Political Parties and the Party System

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Chapter 1

Introduction

Political parties and political systems

The intention is to test and explore the boundaries that exist (we have been told) between therapy and politics, between the inner world and the outer world, between being and doing, and even between what people still call "feminine" approaches to life and "masculine" approaches to life-no matter how problematic those words are. This paper is divided into a number of sections. It begins by addressing the questions, Why me? Why here? Why now? Then there follows a discussion of how, particularly after the 2004 U. S. presidential election, politics in the West can be understood as changing in the direction of what I call "transformative politics." Third, the question, "Can therapists really make a difference in the world today?" is asked. Fourth is a markedly experiential section entitled "The Inner Politician." I conclude with a few reflections on therapy, politics, and spirituality.

The bases for these remarks, which are grounded in clinical work with individuals, also lie in my involvement with a number of political organizations and recent political developments. I have carried out consultations and conducted workshops in Britain,

Europe, the United States, Japan, Brazil, Israel, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. These activities are designed to see how useful and effective perspectives derived from psychotherapy may be in forming policy, in creating new ways of thinking about the political process, and in resolving conflict. It is difficult to present therapy thinking so that mainstream politicians-for example, a senior U. S. Democrat senator or a British Labour Party committee-will take it seriously. And the problem is only slightly reduced when the politicians and organizations are alternative or activist.

I have also been involved in the formation of three organizations in Britain that are relevant to the themes of the paper. One is Psychotherapists and Counselors for Social Responsibility, an organization intended to help therapists and counselors use their knowledge and experience to intervene as professionals in social and political matters. The second organization is Antidote, a psychotherapy-based think tank cofounded with Susie Orbach.It fosters multidisciplinary work, and links are sought with people working in fields other than psychotherapy. Antidote has undertaken research into psychological attitudes toward money and economic issues and is also involved in trying to apply ideas about emotional literacy/intelligence to politics.

The third organization is called the St. James's Alliance. Based at a beautiful Wren church in Piccadilly in central London, it consists of individuals from diverse fields such as politics, economics, ethics, religion, nongovernmental organizations, activist and pressure groups, the media, and psychotherapy.It

attempts to incorporate psychological, ethical, and spiritual concerns into the political agenda and to facilitate dialogue between various single-issue and pressure groups. In the past, these groups were unsympathetic to other groups' goals-poverty workers did not have time for animal rights activists, for instance, and neither group seemed interested in the problems of the Middle East.

But in a suitably facilitated environment, it has been possible to find whole areas of common ground in relation to politics, and there are so many emotional and spiritual similarities to share. This is an experiment in gathering and using the shards of political energy that are normally split up and dissipated. Politics in many Western countries is broken and in a mess; we urgently need new ideas and approaches. Psychotherapists, along with economists, social scientists, religious people, environmentalists, and others, can contribute to a general transformation of politics. Today's politicians leave many with a sense of deep despair and disgust. They seem to lack integrity, imagination, and new ideas. Across the globe, and in response to the challenge, a search is on to remodel politics. Psychotherapy's contribution to this search depends on opening a two-way street between inner realities and the world of politics. We need to balance attempts to understand the secret politics of the inner world of emotional, personal, and family experiences with the secret psychology of pressing outer-world matters such as leadership, the economy, environmentalism, nationalism, and war. Our inner worlds and our private lives reel from the impact of policy decisions and the existing political culture. Why, then, do our policy committees

and commissions not have psychotherapists sitting on them as part of a range of experts/This is not a call for a committee of therapists, but just as a committee will often have a statistician present (someone whose role may not be fully appreciated by the other members), there should also be a therapist at the conference table. We expect to find therapists offering views on social issues that involve personal and familial relationships or matters to do with mental health but they may also have ideas to contribute on the" hard" issues-war, violence, poverty, and the economy. Is it possible to imagine a world in which people are encouraged to sharpen their half-thought-out, intuitive political ideas and commitments so as to take more effective political action? There are probably buried sources of political wisdom in many people, particularly those who do not seem likely to function in such a way. More and more, I have come to see that one does not have to be politically active or knowledgeable and talkative about politics to have something creative to say. Poets and mystics, introverts, those who eschew politics, and those who are ashamed at what they take to be their own ignorance often know something that the more overtly political do not. These anti-political citizens are a great aid in finding out how secret things childhood experiences, intimate relationships, fantasies (including sexual fantasies), dreams, and bodily sensations-may be reframed and turned to useful political ends. Thinking about those who usually do not say much, I find that they make a profound contribution to what I call" political clinics." These are large-group events, often composed of persons who have nothing to do with therapy and psychology at all but come together to explore their emotional and feeling-based

reactions to major political themes such as terrorism, the troubles in Northern Ireland, the conflict in the Middle East, racism, and homelessness. I have discovered that those who say" I am not interested in politics" are often deceiving themselves, caught in a reaction formation. As the political clinic unfolds, it becomes clear that they are indeed extremely interested, knowledgeable, and wise about politics but have always doubted, because they have been taught to doubt, that the emotional reactions they are experiencing are a legitimate part of political process. We are taught, in the Western countries, not to deny that we have emotions about politics, because that would be impossible, but to put those emotions rather low on the scale of what we value in official political debate and political discussion.

Sometimes at the conclusion of these political clinics, we start to talk in terms of citizens as" therapists of the world" who have a large set of usable counter transferences to the political cultures in which they live. This idea constitutes an intellectual challenge to much psychological theorizing about citizens, especially in psychoanalysis, wherein the citizen is regarded as a kind of baby, who has a transference and a collection of fantasies toward the" parental" society in which he or she lives. Turning that around, so that the citizen is seen as a kind of therapist or parent figure for the society can have a radical, uplifting, and empowering effect, overturning the tradition-especially in psychoanalysis-in which the citizen is seen as the baby and society as the parent. This claim, that the citizen is capable of being the therapist (parent) of the world, is one that embodies many possibilities as we struggle to work out what functions citizens might perform in

a society in which their voices are distorted by the mass media, and their internal lives unfold in a highly fraught political climate dominated by corporations and cartels.

Transformative Politics

Politics is slowly changing in Western countries, and we are at a very interesting moment in political consciousness. What used to be an elitist insight about how everything is secretly political is now becoming an element in mass awareness. For years now, feminists, academics, intellectuals, and some therapists and analysts have lived happily with the idea that our personal, psychological, and private worlds are full of political tensions, dynamics, and energies. But actually this has been a superior form of knowing, a political gnosticism. We knew that politics has expanded its definition to include all of the private stuff, but the masses did not. They have continued to be taught (but many now accept it less) that politics means official politics, party politics, congressional or parliamentary politics, power politics, the politics that money can buy, and so on. What helped to accelerate the democratization of the personal-is-political insight were the huge eruptions of feelings about certain events or political trends in recent years, turning those events into what can be called archetypal or at least numinous experiences: I am thinking of disparate phenomena, ranging from grief at the death of Princess Diana, to global anger at the role of the United States in world politics, to intense debates about the role of women in societies across the planet. The most ruthlessly successful contemporary politicians (such as Tony Blair) have perceived this

move into general awareness of the elitist, gnostic, private knowledge about how politics has changed, and they now couch their utterances in the language of the emotions. Another way in which politics has changed is that it has become more of a transformative process. By this I mean that engagement in political activity and processes of personal growth and development are seen increasingly as the same thing, or at least as the two sides of a coin.If one interviews persons active in post-Seattle politics, in the environmental movements, in certain sectors of feminism or the men's movement, or in ethnopolitics, one sees that what they are doing is in many respects self-healing in a positive sense that is familiar to psychotherapists. So politics starts to carry an overtly psychological, transformative burden. Sadly, this kind of transformative politics is not only progressive and left leaning, but it can also be spotted in many right-wing and reactionary movements, as the recent election showed.

A third way in which politics has changed is that there is now something that can be called" political energy" to be considered along with political power. Political power is what you would imagine it to be: control over resources such as land, water, oil- or indeed, information and imagery. Especially today, the issue of who controls information and imagery (e.g., on the Internet and on television) is almost as important as the issue of who controls oil or water. Political power is held by those you would expect to hold it: men, white people, the middle and upper-middle classes, and those who run the big institutions of finance, the military, and the academic and professional worlds, including the world of

mental health. Political energy is different. It is almost the opposite of political power. Political energy involves idealism and an imaginative and visionary focus on certain political problems with a view to making a creative impact on those problems (not necessarily with the goal of solving them).

Political energy seeks more political energy, attempting to build to critical mass. It is different from political power because those who have political energy, imagination, commitment, idealism, and real compassion almost by definition lack political power. Conversely, in contemporary societies, those who have political power tend to lack political energy. This is a fundamental and radical claim that I am sure will be much disputed. Indeed, the very idea of political energy will upset some intellectual applecarts, because most analysts cannot entertain this notion. In their view, energy does not exist; it is only a mechanistic 19th-century way of looking at things. But there seems to be a possible middle position in which energy, in the sense of psychic energy, is maintained both to exist and not to exist.

Jung suggested that, contra Freud's conception of libido, there is a neutral form of psychic energy that can run down various biological, psychological, spiritual, and moral channels. My proposal is that there is also a social channel and that a subset of the social channel will have to do with politics and political energy. As indicated just now, I use the term energy in both a metaphorical and a literal sense. Jung's idea that there is a specifically moral channel for psychic energy is extremely interesting, resonating with much evolutionary, ethological,

genetic, and psychoanalytic thought-Klein's idea of an innate superego, Winnicott's insistence that children have an inborn sense of guilt and hence are not born amoral, Milner's counsel that we stop seeing morality solely as something implanted in children by parents and society. Freud foreshadowed this train of thought with his remarks about the innate disposition of the self-preservation instincts to become more socially oriented.

People with political energy are doing something rather new and different in the Western world today in comparison with what those who have political power are doing. This thought can be liberatory if you are working in a small neighborhood group, in a social and political project with limited resources and support, or with people who have been abused, or if you are trying to build an environmentally informed movement for sustainable development and worldwide economic justice. If you are doing any or all of these things, then you probably do not have much power and it is very easy to judge yourself the way that the conventional political world might judge you-as a waste of time and space when it comes to real politics.

But the very notion of political energy is intended to shift this way of thinking. Very often when I talk about this, people say (as they did for example, at a conference in BeIo Horizonte, Brazil), "Yes, and we wonder what would happen if our country valued political energy as much as it values political power."

If political energy is not to be found in the sites of official politics, then where may we find it? Politics has left its home

base and gone out into the world to redefine itself and find other and new places to settle.

I am not advocating removing political energy from moribund formal institutions; this has been happening in Western societies anyway over many years in one of the most significant sociocultural and collective psychological shifts to take place in the developed countries since the end of World War II.

A striking feature of the past 20 years in such societies has been the spontaneous growth of new social and cultural networks. More and more people are now involved in such networks, increasingly aware that what they are doing may be regarded as political.

The contemporary elasticity in our definition of politics is not something that has been worked out by intellectuals. Nor has there been a concerted effort to achieve such a shift, because the new social movements operate in isolation from each other.

Yet, as we have found in the St. James's Alliance discussed previously, they have something psychological in common. They share an emotional rejection of big politics-its pomposity and self-interest, its mendacity and complacency.

They share a Weltanschauung and set of values based on ideas of living intelligible and purposeful lives in spite of the massive social and financial forces that work against intelligibility and purpose. Such new social changes include environmentalism; the formation of groups working for the rights of ethnic and sexual

minorities, animal liberation, complementary medicine; spiritual and religious groups devoted to paganism and neo-paganism; rock and other kinds of music and art; finding God in the new physics; an explosive growth in the participation in sports; organic farming-and psychoanalysis, psychotherapy, and counseling.

Elsewhere, I referred to the social movements as participating in a "resacralization" of politics. Sacral means holy, and the intent was to pick up on the attempt to get a sense of purpose, decency, aspiration, and meaning back into political culture. When I consider attempts by analysts and psychotherapists to do their bit, I have no alternative but to count us as part of this general, worldwide resacralizing movement.

Psychotherapists may want to be different and special, but in our attempts to work the borders between psychotherapy and society, we are part of something bigger, even if the rhetoric sometimes feels too New Agey. Psychotherapists tend to share with other resacralizers a sense of disgust with present politics and politicians. In political clinics, this is often an actual physical disgust involving the gagging reflex, an ancient part of the nervous system that is absolutely necessary for survival in a world full of tangible and metaphorical toxins.

Let me conclude this section by accepting that a transformation of politics is not going to happen in any kind of simple or speedy way and may not happen at all. There is an impossibility to the whole project because the social realm is as inherently

uncontrollable as the drives and images of the inner world and the unconscious. Once human desire enters a social system-as it always will-that system cannot function predictably. There are no final solutions to social questions. The social issues that face Western societies are as incorrigible, as unresponsive to treatment, as the psychological issues that individuals face.

Moreover, many will dispute that the cumulative public significances of these movements is positive. It can be argued that the proliferation of new networks and cultural practices is merely a further symptom of social malaise-a selfish retreat into personal, individual preoccupations, reflecting an abandonment of the aspiration to truly political values. It can also be pointed out that reactionary, fundamentalist, religious movements can be seen as attempting, in their own rather different terms, a form of resacralization. But what gets highlighted when religious fundamentalism is brought into the picture is the vastness of the energy pool available for the political reforms that are urgently needed.

Although I am enthusiastic about psychotherapy's role in the refreshing of political culture, I am also somewhat skeptical. So my answer to the question "Can therapists really make a difference?" is both "No" and "Yes." Let's deal with "No" first-with the pessimism. James Hillman and Michael Ventura wrote a book called We've Had a Hundred Years of Psychotherapy-and the World's Getting Worse. It is fairly clear what they were getting at-that psychotherapy makes little or no impact on an unjust world and that persons in therapy are cut off from taking responsibility

for ameliorating injustice (cut off from their political energy by therapy, which takes all available psychic energy for its own project of personal exploration).

Yet I think that a much more accurate title for their book would have been We've Had a Hundred Years of Psychotherapy, Trying to Improve the World, But the World Has Stayed Pretty Much the Same, because it is not new for psychotherapists to want to do something in relation to the world. Freud wanted it, Jung wanted it, and the great pioneers of humanistic psychotherapy-such as Maslow, Rogers, and Peris-all wanted it as well. All of these people and their followers invited the world into therapy, but the world didn't show up for its first therapy session.

There are good reasons why the world didn't show up, other than mere resistance. One reason is that therapists so much want and need to be right. (Me, too-this shadow issue of the analyst's maddening rectitude is not one I pretend to have fully dealt with.) Therapists want to reduce everything to the special knowledge that they have. This kind of reductionism gives therapy a bad name when it comes to political and social issues. For example, I remember reading in the London Guardian an article-later the object of intense ridicule-by a Kleinian psychoanalyst about the phallic symbolism of cruise missiles going down ventilator shafts in Baghdad.

My Jungian colleagues are just as bad when they tell us that the military-industrial complex is all the responsibility of the Greek God Hephaestos. The world won't listen to that level of

explanation from psychotherapists and is right not to. The priority for psychotherapists is to embark on multidisciplinary work.

But other issues besides therapy reductionism have stopped us from being useful outside a few specific areas such as psychoanalytically influenced social casework or, in some countries, child welfare legislation. Overall, there is a fairly bad record to own up to. Psychotherapists have colluded with oppressive regimes in Nazi Germany, the former Soviet Union, Argentina, and South Africa.

We have been involved in dubious activities such as sending soldiers suffering from shell shock and battle fatigue back to the line of battle in both world wars. There is also the ever-present collusion of many psychotherapists with all manner of normative and oppressive practices, ranging from the psychopathological stigmatization of lesbians and gay men.

And therapists all over the world easily join in right-wing politicians' attacks on father-lacking lone-parent families. According to the right-wing reading, these families-totally responsible for spoiling our wonderful world, only need a father or father figure to come back and sort them out. I love fathers and was one of the first to write about what good-enough fathers actually do, especially with their bodies, to further the sexual, aggressive, and spiritual development of their children. But I utterly loathe the damaging idealization of fathers that so many

Western politicians have gone in for, backed by complacent analysts, therapists, and other mental health professionals.

Then there is the problematic matter of psychotherapy's implicit claim that Western and rocentric, middle-class values and ways of thinking hold and have value universally and are superior to/should be imposed on the values and ways of thinking of non-Western cultures.

Clearly, these unspoken assumptions reflect the typical caseloads of analysts and therapists, especially in private practice, in many countries. The treatment of women in much psychoanalytic thinking and practice has also been damaging to some. The rise of feminist and gender-sensitive psychotherapy has had an important impact in ameliorating this situation. And what a lot of therapists and analysts say about men is also beginning to receive the same kind of critique that definitions of and generalizations about women used to receive.

Another reason why people are not so likely to listen to therapists who want to make a difference in the world is that therapists are completely crazy in their own professional politics, and the way they organize themselves radiates that craziness. No profession has been quite as subject to splits as the therapy profession; no profession has so frequently used personal demonization and pathological pigeonholing to deal with and get rid of troublesome outsiders and those who question from within.

As I continue to look at why we world-oriented therapists do not have a client, I note that-for reasons I do not fully understand

even now-the therapy world has tragically split its clinical project off from its sociocritical project. Frankfurt school writers and Lacanian theorists rarely talk of clients, or in an ordinary way about people: mothers, fathers, families, marriages, dreams, symptoms, sexuality, aggression, the inner world of the imagination. And when we read most clinical texts, the external world is hardly mentioned. Much therapy still seems (or claims) to take place in a political vacuum.

There are several delusional aspects of this virginal fantasy about what we do. One delusion is that there are no politics going on the session itself, whereas many clinicians know how the power dynamics and imbalances of the typical therapy setup cannot be wished away by reference to parental transference or the law of the father. These power imbalances often involve the denial of difference of any kind between therapist and client, the bending of the client to the moral will of the therapist, and the ongoing scandal of sexual misconduct.

Another delusion is that it is not possible to find a responsible way to work directly with political, social, and cultural material in the clinical session. There is not sufficient space here for a full discussion of this topic. Succinctly, my position is that it is time to think together about how we can change our practices and our thinking about clinical work in order to incorporate these taboo themes.

To explore empirically what has been happening at the interface of psychotherapy and politics in the actual session, I surveyed

2000 analysts and therapists of many schools worldwide about which political issues their clients mentioned in therapy, how frequently the clients raised such issues, whether such mentions were increasing or decreasing, and how the therapists reacted.

Approximately 700 responded: I also asked the respondents about their own political views and histories. The survey revealed that the therapy profession is far more politically sensitive than one would think, and that politics is a welcome theme in a significant minority of clinical offices.

It underlined the importance of shopping around for and interviewing a potential analyst or therapist. The answers to the questions about which political and social issues are raised also made it clear that clients are raising economic, environmental, and gender-political issues (including issues that do not seem to affect them personally) in their therapy sessions much more than they used to.

The respondents clearly wanted to honour and respond to this development, but almost all admitted that they lacked training, helpful texts, and general encouragement to do it on a regular, professional, reputable basis. In fact, many felt that it would be regarded as bad practice even though they wanted very much to engage more expertly with such material when clients bring it to the session.

There is a big difference between a mutual exploration of some huge external event that has dominated everyone's lives (such as the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001) and struggling to

develop ongoing, ordinary ways of working in the session with the client's political selfhood (and that of the therapist) as it has evolved over a lifetime.

Though it can be a fascinating and important moment in any therapy, responding to the impact on the analysis of a moment of high political drama that has affected everyone is not the same as extending what we regard as contemporary good practice to include all aspects of work on the political dimensions of experience.

For example, the Psychoanalytic Dialogues symposium entitled "Reflections on September 11, 2001" (2003, 13/3), though moving, and insightful, did not refer to an ongoing need to develop clinical principles by which to explore the transformative aspects of what I call political discussion within the sealed vessel of an ordinary therapy relationship.

Such work might include (but not be restricted to) the following:

- Exploration of the role played by the joint immersion in the social order on the part of analyst and client in making relationality possible in the first place, whether at a conscious level or at that of unconscious-to-unconscious communication: citizenship facilitating countertransference;
- Considering the functioning of nonpersonal fields that cause distress in individuals who are not personally affected-for example, economic injustice, species depletion, domestic violence (my experience being that

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the strongest imaginable affects, disturbances in self-image, and psychological conditions-such as depression-involve etiologies at least partly rooted in such nonpersonal fields); and

- Refining technique so as to work out ways of managing states in the analyst that are difficult to manage due to the presence of political viewpoints in the client that feel offensive, upsetting, or disagreeable to the analyst (we all work with people whom we sometimes find unpleasant, and we can build on this capacity so as to encompass our responses to what we find personally unpleasant in the political positions held by the client).

The Inner Politician

Where did your own politics originate? I think this is a question worth asking. What influence did your mother have on the politics you now have? Or your father? And what about differences between your parents in political outlook? Some people have been influenced in their political development by significant others in their lives, such as teachers, clergy, older friends at school.

Were you? Your gender is really very significant in the kind of attitude to politics that you have, and your sexual orientation is equally important. Lesbians and gay men live more closely to the political aspects and nuances of life than straight people do. Class and socioeconomic factors are obviously central, too, and so is ethnic, religious, and national background. In Western

societies, the feeling of being oppressed by a domestic tyrant, whether male or female, or of seeing other family members as oppressed, can give rise to a sharp sense of injustice and embryonic revolutionary feelings.

Sometimes when I talk to people about what has formed their politics, they start to speak about an event or moment that they remember-their first political memory, the first time they became aware that there is a political system with power at its core, including disparities of wealth and influence. Did you explore these first political memories with your own analyst?

Another way to look at the notion of the inner politician is to imagine a political energy scale on which ten stands for political fanaticism, even martyrdom, and zero stands for absolute passivity, a total lack of interest in politics. Where would you place yourself right now in your life-what level of political energy do you have? Play around with the scale. When you're with people of the same sex, does the energy level go up or down or stay the same?

Is it higher at home or at work? Are there some issues that send it skyrocketing and some that bring it down? Think of the last big interpersonal disagreement or fight with someone you love. Could it be that there was a different level of political energy at work in each of you?

Let's take this thinking right into the traditional heartland of psychotherapy. What was your mother's level of political energy compared with yours, or with your father's? What was your level

compared with the typical level of those from the street or neighborhood where you grew up? Continuing to sketch the inner politician, I come to the question of political style. I have noticed in my conflict resolution work that those in conflict are often operating not only with very different levels of political energy, but also with very different political styles. Hence, in my work as a political consultant, I am using the idea of conflicting political styles in many settings.

