itself were frequently cited by Africans and others as obstacles to Africa's development. But irrespective of the extent to which these have actually had an impact on African countries, these countries cannot be 'exonerated' from failing to carry out their innate responsibilities. The case of Korea is a sobering reminder of what needs to be done for a poor nation to move up the ladder of development, and its lesson is that aid, whether in the form of grants or financial loans, will be helpful when properly utilized. Foreign assistance itself is not the problem, as it is simply a means to an end. One can use it usefully or render it useless, and aid

would not necessarily root out resources for the private sector or inhibit its growth. Business and the economy fail not flourish in the region not because there is too much aid, but because there is a lack of economic activities in the first place: modest entrepreneurship, a non-committal attitude when it comes to economic activities and investing their resources for future gains, etc.

Successful and creative entrepreneurs have certainly emerged in Sub-Saharan Africa, but they are too few in number and it takes much more than talented businessmen to turn around the economy. Recent reports confirm that Africa is still the most commodity-dependent continent in the world. In order to uplift and invigorate the economy, African countries need to have manufacturing industries that can export to create jobs and generate income for the rapidly growing population. Of course, it has become harder to industrialize. When developed countries and Asian countries industrialized, they did so in a different international setting from that in which African countries now find themselves. However, we should ask why Africa has not been able to build up a manufacturing industry when many others have been able to do so. As even African Development Bank experts point out, regardless of the hurdles facing Africa today, 'manufacturing remains the best hope for SSA to generate a large number of good jobs and reduce the prospects of political and social instability'.[15]

Achieving successful economic transformation would be unthinkable without an evolution in the manufacturing sector. Yes, there has been a lot of talk of entrepreneurship and buzz about business start-ups in many Sub-Saharan African countries, encouraged by the likes of CNN's *African Start Up* and *Africa Marketplace* programmes. While this is to be commended as positive, there is also some cause for worry. Leaving the vast segment of the populace in the private sector to survive in the wilderness of open markets by virtue of their creativity may be not the most responsible thing to do. Even in one of the most innovative countries like Korea, today about 70% of all start-up businesses fail within a few years. We should heed the warnings that premature deindustrialization is neither a desirable nor an inevitable trend for developing countries.

Many prominent scholars like Dani Rodrik, Ha-Joon Chang and Joseph Stiglitz have stressed the importance of realizing and deepening industrialization for developing countries. As noted earlier, Rodrik has written about the 'perils of premature deindustrialization'. Chang stressed that the idea put forward by neo-liberalists that countries can skip the industrialization phase and move on to the deindustrialization stage is simply an illusion; since the service industry is inherently small-scale and has limitations in terms of its production capacity, it cannot be a sufficient driving force for economic growth. Furthermore, service goods are not easily traded, so service sector-based economies lack exporting capabilities; according to Chang, this in turn curtails export earnings and the ability to purchase foreign technologies, jeopardizing economic growth.[16]

Joseph Stiglitz has lately expressed that the government plays a central role in shaping the economy, not only through formal policies (industrial, and expenditure and tax), but also in writing the rules of the game, and the economic structure is inevitably affected by the way in which the government structures markets.[17] In that sense, Stiglitz mentions that every country has an industrial policy, but some countries do not know it, and when governments are not self-conscious in their direction of the economy, this opens up the possibility of special interests greatly influencing the economy, leading to pervasive inefficiencies, lower growth and more inequality.[18]

One would think that Korea has already achieved a full cycle of industrialization, but in his recent book *There Is No Korea After 3 Years*, Byeong Ho Gong warns Korea against deprioritizing the manufacturing sector.[19] If the manufacturing industry is still vital for countries like Korea, which is the sixth-largest exporting nation in the world, what does this say about other developing countries?

Building an industrial economy for Sub-Saharan African countries should begin in the agricultural sector. In fact, on many occasions, African heads of state have convened to be reminded of, and recommit to, this need. For instance, they recommitted themselves to the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) in Malabo in 2014. The CAADP is a continental framework with a 2025 vision for promoting inclusive growth and prosperity through

investment in the agricultural sector. African countries are said to have taken the lead and put in place their own National Agriculture Investment Plans (NAIPs). Once again, there is no lack of expression, but the problem always lies in the implementation. The commissioner for the rural economy and agriculture at the African Union Commission writes:

> According to World Bank, evidence shows that in sub-Saharan Africa (SSA), investing in agriculture is 11 times more rewarding in reducing poverty than investment in other sectors. Data show that 80% of marketed agricultural production in SSA comes from smallholders, 60% being women. The issue, therefore, is no longer whether the agriculture sector is important; it is rather how Africa should invest boldly in its agrifood systems so as to leapfrog the structural transformation of the overall African economies … In order to sustain the achievement and to accelerate the implementation of agricultural plans, countries will need to invest in systemic capacity building. The youth should be equipped with knowledge, if we want our agriculture to go the extra mile. African countries should rethink their capacity building strategies by focusing more on vocational training.[20]

A collective awareness that agriculture must be the priority sector to target for Africa's development seems to have materialized and gathered momentum among African leaders and experts, as well as international organizations like the World Bank. Without any doubt, the establishment of a sound agricultural industry will form the bedrock of economic transformation in Sub-Saharan African countries.

As much as rural-agricultural development is strategic for Sub-Saharan Africa, its realization cannot be expected to happen overnight either. However challenging the task may be, African governments and peoples must be patient and persist in their efforts. To begin with, while it would be desirable to add value to agricultural products and enhance the value chain, it is also crucial, in the meantime, to boost the production of crops. People were inclined to believe that because there is no market and poor infrastructure to transport agricultural goods in Africa, there is no use producing in mass quantities. But more and more African

farmers are realizing that good production, in terms of both quantity and quality, is paying off. The stable production of large amounts of commodities of consistent quality are what everybody—the government, investors, private firms, donors and international organizations—is looking for, and the demand for these seems to be on the rise.

Korea's experience underscores the importance of the agricultural sector. Korea realized its Green Revolution and White Revolution during the period of the modernization drive in 1970s and 1980s. Throughout Korea's history, for the sake of stability and security amid external threats and invasions, increasing food production was a long-cherished desire of the nation. From the early 1960s, Korea set out its first National Economic Development Plan to pursue self-sufficiency in food production, making it a priority on the national agenda. As the government actively pursued various policies to increase food productivity, by the latter half of 1970s, Korea was able to achieve 100% self-sufficiency in rice production, which is the main national staple.[21] The achievement of self-sufficiency in rice production in Korea is referred to as the Green Revolution. This was accomplished through R&D efforts in the agricultural sector and a new technology transfer system, such as increased rice productivity through improved rice varieties, as well as the development of cultivation technologies and the swift dissemination of new technologies to farmers.

This process was also driven by the government's commitment through its policies and practices on building infrastructure related to rice production, flexible production and supply chains for materials such as fertilizers and chemical pesticides. Self-sufficiency in rice production became a cornerstone for strengthening the basis of national economic development not only for procuring food security and boosting incomes of farm households, but also for saving foreign currency required to import foreign rice.

The White Revolution refers to the modernization of the structure, material and technology of greenhouses in Korea needed to achieve the rapid expansion of protected cultivation areas and to produce a stable supply of vegetables from the 1970s to the 1990s. The name derives from the extensive use of white-coloured plastic or polyethylene films for greenhouses. Before the 1970s, all plastic films were imported into

Korea, but greenhouse vegetable production became popular from the 1970s onwards, when Korea built up its petrochemical industry. In this respect, industrialization greatly benefited the agricultural sector.

Before vinyl houses or greenhouses were used in Korea, vegetables could not be grown in winter, but once they became available, farmers were able to produce them all year round, which also benefited consumers, who could enjoy fresh vegetables all the time. In the 1980s, flower growing became possible, and now even fruits (including some tropical fruits) are being produced in greenhouses in Korea. Nowadays, 'smart greenhouses' with remote control technology are being developed. The White Revolution greatly contributed to Korea's rural employment and income generation, which in turn helped support the national economy. Economic growth as well as government plans and policies enabled the rapid expansion of protected cultivation using greenhouses in a very short period of time.[22]

Another critical element in Korea's successful development is the land reform that has been mentioned earlier. In many African countries, the system of ownership of land is managed in a 'flexible' but 'random' manner. While there is a need not to disrupt the status quo in land rights for the sake of social stability, a systematic and universal designation of land ownership must be enacted in the longer run for the efficient use of land for economic purposes.

Relevance of the Korean Development Model or Experience

South Korea's development experience and 'model' has many implications for Sub-Saharan African countries and it should be heeded from a practical as well as an academic viewpoint. Having come across a wide range of works on Africa's development conducted by a multitude of entities and having attended so many meetings, seminars and lectures on the topic, I cannot shrug off the impression that today's business in development has become too technical and routine, without being substantive. We seem to be lost in a world of logic and science, as if

sharing rational and sophisticated thinking is the solution to problems. However, the essence of development is about *doing*, often needing to touch base with people at the grassroots level.

Africa's development programmes have failed to bear fruit not because the methods were wrong, but because people were not enacting them. Hence, the task is twofold: to basically 'adapt' to local conditions, but at the same time to 'challenge' the locals to change their attitudes and behaviour for the better. Thus, how to bring about change is key, and shaping perceptions, incentives and disincentives (or 'punishments') are of great importance. In this respect, Korea's development experience can provide useful food for thought as the Korean model is, in itself, an epitome of 'development as practice'.

In this respect, so much needs to be done, and one part of this is strengthening the social capital in African communities and society at large from the standpoint of practicality. However, albeit slowly, a certain level of awareness and endeavours to this end seem to be materializing in the region. For instance, Amin Mawji, who is the Representative of the Aga Khan Development Network (AKDN) in Uganda, has compiled best practice ideas of civil society in Africa in his book *Poverty to Prosperity*, in which he emphasizes values and ethics besides highlighting the best practices, and notes that 'an interesting challenge facing society today is how to motivate people from a cross-section of society – across tribe, colour, creed – to collaborate, to work together, to share'.[23]

The success of Sub-Saharan African countries is not assured even if they all adopt the same model of development, but their performance will depend not only on how they work on the basics, but also on how they compete and collaborate among themselves. And in the end, each nation has to figure out and pursue the best strategy for it to be competitive. And there is no need to prejudge or presume what is appropriate for the countries on their behalf. The value of the development model and examples should be gauged not on how much they can be easily replicated, but rather on how much motivation and positive impact they can bring to the countries.

Some experts are dismissive of the Korean case, claiming that it is an exceptional case and one which cannot have much relevance for developing countries. But there is strong merit in the Korean case being

dramatic, forceful and clear-cut, and thus it should not be dismissed. In terms of an educated population, a skilled workforce and a sense of national unity, Korea may have been ahead of Sub-Saharan African countries at the time of its independence, but it was at a greater disadvantage in other areas. Also, many developing countries at that time surpassed Korea in various categories.

One could point out the different international setting for Korea at the time, which might have been more favourable for it compared to what African countries faced then and now. But on the flip side, it could be argued than some African countries as well as many other non-African developing countries may have had many more advantages than Korea in different ways. Generally, there are always many different ways to undertake personal, organizational, social and national tasks. If people make it a habit to think ahead and learn from previous experiences, the assignments they assume can be more easily and routinely carried out. This will enable more activity, output and speed.

People who harbour pessimistic realism or classist ideology may think that African leaders and elites, and foreign governments and companies, want the maintenance of the status quo in Africa—that is, continued underdevelopment—in order to safeguard their vested interests. And I also have heard from ordinary Africans that their leaders and ruling elites seem to not want the people to become enlightened or empowered because they fear that this might endanger their privileged status and interests. Some even suggest that African leaders are now themselves practising colonialism by exploiting their own people.

Resorting to tribalism, ethnic-regional division, taking advantage or fomenting security threats and conflicts, abusing security-military apparatus, etc. are traditional methods of ruling and maintaining power in many parts of the developing world, especially Africa. And unfortunately, in most instances, electoral democracy has degenerated into unwholesome contests to maintain power, influence and wealth. But the reality holds many truths. Normally, political leaders would neither be totally exploitive nor benign, but would fall somewhere in between these extremes. And no African leader would be able to fully manipulate and suppress their people. By all indications, the current rulers of Sub-Saharan

African countries are nowhere near the position of wielding complete control over their people without also jeopardizing their own status.

African leaders, from their perspective, could be apprehensive of the rise of public disgruntlement towards them, which can lead to social unrest. Internet usage and social media have also become widespread in Africa, and regional and international pressures are also significant, so that African rulers also have to watch their backs. All in all, Africa's persistent problems are primarily due not to the monolithic power of governments suppressing their people, but to a lack of coherence and unity in the nation, and a weak sense of purpose and commitment for development among leaders and people in general. The crux of the matter is that the nature of Africa's problems is portrayed mostly in terms of people's 'rights' (through the political prism), when in fact it is really about 'work ethics' or social conduct (functional, economic attributes). Today, just about everything is seen in a political light, and Africa's development is perhaps the greatest victim of this.

When the priority of African countries should be placed on finding human solutions to what are obviously problems of human nature, whether superficial or deep-seated, the trend of our times is moving away from this, following business, technical and educational sophistication, and the fanfare of innovation. So, there can be a misplaced 'conviction that progress can only be achieved by a quantum leap from (rural) backwardness to (urban) modernity'.[24] And what is also concerning is that the gap between the 'two worlds' inside African countries seems to be widening instead of narrowing.

Pursuing the trend of the times is a natural and smart thing to do. But such efforts will be hollow if the more fundamental tasks facing a nation are skipped over or forgotten altogether. South Korea was able to transform itself into a developed economy in such a short time not because it merely exerted itself in terms of adopting to the trend of the times, but, more importantly, because it focused vigorously in closing the 'development gap' by means of expeditiously tackling the innate basic obstacles that are characteristic of poor countries.

Who can refute that a nation has to be diligent for it to be successful in all aspects of life? This is self-evident, but I can hardly see any utterance of the word 'diligence' or 'hard work' in today's world, as if

this is a thing of the past. Now and then, I see African leaders scolding their officials for being negligent and failing to get the job done, but I have rarely heard them enunciating the value of diligence as a norm that the civil servants or people should practise. Korea's turnaround required extraordinary work on the part of the people. If the Korean people were not supportive of the government's policies and did not actively take part in the development process, the nation would not have achieved such progress.

Many people seem to misunderstand that development or transformation will somehow occur over time and can be prompted by 'transfers' of capitals, know-how, technology, etc. But development is not about 'knowing', 'getting' or just desiring; rather, it is essentially about 'doing' things. Unfortunately for African countries, the world is becoming increasingly competitive and the human capital gaps are widening. This is why a dramatic turnaround in the mindset of the African population is necessary sooner rather than later. This is because development or transformation is equivalent to 'change', and the scale and depth of positive change over time matters. 'Speed' is also critical because if the changes take too long, it will offset any gains and might lead to other problems and even to regression. When you are nimble, there are advantages because you not only can go faster, but you can also have more time to fix things or turn back to find other routes when things are not right. A good example of this is Korea's response to the 1997 IMF bailout crisis.

Another crucial factor is the role of the government. South Korea is just one of many cases throughout history attesting to the importance of active government intervention to induce economic transformation and growth. We do not need to go back hundreds of years to the likes of Frederick List, Benjamin Franklin and Alexander Hamilton to be reminded of the genesis and tradition of government intervention to support the industry and economy. Today, governments of the developed world play expansive roles, albeit in a more intricate and technical fashion than in the past.

I have yet to see a businessman who has not admitted that the government's assistance is vital for his business. This holds true for all businessmen, regardless of their nationality and location. When it comes to

doing business overseas, especially in new markets and in unfamiliar territories like Africa, businessmen say that the government's intervention is all the more crucial. Many advanced countries, including the US, are very regulatory in nature. The consequences of the 2008 global financial crisis give the case in point, proving the necessity of this stance. As for developing countries, governments can and should promote economic growth by playing an active role of facilitator and taking vigorous pro-capitalistic measures. Most importantly, the states should focus their energies on pushing for industrialization alongside the development of the rural-agricultural sector.

This is where the logic of 'economic discrimination' comes in. The word 'competition' is of essence in the economic world. And the forces that promote positive competition are incentives and disincentives or 'punishments'. If governments can be instrumental in encouraging many winners to emerge, this will spur economic growth. The economic history of the world is about winners. The rise and fall of powers, the surge of Western economies and the new rivalry unfolding among major economic powers today can all be seen in the context of who emerges triumphant over others. Hence, the future of the economies of Sub-Saharan African countries will hinge on whether and to what extent they espouse the rule of competitive economy and society.

There is an opportunity for change in the midst of challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa. The dissatisfaction of the masses in relation to their livelihood and the performance of states can remain latent and subdued, or can accumulate to generate pressure for reform, or cause unrest and chaos. But the leaders cannot remain complacent and idle because in order to stay in power, they have to be able to mobilize the resources to meet the minimum public demands. Most of all, the population explosion and the growing unemployed youth phenomenon must be dealt with before it reaches an untenable level.

What African leaders and governments have been doing is not working, nor is it desirable in terms of development. There are clear limitations on what foreign entities like foreign businesses, development partners, international organizations and NGOs can do for African countries, and whatever measures they take, it will revert to how African nations respond and what actions they take.

Therefore, the solution lies in breaking the psychological yoke—that they do not have the capability and are destined for underdevelopment—that has inhibited Africa from moving forward with confidence. As Ha-Joon Chang (2010) pointed out, Africa is not destined for underdevelopment: Africans are not poor because of any mysterious or immutable factors; they are poor for the same reasons other nations were once poor, which means that their poverty can be fixed if they apply the same solutions that other nations have applied. But before the right policies can be pursued, the psychological barrier that is at the heart of Africa's problem must be overcome.

Notes

1. IMF, *Regional Economic Outlook—Sub-Saharan Africa Restarting the Growth Engine* (April, 2017), p. 3. For 2016, most oil-exporting nations were in recession (with a contraction in GDP growth), while conditions in many other resource-rich countries also faced difficulties: continued political uncertainty (South Africa), weak fundamentals (Ghana) and acute droughts (Lesotho, Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe).
2. Jakkie Cilliers, 'Made in Africa-Manufacturing and the Fourth Industrial Revolution', *Africa in the World Report 8*, Institute for Security Studies, April 2018, pp. 7, 11.
3. A. Gelb, C. Meyer, V. Ramachandran, and D. Wadhwa, 'Can Africa Be a Manufacturing Destination? Labour Costs in Comparative Perspective', Centre for Global Development, Working Paper 466, 15 October 2017. Jakkie Cilliers, 'Made in Africa-Manufacturing and the Fourth Industrial Revolution', *Africa in the World Report 8*, Institute for Security Studies, April 2018, p. 11.
4. Ramathan Goobi, discussing 'IMF Regional Economic Outlook for Sub-Saharan Africa', presentation by Clara Mira, Country Representative of the IMF for Uganda, at ESAMI, Kampala, 15 June 2017.
5. 'How the Taxman Slows the Spread of Technology in Africa', *The Economist*, Middle East and Africa, 9 November 2017.
6. The first Industrial Revolution used water and steam power to mechanize production; the second used electric power to create

mass production; the third used electronics and information technology to automate production; the fourth is building on the third, the digital revolution that has been occurring since the middle of the last century. It is characterized by a fusion of technologies that is blurring the lines between the physical, digital and biological spheres. See http://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/the-fourth-industrial-revolution-what-it-means-and-how-to-respond.

7. Continued globalization and technological progress (the fourth Industrial Revolution), an increasingly competitive international market amid the rise of emerging economies, among other factors, make the prospects of Sub-Saharan Africa's industrialization and structural transformation uncertain. The age of linear economic/industrial transformation may not be easy or sensible to pursue. In certain cases and areas, 'leap-frogging' might be both practical and inevitable because, for instance, ICT technology has already pervaded widely in the societies and economies of Sub-Saharan Africa.

8. Rafiq Raji, 'Additive Manufacturing: Implications for African Economies', *How We Made It in Africa*, 25 October 2017, https://www.howwemadeitinafrica.com/additive-manufacturing-implications-african-economies/60103.

9. Baldwin, *The Great Convergence: Information Technology and the New Globalization* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2016).

10. McKinsey Global Institute, 'Digital Globalization: The New Era of Global Flows', March 2016, https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/digital-mckinsey/our-nsights/digital-globalization-the-new-era-of-global-flows.

11. David Henley, *Asia-Pacific Development Divergence—A Question of Intent* (London: Zed Books, 2015), p. 25.

12. Semakula Kiwanuka, 'Why Has Sub-Saharan Africa Never Undergone Industrial Revolution?', *New Vision* (Ugandan daily), 24 March 2016.

13. See Ellen Meiksins Wood, 'The Agrarian Origins of Capitalism', *Monthly Review* 50, no. 3 (July–August 1998); Robert A. Degen, *The Triumph of Capitalism* (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2011), p. 12.

14. Ha Joon Chang, 'Transformative Industrial Policy for Africa: Put Manufacturing at the Centre of Development', speech given at the Second Annual Adebayo Adedeji Lecture, 3 April 2016, Addis Abbaba, provided by UNECA.

15. Haroon Bhorat, Ravi Kanbr, Christopher Rooney, and Francois Steenkamp, 'Sub-Saharan Africa's Manufacturing Sector: Building

Complexity', *Working Paper Series* No. 256, May 2017. African Development Bank, pp. 9–10.

16. Ha Joon Chang, *23 Things They Don't Tell You About Capitalism* (London: Penguin Books, 2010). The points made regarding markets and role of government are: (1) 'There is no such thing as a free market'; (7) 'Free-market policies rarely make poor countries rich'; (12) 'Governments can pick winners'; (16) 'We are not smart enough to leave things to the market'; (21) 'Big government makes people more open to change'; (23) 'Good economic policy does not require good economists.'

17. Joseph Stiglitz, *Rewriting the Rules of the American Economy: An Agenda for Growth and Shared Prosperity* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2015).

18. Joseph Stiglitz, 'Industrial Policy, Learning and Development', in John Page and Finn Tarp (eds), *The Practice of Industrial Policy: Government-Business Coordination in Africa and East Asia* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), pp. 23–39; WIDER Working Paper 2015/149, published by UNU-WIDER and the Korean International Cooperation Agency, Helsinki, Finland, December 2015.

19. Byeong Ho Gong, *There Is No Korea After 3 Years* (Seoul: Ishipilsegibooks, 2016) (Korean).

20. 'Why Strong Leadership Is Necessary to Transform African Agriculture', article written by Rhoda Peace Tumusiime, the Commissioner for Rural Economy and Agriculture of African Union (AU) Commission, appeared in *New Vision* (Uganda), 28 March 2016, p. 16.

21. Sok-Dong Kim et al., *The Green Revolution in Korea—Development and Dissemination of Tongil-Type Rice Varieties* (Seoul: KDI, 2012).

22. Rural Development Administration (http://www.rda.go.kr/foreign/ten). See also Hyo-duk Seo et al., *White Revolution of Agriculture in Korea: The Achievement of Year-Round Production and Distribution of Horticultural Crops by the Expansion of Greenhouse Cultivation* (Sejong: RDA, 2013) (Korean), pp. 15–18.

23. Amin Mawji, *Poverty to Prosperity: Empowering the Future, Best Practice Ideas from Civil Society* (Kampala: Graphic Systems Uganda Limited, 2017).

24. David Henley and Ahmad Helm Fuady, 'Sources of Developmental Ambition in Southeast Asia and Sub-Saharan Africa', *Developmental Regimes in Africa*—a joint initiative between *Africa Power and Politics* (APPP) and *Tracking Development*—Policy Brief no. 4, January 2014, p. 3.

Development of Africa: Implications and Policy Recommendations

The Need for a Drastic Turnaround

In Chapter 5, I talked about the 'missing links' in Africa's development. The three things that I highlighted are the sense of nation, development-mindedness and the active role of the state. Mystified as to why so many things appeared not be working properly in the region, I pondered at great length as to what might be the reason for this. Over time, it occurred to me that basically these three things were fundamentally lacking.

Attaining these missing links expeditiously may not be easy but they are achievable, just as the Western and Asian countries, as well as others, have been able to do. Perhaps too many people, both Africans and outsiders, have come to have a fixed idea that African people cannot develop on their own and have to be helped continuously. But there can be nothing more detrimental for development than such thinking. No meaningful development can take place with outside assistance alone, regardless of how much assistance one can get from others. External supports can be of value only if they are used as instruments for bigger purposes than as short-term ends in themselves.

It is not enough simply to lay out national visions and express aspirations. Elaborate road maps and master plans that you see so often in many countries in the region have no bearing on development if proper and intensive actions are not taken in a methodical and sustained way. And there is no question that a nation will fare much better if it has a stronger sense of purpose and inclination to act in order to achieve whatever goals they might pursue as a nation. There have been no shortage of verbal expressions and written works stressing what must be done, but everybody seems to be waiting for someone else to take action. So, why is it that people are reluctant to take action?

Maybe a better question to ask would be: 'What induces people to act?' Here, the concept of *sinsangpilbhur*—the rule of incentives and sanctions (punishment) or economic discrimination—may come in handy. In the absence of incentives for good deeds, people will be less inclined to take positive action than otherwise would have been the case; equally, if there were no sanctions for misdeeds, people will be more inclined to repeat them than if there were sanctions. Hence, it will be an ideal proposition for a society to have in place a strong mechanism of incentives and sanctions for the maintenance of social order and productivity. The logic of 'doing' (being functional) should prevail over the logic of 'being' (being overly fixated on rights).

Regarding incentives, there is a general theory in psychology conceived by Abraham Maslow called 'the hierarchy of human needs', which is described in a pyramid structure. According to Maslow, human motivations follow a general pattern of movement up the ladder from basic needs to sophisticated needs: 'physiological needs' → 'safety and security' → 'social   needs' → 'esteem' → 'self-actualization' → 'self-transcendence'. Originally, this comprised five stages, but Maslow later added 'self-transcendence' to his hierarchy. 'Physiological needs' refers to survival or basic instincts like wanting air, shelter, water, sleep, sex, etc. 'Safety and security' means individuals wanting to avoid immediate threads and dangers to their lives. 'Social needs' means love and belonging, like having friendship and family. 'Esteem' is about self-respect, confidence and achievement; 'self-actualization' means the realization of a person's full potential; and 'self-transcendence' is the achievement of one's 'highest' goal outside of regular dimensions in altruism and spirituality.[1]

Where there are human needs, there are incentives. Hence, the secret to success in achieving development may lie in inducing positive actions amongst the people using incentives that conform to their needs. But what are the incentives? This is essentially a relative and variable term, and their value or appeal depends on the perception of the people. For instance, all human beings would seek basic needs, but not necessarily everyone would pursue 'esteem' or 'self-transcendence', or at least not to the same degree. The meaning and importance of 'self-actualization' may vary greatly depending on the individual's social, cultural, economic background, and it also depends on personal traits and the level of ambitions of individuals.

So, what shapes human incentives? And how can they be structured? Can society and the state, together with the private sector, shape the structure of incentives for people in a way that can enhance national development? The answer is yes, and they should do so. These questions are related to perceptions, and therefore to mindsets. Along with incentives, punishments or sanctions can be a powerful and effective motive which can be conducive to development. But their value and effectiveness are only good insofar as they are perceived as such. This is why mindset change campaign is crucial, and the necessary interventions should be sought right away. Below is an illustration of how these are structured to meet national developmental goals.

The following figure illustrates incentives and punishments from the short-, mid- and long-term perspective. Short-term incentives for individuals would correspond to basic human needs or instincts for physical survival, like getting food and money. Mid-term incentives correspond to needs like securing a job, earning income and being recognized. Long-term incentives are the desires to realize self-fulfilment or gratification from the perspective of life accomplishment (Fig. 10.1).

Punishments are 'negative' incentives or disincentives. Punishments are applied for various acts—violations, misconduct, failures, crimes, etc.—that are censured by society. Short-term punishments are applied rightly and expeditiously, like when one is caught stealing. Mid-term punishments can be brought about by incompetence, under-performance, misjudgement, maladjustment, etc. and manifest themselves in the form of loss of trust, job, business opportunities, etc.

	short-term	mid-term	long-term
Incentives	**survival** (food, money, physical needs)	**stability** (job, income, recognition)	**self-fulfilment** (social status, career management, respect)
Punishments	immediate sanctions, penalties	instability, lost opportunities	deprivation, alienation, dishonour, life-failure

Fig. 10.1 The basic structure of incentives and punishments

(interest level)

national interest

collective interest

self-interest   A

short-term   mid-term   long-term   **(time frame)**

Fig. 10.2 The desired trajectory of pursuit of interest (incentives)

Long-term punishments would include more serious sanctions like long-term imprisonment, public censure and stigmatization, being banned for life from a profession, etc.

Once we recognize the basic elements of the incentive-punishment structure existing in the society, we may ask, how can they be applied? Figure 10.2 should be easy to understand. The vertical axis indicates different levels of interest that people seek, ranging from personal to national: self-interest, broader interest beyond individuals that can be called collective interest, and the national interest. The horizontal axis shows the timeframe: short-term, mid-term and long-term. If we can indeed engineer people's interest or incentive structure to evolve for the

better, the desired path would be from point A to point B. People's pursuit of their personal interests is a matter of course. But people should always try to see the bigger picture of their environment and society because the 'inordinate' pursuit of personal interest by everybody will fundamentally deteriorate the conditions of their organization or society and make them unhealthy, which will, in turn, have detrimental effects on their personal interests—hence the importance of social order, social capital and collective/social interest. The same holds true for the national interest, and national development can be achieved only if national interests are promoted.

Figure 10.3 illustrates the missing links to achieving transformative and sustainable development in Sub-Saharan Africa: a sense of nation or national identity, a strong and proactive role played by the government and development-mindedness (knowing, practising, owning, passion: KPOP). 'Sense of nation' corresponds to 'social fabric'; 'active role of government' represents 'effective governance'; and 'development-mindedness' translates into 'productivity'. The pyramid shows in what order these three elements were put to work in realizing the economic (and to a certain degree political) transformation of South Korea.

Korea is a good case study highlighting the typical features of East Asian developmental states. Koreans developed a strong sense of national identity and unity during their struggle against Japan's colonial rule, the fight for independence and the push for post-war national


Fig. 10.3   The missing links to development

reconstruction.[2] In fact, throughout its history, Korea has been constantly subjected to aggression or threats by its neighbours and in the late nineteenth century, it became the arena of geopolitical rivalry among foreign powers.

Immediately after achieving independence in the aftermath of the Second World War, Korea was divided and subsequently engulfed in a civil war that devastated the entire nation.

Overcoming incessant adversities and challenges was at the core of the Korea's story of survival, modernization and full-fledged development. In the midst of despair and disorientation, the government's role was paramount in spearheading the nation forward on the path to modernization, particularly in the early stages of economic take-off. The government was the standard-bearer and initiated the empowerment of the people by instilling development-mindedness in them. The people positively complied, producing an extraordinary synergistic effect of government–people–business collaboration.

While this is not illustrated here, there can be alternative paths (in terms of sequence) for countries where a sense of nation, national identity and unity are still weak. For example, a strong government initiative bringing on board various political, social and regional leaders and groups could foster a sense of nation and development-mindedness. This could be done by national campaigns spearheaded by political leaders.

Before we deduce a development formula or model, which is an important aim of this book, it will be informative to also try to illustrate what is the basic structure of development of Sub-Saharan African countries. This is shown in Fig. 10.4. You can see that 'government' and 'firms' are marked much smaller relative to 'market' and 'foreign assistance', and that the area of overlap of these components is also small. This means that the role of or dependency on the market and foreign aid is relatively much higher. And often it is difficult to make distinctions between business and development activities.

Here, a widespread market liberalization is a common feature and the economy is left to the market system to take care of itself. There is little government intervention or role played to promote and stimulate the economy. Naturally, foreign assistance or donors' support is substantial,

Fig. 10.4 The basic economic development structure of Sub-Saharan Africa

but this is not well integrated or converted into real economic growth. Businesses are lacklustre in terms of their numbers, scale, activities and contribution to national income. If we exclude foreign companies and multi-national corporations, it is further reduced. There is little fusion and synergy among these four economic elements, as the figure shows. I have indicated 'negative elements' because these are also substantial impediments to the attainment of development visions. Evidently, for most Sub-Saharan African countries, they seem to have 'sound' state institutions, superficially, that is, in statutory terms.

But there are many negative elements as well as shortcomings at various levels and stages of policy formation and implementation.

Enough has been said of corruption, lack of transparency and account-ability, bad governance, disregard for the rule of law, etc. and these are not only the causes of problems, but also the reflections and outcomes of more deep-seated problems. Simply denouncing and wishing these away will not be helpful; what is more important is to tackle the under-lying causes of these problems. The fundamental way to do so would be through a mindset change geared towards development.

Figure 10.5 depicts the 'holy trinity of economics' and 'economic dis-crimination', the terms coined by Sung-Hee Jwa.[3] He stresses that the market is not the sole entity in the capitalist economy and that the govern-ment and firms are also very important players. The picture shows that the market, the government and firms, the 'holy trinity' of economics, can be closely intertwined and can interact with one another to produce sustain-able and dynamic economic growth, with 'economic discrimination'—the rule of incentives and punishments—playing a pivotal role at the centre, as was the case in South Korea. This will be addressed again later. Figure 10.6 shows a proposed model of development for Sub-Saharan Africa, which also provides a summary of the theme of this chapter.

The Sub-Saharan African nations have for so long underperformed and under-achieved in terms of their potential, while being unable to take advantage of opportunities, because they have not come to terms


Fig. 10.5 The holy trinity of economics and 'economic discrimination' (*Source* Sung-Hee Jwa (2017))

Fig. 10.6   The new development formula for Africa

with what must be done to enable real progress in relation to economic livelihood and status. But people may not fully grasp what they have been missing and can even be misled by unfounded praise. It was fashionable to talk about 'Africa-rising' and the continent has been touted as the last frontier of the global market. Citing the fast and sustained economic growth registered in Sub-Saharan African countries, some wondered whether African development has indeed turned the corner. However, Africa's growth started to dip in 2011, hitting a low in 2016. The region's economic growth has been picking up again from 2017, helped by the global economic recovery, but the trajectory seems to be a very moderate recovery, as projected by the African Development Bank (2018).

The lessons learned dictate that we need to be cautious. Many point out that the recent economic growth in Africa has serious shortcomings. For example, David Booth and Diana Gammack point out that the pattern of economic growth of Sub-Saharan Africa is not leading to the structural transformation that is needed because it:

> is not having a large impact on mass poverty, mainly because it is not rooted in agricultural productivity gains. It is not leading to a diversification of production and exports or to the acquisition of technological capabilities by new generations of productive enterprises. Much of the current growth is jobless growth, a fatal feature given that sub-Saharan Africa's population is expected to rise from 800 million today to 2.5 billion with a generation, with over one half of the total living in cities. (Mills and Herbst 2012: 18–19)[4]

Likewise, Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu poses a question: 'But let us pause and ponder. Is this development, in which Africa has come to be regarded as the "last frontier" of the global economy – an inevitable outcome of globalization – really a cause for celebration? Will it lead to the real rise of the continent as an economic power house in the mould of Asia or the West? Is Africa engaging the world – and globalization – on its own terms?'[5] And he adds that Africa's economic growth is not transformative, considering that its economic growth statistics are derived mostly from cyclical benefits from a structural dependence on primary commodity products.[6]

It seems that African countries and the international development community alike have stayed too long in a state of blindness. Many of them are likely to have fixed views on Africa, taking Africa's situation as a *given* and trying to get things done under the premise of the *given* circumstances. The fatal mistake was trying to do everything from one end—donors—while very little was done from the receiving end, the end where change needs to take place. Although foreign assistance did not 'fit' Africa because of a fundamental mismatch between the two, both sides stuck to doing the same thing for too long.

This compatibility matter is not confined to development assistance; it also applies to regular business, trade and investment, and other exchanges in various fields. The continued mismatch occurs because there is no proper process of 'incorporation' or internalization on the part of the protagonists. An African observer states: 'Many still blame colonialists, but more than 50 years of independence, is Africa where it ought to be? Aren't we also to blame for our continent's delayed transformation? A lot, if not all of our crude transformation impeding mentalities come from our culture–families which form our foundational perceptions, and interactions with the wider society … Who do we expect to perform magic of correcting these erroneous mentalities?'[7]

As shown in Fig. 10.6, I have 'remodelled' the 'holy trinity' formula to fit the Sub-Saharan African countries by adding two more elements to it: people and development partners. This reflects the different environment African countries are facing compared to those that Korea and East Asian countries faced during their high growth period. First, Sub-Saharan Africa is heavily dependent on foreign aid and funding. Second, the 'people' factor needs to be gauged because African governments are confronted with additional challenges in terms of garnering popular support due to intrinsic socio-cultural dynamics as well as the influence of democracy and globalization.

The merits of the 'holy trinity' model need to be mentioned. For developing countries, a move towards privatization and liberalization is a positive step forward and should be commended. As was the case in some African countries, reforming the economy to undo the government's ownership of business and wealth concentration that stifles

incentives for private sector was a good thing. But government actions that fuel inefficiencies by excessive, improper government controls, uncompetitive policies and managerial incompetence are a very different thing from the government's positive intervention to facilitate the market mechanism, even correcting 'market failures' and generating economic dynamism. It is a grave mistake to confuse these two. Privatization and liberalization will not solve all the problems and will not be sufficient in themselves.

This is where disciplined, responsible and competent government leadership can make all the difference. While this seems to be a far cry from Africa's reality, it must be worked on, otherwise there is little chance that African countries will escape the trap of bad governance, inefficiencies and poverty.

The problems African states are faced with today mostly stem from inaction or non-implementation. And many African experts acknowledge this: 'The real challenge is to just get on with "doing it" … Most Africans understand that factors such as ethnicity or corruption have been big problems for the continent. But the real problems are at a full level below. They are foundational, and can only be addressed by a transformation that begins in the mind, in the way Africans *think*. Thinking is often more important than we think.'[8] The task of taking up the 'missing links' is all about genuinely committing to mindset change.

In the process of implementing the aforementioned formula for development, it is also important to keep things from reverting back to the negative realm. Progress made in this endeavour will have positive repercussions on the whole mechanism. It is no coincidence that Korea's development model reaped success, as it had the advantage of being action-oriented, pragmatic and strictly incentives-oriented.

Below, I will elaborate on the three important areas in the context of policy recommendations: the role of government and governance, education, and economic policy. So many recommendations, policy blueprints or technical studies, etc. have already been presented to Africa, and this is yet another. But the explanations and examples given here, which are easy to digest, do provide a valuable glimpse into Korea's

experience and highlights some fundamentals that are integral to national development and therefore that should be put to work in unison with each other.

The Role of the Government

For any country, the importance of the role of the government cannot be emphasized enough, particularly in the case of developing countries. The general characteristic or the strength of government bureaucracy is being 'impersonal' and 'rationalistic' in the way in which it functions. But the routinization of the work of government organizations tends to entail unintended problems if the people who run them become forgetful of the purpose they are supposed to serve. Government bodies will deviate from the public's expectations over time if conscientious efforts to 'humanize' and invigorate the bureaucracy are not made. That is why even in developed countries, there are constant calls for reforming and reinvigorating the government.

As for most of African states, considering their areas of weaknesses, the government mode must shift gears towards: (1) performance; (2) a rigorous disciplinary regime for civil servants; and (3) the introduction of a practical and comprehensive e-government system to enhance service and transparency, and to curb irregularities and corruption. For these, a sensible and practical evaluation system must be put in place. And it is important not to fall into 'legislature-institutional traps'; it is equally important to maintain a sense of balance as well as some degree of flexibility in upholding norms and regulations on the one hand and making things work on the other hand. Figure 10.7 provides an illustration of this.

Returning to the question of balance and flexibility, as is often the case in developing countries where certain regulations are non-existent or weak, they tend to 'copy and paste' or combine various regulations of developed countries to fill the void. But the problem is that these provisions can be too stringent or unrealistic for developing countries that do not yet have the necessary conditions or level of governance to match them.

Fig. 10.7 The desired mode of governmental reform for Sub-Saharan Africa

A case in point is that we see elaborate procurement laws in place in the Sub-Saharan African region, but because of their complex conditionality, this leads to delays in public projects, along with increases in costs, inefficiency and corruption. An example of this is Uganda's procurement regulation for public construction works, which requires at least nine months before the funds can be dispersed for the projects.[9] People are either stuck in the regulations and waste so much time over technicalities, or they try to short-circuit the process by forging documents. A simple problem like potholes that should be repaired instantly is abandoned because of irrational procurement regulations. Laws and regulations in themselves do not prevent shoddy work; rather, it is the

supervision on the ground, work ethics and discipline that actually count in terms of getting things done.

Regarding the functioning of the state organization, the goal should be 'incremental progress'. While the mindset change and commitment for renovation in bureaucratic circles ought to be sought rigorously and promptly, the goals pursued should be realistic, continuous and long-term. The optimal outcome would be 'incremental progress'. Given the circumstances of Sub-Saharan African countries, setting overly ambitious targets for governmental transformation is most likely to fail. To gather momentum for such drive would require a strong political will and a national campaign supported by the people.

The 'back-tracking syndrome' that I have already mentioned is also prevalent in Sub-Saharan Africa's bureaucratic society. This is the result of the penchant of government officials for their personal interests vis-à-vis the public interest, a lack of discipline (such as negligence in their duties and absenteeism), a failure to report and follow through, etc.

Performance, discipline and e-governance should be considered as the 'tripod' for the governmental reform in Africa. The lessons of countries that industrialized early and 'developmental states' justify the need for well-functioning and credible government in Sub-Saharan African countries, and political leadership and consensus must gather force to push reform in this respect.

Basically, we can categorize governmental roles into three types: 'state-dominant', 'citizen-dominant' and 'diffused-dependent': The state-dominant type refers to the transformational states playing a strong role as 'facilitators' of development, prioritizing performance; the citizen-dominant type means the advanced and mature state of nations where citizens and the private sector have an important bearing on the output and quality of the state's functions, ensuring stability; and the diffused-dependent type refers to the case in which most Sub-Saharan African countries find themselves i.e. being neither state-dominant nor citizen-dominant, which literally means there is a weakness in both the government's role and the people's participation and contribution with respect to development. So, in comparison to the first two types, the last type does not have apparent advantages, showing a variety of weaknesses

like a tendency towards dependence on outside forces, continued poverty and the government's underperformance.

From this, we can deduce three different government orientations: politically oriented, performance-oriented and governance-oriented. The politically oriented kind is typical in most Sub-Saharan African countries: the government's attitude, engagement and day-to-day activities are driven more by political considerations and personal interests than by a true sense of duty to perform and deliver for the sake of the public interest. Executive functions are so closely knit to ruling party politics as well as the personal agendas of the powerful so that one can sense there is 'too much politics'; government departments conveniently serve as tools for politics in every way. The performance-oriented type is geared towards government output and is the hallmark of developmental states. The governance-oriented type, which is characteristic of developed countries, places priority on policy implementation and public service delivery in conformity with regulations and norms. Consistency, transparency and rationality, among other factors, are key measurements of success.

In reality, such distinctions would not be easy to make in a equally simple, clear-cut manner, and states will likely have to embody a mixture of different features. For the countries that need to catch up with the more developed countries, the primary role of the government should be spearheading development rather than maintaining the status quo. The prevailing thinking of established economies tends to view big governments and government interventions as something negative, causing distortions and inefficiencies in the economy. While this may be valid from the viewpoint of developed economies, it may not address the circumstances of developing countries.

Figure 10.8 shows various combinations of the intensity and orientations of the governmental role: on the *y*-axis, three different levels of government intervention—high, medium and low—are marked, while the horizontal axis indicates three types of government role orientation (political, performance and governance-oriented). A vast majority of Sub-Saharan African countries would belong to this category. As to whether or what countries in the region can be called developmental

Fig. 10.8 Combinations of government intensity and orientation

states (the candidates can be such countries as South Africa, Rwanda and Botswana), the situation is unclear and debatable.

Also, what areas of government intervention we are talking about matters—it can be about only industrialization or the whole array of administrative tasks. Among the states with the highest levels of state intervention are countries like North Korea and Cuba. The actual placement of the countries in the matrix may vary when different criteria are applied. The same goes for governmental orientation. For instance, the orientation of a state's role can vary from sector to sector, and multiple orientations can concurrently exist. An example is Rwanda: the government's motivation is frequently seen to be political, economic, performance-oriented and governance-striving at the same time.

Given the necessity for African states to make their governments more functional, that is, being action-oriented, meeting the public's demands and policy goals, how to overhaul the structure and activities of government to make this possible needs to be considered. Once again, incentives and sanctions, sticks and carrots must be applied.

This requires a strong governing body or mechanism to supervise and enforce civil servants' compliance and delivery. We can start with the introduction of a regular 'mindset change' training of public officials and a tight regime of monitoring their performance.

Upgrading performance needs many things, like being focused, diligent and committed, while simple, routine administrative duties would only require steady work. But routine work is by no means a given in Sub-Saharan Africa, where civil servants' absenteeism and undertaking of multiple jobs is commonplace. But such behaviour on a broad scale should not be allowed to continue as it will only add to the vicious cycle of poverty and underperformance. Because of the widespread practice of negligence and corruption at the organizational level, if left unchecked, government institutions, especially those in the public service sector, will continue to deteriorate over time, becoming in themselves a serious problem for the nation.

For African countries that are in great need of transformational policy planning and execution across the board, the role of policy-makers and bureaucrats having the authority to carry out the necessary changes assumes particular importance. Institutions are weak in Africa, but the institutions themselves are moulded through the long-term accumulative practices of the nation. As such, the best way in which the development of African countries can be effectively driven is by starting with conscientious and calculated reforms within the government.

The government elites should be held to the highest standards in terms of upholding public interests. Officials undertaking the assignments must have pride, devotion and responsibility in serving their nation. The embedded 'sense of mission' to serve their nation ought to be the key attribute of bureaucratic elites, but unfortunately, this does not seem to be the case in Africa, as the majority of African elites are seen to have a weak sense of duty and responsibility, and often don't seem to know very well what they are supposed to do.

On the other hand, it might be unfair to denounce African elites for all of Africa's ills. The 'culture' and the demands of the people also undoubtedly play an important part in this. While the effectiveness of government rests with the ability of its officials, it is ultimately the people and public opinion that shape the outcome of governance. That is to

say, bureaucratic society does not function in a vacuum, but constantly interacts with, and is affected by, the environment and various entities, the most important of these being the people.

I have heard many African political, bureaucratic and business elites admitting dissatisfaction and frustration with their people. On their part, they complain that their constituents or their relatives back home expect too much from them and that this is unsustainable. Realistically, a certain balance should be sought between simply trying to 'conform' to the demands of the people and informing or educating them that not only is this not sustainable, but that is also detrimental to society. But the African elites are giving in and are opting for the former, while failing to challenge the public with respect to what is right, rational and beneficial from the long-term perspective.

'Cultural pressures' that have detrimental impacts on society need to be tackled responsibly and persistently. It is only fitting that the wealthy and privileged class of Africa, rather than being detached from their own environment, must assume greater social and moral responsibility for their nations. If the elites and intellectuals fail to take a stand and lead society forward in a positive fashion, society will likely remain stagnant.

Only when the government and the people look squarely at each other and share common ideas and objectives can the state function properly in the long term. It could be said that the political leaders are only as good as the people who chose them. Hence, it is crucial to empower the people to take genuine ownership of their lives and nationhood. This means cultivating people to be not only assertive of their rights and vigilant against government's exercise of power, but also to have a strong sense of the common good, social and moral values, and collective interests.

In developing countries in particular, and even in some Western countries, democracy is often being stretched to its limits. In some cases, it is 'abused' in such a way that people think they can do anything in the name of freedom and democracy. When the society's dominant pattern becomes too transactional and everyone is bent on immediate personal gains without some counterbalance of a broader, collective restraining social mechanism in place, 'freedom' is much more vulnerable. In the extreme case, this can entail a deep turmoil and national

crisis. Freedom and democracy are being stressed without equal emphasis on social and moral values and the maturity of the society to uphold civic standards and norms. In this respect, education, particularly in relation to civic duties, work ethics and development-mindedness, is of paramount importance.

The performance of government and the discipline of bureaucratic organization go hand in hand. In order for the government to deliver what the public requires, civil servants should be both motivated and disciplined with a sense that their goal and duty is to serve the public. To ensure this on a broader level, the general public should act as the ultimate vanguards to preserve and uphold the integrity, stability and prosperity of their nation. Parliament is expected to act as a check and balance vis-à-vis the executive body, but Parliament's competence and credibility is again dependent on the engagement and will of the people. It is on such grounds that I have gone to great lengths in this book to stress the need to build the social fabric, social capital, sense of nation and patriotism, and 'development-mindedness' in Sub-Saharan Africa.

In addition to the reorientation geared towards greater performance and discipline, e-governance can be added as the third pillar of governmental reform. The logic behind e-governance is that there is an enormous value in it for enhancing efficiency and transparency in administration and public services: it promotes discipline in government officials as the room for human error, irregularities or manipulation is greatly reduced, and illicit transactions in particular can be substantially curbed.

Korea has energetically promoted e-government as a central tool to make its government more competitive by capitalizing on its world's leading information and communications technology (ICT), including broadband Internet. The Korean government laid the groundwork for e-government schemes, such as the National Basic Information System (NBIS) computer networks in the 1980s, and streamlined applicable laws and institutions in the 1990s. It then made the implementation of e-government a major national agenda for the 2000s, concentrating on 11 major tasks for e-government (2001–2002) and 31 major tasks for

the e-government roadmap (2003–2007). With such proactive measures, e-government has become firmly established in all areas of the Korean government.[10]

The benefits of Korean e-government were visible and manifold: the efficiency and transparency of administrative work have both greatly improved; administrative civil services have been substantially enhanced; and people's access to and participation in the policy-making process has expanded. Korea's e-government initiative has become a success story of its own, and the effectiveness of its e-government is now acknowledged worldwide so that its various e-government systems are being exported to foreign countries. The UN Global E-Government Survey, held in 2010 and 2012, ranked Korea first among all the member countries, with the highest possible scores given in the categories of the Online Service Index and the e-Participation Index.[11]

In Korea, what started as computerization of administrative work to reduce the workload (like handwriting) of civil servants in the context of the simplification of public documentation, developed into the overall informatization of the national administration and public service, after going through many different stages of informational platforms. Today, almost all work in government, both central and local, is computerized. The relative information is shared within the government and this is used to enhance the work efficiency of civil servants.

The ultimate goal of e-government or e-governance should be to realize a deepening of democracy through the enhancement of public service and the efficiency of public administration against the backdrop of the evolution of an information society. That is why the proliferation of e-government is regarded as synonymous with progress in governance. The technical advantage of e-government is that it can instantly carry out a number of tasks simultaneously with the least amount of effort and the lowest cost. This is evident in such a case as where a client does not need to visit a government office to get whatever service is required, but can instead use the Internet or visit portal sites to do the same. This makes personal contacts between civil servants and the public unnecessary, providing convenience to people while curtailing the possibility

of corruption that is likely to take place in face-to-face encounters. The openness and transparency with which communication and service are carried out promotes a positive atmosphere and outcomes.

The City of Seoul adopted the Online Procedures Enhancement for the Civil Application (OPEN) system, which is the digitalization of the process of producing authorizations and permits for citizens from the stage of application to issuance. The OPEN system is used for such areas as construction and sales, which are prone to solicitations, delays, irregularities, etc. By removing the necessity of personal contacts between city officials and the general public, the OPEN system effectively curtails the roots of corruption while promoting the transparency of the public administration. The public's satisfaction with the OPEN system service and civil servants is exceptionally high.[12]

Most developing countries do not seem to be ready to fully embrace a comprehensive program of e-government. Rather than wait for total readiness, an approach of learning by doing and consolidating small gains is recommended. But it is really up to African leaders and the people to make strategic decisions as to where they want to be heading. They should realize by now that e-governance is more than a technological trend and that it represents a genuine opportunity to attain qualitative, cost-effective government services and a better relationship between the government and the public. Its benefits can go beyond the efficiency of public service and administration to enhance good governance and empower citizens. Online systems for users have not only cut the time spent on processing applications and thereby increased the efficiency of transactions, but have also made them transparent, easily traceable and accessible.

The benefits that Sub-Saharan African countries can reap from e-government are deemed to be huge. E-government promotes efficiency and also helps people to break away from unwholesome temptations. While the fundamental way to do this is through the 'mindset change' of the people, a much simpler but practical means that can be employed alongside this endeavour is digitalization, or 'impersonal transactions' of public service. The positive effects of e-government can be immediate and far-reaching.

But corrupt rulers and the privileged class enjoying vested interests are likely to resist the full-scale application of this tool. There is an interesting story coming out of donor circles that a fragile African country that has become another sad story of state failure in the region had refused an offer by a donor country to have an e-government system installed for it. At first, the government welcomed this offer, but after it learned that the system was designed to curb illicit financial transactions by making everything transparent, which it did not want to happen, it apparently rejected it.

To install an e-government system throughout government departments and agencies that would have a palpable impact on the nation would require considerable resources and capacity. But this can be done even in poor countries with the will of the government. Rwanda is an example that is moving in this direction and is yielding actual results.

The three key ingredients mentioned that Sub-Saharan African countries need to adopt to strengthen and reform the government are performance, discipline and e-government. In pursuing these measures, it is also important to retain some degree of flexibility to make this possible in practice. Regulations should be observed, but the emphasis should be placed on how to get things done rather than on the formality and technical correctness. An appropriate outcome of such government 'reorientation' or reform will be 'incremental progress', because gradual, steady progress is the most realistic goal to achieve under the existing constraints. Setting an over-ambitious goal can easily derail well-intentioned efforts from the initial stages, and the key is to keep the momentum alive and avoid stalling which most often happens in Africa.

Making e-government work requires commitment, devotion, resources and the right mindset. And this boils down to mindset change. Nonetheless, investing in e-government can only have beneficial results in terms of enhancing governance, public services and the efficiency of administrations. For African countries, it is all the more advisable to pursue e-government as aggressively as possible, as it is the most practical and effective way to tackle the kind of widespread irregularities that the region suffers from.

Economic Policy

For any country, navigating the economy towards stability and growth is front and centre of all government policies and is the greatest pre-occupation of the state leaders. But sound management of economic affairs is all the more imperative for African countries that have wide-spread irregularities to contend with alongside the formidable task of overcoming poverty and achieving economic prosperity. But the reality is that serious, in-depth discussions and analysis in relation to African countries' economic policies have been driven mostly by international development organizations and donors.

Africa's economic growth was a mere 1.7% in 2016, lower than all other developing regions except Latin America and the Caribbean, placing the narrative of 'Africa Rising' into question (UNECA 2017). The joint report of the African Development Bank, the OECD and the UNDP, *African Economy Outlook 2017*, attributed this to low com-modity prices, the sluggish performance of the global economy, the slowdown of growth in emerging economies like China, second-order effects of the Arab Spring, amplified by the prolonged conflict in Libya, and bad weather conditions such as droughts in some African coun-tries.[13] But African countries were expected to recover in the coming years thanks to a gradual rise in commodity prices, increasing private demand, including in domestic markets, sound macroeconomic policy management adopted by many countries, a generally improving busi-ness environment, etc.[14] Also, Africa's advances in trade and regional integration were noted: over the last two decades, Africa's trade with the world has quadrupled; the continent's trading partners are more geo-graphically diverse; and regional cooperation is gaining momentum. This is possible 'because African countries have adopted more open policies, invested in infrastructure and continued to pursue regional integration'.[15]

The report recommended that Africa diversify its exports to reduce exposure to commodity price shocks, improve the capacity of intra-Africa trade and focus on regional integration. While recognizing that human development is slow and uneven, political and economic

governance has shown some encouraging signs. According to the report: 'the most recent data show improvements in Africa but also challenges to overcome. Governments are using public resources more efficiently and delivering more social services, thanks to regulatory reforms and digital innovations. They are also working to enhance the quality of the business environment to catalyse private sector investment'.[16]

The report also mentions that 'promoting industrialization is back on Africa's economic policy agenda, with renewed impetus and vigour', but the strategy that about half of African countries are pursuing— which is to create labour-intensive industries to enhance job growth— does not address the needs of firms that have high growth potential. Governments should design strategies that remove the existing binding constraints on high-potential entrepreneurs; implementing productivity strategies requires full commitment, strong and far-sighted political leadership, efficient government coordination and active private-sector participation.[17]

UNECA's *Economic Report on Africa 2017* offers a more straightforward and sobering look into the state of Africa's economy that declined to a decade-low of 1.7% (1.4% for Sub-Saharan Africa) in 2016 from 3.7% in 2015, below the global average of 2.3%. It points out that African countries' reorientation from an investment-led to a consumption-based economy has hit them through a fall in demand and also indirectly through lower global commodity prices. To make matters worse, African inflation rose from 7.5 to 10%, due to supply-side factors, rising electricity prices and falling values of currencies.[18] Such weakness in both the supply and demand side of the economy, along with weaknesses in other economic fundamentals, make Africa's transformational development that much more difficult to attain and place Africa into a position of greater dependence on its development partners and foreign investors.

Among many aspects of Africa's social economy, what is of particular concern is a set of human elements: high population growth, low and subdued labour productivity, and rapid urbanization. It is projected that by 2035, Africa's urban population rate will reach 49%, and 'this shift has profound implications for achieving the continental and global targets for inclusive growth and transformation, including Agenda

2063 and the 2030 Agenda on Sustainable Development. Theory and global experience show that urbanization and structural transformation are closely linked – but less so in Africa, which has largely followed its own urbanizing path weakly tied to structural transformation, including industrialization'.[19]

Sub-Saharan African countries have many challenges and obstacles to confront and overcome, and a long way to go to reach the position of a transformed economy free from poverty and enjoying sustainability, stability and prosperity. The issue with the economies of Sub-Saharan Africa is that there is no lack of policy vision and identification of their problems, as many policy recommendations have been made by various international and regional development organizations, often in conjunction with African states.

Coming up with fresh new recommendations on economic policy for Africa may not be easy. As Joong-Kyung Choi suggests, applying a 'one-size-fits-all' approach will be very difficult and unrealistic, while on the other hand, a 'Christmas tree' approach that suggests 'every challenge in every field should be solved at once … is difficult to be implemented taking the government's capacity of the developing country into account'.[20] Choi points out that the desirable thing is to set priorities among the agenda items and then deal with them one by one. In Sub-Saharan Africa, there is the extra burden of pushing forward with multiple tasks at the same time to avoid regression or fall-back.