My inspiration in overall terms was Jung's model of psychological types: extroversion, introversion, thinking, feeling, sensation, intuition. As in life generally, for a variety of reasons (some having to do with personal backgrounds, some with inborn political constitutions), people live out the political aspects of themselves in different ways. Some are violent terrorists; some are pacifists.

Some want empirical backup for their ideas; others prefer to fly by the seat of their pants. Some definitely enjoy cooperative political activity; others will suffer the nightmare of working in a group only because they passionately believe in the ends being pursued. As we begin to work out a psychologically driven transformative politics, let us not make the mistake of insisting that everyone do it in precisely the same way.

If we are to promote political creativity, we need to value and honour diverse political styles and types, and to think of ways of protecting such diversity. (I am indebted to Muriel Dimen [personal communication] for the observation that political style

and self-state have something in common as approaches to the diversity of personality.)

As I mentioned, the notion of political style is useful when addressing conflict, whether interpersonal or within organizations or even between nations or parts of nations. Just as introverts and extroverts suffer from mutual in comprehension, persons who employ a particular political style often have very little understanding of how other persons or groups are actually doing their politics. This is not to say that political content per se is irrelevant, only that there may be more that divides opponents than their different views.

One might list words that evoke images of differing political types as follows, in a spectrum ranging from active styles to passive ones: warrior, terrorist, exhibitionist, leader, activist, parent, follower, child, martyr, victim, trickster, healer, analyst, negotiator, bridge builder, diplomat, philosopher, mystic, ostrich.

When working on questions of political style, it is not necessary to encourage anyone to stick to just one style. In fact, the opposite is true. The context in which the politics in question is taking place needs to be borne in mind. Some people will use one political style in one setting and quite another in a different one. A negotiator at work may be a terrorist at home. Some may have a superior political style, an inferior political style, and auxiliary styles, to borrow the words of Jimg's typological schema. Thus, a warrior may have neglected her philosopher or a diplomat his activist.

This approach was partially fashioned on the basis of my work with a mixed group of Israeli Arabs and Israelis of Jewish background in Jerusalem in the early 1990s. It became clear that, aside from the obvious irreconcilable differences in how the Middle East political scene was understood, there were individuals on both sides of the divide who were participating in the group in very similar or identical ways.

I pointed this out and reorganized the spatiality and seating plan of the group along style lines rather than content lines. There were discernible improvements in comprehension, and even, to a limited extent, in goodwill. The warring factions were presented not with an analysis of what they were saying (that came later), but with a panorama of the ways in which they were saying it- that is to say, with the style of politics they were using.

I have also found the same approach useful in addressing organizational and theoretical disputes in the psychotherapy field and, most recently, in work with senior administrators in Britain's beleaguered National Health Service.

Psychotherapy, Politics, and Spirituality

Attempts are constantly made to improve things in the political world, usually by redistributing wealth or changing legislative and constitutional structures or defusing warlike situations. It is not that nothing is being tried to make things better. Equally vigorous attempts are made to resist and to contest such changes, and most social systems have a gigantic, impersonal

capacity to resist change anyway. But projects of reform are valuable and necessary and generate their own psychological changes. For example, the consequences of fair and effective minimum wage legislation or devolving power to the regions of a country or amending the constitution would have effects that would show up on any national emotional audit.

But a materialist approach deriving exclusively from economics, or one that depends solely on altering the structures of the state, will not refresh those parts of the individual citizen that a psychological perspective can reach.

Our disappointment at liberal democracy's failure to deliver the spiritual goods and our growing realization that there are limits to what can be achieved by economic redistribution or altering constitutional structures strengthen my overall argument: something is missing in contemporary Western politics, something that involves a calamitous denial of the secret life at its core. We can change the clothes and shift the pieces around, but the specter that haunts materialist and constitutional moves in the political world is that they only ruffle the surface. They do not (because-alone-they cannot) bring about the transformations for which the political soul yearns.

The perspectives advocated here may never, ever be applied to our political culture. Everything psychotherapists and analysts have said or done may fail to make one iota of difference in the condition of the world. So I conclude with a few words about failure by Samuel Beckett, who lived and struggled as intensely

as anyone with what it might mean to be a good-enough citizen, involving a profound acceptance of the need to go on in the face of not being able to go on: "No matter. Fail again. Fail better."

Chapter 2

Gestural Politics: Civil Society OB Markers and" New" Politics

The study of civil society in Singapore is an academic field attracting significant interest and analysis. It is commonly recognized as an important element in a vibrant and innovative society. Citizen participation in the policy process also plays a crucial role in a modern knowledge-based economy. Authoritarianism under the PAP People's Action Party has never prevented social organization per se, including the conditional existence of autonomous groups not threatening to the PAP. In fact, at times the PAP has actively but selectively encouraged social organization as a way of embedding the regime. In early 2005, E. Kay Gillis published a monograph entitled Singapore Civil Society and British Power, tracing the "history" of civil society by investigating "associational activity" in Singapore from 1819 to 1963, or during the era of British power and rule. Gillis found through her research that civil society in Singapore had been strong and effective throughout the period, despite the fact that the British regime was seen as authoritarian, demonstrating that civil society can exist outside a liberal democratic context. In fact, Gillis argues that civil society, marked by open and autonomous citizen participation in the policy process, played a crucial role in the movement towards the nation's independence. (Others, however, question the existence of contemporary notions

of civil society before the formation of the Singapore nation-state). According to Gillis, although civil society started to dismantle during the final period of British rule, it was the then newly elected PAP government's "introduction of domestic restrictive policies on the grounds that the survival of Singapore was at stake" that brought civil society to its lowest ebb. Although Singapore has since not only survived but prospered economically under the control and rule of the PAP, many of these restrictive—and arguably, repressive—policies continue to affect the cultivation of civil society in contemporary Singapore. Singapore's brand of authoritarianism, one of the more dubious reasons for its remarkable success over the past four decades, has been characterized by both legal and "extra-legal" limits to independent social and political activities.

While legal limits would include somewhat repressive and political laws such as the Internal Security Act (ISA) and the Societies Act of 1968, the application of what I would call "extra-legal" strategies are far broader. These include, inter alia, "extensive mechanisms of political co-option to channel contention through state-controlled institutions", the creation of quasi-opposition in parliament via the Nominated Member of Parliament (NMP) scheme, as well as the ambiguously framed yet enduring discourse of out-of-bounds markers (or "OB markers"), an important element in our study of civil society in Singapore which will be deliberated in this paper. The encroachment of the state into many facets of everyday life led to calls, particularly by the newly emerging middle-class Singaporeans, for greater liberalization of the cultural sphere. As a consequence, interests

in civil society—both in socio-cultural and political terms—were rekindled from the mid-1980s onwards, though not much happened until the early 1990s. In November 1990, Singapore witnessed its first "changing of the guard" when Goh Chok Tong became the country's second Prime Minister. Upon taking up his new position, Prime Minister Goh declared his intention to embrace a more open, consultative, and consensual leadership style.

To many observers, this meant that Singapore was on course for a less authoritarian mode of rule, which translated to a more participatory form of democracy, and one that would appear to be more sympathetic and welcoming to civil society. The reality, however, was starker than envisaged. While the 1990s saw a revival of interest in the concept of civil society in Singapore, it was also the decade that led to the entrenchment of "OB markers", a golfing terminology that is intended to demarcate the parameters of political debate and thus render civil society meaningless, into Singapore's political lexicon.

Then in January 2004, shortly after then Deputy Prime Minister and Finance Minister Lee Hsien Loong was declared Singapore's next premier, he gave a major speech on the future of politics and society in Singapore at the 35th Anniversary Dinner of the Harvard Club of Singapore. In a speech intended as a preview to his style of rule, Lee laid down his protocol for government-people interaction, as well as the limits of political engagement, by declaring that Singapore "must open up further" by promoting "further civic participation".

Without quite explaining what he meant by "civic" or "opening up", Lee proffered five broad "suggestions"—better read as caveats—on how to promote "civic participation" and therefore build a more "civic society" in Singapore, namely: guidelines for public consultations on new policies or regulations, space for rigorous and robust debate, an emphasis on action or active citizenship, a constructive and "non-crusading" media, and a government that continues to lead the way even as it becomes more open to views. Taking a leaf from his predecessor's book, Lee was in fact pre-empting the "noise" of civil society and political criticism by declaring that he would become an open, inclusive, and consultative leader.

As this paper will go on to contend, the use of populist rhetoric like "openness" and "inclusiveness", as representations of a "civic" and/or "civil" society, must not be taken at face value, since they are often cryptic and ambiguous. Rather, these broad terms and loose concepts exemplify what I would present as "gestural politics", where, "by displaying the "liberal" gestures of the regime, Singaporean voters as well as foreign visitors and investors would be attracted to the new Singapore and its leadership one way or another". In other words, the "gesture" of civil society is more pertinent than its substance. After all, the rise of globalization, along with global (if Western) socio-political influences and rapid advances in media technologies, has meant that it was a matter of time before the government had to deal with the incursion of an increasingly politicized civil society that could threaten PAP rule. Gestural politics thus helps to "nip the problem in the bud". Recognizing that the concept of civil society

comes in various contours, forms, and content, and as such is always arbitrary and ill-defined, it is therefore up to the regime to define, and thus scope, civil society for its own ends and purposes. For better or worse, the equivocal but complex notion of civic and/or civil society makes it particularly amenable to wide (mis)appropriation, hence a "perfect" representation of gestural politics. As Kumar connotes, albeit in another context:

"Civil society" sounds good; it has a good feel to it; it has the look of a fine old wine, full of depth and complexity. Who could possibly object to it, who will not wish for its fulfilment?

The discussion that follows provides a broad summary of how the term "civil society" has been employed in Singaporean public (and political) discourse: from its promulgation as "civic" society by George Yeo in the 1990s to its reassertion as a government vision statement calling for "active citizenship" and citizens' "feedback" at the turn of the millennium (especially in Singapore 21: Together, We Make the Difference) from 1999; to its current—and arguably, future—place in a supposedly "new" Singapore of the 21st century, creatively captured by the theme of an "open and inclusive Singapore", first articulated by Lee in January 2004 and followed up in his brief "swearing-in" speech on 12 August 2004. In essence, this paper considers how civil society exemplifies "gestural politics" in Singapore. It argues that while to some extent, engagement with the concept of civil society has become a political necessity, "new" rhetoric about politics and civil society in Singapore remains by and large gestural. Or as Chua puts it in his socio-political assessment of "Singapore in

the next decade", the "new" Singapore of the 21st century is likely to be marked by greater liberalization, and not a democratization, of the social, cultural—and indeed public—sphere. The 1990s: Civic Society and Active Citizenship Citizenship is not a reality TV show.

You cannot just watch in the comfort of your home. You need to participate. Every time we participate, we reaffirm our membership and allegiance to our fellow citizens, our community and our country. [Participation] is critical in rooting Singaporeans to the country. (Raymond Lim, Singapore's Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Trade and Industry)

In June 1991, while government administrators were implementing voter-friendly "consultative" strategies of the "new guard" led by newly installed Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, the concept of civic society was promulgated in Singapore by a "new guard" minister, George Yeo, who was at the time acting in the portfolio of Information and the Arts] Widely regarded as one of contemporary Singapore's most eloquent politicians, Yeo made his—and indeed Singapore's—seminal speech on "civic society" to suggest a need for Singaporeans to be actively involved not so much in parliamentary, partisan, or lobbyist politics, but in creating a "Singapore soul", marked by a nationalistic and deep emotional attachment to Singapore. His intention was to urge Singaporeans to participate or play a part in enhancing the civic life in and of Singapore so that people will treat the country as home rather than a "soulless hotel" where one can come and go as one pleases. As Yeo declared: If we are not to be only a hotel,

we must have a soul. To develop that soul, we need a lively civic society. The State must pull back some so that the circle of public participation can grow.

The use of the term "soul" to refer to one's deep affiliation with the nation is a powerful metaphor. As Nikolas Rose elucidates in his Foucaultian analyses of contemporary governmentality, good government "operates through the delicate and minute infiltration of the ambitions of regulation" into the very interior—or soul—of human existence and experience. Thus, to equate a "lively civic society" with the "soul" of a nation is to effectively forge symmetry between the desires of the individual as citizen and the urge of governments to manage the individual as a participatory subject and cultural citizen.

In this way, the state would be able to, as Yeo puts it quite plainly, "pull back some" to provide "space" for citizens to perform their patriotic citizenship duties. In the case of Singapore during the 1990s, the intention of raising the stakes of civil society-cum-public participation was not so much to enable a thriving public sphere, but to advance and perfect the regulatory apparatuses-cum-technologies of government. Yeo's vision of a civic society is, after all, consistent with then Prime Minister Goh's professed commitment towards a more consultative style of government. The problem though is that the term "civic society" is not quite identical to that of a "civil society". As Singaporean sociologist Chua Beng Huat points out:

The difference between the two terms, "civic society" and "civil society" is not some inconsequential play of words, but an

indication of one's political stance on the appropriate balance in the relationship between state and society in Singapore.

In other words, when Singaporean politicians use the term "civic society", they are effectively talking about the "civic" responsibilities of citizens as opposed to that of the "rights" of citizenship espoused in the conventional and political understanding of the concept of "civil society". Likewise, Koh Tai Ann suggests that Singapore's model of "civic society" seeks primarily to forestall the potentially destabilizing "politicking" practices of civil society. By placing emphasis on the term "civic"—and the attendant discourses of courtesy, kindness, graciousness, and civility—which spells how citizens ought to behave and conduct themselves publicly, it is hoped that Singaporeans would be discouraged or distracted from real politicking activities.

The choice of the term "civic" by Yeo and other government officials is thus prudent and well-calculated, one that is "consistent with the PAP's language of politics". Even if "civic society" does become interpreted—or confused—as "civil society", the grounds are well covered. At an Institute of Policy Studies conference on civil society in May 1998, George Yeo—who was by then elevated to the full senior status of Minister of Information and the Arts—made a conceptual departure from his original "civic society" speech by declaring that a "civic" society was really Singapore's idea of "civil society". Civil society to Yeo is not just about citizenship in the form of voting rights or the right to carry a Singapore passport, it is more veraciously about

enhancing the relationship between state and the non-state for the sake of the nation and its citizens. In trying to depoliticize "civil society", Yeo was in effect attempting to engage—somewhat pre-emptively—the proponents of an autonomous civil society by defining the very terms and tenets of future political engagement. Far from being depoliticized or non-political, this move to carve out a "civic" mode of civil society for Singapore was motivated by political expedience.

Indeed, like most aspects of politics in Singapore, civic or civil society has its own "special meanings", explicable and interpretable only by the PAP. By "pre-defining" civil society, the government could thus go on to talk about various aspects of "civic-ness" and "civility" as captured in less problematic public discourses such as courtesy, kindness, and graciousness.

It could also go on to "proselytize" about the merits of citizen participation in the policy process or "active citizenship", the central theme of "Singapore 21" (the government's 1999 vision of Singapore in the 21st century), knowing full well that free and autonomous participation is mostly absent in a society that is notorious for being politically passive and apathetic. Ho Khai Leong alludes to this problem when he notes that:

The extent to which Singapore citizens can influence policy making depends on the extent to which the PAP allows it to happen. The basic ground rules are set from above and citizenry is merely passively reacting to those regulations. Although most Singaporeans perceive "Singapore 21" as yet another motherhood

statement by the self-proclaimed all-knowing government, the call for "active citizenship" was generally well-received by many people, including those affiliated with local interest groups. The possibility of forging a new "social contract" between the government and its people was sufficiently attractive to groups which had previously existed on the periphery.

Groups such as The Working Committee (TWC), a civil society advocate group, proclaimed in October 1999 that it would be going online to promote civil society. Even the well-known Internet-based association People Like Us (PLU), a group which aims to promote awareness of issues concerning gays and lesbians in society, decided in 2000 to "roll up their sleeves" to publicly discuss about their "active citizenship" roles in conservative Singapore.

That year, an application by the PLU to hold a public forum on "Gays and Lesbians within Singapore 21" was flatly rejected by the Police Public Entertainment Licensing Unit (PELU) on the grounds that mainstream moral values of Singaporeans are conservative, and that Singapore's Penal Code has clear provisions against certain homosexual practices. As Lee summarizes the episode:

[A]ctive citizenship and participation in the Singapore context not only has legal, social and cultural limits, but comes with political and ideological boundaries that can and will be strictly enforced at the sole discretion of the authorities. The PLU's brush with the law enforcers made it clear that while groups with socially "off-

centre" or politically sensitive agendas may continue to exist, they should remain "closeted" from the public at all times. Although "Singapore 21" had been depicted as a large-scale consultative project involving some 6,000 ordinary Singaporeans from all walks of life (Singapore 21, "Preface"), it was never intended as a "bottom-up" mass participation exercise, nor was it designed, strictly speaking, to cultivate the growth of civil society.

On the contrary, it became more like a strategic attempt at addressing the long-standing "problem" of political apathy and passivity among Singaporeans, measured predominantly by their seeming disinterest in politics and reluctance to offer feedback via established channels. The concept of feedback, understood quite simply as the expression of one's views on public policy, is deemed one of the most evident and active signs of citizen participation in government. Yet, it has been—and remains—a vexed political issue in Singapore, with a sizeable number of Singaporeans politically apathetic, passively docile, or fearful of reprisal.

As Terence Chong explains with cogency: Past examples of alternative political activism have ingrained in Singaporeans the lessons of challenging the Government. The spectre of incarceration, bankruptcy and exile of political opponents, has, rightly or wrongly, penetrated the middle-class psyche. Apathy thus protects [Singaporeans] from personal distress and embarrassment. Such apathetic condition is also understandable in view of the fact that the highest consultation channel in

Singapore, the centrally controlled Feedback Unit, headed by PAP members of parliament (MPs) and civil servants, was created "out of political necessity" in March 1985:. The formation of the Feedback Unit was a result of the PAP government's frustration at losing two seats to the opposition and winning a smaller share of the popular vote than expected at the 1984 General Election.

As Birch explicates, one of the key words of the post-Lee Kuan Yew's "new guard" has been "feedback", designed not so much to replace a top-down mode of rule, but to manage dissenting voices or public dissonance. At the annual conference of Feedback Groups in Singapore in January 2004, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs and Trade and Industry, Raymond Lim, reiterated the prime objectives of the Feedback Unit in a speech entitled "Feedback and the Public Purpose" by declaring that:

Feedback makes policy formulation in government a more informed process, ensuring above all that it is relevant. It also makes policy implementation a more effective process, as it enhances public receptiveness based on a better understanding and acceptance of the policy.

Minister Lim's statement makes it quite clear that prime intention of the Feedback Unit is to enhance" public receptiveness" to government policies. It is, in other words, highly functional and predominantly gestural. Any feedback on policies, especially impending and potentially unpopular ones, would thus facilitate the forging of" consensus politics" between the citizenry and the government.

In this way, the concept of feedback or consultation becomes another" gesture" of the government used to gauge political support or otherwise. As a result, those who do not support specific policies would never use established feedback channels to voice their thoughts. It is interesting to note from a 2003 survey that while 80 per cent of Singaporeans find the Feedback Unit's channels accessible and adequate, and 77 per cent acknowledge the Unit as an effective means for feedback, only about 6,800 feedback inputs--out of a total population numbering more than four million--were received that same year.

By contrast, however, the" Forum" page of the national and most widely read daily, the Straits Times, attracts more than 2,000 letters every month. The Straits Times Forum has become, virtually by default, the most popular site for public feedback and discussion in Singapore, serving to amplify public sentiments on a broad range of social, cultural, economic and, to a lesser extent, political issues. However, it is important to note that while the Forum page has been labelled the" most democratic space in Singapore", the extent to which one can engage in political debate through this forum is almost solely determined by editorial decision and judgement. If the media in Singapore is, as Birch notes in Althusserian terms, an" ideological state apparatus", then genuine or active participation in policy-making via the state-managed newspaper outlet is either futile or not possible, thus reinforcing Ooi Can Seng's (" State-Civil Society Relations and Tourism", in this issue) claim that the Singapore government has been able to re-define civil spaces for its own interests. The corollary is that letters that are

deemed politically offensive or destabilizing would not make the cut, thus making the Straits Times Forum a poor example of civil society as it is a socially and politically unproblematic space for the establishment.

The call by" Singapore 21" to embrace" active citizenship" needs to be examined against the backdrop of political hegemony and apathy in Singapore. Calls to participate are typically accompanied by important caveats, including unwritten rules about the limits of participation, exemplified most prominently by OB markers (which the next section of this paper will address). Riding on the context of the Forum, what is not being said tends to speak louder than what is or has been. In this regard," active citizenship" is at best a Machiavellian political gesture aimed at instructing Singaporeans on how to become good and obedient citizens by working with and alongside the state to minimize resistances to government policies. Contrary to the minister's comments in the opening quote to this section, active citizenship in Singapore is precisely a" reality TV show," where citizens who consciously choose to remain apathetic and" inactive" --that is, those who watch the unfolding drama of politics from the comfort of their homes--are the model" participants" in a society that values political compliance and acquiescence.

Some groups would like [the government] to open faster--not just loosen restrictions but remove them altogether. But while we talk about OB markers and wider fairways, remember that most Singaporeans still do not play golf. Bread and butter issues are still uppermost on their minds. [...] The test of our policies is not

how closely we approach an idealized model, but how well we move the majority forward so that we remake Singapore into a dynamic global city and the best home for Singaporeans.

The concept of the OB markers arose following an episode in 1994 dubbed "the Catherine Lim affair". On 20 November 1994, well-known Singaporean novelist and social commentator Catherine Lim's political commentary entitled "One Government, Two Styles" was published in the Sunday edition of Singapore's Straits Times daily. In it, Lim opined that Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong's promise of a more open, consultative, and consensual leadership style had been abandoned in favour of the authoritarian style of his predecessor, referring specifically to the former premier Lee Kuan Yew. This was the gist of Lim's contention:

Over the years, a pattern of governance has emerged that is not exactly what was envisaged. Increasingly, the promised Goh style of people-orientation is being subsumed under the old style of top-down decisions.

Women and Politics

Women in government in the modern era are under-represented in most countries worldwide. Even though some progress has been made during the last two centuries, and women are increasingly being politically elected to be heads of state and government, this tendency is still persistent. The global participation rate of women in national-level parliaments is

23.3%. A number of countries are exploring measures that may increase women's participation in government at all levels, from the local to the national. Increasing women's representation in the government can empower women and is necessary to achieve gender parity. This notion of women's empowerment is rooted in the human capabilities approach, in which individuals are empowered to choose the functioning that they deem valuable.