Economic policy recommendations for African countries in light of their reality, the lessons of Korean development and the global regime of economic governance can be classified into four categories: (1) macroeconomic stability; (2) effective industrialization; (3) human capacity development; and (4) reinvigoration of the market mechanism (economic principles having precedence over political considerations). In order for these recommendations to yield results, it should be matched by unrelenting determination and deeds. This all seems simple and clear, but contemplating on the grand scheme of inter-connecting and implementing these objectives, and actually delivering them are the hurdles that demand extraordinary efforts in order to be overcome.

Basically, I think that the countries can choose from the three options of 'low intensity', 'medium intensity', and 'high intensity' approaches:

the 'low intensity' option is more or less following the existing regime with improved efforts in basic areas like macroeconomic stability and good governance. The 'medium intensity' option is sort of a middle ground, while the 'high intensity' option is tantamount to vigorously pushing for full-scale transformational development similar to that which South Korea was able to do. The 'medium intensity' option can be described as that which in principle prescribes to the 'high intensity' approach, but, being 'restrained' by various conditions and limited in terms of national capacity, settles for the 'second-best' option.

These three options represents different levels of 'costs and benefits' or 'risks and rewards': the 'low intensity' approach is rather easy to pursue, without having to go through 'great pains', but its downside is that the 'benefits' or 'returns' will be modest, and the resulting change will be limited at best. On the other hand, the 'high intensity' alternative would be very demanding on nations, imposing a heavy burden on them on all fronts, but it could produce many great benefits if properly enacted.

The mainstream donor community and international organizations have not been avid champions of industrial policy for developing countries. Today, what is most frequently and widely stressed are macroeconomic stability, free markets and an open economy, a business-friendly environment, entrepreneurship, good governance, etc. Of course, macroeconomic stability is important for every country, but this and the free market system alone cannot ensure the substantive economic transformation of poor economies. Effective allocation of resources or production factors is a most basic condition for a well-functioning economy. But the more fundamental task for the poorest countries is how to achieve economic dynamism to broaden the economy in an expeditious manner.

In all fairness, the 'low intensity' approach is essentially a recipe for the status quo rather than evolution. Macroeconomic stability is the outcome of the accumulative work of managing inflation, interest rates, currency rates, deficits and the debt burden. It is what can be achieved by continued vigilance and prudent engagement by the authorities. With globalization and the high level of dependence of African countries on foreign resources, companies and markets,

African governments must have an equally high level of discipline in terms of managing macroeconomic stability.

Compared to the 1960s, 1970s and 1980s, when Korea was able to achieve phenomenal economic growth, the international economy nowadays is more competitive, interdependent and inter-linked, while the global financial and trade regimes have become more binding on national governments, making the 'autonomous' pursuit of economic policies considerably more difficult for developing countries. Moreover, African countries now face less lenient international trade regimes than was previously the case. How much leeway African countries can have under the current economic regimes if they decided to push ahead aggressively with industrial policy and export promotion is unclear and would require a more detailed examination. And there can be a grey area between what is stipulated in theory and allowed in practice. But for the poor economies in the region, there should still be quite a number of possibilities of which to take advantage and many ways to navigate through the situation if they are seriously committed to doing so.

Perhaps there is a fourth option: the 'incremental change' approach. The goal here would be to first reach the 'low intensity' target of macroeconomic stability and sound governance, but rather than stopping there, moving on to the next phase of meaningful industrialization and then to high-end industrialization and a service sector economy. The goal for every nation would be to enjoy growth and stability at the same time.

Korea started out in the early 1960s with an aggressive export promotion and economic growth policy, followed by a policy of gearing-up HCIs in the 1970s. But Korea had to pay more attention to economic stability during the process of economic development. Overall, Korea's 'high intensity' development approach was about growth first and then stabilization afterwards. Since the 1990s, Korea has been trying to balance the two, with special lessons learned from the 1997 IMF financial crisis and the 2008 global financial crisis on the need to manage financial transactions and markets.

In relation to industrial policy, Korea provides an example of fundamental but long-forgotten lessons of industrialization: that an economy has to undergo different stages of policy orientations in order to

attain full-scale development. For Korea, each phase was extraordinarily clear-cut: (1) post-war national rehabilitation (the 1950s); (2) laying the foundations for a 'self-supporting' economy (the 1960s); (3) upgrading the industrial structure and modernizing the rural sector (the 1970s); (4) shifting towards openness and liberalization (the 1980s); and (5) espousing globalization and structural reforms (the 1990s).

Korea's situation in the aftermath of independence and the Korean War was not very different from that which Sub-Saharan African countries faced upon their independence. But what sets Korea apart from African countries is that Korea was able to fulfil all the stages of economic development following the path of industrialization of developed economies, albeit in a very compressed manner.

In the case of Sub-Saharan African countries, it seems evident that of these five phases, phase 2 and phase 3 have not properly taken place. The relevant policies have not been effectively pursued in a timely and systemic manner, and the countries have thereby missed many opportunities. African countries have opened up their economy, liberalized the market and privatized companies without fully understanding the implications of doing so. Without taking up crucial tasks of laying the foundations for a 'self-supportive' economy and pushing for industrialization and rural development, they have opted for an easier solution of opening up and liberalizing. In so doing, they have essentially outsourced most of the components needed for a successful national economy.

As a consequence, all kinds of policy goals are pursued in juxtaposition, complicating efforts and compounding the already challenging tasks. Still, many African countries have not completed laying the groundwork for statehood and economic development. Korea achieved rapid growth based on the solid cornerstones of development: land reform, socio-economic mobilization and empowerment of the people, the creation of various agencies, proactive government initiatives, etc., and these turned out to be vital 'building blocks'. More important was the actual follow-up actions to these plans.

But instead of exercising true ownership of their economy, Sub-Saharan African countries have frequently taken a regressive and deleterious stance. After a half-century of independence, many African leaders are still blaming the influence of colonialism and international

environment for their economic failures. Apart from the lack of grand economic schemes, the post-independence African economy suffered severely from a deficiency of participation and support from various indigenous players and sectors. Unlike Korea, which made the most of what little resources it had in laying the groundwork and setting up bodies for national development, African states wasted their precious resources and opportunities through inaction, misconduct and missteps.

Sub-Saharan African nations received more financial inflows and aid grants in the context of development assistance than any other region in the world. The tasks they faced—uniting the nation, providing security, achieving economic growth and welfare, democratization and good governance, etc.—are the basic things that the leaders and people of every country have to assume as their own responsibility. The African problems have been caused not by acts of nature and irresistible forces, but by human failings. African leaders readily invoke sovereignty or non-interference in domestic matters, but when it comes to economic problems, they are quick to put responsibility on external causes and colonial legacies, Western imperial designs and so on.

On the flip side of Africa's energetic open-arms policy towards foreign investors, there is a disquieting reality of dependency and opportunism by the 'well-connected' for rent-seeking. 'Upper-echelon' African business circles seem to be have evolved in an unwholesome manner. Rather than trying to be entrepreneurial and competitive in their own right by showing commitment, making investments and taking risks on their own, many seem to want to act as 'middlemen' in order to gain short-term profits or windfall gains.

The common challenges facing Sub-Saharan African countries are rapid urbanization amid a population explosion, acute unemployment for the youth and college graduates, etc. But the overarching problem is the myopic thinking when it comes to business, often being seriously blindsided and, worse still, not really doing the things that need to be done. Sub-Saharan African countries have no shortage of policy papers, road maps and master plans laying out 'what is lacking', 'what is to be achieved' and 'what is the way forward'. But the persistent problem is always the implementation, and it reverts back to intent, commitment

and practice. The question is: how much are elites and the privileged class conscious of public interests, and how patriotic and devoted are they to contributing to the improvement of lives of their compatriots beyond their own personal gains?

Jennifer Blake compared Africa and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), and pointed out that there are three aspects of the ASEAN growth experience that can provide useful lessons for Africa. First, ASEAN countries have made many of the reforms and investments needed to ensure longer-term prosperity; measurable progress has been achieved across the region in terms of tearing down red tape and putting in place institutions, educational systems and infrastructure. Over the past four decades, they have improved their productivity by diversifying their economies rather than depending on volatile commodity prices. Second, they have been much more successful in regional integration compared to African countries, recognizing that in a rapidly evolving global context, they must join forces to reap the economies of scale. Third, economic outcomes are driven by positive expectations: 'In much of Asia there is an inherent belief that countries will experience rapid economic progress – of course driven by past experience but also a general confidence in the future – and this tends to reinforce a positive self-fulfilling prophecy. Greater confidence in the future would be a boon in Africa, which is particularly at risk due to the present slowdown.'[21]

When all approaches stumble time after time, then it is likely that something simple and basic rather than something very complex and technical has gone wrong. When everybody, including development experts, is looking everywhere to find reasons, the ultimate answer may lie in the fundamentals, like being steady and consistent. I concur with David Henley's view that what successful development strategies aim to do is 'to alleviate poverty on a massive scale (outreach), with great *speed* (urgency), and with a pragmatic and sometimes ruthless eye for *simplicity* (expediency)'.[22]

Returning to the development path of Korea, post-war national rehabilitation self-supporting' economy most Sub-Saharan African countries have barely fulfilled even a few of them. African countries have

seemingly 'jumped' to phases (4) and (5) without properly fulfilling steps (1), (2) and (3). And the steps taken ((4) and (5)) are not perfect either. The first three stages indeed require arduous work and are by no means rudimentary. The post-war national rehabilitation era of Korea should approximate the early period of post-independence of African countries. All-out efforts in nation-building should have been made at this time, with a renewed sense of national identity and unity translated into a vigorous institutionalization of state structures and a push for modernization, but apparently this has not happened in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Most Sub-Saharan African countries have not completed nation-building and laying the foundations for economic development, hence, the next step—upgrading the industrial structure and modernizing the rural sector—is still far from reach. When the countries under this 'pre-mature' state merely open up markets, they can drift further away from the desired path of development, with the outcome that we see today: a commodity-dependent economy, the domination of multi-national corporations and foreign companies, the underdevelopment of the agricultural sector, a meagre manufacturing industry, a huge informal economy, snowballing youth unemployment, rising debt, widespread corruption, etc.

There is still a tendency for African rulers to complain about the 'unfair treatment' of Africa by the West. They do so when they benefit vastly from, and rely so heavily on, aid, funds, investments and business operations from rich nations. An East African state leader pointed out that Africa is on the rise and 'even as we rise, the international system maintains an irrational unjust structure that relegates Africa to [the] periphery, that defends injustice and double standards as a matter of course, and, which impoverishes us'. He questioned the dividends of globalization and implored African leaders to look more inwardly by promoting intra-African trade for its people's prosperity in a 'rigged international system', adding that 'even in the face of an international order stacked against us, built on our backs, Africans have made painful progress'.[23]

Besides pointing out the need for African regional integration, it has also become fashionable for African countries to create industrial parks in a bid to attract investments and form industrialization hubs. But due to poor infrastructure, administrative hurdles, a lack of available materials and skilled labour, corruption, a lack of capable local partners, etc., this has mostly not materialized in any satisfactory way.

We have discussed macroeconomic stability and industrialization. Now we turn to human capacity, which includes entrepreneurial skill with the emphasis on management capacity, as well as the quality of the workforce in general. The surest way to move towards an industrialized economy is to have local, home-grown companies flourish and expand, with local businessmen having true ownership of their business. For this to occur, a major increase in skilled workforce and competent management that will support the expanding businesses and economic growth is necessary. But what is clearly the weakness is 'management capacity'. There is a very good chance that the threshold of transformation will be reached when the overall managerial capability of the people is enhanced. Figuring out what holds this capacity backs and how it can be substantially raised will be a game changer for sure.

Sung-Hee Jwa stresses that it is not the market but enterprises that are the most important driving force for economic growth in developing countries. He rebukes the theory of the 'invisible hand' of the free market mechanism, arguing that thriving companies are the answer to successful industrialization and that, without them, developing countries will remain as agrarian societies.[24]

So, what are the conditions for indigenous or local companies to successfully emerge as competitive and sustainable businesses? The productivity which allows the quantity and quality of commodities and services, as well as the managerial skills that render this possible, readily comes to mind. The reason why there are so few prominent 'native' enterprises in the region is because of the lack of such capabilities. In this regard, what African governments can take away from Korea's experience is that the government must do much more and must fundamentally reposition itself from being an 'onlooker' to taking the helm in relation to industrial planning and the promotion of business and economic growth.

The restraints on the competitiveness of Sub-Saharan African countries are mostly human factors, and hence they can be tackled. A prevalent problem is the poor work or low credibility of the workforce. Supervision is a very demanding and arduous task, and this pushes up costs in terms of extra time, labour and money spent. Basically, it is an innate issue of individuals rather than being structural or externally influenced, but the accumulative impact on the economy is huge. At the institutional or organizational level, rampant corruption and unhealthy practices, such as public officials openly engaging in private business, further undermines the overall economic efficiency of the countries in the region.

To put things into perspective, the opportunities were always there for the taking. I have heard political leaders in the region citing successes that the Indian business communities have been able to reap in eastern and southern Africa over so many decades, while deploring the fact that their own people do not exert themselves in the same way; others have pointed out that the Lebanese expatriates have been doing the same all over western Africa. It is not mere commercial savvy, but, more importantly, hard work, commitment, discipline and perseverance that determine the outcome of business. Ideas and plans are only as good as their implementation. And implementation hinges on what I have termed 'development-mindedness': knowledge, practising, ownership and passion (KPOP).

Education in Ethics and Mindset Change

When we are dealing with a magnanimous goal like changing the course of a nation, people should embrace it wholeheartedly, and it is always good to begin with a sound education. The progress of Sub-Saharan African countries thus far is disappointing, considering how much potential they have, but how little they have advanced over the decades in terms of strengthening their social, economic and political fabric. The international community which has struggled in terms of its development endeavours on Africa, should also reflect on whether there had not been blind-spots in its methods rather than just go about doing business the same way.

This calls for objective, cool-headed reassessment of Africa's problems. And it should begin with a recognition of the nature of the problems. What kind of a response is needed would depend on the nature of the problem. If the problem is technical, it would require a technical approach. If it is more fundamental and deep-seated, it should be approached differently, in the context of 'tailored response'. But in order to be able to do this, countries must recognize their problem as such and also accept the required means.

Anyone who has worked on African development ought to understand that what is required in terms of addressing the nature of the challenges facing Africa is not simply distributive, welfare or poverty-relief types of responses. It is not only about a 'lack of capacity' either. Rather, the answer lies elsewhere, at a different level: *the mindset and behaviour of the people*. There seems to be a big gap between what is desired and what is necessary. Changes will come when people understand how wealth is created and through what process it can be reproduced and sustained. The blind-sights or negligence have continued for so long because no meaningful evolution in terms of the mindset has occurred.

From the development partners' perspective, there can be an issue of 'short-memory', a short cycle and turnover of projects, frequent shifts in the officials in charge, etc. They could also be 'captured' or entrenched in their own systems, without themselves knowing that this is the case. People could make the mistake of treating such subjects like people's mindset and culture as taboos on the premise that these are intrinsically unchangeable. But as I have already pointed out, cultural heritage, identity and traditions that are objects of national pride and hence need be cherished should not be confused with 'social behaviourism' that can and should evolve over time when necessary. Development itself is about evolution, and hence sticking rigidly to old habits is counterproductive in terms of development and is tantamount to self-denial of improvement. People cannot have it both ways: 'comfort' and 'progress' are mutually exclusive. I deplore it when I see people complaining and even indulging in self-pity when they are willing to do so little to help themselves.

Development means changing for the better. That is why we have education, public campaigns, activist movements and so on. Today's degradation of the natural environment, increasing security threats and growing competition in business, among other factors, demand change on the part of the people, even if only for their survival, let alone from the perspective of development. The logic of social development, people's empowerment, as well as economic principles, should serve as the basis for healthy politics; it should not be the other way round, where everything is being driven by political considerations.

In Sub-Saharan Africa, so many things break down and deteriorate in everyday life that such phenomena are accepted as normal. Self-regulating or correcting mechanisms in society are feeble, and responses to public requirements, accidents, crimes, natural disasters and contingencies are not swiftly and effectively taken, and are sometimes grossly neglected. Expectations of and trust in the public service is very low, and the general sense of people's powerlessness and detachment from the country's centres is perceived to be widespread. Even the elites and the privileged class have their fair share of frustrations and uneasiness in relation to their society.

But the vast majority of people seem to accept the reality with a 'subsistence' mindset and, as a result, society is bogged down in a languid state. You rarely see any expressions of social outrage or calls for fundamental change in the form of large-scale public demonstrations and campaigns. In certain countries, we see demonstrations and strikes all too often, but these are almost entirely protests against poor public services, labour unions demanding better wages and the poor demanding more welfare.

Moreover, activist movements that are energetically pursued are not in evidence either. Under the circumstances, Africa's politics have managed to adapt to the reality in their own way, not in strengthening governance and fabric of the society, and empowering the people, but by following a 'minimalist' strategy and catering to the people's needs that remain largely subsistence-oriented.

Problems stemming from the weak fundamentals of civil society, like people's sense of themselves and their community, civic values, work ethics, etc., that pertain to the realm of human development should

be recognized and dealt with in a serious fashion and should not be left to be addressed in the political context or politicized. The international community also has to be careful of the traps of taking a political approach from their end. Mainstream partners sometimes make the mistake of focusing on what is nominal and lose sight of the issues that plagues Africa's development.

The ills of an overdose of politics are consequential: diversion of attention to politics; loss of opportunities to engage in issues of more substance, like work culture and work ethics; dependency on politics and political figureheads; division and fragmentation of society stemming from politics, etc. The profound harm done is that the people, especially the rural population and the youth, become so dependent on politicians and assistance from the state that they lose any motivation to work and take ownership of their lives.

The workings of the elite class, entrepreneurs and foreign partners, under the given circumstances, will not be sufficient in themselves for the countries to overcome poverty in a transformative fashion, regardless of how many resources may be injected. It is the broad section of the masses, the ordinary people that have to be empowered and enlightened. Only then will African societies be able to enjoy sustainable development and prosperity. In order for this to occur, the expectations and ambitions of individuals for their lives must also be raised substantially. Without people's sense of self-esteem and pride, expectations for a better tomorrow and, most importantly, the willingness to take on responsibilities, all the endeavours made will most likely end up achieving little.

So, how can countries turn around the degradation of people's values and the sense of ownership in their lives and work ethics? The only logical answer that I can find is through education in ethics, human and social development emphasizing the need for dynamic change. There should be a boldness to include in the curriculum the resocialization or reorientation of existing modes. African nations ought to take this matter very seriously and wholeheartedly and carry out the entire task forcefully. This is the field where the role of donors can be vague and limited, as it will be an uncharted territory for the traditional donor community.

Korea provides a good set of examples of mindset change initiatives that Africans may find relevant and appealing. In a sense, such endeavours can be considered as the nation-building process, and hence for developing countries, there is great value in conscientiously launching them in a campaign-like fashion. Development is about changing for the better and people cannot expect positive things to happen when they are not willing to change themselves. Korea's experience in this field offers a worthy example from which countries can readily take inspiration.

Ethics has been taught in Korean schools as a regular subject on the curriculum since 1955, when the relevant provision was enacted. Along with ethics, an early vocational course called 'practical arts' (*shilkwa*) was also established in the same year. Both of these are still taught in Korean schools. The subject of ethics in primary schools is called *barun-senghwal* or 'right habits of life', in secondary schools *dodeok* or 'ethics' and in universities it was called *kokminyoonli* or 'national ethics' up to the mid-1990s, but later changed to 'ethics'. It started with the purpose of teaching the basic morals like attitudes of individuals befitting dutiful members of society, patriotism and a law-abiding spirit, responsibility towards one's family members, etc.[25]

Furthermore, in 1968, in an effort to solidify the foundation of a national ethics and ethos, the Charter of National Education was promulgated by the Korean President. The reason for its promulgation was because of the need to address various shortcomings of the nation: Korea's valuable traditions and heritage were not being followed and advanced; there were imbalances or disharmony between material development and people's value systems, the latter lagging behind the former; people lacked a sense of state, society and national identity; and national education indicators were ambiguous, while spiritual and ethical education was being neglected.

The Charter's main body is broken down into three parts emphasizing: the pride and duty of the Korean nation; norms and virtues in everyday life; and national unification and evolution of democracy. The sentiments underpinning the charter are: (1) the establishment of a national identity; (2) the creation of a new national culture through

harmony between tradition and progress; and (3) the development of democracy by means of harmonization of individuals and the state.[26]

In the 1990s, the Charter was removed from Korean textbooks. As for the ethics course, although it has been maintained for a long time, it is gradually being phased out, reflecting political and social changes in Korea. For example, 'national ethics' was dropped from exams to recruit civil servants in 1994. In more recent years, since 2014, ethics is no longer taught in high schools. Although the economic achievements of Korea during the 'developmental dictatorship' era are undeniable, Korean people living in a different era of democratization, a pluralistic society and in a situation of economic prosperity tend to hold a more sophisticated or critical view of past events and legacies.

But the mindset change, moral and work ethics-oriented initiatives that Korea undertook should not be dismissed easily as being out of touch with today's reality. These can be all the more relevant in developing countries. In fact, Korea's public or state-led mindset change and ethics campaign did not come out of nowhere, but had deep roots in Korea's history and society. Korea, having undergone a process of economic, political and social evolution, has placed greater emphasis on public service and ethics codes for civil servants and politicians.

The Canaan Farmers School is reputed to have positively contributed to development by spearheading changes in its own way. Founded in 1931, the Canaan Farmers School methodology is said to have been adopted later in the model of the New Village Movement, the *Saemaul Undong*, which was launched in 1970.

This school's ideas are about making people disciplined, voluntary, active, hard-working, forthright, ethical, frugal and responsible as individuals and community members. It tries to instil the 'I work first, I serve first, I sacrifice first' mentality in people, with the motto of 'let's learn until we know, let's devote ourselves to work, let's serve in humility'. It has an eye-catching slogan that is emblematic of its ethos: 'do not eat to eat, but eat to work. If you don't like to work, do not eat. Work at least four hours for each meal'.[27]

The school also teaches 'mindset pioneering': that it is all up to the people to get things done, so they should have a positive 'can-do' spirit. Individuals are urged to wake up early before dawn to start the day, and changing oneself for the better, being passionate and faithful pioneers and the need to maintain one's own good health are also emphasized.[28]

The logic of the school's approach is that while various projects for poverty eradication and sustainable development are necessary, it is more important to educate leaders who will effectively drive these projects forward and have the ability to lead others. The basic component of leadership training is mindset transformation based on the belief that a person can change only when his or her mind changes. The task here is to make the changes in mindset embedded in the personality of trainees so that they will act differently, in a more positive manner. The expected benefits are twofold: the creation of model communities of poverty eradication based on mindset transformation and raising leaders who practise and live out the changed mindset.[29]

The founder of the Canaan movement, Kim Yong-ki (1909–1988), spent his whole life cultivating barren land and enlightening farmers during Korea's most difficult times of Japanese occupation and the postwar periods when the nation was suffering from extreme poverty and hunger. He said:

> For a country like ours, learned people must get involved in agriculture. Agriculture is the core of all industries. But on the contrary, learned people are avoiding agriculture and only ignorant rural people have been working as farmers. This has kept our nation's economy and civilization primitive, resulting in loss of our sovereignty to Japan. To recover our sovereignty, we must gain economic independence. And for that, there is no other way but for the learned to get involved in agriculture and increase food production.[30]

He would also say: 'Don't tell people to work but be the one to work first', 'Don't just keep your appearance clean but keep your heart clean', 'If you don't like to work, do not eat', 'Take courage, my country', 'You will reap as you sow', 'Young men, go to the countryside', 'Do good and do not lose hope' and 'Be the pioneer to change your fate'.

Kim Yong-ki's extraordinary passion to fight against the odds and break 'the status quo' by tackling head-on what could be extremely onerous and almost impossible, but essential undertakings for trans-formative development—changing the mindset of people—is remarkable. It is said that his thoughts and conviction on the Canaan Farmers movement were rooted in his Christian faith. In any case, from the perspective of development, I think that 'his thoughts and deeds form imperative basis for mindset transformation of leaders in developing nations'.[31]

According to the Canaan Farmers School, immediately after General Park Chung-Hee took power following a military coup in 1961, he vis-ited the school. When he visited the school again in March 1962, he is said to have remarked 'we led a political revolution, but you led a life-style revolution'. In April 1962, hundreds of district leaders led by the Vice Minister of Home Affairs came to the school for training.[32]

The Canaan Farmers School seems to have strongly inspired President Park to envision and launch the *Saemaul Undong*, the New Village Movement, in 1970.[33] As the school was increasingly recognized at the start of the 1970s, it attracted not only farmers but increasingly people from all walks of life, including soldiers, civil servants, business-men, professionals, college and high school students. As a result, the school's facilities and training courses were also expanded. Over time, the curriculum went through some changes in its content to reflect the changes in reality of Korea, but the mindset-change approach and the heritage of farmers' education continued to be its central component.

Notes

1. Abraham Maslow, *The Farther Reaches of Human Nature* (New York: Viking Press, 1971).
2. In this sense, it could be said that South Korea's sense of nation and national identity was a 'pre-existing condition' at the time that the 'modernization of motherland' drive was launched in the early 1960s.
3. Sung-Hee Jwa (2015).

4. David Booth and Diana Gammack, *Governance for Development in Africa* (London: Zed Books, 2013), pp. 3–4.

5. Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu, *Emerging Africa* (London: Penguin Books, 2014), p. 6.

6. Ibid., pp. 6–7.

7. Patrick Katagata, 'Why Africa Has Failed 50 Years After Independence', *Daily Monitor* (Uganda), 9 May 2017, p. 14.

8. Kingsley Chiedu Moghalu (2014), p. 305.

9. Allen Kagina, the Executive Director of Uganda National Road Authority, was commenting, as a discussant, on Uganda's problems during the 25th Joseph Mubiru Memorial Lecture with Keynote Speaker Ha-Joon Chang on 1 December 2017, Serena Hotel, Kampala, Uganda.

10. National Information Society Agency (NIA), e-Government of Korea: Best Practices (Seoul: NIA, 2012), p. 4, http://unpan1.un.org/intra-doc/groups/public/documents/UNGC/UNPAN043625.pdf; see also Special Committee for e-Government, Republic of Korea, *Korea's e-Government: Completion of e-Government Framework* (e-Government White Paper) (2003), pp. 8–16.

11. Ibid.

12. MOK Jin-hue, 'E-Government and Transparency of Public Administration', 28 April 2008, http://humanarchive.tistory.com/295.

13. Africa Development Bank, OECD Development Centre, UNDP, *African Economic Outlook 2017, Special Theme: Entrepreneurship and Industrialization* (Paris: OECD Publishing, 2007), pp. 23–25.

14. Ibid., pp. 27–29.

15. African countries' more open policies, investment in infrastructure and continued pursuit of regional integration have eased business activities and also increased the continent's appeal as a partner in global trade, according to *African Economic Outlook 2017*.

16. Ibid., p. 18.

17. *African Economic Outlook 2017* offers three suggestions for easing the constraints that most entrepreneurs in Africa are confronted with: first, to strengthen skills and meet the needs of labour market, it is necessary to implement public policies that prioritize formal education, apprenticeships, vocational training and managerial capabilities; second, policies that support business clusters can help raise the productivity and growth of firms, including smaller ones; and, third, financial market policies can increase firms' access to innovative and tailored sources of finance.

18. United Nations Economic Commission for Africa (UNECA), *Economic Report on Africa 2017*: *Urbanization and Industrialization for Africa's Transformation* (Addis Ababa: ECA, 2017) pp.2–3.

19. Ibid., executive summary xx.

20. Joon-Kyung Choi, *Upside-Down Success Story of Korea's Economic Development* (Seoul: Daewon Publishing, 2013), translated by Christy Hyun-Joo Lee, p. 180.

21. Jennifer Blanke, Chief Economist, World Economic Forum, 'From Kigali to Kuala Lumpur: What Will It Take for Africa to Follow South-East Asia's Development Path?', 31 May 2016, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/05/from-kigali-to-kuala-lumpur-what-will-it-take-for-africa-to-follow-southeast-asia-s-development-path/.

22. David Henley (2015), p. 178.

23. Statement by Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta on 19 November 2016 during the 2nd annual Diplomatic Black Tie dinner in Kampala (reports by *New Vision* and *Daily Monitor* on 21 November 2016).

24. Sung-Hee Jwa's paper 'Korea in Crisis Asking Park Chung-Hee for Answers' (Korean), presented at the symposium held by the Park Chung-Hee Foundation on 15 June 2016.

25. *Doosan Encyclopedia* (Korean), http://terms.naver.com/entry.nhn?docId=1082774&cid=40942&categoryId=31723.