The term 'political participation' has a very wide meaning. It is not only related to 'Right to Vote', but simultaneously relates to participation in: decision making process, political activism, political consciousness, etc. Women participate in voting, run for public offices and political parties at lower levels more than men. Political activism and voting are the strongest areas of women's political participation. To combat gender inequality in politics, the Government has instituted reservations for seats in local governments.

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empowerment is rooted in the human capabilities approach, in which individuals are empowered to choose the functioning that they deem valuable.

Women, as the conventional primary caretakers of children, often have a more prominent role than men in advocating for children, resulting in a "double dividend" in terms of the benefits of women's representation. Female representatives not only advance women's rights, but also advance the rights of children. In national legislatures, there is a notable trend of women advancing gender and family-friendly legislation. This advocacy has been seen in countries ranging from France, Sweden and the Netherlands, to South Africa, Rwanda, and Egypt. Furthermore, a number of studies from both industrialized and developed countries indicate that women in local government tend to advance social issues. In India, for instance, greater women's representation has corresponded with a more equitable distribution of community resources, including more gender-sensitive spending on programs related to health, nutrition, and education.

In 1954, the United Nations *Convention on the Political Rights of Women* went into force, enshrining women's equal rights to vote, hold office, and access public services as provided for male citizens within national laws.

Worldwide status of women's representation in government

As of October 25, 2013, the global average of women in national assemblies is 21.5%. At the same time, large differences exist between countries, e.g. Sri Lanka has quite low female participation rates in parliament compared with Denmark, Sweden and Norway, where female representation rates are among the highest.

Women in national parliaments

Out of 189 countries, listed in descending order by the percentage of women in the lower or single house, the top 10 countries with the greatest representation of women in national parliaments are (figures reflect information as of July 1, 2017; a - represents a unicameral legislature with no upper house):

Rank	Country	Lower or Single House	Upper House or Senate
1	Rwanda	61.3%	38.5%
2	Bolivia	53.1%	47.2%

3	Cuba	48.9%	–
4	Iceland	47.6%	–
5	Nicaragua	45.7%	–
6	Sweden	43.6%	–
7	Senegal	42.7%	–
8	Mexico	42.6%	36.%
9	Finland	42.0%	–
10	South Africa	41.8%	35.2%

New figures are available for up to February 2014 from International IDEA, Stockholm University and Inter-Parliamentary Union. (2014).

Although over 60% of countries have reached at least 10% women in their national legislature, far fewer have crossed the 20% and

30% barriers. By February 2006, only about 10% of sovereign nations had more than 30% women in parliament. The major English-speaking democracies are placed mostly in the top 40% of the ranked countries. New Zealand ranks at position 27 with women comprising 32.2% of its parliament. Australia (24.7% in the lower house, 38.2% in the upper house) and Canada (24.7% lower house, 37.9% upper house) rank at position 46 out of 189 countries. The United Kingdom is ranked at 58 (22.5% lower house, 22.6% upper house), while the United States ranks 78 (17.8% in the lower house, 20.0% in the upper house). It should be noted that not all of these lower and/or upper houses in national parliaments are democratically elected; for example, in Canada members of the upper house (the Senate) are appointed.

Paxton describes three factors that are the basis for why national level representation has become much larger over the past several decades. The first is the changing structural and economic conditions of nations, which says that educational advancements along with an increase in women's participation in the labor force encourages representation. The second is the political factor; representation of women in office being based on a proportionality system. Some voting systems are built so that a party that gains 25% of the votes gains 25% of the seats. In these processes, a political party feels obligated to balance the representation within their votes between genders, increasing women's activity in political standing. A plurality-majority system, such as the one the United States, United Kingdom, and India has, only allows single candidate elections, and thus allows political parties to entirely dictate regions' representatives even if

they only control a small majority of the vote. Last, there is the ideological disposition of a country; the concept that the cultural aspects of women's roles or positions in the places they live dictate where they stand in that society, ultimately either helping or handicapping those women from entering political positions.

Challenges faced by women

Women face numerous obstacles in achieving representation in governance. Their participation has been limited by the assumption that women's proper sphere is the "private" sphere. Whereas the "public" domain is one of political authority and contestation, the "private" realm is associated with the family and the home. By relegating women to the private sphere, their ability to enter the political arena is curtailed. Gender inequality within families, inequitable division of labor within households, and cultural attitudes about gender roles further subjugate women and serve to limit their representation in public life. Societies that are highly patriarchal often have local power structures that make it difficult for women to combat. Thus, their interests are often not represented or under-represented.

There have been many arguments saying the plurality-majority voting system is a disadvantage to the chance that women get into office. Andrew Reynolds brings forth one of these arguments by stating: "Plurality-majority single-member-district systems, whether of the Anglo-American first-past-the-post (FPTP) variety, the Australian preference ballot alternative vote (AV), or the

French two-round system (TRS), are deemed to be particularly unfavorable to women's chances of being elected to office". Andrew believes that the best systems are list-proportional systems. "In these systems of high proportionality between seats won and votes cast, small parties are able to gain representation and parties have an incentive to broaden their overall electoral appeal by making their candidate lists as diverse as possible".

Even once elected, women tend to hold lesser valued cabinet ministries or similar positions. These are sometimes described as "soft industries" and include health, education, and welfare. Far less often do women hold executive decision-making authority in more powerful domains or those that are associated with traditional notions of masculinity (such as finance and the military). Typically, the more powerful the institution, the less likely it is that women's interests will be represented. Additionally, in more autocratic nations, women are less likely to have their interests represented. Many women attain political standing due to kinship ties, as they have male family members who are involved in politics. These women tend to be from higher income, higher status families and thus may not be as focused on the issues faced by lower income families. In The United States, the lower end of the professional ladder contains a higher proportion of women while the upper level contains a higher proportion of men. Research shows that women are underrepresented in head positions in state agencies making up only 18% of congress and 15% of corporate board positions. When women do gain any level of representation it is in the fields of health, welfare, and labor. They are seen to be addressing

issues labeled as feminine. Additionally, women running for public office typically gain additional, unnecessary scrutiny on their private lives. For instance, fashion choices of politically active women are often picked apart by the media. In these "analyses" women rarely gain approval from those in the media, who usually say they either they show too much skin or too little, or perhaps that they either look too feminine or too masculine. Sylvia Bashevkin also notes that their romantic lives are often subject of much interest to the general population, perhaps more so than their political agenda or stances on issues. She points out that those who "appear to be sexually active outside a monogamous heterosexual marriage run into particular difficulties, since they tend to be portrayed as vexatious vixens" who are more interested in their private romantic lives than in their public responsibilities. If they are in a monogamous, married relationship but have children, then their fitness for office becomes a question of how they manage being a politician while taking care of their children, something that a male politician would rarely, if ever, be asked about.A 2017 study found that female Republican candidates fare worse in elections than Republican men and Democratic women.

Challenges within political parties

In Canada, there is evidence that female politicians face gender stigma from male members of the political parties to which they belong which can undermine the ability of women to reach or maintain leadership roles. Pauline Marois, leader of the Parti Québécois (PQ) and the official opposition of the National

Assembly of Quebec, was the subject of a claim by Claude Pinard, a PQ "backbencher", that many Quebecers do not support a female politician: "I believe that one of her serious handicaps is the fact she's a woman [...] I sincerely believe that a good segment of the population won't support her because she's a woman". A 2000 study that analyzed 1993 election results in Canada found that among "similarly situated women and men candidates", women actually had a small vote advantage. The study showed that neither voter turnout nor urban/rural constituencies were factors that help or hurt a female candidate, but "office-holding experience in non-political organizations made a modest contribution to women's electoral advantage".

Bruce M. Hicks, an electoral studies researcher at Université de Montréal, states that evidence shows that female candidates begin with a head start in voters' eyes of as much as 10 per cent, and that female candidates are often more favorably associated by voters with issues like health care and education. The electorate's perception that female candidates have more proficiency with traditional women's spheres such as education and health care presents a possibility that gender stereotypes can work in a female candidate's favor, at least among the electorate. In politics, however, Hicks points out that sexism is nothing new:

(Marois' issue) does reflect what has been going on for some time now: women in positions of authority have problems in terms of the way they manage authority [...] The problem isn't them, it's the men under them who resent taking direction from strong

women. And the backroom dirty dialogue can come into the public eye. Within Quebec itself, Don McPherson pointed out that Pinard himself has enjoyed greater electoral success with Pauline Marois as party leader than under a previous male party leader, when Pinard failed to be elected in his riding. Demographically, Pinard's electoral riding is rural, with "relatively older, less-well educated voters".

Women's suffrage movement

Women's suffrage is the right of women to vote in elections. Most countries enacted women's suffrage in the first half of the 20th century. In Europe, the last countries to enact it were Switzerland and Liechtenstein. In Switzerland, women gained the right to vote in federal elections in 1971; but in the canton of Appenzell Innerrhoden women obtained the right to vote on local issues only in 1991, when the canton was forced to do so by the Federal Supreme Court of Switzerland. In Liechtenstein, women were given the right to vote by the women's suffrage referendum of 1984. Three prior referendums held in 1968, 1971 and 1973 had failed to secure women's right to vote.

After Saudi Arabia granted women the same voting rights as men have in December 2015, Vatican City became the only country in the world where women are fully and exclusively denied the right to vote.

Mirror representation

Women's participation in formal politics is lower than men's throughout the world. The argument put forth by scholars Jacquetta Newman and Linda White is that women's participation in the realm of high politics is crucial if the goal is to affect the quality of public policy. As such, the concept of *mirror representation* aims to achieve gender parity in public office. In other words, mirror representation says that the proportion of women in leadership should match the proportion of women in the population that they govern. Mirror representation is premised on the assumption that elected officials of a particular gender would likely support policies that seek to benefit constituents of the same gender.

Effects of mirror representation on public policy

A key critique is that mirror representation assumes that all members of a particular sex operate under the rubric of a shared identity, without taking into consideration other factors such as age, education, culture, or socioeconomic status. However, proponents of mirror representation argue that women have a different relationship with government institutions and public policy than that of men, and therefore merit equal representation on this facet alone. This feature is based on the historical reality that women, regardless of background, have largely been excluded from influential legislative and leadership positions. As Sylvia Bashevkin notes, "representative democracy seems

impaired, partial, and unjust when women, as a majority of citizens, fail to see themselves reflected in the leadership of their polity." In fact, the issue of participation of Women in politics is of such importance that the United Nations has identified gender equality in representation (i.e. mirror representation) as a goal in the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW) and the Beijing Platform for Action. Besides seeking equality, the goal of mirror representation is also to recognize the significance of women's involvement in politics, which subsequently legitimizes said involvement.

There have been differing results between studies that looked at the significance of women's representation on actual policy outcomes. Though women in the United States are more likely to identify as feminists, a 2014 study looking in the United States finds "no effect of gender of the mayor on policy outcomes." A 2012 study finds mixed evidence that the share of female councilors in Sweden affected conditions for women citizens, such as women's income, unemployment, health, and parental leave. A 2015 study in Sweden said that: "The findings show that female legislators defend feminist interests more than their male colleagues but that they only marginally respond to women's electoral preferences."

A 2016 study looking at African politicians finds "gender differences in policy priorities [to be] quite small on average, vary across policy domains and countries".

Social and cultural barriers to mirror representation

Mirror representation stems from the barriers female political candidates often face, these include: sex stereotyping, political socialization, lack of preparation for political activity, and balancing work and family. In the media, women are often asked how they would balance the responsibilities of elected office with those to their families, something men are never asked.

Sex stereotyping. Sex stereotyping assumes that masculine and feminine traits are intertwined with leadership. Hence, the bias leveled against women stems from the perception that femininity inherently produces weak leadership. Due to the aggressive and competitive nature of politics, many insist that participation in elected office requires masculine traits. Sex stereotyping is far from being a historical narrative. The pressure is on female candidates (and not male ones) to enhance their masculine traits in order to garner support from voters who identify with socially constructed gender roles.

Political socialization. Political socialization is the idea that, during childhood, people are indoctrinated into socially constructed norms of politics. In the case of women's representation in government, it says that sex stereotyping begins at an early age and affects the public's disposition on which genders are fit for public office. Socialization agents can include family, school, higher education, mass media, and religion. Each of these agents plays a pivotal role in either fostering a desire to enter politics, or dissuading one to do so.

Generally, girls tend to see politics as a "male domain". Newman and White suggest that women who run for political office have been "socialized toward an interest in and life in politics" and that "many female politicians report being born into political families with weak gender-role norms."

Lack of preparation for political activity. An aftereffect of political socialization is that it determines how inclined women are to pursue careers that may be compatible with formal politics. Careers in law, business, education, and government, professions in which women happen to be minorities, are common occupations for those that later decide to enter public office.

Balancing work and family. The work life balance is invariably more difficult for women, because they are generally expected by society to act as the primary caregivers for children and maintainers of the home. Due to these demands, it is assumed that women would choose to delay political aspirations until their children are older. Also, a women's desire for a career in politics along with the extent that the respondent feels her family duties might inhibit her ability to be an elected official. Research has shown that new female politicians in Canada and the U.S. are older than their male counterparts. Conversely, a woman may be pushed to remain childless in order to seek political office.

Institutional barriers may also pose as a hindrance for balancing a political career and family. For instance, in Canada, Members of Parliament do not contribute to Employment Insurance; therefore, they are not entitled to paternity benefits. Such lack of

parental leave would undoubtedly be a reason for women to delay seeking electoral office. Furthermore, mobility plays a crucial role in the work-family dynamic. Elected officials are usually required to commute long distances to and from their respective capital cities, which can be a deterrent for women seeking political office.

Policies to increase women's participation

The United Nations has identified six avenues by which female participation in politics and government may be strengthened. These avenues are: equalization of educational opportunities, quotas for female participation in governing bodies, legislative reform to increase focus on issues concerning women and children, financing gender-responsive budgets to equally take into account the needs of men and women, increasing the presence of sex-disaggregated statistics in national research/data, and furthering the presence and agency of grassroots women's empowerment movements.

Education

Women with formal education (at any level) are more likely to delay marriage and subsequent childbirth, be better informed about infant and child nutrition, and ensure childhood immunization. Children of mothers with formal education are

better nourished and have higher survival rates. Education is a vital tool for any person in society to better themselves in their career path, and equalization of educational opportunities for boys and girls may take the form of several initiatives:

- abolishment of educational fees which would require parents to consider financial issues when deciding which of their children to educate. Poor children in rural areas are particularly affected by inequality resulting from educational fees.
- encouragement of parents and communities to institute gender-equal educational agendas. Perceived opportunity cost of educating girls may be addressed through a conditional cash transfer program which financially reward families who educate their daughters (thus removing the financial barrier that results from girls substituting school attendance for work in the family labor force).
- creation of "girl-friendly" schools to minimize bias and create a safe school environment for girls and young women. Currently, a barrier to female school attendance is the risk of sexual violence en route to school. A "safe school environment" is one in which the school is located to minimize such violence, in addition to providing girls with educational opportunities (as opposed to using female students to perform janitorial work or other menial labor).

Mark P. Jones, in reference to Norris's *Legislative Recruitment*, states that: "Unlike other factors that have been identified as influencing the level of women's legislative representation, such as a country's political culture and level of economic development, institutional rules are relatively easy to change".

In an article about the exclusion of Women from politics in southern Africa, Amanda Gouws said "The biggest hurdles to overcome for women are still on the local level where both men and women are often recruited from the communities and have limited political skills". The level of education in these local governments or, for that matter, the people in those positions of power, are substandard.

One example of the hurdles women face in receiving good education comes from Beijing. "Most women who attended the NGO Forums accompanying the UN conferences, which are for government delegations (though increasingly many governments include activists and NGO members among their official delegates), were middle-class educated women from INGOS, donors, academics, and activists". Lydia Kompe, a well-known South African activist, was one of these rural women. She noted that she felt overwhelmed and completely disempowered. In the beginning, she did not think she could finish her term of office because of her lack of education. Manisha Desai explains that: "There is an inequality simply around the fact that the UN system and its locations say a lot about the current focus of those systems, such positions being in the US and Western Europe allow easier access to those women in the area. It is also

important to note that institutions affect the cultural propensity to elect women candidates in different ways in different parts of the world."

The study of the history of women's representation has been a major contribution in helping scholars view such concepts. Andrew Reynolds states: "historical experience often leads to gender advancement, and political liberalization enables women to mobilize within the public sphere". He argues that we will see a larger number of women in higher office positions in established democracy than in democracies that are developing, and "the more illiberal a state is, the fewer women will be in positions of power". As countries open education systems to women, and more women participate in historically male dominated fields, it is possible to see a shift in political views regarding women in government.

Quotas

Quotas are explicit requirements on the number of women in political positions. "Gender quotas for the election of legislators have been used since the late 1970s by a few political parties (via the party charter) in a small number of advanced industrial democracies; such examples would be like Germany and Norway". Andrew Reynolds says there is "an increasing practice in legislatures for the state, or the parties themselves, to utilize formal or informal quota mechanisms to promote women as candidates and MPs". The statistics surrounding quota systems have been examined thoroughly by academia.

Types of quotas include:

- Sex quota systems: institute a "critical value" below which is deemed an imbalanced government. Examples of such critical values include 20% of legislators, 50% of politicians, etc.
- Legal quota systems regulate the governance of political parties and bodies. Such quotas may be mandated by electoral law (as the Argentine quota law, for example) or may be constitutionally required (as in Nepal).
- Voluntary party quota systems may be used by political parties at will, yet are not mandated by electoral law or by a country's constitution. If a country's leading or majority political party engages in a voluntary party quota system, the effect may "trickle down" to minority political parties in the country (as in the case of the African National Congress in South Africa).

Quotas may be utilized during different stages of the political nomination/selection process to address different junctures at which women may be inherently disadvantaged:

- Potential candidacy: sex quota systems can mandate that from the pool of aspirants, a certain percentage of them must be female.
- Nomination: legal or voluntary quotas are enforced upon this stage, during which a certain portion of

nominated candidates on the party's ballot must be female.

- Election: "reserved seats" may be filled only by women.

Quota usage can have marked effects on female representation in governance. In 1995, Rwanda ranked 24th in terms of female representation, and jumped to 1st in 2003 after quotas were introduced. Similar effects can be seen in Argentina, Iraq, Burundi, Mozambique, and South Africa, for example. Of the top-ranked 20 countries in terms of female representation in government, 17 of these countries utilize some sort of quota system to ensure female inclusion. Though such inclusion is mainly instituted at the national level, there have been efforts in India to addresses female inclusion at the subnational level, through quotas for parliamentary positions.

With quotas drastically changing the number of female representatives in political power, a bigger picture unravels. Though countries are entitled to regulate their own laws, the quota system helps explain social and cultural institutions and their understandings and overall view of women in general. "At first glance, these shifts seem to coincide with the adoption of candidate gender quotas around the globe as quotas have appeared in countries in all major world regions with a broad range of institutional, social, economic and cultural characteristics".

Quotas have been quite useful in allowing women to gain support and opportunities when attempting to achieve seats of power, but

some see this as a wrongdoing. Drude Dahlerup and Lenita Freidenvall argue this in their article "Quotas as a 'Fast Track' to Equal Representation for Women" by stating: "From a liberal perspective, quotas as a specific group right conflict with the principle of equal opportunity for all. Explicitly favoring certain groups of citizens, i.e. women, means that not all citizens (men) are given an equal chance to attain a political career". Dahlerup and Freidenvall claim that even though quotas create theoretical imbalance in opportunity for men and that they necessarily break the concept of "classical liberal notion of equality", quotas are almost required to bring the relation of women in politics to a higher state, whether that is through equal opportunity or just equal results. "According to this understanding of women's under-representation, mandated quotas for the recruitment and election of female candidates, possibly also including time-limit provisions, are needed".

The introduction of gender quotas in the electoral process has spurred controversy from male politicians, resulting in resistance to the acceptance of quotas in the political realm. The mobilization of women in politics has been hindered by means of preserving male political survival, and to avoid political interference with male power and domination. Moreover, the implementation of gender quotas has caused the male candidate population to decrease in order for their female counterparts to participate, and this is commonly referred to as the "negative sum," and this can result in a more qualified male being rejected to allow a female politician to participate. Furthermore, in the case of Argentina, which is currently mandated for a 30% female

party at each level of government, saw the introduction of the 'quota women'; females that were less experienced, and only elected due to the legal requirement of quotas. The introduction of the 'quota women' has triggered what political scientists refer to as a 'mandate effect,' where quota women feel obligated to represent solely the interests of the female public. Moreover, in order to preserve male political survival, "domination techniques" have been utilized to both exclude and delegitimize female representation in politics, and this can be depicted in the case of Argentina, where it took several elections to gain 35% of female representatives. With the increase of female representation in Argentina, issues that were rarely discussed before became paramount in debates, such as "penal laws, sexual assault laws, and laws on maternity leave and pregnancy... sexual education, [and] emergency contraceptive."

Critical mass theory has correlations with both substantive representation as process and substantive representation as outcome. Critical mass theory suggests that once a certain percentage of women representatives has been reached, that female legislators will be able to create and enable transformative policies, and this has the potential to place pressure on quota women to act on behalf of all women. One paramount criticism of critical mass theory is its attention to numbers, and the understanding that quota women are to represent women collectively.

Furthermore, the representation of women as a collective group remains controversial, as "[if] she is a white straight, middle-

class mother, she cannot speak for African-American women, or poor women, or lesbian women on the basis of her own experience anymore than men can speak for women merely on the basis of theirs."

Chapter 3

Forms of Government and Political Parties

Monarchies, Aristocracies, And Democracies

Having examined the several forms of states and associations of states, we come now to consider the forms of government, keeping in mind that government is not the state, but, as Francis Lieber has remarked, merely the instrument or contrivance through which the state acts in all cases in which it does not act by direct operation of its sovereignty. Following the same principle observed in the classification of states, namely, the number of persons in whom the supreme power is vested, we shall find that governments may be classified as monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic.

If the supreme governing authority is vested in a single person, however numerous his subordinates, the form of government is said to be monarchical. Popular usage, however, considers any government having a hereditary executive to be a monarchy, even though its legislative department rests upon a popular basis. In short, popular usage makes the test the nature of the executive tenure and the tenure of the titular executive at that. Thus most

of the governments of Europe are commonly styled monarchies, when in reality only the executive part of the government is constituted on the monarchical principle. The modern term "monarchy, "as Sidgwick observes, is largely used to denote governments in which only a share of power is left to the single individual called the monarch.

If the supreme governing authority is intrusted to a small group or class of the population, the government is said to be aristocratic. It is a government in which only a minority of the citizens have a share, the rest of the population, as Montesquieu remarks, being in respect to the former the same as the subjects of a monarch in regard to the sovereign. If the great mass of the adult male citizens share in the government, either through the choice of its agents, through participation in the enactment of law by means of the so-called initiative or referendum, or through a popular assembly of all the citizens, we have a democratic form of government or a democracy. Professor

Seeley defined democracy more broadly as a government in which everyone has a share. John Austin said it signified any government in which the governing body is a comparatively large fraction of the entire nation. Sir Henry Maine said it could be most accurately described as "inverted monarchy. "

The classification of governments as monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic is identical with the classification of states given in the preceding chapter, but it does not follow that the form of government in any given state is necessarily identical with the

form of state, though usually they are similar in form and spirit. A democratic state, for example, is apt to have a government in which democratic or popular elements predominate. But while this is the natural and usual condition, it is quite possible that a democratic state should have a government organized upon an aristocratic basis. Indeed, it is difficult to see why such a system is not the nearest approach to the ideal, provided the aristocracy is one of real merit rather than one which is artificial in character. Strictly speaking, there are no longer any pure monarchical governments in Europe.

What are loosely and popularly called such are in fact mixed governments, that is, governments composed of monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic elements combine. The truth is, as Rousseau remarks, all governments are in a sense mixed. There is no modern civilized state in which the governing power is vested wholly in the hands of a single person. In the typical monarchies, so called, of Europe, there is an hereditary chief of state and a legislative body, containing usually both aristocratic and democratic elements. Only in certain absolute states of Asia and Africa do we find anything approaching pure monarchical government, that is, one in which the ruling power is vested in the hands of a single person.

On the basis of the source or tenure of the executive, monarchies may be classified as hereditary or elective, or they may be a combination of both. All of the monarchies of the present day are hereditary, though there have been many exceptions in the past. The early Roman kings were elective, as were the kings of the

ancient monarchy of Poland. The head of the Holy Roman Empire, as is well known, was chosen by a small college of electors, though usually from the same family. Under the Treaty of Berlin, of 1878, the reigning prince of Bulgaria owed his throne to election. In general, it may be said that the installation of dynasties in newly formed states usually takes place through election, though the crown thereafter. is generally transmitted according to certain rules of hereditary succession.

It may also be stated as a general proposition that in the early history of states kings were generally chosen or in some way accepted in the first instance, though the hereditary feature was so strong that the elective principle was gradually pushed into the background.

Speaking of the election of the early English kings, Stubbs observes that "the king was in theory always elected and the fact of election was stated in the coronation service throughout the Middle Ages in accordance with the most ancient precedent. ""But, "he adds, "it is not less true that the succession was by constitutional practice restricted to one family, and that the rule of hereditary succession was never, except in great emergencies and in most trying times, set aside. "In a sense, of course, the English monarchy is still elective, since Parliament claims and exercises the right to regulate the law of succession at its pleasure.

Again, monarchy may be either of the absolute type, in which case the monarch is sovereign, and state and government, legally

and politically speaking, are identical, or it may be constitutional or limited in form. In the former case the monarch is bound by no will except his own; in the latter case he is bound by the prescriptions of a constitution which he has sworn to support, and hence the royal office is nothing but an organ of government.

No examples of the former type of monarchy, as has been said, are found to-day outside of Asia and Africa. All of the so-called monarchies of continental Europe now have written constitutions, framed either by national assemblies representing the people, or granted by ruling sovereigns and accepted by the people. Monarchies may of course be still further subdivided, but little or nothing would be gained by extending the classification beyond hereditary and elective, absolute and limited types.

Aristocracies, like monarchies, may likewise be of several varieties. There may be aristocracies of wealth, and these may be based either on ownership of land or of all property in general; or they may be hereditary and hence based upon birth or family connection; or they may be official in character, that is, composed mainly of those who hold or have held public office; or they may be military or a combination of some or all of the above elements.

Democracies are of two kinds: pure or direct, and representative or indirect. A pure democracy is one in which the will of the state is formulated and expressed directly and immediately through the people acting in their primary capacity. A representative democracy is one in which the state will is ascertained and

expressed through the agency of a small and select number who act as the representatives of the people.

A pure democracy is practicable only in small states where the voting population may be assembled for purposes of legislation, and where the collective needs of the people are few and simple. In large and complex societies, where the legislative wants of the people are numerous, the very necessities of the situation make government by the whole body of citizens a physical impossibility. In the city states of antiquity pure democracies were not impossible, and they were not uncommon; but in the states of the modern world and under modern conditions they are impossible. The only surviving examples to-day are found in four of the petty and largely primitive cantons of Switzerland. What is in substance a representative democracy is sometimes called a republic or a republican government.

Although restricted by modern usage to a government conducted through agents popularly chosen, yet the term "republic, "as Hamilton and Madison pointed out in "The Federalist, "has often been employed to describe governments which popular usage to-day would designate as monarchical or aristocratic. Thus Sparta, Athens, Rome, Carthage, the United Netherlands,

Venice, and Poland have all been described by political writers as republics, though none of them possessed that full representative character which we to-day consider to be the distinguishing mark of a republic. Rome, for example, was organized on a military basis, Venice was an oligarchy of hereditary nobles, Poland was a

mixture of aristocracy and monarchy. France under the constitution of the year XII was styled a republic, though the chief of state bore the title and rank of emperor, and the crown was hereditary in the Napoleonic family.

The constitution of the United States imposes upon the national government the duty of guaranteeing to the component states a republican form of government, but it does not attempt to define the essential characteristics of such a government, simply assuming that they are too well understood to admit of a difference of opinion. Madison in "The Federalist "said it was a government in which there was "a scheme of representation. "It was, he said, "a government which derives all its powers, directly or indirectly, from the great body of the people and is administered by persons holding their offices during pleasure, for a limited period or during good behaviour.

"The two "great points of difference, "said Madison, "between a republic and a democracy are: first, the governing power in a republic is delegated to a small number of citizens elected by the rest; and, second, a republic is capable of embracing a larger population and of extending over a wider area of territory than is a democracy.

In a democracy the people meet and exercise the government in person; in a republic they assemble and administer it by their representative agents. "Madison rightly regarded hereditary tenures as inconsistent with modern notions of republican government, although he considered good behaviour tenure for

the judiciary at least admissible. It is also essential to the republican idea that the principle of representation shall be based upon a reasonably wide suffrage. A suffrage so restricted, for example, as that which existed in France under the restored monarchy, when the number of voters did not exceed 300, 000 Out of a total population of 10, 000, 000 would hardly be considered consistent with republican government. Republics have been classified as aristocratic and democratic; as monocmtic and plutocratic; unlimited, mixed, and limited; as corporate, oligarchic, aristocratic, and democratic; as federal and confederate; as centralized and unitary; as hereditary and elective, etc. The classification of governments as monarchies, aristocracies, and democracies has lost its former importance and now possesses little interest for the political scientist. To speak of a government as monarchical or aristocratic conveys little or no idea of its structural organization or processes of action.

Many so-called monarchies are such only in name, and there is no fundamental difference in principle between aristocracies and democracies, the only distinction being one of degree. Such a classification puts governments as widely different as those of Great Britain, Prussia, Russia, and Turkey in the same class, others as different as those of France and the United States in another and the same class. It is necessary, therefore, to find other principles of classification in order to be able to classify governmental forms in any satisfactory or consistent manner.

Classifications; Cabinet And Presidential Government

Montesquieu classified governments as republics, monarchies, and despotisms. He defined a republican government as one in which the whole body or a part of the people exercises supreme power; a monarchy as one in which a single person governs by fixed and established laws; a despotism as one in which a single person directs everything by his own will and caprice. The principle underlying this classification is partly numbers and partly the spirit and character of the government. Woolsey classified governments as monarchies, aristocracies, democracies, and "compound states. ". Other writers recognize only two forms, namely, monarchies and republics, the latter comprehending both aristocracies and democracies. The fault with most classifications of governments is, as was said of the classifications of states, that they do not rest upon any consistent scientific principle which will serve as a basis for the differentiation of governments with respect to their fundamental characteristics. No single classification can be of much value; there must be as many classifications as there are points of view from which the government may be considered.

A well-known authority on political science adopts the following canons of distinction in classifying governmental forms: first, the identity or non-identity of the state with its government; second, the nature of the official tenure, including the method of constituting the official relation; third, the relation of the

legislature to the executive; and fourth, the concentration or distribution of governmental power.

Upon the basis of the identity or non-identity of the state with the government, they may be classified as primary or representative. The pure democracy, where the citizens assemble in mass meeting and enact the laws of the state and frame administrative regulations, is, of course, the nearest approach to what we have called primary government. Where, on the other hand, the sovereign has delegated to an organ or organs the power to act for it in matters of government, as is now the almost universal practice, we have representative government in some form, though not necessarily popular government.

Considered from the standpoint of the nature and source of the official tenure, governments may be classified as hereditary and elective. Hereditary government is that form in which the source of office is inheritance according to some rule or principle governing the transmission of political honors and titles.

Elective government is that form in which the choice of those who exercise public power devolves upon the citizens or rather that portion of them who constitute the electoral body. The method of election may be direct, or, as is sometimes said, election in the first degree; or it may be indirect, or in the second degree. In either case it may be by an electorate constituted on the basis of a restricted suffrage or by one on the basis of what is popularly designated as universal suffrage. With respect to the relation of the executive to the legislature, governments may be classified as

cabinet (the terms "ministerial, ""parliamentary, "and "responsible "are sometimes preferred); and what, for lack of a more suitable term, has been called presidential or congressional government. Cabinet government is that system in which the real executive — the cabinet or ministry — is immediately and legally responsible to the legislature or one branch of it (usually the more popular chamber) for its legislative and administrative acts, and immediately or politically responsible to the electorate; while the titular or nominal executive — the chief of state occupies a position of irresponsibility.

The members of the ministry are usually members of the legislature and the leaders of the party in the majority, but whether they are members or not, they have the privilege of occupying seats therein and of participating in the deliberations. In short, the ministerial office is not incompatible with legislative mandate. On the contrary, the cabinet system presupposes the double character of minister and member, and thus executive and legislative functions are inextricably commingled. "There is, "observes Courtenay Ilbert, "no such separation between the executive and legislative powers as that which forms the distinguishing mark of the American Constitution "but the relation is one of intimacy and interdependence.

The nominal or titular executive, according to a legal fiction, is incapable of doing wrong, in a political sense, and is, as it were, under the guardianship of his ministers, who assume the responsibility for his official acts. Collectively they constitute the "government "; they prepare, initiate, and urge the adoption by

the legislature of all the more important legislative projects; and from their seats in the legislature they defend their policies from attack, and when called upon must give an account of their official conduct.

They are the heads of the great administrative departments as well as the political chiefs and parliamentary leaders of the country, and are charged with administering the laws which they propose and have enacted. So long as their policies and official conduct command the support of the majority of the members of the legislature, or rather of that chamber to which they are responsible they continue to hold the reins of office and govern the country.

But as soon as the legislature manifests in no uncertain language its want confidence in the ministry, through a vote of censure or by a refusal to pas its measures, the ministry either resigns office in a body or it dissolves the chamber to which it owes responsibility, orders a new parliamentary election, and appeals to the electorate to sustain it by returning a new parliament which is in sympathy with its policies and acts.

If the results of the election are favorable to the ministry, it continues in office; if adverse, it resigns as soon as the results are fully known or when the new parliament has assembled and by positive vote has made known its want of sympathy. In a typical cabinet system like that of Great Britain the ministry is taken wholly from the ranks of the party having a majority in the popular chamber, and thus possesses the character of

homogeneity. In legal theory the ministers are chosen by the nominal or titular executive, though where the system of responsibility to the legislature is fully developed they are in reality chosen by the legislature, and the designation by the chief of state is little more than a ceremonial function of investing them with the symbols of office.

The number of ministers is rarely fixed either by law or by custom, and hence the size of the ministry is uncertain and variable, the exact number in any case being usually determined by the premier or by executive decree. In Great Britain the number (*i. e.* of the cabinet) in recent years has been in the neighborhood of twenty; in France, it is now twelve; in Italy, eleven; in Belgium, ten.

The cabinet system originated in England and was the product of history rather than of invention. From England it spread little by little to Holland, France, Belgium, Roumania, Sweden, Norway, Denmark, and the British Colonies, until it has become, says Esmein, "the principal system of government in the world. "It has made little headway in Germany, however, and none at all in Switzerland or North America, and but little in Latin America. The cabinet system has received its fullest development in Great Britain, and there its workings have been attended with the most satisfactory results.

Among the cabinet systems of the continent, that of Belgium most nearly resembles the British system, though the crown plays a more important role in that country than in England. The

responsibility of ministers to the king is more real than in England, and he may direct and dismiss them with more freedom than the British sovereign may. As there are generally recognized parliamentary leaders, the king rarely has any real choice, however, in the selection of his ministers.

In Belgium, as in England, ministers without portfolios are sometimes appointed as a means of introducing into the government eminent persons whose support and experience the government desires to avail itself of, yet who would hesitate to assume the burden of a cabinet portfolio. As in England, ministers are chosen not from the ranks of technical administrators, except in the case of the minister of war, who is always a soldier and usually an active general, but from the members of parliament and from the chamber of deputies rather than from the senators. All ministers, whether members or not, have full entree into either chamber.

Cabinet government was introduced in France by the charter of 1814; it became fully established under the July monarchy, was practically abandoned in 1848, but was reestablished with the third republic, though it has never attained the success there that it has in England. In France there is no incompatibility whatever between ministerial office and legislative mandate, and neither law nor custom requires a member of parliament appointed to the cabinet to resign his seat and seek a reelection, as is the rule in England. Custom now requires that all cabinet portfolios shall be given to members of parliament, though until recently this rule did not apply to the ministers of war and

marine. The English and Belgian practice of appointing ministers without portfolios has not been followed in France since 1868, though undersecretaries are sometimes appointed, there being four such at the present time.

Ministers are usually regarded as being responsible to the chamber of deputies only, though the constitutional law of February 25, 1875, expressly declares that they shall be solidly responsible to the *chambers* for the general policy of the government and individually responsible for their personal acts. In legal theory they are appointed by the president of the republic, but in fact circumstances usually determine who shall be members, so that the president has little freedom of choice.

Owing to the existence of many groups in France the task of constructing a cabinet is often one of great difficulty. Hardly any single group or coalition of groups ever possesses a majority in the popular chamber, and it not infrequently happens that there is no recognized leader to whom the chief of state may turn and intrust the task of constituting the cabinet. Under such circumstances the premier is sought from the old cabinet which has been condemned. Consequently it nearly always happens that a new cabinet in France contains several members of the old one, a condition that almost never happens in England, especially when there has been a change of parties. The principal difficulty encountered in constructing a stable cabinet in France arises from the necessity of giving the different groups a sufficient number of members so as to satisfy them. This requires skill and tact, and even when the task is well done such a ministry is weak

and unstable because it is heterogeneous instead of homogeneous. Where there are more than two political parties in a state having the cabinet system of government, coalition cabinets, with their traditional weakness and instability, are inevitable. They are weak and unstable because it is next to impossible for a ministry representing such widely different interests to pursue a common policy for any great length of time. The result is that ministries are short-lived in France and cabinet government has not produced satisfactory results.

In Italy the conditions under which cabinet government is conducted are similar in many respects to those prevailing in France. As in France, the chambers are always divided into a number of political groups or factions, unstable, but sharply differentiated and well-disciplined. Under such circumstances it is difficult for one man to rally the support of a majority to any measure concerning which there is any considerable opposition. Enormous difficulties, even more so than in France, are consequently encountered in forming a cabinet.

Hardly any leaders are designated by circumstances as the representatives of public opinion, and hence there is no certainty that the ministerial leaders chosen will be able to command the support of the chamber on any measure. As in France, widely different groups must be given representation in the cabinet, and each must be placated whenever it shows signs of disaffection. Cabinets formed after long and laborious negotiations, says Dupriez, sometimes go to pieces over the first question which provokes debate. The Italian parliamentary system differs in

some particulars from both those of England and of France. In the first place, the action of the chamber in determining the selection of the ministers is less than it is in either England or France. In Italy the king enjoys a much larger freedom and discretion in choosing his ministers, a fact which sometimes leads to the "disorganization and confusion of the parliamentary assembly.

"In theory the cabinet is responsible to the king and the parliament combined, but the parliament, we are told, has "obsequiously surrendered its powers of control, so that the responsibility is now due mainly to the king. "The ministers are generally taken from the chamber of deputies, the premier practically always.

The ministers of war and marine are usually army and navy officers respectively, and if not already senators, they are made such by royal appointment at the time they are chosen to the cabinet. Ministers without portfolios are sometimes appointed, and since 1888 each minister has had under his control an undersecretary, who takes no part in the deliberations of the cabinet, but may represent the minister before the chamber and defend the acts of the government.

In Germany there exists what may be called ministerial, but not parliamentary, responsible government. Both in the imperial and state governments ministers are appointed by the executive without reference to the political complexion of the legislature or

without regard to the wishes of the majority. In short, the executive is free to choose whom he will.

Technical administrative experts who have had long experience in the service and have risen by degrees to be heads of departments, rather than parliamentary leaders or political chiefs, are usually preferred. They are not generally required by the constitution to be taken from either chamber, though, whether members or not, they are given *entree* thereto with the right of debate.

They are not chosen exclusively from one or the other party, though certain groups are usually recognized in the construction of a cabinet, for homogeneity is not considered a necessity. Legally and theoretically they owe no responsibility to parliament, but are responsible for their acts only to the king or the prince who appointed them. Their tenure, legally speaking, is dependent upon the royal favor and not upon the will of either chamber.

The policies of state are determined by the king and carried out by the ministers, who are theoretically at least the servants of the royal will. Generally, in cabinet governments, the role of the cabinet is not determined by positive law, but by usage and custom. In Prussia, however, this is not the practice. There the relations between king and ministers, between the ministers themselves, their control over the administration, etc., are all fixed by royal ordinances.

There is no such officer as prime minister who exercises the power of direction over his subordinates. though there is a

minister-president who acts as a moderator during the absence of the king, and who frequently presides over the meetings of the cabinet.

Cabinet government is most commonly found in so-called monarchical states, where the conditions most favorable to its success are more generally present than elsewhere. Nevertheless it is sometimes found in republics, particularly those like France, in which monarchical traditions are strong. It has also been introduced into some of the Latin-American republics, notably Chile, Haiti, San Domingo, and Venezuela; but in none of them has the system received anything like a perfect development or attained any high degree of success.

Presidential government as contradistinguished from cabinet or parliamentary government is that form in which the executive is constitutionally independent of the legislature as regards his tenure and to a large extent also as regards his policies and acts. The executive may be, and generally is, responsible to the legislature or one chamber of it for certain grave crimes and sometimes even for lesser offenses, and may be impeached and upon conviction be removed from office; but he is politically irresponsible to the legislature and cannot be removed from office except upon impeachment.

This is the system which prevails in the United States, both in the national and local governments, in Switzerland, and in most of the Latin-American republics, and in a modified form in Germany. Where the presidential system prevails, no distinction

exists between what we have denominated the titular or nominal executive and the real or actual executive.

There are ministers upon whom the chief work of the administration devolves, to be sure, but they are not members of the legislature and rarely have entree to either chamber; they do not assume responsibility for the acts of the executive; they are appointed by the executive without regard to the political complexion of the legislature or the wishes of the majority in control of either chamber; they are, within the limits of the law, controlled and directed by the executive and may be dismissed by him at will.

They are, in short, the ministers of the executive, not of the legislature, administrative chiefs rather than parliamentary leaders. They neither prepare, introduce, nor advocate before the chambers the adoption of legislative measures, except in so far as they may do so through the agency of members of the legislature who are in sympathy with their policies. Votes of censure or of want of confidence by the legislature do not affect them, and when the legislature refuses to enact the measures which they suggest, instead of resigning they continue to govern as though they were in complete harmony with the majority. It not infrequently happens, of course, that they belong to a different political party from that which is in control of one or both of the chambers of the legislature, in which case the presidential system would break down were their tenure dependent upon the support of the majority. From this it will be seen that the one feature which distinguishes presidential government from the

parliamentary or cabinet system is the almost complete isolation of the executive branch from the legislature, and its independence of the same body in respect to its tenure and powers.

Unitary, Federal, And Confederate Government

Considered from the point of view of the concentration or distribution of power, governments may be classified as unitary and federal. If the powers of government are concentrated in one supreme organ or organs that are located at one common centre, and from which all local governing authorities derive their existence and powers, the government is both unitary and centralized. In such a system there is a single common source of authority, and hence but one supreme will is exerted. For convenience of administration the territory of the state may be subdivided into circumscriptions or districts, in each of which a local government may be established and to which certain powers of a local character may be delegated by the central government; but so long as the local organizations are the mere creations of the central power and exist at its will and derive their powers from it and it alone, the governmental system is unitary in character. These local organizations are nothing more than parts of the central government, created to act as its agents; in short, they have no independent wills of their own. In such a system there is no local self-government existing independently of the will of the central government, but only such as the latter may choose to allow. Examples of such systems of government are

those of England, France, Spain, Portugal, Italy, and most of the other states of Europe.

In none of them do we find a constitutional distribution of powers between a central government and a number of local governments, each with a constitution and political organization of its own creation. There are local governments, to be sure, such, for example, as the counties in England, the departments and communes in France, the provinces in Belgium and Italy, etc.; but all such governments are nothing but the creatures and agents of the central authorities and enjoy little or no constitutional protection against central interference and control.

If, on the contrary, the government of the country is distributed by the constitution between a central organization and a number of local organizations, the latter of which are not ordinarily the creatures or agents of the former, but owe their existence to the general constitution in the sense that their spheres are determined by it, the government is said to be federal in character. Federal government may be defined as a system of central and local government combined under a common sovereignty, both the central and local organizations being supreme within definite spheres, marked out for them by the general constitution.

It is dual government as contradistinguished from unitary government, and implies local self-government as opposed to centralized government. It represents a sort of compromise between unitary government and confederate government.

Contrary to the principle which underlies unitary government, the local organizations under the federal system are not the direct creations of the central government; but in most federal systems the reverse is true, that is, the central government has been created by the local organizations through the act of federation.