26. The Academy of Korean Studies—Research Information Service of Korean Studies (RINKS).

27. The slogans of the Canaan Farmers School are as follows: (School ideas) I work first. I serve first. I sacrifice first; (School motto) Let's learn until we know. Let's devote ourselves to work. Let's serve in humility; (Table manners) Do not eat to eat, but eat to work. If you don't like to work, do not eat. Work at least four hours for each meal; (Mindset) Mindset Pioneering! Pioneering Mindset! We are still young. Much work to do. Let's make it done. It can be done. Wake up the dawn. The people are calling for us. Let's go to Canaan; (Change) Change myself first. Change now first. Change here first. Change small things first. Change doable things first. Change until the end; (Pioneers) Pioneers must be dreamers. Pioneers must be confident. Pioneers must be strong-willed and patient. Pioneers must be brave and decisive. Pioneers must sweat and weep. Pioneers must be knowledgeable. Pioneers must be commit-ted. Pioneers must be dedicated. Pioneers must be devoted. Pioneers must run. Pioneers must maintain a peaceful family. Pioneers are not born overnight. Pioneers must be passionate and faithful; (Sweat) I

have seen my sweat on the forehead. I confirmed my sweat. The less I sweat, the more I weep; The more I sweat, the less I weep; (Health) If I lose money, I lose a little; If I lose honour and credit, I lose much; If I lose health, I lose all. Health is the only thing I cannot borrow from others. The failure, frustration, and hopelessness I suffer today is the result of the time I spent badly yesterday; The success, joy, and hope I enjoy today is the reward of the time I spent well yesterday; (Today) Today is the first day of the rest of the days left. Today is the first day of the rest of my life; (Wake up) Let's wake up the dawn. Let's start the dawn. Let's welcome the dawn; (Take courage) Take courage, my country. Take courage, my people.

28. Canaan Farmers School (Wonju) website http://www.canaanin.or.kr; KIM Bum II, *Achievers Are Believers* (Seoul: Kyujangmunwha, 2008) (Korean), pp. 12–20.

29. Introductory briefings from Canaan School of Farming (Wonju) during the author's visit to the school on 12 May 2011.

30. Canaan Global Leadership Centre, 'Introduction to Canaan Global Leadership Centre', 29 May 2010, https://sites.google.com/site/canaangloballeadership.

31. Ibid. The Canaan Farmers School is now engaged in projects for many developing countries.

32. Ibid.

33. According to the Canaan Farmers School, 66,000 male and female leaders were appointed to represent 33,000 villages around the nation and work diligently for their villages without any monetary reward. The one-week-long camp training for these leaders first took place in the end of January 1972 at the Saemaul Leadership Institute, which adopted the curriculum from the Canaan Farmers School. While the programme helped the trainees with new knowledge for agriculture, the Canaan Farmers School noted that most testified that the Canaan-style mindset training was most helpful. Initially targeted at rural leaders, the *Saemaul Undong* training was expanded to include urban area projects in 1973 and male and female *Saemaul* leaders from cities were sent to one-week-long *Saemaul Undong* training programmes as well. Later in 1974, further expansion of the programme included the training of high-level central government officials, administrative ministers, university professors, members of the media, entrepreneurs, artists, religious leaders, etc. The Canaan Farmers School observed that the *Saemaul Undong* training played a crucial role as a means of national mindset training.

Integrated Rural Development in Africa

The Need for a Success Story

In view of the nature of the task of Africa's development, the key word to be used is 'change'. This is because development itself implies change, while in Sub-Saharan Africa, so many things remain unchanged. In a fast-moving society like Korea, 'change' is almost synonymous with 'survival'. 'Change' could mean many things: improvement, adaptation, progress, achievement, innovation, etc. In Korea, the fervour for 'change' was evident during its rapid growth era, but even now it is regarded as a virtue and a necessity. I recall that even in around 2005, when Korea was already well underway in terms of innovations, there was a boom in demand for innovative leadership training sessions all over Korea. These sessions would stress that 'change' is innovation. Increased competition under globalization and technological innovations requires people to become more nimble.

But what is surprising is that in spite of this necessity, Sub-Saharan Africa has been so silent on 'change'. Basically, it is perceived that the political leaders and elites with vested rights want to maintain the status quo. But, in addition, the masses who should be outraged and yearning

for change have chosen the status quo by adhering to their subsistence way of life. Add to this the dependency syndrome or the welfare-oriented policies and mindset, and you get the picture of Africa that we see today. Breaking old habits is as important as having a rejuvenated and committed governmental leadership.

I have come across a number of foreign professionals, both Western and Asian, working in Africa who expressed that after having spent many years in Africa, they have become convinced that Africa's fundamental obstacle is 'cultural' in nature. Some believe that the 'yoke' of the 'traditional way of life' of the locals is far stronger than anything else and supersedes even their professed religion.

But we can understand this from a different angle. It is not necessarily the cultures impeding development, but rather that development efforts failing to have an impact so that the cultures remain intact. Transforming various aspects of life is the very aim of development. Experts can be burdened by the connotations of the word 'culture', but this should be approached in a practical manner. As I have mentioned, 'culture' can be broken down into two categories: (1) cultural heritage; and (2) behavioural modes. Needless to say, the former, in the form of arts, languages, food, lifestyles, traditions, etc., are to be cherished and upheld, but the latter, when necessary, can and should be modified or ameliorated. This is where education can be instrumental. An appropriate synthesis of civic values, education and development projects can yield positive outcomes in this respect. Since development is about changing, why shouldn't behaviour modes that impede the improvement of lives not be targeted for change? Once this necessity is recognized, then the next logical step would be to find and apply an 'antithesis' to the problem at hand.

Korea's *Saemaul Undong* campaign is a resounding success story of turning around the mindset of the people to realize transformative development. In every respect, the *Saemaul Undong*, which was based on the spirit of diligence, self-help and cooperation, is deemed an ideal model of development for Sub-Saharan African countries because it invokes voluntarism and hard work in the people.

While the *Saemaul Undong* was a national campaign carried out ambitiously in the 1970s and continued afterwards in Korea, as the

Korean economy and society became increasingly sophisticated, it began to be viewed as a 'relic' which had merits when Korea was poor but was not so relevant to the current situation. People became less communal, more urban life-oriented and individualistic, and the attention has shifted towards undertaking *Saemaul Undong* programmes overseas in view of its popularity among developing countries that continue to struggle with poverty and underdevelopment.

It is against such a backdrop that Korea's development agency KOICA launched Smart *Saemaul Undong* in September 2015, which coincided with the adoption of the SDGs. It refers to a holistic community development initiative capturing the partnering government's willingness for development and the people's voluntary participation. Its strategy is to implement an integrative programme utilizing appropriate technology, creating value chains and strengthening partnership, based on the foundation of governance and social capital. This includes embedding the *Saemaul Undong* into partner countries' community development policy, promoting the spirit of the *Saemaul Undong*, and establishing sound governance. Detailed components of this strategy involve: (1) a sector-integrative programme; (2) the appropriate technology; (3) a value chain; (4) competition and incentives; (5) village-level development; (6) *Saemaul Undong* education tailored to the needs of each community; and (7) partnership with the private sector.[1]

Regarding sector-integrative programmes, it is argued that the *Saemaul Undong* has great potential to contribute to the achievement of SDGs as an integrative community development model that encompasses agricultural sectors such as livestock and fisheries, social sectors such as education, health, hygiene and gender, and technology sectors such as ICT, energy and the environment.

With respect to appropriate technology, the *Saemaul Undong* aims to drastically raise performance in improving the level of income within a short period of time by identifying and mobilizing technologies that are the most appropriate in specific settings of partner countries. As for improving value chains, including production (land, seeds, equipment, micro-financing and cultivation technology), harvesting, storage, processing, distribution, marketing and sales are important if income is to be

increased on a sustained basis. Thus, the value chain is taken into consideration in planning what activities to carry out in order to generate income.

'Competition' fuelled by incentives (and disincentives) constitutes another key aspect of the *Saemaul Undong*. Without the willingness and commitment of the beneficiaries, real and sustainable development cannot happen. Thus, places in which a *Saemaul Undong* project is to be undertaken are carefully examined to confirm whether the targeted community or entity has sufficient willingness to change. To measure the outcomes of projects, performance indicators are devised and reviewed on an annual basis to identify and reward high-performing communities.

The *Saemaul Undong* is undertaken at a village level. However, in Korea, this turned into a pan-national movement, so while villages were the main implementers of various projects, other networking bodies existed as well. The *Saemaul Undong* was an integrative work in itself and in the process of actively promoting this movement, an enhanced governance structure in the form of a newly integrated local administrative system emerged.

'*Saemaul Undong* education tailored to the needs of each community' means that the local community must provide training to its members, which can be done through the collaboration of village leaders learning from each other and coming up with *Saemaul Undong* textbooks developed following internal discussions. This is important because the learning process is internally driven, making the villagers self-serving with a true sense of ownership, in contrast to 'outside experts' seemingly dictating everything, as is the case in many development projects. Local problems should be solved through locals' understanding and participation, and by mobilizing local resources.

The KOICA President expressed that 'KOICA is currently receiving requests from 50 developing countries to share knowledge in *Saemaul Undong* or community development. In addition, international organizations such as [the] World Food Program (WFP), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP), and world-renowned scholars, including Professor Jeffrey Sachs, have lauded *Saemaul Undong* as an excellent development model'.[2]

The Korea *Saemaul Undong* Centre was created in 1980 with sub-regional organizations at the national level, along with five member associations, including the Central Council of *Saemaul* Leaders, the Central Council of *Saemaul* Women's Club, the Central Council of Corporation and Factory *Saemaul Undong*, the Federation of *Saemaul* Mini-libraries and the Federation of *Saemaul* Credit Unions. These organizations, like the *Saemaul Undong* Centre, all have vertical sub-regional networks. While this centre has been in existence for a long time, it is only recently that it has started to embark on the Global *Saemaul Undong* programme in around 2009.

In order for the *Saemaul Undong* to have any real impact on African countries, a pragmatic scenario would be having success stories of the *Saemaul Undong* emerge in Africa so that they can be replicated and expanded over the region. The *Saemaul Undong* will not be met with the same degree of enthusiasm in all countries, so the programme needs to be strategically focused.

Saemaul Undong in Uganda

Although the Ugandan example may not be the representative case for the whole Sub-Saharan African region, it should provide an informative case in understanding what can be possible in this region. The *Saemaul Undong* in Uganda is in a burgeoning stage, making it an interesting and valuable testing ground for its African and international programme. The *Saemaul Undong* was formally introduced in 2009 when the Korea *Saemaul* Undong Centre collaborated with Korea Africa Investment and Development (KAID) that was established by a Korean missionary body to conduct model *Saemaul Undong* village projects in Kitemu and Katereke in Nsangi sub-county, Wakiso District.

Around this time, or actually a little earlier, the Canaan Farmers School also began its activity in Uganda. Government leaders in Uganda had shown a keen interest in many aspects of Korea's development, and in 2009, some 20 Ugandan governmental leaders and officials, including the Vice President, visited Korea to attend the Canaan Farmers School's training course. The idea to train these government

officials in the school came from President Museveni, and the Ugandan government paid for their travel costs.

Until a few years ago, the *Saemaul Undong* village pilot project in Uganda, which was sponsored by the Korea *Saemaul Undong* Centre, was largely unknown in Uganda due to the low-profile approach that the Centre followed. On the other hand, the Canaan Farmers School was quite popular, as President Museveni himself was fond of this institution.

It was on 31 May 2013, when President Museveni visited the Korea *Saemaul Undong* Centre in Sungnam, that he understood the difference between the Canaan Farmers School training and the *Saemaul Undong*. He learned that the school focused on mindset change training by emphasizing hard work, frugality, a disciplined life, etc., along with farming skills, whereas the *Saemaul Undong* was a more extensive and systematic community development movement based on the spirit of diligence, self-help and cooperation. The latter was a national movement involving the government, while the former was a private organization for training.

There are three main entities carrying out *Saemaul Undong* programmes in Uganda: KOICA, the UNDP and the Korea *Saemaul Undong* Centre. The earliest to arrive in Uganda was the Korea *Saemaul Undong* Centre's programme mentioned above. KOICA followed suit with the launch of the Mpigi Saemaul model village project in December 2015. Also, KOICA's National Farmers Leadership Centre (NFLC) in Kampiringisa, Mpigi, was officially launched in May 2016. The third entity is the UNDP, which launched the 'inclusive and sustainable new communities (ISNC) in Uganda' project adopting the *Saemaul Undong* model in July 2015. This project was an outcome of the Memorandum of Understanding signed between KOICA and the UNDP on the *Saemaul Undong* in 2013. Meanwhile, the Canaan Farmers School continues to train Ugandans in Korea. The school's programme may not be considered as *Saemaul Undong* per se, but is seen as complementing the *Saemaul Undong* through its mindset change training.

As already mentioned, Korea has announced the four key areas it will engage in to implement the SDGs, and the Project to Establish *Saemaul* Model Villages (ESMV) in Uganda, which was launched in December

2015 in Mpigi District by KOICA, falls into the first category of Inclusive and Sustainable Rural Development.[3]

Mpigi was chosen as the project site because KOICA wanted the NFLC, which was being located nearby, to have a synergistic effect with this project. The objective was to apply the new paradigm of the *Saemaul Undong* to achieve sustainable and integrated rural development. The activities involves the following: enhancing villages' agricultural productivity and income, improving the living environment and the rural community infrastructure; strengthening social capital by instilling a spirit of diligence, self-help and cooperation; strengthening the capacity of farmers' cooperatives and local central government. This was a three-year project (2015–2018) worth a total of USD 3 million.

As the beneficiaries of this project, seven villages were chosen by based on a baseline survey: Tiribogo village (Muduuma sub-county, 224 families, population 856), Kololo village (Kiringente sub-county, 249 families, population 1023), Nsamu village (Mpigi Town Council, 171 families, population 682), Kiwumu(A) village (Kammengo sub-county, 97 families, population 441), Kumbya village (Buwama sub-country, 131 families, population 671), Lwaweeba village (Kituntu sub-county, 129 families, population 666) and Lukonge village (Nkozi sub-county, 1078 families, population 4765). An important point to note is that these villages are not just beneficiaries, but are in competition with one another. Competition and motivation through incentives are central elements of the *Saemaul Undong*. The level of assistance they receive will depend on the results (KOICA Office Uganda).

The expected outcomes of the project are: (1) strengthening social capital—earning higher credibility, nurturing a sense of community and an increase in the frequency of town hall meetings; (2) increasing agricultural productivity and rural income—an increase in both agricultural and non-agricultural income and improvement in product of crops and livestock; (3) improving infrastructure and the living environment—the supply of clean water, better access to medical services, improving living quarters, better access to markets and improvement of the students-per-class ratio; and (4) improving governance in model

villages—an increase in the number of projects carried out, enhancing the quality of project planning and reducing the time taken to resolve village issues.

The history of this project can be traced back to May 2013, when President Museveni visited the Korea *Saemaul Undong* Centre and appreciated the *Saemaul Undong* programmes. He said that Ugandans have gotten used to welfare policies and foreign aid since independence, and in the process Uganda's communal tradition like *Bulungi bwansi* had been lost, and thanked the Centre for refocusing on the lost traditions of Uganda.

The Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Livestock of Uganda submitted a formal request for the project on September 2013, which led to the dispatch of a KOICA site survey team the following year. Consultations and the signing of a MOU took place in April 2015. Then in November 2015, the project office was set up and the steering committee leaders were trained in Korea, and seven model project villages were selected. The official launching ceremony took place in December 2015. In March 2016, members of the committees and sub-committees of these model villages were appointed, and rules on competition and incentives were finalized. It was decided that project funds would be allotted to each village, taking into account their performance. In April 2016, training in *Saemaul* leadership and general development issues for the committee members was conducted. A baseline survey on the villagers' feedback and the progress of projects as well as the formulation of a *Saemaul* action plan was completed in May 2016.

From the perspective of KOICA project management (PM), the four main tasks are: dispatch of experts; supply of logistics/materials; performance management; and public relations. KOICA sent two Korean experts to oversee the project on the ground, while setting up a project team with local employees, as well as drawing up the project scheme. The KOICA Office supplied the necessary logistics, like an office facility, official vehicles and various kinds of materials. Performance management entails using baseline surveys, mid-term appraisal and final assessment to measure performance and draw lessons from the standpoint of the *Saemaul Undong*. Public relations activities include regular press briefings, distribution of brochures, etc.

The flagship of the Korean development project in Uganda is the NFLC, which was built in Kampirignisa, Mpigi District, to showcase a comprehensive Korean model of rural-agricultural development. As the then Korean President pointed out in her speech during the opening ceremony of the centre, this is the first of its kind in Africa. President Museveni had expressed his desire to the Korean side in March 2010 to have such an institution (modelled on the Canaan Farmers School) built in Uganda so that Ugandans could be trained in Korean-style mindset change programmes.

This project to establish the NFLC was carried out from April 2011 to May 2016 with a budget of USD 4.4 million. While the centre was formally opened in 30 May 2016, the project was extended for a year in order to place it on a stronger footing in terms of operational capacity and financial sustainability before its handover to the Ugandan side, which took place in May 2017. The NFLC project's vision is the establishment of a 'top-notch' leadership centre in Uganda and East Africa that will lead to the development of the rural community and the country. Its mission is: (1) to transform mindset and empower farm leaders, civic and political leadership at all levels of government; (2) to train leaders who will be a role model to others by working, serving and sacrificing first; and (3) to impart agricultural technologies to transform from subsistence to commercial farming for wealth.

This NFLC's basic approach is combining the *Saemaul Undong* spirit and agro-technologies. The expectations of the NFLC were very high indeed in Uganda, and hence there was considerable pressure on the key stakeholders to deliver the expected outcomes. The project has three facets: physical infrastructure, a 'delivery system' or operation and the contents or substance. But making these three things happen or work is no easy task and poses big challenges. The physical construction of the NFLC entailed a prolonged and laborious process due to the various obstacles that face construction projects in Africa. Here, the 'contents' are the Korean model of rural-agricultural development, including the *Saemaul Undong*. No matter how good the infrastructure and the contents, these will be worthless if the delivery—the project operation—does not match up.

Hence, KOICA focused on making the NFLC operation efficient and sustainable before it handed over this project to the Ugandan side. The devil is in the detail and the technical aspect of the project—the question of how to make it sustainable—is a major challenge, especially in Sub-Saharan Africa. KOICA's work plan for the operation of the NFLC had the goal of setting up a sustainable operation system of the NFLC through capacity-building.[4]

Before the NFLC was officiated in May 2016, it conducted test operations for more than a year, and over 400 people were trained in *Saemaul Undong* and agricultural skills. Since the official opening, the NFLC has collaborated with the *Saemaul* model village project (ESMV) in Mpigi District, providing training for the latter.

The NFLC had an operational structure of cooperative links between the KOICA Uganda Office and the Ministry of Agriculture, Animal Industry and Fisheries (MAAIF). They signed a MOU on co-management of the NFLC on 25 May 2016. The project management consultant (PMC) led by the Chonbuk National University consortium worked under the KOICA Office. Within this PMC, there was a project manager (PM) who worked as the Cooperation Head of the NFLC to conduct operation of the NFLC, develop modules and a master plan, and run training programmes and farms with his team of Korean experts. On the Ugandan side, a steering committee composed of various officials concerned was placed under the Ministry, while the principal was tasked with contacting the Ministry, securing a governmental budget, legalizing the status of the NFLC, organizing a steering committee and recruiting staff.

The UNDP *Saemaul Undong* project, the Inclusive and Sustainable New Communities (ISNC) Project in Uganda, is the first *Saemaul Undong* programme that the UNDP has launched in Sub-Saharan Africa. In September 2014, Uganda's Ministry of Local Government officials met UNDP officials in New York and learned from them that the UNDP was planning to pilot the *Saemaul Undong* model in some developing countries, particularly in Africa. The Uganda officials persuaded the UNDP officials to include Uganda in this programme. Then, in October 2014, a team from the UNDP headquarters visited

Uganda to work with the Ministry to start putting together the project document for the ISNC programme.

The Ugandan Ministry of Local Government appreciated the follow-up actions of the UNDP as appropriate and timely, as Uganda was re-examining its development agenda through the National Development Plan II with a vision to becoming a middle-income country by the year 2030. It recognized that the project, which would activate the *Saemaul Undong* principles of diligence, self-help and cooperation, would provide the much-needed result-oriented development impetus that is poised to pull the country out of poverty.

This ISNC project is based on the rural development model of the *Saemaul Undong* with the goal of transforming communities with a long-term shared vision of a better life for all, and an infectious enthusiasm for local development, sustained by volunteerism at the community level. The project ran for two and half years (July 2015–December 2017) with funding of USD 1 million provided by Korea. It was implemented in the three districts of Kabarole, Maracha and Luuka, targeting a total of 15 communities. The envisioned results were: (1) a strengthened institutional system of local development; (2) enhanced cohesiveness and inclusiveness in community development; (3) improved and increased local resources and financing mechanisms; (4) scaled up of proven sustainability innovations; and (5) the documentation and dissemination of generated knowledge.

The Minister of Local Government of Uganda spoke about the *Saemaul Undong* model on the occasion of the launching of the ISNC in July 2015:

> During my visit to South Korea in October 2014, I witnessed the transformation that the country underwent over the years and was mesmerized by the impact that was caused by the model. I was particularly intrigued to learn that the model was premised on the platform of spirit of diligence, self-help and cooperation among the rural communities. In Korea, this led to improved livelihoods, but more significantly, transformed communities to develop a long term shared vision of a better life for all, and an infectious enthusiasm for local development, sustained by volunteerism at community level.[5]

The Korea *Saemaul Undong* Centre started its project in Uganda in 2009 with the two model villages of Kitemu (500 households, population 2500) and Katereke (250 households, population 1500) of Nsagni sub-county, Wakiso District, over a five-year period. Then in 2015, it newly designated six model villages in Mityana District: Bbanda (110 households, population 480); Nabaale (105 households, population 450); Kyabombo (110 households, population 390); Mawanga (100 households, population 490); Ndirabweru (96 households, population 470); and Buwala (98 households, population 440). Besides these model villages that are officially supported by the Korea *Saemaul Undong* Centre, 'autonomous' *Saemaul* villages (estimated to be more than 40 as of July 2016) that have adopted the *Saemaul Undong* voluntarily are growing at a fast pace in Uganda.[6]

The typical *Saemaul Undong* programmes for these villages fall into three categories: improvement of the living environment, increase in agricultural production and household incomes, and education. All the work is done by the village residents collectively. Improving the living environment includes constructing *Saemaul Undong* halls, public toilets, public wells, *boda-boda* (motorcycle taxis) shelters, improving kitchens, and cleaning up villages and flattening out dirt roads. Examples of activities to increase agricultural production and incomes are operating cooperative farms (to produce mushrooms, vegetables, maize, bananas, ground-nuts, etc.), factories (to produce feed, blocks, candles, soaps, slippers, furniture, etc.), fish-ponds, piggeries, goat banks, pig banks, sewing schools, beauty parlour schools, *Saemaul* banks, etc. Lastly, the education programme involves training Ugandans in the Korea *Saemaul Undong* Centre and operating a 'mobile *Saemaul* School' in Uganda. Around 170 Ugandans were trained in Korea from 2009 to 2015, and the mobile school has been in operation since 2014.

The Uganda *Saemaul Undong* Centre was formed to undertake *Saemaul Undong* programmes in Uganda supported by Korea's *Saemaul Undong* Centre. Its activities have been steady and engaging, but there is a room for greater expansion. The irony is that the first-term model village assistance for five years by the Korea *Saemaul Undong* Centre showed a rather mediocre performance, while the voluntary *Saemaul* villages like Busanza and Kiboba, which received no direct support

from Korea, did markedly better and their mode more closely resembled the typical model practised by Korean villages. It could be that Kitemu and Katereke villages are located near the Capitol Kampala and have semi-urban features. Also, because many leaders and members of this sub-county have had the chance to visit Korea to be trained there, and received some sort of support on a continuous basis, this probably made them 'dependent' without being really motivated. Of course, the assistance provided by the Korean centre was modest in amount, and in many cases it came in the form of matching funds. But, overall, the two villages did not meet the expectations of being pioneering *Saemaul Undong* villages in Uganda. The leaders and officials became familiar with the *Saemaul Undong* skills and approach, and did well in presentations, but fell short in terms of energizing, expanding and promoting this movement in their region. This turned out to be a very important lesson in itself.

The strength of the Uganda *Saemaul Undong* Centre lies in its local presence and local networking. While Korean experts, volunteers or officials come and go, the Uganda *Saemaul Undong* Centre run by Ugandans has accumulated expertise on the ground and through its contacts with Korean side. Its activities have been widened as it started to provide mobile *Saemaul Undong* clinic services and collaborate with the NFLC, ESMV and ISNC projects. The Korean Embassy in Kampala, working closely with the KOICA Office, has provided oversight for *Saemaul Undong*-related programmes and activities for Uganda. Communications with the host government and relevant entities, and public diplomacy, among other activities, comprise the embassy's regular work.

To help promote the *Saemaul Undong* in Uganda, the embassy itself has held related events. First, it held a *Saemaul Undong* demonstration day event on four occasions between December 2013 and December 2014 in Kampala and Wakiso District. This was a simple cleaning-up exercise designed to draw public attention to the *Saemaul Undong* and to enhance awareness of and support for this movement. Later on, it organized annual the Uganda National *Saemaul Undong* Competition, which started in 2015. The competition plan was announced to interested village leaders, religious leaders, civil society

representatives and journalists who gathered at the embassy. The next step was communicating with competition participants. The embassy responded to inquiries and applications, explaining the guidelines of the competition. Then, an evaluation process was carried out on the work schemes submitted by each village. Participants were also required to present implementation reports with photos of the proposed project sites before and after the execution of the work. Subsequently, an on-site evaluation was conducted, and after going through each committee assessment, the winners were chosen and awards were presented at the end of the year. A total of 190 villages applied for the competition in 2015.

The evaluation criteria basically comprised four elements: (1) the creation or amelioration of the village's common properties (wells, expansion of village roads, etc.); (2) the enhancement of the village environment and living conditions (how much cleaner the village became after entering the competition); (3) organizational capacity (how efficiently structured the village leadership and organization had become for the implementation of *Saemaul Undong* activities); and (4) voluntariness (how much did the people contribute in terms of labour and funds, how regularly did the villagers gather to conduct joint projects, etc.)

The awards, comprising certificates of recognition and a prize, were given to the top seven villages. The awards ceremony, the finale of this competition, was filled with the joy and excitement of the participants, and attracted media attention. The prizes given were not cash, but in-kind materials that the villages were in need of and had asked for. The purpose of the awards was to instil a sense of accomplishment and honour in the practitioners and to encourage them further, in line with the 'incentives and punishment' principle. The embassy also held stakeholder meetings to inform Ugandan and international partners about *Saemaul Undong* projects and to seek their collaboration. On 30 June 2015, it hosted the High Level Seminar on the *Saemaul Undong*, with participants including the Minister of Local Government, the Chairman of the National Planning Authority, the Permanent Secretaries of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Local Government, the Vice President's senior assistant, the UNDP Resident Coordinator, the KOICA Office and the KOPIA Centre heads.

On 15 December 2015, the embassy organized with the UNDP a seminar on implementing SDGs in Uganda. The Senior Advisor to the President on Economic Planning and representatives of various organizations like the UNDP, USAID, the EU, the World Bank, KOICA, KOPIA and civil society attended this meeting. An important subject on the agenda was sustainable rural development, and naturally the *Saemaul Undong* model was discussed.

One of the most memorable moments was when I participated, together with the visiting Secretary General of the Korea *Saemaul Undong* Centre, in the third National *Saemaul Undong* Convention organized by the Uganda *Saemaul Undong* Centre on 23 October 2015 in Kampala. Vice President Edward Ssekandi, other high-level government officials, UNDP representatives and over 1000 *Saemaul Undong* practitioners representing various districts gathered together. The Secretary General was in awe at seeing with his own eyes the fervour of the participants. The Vice President stressed that the dependency syndrome was seriously impairing Uganda's development and that the *Saemaul Undong* emphasizing diligence, self-help and cooperation was the 'best approach' to overcoming Uganda's problems.

The Proposed Scheme for Africa

I have cited Uganda's example of the *Saemaul Undong* to highlight its possibilities, challenges and applicability in Sub-Saharan Africa. Uganda is considered to be a notable case of the *Saemaul Undong* taking root in Africa. There are other candidates like Rwanda and Ethiopia, but Uganda could be the best testing ground for the *Saemaul Undong* in terms of its application to the region as a whole.

Many Sub-Saharan African countries have a tradition of communal self-help similar to the *Saemaul Undong*. As far as I know, these include Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi, Ethiopia and Tanzania, but there must be many more. Also in South Africa, a similar tradition exists, the *Ubuntu*, an obscured legacy that needs to be revived. *Ubuntu* spirits are *enhlonipho* (respect), *abantu* (fellowship), *illlima-letsema* (working together), *stokvel* and *lekgotla* (community dialogue). But a very

meaningful development is unfolding: the *Saemaul Undong* programme entitled the '*Saemaul* Mindset DEEP (Development Experience Exchange Partnership) programme', a joint project between KOICA and the Ministry of Rural Development and Land Reform of South Africa, was launched on 16 July 2018 in Pretoria.