The territorial areas of these local organizations are not therefore mere administrative districts, but autonomous and, in a certain sense, self-created political communities, having their own constitutions and political systems. The central and local governments are not, however, totally separate and disconnected from each other in organization. Federal government is not, as is often loosely said, the central government alone, but it is a system composed of the central and local governments combined.

The local governments are as much a part of the federal system as the central government is, though neither is subject to the control of the other. In most federal systems the component parts participate in the organization of the central government. In the German Empire and the United States, for example, the upper chambers of the national legislature are composed of members chosen by a branch of the state government rather than by the people. Thus a connecting link between the central and local governments is established, which serves to minimize the tendency to mutual jealousy and to strengthen good feeling between them. The principle upon which the powers of government are distributed between the central and local organizations in a federal system is, that those affairs which are

of common interest to all the component parts of the federation and which require uniformity of regulation should be placed under the control of the central government, while all matters not of common concern should be left to the care of the local governments. In short, there should be one government for national affairs and a number of local governments for local affairs. In respect to the former, therefore, federal government resembles unitary government, while in respect to the latter it is more like confederate government.

Opinions differ, however, as to what affairs require uniformity of regulation and what should be left to local regulation, and hence the line of separation between general and local matters is in practice drawn differently in different federal systems.

In most states having the federal form of government, however, such affairs as foreign relations and international intercourse, war and peace, interstate and foreign commerce, coinage of money, patents and copyrights, have been placed under the control of the central government. In international relations the local governments are non-entities and are officially unknown, though, as will be pointed out later, they have shown themselves able in certain instances to interpose obstacles in the way of the successful prosecution of a common foreign policy by the central government.

In the more recently established federal systems of Europe and Latin-America the notion of what requires uniformity of regulation and what will permit of variety of control is somewhat

different from that which has prevailed in the United States, and, consequently, the principle of distribution has been different. In these states many affairs are treated as being of general interest and hence requiring uniformity of regulation, which in the United States are left to local regulation.

Thus, in Canada and the German Empire the whole body of civil, criminal, and commercial law and the law of procedure, as well as the law of marriage and divorce, is national, not local; that is, instead of separate and widely varying legal systems in these domains, there is a single uniform code for all the component parts of the empire. The evils that have arisen in the United States in consequence of the extraordinary variety of legislation, especially in respect to certain businesses and occupations that are really national in scope rather than local, have recently aroused discussion in many quarters in favor of increasing the powers of the national government along various lines.

Two methods have been followed in distributing the powers of government between the central and local organizations, where the federal system prevails. In most such states the powers intrusted to the central government are specifically enumerated. To the local governments are reserved all the remaining powers except such as may be specifically prohibited.

The central government is thus an authority of delegated powers, while the local governments are authorities of residuary powers. In other words, the competence of the central government is *positively* determined by the constitution, while that of the local

governments is *negatively* determined. The presumption of law in case of doubt, therefore, is against the existence of any power claimed by the central government and in favor of any power claimed by the local governments. In the federal system of Canada, however, a somewhat different principle of distribution prevails.

There the local governments are authorities of delegated powers, while the central government is one of both delegated and reserved powers. Whatever may be the method or principle of distribution, or the nature and extent of power delegated or reserved to either government, neither may enlarge its competence or distribute the powers of government differently from the way in which they have been distributed by the constitution.

Only the sovereign itself can do that. In some federal systems, however, the central government is given a limited control over the organization and acts of the local governments. Thus, in the United States it is made the duty of the national government to see that only republican governments shall be maintained by the individual states, from which it may be inferred that the national government may prohibit such local organizations as may not in its judgment conform to this requirement.

In Canada the Dominion government has the power to disallow the acts of the provincial legislatures; likewise in the federal republic of Venezuela the national government may veto the acts of the local legislatures. Both in Germany and Switzerland the

central authorities have a sort of *jus suprema inspectionis* over the operations of the local governments, especially when they are charged with carrying out the acts of the central government. In the German Empire the imperial government may by the process of federal execution compel a delinquent or recalcitrant member of the empire to perform its obligations to the empire.

Confederate government is that form of government in which, as to territory and population, the state is coextensive in its own organization with the organization of the local government. In a confederate system, as in the federal system, there is a central organization; but instead of a single sovereignty there are as many sovereignties as there are local governments.

The central government is merely the agent of the states composing the confederacy, and its jurisdiction is limited to a very few concerns. In operation its commands extend, as has been said, not to the individuals who inhabit the confederacy, but are addressed to the confederated states themselves and reach the individuals for whom they are intended only mediately and indirectly, through the medium of the state organizations.

A confederacy in reality has no citizens or subjects who owe it direct and immediate allegiance. Its jurisdiction generally includes only such matters as relate to foreign relations, defensive war, and possibly a few matters of an interstate character. Usually it possesses no power over the sources of its own revenue supply, but is dependent upon the voluntary contributions of the confederated states. Finally, it lacks stability

and permanence, and its existence is precarious, since it belongs to the component members to withdraw from the confederation at will or refuse to be bound by its acts and resolutions. It is a transitory form of political organization which usually develops into the federal system or dissolves into its constituent elements.

Bureaucratic Versus Popular Government

From the standpoint of the organization and spirit of the administrative service, governments may be classified as *bureaucratic* and *popular*. A bureaucratic government is one which is composed of administrators especially trained for the public service, who enter the employ of the government only after a regular course of study and examination, and who serve usually during good behaviour and retire on pensions.

Under such a system the governmental service acquires the character of a profession, its officials are subject to a rigid discipline, and they tend to acquire an *esprit de corps* somewhat similar to that found among the soldiers of a regular army. They devote their entire time to the discharge of their public duties and have no other occupation. They therefore tend to become a class

apart from the rest of the population, possessing different ideals and interests. In a large measure such government is irresponsible to the people, and is little affected by public opinion — it is, in short, very largely a government of men rather than of laws. It is marked by an excessive formalism, is inclined

to parade and pomp, and has a tendency to overemphasize administrative routine rather than conditions and principles — in short, it tends, as Burke remarked, to think more of forms than of substance.

The most extreme example of a bureaucracy which the world has seen in modern times, perhaps, was that which existed in Prussia from 1720 to 1808. A bureaucracy of a less absolute character was that which existed in France under Napoleon for a time after 1808. In varying degrees of development it exists to-day in all the so-called monarchical states of Europe, especially in Prussia and Russia, and to a less degree in England. Commonly thought of only in connection with monarchical states, its forms and methods, and to some extent its spirit, are, nevertheless, found in the governmental systems of many republican states as well.

The chief merit of bureaucratic government is that it represents high skill and ability. Its officials are specially trained for the public service. It is thus more efficient than popular government; and if skilled, efficient, and economic administration were the only or the main end of government, little fault could be found with such a system. "It accumulates experience, "says John Stuart Mill, "acquires well-tried and well-considered traditional maxims and makes provision for appropriate practical knowledge in those who have the actual conduct of affairs. "

But as we have attempted to show, efficiency of administration is not the sole end to be attained in any governmental system. The education of the people in political matters, the stimulation of

popular interest in public affairs, and the cultivation of loyalty and patriotism on the part of the masses should be among the important aims of every political system, and this cannot be accomplished by the bureaucratic system.

It is not favorable to the development of patriotism, self-reliance, or loyalty. Moreover, it is not without defects inherent in its own nature. "The disease, "said Mill, "which afflicts bureaucratic governments and of which they die is routine. They perish by the mutability of their maxims and still more by the universal law that whatever becomes a routine loses its vital principle. "Such a government, he said, tends to become a "pedantocracy. "It is the only government, some one has remarked, for which the philosopher can find no defense.

Contradistinguished from bureaucratic government is popular government, that is, government by persons drawn at regular intervals from the ranks of the people, who after a brief service return to the private walks of life. Generally they are without special training; not infrequently they serve without pecuniary compensation; and often they are during the term of their public service engaged in other occupations. Under such a system most of the offices are open to all without preliminary preparation or examination; few or no professional qualifications are required, and the official class never develops a caste system or loses touch with the people. The officers are more or less influenced by public opinion, and in the discharge of their duties are more often subject to legislative than administrative control. Finally, from the point of view of their functions and sphere of activity,

governments may be denominated as *individualistic* and *paternal.* A government of the former type is one whose activities are limited mainly to the simple police functions of maintaining the peace, order, and security of society and the protection of private rights. A paternal government is one whose functions are not limited merely to restraining wrong-doing and the protection of private rights, but which goes farther and endeavors to promote by various means the social well-being of the people.

It undertakes to perform for society many services which might be performed as easily through private initiative, on the ground that they can be more efficiently and economically done by the government than by private individuals. Such a government may own and operate various industries, conduct businesses like insurance, provide pensions for the old, the sick, and the infirm, and in various ways care for the social interests of the people.

Succession Of Governmental Forms

No state has retained the same form of government throughout its whole history. Governments, like living beings, are constantly changing their forms so as to adapt themselves to the altered conditions of a new environment. Thus, Athens was first ruled by kings, then by an aristocracy, later by tyrants, then by a democracy, and finally again by kings. So Rome went through a circle of political transformations. It began as a city kingdom, then it became a republic, and finally an empire ruled by Caesar. The government of France within half a century passed through the forms of an absolute monarchy, a republic, an empire, a

kingdom, again a republic, again an empire, and for the third time a republic. Many of the early writers undertook to reduce the successive transformations through which governments pass to a regularly ordered sequence or rule of general application. There existed in early times a popular belief that there was a natural order of political development through which all states must pass in the course of their history. Plato, for example, taught that the natural course of evolution was from aristocracy, the rule of the best, to democracy, the rule of the military, then to oligarchy, then to the rule of the mob, and finally to tyranny.

Aristotle, while differing from Plato as to the order of development, nevertheless believed that forms of government followed one another according to a regular order of succession. According to his rule the state began as a hereditary monarchy, which in time passed into an aristocracy. The latter in the course of time became an oligarchy, the oligarchy became a tyranny, and the latter ultimately passed into a democracy.

Ordinarily after an unsatisfactory experience with democracy a monarchy would be reestablished, and the cycle thus begun again would be passed through as before. Polybius taught that in the beginning the strongest person physically in the state ruled, that is, the state began originally as a monarchy. Then followed a period when justice rather than physical power became the basis of the right to rule, during which time a form of government called by Polybius "royalty "prevailed. This form in time degenerated into tyranny, only to be overthrown eventually, and an aristocracy set up in its place. This in the course of time was

succeeded by oligarchy, which in turn was overthrown by the people and a democracy was established. "Machiavelli laid down almost the same rule regarding the order of natural succession in respect to the political forms of ancient states.

The noted German scholar Schleiermacher asserted that political transformations are determined largely by the spread of political self-consciousness. At first, he said, political consciousness was not highly developed in any minds, though diffused equally among the masses. The democratic form of government naturally corresponded to this condition and was therefore the first state form. In the course of time a higher state consciousness developed and concentrated itself in a few minds.

This led to the establishment of aristocracy. Finally the state consciousness concentrated itself in a single individual, and monarchy, the highest form of state, succeeded. There is a residuum of truth in the principle of Schleiermacher's law, but the weight of opinion is against the order in which he conceived political consciousness to have spread. It is more reasonable to believe that it existed at first in but one or at best only a very few minds, and that it grew and spread slowly and became diffused throughout the mass of the population rather late in the life of the state.

It seems more probable, therefore, that the order of succession was the reverse of that which Schleiermacher laid down; that is, the state began with a monarchical form of organization, which in time became aristocratic, and finally, when political

consciousness became general, the organization of the state became democratic. History, indeed, shows that this has generally been the order of development.

Bluntschli, a critic of Schleiermacher, held that the normal forms of government succeeded each other in the following order: first, theocracy; second, monarchy; third, aristocracy; and fourth, democracy; while the abnormal forms succeeded each other in the following order: hierarchy, tyranny, oligarchy, and ochlocracy. Each of these forms not infrequently passed through several transformations. For example, monarchy began in its pure form, then it became aristocratic in character, and finally, democratic. Republics likewise passed through monarchical, aristocratic, and democratic stages.

Regarding the merits of the rule laid down by the early writers in respect to the succession of state forms, there can be but one conclusion, namely, that such changes do not follow each other in accordance with any law such as reigns in the physical world. History furnishes abundant evidence of this truth. For example, the early monarchies did not always pass into tyrannies, but often the latter resulted from strife among the leaders of an aristocracy. Not infrequently monarchies have been transformed into democracies, aristocracies into monarchies, and democracies into aristocracies. Bodin, in his treatise on the republic, gives numerous historical examples of such transformations.

In modern times monarchies have more often been succeeded by democracies than by aristocracies. During the sixteenth and

seventeenth centuries in many states of Europe monarchical governments of an absolute type were erected upon the ruins of feudal aristocracies. A study of the subject indeed will show that the exceptions are more numerous than the rule. There are, of course, certain laws of political evolution, but no such sequence of succession as was described by the early writers. Not all states have passed through the same stages or undergone the same transformations. The changes that have occurred in some have been the result of internal revolution, in others the result of conscious adoption or imitation. Woolsey justly remarks that if there were such a law of succession as described by Polybius, it would afford a most hopeless prospect to the world. It would, in short, mean the reign of fatalism and of death in the domain of politics.

The Legislative Department and Parties System

The Unicameral Versus The Bicameral Principle

IT has become almost an axiom in political science that legislative bodies should consist of two chambers. At the present time those constructed on the unicameral principle are found only in Greece, Luxembourg, Servia, the Canadian provinces of British Columbia, Manitoba, and Ontario, a few of the smaller German states, and some of the Swiss cantons. Formerly, however, the unicameral idea found more favor than now. In America, in the eighteenth century, it had an influential advocate in Benjamin Franklin, who is said to have compared a double-chambered legislative assembly to a cart with a horse hitched to each end, both pulling in opposite directions. Largely through his influence the legislature of Pennsylvania under its first constitution was constructed on the unicameral principle, and we have the testimony of John Adams that the question of whether the early American legislatures generally should consist of one or two chambers was one of transcendent importance at the time of the adoption of the first state constitutions. In France, at the time of the Revolution, the unicameral idea had many supporters,

and the principle was incorporated in the constitution of 1791 by an almost unanimous vote of the National Assembly, and was continued in the constitution of 1793. The constitution of the year III, however, established the bicameral system; and it was continued until 1848, when the single chamber was again reverted to, though only for a brief interval. Among the powerful advocates of the unicameral principle in 1848 was Lamartine, as Turgot had been its ablest defender at the time of the Revolution. The experience of France with single-chambered legislative assemblies, however, was not satisfactory; and their proceedings, it is said, "were marked by violence, instability, and excesses of the worst kind. "

With remarkably few exceptions the states which have experimented with the single chamber system have abandoned it for the bicameral system. In England, during the Commonwealth, it was tried for a brief period, but without success; and the House of Lords, which had been abolished, was soon restored. The lack of a second chamber in the national congress was one of the causes of dissatisfaction with the Articles of Confederation in the United States, and, with the exception of Benjamin Franklin, none of the framers of the constitution favored retaining the unicameral system. In Pennsylvania, where it existed for a time, we are told that it was marked by a "want of stability "and resulted in "extremely impulsive and variable legislation.

"It was soon abandoned in Pennsylvania and in the few other states where it had been introduced. Other countries, notably Spain, Portugal, Naples, Mexico, Bolivia, Ecuador, and Peru, have

all abandoned it, after a fair trial, for the double-chambered system. The chief argument advanced in favor of the unicameral system by the French statesmen and political writers in 1789 and again in 1848 was that it secured "unity "instead of "duality "in the organization of the legislative branch of the government. Two or three chambers, it was argued, meant two or three sovereignties. "The law, "said Sieyès, "is the will of the people; the people cannot at the same time have two different wills on the same subject; therefore, the legislative body which represents the people ought to be essentially one. Where there are two chambers, discord and division will be inevitable and the will of the people will be paralyzed by inaction.

"The same view was expressed by Lamartine, who maintained that the double chamber sacrificed the great principle of unity by dividing the sovereignty of the state. A similar line of reasoning was pursued by Condorcet, Robespierre, and other leaders in France at the time of the Revolution. In America, likewise, the same kind of argument was advanced by Franklin and others against the bicameral theory. Legislation being merely the expression of the common will, the necessity of committing it to two separate assemblies, each having a veto upon the action of the other, was not apparent. "All the arguments, "says Judge Story, "derived from the analogy between the movements of political bodies and the operations of physical nature, all the impulses of political parsimony, all the prejudices against a second coordinate legislative assembly stimulated by the exemplification of it in the British Parliament, were against a

division of the legislative power. "In short, a double-chambered legislature was an assembly divided against itself.

In America, John Adams combated the doctrines of Franklin, Turgot, and the other French critics of the bicameral system, in a rather remarkable essay entitled "A Defense of the Constitutions of Government of the United States, "in which, among other things, he defended with ability and learning the principle of the division of the legislative power between two coordinate assemblies.

He reviewed the history of free governments and undertook to show that government by single assemblies had "generally been visionary if not corrupt and violent and had usually ended in despotism.

"Of all possible forms of government, a sovereignty in a single assembly, successively chosen by the people, is, "he said, "perhaps the best calculated to facilitate the gratification of self-love, and the pursuit of the private interests of a few individuals — in one word, the whole system of affairs and every conceivable motive of hope or fear will be employed to promote the private interests of a few of their obsequious majority; and there is no remedy but in arms.

Notwithstanding all the objections raised against the bicameral system, experience has apparently established its advantages over the single chamber scheme. "It accompanies the Anglican race, "observes Francis Lieber, "like the common law, and everywhere it succeeds.

"Of all the forms of government that are possible among mankind, "says Lecky, "I do not know any which is likely to be worse than the government of a single omnipotent democratic chamber. It is at least as susceptible as an individual despot of the temptations that grow out of the possession of an uncontrolled power, and it is likely to act with much less sense of responsibility and much less real deliberation. "

The advantages of a second chamber may be summarized as follows: First, it serves as a check upon hasty, rash, and ill-considered legislation. Legislative assemblies are often subject to strong passions and excitements and are sometimes impatient, impetuous, and careless. The function of a second chamber is to restrain such tendencies and to compel careful consideration of legislative projects.

It interposes delay between the introduction and final adoption of a measure and thus permits time for reflection and deliberation. "One great object of the separation of the legislature into two houses acting separately and with coordinate powers, "said Chancellor Kent, "is to destroy the evil effects of sudden and strong excitement and of precipitate measures springing from passion, caprice, prejudice, personal influence, and party intrigue, which have been found by sad experience to exercise a potent and dangerous sway in single assemblies. It is clear, says Bluntschli, in explaining the advantages of the bicameral system, that four eyes see more and better than two, especially when a given subject may be considered from different standpoints. In the second place, the bicameral principle not only serves to

protect the legislature against its own errors of haste and impulse, but it also affords a protection to the individual against the despotism of a single chamber. The existence of a second chamber is thus a guarantee of liberty as well as to some extent a safeguard against tyranny. Where the whole legislative power is intrusted to a single omnipotent assembly, the restraining element of a second chamber is lacking. There is a natural propensity on the part of legislative bodies to accumulate power into their hands, to absorb the powers of the executive and the judiciary, in short, to draw into their grasp the whole government of the state. They have a constant tendency, observes Judge Story, to overstep their proper boundaries, from passion, from ambition, from inadvertence, from the prevalence of faction, or from the overwhelming influence of private interests.

Under such circumstances, he adds, the only effective barrier against oppression, whether accidental or intentional, is to "separate its operations, to balance interest against interest, ambition against ambition, the combinations and spirit of dominion of one body against the like combinations and spirit of another. "The existence of a second chamber, continues Story, doubles the security of the people by requiring the concurrence of two distinct bodies in any scheme of usurpation or perfidy where otherwise the ambition of a single body would be sufficient.

"The necessity of two chambers, "says Bryce, "is based on the belief that the innate tendency of an assembly to become hateful, tyrannical, and corrupt, needs to be checked by the coexistence of another house of equal authority. The Americans restrain their

legislatures by dividing them, just as the Romans restrained their executives by substituting two consuls for one king.

A third advantage of the bicameral system is that it affords a convenient means of giving representation to special interests or classes in the state and particularly to the aristocratic portion of society, in order to counterbalance the undue preponderance of the popular element in one of the chambers, thus introducing into the legislature a conservative force to curb the radicalism of the popular chamber.

We cannot, says Bluntschli, ignore the distinction between the aristocratic and democratic elements in the population of the state and allow one of these elements alone representation in the legislature without doing the other an injustice. Montesquieu asserted, not without some truth, that there are always persons in every state, distinguished by their birth, wealth, or honors, to whom, if they are confounded with the common people and are given only an equal share in the government with the rest, the common liberty would be slavery and who would have to interest in supporting the government, as most of the popular resolutions would be against them.

"The share they should have in the legislature, "he declared, "ought to be proportioned to their other advantages in the state, which can happen only when they form a body that has a right to check the licentiousness of the people, as the people have a right to oppose any encroachment of theirs. John Stuart Mill advocated a second chamber constructed on the principle of political

experience and training without reference to considerations of birth or wealth. If one chamber, said Mill, represents popular feeling, the other should represent personal merit, tested and guaranteed by actual public service and fortified by practical experience. If one is the people's chamber, the other should be a chamber of statesmen, a council composed of all living public men who have passed through important political offices or employments.

Such a chamber, Mill argued, would be not merely a moderating body, or a simple check, but also an impelling force. It would be a body of natural leaders and would guide the people forward in the path of progress. The best constitution of the second chamber, he declared, is that which embodies the greatest number of elements exempt from the class interests and prejudices of the majority, but having in themselves nothing offensive to democratic feeling.

The bicameral system also affords a means of giving separate representation to the somewhat dissimilar interests of capital and labour. An actual illustration of the value of this principle is found, we are told by a well-known writer, in the Australian state of Victoria, where the upper chamber of the legislature is made up mainly of the representatives of capital, while the other chamber is composed principally of the representatives of labour. This is the result chiefly of a restricted suffrage for the upper house, higher property qualifications for membership in it, and the nonpayment of its members for their services. Finally, the bicameral system affords an opportunity, in states having the

federal form of government, of giving representation to the political units composing the federation. In order to maintain the proper equilibrium between the component members and the federation as a whole, the former ought to be represented in one chamber of the legislature without regard to population, that is, represented as distinct political organizations. This, in fact, is the principle upon which the legislatures of most states having the federal form of government are at present constructed.