Over the years, various Korean organizations have been actively collaborating with Uganda, Ethiopia and Rwanda in the *Saemaul Undong*. There are also other countries in western and southern Africa that are interested in the *Saemaul Undong*, but East Africa is deemed to be the most active and successful thus far in this endeavour. South Africa is the latest addition. Overall, *Saemaul Undong* programmes are in a fledgling stage in Africa.

Rwanda tops the region when it comes to the level of governance and its *Saemaul Undong* project seems to be undertaken in a most organized manner in Africa. But the general features of Rwanda make it somewhat 'atypical' in the region. The nation has a very small territory, while having one of the lowest levels of ethnic diversity in Sub-Saharan Africa. In contrast, Uganda is considered to be ethnically the most diverse nation in the world, with a territory nearly ten times larger than that of Rwanda. Ethiopia is also a much bigger country facing greater challenges for expanding and managing development projects like the *Saemaul Undong*.

All in all, Uganda provides an interesting case study to test the viability of the *Saemaul Undong* in Sub-Saharan Africa. There are several major players involved in Uganda: KOICA, the Korea *Saemaul Undong* Centre, the UNDP and the Canaan Farmers School, as well as other various institutions on rural-agriculture development. Hopefully, in due course, when enough information and records have been accumulated on the progress of *Saemaul Undong* projects in the African region, a comprehensive and systematic analysis of the impact of the *Saemaul Undong* on the region will be possible. But for the time being, strenuous efforts need to be made both in terms of the application and in the studies of the *Saemaul Undong* to keep the momentum going.

In light of what has transpired in Sub-Saharan Africa over many decades, we might as well try things differently and more aggressively in relation to development projects for the region. Most of the

development projects that have been carried out in Africa were repetitions of what was done in the past. It is true that capacity-building or educational programmes, and rights-oriented programmes to promote social justice or peace, to protect and empower people, etc. also share a common goal of trying to change people's attitudes and behaviour. But there is a major difference between these approaches and the *Saemaul Undong*. In terms of substance, the established programmes are either theorectial or technical in nature but the *Saemaul Undong* is all about practicality, directly and firmly anchored in the mindset change scheme.

A textbook form of generalized education as well as overly specialized programmes might not yield the desired results. Rather, vocational, technical training is far more desirable for Africa, but this needs to be supplemented by mindset change or 'resocialization' programmes underscoring work ethics to have the necessary actual ripple effects. The advantage of the *Saemaul Undong* is that it encompasses and inter-links players at different levels—individual, village or community, regional and society at large—to produce immediate and palpable benefits to those who practise it. It is a pragmatic approach that goes 'with the grain' of local traditions in African countries. And the practice of 'doing things' with a 'can-do spirit' that the *Saemaul Undong* promotes is what African countries desperately need.

There are elements conducive to the *Saemaul Undong* as well as many challenges in Uganda. What is definitely positive is that there is wide support among Uganda's leaders and people for the *Saemaul Undong*. The level of enthusiasm may vary depending on people's background, but they seem to all see the necessity to pursue such an action-oriented initiative as a rational alternative to the existing modes.

For those who are more insightful and practical-minded, the *Saemaul Undong* is even more appealing. Many Ugandan politicians, officials, civil society and religious leaders have expressed a strong desire to have the *Saemaul Undong* introduced to their districts. Because African rural areas are largely in a state of destitution, they welcome any support programmes they can get, and it is understandable for Ugandan's interest in the *Saemaul Undong*. But there are also many who genuinely like the

movement, knowing it is something very different and that can have more substantive impact on them.

Another merit of the *Saemaul Undong* is that it has a strong appeal from the perspective of national development policy and the availability of state resources. Sub-Saharan Africa's number one priority is arguably rural-agricultural development, as the majority of population reside in rural areas. How to effectively achieve rural-agricultural development on a national scale should be the ultimate task of the leaders. In Africa, successful industrialization is likely to emerge from the agricultural sector, making such an approach all the more worthwhile. It is argued that in Korea, the *Saemaul Undong* served as 'the second economic movement' supporting the government-led economic growth policy.[7]

Political stability and security are also important factors for the success of the *Saemaul Undong*. In this respect, Uganda enjoys a rather favourable politico-security environment compared to other Sub-Saharan countries, making it a good testing ground. Also, the fact that Uganda is blessed in terms of rich natural endowments and favourable agricultural conditions, but is experiencing persistent poverty can prompt people to rethink their existing methods and espouse a new approach such as the *Saemaul Undong*.

Thus, there are good reasons for countries to embrace the *Saemaul Undong* if they know what it is about. But then again, even with all the good intentions and enthusiastic support of stakeholders, various barriers remain. These challenges are what the proponents of the *Saemaul Undong* must continuously fight against and which also demand a different mindset on the part of the Korean development partners. The reason why most development projects do not live up to expectations and wither shortly after donors have completed their mission and hand them over is because the recipients have inherently little zeal to take ownership of and responsibility for them. Hence, it is important for donors to conduct post-management of projects in whatever fashion possible and not to totally terminate engagement for a certain period.

Foreign development partners in the field are faced with double jeopardy. Not only do they have to follow very tough guidelines and regulations of their home country, but they also have to deal with everyday hardships on the ground and worry about the possibility of

the failure of their projects due to problems beyond their control. But knowing all too well how things will likely to unfold given the practices and conditions of the country they are assigned to, it would almost seem irresponsible for foreign aid workers to ignore reality altogether. Hence, regardless of how difficult it may be, development partners should be more demanding, proactive and straightforward in 'pushing' locals to comply and carry out their necessary part in the process. What is required is much more intrusive enforcement of disciplined work standards, supervision and the rule of 'incentives and punishment'.

This vindicates the adoption of a stringent mindset change approach like the *Saemaul Undong* in the Sub-Saharan African region. What came to me as an important reckoning was that serious self-reflection must come from within Africans themselves, and it should not be the job of the development partners to spell out the problems of which the African people should be all too aware. A first meaningful step forward would be to recognize that 'something is wrong' and that it needs to be dealt with. I have seen people blaming others, so often but rarely do they put blame on themselves.

There is a delicate balance between the need for the *Saemaul Undong* to be welcomed and voluntarily espoused by the locals on the one hand, and the need to be strict and really be 'pushy' so that it can produce the desired outcome on the other. For foreign workers, making the locals change their attitude and behaviour is a very difficult as well as a sensitive task. Therefore, *Saemaul Undong* programme managers or instructors need to have extra passion, perseverance and devotion to their duties. They themselves should have strong communication and leadership skills.

In the case of poor countries, there is no choice for them other than to rely on a labour-intensive sector to build and grow the economy. But the socio-economic dynamics of the world have changed and people's work ethic in general is deemed to have deteriorated. Even in the poorest countries, it cannot be taken for granted that ordinary people would be willing to undergo toil and hardships in order to make it in life. A virtue like the Protestant work ethic, which, by the way, has similar features to the teachings of the Canaan Farmers School, may be dissipating fast. There are signs that even the poor and jobless in Africa

are increasingly shunning laborious work and are instead aspiring for easy-going, high-paid jobs that are out of their reach. But there is not much to hope for when the population continues to be neither productive nor diligent.

Other unwholesome trait that I have discovered to be prevalent even among African elites is a lack of confidence which can turn into a more serious form of defeatism. Lack of confidence and motivation breeds inaction, dependence and loss of self-esteem, which in turn can lead to expediency, deviation, irregularities and abandonment of one's responsibilities. Lack of confidence and commitment is reflected in the tendency to 'regress' or 'give up early and have other thoughts'.

The lessons learned from the operation of the *Saemaul Undong* in Uganda over the past six years or so can be summed up as follows: (1) poverty is opportunity; (2) competence and drive in grassroots leaders makes all the difference; (3) flexibility and incremental scaling up of governance is required; (4) apply Goldilocks principle in assistance; and (5) an 'organically' interlinked system of support should be developed.

In Korea, the *Saemaul Undong* was successfully implemented because so many people took an active part in it, and the ultimate factor behind this was poverty: people were united in terms of wanting to get out of poverty and improve their livelihood. And the confidence that was bred into them only made them more passionate. It is believed that the Korean rural population complied actively with this movement because they were hopeful in light of the success of the government's export promotion in the 1960s.

In Uganda, as in other Sub-Saharan African countries in general, rural regions remain poor without much, if any, change taking placing, despite the evolution of the times and technological advances. For those people who are conscious of their situation, who know very well their limitations in the means (and the limited support they can get from their government or donors), but who desire a better life, the *Saemual Undong* can be appealing. But there is variation in the responsiveness to this according to the type of communities: (1) communities near urban or commercial centres, having easily access to business, economic activities; (2) 'communal' villages in provincial districts; and (3) hard-to-access, very remote and isolated 'troubled regions' (with a weak social fabric and dire poverty). The

type that is most likely to have the best chance for the *Saemaul Undong* is communal villages. In sum, poor 'communal' villages having a certain level of yearning for a better life and hope have been found to be most suitable for the *Saemaul Undong*.

Since the *Saemaul Undong* is undertaken at the grassroots community level, no matter how organized and buffed up the external support system may be, if there is no interest, commitment and implementation on the part of the villagers themselves, then there is no point in pursuing the programme. Villages with certain people or a group of people with exceptional vigour in this regard can make a big difference. Thus, it is crucial to identify and assign such leaders during the early stages of planning and launching of the *Saemaul Undong*. A good example is the 'Greater Masaka Mindset Change Agents Club' of Uganda. This youth group that underwent training in the NFLC in April 2017, formed this club during the training and returned to their villages to implement the *Saemaul Undong* in an energetic manner.[8]

For the *Saemaul Undong* to take root and expand successfully in African countries, and not end up as merely a banal project, the government, both at the local and the central levels, must be engaged in a meaningful fashion. Hence, there is a need for a matching administrative system or governance to be put in place. Regarding the governance of the *Saemaul Undong*, it would be unrealistic to expect the African countries to form a strong system of the *Saemaul Undong* governance, even if it is espoused at the state level, because the state of governance in African countries itself is weak in the first place. Endorsement by the head of state and the support of the relevant ministry are definitely encouraging and helpful, but these are not enough. Rather than making this a task in itself, it would be practical to start with a flexible approach of focusing on a grassroots movement to prove the usefulness of the *Saemaul Undong* with concrete outcomes. This will bring about the government's involvement in a natural way.

The fourth lesson is about applying the Goldilocks principle ('just right') in terms of providing assistance for Saemaul Undong. Neither indifference nor 'full support' is desirable. The 'just right' thing is to be moderate and deliberate in *Saemaul Undong* projects: provide intensive training at the initiative stage, but allow the local leaders and residents

to take up on their own in the spirit of diligence, self-help and cooperation. Encouragement and appreciation of their efforts are important, but direct material support should be very limited and measured, only being provided as an incentive in consideration of their actual performance. It is much better and more effective to enhance people's pride and inspire them further through face-to-face communications and 'symbolic' rewards rather than assisting them with material means, otherwise they will simply remain dependent.

What is also important is to nurture an environment of openness and possibilities of collaboration. Motivation, passion and optimism are what drive the *Saemaul Undong*. These can only be sustained when people see the benefits of the *Saemaul Undong* and the positive links it has for their income generation in the longer run. And as a matter of course, this is the area where African governments should play their necessary part. But the *Saemaul Undong* can collaborate with other relevant Korean projects, the host country's projects and other foreign development partners as well. The purpose here is to provide synergistic effects and prevent duplication of efforts through coordination. For example, a network comprising the NFLC, the KOPIA Centre, various *Saemaul Undong* activities and UNDP programmes is being fostered in Uganda. Also, the relevant *Saemaul Undong* bodies can team up with the Ugandan government's Operation Wealth Creation (OWC) that is being implemented to support rural households' agricultural production. I realized that in order for all this arrangement to succeed, a central oversight authority was still very much necessary.

Then how should we engineer the *Saemaul Undong* for Sub-Saharan Africa? Coming up with a blueprint that is applicable for the whole region in a detailed fashion will be almost impossible because not only does the situation vary from country to country, but each provincial region within a given country would have its own unique features. The practical thing to do would be to set some kind of general criteria or benchmarks to start with.

Under the principles or core values of the *Saemaul Undong*—diligence, self-help and cooperation—we can deduce 'three targets' and 'six measures' that are deemed pertinent to Africa. The three targets are: (1) income generation; (2) contribution or burden-sharing by the

locals; and (3) formation of economic links for value chains and market access. The six measures required to achieve them are: (1) maintaining openness and outreach to other initiatives/programmes; (2) adopting and teaching national, social and work ethics at schools, in government circles and in local communities; (3) forming an interactive network among central government, local government and communities; (4) fostering competent and dedicated *Saemaul Undong* leaders; (5) promoting a strong community-centred mechanism like town hall meetings; and (6) developing cooperative business arrangements for increased value addition and access to markets.

Moreover, agents serving as a medium between these targets on the one hand and the relevant measures on the other are mindset change, skills/know-how and financial ownership, which I will refer to as 'MSF' ('M' standing for mindset change, 'S' for skills/know-how and 'F' for financial ownership of the locals). An important thing to note is that these three agents or components need to occur simultaneously and to be synchronized. Figure 11.1 below illustrates this. At the very top you can see the guiding principles of the *Saemaul Undong*: diligence, self-help and cooperation. The three targets that are placed under these principles are income generation, burden-sharing by the locals, and forming value-chains and economic linkage.

To simplify things, the basic goals of Korea's *Saemaul Undong* were twofold: first, improving living quarters and community infrastructure; and, second, increasing household and community incomes through various agricultural and manufacturing activities. In order for economic development to be felt by the ordinary people, it should take place where the majority of the population live—in the rural regions. Thus, improving the basic living environment for rural residents is an important step in realizing national wellbeing.

This is important not only in terms of cleanliness, sanitation and order of rural communities, but also for people's healthiness of mind, which is conducive to socio-economic development. It also helps strengthen the social capital. Not only does one feel much better living in a clean and orderly neighbourhood, but it also makes one more motivated and responsible to maintain that level of living. The work went beyond cleaning up, fixing and building living quarters, like upgrading

Fig. 11.1   The *Saemaul Undong* scheme for Sub-Saharan Africa

and expanding various forms of physical infrastructure in the community: improving and enlarging roads, constructing bridges, flood-prevention structures, etc. This not only made living in rural areas much more convenient, but also created a beneficial environment for commercial activities and opportunities for locals. The appearance of orderliness reflects the state of mind of the people and says a lot about the possibility of development.

The second category I mentioned is the enhancement of rural income through improved agricultural production and other income-generating activities. Income generation for rural areas is the ultimate goal as well as the benchmark of success of the *Saemaul Undong* in Africa. So, in order for the *Saemaul Undong* to prove its worth and hence be able to flourish as a relevant development model in the region, there must be a marked positive outcome—income generation—derived from it.

Another target is people's contribution or burden-sharing. This cannot be over-emphasized, as the *Saemaul Undong* is about empowering the people by instilling a 'can-do' spirit and a sense of ownership in them. People will feel true ownership if they invest and have a stake in the work they undertake. Many existing development projects involve only the one-way provision of assistance or delivery of facilities or equipment to beneficiaries. In other words, they do not directly invoke positive change in recipients by making people act or contribute immediately. The important thing is to strictly uphold the rule that 'nothing is free' and that the locals should play their due part in return for the benefits they receive.

The third target is the formation of economic links in terms of value chains and market access. For *Saemaul Undong* villages, being connected to markets and business or industrial centres is crucial to their viability and welfare as communities. Without such economic connectivity, communities will not be able to achieve autonomous and sustainable development. In Sub-Saharan Africa, most villages in rural areas are remote from economic centres, main roads and markets, and these largely 'isolated' areas are cut off from even what little commercial opportunities are available in provincial regions. A severe shortage of road networks, poor condition of roads and poor means of transportation limit economic and social spill-over effects and exacerbate the

divide that exists between the capital city and the rest of the country. When left unchecked, a vicious cycle in the form of double dipping—the growth of slums and over-population in cities, and the marginalization and deprivation of rural areas—will continue. So, the pursuit of regional economic links should be especially underscored in Sub-Saharan Africa.

As a means of reaching these three targets, I have laid out six measures, which, in turn, have to be driven by the three elements of MSF in a concurrent fashion: mindset change, skills and know-how, and financial ownership. First, if people go about doing business with the same frame of mind, this will not make a difference in terms of speed and quality of work. Second, having a strong and positive mindset is critical for individuals to be self-serving and become more adept in their work and training. In African urban areas and rural regions, there is a great gap in education and knowledge. Hence, conscientious efforts must be made to enlighten, train and educate the rural population, but the desire to learn must come from the residents themselves. And the embodiment and application of mindset change and skills will not be sufficient if this is not accompanied by 'financial ownership'. Having financial ownership means that people have to put their own resources in the project from which they wish to benefit. This makes everybody a worthy member of the community, each contributing to, and having a stake in, the success of the work carried out in their community. It is also good for nurturing civic values.

Learning that 'nothing is free' is a big part of the *Saemaul Undong*, particularly in Sub-Saharan Africa. A government official and politician from northern Uganda told me that no matter how much he helps his constituents, 'no one is willing to even contribute one dollar' to the community projects that they will be benefiting from. Practising financial ownership can also bring dividends in terms of encouraging badly needed savings in Africa.

With MSF as the driver of the *Saemaul Undong* in Africa, six measures should be taken to ensure the overall success and expansion of this rural development model: ethics/civil education; openness and outreach; networking; fostering local leaders; community decision-making and a consensus-building mechanism; and cooperatives. Of these, the first two

seem particularly pertinent for Africa, while the others are more obvious and generally applicable to other regions of the developing world.

First on the list of measures to be taken is embarking on a programme of national education in ethics. The need for a major overhaul in national educational contents in Sub-Saharan Africa cannot be overemphasized. African countries must adopt more vocational, technical courses in schools as opposed to the current theoretical, academic subjects. But more importantly, they need to introduce and vigorously launch public education in ethics—social ethics, work ethics, national ethics, etc.—for all levels of students and also for adults.

The matter of ethics seems to be taken either too lightly or too seriously. First of all, the issue of ethics has many dimensions. We can break down ethics in three categories: (1) moral ethics; (2) collective ethics; and (3) functional ethics. The first of these is usually referred to as 'morals' or personal character. The word 'ethics', in comparison to 'morals', connotes a social context. And I think what is ignored in many developing countries is collective and functional ethics. While moral ethics or morality is innately personal and spiritual, collective ethics is more about one's attitude, beliefs and behaviour *in relation to* one's community, society and nation. While the former is 'inwardly oriented', the latter is 'outwardly oriented'. The former asks whether we are decent and rightful, while the latter asks what inclination we have towards various units of the society. Lastly, functional ethics is about how we 'do' things, or the tendency that we have in our actions and work.

It is crucial that we bring elements of behavioural science into the discourse of development in order for it to be more relevant in our search for answers or solutions. The problems in the first category—corruption, irregularity, bad governance, crimes, etc.—are tied to social and structural problems like poverty and underdevelopment, and they will not go away easily. The second category is more concerned with how to perceive things, to go about doing work, living one's daily life and contemplating one's situation and role in the society. We need to differentiate between these two and pursue them simultaneously, but on different tracks.

When I say that ethics is taken too lightly, it means that we are not realizing how much difference people's mindset and ethics can make in

relation to development. On the contrary, taking the subject too seriously means that people become so fixated on the notion that nothing could be done about it. Neither of these two views is helpful and we need to find a happy medium where we clearly understand the gravity of the problem and act forcibly and continuously to root out the negative socio-psychological syndromes.

In Africa, there is no shortage of general teachings on personal morality. These come in the form of expressions of universal values, civil education and religious-moral teachings, etc. from various entities, including developing partners, government leaders, NGOs and rights groups, social and religious leaders, etc. But what is very much lacking in the discourse of development is the collective and functional ethics.

As for functional ethics, the word 'functional' may not seem very fitting to the realm of ethics as it implies the 'capacity' of people and how people work. But when this becomes problematic, it entails unnecessary cost—human toil, both in relation to time and financial—and the issue of responsibility. Keeping time for appointments and delivery of work, making things in a 'standardized' and acceptable manner, being focused on the job in hand so that things are done properly first time and do not have to be done all over again, etc. are standards are often not kept to the satisfaction in the region.

In this sense, the term 'functional ethics' is similar to 'work ethics'. But the term 'works ethics' implies a generalized meaning of desirable attitudes for work and fails to capture the innate characteristics and issues typical in Sub-Saharan African. That is why I have rephrased it as 'functional ethics' to signify a wide range of attitudinal tendencies—micro-, organizational and social—to explain the case in the region.

Particular emphasis should be placed on education on the collective ethics and functional ethics for Africa; a comprehensive education plan should be implemented to 'inculcate' students and the general populace on civil (or social or national) ethics, how to be rational, effective and successful in their daily work and jobs, and organizations or business. Functional ethics should also include technical and detailed ways of handling basic work.

'Morality' is synonymous with 'rightness' or 'goodness', but the term is subjective, being influenced by religious beliefs, a traditional social

code of conduct or norms, cultures, philosophical orientations, etc. Enumerating what are evidently universally accepted *immoral* acts is much easier: stealing, cheating, lying, adultery, raping, murdering, etc. Then there are civility and virtues like being polite, responsible, honest, generous, diligent, indulgent, patient, helpful, selfless, etc. More lofty and abstract attributes include 'integrity', 'inspirational', 'visionary', 'saintly', etc. And there is a whole array of 'misdemeanours' or 'misconducts' construed as offences or improper and unlawful acts. And of course, acts of 'deviation' and crimes, whether simple, white-collar, organizational or collective, are committed everywhere all the time.

But such common forms of practice that people take for granted in the region, like failing to keep time for service deliveries, failing to be punctual for appointments, not keeping promises or following up, etc., should be also treated seriously. Such a matter lies somewhere in between moral norms and cultural practices or customs, but its accumulative effect leads to a fundamental curtailment of development.

Most of all, what appears to be the unending and unabating widespread practices of irregularities or corruption taking place every day at all levels of society needs to be addressed. The problem derives from a weak social fabric and a genuine lack of a 'culture of shame'. How to rectify this is really in the hands of Africans and something must be done about it.

Collective ethics is a different category. It is routine business for development partners, Africa's civil society and NGOs to raise human rights abuses and governance issues. But they will likely find collective ethics and, to a greater extent, functional ethics a bit odd. By collective ethics, I mean a sense of nation, patriotism and community; people recognizing the necessity and inevitability of their connection with the larger units of life outside their own. Western ideas of liberal democracy stress human rights and individual freedom, but this is premised on the existence of a potentially powerful state ('leviathan') that can infringe upon the rights of citizens.

What the people need is a stable but evolving environment in which to lead decent and better lives and build their society and economy. And it is basically through state-building and making the state to function properly that nations can prosper. Without having a

well-functioning state mechanism in place and without a certain level of social capital being nurtured, development endeavours will be seriously jeopardized. The state or society needs to empower the people so that the people, in turn, will be able to develop their nation. This is a mutually reinforcing process. There needs to be a kind of binding social fabric conducive to the formation of a wholesome nationhood for long-term or sustainable development in Sub-Saharan Africa.

Countries lacking this essential foundation will continue to struggle with the challenges they face today. It will not be easy to engender a renewed national ethos or a sense of nation in the people, but it is certainly achievable, as many others have already done so. But of course, a special level of commitment is necessary.

The first step will be to embark on a national campaign of enlightenment or mindset renewal. Adversities can be turned into opportunities. There can be more harm than meets the eye in nations believing that all they need to do is to follow the trend of globalism and open up their economy, while adopting and emulating developed countries' institutions and values in a literal sense without understanding the prerequisites and underlying issues. Perhaps the greatest barrier to any attempt to overcome such limitations is African politics and populism. The leaders and elites seem to shun what is difficult but what is the right thing to do, and instead opt for what is unwholesome but is politically expedient or the easy thing to do.

Development partners should also pay attention to the issue of collective ethics. And while the initiative must come from within—from African people—it would do no harm if development partners also engage themselves in this endeavour to assist African nations in this process. This can be a new and challenging task for the development community, and would require extra sensitivity, patience and time, but it may pay off in the end.

What is hindering the formation of a healthy 'nationalism', patriotism or national identity in many African countries is party politics. Because of the divisive nature of politics and people's suspicion that there is a political agenda behind public campaigns led by government, it is become more difficult to win people's approval and support and

mobilize them to get things moving. This is the irony of a contemporary electoral democracy that appears robust in Africa, but in reality in many instances is hindering much-needed real changes needed for national development.

An independent body along with civil society, joined by the government and even development partners, can drive the process forward. But politics should be avoided at all costs, otherwise it will be doomed from the start. It has to be collaborative work among various stakeholders, with the general public at the centre. It should be conducted through gathering public opinions, advice from social and religious leaders, education experts, intellectuals, etc., as well as benchmarking relevant cases in foreign countries. The process can be contentious and noisy, but this is how difficult things are done.

There is always the possibility that such an initiative, even if it were to be launched, will lose steam and wither quickly like so many others have done. But my response to this is that if you want transformative development, it has to be done because inherently, there is no quick fix and easy way out in relation to developmental challenges. Being intrinsically action-averse is the reason why Africa is struggling in this regard.

Functional ethics is another important area and it is all about going back to basics. 'Orderliness' is the key word. Among many things, a factor hindering development is the lack of a basic work ethic for observing 'orderliness'. There has been much talk about 'skilling' youth or the workforce, but the terms like 'skilling', 'capacity-building' and 'technical training' disguise what is the real underlying challenge—it is not so much the lack of 'knowledge' and information, but the attitude and pattern of behaviour that counts. There is much ado about 'creativity', 'innovation' and 'entrepreneurship' these days, but what is overlooked is the importance of being organized and conforming to 'standardization'. African products and services are less competitive and African workers are less frequently employed by foreign companies than they should be because of this.

Development can be achieved when individuals do their best with the tasks and the means given, and do not wait for everything to be right. In most parts of Sub-Saharan Africa, where so many basic needs

are left uncared for and so much work needs to be done to get people out of a state of destitution, a sense of urgency to do something about the situation is largely absent. It appears that there is little, if any, appetite on the part of leaders and elites to really sound the alarm and spearhead campaigns to turn things around.

Orderliness and geometrical correctness are part and parcel of all the goodness and signs of advancement. They need to be observed and internalized by workers, businesses and society to make them competitive, viable or generically wholesome. Whether it is about simple manual work, the fabrication of goods, engineering or sophisticated tasks, the most basic rules or standards of work must be followed. While African people in general recognize and value manual dexterity, they sometimes fail to understand that the most basic element to observe at all times in work is geometrical correctness. In a larger context, this is the matter of 'standards' directly connected to economic competitiveness.

Cursory work done with a lack of focus and attention to detail, along with a lack of skills has many negative impacts on society and the economy. First, the direct outcome of the labour is poor-quality work. And costs—time and extra labour demands (including extra supervisory work)—go up, seriously curtailing the competitiveness and credibility of those workers. The typical work pattern of labourers is that they simply come in and do things without setting a proper work scheme and carefully conducting measurements.

Standardization, which is an essential prerequisite for manufacturing, engineering and industrialization, is also critical for social orderliness and quality of life. It is impossible to imagine achieving skills, technology and science while neglecting geometry. One of the reasons why many businesses in the region struggle to be competitive is because of shortcomings in their packaging skills as well as the quality for their products. Many decry the state of African trade that is driven by exporting raw commodities with low value addition, and they call for local processing and value addition of the products and the building of manufacturing industries. But again, it is only through a fundamental 'reorientation' of people's attitudes and behaviour that such progress can come about.

The second measure is 'openness and outreach'. What makes this necessary is because of the unique opportunity as well as the limitations existing in the region. There are community-oriented traditions or customs in Africa that the *Saemaul Undong* can utilize or collaborate with so that it is actually 'going with the grain' in relation to local practices. As I have mentioned, Sub-Saharan African people in general are very open-minded towards outsiders and in many cases there is a natural 'affinity' for movement such as the *Saemaul Undong* in Africa. Furthermore, rural-agricultural development is very high on the agenda in the minds of African leaders and the public.

Many leaders in Africa do appreciate and welcome the *Saemaul Undong*, and if African governments take this model seriously and follow it up with care, then there will be a much better chance for its success. But as we all know, in most cases Sub-Saharan African countries are not known for the efficient delivery of public services. In any case, the strong backing of central government is no doubt conducive to the success of the *Saemaul Undong*.

For the development partner overseeing the programme, in this case Korean agencies, executing *Saemaul Undong* projects in a well-coordinated, systematic manner will be quite a challenge. Therefore, the *Saemaul Undong* needs to be pragmatic and flexible in its approach and be open to collaboration with other similar initiatives. This means not only accommodating 'local variance' to the Korean prototype by taking local practices and conditions into account, but also working in conjunction with other ongoing programmes. There can be a trade-off between 'outreaching' and 'fine-tuning' of the *Saemaul Undong*, and which is more important is debatable. But considering the circumstances, a certain degree of flexibility and localization is both inevitable and practical to facilitate the 'replication' and expansion of the *Saemaul Undong* in the region. The important thing is to adhere to the core principles and modes of the *Saemaul Undong*; the rest can take different forms in varying situations.

Third on the list is networking. According to So, Jin Kwang, the former President of the Korea *Saemaul Undong* Centre and Professor of Gachon University, the benefits of the *Saemaul Undong* as a national

movement can be summed up as follows: (1) governance; (2) social capital; and (3) sustainability.[9] Through the *Saemaul Undong*, a new 'governance' system linking central government, the provinces and grassroots communities emerged in Korea in the 1970s. This greatly enhanced central government's administrative capacity and efficiency vis-à-vis provinces. Previously, different ministries and agencies were dealing with provincial issues, but the *Saemaul Undong* streamlined and integrated communication and policy implementation channels between the government and local entities.

The essence of the *Saemaul Undong* is a bottom-up, voluntary movement by the local population. But the role of government was also critical in designing the *Saemaul Undong* as a national campaign, encouraging and stimulating the movement by offering incentives and awards. What makes the *Saemaul Undong* different from other programmes is that the government did not provide direct assistance to local communities. The Korean government had a grand vision for the *Saemaul Undong*, but it was the local population themselves that undertook the village projects.

The goal of *Saemaul Undong* projects for Sub-Saharan Africa is to churn up exemplary villages so that they can be emulated by other villages, with the expectation that this will lead to the expansion of the *Saemaul Undong* on a national scale. Undoubtedly, if this model underscoring diligence, self-help and cooperation can take root and expand in Africa, it will have many unexpected positive repercussions on the development of the region.

The viability of the *Saemaul Undong* will hinge on, among other things, the central government's continued engagement with and 'ownership' of this campaign. At least in the villages where the *Saemaul Undong* pilot projects are being conducted, there needs to be a close working relationship between the central government, local government and the villages. An ideal scenario would be that the central government officially endorses and incorporates *Saemaul Undong* programmes in its rural-agricultural development policies. This will ensure a favourable and stable environment in which *Saemaul Undong* proponents can pursue their activities.

Another essential measure is fostering competent local leaders who can inspire and lead people in the *Saemaul Undong*. Korea's success with the

Saemaul Undong came about because of passionate people who were led by passionate leaders. No matter how many resources the Korean government an provide for Africa's *Saemaul Undong* programmes, if the Africans themselves are not enthusiastic, it will be pointless pursuing them.

That is why it is critical that 'true believers' of the *Saemaul Undong* emerge continuously. Conventional development assistance methods are mostly about imparting knowledge and skills, and they are carried out in a matter-of-fact fashion. I have not seen a development programme in any other country that emphasizes such a level of passion, devotion, collective efforts and sacrifice of the people being targeted. But we have reached a point where the international development community should give serious thought to employing a value-oriented approach as a supplementary means to existing development endeavours for change. Outside the realm of religious or spiritual teachings, there clearly exists a domain of ethics that can be widely accepted and applied internationally. This should not be a job for religious and spiritual leaders, and moral activists only—it should be taken up by the mainstream players of development, including government circles and civil society in general.

In 2013, the *Saemaul Undong* archives were recorded in the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization's (UNESCO) Memory of the World Register. At the time, the UNESCO International Advisory Committee stated that 'the movement became the cornerstone of Korea's rapid growth from a poor country to one of the world's top ten economic powers and a precious asset to the history of mankind'. It added that 'since it gives the whole picture of how successfully the movement was carried out to modernize 34,000 selected rural villages across the nation, the archives are valuable resources to developing countries and international development agencies who seek to eliminate poverty and modernize rural areas'.[10]

The established international community does not hold back when speaking out against political, human and humanitarian rights abuses. But why is the community silent when it comes to the 'economic developmental rights' of poor nations? It is evident that negative practices, mindsets and syndromes that hinder development are preponderant in the region. So, if development partners care about the livelihood of African peoples, why are they not speaking out on the issue? Which is

more evil: being diplomatically and politically correct or being honest and straightforward? The former is a case of being nice but hypocritical, while the latter is about being blunt but genuine. On development matters, our purpose should be to try to make a difference, even if we have to sometimes stray from our 'comfort zone' and that of others. I think it is actually immoral to keep silent or not speak out on fundamental matters that fundamentally impact the lives of people simply for the sake of avoiding discomfort (and likely criticism). Civility and sincerity must go hand in hand.

The word 'transformation' is popularly used in Africa to accentuate the goal of development. But transformation does not come about easily and is the outcome of an arduous and painful process. National transformation cannot take place with some instances of excellence displayed by a few, but through the mobilization and efforts of the masses. The people must come on board and this requires a substantial and growing number of 'agents of change', the leaders who will urge others to join the path towards development. Since the *Saemaul Undong* is basically a communal campaign (although it can be practised in factories, companies, schools, etc.), its success derives from the vitality of 'community activism', which in turn is dependent on the unity and enthusiasm shown by individual members in their communal work.

There are already similar rural development projects that have been undertaken by various international organizations and bilateral development partners, which all put forward 'sustainable rural development' as their goal. But they are overwhelmingly assistance-oriented programmes trying to help the locals in various fashions (skills training, provision of equipment and facilities, micro-financing, creating marketing opportunities, etc.) to engage in agricultural production or agribusiness. And they may have yielded some positive results, mostly modest and limited, but not to an extent that is 'transformative'.

So, there is an innate risk that *Saemaul Undong* programmes, if not properly understood and pursued, will follow the same fate as other aid programmes. This is particularly so if donor agencies as well as the locals carry out *Saemaul Undong* programmes without sufficient inputs by *Saemaul Undong* experts. But there is a major difference between the *Saemaul Undong* and other aid initiatives in that the former is essentially

a self-reliant community movement that includes self-planning, self-decision-making, and the self-execution of work projects.

Community activism is a positive thing as it has many benefits: promotion of grassroots democracy, information-sharing, building and strengthening the 'social fabric', collective problem solving and education, etc. And economic spill-over effects in the rural regions can be far greater than expected when communities come together. It is so much easier to deal with community units, if they conform to a common cause, than belabouring to somehow win over all the people on an individual basis.

Another important measure to take for the success of the *Saemaul Undong* is taking advantage of cooperatives, which has many parallels with the *Saemaul Undong* and which has proven to be a very good tool to supplement the *Saemaul Undong* in the case of Korea. A cooperative is an autonomous association of people joined to own or operate enterprise for their mutual benefit. The association's characteristics are that it is formed voluntarily, operated democratically by those working for their own benefit (self-help), and managed autonomously. It has a long history and the current, modern form of cooperatives is said to have originated in Europe, but Korea also has a very old tradition that is similar to cooperatives.

While the *Saemaul Undong* was a national spiritual 'reform' movement as well as a driving force for economic growth, Korea's agricultural cooperatives greatly contributed to rural-agricultural development since its inception in 1961. Korea's agricultural cooperatives collaborated with the government in Korea's Green Revolution (involving the development of new rice varieties) and the *Saemaul Undong* in the 1970s. The major projects of Korean agricultural cooperatives include financial services like trust guarantees for farmers, agricultural technical training, protection of farmers' rights, improvement of rural livelihood, supporting agribusiness (the sale of products, the purchase and supply of agricultural equipment and basic necessities for farmers), etc. In Korea, the successful combination of the *Saemaul Undong* along with the dissemination and application of agricultural technology and cooperatives were instrumental in bringing about rapid development in the rural region. Cooperatives had significance as the final-stage guarantor of the

agribusiness value chain. Many farmers found confidence, stability and security in their production activities because of the efficient cooperative system.[11]

Normally, cooperatives are economic associations formed by economically and socially underprivileged people who want to improve their situation and meet their needs. Therefore, if the cooperatives are operated properly, this can greatly benefit the vast majority of African villagers and farmers. In Uganda, cooperatives have failed in the past due to improper management or (political) abuses, but now the government is trying to revive the system, recognizing its merits.

Along with the introduction of cooperatives, enhancing market access for rural regions is considered crucial for the success of the *Saemaul Undong*. Naturally, in order to invigorate cooperatives, the market accessibility of rural regions needs to be continuously upscaled. Market access, in addition to the value-addition of farm products, is a fundamental challenge for Africa's rural regions, where the vast majority of the population resides.

To sum up, as was shown in Fig. 11.1, *Saemaul Undong* projects should be implemented with MSF as the driving force to achieve the three targets (income generation, burden-sharing and the formation of economic links) based on the six measures outlined above. Once this is achieved, it would have positive outcomes (spill-over, governance, social capital and sustainability) and feedbacks.

Notes

1. 'Smart Saemaul Undong Story', an information pamphlet published by KOICA in the autumn of 2015.
2. Ibid.
3. The four areas are: (1) Inclusive and Sustainable Rural Development; (2) Better Life for Girls; (3) Safe Life for All; and (4) Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) for Better Life.
4. JEE Hyeong-jin, the Co-Head of the NFLC, presented this plan on 20 July 2016 during the project launching workshop at the NFLC.

5. Speech by Adolf Mwesige, Uganda's Minister of Local Government, during the ISNC launching ceremony on 10 July 2015, in Kibiito Town Council, Kabarole District, Uganda.

6. SMU Uganda.

7. Choi Hae-suk, *Study of Canaan Farmers School from the Perspective of Life Time Education* (Seoul: Ajou University, 2006) (BA Thesis) (Korean), p. 25.

8. During the 'Program for the Launch of Greater Masaka Model Villages' on 3 August 2017, held at Kkindu Parish Community, Masaka District, the SMU Change Agents divulged that their biggest challenge was confronting the negative mindsets of the villagers.

9. Jin Kwang So, President of the Korea *Saemaul Undong* Centre, gave a lecture on the *Saemaul Undong* to Baanda village (*Saemaul* model village) in Mityana District on 18 August 2016 during his visit to Uganda.

10. UNESCO Memory of the World, 'Archives of Saemaul Undong New Community Movement', http://www.unesco.org.

11. National Agricultural Cooperatives Federation (www.nonghyup.com), Choi Byung-ik and others, *Saemaul Undong and ODA* (Chungyang: Kukjemunwha University, 2014), pp. 46–48.

Part VI

New Path for Africa's Development

Re-Inventing Africa's Development

Realizing the Nature of the Problem

Recollecting my memories when I first stepped on to African soil in 1973 and then returning back in 2001 and again in 2011, I found out that there are two clear trends taking place: one was urban growth, while the other was the levelling-up of freedom of expression and the means of communication. But the manner in which these were unfolding was quite different from what I expected or was used to seeing in my native country and other regions.

In most cases, I noticed deterioration rather than improvement in the overall orderliness, infrastructure management and environment of urban centres. An observer would note: 'Although Sub-Saharan Africa is the least urbanised continent, its rate of urbanisation is among the highest in the world. While urbanisation can be a welcome engine for socio-economic development, innovation, and employment creation, it can also bring about a number of challenges, most of which are manifest within the sphere of urban environment … [which are] crowded living conditions; poor disposal of wastes; inadequate basic infrastructure;

pollution of water and air; and the decline of the urban green frame.'[1] And I would add to this the unbelievable traffic congestion and chaos.

Another striking feature was a noticeably greater extent of freedom of expression enjoyed in the countries compared to the past. By and large, this is the effect of globalization and the spread of technology. The acceleration in usage of the Internet and mobile phones in the region is remarkable and the flourishing of mass media in terms of the number of outlets and variety available is something that was unimaginable in the old days. This is not to negate the reality that sometimes oppression of expression is exercised for political purposes by rulers, but largely such a liberal trend is evident.

As countries increasingly engage with the outside world, and managing public and economic affairs becomes as complex as ever, they need to have stronger capacity in this regard. But this not being the case, we see the unruliness, disorganization and mismanagement of affairs that is typical of Sub-Saharan Africa today. At the heart of the problem lies the tendency of 'right here, right now': people trying to merely 'adapt' to (rather than tame or overcome) the circumstances or environment in which they find themselves, or wanting to settle things now, opting for 'immediate' rather than 'delayed' gratification.[2]

Everything is relative and no society is perfect or doomed. But attitudinal orientations matter. No matter how far our times and technologies have evolved, and however old-fashioned it may sound, the importance of the human mind and determination cannot be emphasised enough. As the moral of Aesop's Fable on the turoise and the hare would tell us, individuals can beat seemingly formidable odds, while people can quickly end up as losers despite their physical or material advantage over others. There is a good chance that a society enjoying an abundance of natural resources and other means, but lacking sincerity and commitment would fare worse than a society which has the opposite traits.

Since people's actions are in the end derived from their perception, attitudinal orientations and goals, despite all the hoopla and excitement over new ideas, technologies and innovations, if any meaningful development is to occur, it has to be accompanied by a mindset change in the people. By development, we are talking about positive changes that

are accountable and visible. It can take many forms that are discernible: the cleanliness and orderliness of living quarters and the neighbourhood and public facilities; the improvement of infrastructure and the delivery of service; improved education and health facilities; enhanced economic activity, productivity and income generation, etc. Hence, if such improvements do not happen, with or without foreign assistance, it means that people are not being responsive and something must be done about it.

There is plenty of blaming going on, but at least people are recognizing that there are problems. Many African leaders have their fair share of frustrations with the lack of progress being made in terms of development. For instance, as reasons for Africa's underdevelopment, Uganda's President Museveni has blamed poor education, underdeveloped human resources and skills, a lack of indigenous entrepreneurs, hindrance to private businesses, small markets and inadequate infrastructure, and a lack of energy resources. He also cites tribal, religious and gender ideological disorientations, a lack of industrialization and a lack of viable pillars in the judicial and defence sectors leading to a collapse in the state's authority.[3]

The African Peer Review Mechanism (APRM) meeting held on 26 August 2016 in Nairobi adopted, as Africa's development blueprint guide, President Museveni's paper on Africa's ten bottlenecks: ideological disorientation; a weak state exemplified by a weak army; human resource underdevelopment; poor infrastructure; a failure to industrialize; fragmented markets; underdevelopment of the service sector; undermining of the private sector; a laissez-faire attitude that is crippling the agriculture sector; and past shortcomings in democracy.[4] African leaders and elites seem to understand what their countries are lacking, but the obstacles that were identified can be seen largely as the outcome and not the causes of more deeper and fundamental problems.

Some mention that the top seven reasons why Africa is still poor are civil wars and terrorism, unending corruption, an education and knowledge gap, poor health and poverty, geographical disadvantages, international aid and unfair trade practices.[5] Greg Mills mentions in *Why Africa Is Poor* that the main reason why Africa's people are poor is because their leaders have made this choice, not because of all the things

cited as lacking or being blamed for this: African rulers have externalized their problems, blaming donor countries and bodies for all their unaccomplished ills.[6]

Those who subscribe to mainstream economic liberalism tend to define the essence of economy too simply or narrowly: in terms of free market mechanism. But what is much more important to developing countries is 'effective capitalism'. 'Markets' existed since the beginning of human civilization and are nothing new or special. In theory, a market is nothing more than a supply-and-demand mechanism. It is of course the most basic means or medium for the exchange of goods and allocation of resources, but in order for wealth creation and economic prosperity in a society and nation to come about, so many more things are needed, like the robust entrepreneurship of business leaders, a skilled and devoted labour force, socio-political stability and security, capital mobilization, an appropriate role played by the government (like 'strategic oversight' or guidance in industrialization), a positive 'national ethos' or work ethic, technology, social capital, good governance, a favourable natural endowment, geographical conditions … and the list goes on.

The reality is that it is not that simple to treat everything in a dichotomic context: liberal (good) and protectionist (bad). And governments can indeed play a key role in economic development if they act as facilitators and drivers of effective capitalism. What matters is keeping politics out of the economic realm as much as possible. Fostering competent and disciplined bureaucracy insulated from political influences is a good way to start and it is never too late to do so. South Korea's case is a vindication of the 'holy trinity' of economics: markets, corporations and government. Reforming government is the way to go, not doing away with it.

There is no question that the national rulers are the ones most responsible for their country's state of development. But we should not underestimate or overestimate their ability. We can talk about the issue of too much 'political correctness', but we should also be aware of the flaws of 'intellectual correctness' or 'academic correctness', which places all the blame on the rulers and portrays the masses as victims. This can be more detrimental than meets the eye. We should also note Joseph

de Maistre's quote that 'every nation has the government it deserves'. And the following observation has also makes a salient point: 'the leaders of any given society, club or country are just the picture of that society, club or country at large … People are trained by the society. The value system of that given society is what teaches them what to believe, how to behave, what to pursue with their lives and how to lead their people'.[7]

The leaders of states get their agendas implemented through their teams of elites and civil servants, and ultimately through the workings of the people. The rulers cannot control everything and cannot be effective in managing their economy and other affairs if they are not sufficiently supported by many layers of 'collaborators'. South Korea would not have achieved an economic miracle if it were not for the sacrifice of hardworking people and the enterprising private sector, as well as its bureaucrats.

The state leadership should be the key drivers of development as well as its last bastion. But still, many African leaders are corrupt and abusive of their power, and seek to maintain the status quo. It is also true that any leader with a reasonable mind would dearly want to prove their worth through economic performance, as the pressure is mounting on them to deliver whatever they can to satisfy the rising expectations of the masses. Therefore, economic performance is deemed to be the surest answer to achieving political success. In most cases, African leaders come short in terms of their goals because they are stuck in the comfort zone of compromising with reality even before earnestly attempting to produce results. Thus, it takes much more than the simple decisions of leaders.

While it is easy to destroy what was achieved in an instant, it would require mammoth efforts to rebuild whatever has been undone. Raila Odinga, the former Prime Minister of Kenya, spoke on the day of the Centenary of Nelson Mandela's birth that Africa's ills can no longer be blamed on the colonial legacy, but rather that Africa's deterioration has been brought about by bad politics and African leaders abusing their power. The main root cause of Africa's continued poverty is undoubtedly the mindset issue, which hinders positive action being taken. But the prospect of confronting the root causes may be daunting for

political leaders, policy-makers and even civil society. Many African nations are by no means static. On the contrary, you see so much vibrancy in individuals when they *come together* in social life—cultural events, social gatherings, public celebrations, commemorations, etc. What is desirable (and it could be a strategic move) is to induce the people to show an equal level of liveliness and passion in their workplaces and businesses.

For this purpose, 'leaders' are always needed in every corner and level of society. When the people, especially the poor, are left on their own, they feel powerlessness and alienation, but when they come together as an entity, they form a sense of social belonging and can suddenly feel inclined to act. This holds true both in rural-communal areas and semi-rural urban localities. In such an environment, a 'communal' approach such as that adopted by the *Saemaul Undong* can be effective in driving people to act in the pursuit of shared goals. Motivation and confidence can be built up easily through associations. However, when their orientation is misplaced and becomes primarily 'transactional', and matters are settled in courts, the society is likely to further degenerate and it will be difficult to turn back the tide. That is why initiatives like mindset change campaigns need to be executed, with leaders setting examples.

Figure 12.1 below illustrates the persistent gap between the developed world and Sub-Saharan African countries. The y-axis represents the level (quality) of the social and institutional fabric, as well as the technical, productive skills. Since independence, the overall level of the social and institutional fabric of African countries in terms of social capital, civic values, governance, respect for norms and regulations, etc. has remained largely unchanged at a low level. Hence, there are still big gaps that need to be reduced. The curves are rough depiction of the estimations of the levels assessed.

Of the two gaps—that in the social and institutional fabric, and that in skills and technology—the latter can have particularly deep repercussions on African countries in the low end as having a competitive edge in terms of skills and technology on a global scale is of great importance today.

Fig. 12.1   Development gaps: the problem of being transfixed

The upper dotted line in Fig. 12.1 represents the global competitive skills and technology (mainly for business) level, which is much higher than that of Sub-Saharan Africa. The trend is that the gap between the world's and Africa's skills and work capacity is widening.

What this implies is that Sub-Saharan Africa, which is open for business, is exposed to and can partner with foreign and multi-national companies with the highest competitive capacity, skills and technology. And there is an increasing number of visits between Africa and the rest of the world. So, there seems to be good exposure and opportunities for Africa to make up for its weakness by way of opening up its markets.

However, this will not resolve the problem of poverty because the fundamental gap will continue to exist under the circumstances. Without a proper policy, governance and mindset in place, it will be difficult not only to 'harness' foreign businesses, but also to properly 'support' and utilize them so as to reap the maximum level of mutual benefits.

There is a good example in Latin American countries that missed the opportunity to achieve rapid economic growth and successful transformation in the early stages of development due to their unsuccessful import substitution policies, premature introduction of foreign direct

investment and heavy reliance on multi-national corporations. Many of them are now paying the price for repeated missteps, like not being able to industrialize at auspicious moments, and giving into populism and the demand for welfare surpassing the means, as well as a failure to curb corruption.

Liberalization or globalization cannot be all bad for Africa. But when countries use these forces to forgo their own responsibility while trying to find solutions in foreign partners, the possibility of attaining economic viability in the context of self-empowerment will be diminished. Without addressing mindset and fundamental challenges, they will drift further away from the desired path of development.

Attitudes and Work Ethics

Attitudes and work ethics do matter—very much in fact—regardless of whether we are in a traditional working environment or high-tech sectors, and most likely also AI industries in the future. Basically, in the labour-intensive economic structure that characterizes Sub-Saharan Africa (only South Africa has a very capital-intensive industrial sector), the work ethic assumes a great significance. But even in capital- and technology-intensive sectors, where the cost of human failure in decision-making or management could be far greater, attitudes and ethics are deemed all the more crucial. People may not be amply aware that no matter how far machines, automation and artificial intelligence can be advanced, there is still room—and considerable room at that—for human interventions, as even the most sophisticated robots cannot replace humans (there are already troubles surfacing in relation to overmechanization).

As long as we choose to remain as 'humanity' irrespective of technological innovations, we cannot do away with norms like work ethics. Thus, many things depend on human attitudes and they can impede or stimulate progress. If people do not have the 'proper' set of attitudes, all the natural endowments available or all the technical and institutional support offered would quickly lose their value. Sub-Saharan Africa is an ironic case in that it probably has the largest 'untapped' and most

'concentrated' fertile land mass in the world, but its agricultural output is one of the lowest in the world.

And how are Africa and international organizations trying to cope with the situation? The common solutions that are sought seem to be mainly technical and material, and such a pattern of recourse seems to be stubbornly followed in spite of repeated setbacks. Acquiring 'knowledge' is crucial, and knowledge and attitude go together, but considering that the methods used have barely improved, there must have been a serious neglect or a blind-sight in the efforts. Or it may be that the international community, having not yet found a better alternative, has no other choice but to continue its course.

In 2015, the African Development Bank recommended that Africa can boost agricultural productivity by doing the following eight things: develop high-yielding crops; boost irrigation; increase the use of fertilizers; improve access, regulation and governance; make better use of technology; adopt genetically modified (GM) crops; reform land ownership with productivity and inclusiveness in mind; and step up integration into agricultural value chains (AVCs).[8] This all sounds fine in theory and would go down well with conference attendants, but from the perspective of policy-makers and farmers, how helpful will this be? Such a long shopping list of the things that ordinary people can hardly manage to undertake cannot be the best practical solutions.

An increasing number of experts seem to agree that natural endowments, physical resources or even technical know-how do not matter greatly in terms of making the difference in the absence of a positive attitude or mindset in the locals. For instance, Piet van Asten explains that an in-depth study shows how farmers in East Africa make decisions in farming is depended on how they percieve reality rather than the actualy conditions on the ground, and given that attitudes of farmers plays an important role, understanding their attitudes will provide insights into their actions, and thereby some clues as to what can be done to assist them.[9] But understanding attitudinal traits is one thing and deciding what to do about it is quite another.

Naturally, such an attitudinal issue is not confined to farmers, but affects the whole spectrum of society. In this book, I have tried to dissect the meaning of 'mindset', which is a broad and general concept. And I

think it boils down to 'attitudes' and 'work ethics' from a developmental perspective. There are many nuances to the word 'attitude', but from the point of view of development, it can be defined as 'a manner of thinking, feeling, or behaving that reflects a state of mind or disposition the way a person views something or tends to behave towards it, often in an evaluative way'.[10] Different people see and respond to problems in different ways and for different reasons. The issue of being 'transfixed' is not only a problem for Africa, but is also a factor in the approach of the international community. Things will remain static when activities only touch upon what is on the surface, without going deeper to address the root causes. In just about everything, 'rationality' is assumed and the efforts to bridge the 'divide' have been dismal at best, so the 'parallel' continues.

Essentially, there are two dimensions to Africa's needs: first, the improvement of basic conditions and quality of life; and, second, sustainable economic development. The former concerns the basic human needs and rights of the people, while the latter concerns more mid- to long-term tasks of nations, like achieving structural change in the economy.

However, it is true that the mainstream donor community is seen to be principally focused on the former while 'neglecting' the latter. On the other hand, China, an emerging donor, literally confines itself to the 'hardware' sub-division of the latter, like infrastructure construction and energy development projects. What seems to be increasingly evident is that the promotion of the former (the fulfilment of human needs and rights) does not necessarily lead to progress in the latter (sustainable economic development). Equally, it is certainly the case that Sub-Saharan African countries are in dire need of physical infrastructure, but infrastructure constitutes just one of the many things necessary for national development, and the issues related to the construction of infrastructure, like corruption, rises in the cost and delays of work, poor management, etc., revert back to the question of governance, the ethics of individuals and the norms of society. As such, there is no quick fix or a means of circumventing the fundamentals.

Only the people of Africa can do what it takes to effectively close the perennial poverty gap, although the international community can certainly help. Without wasting more time and resources, we should come to terms with the fact that the principal root cause of Africa's poverty is

the mindset issue, and therefore we should re-align our efforts to tackling this matter. Recently, I have discovered a casual way of getting my message across and starting a conversation without sounding too blunt or judgemental (or undiplomatic): I would say 'I think the reason why Africa remains poor is not necessarily because people lack the resources or the means, but rather, it's more due to the management problem'. No one objected and people could not agree with me more.

I was recently reminded, once again, that we too often take it for granted, or presume, that others' thoughts, behaviours and needs are the same as ours, when in fact they may not be. I heard from a number of experts from international aid agencies that in order to ensure effectiveness of aid programmes, donors must understand the culture and attitudes of the locals. I have had an opportunity to consult with the representatives of UN specialized agencies, who told me that the international development community makes the common mistake of pursuing an individual-oriented approach when the typical characteristic of African locals is familial or communal in nature—in other words, that people's actions are bound up with their kinship.

During the discourse, the head of the UNDP office in Uganda told me about some interesting episodes that occurred with a number of projects to assist women and girls in the rural region. They provided borehole pumps to the villages to save them from walking many kilometres a day just to fetch water. However, it turned out that the girls were not using the pumps in their villages, but instead were continuing to fetch water from the remote water sources. The explanation for this was that they wanted the privacy and 'free time' by themselves, to meet and chat with their friends, perhaps to escape boredom (or the shackles of their in-laws) or to refresh themselves. As such, the organization decided to provide bicycles to girls, but this did not work either, and men were using them instead. Another story was about young women shunning newly built latrines in or around their homes. It is said that women do not feel comfortable either sharing or being seen using the same latrine with other family members or relatives, especially the elderly; they would rather find remote places.

Therefore, the advice of these experts was that before we, the donors, embark on assistance programmes, we should consider the culture and

attitudes of the beneficiaries to ensure that these programmes have the desired impact on them. They also suggested that mindset change takes time, and we should expect the results to come slowly and gradually. I was all ears and their arguments made good sense to me. I thanked them for enlightening me about what I have not known before.

But later that day, when I tried to figure out what lessons could be taken away from the meeting, I realized that the perceptions within the international development community can also be highly divergent. I could not brush off the feeling that what these international aid officials were suggesting implicitly was that their logic and methods were essentially geared towards maintaining the status quo. More agents of change, not less, are needed. There is every reason to acknowledge and take local cultures and practices into account, but there is also a danger that by doing so, we could fall into the trap of perpetuating the status quo, which is exactly what development efforts should fight against.

Currently, there are basically two different trains of thought underlying international aid and development with respect to Africa. As mentioned earlier, one is about prioritizing basic human needs and their rights; the other is about prioritizing the building of physical infrastructure. People might think that this covers the essentials, but it does not. In fact, there is a big blind-spot in the existing development architecture, a third arm which we can call mindset change or a 'power-of-the-mind' approach or empowering the people with a development mindset.

The benefit of this mindset change approach, when properly applied, can reap enormous results, as demonstrated by the South Korean case. The advantage of this mindset change approach is that while the first 'basic-human-needs-and-rights (BHNR)' approach and the second physical infrastructure building approach both breed strong dependency on the part of the recipients, this, on the contrary, promotes the attributes of self-reliance, independence and self-ownership. Not only can, and should, this approach be employed to complement the first and the second approaches, but when successfully pursued, it will make these two approaches redundant. For example, in the case of South Korea,

the amount of aid it received for BHNR and physical infrastructure was minimal, and the duration of such assistance was far shorter compared to other countries.

Figure 12.2 below represents a proposed new formula of development assistance to Africa, the tripod of development assistance: the existing BHNR approach and physical infrastructure building projects, and the addition of the new mindset-change approach. The BHNR approach is what the traditional donors have mostly been engaged in, while physical infrastructure projects are what China and, to a lesser extent, other emerging donors have been mostly focusing on.[11]

The mindset-change approach is not unique to Korea, but is applied routinely in the everyday lives of all the people. Whether in films, dramas or novels, we almost always see someone taking the lead in uplifting others to fight on or rise to the occasion and not give up in despair. This does not happen only in dramatic scenes; even small words that touch our hearts and encourage us can unleash powerful forces in individuals. In schools, companies, factories, sports teams, hotels, hospitals, the military, government agencies, etc., people are repeatedly and persistently reminded of their 'code of conduct' and are urged to exert themselves in order to fulfil their duties.