The eighteenth century French doctrine that the bicameral system is incompatible with the principle of the unity of sovereignty will, upon examination, be seen to be untenable. Division of the legislative body into two chambers does not involve a division of the sovereignty of the state any more than the distribution of governmental power between legislative, executive, and judicial organs means a division of sovereignty. So long as the concurrence of both chambers is necessary to legislate, that is, so long as legislation. emanates from the assembly as a whole, there is not duality, but unity. Law is the will of the people, observes Laboulaye, whatever may be the mode employed for enacting it.

Where, however, the structural principle of both chambers of the legislature is the same, much of the value of the bicameral system is lost. If the two chambers are identical in constitution, then the second is a mere duplication of the first; and the advantages of the additional chamber are questionable. "If the two houses were elected for the same period and by the same electors, "observes Lieber, "they would amount in practice to

little more than two committees of the same house; but we want two bona fide different houses representing the impulse as well as the continuity, the progress and the conservatism, the onward zeal and the retentive element, innovation, and adhesion, which must ever form integral elements of all civilization. One house, therefore, ought to be large; the other comparatively small, and elected or appointed for a longer time. "Some writers maintain that no advantage whatever is to be gained by the bicameral system if the two chambers are identical in constitution. In such a case it is, says Bluntschli, like employing duplicate organs to do the same thing.

Bluntschli argues, with good reason we believe, that the upper chamber ought to rest on a different basis from the lower chamber, that it ought, to some extent at least, to represent special classes or interests or political units as such without full regard to population; while the lower chamber ought to represent the opinion and interests of the mass of population, and to this end the representative ought to be chosen by the whole body of the citizens.

Judge Story was of the same opinion. The division of the legislature into two branches, he declared, would be of little or no intrinsic value unless the organization was such that each house could operate as a real check upon undue and rash legislation.

But it is not necessary to the success of the bicameral system that every class and interest in the community should be given

distinct and separate representation. What is required in order to realize the full value of the bicameral principle is that the two chambers should be differently composed and should rest on dissimilar bases.

The members of one chamber ought to enjoy longer tenures, they ought to represent a larger constituency, higher membership qualifications ought to be required of them, and they might well be chosen in a different manner and by a differently constituted electorate. Where these requirements exist there will always be one chamber smaller in size than the other, possessing a higher degree of experience and perhaps of ability, more conservatism of spirit, and representing more fully the higher property and intellectual interests of the state.

Thus the high age qualifications (the attainment of the fortieth year) required of senators in Belgium, France, and Italy has had the effect of securing more experienced statesmen in the legislatures of those countries. The longer tenure, the larger constituency, and the method of indirect election for members of the United States Senate tend to secure a more experienced, more conservative, and, on the whole, an abler body of legislators than is found in the House of Representatives. The same is true of the upper chambers of the Australian Commonwealth, and the republics of Brazil, Mexico, and Switzerland.

The hereditary principle which prevails almost wholly in the structure of the upper chamber in Great Britain and to a less degree in Austria, Hungary, and Spain diminishes rather than

increases the efficiency of the legislature; yet under restrictions which it has been proposed to introduce into the English system the principle would not be without its advantages, since it would provide a means of introducing into the legislature a class of educated and leisured men who have had exceptional opportunities for acquiring political information and for imbibing the result of political experience, without at the same time bringing into the legislature large numbers of men who add little or no strength.

The appointive principle which prevails in Italy for the constitution of the upper chamber, and to a less degree In several other European states, is out of harmony with modern notions of representation, yet it has the advantage of insuring a place in the legislature for distinguished men who have held public office and also for men who have attained eminence in science, art, and the learned professions.

Perhaps the ideal mode of determining the membership of the upper chamber lies in a combination of some or all of the above systems, if we eliminate the Norwegian method of cooptation and the British hereditary principle, neither of which commends itself to us.

A certain number of members of whom high qualifications are required might very properly be elected upon the basis of a restricted suffrage from the larger administrative subdivisions into which the state is divided; a certain number might be elected by the local governments, such as the provincial legislatures or

municipal councils; a limited number might be appointed by the excutive from those who have achieved eminence in the state or who have held certain high offices, etc.

With regard to the constitution of the lower house, there is a substantial unanimity of opinion and of practice that it should rest upon a popular basis, that is, its members should be chosen by direct election, upon the basis of a wide suffrage and for short terms. Finally, the experience of the past demonstrates the wisdom of the principle of inequality of powers as between the two chambers.

Nearly everywhere the upper chamber is intrusted with a share, negative or positive, in the administration of the government, often a certain participation in the control of the foreign policy of the state, and sometimes is vested with important judicial functions. This has a tendency to increase the dignity and prestige of membership therein and thus secure legislators of higher ability and added conservatism. The scheme of partial renewal common in the organization of the upper chambers is likewise a valuable principle, in that it tends to secure the element of experience and preserve continuity of membership.

Methods Of Apportionment

Several methods of apportioning or distributing legislative representatives have been followed. One is to distribute them among the political divisions of the state without regard to their population, or at least without exclusive regard to it. In all the

important federal unions except the German Empire and the Dominion of Canada the principle of equality of representation among the component members prevails in the construction of the upper chambers. In the German *Bundesrath* the number of votes to which each state of the empire is entitled varies from one to seventeen; and in the Canadian House of Lords the number varies from four to twenty-four, the latter being the number allowed the province of Quebec. In the French Republic the number of senators from each department varies from one to ten. Another method of distribution is to apportion the representatives among the political divisions of the state with some regard to the amount or value of property in each. The chief merit of such a method is that it takes into consideration one of the important elements which enter into the physical make-up of the state.

The doctrine that taxation should go hand in hand with representation has long been a cherished political theory of the people of America and England, and perhaps no better system could be devised for protecting the rights of property than by giving it a share of representation in the legislative branch. For other reasons, however, it has not commended itself to the people of democratic states; and outside of a few European monarchies where property is taken into consideration to some extent in organizing representation in the upper chambers, the system no longer prevails. In no state is property to-day the sole basis of representation in either chamber, and the few remaining traces of the principle that have survived the nineteenth century will doubtless disappear in the course of time.

Another principle is that which bases representation on the total population, citizens and aliens, male and female, enfranchised and unenfranchised alike, and not on the number of voters merely. This is now the almost universal rule governing the apportionment of representation in lower chambers, and in some states it is also the basis of representation in the upper chambers.

It possesses the element of simplicity and uniformity and is regarded as being more in harmony with present day notions of representative government. The ratio of representation varies widely among different states. For the national House of Representatives in the United States it is now one representative for every 193, 000 of the population. In the with some regard to the amount or value of property in each. The chief merit of such a method is that it takes into consideration one of the important elements which enter into the physical make-up of the state. The doctrine that taxation should go hand in hand with representation has long been a cherished political theory of the people of America and England, and perhaps no better system could be devised for protecting the rights of property than by giving it a share of representation in the legislative branch.

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The ratio of representation varies widely among different states. For the national House of Representatives in the United States it is now one representative for every 193, 000 of the population. In the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland it is one member for every 62, 700 of the population; in Belgium, one member for every 40, 000; in Brazil, one member for every 70, 000; in Mexico, one for every 40, 000; in Switzerland, one for every 20, 000; in France, one for every 100, 000; in the German Empire, one for every 100, 000; in Canada, one for every 22, 600 of the population.

The same variety prevails among the individual states composing the federal republic of the United States, where the principle of apportionment on the basis of population is generally the rule for the constitution of both the upper and lower chambers. Perhaps an ideal system would be one which would take into

consideration the elements of population, geographical area, and property combined, if there were any criteria for determining the relative weight which should be given to each of these elements. As yet no satisfactory scheme of this kind has been devised.

The Electorate

Theories Of Suffrage

It was a part of the French political philosophy of the eighteenth century that every citizen has a natural and inherent right to participate in the choice of his representatives. This was a logical consequence of the French conception that sovereignty is the general will and that this will cannot be accurately ascertained and expressed unless all the citizens are allowed to participate in its expression through the choice of representatives.

"All the inhabitants, "said Montesquieu, "…ought to have a right of voting at the election of representatives, except such as are in so mean a situation as to be deemed to have no will of their own. "Rousseau held a similar view. This doctrine was powerfully supported by Robespierre, Condorcet, Petion, Boissy d'Anglas, and other Frenchmen at the time of the Revolution. Sovereignty, said Robespierre, resides in all the people, and every citizen, whoever he may be, should have a share in the representation and the right to participate in the formation of the law by which he is bound. Notwithstanding the general prevalence of this notion in France in the eighteenth century, the French constitutions of the time did not, as a matter of fact, establish

the principle of direct and unrestricted suffrage. The national assembly established instead a system of indirect election based on a restricted suffrage, and it made a distinction between active and passive citizens, the latter of whom were allowed no part in choosing the intermediate electors. In 1792, however, the distinction between ciloyens actifs and citoyens passifs was abolished, as was also the tax qualification for voting; the age requirement was reduced to twentyone years, and a system approaching universal manhood suffrage was substituted, though the system of indirect election was retained.

The constitution of the year III reestablished a tax qualification for voting without specifying the amount; in 1800 this was abolished and the principle of a wide suffrage reestablished. Under the restoration, in 1814, however, France went to the extreme of requiring the payment of a tax amounting to 300 francs and the attainment of the thirtieth year of age as a condition to the exercise of the suffrage. The Revolution of 1830 brought about a reduction from 300 to 200 francs in the amount of the tax contribution required of electors and the lowering of the age requirement to twenty-five years for members of the lower chamber.

Both during the period of the Restoration and the July monarchy, the number of electors in proportion to the population was exceedingly small, and this became the cause of widespread popular discontent. A movement for direct universal manhood suffrage became active about 1840, and it triumphed in 1848 with the establishment of the second republic, the constitution of

which declared that suffrage should be direct and universal and that all Frenchmen twenty-one years of age and in the enjoyment of their civil rights should be electors, regardless of the amount of their property. This system was continued under the second empire and under the third republic, and is still in existence.

The French political dogma of the eighteenth century, that the right of suffrage is a gift of nature, belonging to all citizens alike, has generally been rejected as a false and pernicious principle; and no states, not even France, as we have shown, have in practice acted wholly on such a principle.

The better view is that suffrage is not a natural right of all men, but a privilege granted by the state to such persons or classes as are most likely to exercise it for the public good. Nearly all electoral systems have been framed on this principle, that is, they have conditioned the privilege upon a variety of considerations to be explained later. In the early stages of the evolution of the representative system the restrictions were much more general and stringent than they are to-day, and consequently the body of electors was much smaller in comparison with the whole number of inhabitants.

In the eighteenth century, and indeed far into the nineteenth, the exclusion of the non-property-owning classes was not considered inconsistent with the prevailing notions of popular government; and nowhere outside of France was there any considerable number of statesmen or political writers who believed that government by the masses of the people was practicable.

In England, until 1832, the parliamentary franchise was limited in the counties to freeholders whose landed property was of the annual value of forty shillings; and in the eighteenth century the value of forty shillings was many times what it is to-day. In the English colonies of America freehold qualifications for voting were common in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and in a number of them religious qualifications also existed.

The Massachusetts charter of 1691, for example, limited the suffrage to possessors of freeholds of the annual value of forty shillings or of other estates to the value of forty pounds. Likewise the early state constitutions generally restricted the right of voting to the property-owning classes. In some, like New Hampshire, Delaware, Georgia, and Pennsylvania, the payment simply of a tax was required, but in others the suffrage was restricted to owners of land of an annual value ranging in amount from three pounds in Massachusetts to fifty pounds in New Jersey.

With the rapid spread of democratic ideas after 1820, however, restrictions upon the suffrage began to disappear, and before the middle of the century practically the entire adult white male population was in the enjoyment of the franchise. Only one or two of the older states restricted the right to vote to those who could read and write, though here and there a small property qualification was required. In recent years some of the Southern states, owing to the presence of a large ignorant negro population, have restricted the suffrage to those who can read or "understand "the state constitution. In other Southern states the

privilege of voting is limited to those who own a small amount of property, or pay a poll tax, or have served in the Union or Confederate armies or are descended from those who so served, or were voters in the year 1867 or are descendants of such voters. Ability to read and write is a condition to the exercise of the suffrage in several of the Northern and Western states also.

In all the states citizenship of the United States or a declaration of intention to become a citizen is required as well as residence for a specified period in the state and election district in which the voter offers to vote. The attainment of the twenty-first year of age is a universal requirement, and with the exceptions to be noted later the right of suffrage is generally restricted to persons of the male sex. A common requirement also is that the voter's name shall be inscribed on an electoral list, or, in popular language, he shall be "registered. "

In England, as a result of successive extensions beginning in 1832, the franchise has come to embrace the mass of the adult male population, the ratio of the voters to the total population being about one to six. Practically the only classes of adult males now excluded from the franchise are domestic servants, bachelors living with their parents and occupying no premises on their own account, and persons whose change of abode deprives them of a vote.

In the latter class are included vagrants, artisans who move about in obedience to the demands of trade, and many professional persons like teachers whose calling is such that the

'rule requiring twelve months' occupation often excludes them. Among the specifically excluded classes are peers, aliens, idiots, paupers, convicts, persons employed by candidates, and a few public officers, such as those directly concerned with the conduct of elections.

In order to exercise his privilege the name of the voter must be on a registration list, made up in the first instance by the overseers of the poor in each parish and revised and corrected by an official known as the revising barrister. In France, as has been said, practical universal manhood suffrage now prevails except that certain individuals are excluded, such as persons convicted of crime, bankrupts, persons under guardianship, and persons in the active military or naval service.

The suffrage for the election of members of the *Reichstag* of the German Empire also approaches the universal manhood level, though the attainment of a more advanced age is required than in America or England, namely, twenty-five years. The franchise is restricted wholly to Germans of the male sex, while various persons are excluded, notably those under guardianship, bankrupts, paupers, persons who have lost their civil rights, and persons who are in the active military service. The names of all voters must be inscribed on an electoral list for a certain period before the election.

The suffrage in the several German states varies widely, but usually it is more restricted than the imperial franchise. Such, for example, is the three-class system of voting in Prussia,

according to which the voters are divided into three categories on the basis of the amount of taxes they pay, each class voting separately and choosing one third of the intermediate electors by whom the members of the *Landtag* are elected. Under this arrangement a few large taxpayers in an election district possess the same electoral power as a large number of voters who own a small amount of property.

The same system is applied in choosing municipal councils in the cities and villages of Prussia. Italy almost alone of the European states requires an educational qualification for the exercise of the suffrage. For the election of members of the Chamber of Deputies the elector must have passed an examination on the subjects embraced in the course of compulsory education, though the examination is not required of certain classes who could obviously pass it, such as the members of learned societies, college graduates, professional men, etc.; nor of those who pay a direct tax of nineteen lire to the state or who pay rents of a certain amount.

In Austria, until 1907, a complicated five-class system prevailed, according to which the voters were grouped somewhat as in Prussia on the basis of the amount of taxes they paid. By a constitutional amendment adopted in 1907, however, the five-class system was abolished and virtual manhood suffrage was established for the election of all representatives to the popular chamber. In Hungary, by an amendment of 1907, what amounts to virtual manhood suffrage was also established, though there are some disqualifications, notably in the case of certain public

officers. In Switzerland, both in the confederation and in the cantons, the suffrage is enjoyed by all males twenty years of age except the clergy, and a few other classes who are unfit. Likewise in Greece and in Spain (since 1890) virtual manhood suffrage prevails.

Belgium in 1893 introduced a system of plural voting. Every male citizen twenty-five years of age and a resident at least one year in the commune is allowed one vote; a supplementary vote is allowed to every man who has reached the age of thirty-five years and has legitimate offspring and pays a tax of 5 francs to the state; also to every landed proprietor twenty-five years of age the value of whose land aggregates at least 2000 francs.

Two supplementary votes are allowed to every citizen twenty-five years of age who possesses a diploma from an institution of higher learning or a certificate showing the completion of a course of secondary education; or who holds or has held a public office or who practices or has practiced a private profession which presupposes that the holder possesses at least a secondary education. No one, however, may have more than three votes in the aggregate.

The Belgian system represents an effort to combine the advantages of universal suffrage with a scheme of what Sidgwick calls "weighted voting, "with a view to mitigating the evils inherent in a system of universal suffrage by preventing the ignorant and uninstructed mass of the community from overriding the intelligent and capable few. It rests on the

assumption that there are some individuals in the state whose votes ought to be given a greater weight in the choice of public officials than those of the rest, that while everyone ought to have a vote, some ought to have more than one. It recognizes, in short, that some men are wiser and better fitted to choose, and that some men's opinions should count for more than others' in ascertaining the general will. While admitting that every honest and capable citizen should be allowed a share in choosing those who are to govern him, it denies that everyone should be given an equal share, in short, that the judgment of the illiterate and incapable should count for less than that of the capable and educated voter.

The Belgian system takes into consideration the elements of property, education, family relation, and occupation or profession in determining the weight of a man's voice in the government. It assumes that the vote of the owner of property upon which taxes are paid to the state should count for more than the vote of one who contributes nothing to its support; that the vote of the man who has added to the population and power of the community by establishing a family should be given greater weight than the vote of him who has not; and that the share of the citizen who contributes to the advancement of civilization by practicing a profession should be larger than that of a common laborer, etc.

The chief objection to such a system of suffrage lies in the difficulty of finding a just and practical standard or criterion by which the weight of different votes may be graduated. Any scheme for assigning different values to the votes of the property

owner, the man of education, the head of a family, the professional man, etc., must be largely arbitrary. The possession of property, for example, is often the result of accident rather than of thrift, economy, or capacity, and even if it were otherwise, popular opinion is so averse to the basing of political rights upon wealth that the scheme would be hard to defend in a democracy.

It is sometimes said in support of the argument that the wealthy have more interests to be protected than the poor and should therefore be given a proportionately larger share in the choice of those who govern. But to this it may be replied that the power of self-help among the rich is correspondingly greater, and hence the need of state protection is less than in the case of the poor. Weighted voting for the wealthy, moreover, tends toward the establishment of class government and government by the wealthy few at that — the most obnoxious of all forms of government.

The nature of one's profession or occupation is regarded by some as a fairly just and practical test for determining the weight of a vote. Thus it is said, an employer is likely to possess more ability and intelligence than an employee; a banker, a merchant, or a manufacturer, more than an artisan; one engaged in a learned profession, more than one engaged in an unskilled trade; and so on.

Thus John Stuart Mill, who was an advocate of the scheme of "weighted voting, "expressed the opinion that two or more votes

might properly be allowed to every person who "exercises any of these superior functions. "A system of plural voting in which a superior weight was assigned to the vote of the educated man was strongly recommended by Mill as a "counterpoise to the numerical weight of the least educated. "It would be a means, he argued, of offsetting the "more than equivalent evils "of a "completely universal suffrage.

"In any system providing a widely extended suffrage it might be wise, he said, "to allow all graduates of universities, all persons who have passed creditably through the higher schools, all members of the liberal professions, and perhaps some others who registered specifically in those characters, to give their votes as such in any constituency in which they choose to register; retaining in addition their votes as simple citizens in the localities in which they reside.

All these suggestions are open to discussion as to details; but it is evident to me that in this direction lies the true ideal of representative government, and that to work toward it by the best practical contrivances which can be found is the path of real political improvement.

"But intellectual superiority or academic training is not always a mark of political capacity. A skillful but uneducated artisan may easily possess more political insight and judgment than a schoolmaster, a physician, or other professional man of high academic training. Political privileges based on distinctions of superior intelligence are, moreover, likely to be arbitrary and

invidious. The question has been much discussed whether one who possesses the right to vote ought not legally to be required to exercise it, just as the citizen is compelled to serve on juries and at times to hold certain offices. It is sometimes asserted that voting is a public service, a civic duty, for the neglect of which a penalty ought to be imposed; and that, especially in a democracy, the participation of all citizens in elections ought to be obligatory, otherwise the election returns cannot be said to represent the real will of the electorate.

At the present time, however, Belgium and Spain are the only countries of importance in which the principle of compulsory suffrage has been introduced in practice. In Belgium it has been in operation for a number of years, and in Spain it was introduced in 1908. The Spanish law on the subject requires all males of legal age, except judges, notaries, priests, and men over seventy years of age to vote unless absent or sick.

Failure to do so is punishable by publication of the name of the delinquent as a mark of censure, by a two per cent increase of his taxes, by the loss of one per cent of his salary if he is in the employ of the state, and in case of repetition of the offense, by the loss of the right to hold public office in the future. But the principle of obligatory voting has not generally commended itself to political writers or statesmen.

It assumes that voting is a public legal duty instead of a privilege or a moral duty. However reprehensible may be the conduct of the citizen who neglects his civic obligations and his public

duties as a member of society, it is hardly the province of the state to punish by legal means the nonperformance of such duties. The value of universal suffrage depends on its being regarded at once as a privilege and a moral duty.

If it were required by law, the privilege would be exercised as a mere form and without regard to the public good, very much as it was by the *sans-culottes* of Paris, who were paid for their attendance during the French Revolution. The effect would be a marked lowering of the character of the privilege. Moreover, compulsory votes would be much more open to bribery and would soon come to be estimated by their market value.

It is sometimes claimed, as was said in an earlier part of this chapter, that the right of the individual to participate in the choice of representatives is a right inherent in the quality of citizenship; that it is one of the natural rights of man, indispensable to his liberty, and a logical necessity if the doctrine that governments derive their just powers from the consent of the governed has any meaning.

This doctrine, as we have already explained, was one of the cardinal dogmas of the French political philosophy of the eighteenth century and still has many advocates throughout the world. According to this view, the enjoyment of the franchise contributes to the dignity and selfrespect of the individual, and is an agency of political education, as well as a powerful instrument for interesting the masses in public affairs and attaching them to the loyal support of the government.

The doctrine that governments derive their powers from the consent of the governed has, however, always been construed in practice as having important limitations. No one, as Judge Story has well remarked, not even the most strenuous advocate of universal suffrage, has ever yet contended that the privilege should be absolutely universal; and no one has ever been sufficiently visionary to maintain that all persons of every age, degree, and character should be entitled to vote in all elections for all public officers.

As a matter of fact, all states, even the most democratic, restrict the suffrage to a part only of their population. Most of them deny the privilege, wholly or in part, to females, minors, insane persons, and idiots; practically all of them debar those who have been convicted of grave crimes, including corrupt practices at elections; most of them exclude those who have to be supported by the state; some withhold the right from bankrupts; others deny the privilege to vagrants and even to worthy persons who do not have a fixed residence within the electoral district; some exclude the holders of certain offices, particularly those whose duties are connected with the management of election; others, like France, Germany, and Italy (and England indirectly), exclude soldiers in actual military service; some debar persons who do not own property or pay direct taxes to the state; a few exclude illiterate persons on the ground that such persons are presumed not to possess the requisite intelligence for the wise exercise of the privilege, etc. The truth seems to be, says Judge Story, that the right of voting, like many other rights, is one which, whether it has a fixed foundation in natural law or not, has always been

treated in the practice of nations as a strictly civil right derived from and regulated by each society according to its own circumstances. The extent to which the privilege may be wisely allowed depends upon the general intelligence of the population, the character of the offices to be filled at the election, the political training of the people, and a variety of other circumstances. The best democratic thought of modern times favors as wide an extension of the elective franchise as is consistent with good government, and certainly the trend of recent development has been in the direction of universal manhood suffrage. Educational and property restrictions have almost entirely disappeared both in Europe and in America.

Here and there, however, they still prevail in moderate form, and many able writers defend them not only as consistent with popular government but as legitimate safeguards against inefficient and corrupt government. Among such writers we may mention the names of John Stuart Mill, W. E. H. Lecky, Sir Henry Maine, Professor Sidgwick, Emile Laveleye, and Johann Kaspar Bluntschli.

Mill says, "I regard it as wholly inadmissible that any person should participate in the suffrage without being able to read and write, and, I will add, perform the common operations of arithmetic....

No one but those in whom *a priori* theory has silenced common sense will maintain that power over others, and over the whole community, should be imparted to people who have not acquired

the commonest and most essential requisites for taking care of themselves.... It would be eminently desirable, that other things besides reading, writing, and arithmetic should be made necessary to the suffrage; that some knowledge of the conformation of the earth, its natural and political divisions, the elements of general history and of the history and institutions of their own country, could be required of all electors.

"Mill, however, properly maintains that where the suffrage is made to depend upon ability to read and write, the state should provide as a matter of justice the means of attaining these accomplishments without cost to the poor, otherwise the requirement becomes a hardship. Mill also defends taxpaying qualifications as legitimate even in a democratic state.

"It is important, "he asserts, "that the assembly which votes the taxes, either general or local, should be elected exclusively by those who pay something towards the taxes imposed. Those who pay no taxes, disposing by their votes of other people's money, have every motive to be lavish and none to economize.... The voting of taxes by those who do not themselves contribute is a violation of the fundamental principle of free government; representation should be coextensive with taxation. "

Lecky in his "Democracy and Liberty "dwells upon the dangers of government by the ignorant masses and, like Mill, advocates a system of suffrage which will give some consideration to education and property. The legislature, he points out, is

essentially a machine for taxing, and it should be chosen by an electorate restricted mainly to those who contribute the taxes.

"One of the great questions of politics in our day, "he says, "is coming to be, whether, at the last resort, the world should be governed by its ignorance or by its intelligence. "The idea that the "ultimate source of power should belong to the poorest, the most ignorant, the most incapable, who are necessarily the most numerous, is a theory which assuredly reverses all the past experiences of mankind. "The election returns, Lecky goes on to say, very rarely represent real public opinion because under a system of universal suffrage there are multitudes who never contribute anything to public opinion, but cast their votes as directed by other individuals or organizations, or at haphazard, when they are ignorant of the candidates and issues.

One man "will vote blue or yellow "because his father voted that way, without reference to the principles involved; others are governed by prejudices, and so on. "A bad harvest or some other disaster over which the government can have no more influence than over the march of the planets, "he observes, "will produce a discontent that will often govern dubious votes and may perhaps turn the scale in a nearly balanced election.

"Lecky predicts that the day will come when it will appear to be "one of the strangest facts in the history of human folly "that the theory that the best way to improve the world and secure national progress by placing the government under the control of the least enlightened classes should have once been regarded as

liberal and progressive. In considering the attitude of the ignorant masses toward scientific progress, Sir Henry Maine, one of the most powerful critics of popular government, affirms somewhat extravagantly that "universal suffrage, which to-day excludes free trade from the United States, would certainly have prohibited the spinning jenny and the power loom.

It would certainly have prohibited the threshing machine. It would have prevented the adoption of the Gregorian calendar, and it would have restored the Stuarts. It would have proscribed the Roman Catholics with the mob which burned Lord Mansfield's house and library in 1780, and it would have proscribed the Dissenters with the mob which burned Dr. Priestley's house and library in 1791. "

The Belgian publicist Emile Laveleye, another critic of universal suffrage, while admitting its advantages in dignifying the individual and affording a means for the political education of the masses, yet asserts that under a parliamentary system of government it would lead to the "loss of liberty, of order, and of civilization. "He compares the government of a modern state to a delicate machine prodigiously complex and extremely difficult to operate. "How can such a machine, "he asks, "be operated by the ignorant and uninterested?

"If I have to choose between two absurdities, "he says, "I prefer the infallibility of the pope to that of the people. The partisans of the new Catholic dogma do not invoke reason; they believe in the supernatural. But the partisans of the sovereignty of the masses

do not invoke mystery; they affirm a visible, palpable nonsense, namely, that the people, half of whom can neither read nor write, are capable of rendering an intelligent judgment upon grave questions of legislation. "

But notwithstanding the unfavorable opinion of such writers as those quoted above, the movement in the direction of a complete enfranchisement of the masses continues without abatement, and hardly anywhere has it made greater progress in recent years than on the continent of Europe. Nothing has occurred in Europe or America since the beginning of this movement to warrant the belief that the extravagant prophecies of Lecky and Maine regarding the future of democratic government under an extended suffrage are ever likely to come to pass.

In consequence of the extraordinary interest now being manifested in public education throughout the world and the rapid multiplication by governments, monarchical and republican alike, of the facilities for educating the masses, there is every reason for believing that the democracy of the future will not necessarily be government by those whom Lecky characterized as the "most ignorant and the most incapable. "Nevertheless, their warnings concerning the dangers of an extended suffrage are not to be taken lightly.

The truth of much of what they have said regarding the incapacity of the ignorant masses for self-government is abundantly established by reason and the experience of the past. If government by the whole people is to be a success, they must

be fitted and made capable for self-government. To vest the power of choosing those who are to rule the state in the hands of the incapable and unworthy classes, as Bluntschli justly remarks, would mean state suicide.

Give the suffrage to the ignorant, says Laveleye, and they will fall into anarchy to-day and into despotism tomorrow. Whatever the truth in either proposition we should do well to heed the saying of John Stuart Mill that universal teaching must precede universal enfranchisement.

Chapter 5

Political Systems of Political Parties

The Comparative Approach to the Study of Politics

There are about 200 states in the world today, each with a political system that is distinctive in some ways. How can we classify them in a manageable fashion? It makes sense to highlight clusters of states that share important similarities, just as it is useful to identify what distinguishes one cluster of relatively similar states from other clusters. When comparativists classify a large number of cases into a smaller number of types or clusters, they call the result a typology. Typologies make comparison easier both within the same type as well as between types of states. For example, Britain and the United States are long established democracies, but they have very different institutional architecture. Britain has a parliamentary system, in which parliament chooses the prime minister, that is, the official who heads the executive. Parliament and the prime minister have considerable power over each other. Parliament can force the prime minister to resign by voting a motion of no confidence. And the prime minister can dissolve parliament and call new elections. The United States has a presidential system, in which

the president and the legislature are separately elected. Further, the two branches have extensive powers independent of each other. Neither branch can force the other to resign, although Congress can impeach the president.

What political significance is there in the fact that Britain and the United States organise state power in such different ways? This kind of question about the different mix of state institutions within similar political systems is the kind of issue that is at the heart of comparative politics. How do we construct typologies of states? Typologies are artificial constructs, made rather than occurring naturally. They are based on certain features that comparativists decide are important as the basis for classification. Typologies are helpful to the extent that they permit us to engage in useful comparisons that further our understanding of politics.

The typology that we use in this book classifies regimes into three groups: *consolidated democracies, transitional democracies*, and *authoritarian regimes.* This typology reveals the bedrock distinction between democratic and undemocratic regimes. To understand why we have chosen to classify countries in this fashion, it is first necessary to take a closer look at what is meant by democracy.

It is generally agreed by political scientists that democracy includes the following features:

- Selection to important public offices on the basis of free and fair elections based on universal suffrage. For

an election to qualify as fair, votes must be counted accurately, with the winning candidate determined according to pre-existing rules about the kind of majority or plurality that is needed to gain electoral victory.

- Political parties are free to organise, offer their ideas, present candidates for public office, and compete in elections. The opposition party or parties— those not in power—enjoy adequate rights to organise and to criticise the incumbent government.

- The elected government develops policy according to specified procedures that are fair and relatively open to public scrutiny. Elected executives are held accountable for their decisions and actions at the next election, through the courts, and by the legislature. In turn, the legislature is held most directly accountable to the citisens through a system in which voters choose who will represent them in the legislature.

- All citisens possess civil and political rights—the right to participate and vote in elections periodically held to select key state officeholders—and civil liberties—the rights of free assembly, conscience, privacy, and expression, including the right to criticise the government. In theory, these rights must be available to all citisens equally.

- The political system contains a judiciary with powers independent of the executive and legislature, charged with protecting citisens' rights and liberties from violation by the state and other citisens, as well as

> with ensuring that governmental officials respect the constitution and other laws.
> - The military must accept, without question, that it is subordinate to the elected government and that its commander-in-chief is an civilian responsible to voters.

Our typology of political systems distinguishes between those countries whose political regimes are democratic according to the above criteria and those that are not. The typology involves a further distinction between long established, or consolidated democracies, and newly established, or transitional democracies. We believe that there is an important difference in kind, and not just of degree, between these two types of democratic states. We distinguish between consolidated and transitional democracies in two ways. First, the *longevity* and *durability* of democratic institutions and practices. Have they been solidly and stably established for an ample period of time? Precisely how much time is open to question. Consolidated democracies are long-standing democracies: the countries in this book that fall in this category have been democracies for a minimum of about sixty years. There is very little likelihood that a consolidated democracy will experience a reversal and become undemocratic.

Transitional democracies are those that have relatively recently adopted the essential features of democracy, and their futures as democracies may be less certain. The second criterion for distinguishing between consolidated and transitional democracies is the *extent* of their democratic practice. In consolidated democracies, there is relatively full compliance with the

democratic principles. We do not mean to claim that consolidated democracies always respect democratic principles. That would be naïve. For example, police abuse and unequal treatment of citisens who are poor or from a racial or ethnic minority are all too common in democracies like Britain, France, and the United States. However consolidated democracies generally practice the democracy they preach.

The reason we highlight the extent of democracy becomes apparent when we turn to the category of transitional democracies. In such countries, formal democratic institutions and procedures often conceal informal practices that violate the checklist of core features of democracy. To be sure, there is greater legal protection of citisen rights and liberties, a more independent judiciary, and more independent political parties in transitional democracies than in authoritarian regimes—the third category that is part of our typology. But these and other democratic features are less extensive and stable than in consolidated democracies.

In transitional democracies, democratic forms of governance coexist with and are often compromised by undemocratic elements. Compared to consolidated democracies, political authorities in transitional systems are much more likely to engage in corruption, control of the media, intimidation and violence against opponents, vote rigging, and other measures to make sure they get re-elected. Despite what the constitution of the country may specify, the courts are often packed with judges loyal to the ruling party, and top military officers often exercise

extraordinary political power behind the scenes. The countries in *Introduction to Comparative Politics* that we classify as transitional democracies are Mexico, Russia, and South Africa.

How do we define authoritarian regimes? The simplest way would be to say that they fail to meet all or most all of the characteristics of a democracy. Authoritarian regimes lack meaningful procedures for selecting political leaders through competitive elections based on universal suffrage; there are no secure procedures for holding political leaders accountable to the citisens of the country; the right to criticise the government is severely restricted; people of different genders, racial groups, religions, and ethnicities do not enjoy equal rights; and the judiciary is not an independent branch of government capable of checking the power of the state or protecting the rights of citisens; and finally the military may not be effectively subject to civilian political control. Clearly, then, authoritarian states are not democracies. But it isn't good social science to define something only by what it is not.

The term *authoritarianism* refers to political systems in which power is highly—perhaps almost totally—concentrated in a single individual, a small group of people, or a single political party or institution. Furthermore, those with power claim an exclusive right to govern and use various means, including force, to impose their will and policies. Another way to put it: in authoritarian systems, the state is more powerful than the citisens it governs and is not accountable to them. There is an enormous variety of authoritarian regime types: communist party–states; theocracies

in which sovereign power is held by religious leaders and law is defined in religious terms; military governments; absolute monarchies; and personalistic dictatorships. These types of authoritarianism differ from one another in many ways, including fundamental beliefs and the degree and methods of force used to suppress opposition and control society. The countries classified as authoritarian in *Introduction to Comparative Politics* are China and Iran. Although there are fundamental differences between democracy and authoritarianism, these categories are not airtight.

For example, in most authoritarian countries, there are elements of democratic practices. In Iran, there are vigourously contested multiparty elections, although the extent of political debate and opposition is defined and limited by the Islamic clergy. For the last decade or so in China, a form of grassroots democracy has been implemented in the more than 700,000 rural villages, where a majority of the population lives. Even though the communist party still makes sure that dissent does not get out of hand, China's rural dwellers now have a real choice when they elect their local leaders, and their choices have often resulted in the ouster of corrupt and unpopular officials.

Such democratic elements in Iranian and Chinese politics certainly make a difference in important ways to the citisens of those countries, but they do not fundamentally alter the essential authoritarian character of the state in these two countries. As another example of the gray zone between democracy and non-democracy, we consider India a consolidated democracy because

it has generally respected most of the democratic procedures on our checklist since, it gained independence from Britain in 1947. There is intense political competition in India, elections are usually free and fair, and the Indian judiciary is quite independent. However, India has repeatedly experienced scenes of communal violence, in which Muslim, Sikh, and Christian minorities have been brutally massacred, sometimes with the active complicity of state officials.

Horrific political violence has occurred so often and sometimes on such a wide scale that India's claim to live up to the democratic idea is certainly open to question. When it comes to democracy there are many different shades of gray, but in every country a gap remains between the aims and achievements of democratic governance. We hope that the timely information and thematic focus of this book will not only help you understand better politics in several different countries from around the world but also inspire you to explore further the comparative approach to the often troubling, sometimes inspiring, but always changing and endlessly fascinating world of politics.

The Comparative Approach to the Study of Politics

How do those of us who study comparative politics—we call ourselves comparativists—go about comparing? What do we compare? Because *countries* are the basic building blocks of the international system and *states* are the most significant political institutions within countries, these are the two critical units for comparative analysis. The comparativist measures and tries to

explain similarities and differences among countries or states. One influential approach in comparative politics involves developing what are called causal theories that try to explain why "If X happens, then Y is the result." In other words, how does X. This is a basic method of any study that claims to be scientific, whether in the natural, or "hard," sciences like physics and chemistry, or the social, or the "soft" sciences, which include anthropology, economics, and sociology, as well as political science.

To illustrate what causal theories mean in the political science, let's say that we wanted to understand what causes conflict (Y) to intensify among various kinds of groups in a particular country. Many scholars have noted that if a country's economic pie (X) suddenly shrinks, the competition between groups for pieces of that pie will intensify, and conflict is likely to be the result.

In other words, a decrease in X (economic pie) will *cause* an increase in Y (conflict).This kind of causal relationship might be tested by statistical analysis of a very large number of cases, a project facilitated in recent years by the creation of data banks that include extensive historical and contemporary data. Another way to study this issue would be to focus on one country, or several, to analyse how the relevant relationships between X and Y have varied over time and with what effect. Comparativists look at a variety of cases and try to identify similarities and differences among countries and discover significant patterns that will, hopefully, help us to better understand what causes important political outcomes. It is important to recognise the

limits on just how "scientific" political science—including comparative politics—can be.

Two important differences exist between the natural and the social sciences. First, social scientists study people with free will. Because people have a margin for free choice, even if one assumes that they choose in a rational manner, their choices, attitudes, and behaviour cannot be fully explained or predicted. This does not mean that people choose in a totally random fashion. We choose within the context of economic constraints, institutional dictates, and cultural prescriptions. Comparative politics systematically analyses how such factors shape political preferences and choices; indeed, one recent study claimed that political beliefs are, to a significant degree, genetically determined, that is, our political values and opinions are, at least partly, inherited biologically from our parents.

A second difference between the natural and social sciences is that in the natural sciences, experimental techniques can isolate how distinct factors contribute to a particular outcome. In a laboratory setting, it is possible to change the value or magnitude of a factor—for example, the force applied to an object or mix of chemicals—and measure how the outcome has consequently changed. But political scientists and comparativists rarely have the opportunity to apply such precise experimental techniques. Some political scientists have conducted experiments with volunteers in controlled settings to test, for example, the influence of political advertisements on voter opinions. But laboratories provide crude approximations of natural settings,

since, only one or a few variables can be manipulated. The real world of politics, by contrast, consists of an endless number of variables, and they cannot easily be isolated or manipulated.

It simply is not possible to predict with absolute certainly how someone will vote once he or she gets into the voting booth; nor is it possible to know fully why voters cast their ballots the way they do. Some political scientists try to get deeper into the question of cause and effect by using statistical techniques to identify the specific weight of different factors in explaining variations in political outcomes.

But it is difficult to measure precisely how, for example, a person's ethnicity, gender, or income influences her or his voting choices.

Nor can we ever know exactly what mix of factors— conflicts among elites, popular ideological appeals, the weakness of the state, the organisational capacity of rebel leaders, or the discontent of the masses—leads to the success or the failure of a revolution. Indeed, similar outcomes of different revolutions may result from different combinations of factors. No single theory, therefore, can explain the outcomes of all revolutions—or why people vote the way they do.

Challenge of Globalisation and Comparative Politics

Comparative politics has traditionally focused on studying single countries or domestic institutions and processes in several countries. Comparativists considered that studying the

international system fell within the subfield of international relations. However, for nearly two decades, globalisation has been a critical factor in analysing politics within and among countries. Today, business and trade, information technology, mass communications and culture, the environment, immigration and travel, as well as politics, forge deep connections—and often deep divisions—among people worldwide.

To appreciate the complexity of politics in any country, comparativists now recognise that we must look beyond and across borders at the growing interdependence among nations. We have learned that we must develop a truly global perspective in order to understand the politics of individual countries and to compare them. The terms *globalisation* and *global era* identify the growing depth, extent, and diversity of today's cross-border connections.

Discussion of globalisation usually begins with economic activities—the great increase in international trade, finance, and overseas investment, as well as the worldwide reorganisation of production and redistribution of the workforce that has led to the creation of the so-called global factory in which very few manufactured products are, in fact, produced in just one country. Globalisation also involves the movement of peoples through migration, employment, business, tourism, and educational opportunities.

The Internet and other new applications of technology now blur distinctions between what is around the block and what is

around the world. These technologies link producers and contractors, headquarters, branch plants, suppliers, and consumers in real time anywhere in the world. Employees may be rooted in time and place, but they can take advantage of the ebb and flow of a global labour market. On the flip side: a secure job today may be gone tomorrow if an employer decides to move a business to another country. Globalisation has provoked challenges from grassroots movements in every region of the world that are concerned with its negative impact on, for example, poor people, the environment, and labour rights.

Conferences convened by governments and international organisations to develop rules for global commerce have been the sites of demonstrations by coalitions of environmental, labour-based, and community activists. Activists from around the world have recently assembled in places such as Mumbai, India, and Porto Alegre, Brazil, to exchange ideas and develop alternatives to the current form of economic globalisation. Globalisation in its many forms challenges the ability of even the strongest countries to control their destinies. In today's world, no country can be an island unto itself and protect its national culture from outside influences, seal off its economy, or isolate its people.

Many of the most important problems confronting individual states are related to globalisation, including pandemics like AIDS, global climate change, financial panics, the arms trade, and international terrorism. The study of comparative politics has, in many ways, become the study of global politics. The events of September 11, 2001, made it painfully clear that

international terror networks, such as Al Qaeda, are an evil form of globalisation. Terrorists, and the causes that motivate them, move around the world.

They can attack anywhere. But such issues have not replaced concerns about economic globalisation, which has an impact on many more countries and peoples than does terrorism. Rather these issues remind us how multifaceted globalisation has become and underline the urgency of developing a more complex understanding of globalisation and how it influences both politics throughout the world and the study of comparative politics.

Comparative Government and Politics

The nature and scope of comparative politics has varied just as to the changes which have occurred historically in its subject matter. The subject matter of comparative politics has been determined both through the *geographical legroom* which has constituted its field as well as the *dominant ideas* regarding social reality and transform which formed the approaches to comparative studies. Similarly, it dissimilar historical junctures the thrust or the primary concern of the studies kept changing.

The Origins of Comparative Study of Politics

In its earliest incarnation, the comparative study of politics comes to us in the form of studies done through the Greek philosopher Aristotle. Aristotle studied the constitutions of 150 states and classified them into a typology of regimes. His

classification was presented in conditions of both descriptive and normative categories *i.e.*, he not only called and classified regimes and political systems in conditions of their kinds *e.g.*, democracy, aristocracy, monarchy etc., he also distinguished them on the foundation of sure norms of good governance. On the foundation of this comparison he divided regimes into good and bad—ideal and perverted. These Aristotelian categories were acknowledged and taken up through Romans such as Polybius and Cicero who measured them in formal and legalistic conditions. Concern with comparative study of regime kinds reappeared ' in the 15th century with Machiavelli.

The Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries

The preoccupation with philosophical and speculative questions regarding the 'good order' or the 'ideal state' and the use, in the procedure, of abstract and normative vocabulary, persisted in comparative studies of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries signified the era when liberalism was the reigning ideology and European countries enjoyed dominance in world politics. The 'rest of the world' of Asia, Africa and Latin America were either European colonies or under their sphere of power as ex-colonies. Comparative studies throughout this era man Finer's Theory and Practice of Contemporary Governments and Carl J. Friedrich's Constitutional Government and Democracy, Roberto Michels, Political Parties and M.Duverger, Political Parties were mainly concerned with a comparative study of organizations, the sharing of power, and the connection flanked by the dissimilar layers of

government. These studies were Eurocentric, i. e, confined to the study of organizations, governments, and regime kinds in European countries like Britain, France, and Germany. It may therefore be said that these studies were in information not genuinely comparative in the sense that they excluded from their analysis a big number of countries. Any generalization derived from a study confined to a few countries could not legitimately claim having validity for the rest of the world. It may be accentuated here that exclusion of the rest of the world was symptomatic of the dominance of Europe in world politics—a dominance—which though, was on the wane, and shifting slowly to North America. All modern history had Europe at its centre, obliterating the rest of the world whose histories were bound with and destined to follow the trajectories already followed through the advanced countries of the West. Therefore the works manifest their rootedness in the normative values of western liberal democracies which accepted with it the baggage of racial and civilizational superiority, and assumed a prescriptive character for the colonies/former colonies.