Fig. 12.2   The tripod of development assistance

In every society, there is a constant need to 'energize' people to act positively, and this is a vital part of the management process for any institution or organization. And the mechanism for motivating or energizing people is, of course, 'rewards (remuneration) and sanctions (punishments)', as mentioned earlier. The problem is that we have forgotten to do all this when it comes to Africa's development.

Going back to the term 'development-mindedness' or KPOP, all this seems to underscore the importance of the last 'P', which stands for 'passion'. I have pointed out that Korea's uniqueness of its mindset change approach can be found in the 'reverse engineering': the act of instilling passion in people first and letting the power unleash itself, which will take care of the rest.

The achievement or success of a nation is not assessed in terms of how the powerful and the privileged have amassed wealth and lead prosperous lives; instead, it is the overall level of living of the whole population that counts and matters. That is why when we are talking about national development, it is crucial to have a set of initiatives that connect with the people and are relevant at the national level. This is the area in which most Sub-Saharan Africa countries find themselves at the weakest point.

What Africa lacks most, and hence needs to assign the highest priority to, is none other than the software compartment of mindset change. Without an attitudinal change in the people and the leaders, and understanding what constitutes or enables development, all the assistance provided by the international community, and all the investments and other business opportunities that foreigners may offer will be to no avail, since Africans will not be the true drivers and owners of development.

The first thing to do is to be aware of the necessity of mindset change. The next challenge is how to focus on and implement this task. The mindset change campaign itself should come from Africans themselves. For donors, their role should be assisting such efforts in a supplementary and facilitating fashion.

Critics have pointed out the ills of continuous flows of aid to Africa. If a wise thing to do is not cut these drastically—and I do not see this happening anytime soon—then both donors and African countries

should at least work closely together to foster a new environment of development partnership. It should start with the premise that people's attitudes are 'changeable'. And the practical way to launch this endeavour is to bring the locals, the leaders and the masses to the point where they comprehend the inevitability of change in their mindset and behaviour if they want to lead better lives. A strong community drive in which committed leaders from different backgrounds come together can be instrumental in this regard. People should be made to realize that relying on handouts from their government or aid organizations will get them nowhere and will only disempower and impoverish them further.

Such initiatives should not just target the 'development-mindedness' of the people in general, but should also involve concrete measures to curtail specific obstacles that undermine development. For example, a typical hindrance commonly experienced by donors are delaying and 'sabotaging' efforts by the officials in charge. Such acts are committed due to a lack of supervision and enforcement of disciplinary rules, as well as the overall weakness in the governance of the state. If African governments can put in place a more stringent administrative oversight and accountability enforcing mechanism in their system, it would considerably enhance the performance of development projects.

The continued gaps and discrepancies between what the development community is pursuing and what will actually take place are more attributable to 'attitudinal' factors than 'capacity gaps' and local conditions that the people on the receiving end often cite as the reason for such shortcomings.[12] By suggesting that a lack of capacity is the primary reason for failures, they are in fact asking for open-ended support from donors. They try to conveniently avoid responsibility by invoking their 'lack of capacity', when the real reason is their intent. Attitudes and capacity are two very different things, and attitudinal problems should not be masked by such terms as 'lack of capacity'.

The word 'capacity' implies the ability of someone to carry out certain assignments or demonstrate their skills, and is based on accumulated knowledge and training. So, when people say that the problem is due to a lack of capacity, they are insinuating that its nature is technical and what is needed is more investment for building capacity. But the reality is that the most egregious transgressions are often committed

by those who know all too well the field of their expertise and hence should know better. The issue is far more profound than simply accumulating knowledge and capacity.

There is no denying that in the region, many people do lack the necessary education and technical skills training, and the illiteracy rate in Africa in general as a continent is probably the highest in the world. Of the top ten countries with the highest illiteracy rate in the world, nine are from Africa, with only one country coming from outside the continent (Afghanistan).[13] Fighting illiteracy and providing greater education opportunities to the population should be the rudimentary responsibility of the state. But what is necessary is moving beyond people's ability to read and write, as this is only the first step in the long process of human development.

The question is not only how we can fight widespread irregularities and corruption, but also how the people can be uplifted and empowered. The reason why Sub-Saharan African countries are not faring well compared to many other developing nations in Asia and other parts of the world is that the 'double drawbacks of underdevelopment'—corruption and poor work ethics—are markedly more serious here than elsewhere. And these will not take care of themselves in a social, economic and political environment that seeks to maintain the status quo. A 'shock-therapy' type of approach and an all-out campaign at a national level might be needed.

A Westerner once asked me why I thought when there is so much corruption in China, just like Africa, China still manages to reap economic success. I replied that it must be due to differences in the level of work ethics. Africans themselves know better than anyone else how much corruption there is in Africa, so they are curious to hear from foreigners how their countries were able to deal with corruption. A Dutch colleague of mine once told me that when he was asked by a Ugandan businessman whether there was corruption in the Netherlands just like in Uganda; he responded that corruption exists everywhere, but the difference is that in the Netherlands those who commit irregularties are likely to be held accountable for it while in Uganda they are not.

I have discussed the preponderance of the 'commission culture' and the 'allowance culture' in Sub-Saharan Africa that is eating away at the

competitiveness and public interest of the nations in the region. The former is an unwritten practice, while the latter is institutionalized in the governmental sector. In any case, they reflect unwholesome opportunism, laxity or loopholes in supervision and disciplinary mechanisms, and the temptation to seek windfall gains whenever possible. Another widespread practice in governmental circles in Africa that I still do not understand is the failure on the part of the government to pay its employees' monthly salaries on time. The payment of regular salaries should be a predictable task and it is purely due to administrative laxity that this is not the case, so there cannot be any excuse for that.

Why governments and their public sectors seem to always fall short in terms of delivering public service and spurring economic dynamism in Africa is due not so much to bureaucratic bottlenecks and inefficiencies, but rather a lack of supervision and managerial negligence, in addition to the prevalence of irregularities and corruption. In most countries, the function of government falters not necessarily because of 'bureaucratization', but rather because the organization is deficient in 'life' and a sense of purpose. Generally, the merit of public service is the honour to serve one's nation, as well as job security. Since government officials' salaries and budgets come from taxpayers, they have the obligation to serve the public interest. If an employee wants to amass wealth, they should be in the private sector doing business. The same holds true for elected officials and parliamentarians in particular. Carrots and sticks are always necessary in the management of personnel and the operation of any organization. And, of course, the important thing is to enforce them vigorously. Most of all, 'sticks' or 'sanctioning mechanisms' are required to prevent civil servants from committing detrimental acts.

Frederick Herzberg, who studied employees' attitudes and motivations in order to come up with the 'motivation-hygiene theory', claims that there are satisfying and dissatisfying factors in employees' work environments. Satisfying factors, which he called 'motivators', include recognition, achievement and the challenge of work itself. Meanwhile, dissatisfying factors, which he termed 'hygiene factors' that do not give positive satisfaction or lead to higher levels of motivation (though dissatisfaction results from their absence), include status, job security, salary, fringe benefits, work conditions, good pay, paid insurance and

holidays. The word 'hygiene' is used in the sense that these are mainte-
nance factors.[14] The conclusions drawn from the case in the US, where
the study was conducted, cannot be applicable to all other regions. But
the most striking feature that is typical of Sub-Saharan Africa may be
that the management system to effectively apply incentives and disin-
centives for employees is difficult to find.

If the employers or leaders of organizations were truly dedicated to
enforcing carrots and sticks, exercising their powers in a constructive
way, we would probably see a far different situation from the one we
see today. The gross failure in management comes not from a lack of
'knowledge' or 'capacity', but from an unwillingness to take the trou-
ble to see to it that things are working properly. It is basically an atti-
tudinal rather than a technical problem. But then the same holds true
for employees. Workers need to have an 'earning-one's-way-to-success'
mentality and their catchphrases should be 'work ethics', 'devotion',
'consistency' etc.

Regarding methodology, it would be worthwhile if comprehensive
and in-depth research on the mindset of the people could be conducted.
A study of the mindset can become a field where many 'mysteries' or
paradoxes can be unlocked, and hence solutions can be discovered.
Confronting the matter of the mindset of people can be both a daunt-
ing and an onerous task, and there can be a disinclination to address the
topic at all. But this is an opportunity to think creatively and enlarge
our boundaries of engagement with respect to development. I hope this
book spurs new interest in this field.

A famous phrase—'truth will set you free'—comes to my mind at
this point. There are many issues around the world, and some seem to
be simply too daunting to rein in. Fighting natural disasters and the
effects of climate change, dealing with conflicts that are based on polit-
ical, ethnical, and religious divides and that reflect direct conflict of
interests or a stalemate in power dynamics are some examples. However,
the truth is that lifting Africa out of poverty should by no means be
an insurmountable task because there is no inherent conflict of inter-
ests or strategic stalemate involved here; that is, no intrinsic or inten-
tional obstacle exists to discourage Africa's development. Thus, there
is no point in shying away or refraining from 'searching' for the truth

because the truth and the facts will only lead to ultimate solutions. As far as the development of Sub-Saharan Africa is concerned, there are no risks involved in assuming a bold, proactive posture in order to move forward.

As was the case in South Korea, the kind of mind transformational initiatives must come from within. This requires the courage to confront 'inconvenient truths' rather than hiding behind the cloak of political and academic correctness. Ethical and civic society can only be attained from the self-reflection of individuals through the embodiment of ethics, and this cannot be provided externally. People might be tempted to seek explanations and solutions to the problems outside of themselves, but this will do no good even in the short term. Being truthful to oneself or, to put it differently, 'internalizing' one's responsibilities is the entry point of *social correctness*. When individuals only blame others, they are choosing to become a mere 'dependent variable' of others.

Especially in development, the question of attitudes is a core issue and it should be recognized as such by all the stakeholders involved. For instance, being optimistic and having confidence is always a good trait. But having an empty sense of pride or being overly naive that somehow everything will turn out for the best or that someone else will take care of the problems will not help.

'Mindset' is a term encompassing 'attitudes' and 'work ethics'. There is no given definition of 'work ethics' and it could be defined simply as 'an ethical principle that places greatest value on hard work and diligence'.[15] Business etiquette expert Jacqueline Whitmore talks about seven elements of strong ethics: professionalism, respectfulness, dependability, dedication, determination, accountability and humility.[16] We can see how far in depth we can go with the term 'work ethics' and how much it is relevant in today's business and our livelihood in general. Hence, unless the work ethics of the people of developing nations are successfully targeted and changed, business, foreign aid or development projects will continue to have only a very limited output. What is in everybody's interests is to avoid turning material or financial support or resources into de facto handouts that have no visible impact on Africa's development.

People's work ethics make all the difference in the performance of a nation. I do not wish to be seen as biased, but there is such a thing as a typical work pattern of the local workers. To cite an example, this becomes evident when you are moving in and out of countries. I know that moving household goods out of your home and loading them into a 40-foot container truck takes half a day's work in Seoul. In Rome, it took a full day plus some extra hours the next day. In Abidjan (the capital of Cote d'Ivoire), it took two full days. In Uganda, three days were needed to get everything out.

Increasing economic efficiency and competitiveness does not happen easily over time and the most practical way of enhancing it is through strengthening the work ethics of workers. Whether it is simple manual work or a technical assignment, what must be done must be done, and cutting corners always has consequences.

In sociology, there are theories of social movements or revolutions explained in terms of 'relative deprivation', such as James C. Davis' J-curve theory (1962). According to this theory, revolution occurs when the gap between people's 'expected need satisfaction' and 'actual need satisfaction' widens to an intolerable level. But from the perspective of development, the correlation between people's level of 'desires' and level of 'work ethics' could be more meaningful.

In the economic sense, 'work ethics' has bearing on 'supply' aspect of market mechanism as work ethics affects productivity, output, competitiveness, quality of work, service delivery, etc.. The work ethic of a nation is deemed to be a fundamental determinant of its economic performance. And logically, people's demand (desires) should be matched by supply (work ethics) to ensure the stability, satisfaction and prosperity of society or nation. Needless to say, as in the case of J-curve theory, the growing discrepancy between people's expectations and reality can have a negative impact on society.

We should pay attention to what different combinations of desire and work ethics imply. A society showing both desire and work ethics on a steady rise is an ideal state for developing nations that need to escape poverty and attain sustainable development. When countries have achieved economic transformation and enter the phase of mature industrialization or post-industrialization, the overall level of the work

ethic in the people measured in conventional terms (hours of work, labour intensity, etc.) will drop. When countries become wealthier, they can afford to provide better working environments for people, but the rich nations' desires, which are already high, may continue to rise. In such a case, the gap should be filled by innovative measures enhancing the efficiency and competitiveness of the workforce, institutions and policies.

When the levels of both desires and work ethics remain unchanged at low levels, this represents a stagnant society with an economy stuck in a state of underdevelopment. Meanwhile, when the work ethic stays sluggish, but desires continue to ride high, this means that a society cannot satisfy its own demands, possibly resulting in the public's dissatisfaction and distrust in the government and the system, increased dependency on outside assistance and investments, a deterioration in public services, corruption and irregularities, etc.

Notes

1. Thomas P.Z. Mpofu, 'Urbanization and Urban Environmental Challenges in Sub-Saharan Africa', *Research Journal of Agricultural and Environmental Management* 2, no. 6 (June 2013), pp. 127–134.
2. See the book *Don't Eat the Marshmallow Yet: The Secret to Sweet Success in Work and Life* written by Joachim de Posada, Berkeley, 2005.
3. The remarks made by President Museveni's during the ceremony of the 50th anniversary of Uganda's independence in 9 October 2013 and other occasions.
4. 'Africa: Museveni Paper Adopted as Africa's Dev't Blueprint Guide', *The Observer* (Uganda), 27 August 2016. Uganda's President Museveni elaborated on this earlier on 9 October 2013 during Uganda's Independence Day celebrations: (1) ideological disorientation, which manifested itself in the sectarianism of religion and tribes (failing to see that all groups in Uganda benefit from each other by buying products of the respective groups apart from the other historical, linguistic and cultural similarities or links); (2) the need to radically reform the state structure, especially the army, which was not only being sectarian but was also led and manned by people of little or no education; (3) attack

on the miniscule private sector based on the ideology of inadequately analysed nationalism (because all investments made in Uganda, being part of its GDP, strengthen Uganda's independence rather than weakening it); (4) human resources that was not educated or well catered for in terms of health; (5) inadequately developed infrastructure—especially electricity, roads, railways and piped water—all undermining the profitability of investments in the country on account of the high costs of doing business in this economy; (6) a small internal (regional) market on account of colonialism fragmenting the ancient pre-colonial market that used to stretch from the River Congo to Zanzibar on the Indian Ocean and to the swamps of South Sudan, the inconveniences caused by the greedy tribal chiefs; (7) a lack of industrialization, exporting only raw materials, thereby donating money and jobs to foreign economies; (8) an underdeveloped services sector (hotels, banks, insurance, transport, etc.); (9) an under developed agriculture with only a small portion of the economy being engaged in commercial agriculture, while the majority of the farmers were only engaged in subsistence farming using inferior seeds and breeding stock, not using fertilizers, no irrigation and not using improved agro-practices; and (10) a culture and history that lacked democracy.

5. Kajuju Murori, '7 Top Reasons Why Africa Is Still Poor, 2017', *The Africa Exponent* (Tanzania), https://www.africanexponent.com/post/billions-lost-in-profits-by-foreign-companies-tax-evasion-1953.

6. Greg Mills, *Why Africa Is Poor: And What Africans Can Do About It* (Johannesburg: Penguin, 2010).

7. Otoaye Godfrey Martins, '7 Reasons Why Africans Are Poor and How to Be Rich in Africa', *The Spirited Hub*, http://thespiritedhub.com/7-reasons-africans-poor-rich-africa.

8. Africa Development Bank, *Africa's Competitiveness Report 2015* in Mark Jones, '8 Ways Africa Can Raise Farm Productivity and Boost Growth', World Economic Forum Global Agenda, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/06/8-ways-africa-can-raise-farm-productivity-and-boost-growth.

9. Piet van Asten made the remarks during his presentation at the 'Seminar on Uganda's Agricultural Development' at the Sheraton Hotel, Kampala on 5 December 2016. This seminar was organized by the Korean Embassy. The attitudes were broken down into four categories: 'pessimist', 'optimist', 'pragmatist' and 'trapped'. The International

Institute of Tropical Agriculture (IITA) is a member of the Consultative Group for International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) consortium.

10. *The Free Dictionary*, https://www.thefreedictionary.com/attitude.

11. It has been a general tendency for traditional bilateral donors, namely Western donors, not to focus on major physical infrastructure projects, while regional bodies and international organizations like the EU, the World Bank and the African Development Bank have been considerably more active in this field. China is the most conspicuous collaborator in infrastructure-building projects for Africa.

12. I have realized that often the locals, when talking to foreigners, purposefully avoid using words with negative connotations like 'corrupt', 'deceitful or 'unethical', but instead use more neutral terms like 'lacking capacity' to explain their problems.

13. *Which Country*, http://www.whichcountry.co. The information is said to be verified by authentic sources and collected from the CIA World Factbook (2011).

14. 'Summary of Herzberg's Motivation and Hygiene Factors. Abstract', *Value Based Management*. Retrieved on 6 January 2016, http://www.valuebasedmanagement.net/methods_herzberg_two_factor_theory.html.

15. *The Free Dictionary*, http://www.thefreedictionary.com/work+ethic.

16. Jacqueline Whitmore, '7 Elements of a Strong Work Ethic', *Entrepreneur*, https://www.entrepreneur.com/article/250114.

Conclusion

Recapping the Fundamentals

In this volume, I have laid out many issues that are pertinent to Sub-Saharan Africa and have stressed what are deemed to be the priorities for Sub-Saharan African countries in order to attain transformative development. Describing problems may be the easy part, but the root causes of the problems must be identified if they are to be tackled. The overall assessment is that Sub-Saharan Africa appears to have fallen further behind the rest of the world in terms of economic competitiveness, work capacity, industrialization, income equality and possibly the social fabric. But the tide can be turned and some countries are doing better. Africa's blessings in terms of its natural endowment and economic potential are undeniable, and hence the fundamentals should be worked on assiduously to reap the maximum dividends from such possibilities.

As I have mentioned, development should be a way of life. Indeed, national and political leaders, their vision, and government policies serve as signposts for this, but ultimately it all comes down to how people—the elites, civil servants, businessmen, workers, farmers, etc.—conduct

themselves in their everyday lives, which will have an accumulative effect as a nation. Perhaps the most deceptive caveat to development is the complexity of the development narrative or the 'professionalism' of this field: development is portrayed and pursued too much in technical terms aloof from reality.

The world is fast-moving and everybody is busy trying to catch up with the trends that are taking place. And in the process, people can lose sight of the bigger picture, which is the basics or the fundamentals of economic and social development that apply universally. In any field—and this is particularly evident in science and technology, and sports—the fundamentals are the most important factor. They are called 'fundamentals' not because they are rudimentary and easy, but because they are the most crucial elements. In science, for instance, 'applied technology' is derived from 'original technology', which is extremely difficult to acquire. No matter how elaborate the applied technology, if it is not based on original technology, it will not work. In sport, one cannot expect to become a top athlete without embodying all the sound fundamentals of the discipline.

Therefore, to treat the fundamentals of development as 'outdated and irrelevant' is a grave mistake. The world has long forgotten the fundamentals of development and in Africa they never seem to have been properly put in place. I believe that in development, there are fundamentals within fundamentals and it is crucial to understand and capture these. In this context, drawing on Korean development model (Fig. 8.1) can be most useful.

To simplify, and go straight to the crux of the matter, the two most essential principles of development that are universally applicable are economic discrimination in the economic realm and development-mindedness in the socio-political realm. But strictly speaking, these two are interactive and inter-connected. Korea's development was driven by these two principles, which acted as engines of development. This was particularly true during the decades of high growth, but their relevance is by no means lost today.

In the case of Korea, the 'four cornerstones' (land reform, empowerment of the people, educational reform and governmental reform), which now may seem rudimentary, constituted the crucial groundwork

for development. The active role played by the government was another major ingredient of success. And what made economic discrimination and the strong development mindset work effectively was the 'egalitarian spirit' of Koreans. The development path was basically followed two tracks: economic discrimination propelled economic transformation while the strong development-mindedness led socio-political transformation.

A development formula for Sub-Saharan African countries (Fig. 10.6) was deduced from the Korean development model, i.e., lessons learned from the Korean development experience, taking into account Africa's circumstances. As was the case in Korea, African countries also need 'economic logic'—economic discrimination—to prevail for the sake of their business and economic growth. As was explained, economic discrimination works through the inter-play of the market, businesses and government. But in Sub-Saharan Africa, international donors or development partners have a big stake in the economy and hence I have included them in the equation. 'People' is also included in light of Africa's large, unorganized informal sector and the fast-growing youth population that can make a difference for the economy if they are properly targeted.

Running parallel alongside the economic track are the 'missing links', which comprise of sense of nation, development-mindedness and the active role of the state. These are deemed important for Sub-Saharan African countries to embrace and adopt. Last but not least, active measures to counter and ultimately stamp out various negative elements are considered crucial for the region's development. Countries must vigorously fight the negative elements—the back-tracking syndrome, short-sightedness, inaction, the 'what's-in-it-for-me' syndrome, the dependency syndrome and a commission culture—that can quickly offset various development endeavours made by the countries and international partners.

So the tasks confronting Sub-Saharan African countries are significant as already laid out. But since these are essentially human factors, they are achievable and the important thing is to work on multiple fronts at the same time. Here, speed is of the essence and a 'slow and piecemeal approach' should be avoided. There cannot be progress

when any new gains made in a certain area are undone by lack of progress in another. It should be noted that Korea was successful because the reform was conducted expeditiously in many areas to produce synergistic effects.

Many economic aspects in the region have the characteristics of being 'static', when 'dynamism' is the trait that developing countries should be embracing. For example, in Africa, there seems to be too great a level of preoccupation with how to allocate the 'pie' (wealth or resources) when much greater emphasis should be placed on how fast they can enlarge the pie. So the key question for Africa is how the dynamism on the part of the people and the economy can be acquired and enhanced.

In fact, there are so many ways to make improvements and make them fast: working harder (faster and longer hours), becoming more focused and organized, reducing wastage, being more consistent and predictable, better conforming to norms and regulations, etc. It does not require extra skills, technology and resources to be able to do all these things; it concerns human factors like attitudes, work ethics, the level of determination and discipline, etc.

There is no hidden agenda or risks in such an attitudinal or mindset change approach. There is absolutely nothing to lose and everything to gain with this kind of approach as its merits are so evident. But working out how to effectively pursue this as a public or national initiative may not be so easy. The ability to enter this threshold of social mobilization will, in itself, represent a milestone. But we should ask who should be spearheading such an initiative and through what mechanisms it should be pursued.

Ideally, this could take the form of being a grassroots citizens' movement with the support of the state. But in reality, the role of national leaders will be central, at least at the launching stage. The vision, drive and wisdom of leaders will no doubt be important. The majority of African countries do not yet have credible and efficient political and governance systems in place, so the personal capability and traits of national leaders can be all the more important. Ideally, they should be fervent patriots and their ideas should be zealously followed and implemented by the nation's civil servants. But there is also the danger of the campaign being seen as politically motivated, which would greatly

undermine its legitimacy. Hence, a national consensus should be sought and a politically neutral body should be formed to oversee and drive the movement forward.

It would be meaningless if there is no participation in this process by the people. And in the end, the people must be able to deliver what matters most for development: economic outputs and the promotion of social, political changes. People can always empower themselves through their actions without waiting to be empowered by the government.

Speaking of empowerment of the people, perhaps nothing is more relevant than instilling in the people the 'development-mindedness' that I have termed 'KPOP'. The components of KPOP, which are detailed in Chapter 5, are the basic ingredients that make people productive and successful as individuals. If an increasing proportion of the population, especially the youth, were to embody such traits, and the trend prevails, the nation will be on a promising path. From the perspective of individuals, these can be attained in the given order, but as I have explained, in Korea, 'reverse engineering' was successfully applied: rather than starting from the 'knowing (learning)' phase, working from the last phase of imbuing or motivating 'passion' proved to be very effective. When people feel passionate about something, then the rest (learning, practising and owning) comes naturally. Passion breeds actions and outcomes, and these lead to confidence. The benefits of such virtuous cycle are deemed to be immense.

In Korea, it was the Korean leaders, both civil and public, who taught, encouraged and mobilized the people to be empowered. It was not foreigners or aid organizations. Technical know-how can be learned or introduced from abroad and development partners can assist in training, but the promotion of the campaign to empower the people should come from African leaders themselves. Foreigners do not need to spell out to Africans that they need a mindset change to escape from poverty and achieve economic development. This should be the work of the African leaders, intellectuals and ordinary people, who will gain the most by undertaking such a campaign for change.

Without a noticeable enhancement in the development-mindedness of the people in general, the prospects for achieving successful national development will not be good. It is up to the African nations to

aggressively take on the tasks and effect changes, as development-mindedness of the people can only be attained through their own efforts. Foreign partners can only show how it could be done in the preliminary stages; the real work itself has to be undertaken by the protagonists.

From 'Dualism' to a 'Medium-Bridging' Approach of Development

This book highlights the attitudinal factors and the 'missing links' that have long been forgotten, ignored or underestimated in the discourse and practice regarding Africa's development. However, I think there is another blind-spot that needs to be mentioned here, which is the failure to properly grasp the significance of the 'middle ground' between the 'traditional' sector and the 'modern' sector. For so long, the perception of 'economic dualism' appears to have dominated the minds of experts and ordinary people alike, especially when it comes to the issue of Africa's development. A dual economy refers to the state of two separate economic sectors existing within a country, divided by different development and technology levels. The concept was first conceived by Julius Herman Boeke to describe the coexistence of modern and traditional economic sectors in a colonial economy (social dualism).[1]

Later, Benjamin Higgins developed the idea into 'technological dualism', which proposes that resources and technological constraints in two sectors—modern and traditional—limit development in poor countries.[2] The most familiar dualist theory is Arthur Lewis' 'dual sector model', which postulates a rural low-productive, low-income subsistence sector with a surplus population and an expanding high-productive urban capitalist sector. He argued that developing economies could achieve substantial economic growth by encouraging labour to move from the agricultural sector to the manufacturing sector. The Lewis model is considered to have remained for more than 50 years as one of the dominant theories of development economics.[3]

All theories have their limitations, especially if they relate to social sciences, because they are inherently incapable of handling all the cases

and variables of the complex reality of our world—that is why they are theories. Theoretical debates aside, what really matters is the possible negative impact that cursory interpretations of such ideas can have on developing nations. Economic theories should not be taken literally, but need to be understood each time in the different context that one is dealing with. As has already been pointed out, Africa's predicament continues because basically its problems are dealt with in a static context, in a rather superficial way without going through a sufficient thought process. Many African leaders and elites are seen to have harboured 'dualistic' thinking for a long time. In a desire to move out of backwardness and towards modernity, they have been drawn to the standards of rich countries and have sought the expertise and training that the advanced world has to offer, as well as promoting trade and investment. Terms like 'entrepreneurship', 'value-addition', 'agribusiness', 'innovation' have been frequently used in Africa. And almost always, there seem to be gaps between what is desired and what is achievable. For instance, some inexperienced leaders have unrealistic desires to have mammoth ultra-modern hospitals, new town complexes, etc. built with foreign assistance, without giving any thought to their cost and sustainability.

There is no such thing as making leaps and bounds when it comes to national development or transformation involving major structural changes. Nations cannot just move from one state of being to another in a routine fashion. Transformation cannot take place simply through making good policy choices, receiving good advice from donors or receiving investment and technology from foreign partners. Many Africans tend to take these as an end in themselves, but they are nothing more than a means and everything is dependent on how much the nation vigorously works towards development.

In Sub-Saharan Africa at least, a policy prescription based on the thinking of dual economy would not be very effective. Many countries must have at one point or another pursued such an approach, apparently with no or very little success. Lewis' dual-sector model does not apply well to Africa because there is such a big gap between the traditional and the modern sectors, and the modern sector is actually very small and weak. Furthermore, the modern sector, which is the manufacturing industrial sector, is mostly owned and run by multi-nationals,

foreigners and the minority business community. In Africa, population growth is explosive, resulting in a youth-heavy population, which causes concern in view of the limited job opportunities for them. And, of course, there are the issues of attitudinal, cultural and social 'restraints' or limitations that have to be overcome.

The circumstances in Africa are that even with an open economy and business-friendly policies, the largely subsistence-oriented rural sector, to which most of the people belong, has not been impacted by or received much benefit from the modern sector. But the rural populace, especially the youth, flock to the cities, where they remain marginalized. Hence, it is not the growth of the manufacturing industrial sector (the modern sector) matched by a reduction in the traditional sector that we are witnessing, but an increase in the number of people at the 'periphery' of two sectors: relatively large rudimentary businesses or those linked to the 'informal' sector. The workers here do not really belong to the modern sector, though in a sense they might look entrepreneurial. This is due to a lack of skills/capacity, a lack of market demand or buying power, a lack of capital and investment, etc.

But the biggest consequence of this is the dearth of social capital, like trust, cooperation, bonds, reciprocity and sense of the common good. Probably the best way to close the gap between the traditional sector and the modern sector, or to move from the former to the latter, is to strengthen social capital so that it can serve as a mediatory force or a medium that facilitates the transition from the traditional sector to the modern sector. Social capital is deemed to be a very practical and effective means which can be created in any situation and is not dependent on foreign resources. On the other hand, financial capital is hard to come by and can be misused, as we see so frequently in the region. Another advantage of building social capital is that it can induce other positive values like good work ethics in addition to strengthening the social fabric of a nation.

The logical next step will be figuring out how to best foster social capital in Sub-Saharan Africa. One of the ways in which I think this could be done is by developing the 'medium'. This 'medium' I am talking about here can be defined as a 'sector' within the traditional sector that has potential 'developmental' elements which can be turned into a tool for

the transition of the traditional sector into a modern sector. People would need to embody the necessary social, attitudinal qualities before they could be effectively incorporated into modern sector. The medium, as social capital or bond, can have a multitude of uses and could act as a powerful vehicle leading to the development of the modern sector. Therefore, identifying and promoting the medium should be actively carried out.

The 'medium-bridging approach' purports to explore and take advantage of positive elements inherent in developing nations' local practices, and reinvigorating them to expedite the transformation of the traditional sector into a modern sector. Since the potential elements of the medium are embedded in the local contents, it is easy to revive and resuscitate them.

In Korea, the 'medium' was successfully established and operated in the form of 'empowerment of the people', 'mindset change' and the *Saemaul Undong* (new village movement) campaigns. The contents of 'medium' can be found in traditional values or practices, or in the form of something that has been 'reinvented' and 'updated' to suit the current situation. Whether it is old or new is not important; what matters is whether or not it is initiated, 'owned' and subscribed to by the local populace.

As for the prospects of success of the 'medium' or 'home-grown solutions' in Africa, there are already promising signs to this effect in newly emerging countries like Rwanda. Of course, Botswana, a more established country in this respect, is in a class of its own. Rwanda provides an interesting case study as it is likened to South Korea. The two countries share many common traits. Both are small, resource-scarce, mountainous countries. The flat, habitable land is hard to find, so there is a high population density in the residential districts. But this contributes to a high rate of Internet connection. Both countries are surrounded by bigger neighbours and have faced major crises. The history of Korea is fraught with tribulations: harsh colonial rule, national division and the devastation of the Korean War. Rwanda suffered an unprecedented genocide in 1994 that still haunts the country. Korea turned the crisis into an opportunity, and so have Rwandans. When Korea had to rebuild from the ashes of war, it had nothing to rely on but its human resources. Korea is one of key benchmarking countries for Rwanda, along with Singapore.

Rwanda stands out all the more because in the region, such features as good governance that Rwanda displays are a rarity. Of course, there are issues in the political realm, but overall it is succeeding in winning the confidence of the international community. A number of the biggest international hotel chains have opened for business in Rwanda, the latest being the Kigali Marriott Hotel, which opened in September 2016. Now the meetings, incentives, conferences and exhibitions (MICE) business is flourishing in Rwanda.

What is the secret behind Rwanda's impressive turnaround in its governance, public services and business? According to President Kagame, it is the home-grown solutions that have improved citizens' participation and accountability: 'We have very high ambitions and scarce resources. Before we go out begging for things we may never get, we have to ask ourselves, "have we exhausted the resources around us?" This is how home grown solutions start.'[4] 'From our history as a nation, it became evident to us, in the hardest way possible, that we can only count on ourselves. Thus self-reliance became the rationale for life. Now, given the challenges that Rwanda is facing, and the ambitions and aspirations we have for the future, it is impossible that conventional approaches will get us there in the time-frame we want; hence, home-grown solutions.'[5]

This sounds strikingly similar to Korea's *Saemaul Undong*. Rwanda's home-grown solutions include *Abunzi* (mediation committees), *Gacaca* (speedy justice), *Umuganda* (communal self-help), *Umushyikirano* (citizen participation), *Itorero* (civic education) and *Umwhiherero* (national leadership retreat).[6] Similarly, Botswana has applied its own socio-cultural traditions like the system of chiefs—*Kgotla*—to enhance its development.

Many developing countries faltered in joining the ranks of the advanced economies because they succumbed to the challenge of 'dualism' and let the 'international economic tide' get the better of them. Besides the Asian Tigers, the reason why even the Southeast Asian countries have had much more economic success than African countries (in the 1960s and even the 1970s, the two regions were more or less at the same level) is that they were not tied to a 'dual-structure' mentality, but pursued pro-poor, pro-rural agricultural policies at an early stage of development. Perhaps less dramatic or successful than Korea's case but the 'medium' was in the works in these countries.

The lesson drawn from this is that African countries must find solutions for development from within. 'Internalizing' or taking ownership of development should be an integral part of the nation-building process, but African countries seem to have long forgotten about nation-building. As such, they prematurely 'exposed' themselves to the outside world before they got their own house in order and were prepared for this new venture. And just when the governments had the chance to duly take charge of their economy, they were quick to 'outsource', liberalize and privatize. This signified the abandonment, not the exercise, of the government's mandate.

It is during the nation-building phase that the government's grip and role need to be most robust. The political slogan 'small but efficient government' (although I do not hear it much these days) is premised on the 'overgrown' government bureaucracy. But it is doubtful that African countries have come near the threshold of strong, 'full-fledged' states. The size of the government itself is not so relevant, as the strength of government comes from its functionality, coherence and discipline, buttressed by good political leadership and the watchful eye of the public.

Figure 13.1 depicts the dual-economy structure and the medium-bridging approach used to deal with this. The top graph in the figure shows a typical underdeveloped economy with a very large traditional sector and a modest modern sector. The *y*-axis shows the scale of the population (number of people) and the *x*-axis the level of development, technology or productiveness. Apparently, there is a big gap between the two sectors so that the transition from a traditional sector to the modern sector is virtually at a standstill.

The middle and bottom graphs in the figure show how the medium-bridging approach works. The first thing to do in Phase 1 is to nurture the medium. Building the medium is critical for poor countries because this is the opportunity for the people to take ownership of development by internalizing it. In order for this endeavour to succeed, confidence, optimism and eagerness must be manifested, and the necessity of the campaign must be brought home to the people. In addition, the strong leadership of popular leaders will be required in this regard.

Once the medium is successfully formed through the participation and support of the public, it is important to keep the momentum

Fig. 13.1 The dual economic structure and the medium-bridging approach

going in order to expand the base of the medium and intensify its strength. For this, both the government and private engagement should ensue. The benefit of this initiative is that it promotes social capital, development-mindedness and local governance. Then, when the medium assumes a life of its own and is running, its positive impact on the economy can be substantial. The traditional sector is labour-intensive, while the modern sector is capital- and technology-intensive. The significance of the medium is that it is *social capital-intensive*, which the African nations sorely need.

We can see that the traditional sector is reduced with the growth of the medium which originates from the former. The traditional sector is being transformed into a modern sector through the vehicle of the medium. The end result is a transformed economic structure with a substantially enlarged modern sector and an equivalent decrease in the traditional sector. When the transition has run its full course, the medium, having exhausted its usefulness, will wither. A highly developed economy will have a very small traditional sector and a dominant modern sector, and will no longer need the medium. If the medium is not strong and large enough to have an impact on the economy, it can end up simply as 'peripheral'.

Aid Versus Business?

There has been a lot of talk about the worthiness of aid versus business in Sub-Saharan Africa. But discussions on this topic do not seem to have much merit. African development issues have continued for too long and have extended so widely that it is no longer a simple matter of 'aid versus business'. However, many people still seem to view the matter through such a lens, so there is a need to revisit this topic.

In Africa, aid and business are closely intertwined. Such a phenomenon is the outcome of natural forces at work rather than by design. In Africa, many drawbacks like weakness in management capability, work ethics and governance, as well as the prevalence of irregularities, persist. It will be difficult for Africa to extricate itself from poverty and other predicaments under such conditions. Foreign aid has not caused Africa's

problems; it is the latter that has invited the former. Foreign assistance has flaws of its own for certain, but this is due to various limitations in reality, so it cannot be the central issue. When African countries start to get to grips with their fundamental challenges and do something about them, foreign aid will naturally dissipate.

Under such circumstances, business will not be business in strict terms. In other words, in many cases, some sort of development assistance has to be involved to support even private business activities. For example, because of various business risks posed by security issues, weak administration and governance, poor infrastructure, the lack of a productive local workforce, etc., foreign companies wanting to do serious business in Africa have to undertake activities well beyond the traditional scope of private business: offering technical support, capacity training, even governance and physical infrastructure, besides bringing in capital investment and management personnel. It is not the usual business partnerships between the 'equal' business collaborators that we see in other regions. 'Dependent partnership' is probably a better term to describe this.

Advocates of the neoliberal school of thought have been most critical of foreign aid while fervently supporting free trade and business. Their criticism of foreign aid to Africa is understandable as they have rightly pointed out that aid has had a limited impact on alleviating poverty and has aggravated the dependency syndrome in Africa. And I agree with the argument that entrepreneurship and the robustness of the private sector are what ultimately drive economic growth. Without question, the economic growth and strength of a nation hinges on the vitality of its private sector and businesses. But that is about as far as neoliberalism can go in terms of logical coherence; the rest is full of weaknesses. It neither describes the reality correctly nor offers persuasive and responsible policy prescriptions. It disregards so many factors that are in play, particularly in African countries.

The problems that make aid ineffective are also those that stymie business and the economy in general. These are not two different options that can be separated from each other, especially in the case of Sub-Saharan Africa. If more business and investment with less aid was the answer to Africa's predicament, then aid to Africa would not have been the problem in the first place. What makes aid ineffective and problematic is what also makes business and investments ineffective and problematic.

When there are few successful enterprises and industrial development virtually remains at a standstill in the region, there must be good reasons for this state of affairs. African countries need to work strenuously to overcome their shortcomings in the fundamentals, while also tackling the many negativities or 'leakages' that undercut their progress. In these circumstances, replacing foreign aid with business and investment will not work wonders, as some have suggested. South Africa is the most industrialized and advanced economy in the region, but the disparity and 'dependency' structure within it is all too evident.

There are many business elements in aid programmes and, equally, many business activities are closely linked with development in Sub-Saharan Africa. In this respect, the region's economic dependence on foreign partners and the international community in general has not diminished: Western countries continue to provide budgetary support to Africa; an increasing number of aid projects are undertaken in the form of public-private-partnerships (PPPs); African economies are heavily dependent on foreign companies and investments; direct foreign involvement, like foreign entrepreneurs' on-site management and the influx of foreign capital, is what supports the economies of many African countries; many major national projects like large-scale infrastructure building projects are carried out using foreign loans and technology. The trading of consumer goods, equipment and intermediary products is done by the private sector, but the limited purchasing power of locals poses an immediate challenge for business.

In terms of development assistance, foreign partners, the host government and other entities share the responsibility, and hence there is at the very least some level of governance exercised for the projects. But in private business, there is no assurance of such governance. As has been mentioned repeatedly, in the region, the nation-building task is largely unfinished and ongoing, and the social fabric and social capital are still weak. In these circumstances, foreign aid and business cannot be so clearly distinguished from each other, and both are needed. Aid indeed has its flaws and may not be the best thing for Africa, but the benefits that the whole array of foreign aid has brought to African countries, if these can be measured in real terms, would not be negligible. As I have pointed out, when the international community has given so much assistance for so many decades to a particular region, there must have been good reasons to make this happen.

And the people should reflect on what would have transpired had foreign aid not been provided to Africa. Here, foreign aid should not be considered as merely simple material or financial assistance, but a very wide range of means and activities, including management support and supervision, technical training and capacity-building, consulting, education, governance-enhancing measures, support for private businesses, the provision of various facilities and infrastructures, and even various donor 'pressure' on African governments to conform to universal norms and values. The actual value of these will be difficult to measure, but would African countries have fared better if there had been no such interventions and they were left entirely to the free market mechanism? By all accounts, it is likely that situation would have been much worse.

Basically, African countries remain poor and underdeveloped not because they lack resources and means, but because they have issues with respect to management from the very top to the very bottom across all sectors. This is the reflection of the countries' inability to take charge of their national development mission. Trade and investment do not come about simply by wishing it to be so; it has to make business sense. Business deals do not occur in a vacuum, but follow profitable markets while avoiding risks. For business in Africa to flourish, many things need to be enhanced or secured, like work ethics, the skills and capacity of the locals, accountability, good governance, active government support, better security, etc.

If aids and business both have limitations in Africa, then what is the alternative? Those who want to find a middle ground could fancy 'social enterprises' being a solution. Social entreprises look and work like regular, traditional enterprises because they are revenue-generating, but that have the goal of having a positive impact on society in terms of the well-being of the environment and human life.[7] But social entreprises that operate at the borderline between the for profit and non-profit domains can be even more difficult to manage successfully given the challenging conditions in Sub-Saharan Africa.

There is more to Africa's business model than meets the eye, and tackling relevant policy matters should begin with the understanding of

more basic factors that lie beneath the surface. Having an overly rosy picture of the role of the private sector and business when the social fabric and the role of the government remain very weak is simply naive and detrimental: mismanagement, inefficiencies, shut-downs and corruption are the price to pay for this way of thinking.

The Last Word

Continued poverty and underdevelopment, not to mention various instabilities and conflicts, in the region can be attributed primarily to gross negligence on the part of the countries in terms of their task of nation-building. All African nations aspire to achieve economic prosperity and talk about transformation, but what they have not done is to actually put in place the things that allow such progress to occur. Because what is at stake and matters ultimately today is the most significant 'unit', the nation. When a nation becomes independent and forms a state, every effort should be made to make it worthwhile, otherwise there is no point in having a state to begin with.

Ethnical, racial and regional divides create a hurdle, but this is not uniquely an African issue. In fact, there are many developed and developing countries outside of Africa that have multi-ethnic, cultural features as well as regional divides. Therefore, such elements cannot serve as a good excuse for underdevelopment. Dealing with these matters is simply a part of the normal, everyday business of all nations. But what is intriguing is that many people want to treat Africa differently, forgetting the general rule applicable to all people in our history—no nations had all the right or favourable conditions (including doorstep or initial conditions for industrialization) to develop successfully when they emerged as nation states or territorial states. It is the process of consolidation, integration, harmonization and building the capacity to deal with various challenges that makes states viable. In this respect, nation-building, which is essential for national development, is not one-time event, but one which has to be worked on persistently in order to be achieved.

So the reason that Sub-Saharan African countries continue to struggle—despite their enormous riches in terms of natural endowments and external assistance, as well as the goodwill and opportunities provided to them by the international community at large—is because they have not done their part at their end. The worst thing that can happen is further 'internationalization of Africa's problems' or increasingly turning Africa's problems into the responsibility of the international community, thereby incapacitating African nations forever. Despite all the talk inside the African Union about Africa taking ownership of the Union, its members cannot agree to stop depending on outside assistance to finance its operations. In this regard, initiatives and progress to launch the African Continent Free Trade Area (AfCFTA) in 2018 are a positive development for the region. But the question remains how expediently and thoroughly will this be pursued and operated, and if it will not become another New Partnership for Africa's Development?

Improving basic living conditions and rights of the people, and achieving sustainable economic and social development should be the primary goals of African countries, and the role of the international donor community should be assist them in this respect. But in order to move in the direction of progress, efforts must be made to break the status quo and the elements that perpetuate the current state of poverty and underdevelopment. And it all comes down to people's mind and behaviour which determine how much and what kind of change can be brought about under the given circumstances.

Regarding work ethics, it is undeniable that when people become more diligent and disciplined in their work, things improve markedly. But people cannot simply be told to work harder or expected to behave in this way; they have to be 'motivated' to act differently. Among many things, what is probably more important is to have higher expectations or desires in life. People should be dissatisfied with their present lot and should be aspiring for a better life. Some African leaders implore their people to get out of a subsistence way of life and become more productive, but a perennial impediment is the *minimalist* tendency in the

lifestyle of the people in general: exerting minimal effort while expecting minimal returns.

Mindful of this, a shift should be made from such a minimalist stance to a 'more-for-more' type of approach: people having greater desires and expectations in life, and exerting greater efforts to achieve them, while at the same time contributing in terms of economic value addition. A lesson from the Korean case is that during the emerging state of the economy at least, for the sake of rapid economic growth, it is vital to avoid the politicization of the economy; in other words, it is better to delink economic policies from political consideration as much as possible.

An interesting example in this respect is South Africa. Despite all its advantages compared to other Sub-Saharan African countries, South Africa suffers from an exceptionally low economic growth rate and a reduced credit standing. Mismanagement, corruption, inordinately politically oriented economic policies and uncertainties in politics, among other factors, are the challenges facing the new President Cyril Ramaphosa in the aftermath of Jacob Zuma's era of misrule and 'state capture'. The impending land expropriation without compensation is another potential 'dynamite' issue that may rock the country if it is not appropriately pursued. Besides its socio-economic ramifications, in purely technical terms, considering the lack of capacity and corruption in government circles, land reform poses another great hurdle for the nation.

Without a general change in people's mindset or their value system, and most importantly their 'motivational-behavioural system', it will be illogical to expect substantive progress to come about. The 'speed' of work is another thing that I have stressed, because development is essentially about how much change can be made over time. A most simple measurement of development could be represented as follows:

$$\text{Development} = \frac{\text{Change}}{\text{Time}}$$

Here 'change' means the extent of positive net change or improvement. So how can a society or nation manage to 'engineer' its people

to become more actively oriented in a positive fashion? There can be a number of approaches at different levels and in order to be effective, they should be synchronized or pursued in unison. As explained, the basic economic principle or mechanism should be 'incentives and sanctions'. Here, a 'meritocracy' should be strictly observed, based on 'competition' and performance. And extra efforts need to be made to bring about positive attitudinal change on the part of the people, and a vigorous campaign to instil development-mindedness and KPOP in the populace may prove to be very useful.

There are clear limitations in terms of the extent to which a nation can develop in a transformational and sustainable way if the people are not increasingly empowered and if only a small number of people and companies remain productive and drive the economy forward. Foreign partners or companies can be brought into fill the gaps, but even this would not yield the expected outcomes in the end without the overall improvement in the conditions and capacity of the host nations. A national economy that is overdependent on foreign entities with the vast majority of its people remaining dependent and unproductive cannot be a sign of success. This is where Asian countries contrast with Sub-Saharan African countries, the former being able to empower and economically mobilize a large section of their population, while thus far, the latter has not able to do so.

The fastest way to transform for developing countries would be when there is both good governance and strong, effective mobilization of the people. But it could be considered as a given that poor countries lack such attributes and, as a consequence, they remain poor. In Africa, many things do not seem to work as they are supposed to, and some experts can claim to know more about the reasons why than others. However, coming to have a better understanding of an issue does not necessary mean that one will deal with it more proactively. Knowing is one thing, but taking action is quite another. It all depends on how, and with what objective, one approaches the issue.

Even governance and work ethic levels which people would think are more or less fixed should be regarded as variables that can altered. Experts can inadvertently promote the status quo rather than change with their 'this is how it works, so this is how it should be done' kind of attitude. I believe there is always a price to pay for choosing to remain

in one's comfort zone, and catering to people's needs cannot be an end in itself for the sake of development.

Everything begins from the basics, and problems that are fundamental in nature call for equally fundamental responses. Whether it concerns daily business, construction works, technical training or institution-building, laying a solid foundation or embodying sound basics is the key to success. Development is a building-block process, and the quality as well as the quantity of inputs will determine the outputs. There is no silver bullet or shortcut to improving the state of the economy of a nation. It is not a simple matter of choice or timing like having the right things at the right time; it is a matter of how well and expeditiously things are actually *done*. So let us not be consumed by debates pitting 'aid vs. business', 'liberalization vs. protectionism' or 'private sector vs. government intervention' because these are peripheral topics that mask and divert our attention away from the central issues. We should also pay more attention to institutions; the indications are that the performance of institutions in Sub-Saharan Africa is weakening instead of improving, as noted by the World Bank.[8] Even in more advanced countries like South Africa, 'there had been a profound weakening of state institutions and a generalisation of criminality across the state and not only in national departments' (see Note 8).

Each person has different individual attributes, abilities and level of ambitions, and everyone can contribute to their society in different ways through the division of labour. The important thing is that individuals each play a part that matches their purported role. 'Small and steady progress' may not sound like a big deal, but means a lot. And it will take commitment and consistent efforts to achieve incremental progress on a sustained basis, including actions to prevent or minimize various 'leakages' that happen every so often across Africa. Small and steady improvement, on all fronts, can mean everything for the development of a nation. When improvements, even modest ones, add up, significant transformational changes can come about. Big achievements do not happen overnight, but must be worked on assiduously. The miraculous economic development of South Korea is the outcome of such a broad-based 'incremental and sustained' approach involving or mobilizing a large segment of the populace and driven by multiple actors.

But the voice of conscience has not died down. In South Africa, the Moral Regeneration Movement (MRM) emerged as early as 1997 with a sense of urgency in the midst of rising violence, intolerance and disregard for the wellbeing of others.[9] In 1994, the first post-apartheid government of Nelson Mandela was formed, but the legacy of apartheid manifested itself in an unexpected fashion, for example, in the rise of the black-on-black violence, despite the achievement of democracy. Hence, Mandela introduced the concept of the MDM, which he termed the RDP (Reconstruction and Development Programme) of the soul.[10] This movement goes on unabated in view of its apparent need, but there can be limits to such a campaign if it is confined to a moral-religious context. What is much needed alongside this is a different empowerment of the people, a social mobilization movement that drives people to become more positively oriented in their actions.

There should be some points to take away from this book that shed light on important things that were literally ignored. I will mention just two here. The first one is that, surprisingly, the development community, both international and local, has not identified and targeted human factors to any serious degree; that is, they have not gone straight to the heart of the matter. Development assistance has largely turned into diplomatic and political events that talk about the niceties on the surface, but avoid touching the innate, hard-to-deal-with subjects. If the intrinsic factors are not recognized and dealt with forcefully, then development efforts will continue to be a ritual or superficiality. The second point to take away is that the mainstream international development community and African countries have not heeded facts, truths and examples of economic development that history and the world have demonstrated for all to see and applied them in practice.

The best indicator of development is looking at it from the standard of 'way of life'. 'Has the way of life of people changed and become more developmental?' should be the central criterion. The measurement should not be how much funds or material wealth are transferred to the benefit of the recipients. So, various grant offering programmes that do not change people's behaviours but make them even more dependent are detrimental as they are anti-developmental and perpetuating poverty.

If the South Korean example is anything to go by, for a very poor country to emerge successfully in the way it did, improvements must be made in all aspects of nationhood and lives of the people: nation-building, national ideas and goals, work ethics, ambitions to lead better lives, civic-mindedness, adherence to norms, rules and regulations, democracy and universal values, etc. In fact, in the early stage of Korea's development, the focus was on nation-building, empowerment of the people and work ethics; in its latter phase, democracy, international standards, civic values and universal norms were increasingly pursued and valued.

I think these are all essential elements and features that characterize developed nations. But the established international community tends to place emphasis on democracy, the rule of law, human rights and good governance, while African states in general are seen to stress law and order, stability and security, or 'national interests' and unity above others. Meanwhile, in some African countries, the leaders or governments have launched moral campaigns or pleaded with the people to become more economically productive.

In any case, national objectives, international rules and global values are all necessary for African countries to espouse in their path to development. Thus far, the methods used to 'inculcate' the people with these values have not proven to be very effective. What then would be a more practical, effective and natural approach to use in this situation? I think one of the answers to this is the 'community approach', as explained earlier.

In Africa, people's attachment to their relatives and community is unmistakable. Inculcating values and ideas in the people, let alone changing their mindsets, may not come easily through public lecturing. Instead, it would require a mechanism of voluntarism and constraints that can be applied directly to the people. The advantage of the community approach is that 'community' is already embedded with certain elements of voluntarism and constraints, so there is already a mechanism in place that can be utilized. If worked on properly, this can turn out to be an effective 'medium' for development that can act as the bridge for converting a traditional sector into a modern one. The most prominent example of this presented in this book is Korea's *Saemaul Undong*.

To elaborate on the second point to take away from this book, developed countries, international organizations and African nations alike have long drifted away from the very fundamentals of economic development and have been looking for answers in the wrong places. The proper approach should have been to spell out the core elements or 'undeniable truth' in development and then, based on this, engineer implementation plans by making the necessary adjustments in their existing methods.

In hindsight, it is quite surprising that the examples and lessons of South Korea and other Asian countries that provide the latest and possibly the most valuable case studies for African countries have not been more seriously considered and applied. But it is never too late, even if the international economic environment has changed considerably over recent decades. As such, there needs to be fresh new thinking in both theory and practice when it comes to African development. In this regard, Sung-Hee Jwa mentions that: 'Under whatever circumstances, the Korean lessons of keeping to economic discrimination principle in building economic institutions and policies as well as in creating the self-help spirit should not be ignored for those seeking economic development because this principle is the key to economic as well as human development by helping to overcome the constraints of resource endowment and the international environment as well as developmental-unfriendly tradition and culture.'[11]

Development is about 'changing for the better'. The *Cambridge Dictionary* defines it as 'the process in which someone or something grows or changes and becomes more advanced'. So when nations want to achieve development without themselves making the necessary changes, it means that they either do not understand what development stands for or think that others can do the work for them. *Wanting change without changing*, which sounds like an oxymoron, is a deep-seated impediment to development in the region.

Turning to the private sector, the fact that Africa is open to the world for business, and that new and innovative technologies are increasingly being applied to its markets, while creative entrepreneurs are emerging in start-ups gives new hope for economic dynamism in Africa. But in order for these private initiatives to flourish, they will need an

equally favourable environment and conducive support system, including administrative assistance, to facilitate their activities. In essence, it comes down to the management of state affairs and governance.

It is true that the current state of Sub-Saharan Africa requires many interventions in wide-ranging areas, and the various efforts made to this end by so many entities should not be overlooked. And we must go further in actively promoting development-mindedness, work ethics, social capital, civic values, etc. based on such spirit as voluntarism, ownership and 'harmonious change'. Although they are diverse, so we should always heed the call not to treat them as interchangeable, Sub-Saharan African countries can indeed all achieve successful economic transformation, under the present circumstances, should they espouse the key principles of development. And a more prosperous and stable Africa will be good for everybody and for the whole world.

In addition, the political stability and security that Africa's economic success will enhance will also greatly contribute to international peace and security. The best way to deal with the problem of refugees, illegal immigrants and modern-day slaves from Africa pouring into Europe and other parts of the world is by making Africa stable and prosperous. Hence, the global community should be more open-minded in its objectives and approach, and should work more in unison.

In this book, I have tried to make the case that a different approach is necessary for development in Sub-Saharan Africa. In laying out some ideas for 'reinventing Africa's development', I did not jump to the main points, but reviewed Africa's journey and its problems, the root causes of its underdevelopment; I then elaborated on South Korea's development model and experiences, and introduced relevant projects undertaken in Uganda as a main reference.

Certainly, there is room for improvement, and more cases in African countries could have been reviewed. While admitting limitations, I will leave the task to be further pursued in the near future. In any case, this endeavour was a challenging task, and my objective was to highlight the significance of the 'missing links' in Africa's development, and to bring the focus back to the 'basics' of social, economic and political development that the South Korean case very forcefully demonstrates. The grand theme of reinventing Africa's development is 'mindset change',

and under this proposition, I have attempted to link Africa's development to the Korean model of development, highlighting the mindset change approach and focusing on Korea's ingredients of success that are applicable to Africa. In order to do so, I had to newly construct the conceptual model of Korea's development to make sense of Korea's experience by accommodating socio-political alongside economic factors. The results are the derivation of a set of policy implications and recommendations for Africa.

Let me end by citing Nelson Mandela: 'The first thing is to be honest with yourself. You can never have an impact on society if you have not changed yourself.' These priceless words are displayed for everyone to see in Johannesburg's Apartheid Museum.

Notes

1. 'Dualistic Theories', *Theories of Underdevelopment*, http://economicsconcepts.com/dualistic_theories.htm. See also Sanket Suman, 'Social Dualism: Meaning, Characteristics and Critical Appraisal', *Economics Discussion*, http://www.economicsdiscussion.net.
2. Ibid.
3. Douglas Gollin, 'The Lewis Model: A 60-Year Retrospective', *Journal of Economic Perspectives* 28, no. 3 (Summer 2014), pp. 71–88.
4. Rwandan President Paul Kagame's speech delivered to a delegation from St Andrew's University in March 2015, quoted from the article 'Rwanda's Homegrown Solutions: Nation Harnesses Its Traditions for Success Today', *The Independent* (Uganda), supplement section, 23–29 December 2016.
5. Professor Anastase Shyaka, CEO of the Rwanda Governance Board, was elaborating on the Homegrown Solutions (quoted from the above article in *The Independent*).
6. Rwanda Governance Board, http://www.rgb.rw/index.php?id=134.
7. Social Enterprise Alliance, https://socialenterprise.us/about/social-enterprise; BC Centre for Social Enterprise, http://www.centreforsocialenterprise.com/what-is-social-enterprise.
8. 'World Bank Reveals a Weakening of Policy and Institutional Performance in Africa', World Bank press release, 24 July 2017.

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