The Second World War and After

In the nineteen thirties the political and economic situation of the world changed. The Bolshevik Revolution in Russia in 1917, brought into world politics, Socialism, as an ideology of the oppressed and, as a critical alternative to western liberalism and capitalism.With the end of the Second World War a number of important growths had taken lay, including the waning of European hegemony, the emergence, and entrenchment of United

States of America as the new hegemon in world politics and economy, and the bifurcation of the world into two ideological camps *viz.* capitalism and socialism. The majority of the 'rest of the world' had, through the time the Second World War ended, liberated itself from European imperialism. For an era after decolonization the notions of growth, modernization, nation-structure, state-structure etc., evinced a degree of legitimacy and even popularity as 'national slogans' in the middle of the political elite of the 'new nations'. Ideologically, though, these 'new nations', were no longer compelled to tow the western capitalist path of growth. While socialism had its share of sympathizers in the middle of the new ruling elite of the Asia, America, and Latin America, quite a number of newly self-governing countries made a conscious decision to aloofness themselves from both the power blocs, remaining non-aligned to either. A number of them evolved their own specific path of growth akin to the socialist, as in the case of Ujjama in Tanzania, and the mixed-economy model in India which was a blend of both capitalism and socialism.

It may be worth remembering that the comparative study of governments till the 1940s was predominantly the study of organizations, the legal-constitutional principles regulating them, and the manner in which they functioned in western liberal-democracies. In the context of the growths, a powerful critique of the institutional approach appeared in the transitional of 1950s. The critique had its roots in behaviouralism which had appeared as a new movement in the discipline of politics aiming to give scientific rigour to the discipline and develop a science of politics.

Recognized as the behavioural movement, it was concerned with developing an enquiry which was quantitative, based on survey techniques involving the examination of empirical facts separated from values, to give value-neutral, non-prescriptive, objective observations and explanations. The behaviouralists attempted to study social reality through seeking answers to questions like 'why people behave politically as they do and why as a result, political procedures, and systems function as they do'. It is these 'why questions' concerning differences in people's behaviours and their implications for political procedures and political systems, which changed the focus of comparative study from the legal-formal characteristics of organizations.

Therefore in 1955 Roy Macridis criticized the existing comparative studies for privileging formal organizations in excess of non-formal political procedures, for being descriptive rather than analytical, and case-study oriented rather than genuinely comparative. Harry Eckstein points out that the changes in the nature and scope of comparative politics in this era illustrates sensitivity to the changing world politics urging the need to re-conceptualize the notion of politics and develop paradigms for big-level comparisons. Rejecting the then traditional and approximately exclusive emphasis on the western world and the conceptual language which had been urbanized with such limited comparisons in mind, Gabriel Almond and his colleagues of the American Social Science Research Council's Committee on Comparative Politics sought to develop a theory and a methodology which could encompass and compare political systems of all types - primitive or advanced, democratic or non-

democratic, western or non western. The broadening of concerns in a geographic or territorial sense was also accompanied through a broadening of the sense of politics itself, and in scrupulous, through a rejection of what was then perceived as the traditional and narrowly defined emphasis on the study of formal political organizations. The notion of politics was broadened through the emphasis on 'realism' or politics 'in practice' as distinguished from mere 'legalism'.

This incorporated in its scope the functioning of less formally structured agencies, behaviours and procedures *e.g.* political parties, interest groups, elections, voting behaviour, attitudes etc. With the deflection of attention from studies of formal organizations, there was simultaneously a decline in the centrality of the notion of the state itself. The emergence of a big number of countries on the world scenes necessitated the growth of frameworks which would facilitate comparisons on a big level.

This led to the emergence of inclusive and abstract notions like the political organization. This notion of the 'organization' replaced the notion of the state and enabled scholars to take into explanation the 'extra-legal', 'social' and 'cultural' organizations which were crucial to the understanding of non-western politics and had the added advantage of including in its scope 'pre-state'/'non-state' societies as well as roles and offices which were not seen as overtly linked with the state. Also, with the transform of emphasis to actual practices and functions of organizations, the troubles of research Game to be defined not in conditions of what legal powers these organizations had, but what they

actually did, how they were related to one another, and what roles they played in the creation and execution of public policy. This led to the emergence of structural-functionalism, in' which sure functions were called as being necessary to all societies, and the execution and performance of these functions were then compared crossways a diversity of dissimilar formal and informal structures. While the universal frameworks of systems and structures-functions enabled western scholars to study a wide range of political systems, structures, and behaviours, within a single paradigm, the appearance of 'new nations' provided to western comparatives an opportunity to study what they perceived as economic and political transform.

Wiarda points out that it was in this era of the sixties that mainly modern scholars of comparative politics came of age. The 'new nations' became for mainly of these scholars [ironically] 'livelihood laboratories' for the study of social and political transform. Wiarda describes those 'exciting times' which offered unique opportunities to study political transform, and saw the growth of new methodologies and approaches to study them. It was throughout this era that some of the mainly innovative and exciting theoretical and conceptual approaches were advanced in the field of comparative politics: study of political civilization, political socialization, developmentalism, dependency and interdependency, corporatism, bureaucratic-authoritarianism and later transitions to democracy etc.

This era saw the mushrooming of universalistic models like Easton's political organization, Deutsch's social mobilization and

Shil's centre and margin. The theories of modernization through Apter, Rokkan, Eisenstadt and Ward and the theory of political growth through Almond, Coleman, Pye and Verba also claimed universal relevance. These theories were claimed to be applicable crossways cultural and ideological boundaries and to explain political procedure everywhere.

The growth of comparative political analysis in this stage coincided with the international involvement of the United States by military alliances and foreign aid. Mainly research in this era was not only funded through research foundations, it was also geared to the goals of US foreign policy. The mainly symbolic of these were the Project Camelot in Latin America and the Himalayan Project in India. This era was heralded through the appearance of works like Apter's study on Ghana. Published in 1960, Politics of Developing Regions through Almond and Coleman sharply defined the character of the new 'Comparative Politics Movement'. The publication of a new journal in the US entitled Comparative Politics in 1969 reflected the height of this trend. 'Developmentalism' was possibly the dominant conceptual paradigm of this time. To a considerable extent, the interest in developmentalism emanated from US foreign policy interests in 'developing' countries, to counter the appeals of Marxism-Leninism and steer them towards a non-communist method to growth.

The 1970s and Challenges to Developmentalism

Towards the 1970s, developmentalism came to be criticized for favoring abstract models, which flattened out differences in the middle of specific political/social/cultural systems, in order to study them within a single universalistic framework. These criticisms accentuated the ethno-centricism of these models and focused on the Third World in order to work out a theory of underdevelopment. They stressed the need to concentrate on solutions to the backwardness of developing countries. Two largest challenges to developmentalism which arose in the early 1970s and gained widespread attention were corporatism.

Dependency theory criticized the dominant model of developmentalism for ignoring international market and power factors in growth. It was particularly critical of US foreign policy and multinational corporations and suggested, contrary to what was held true in developmentalism that the growth of the already-industrialized nations and that of the developing ones could not go jointly. Instead, dependency theory argued, that the growth of the West had approach on the shoulders and at the cost of the non- West. The thought that the diffusion of capitalism promotes underdevelopment and not growth in several sections of the world was embodied in Andre Gundre Frank's Capitalism and Underdevelopment in Latin America, Walter Rodney's How Europe Underdeveloped Africa and Malcolm Caldwell's The Wealth of Some Nations. Marxist critics of the dependency theory, though, pointed out that the nature of use by surplus extraction should not be seen basically on national rows

but, as section of a more intricate pattern of alliances flanked by the metropolitan bourgeoisie of the core/centre and the indigenous bourgeoisie of the margin/satellite as they operated in a worldwide capitalist organization. The corporatist approach criticized developmetalism for its Euro- American ethno-centricism and indicated that there was alternative organic, corporatist, often authoritarian methods to organize the state and state-community relations.

The 1980s: The Return of the State

Throughout the later 1970s and into the 1980s, still reflecting the backlash against Developmentalism, a number of theories and subject matters appeared into the field of comparative politics. These incorporated bureaucratic-authoritarianism, indigenous concepts of transform, transitions to democracy, the politics of structural adjustment, neo-liberalism and privatization. While some scholars saw these Approaches growths as undermining and breaking the unity of the field which was being dominated through developmentalism, others saw them as adding healthy variety, providing alternative approaches and covering new subject regions. Almond, who had argued in the late 1950s that the notion of the state should be replaced through the political organization, which was adaptable to scientific enquiry, and Easton, who undertook to construct the parameters and concepts of a political organization, sustained to argue well into the 1980s on the importance of political organization as the core of political study. The state, though, received its share of attention in the 60s and 70s in the works of bureaucratic-

authoritarianism in Latin America, especially in Argentina in the works of Guillermo O'Donnell *e.g.*, Economic Modernization and Bureaucratic Authoritarianism. Ralph Miliband's The State in Capitalist Community had also kept the interest alive. With Nicos Poulantzas's State, Power, Socialism, and political sociologists Peter Evans, Theda Skocpol, and others bringing the State Back In, focus was sought to be restored onto the state.

Comparative Study of Politics: Nature and Scope

That comparative politics is distinguished from other disciplines which also use the comparative method, through its specific subject matter, language, and perspective. In that case, we might well enquire the question, is there at all a separate field of *comparative political analysis,* or is it a *sub-discipline subsumed within the superior discipline of Political Science.* The three characteristics of subject matter, language, vocabulary, and perspective, we necessity keep in mind, are inadequate in establishing the distinctiveness of comparative politics within the broad discipline of Political Science, mainly because *comparative politics shares the subject matter and concerns of Political Science, i.e.* democracy, constitutions, political parties, social movements etc. Within the discipline of Political Science therefore the specificity of comparative political analysis is marked out through its *conscious use of the comparative method to answer questions which might be of common interest to political scientists.*

Identification of Relationships

This stress on the comparative method *as defining the character and scope of comparative political analysis has been maintained through some scholars in order to dispel frequent misconceptions in relation to the relative politics as involving the study of 'foreign countries' i.e., countries other than your own. Under such an understanding, if you were learning a country other than your own, you would be described comparatives. More often than not, this misconception implies merely the gathering of information in relation to the individual countries with little or at the mainly implicit comparison involved. The distinctiveness of comparative politics, mainly comparatives would argue, lies in a* conscious and systematic *use of comparisons to study two or more countries with the purpose of* identifying, *and eventually* explaining differences or similarities *flanked by them with respect to the scrupulous phenomena being analyzed. Comparative political analysis is though, not basically in relation to the identifying similarities and differences. The purpose of by comparisons, it is felt through many scholars, is going beyond 'identifying similarities and differences' or the 'compare and contrast approach', to ultimately study political phenomena in a superior framework of relationships. This, it is felt, would help deepen our understanding and broaden the stages of answering and explaining political phenomena.*

Comparative Politics and Comparative Government

The often encountered notion that comparative politics involves a study of governments arises, asserts Ronald Chilcote, from

'conceptual confusion'. Unlike comparative government whose field is limited to comparative study of governments, comparative politics is concerned with the study of all shapes of political action, governmental as well as nongovernmental. The field of comparative politics has an 'all encompassing' nature and comparative politics specialists tend to view it as the study of everything political. Any lesser conception of comparative politics would obscure the criteria for the selection and exclusion of what may be studied under this field.

It may, though, be pointed out that for extensive comparative politics concerned itself with the study of governments and regime kinds, and confined itself to learning western countries. The augment in numbers and variety of unit/cases that could be brought into the gamut of comparison was accompanied also through the urge to formulate abstract universal models, which could explain political phenomena and procedures in all the units. Simultaneous to the augment and diversification of cases to be studied was also an expansion in the sphere of politics therefore as to allow the examination of politics as a total organization, including not merely the state and its organizations but also individuals social groupings, political parties, interest groups, social movements etc.

Sure characteristics of organizations and political procedure were especially in focus for what was seen as their usefulness in explaining political procedures, *e.g.*, political socialization, patterns of political civilization, techniques of interest articulation and interest aggregation, styles of political

recruitment, extent of political efficacy and political apathy, ruling elites etc. These systemic studies were often built approximately the concern with nation-structure *i.e.,* providing a politico-cultural identity to a population, state-structure *i.e.,* providing institutional structure and procedures for politics and modernization *i.e.,* to initiate a procedure of transform beside the western path of growth. The attendance of divergent ideological poles in world politics, the rejection of western imperialism through mainly newly liberated countries, the concern with maintaining their separate identity in the form of the non-aligned movement and the sympathy in the middle of mainly countries with a socialist path of growth, slowly led to the irrelevance of mainly modernization models for purposes of global/big stage comparisons. Whereas the fifties and sixties were the era where attempts to explain political reality were made by the construction of big level models, the seventies saw the assertion of Third World-ism and the rolling back of these models. The Eighties saw the constriction of the stages of comparison with studies based on areas or smaller numbers of units became prevalent. With globalization, though, the imperatives for big stage comparisons increased and the field of comparisons has diversified with the proliferation of non-state, 'non-governmental actors and the increased interconnections flanked by nations with economic linkages and information technology revolution.

Scaling Down of Systems

Much of the growth of comparative political analysis in the era 1960s to 1980s can be seen as an ever widening range of

countries being incorporated as cases, with more variables being added to the models such as policy, ideology, governing experience, and therefore on. With the 1980$, though, there has been a move absent from common theory to emphasis on the relevance of context. In section, this tendency reflects the renewed power of historical enquiry in the social sciences, and especially the emergence of a 'historical sociology' which tries to understand phenomena in the extremely broad or 'holistic' context within which they happen. There has been a shying absent from models to a more in-depth understanding of scrupulous countries and cases where more qualitative and contextualized data can be assessed and where explanation can be taken of specific institutional conditions or scrupulous political cultures. Hence we see a new emphasis on more culturally specific studies countries, and nationally specific countries, and even institutionally specific countries. While emphasis on 'grand systems' and model structure diminished, the stress on specific contexts and cultures has meant that the level of comparisons was brought down. Comparisons at the stage of 'smaller systems' or areas, though, remained *e.g.*, the Islamic world, Latin American countries, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia etc.

Civil Community and Democratization Approach brought into currency the notion of the 'end of history'. 'The End of History?', which was urbanized later into the book The End of History and the Last Man, Francis *Fukuynma* argued that the history of ideas had ended with the recognition and triumph of liberal democracy as the 'final form of human government'. The 'end of history',

invoked to stress the predominance of western liberal democracy, is in a method reminiscent of the 'end of ideology' debate of the 1950s which appeared at the height of the cold war and in the context of the decline of communism in the West. Western liberal scholars proposed that the economic advancement made in the industrialized societies of the west had resolved political troubles, *e.g.,* issues bf freedom and state power, workers rights etc., which are assumed to accompany industrialization. The U.S. sociologist, Daniel Bell in scrupulous, pointed in his work of Political Ideas in the 1950s, that in the light of this growth there was an ideological consensus, or the suspension of a require for ideological differences in excess of issues of political practice. In the nineteen eighties, the thought of the 'end of history' was coupled with another late nineteen eighties phenomenon — globalization. Globalization refers to a set of circumstances, scientific, technical, economic and political, which have connected jointly the world in a manner therefore that occurrences in one section of the world are bound to affect or be affected through what is happening in another section. It may be pointed out that in this global world the focal point or the centre approximately which measures move worldwide is still western capitalism. In the context of the therefore described triumph of capitalism, the approaches to the study of civil community and democratization that have gained currency provide importance to civil community defined in conditions of defence of individual rights to enter the contemporary capitalist world.

There is, though, another important trend in the approach which seeks to lay questions of civil community and democratization as

its primary focus. If there are on one hand studies conforming to the modern interest of western capitalism seeking to develop market democracy, there are also a number of studies which take into explanation the resurgence of people's movements seeking autonomy, right to indigenous civilization, movements of tribal, dalits, lower castes, and the women's movement and the environment movement. These movements reveal a terrain of contestation where the interests of capital are in clash with people's rights and symbolize the language of transform and liberation in a period of global capital.

Therefore concerns with issues of identity, environment, ethnicity, gender, race, etc. have provided a new dimension to comparative political analysis.

Information Collection and Diffusion

An important aspect and determinant of globalization has been the unprecedented growths in the field of information and communication technology *viz.*, the Internet and World Wide Web. This has made the manufacture, collection and analysis of data easier and also assured their faster and wider diffusion, worldwide. These growths have not only enhanced the availability of data, but also made possible the emergence of new issues and themes which extend beyond the confines of the nation-state. These new themes in turn form a significant/influential aspect of the political environment of the modern globalized world. The global network of social movement's institutions, the global network of activists is one such important aspect. The diffusion

of ideas of democratization is a significant outcome of such networking. The Zapastista rebellion in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas used the Internet and the global media to communicate their thrash about for rights, social justice and democracy. The concern with issues concerning the promotion and defence of human rights which is dependent on the collection and dissemination of information has likewise become pertinent in the modern world.

Systems Analysis

Systems analysis is the study of sets of interacting entities, including computer systems analysis. This field is closely related to necessities analysis or operations research. It is also "an explicit formal enquiry accepted out to help someone identify a bigger course of action and create a bigger decision than he might otherwise have made."

The conditions analysis and synthesis approach from Greek where they mean respectively "to take separately" and "to put jointly". These conditions are used in scientific disciplines from mathematics and logic to economics and psychology to denote same investigative procedures. Analysis is defined as the procedure through which we break down an intellectual or substantial entire into sections. Synthesis is defined as the procedure through which we combine separate elements or components in order to form a coherent entire. Systems analysis researchers apply methodology to the analysis of systems involved to form an overall picture. Organization analysis is used

in every field where there is a work of developing something. Analysis can also be defined as a series of components that perform organic function jointly.

Information Technology

The growth of a computer-based information organization comprises a systems analysis stage which produces or enhances the data model which itself is a precursor to creating or enhancing a database. There are a number of dissimilar approaches to organization analysis. When a computer-based information organization is urbanized, systems analysis would constitute the following steps:

- The growth of a feasibility study, involving determining whether a project is economically, socially, technologically and organizationally feasible.
- Conducting information-finding events, intended to ascertain the necessities of the organization's end-users. These typically span interviews, questionnaires, or visual observations of work on the existing organization.
- Gauging how the end-users would operate the organization computer hardware or software, what the organization would be used for and therefore on

Another view outlines a phased approach to the procedure. This approach breaks systems analysis into 5 phases:

- Scope Definition
- Problem analysis
- Necessities analysis
- Logical design
- Decision analysis

Use cases are a widely-used systems analysis modeling tool for identifying and expressing the functional necessities of an organization. Each use case is a business scenario or event for which the organization necessity gives a defined response. Use cases evolved out of substance-oriented analysis; though, their use as a modeling tool has become general in several other methodologies for organization analysis and design.

Practitioners

Practitioners of systems analysis are often described up to dissect systems that have grown haphazardly to determine the current components of the organization. This was shown throughout the year 2000 re-engineering attempt as business and manufacturing procedures were examined as section of the Y2K automation upgrades. Employment utilizing systems analysis contains systems analyst, business analyst, manufacturing engineer, enterprise architect, etc.

While practitioners of systems analysis can be described upon to make new systems, they often vary, expand or document existing systems. A set of components interact with each other to accomplish some specific purpose. Systems are all approximately

us. Our body is itself an organization. A business is also an organization. People, money, machine, market and material are the components of business organization that work jointly that achieve the general goal of the organization.

An Evaluation of Systems Theory

Systems theory is the interdisciplinary study of systems in common, with the goal of elucidating principles that can be applied to all kinds of systems at all nesting stages in all meadows of research. The term does not yet have a well-recognized, precise meaning, but systems theory can reasonably be measured a specialization of systems thinking, a generalization of systems science, and a systems approach. The term originates from Bertalanffy's common organization theory meadows, such as the action theory of Talcott Parsons and the social systems theory of Niklas Luhmann.

In this context the word *systems* is used to refer specifically to self-regulating systems, *i.e.*, that are self-correcting by feedback. Self-regulating systems are established in nature, including the physiological systems of our body, in regional and global ecosystems, and in climate—and in human studying procedures.

Modern ideas from systems theory have grown with diversified regions, exemplified through the work of biologist Ludwig von Bertalanffy, linguist Béla H. Bánáthy, ecological systems with Howard T. Odum, Eugene Odum and Fritjof Capra, organizational theory and management with individuals such as Peter Senge,

interdisciplinary study with regions like Human Resource Growth from the work of Richard A. Swanson, and insights from educators such as Debora Hammond and Alfonso Montuori. As a transdisciplinary, interdisciplinary and multi-perspective domain, the region brings jointly principles and concepts from ontology, philosophy of science, physics, computer science, biology, and engineering as well as geography, sociology, political science, psychotherapy and economics in the middle of others. Systems theory therefore serves as a bridge for interdisciplinary dialogue flanked by autonomous regions of study as well as within the region of systems science itself.

In this respect, with the possibility of misinterpretations, von Bertalanffy whispered a common theory of systems "should be a significant regulative device in science," to guard against superficial analogies that "are useless in science and harmful in their practical consequences." Others remain closer to the direct systems concepts urbanized through the original theorists. For instance, Ilya Prigogine, of the Center for Intricate Quantum Systems at the University of Texas, Austin, has studied emergent properties, suggesting that they offer analogues for livelihood systems. The theories of autopsies of Francisco Varela and Humberto Maturana are a further growth in this field. Significant names in modern systems science contain Russell Ackoff, Béla H. Bánáthy, Anthony Stafford Beer, Peter Checkland, Robert L. Flood, Fritjof Capra, Michael C. Jackson, Edgar Morin and Werner Ulrich, in the middle of others. With the contemporary foundations for a common theory of systems following the World Wars, Ervin Laszlo, in the preface for Bertalanffy's book

Perspectives on Common Organization Theory, maintains that the translation of "common organization theory" from German into English has "wrought a sure amount of havoc". The preface explains that the original concept of a common organization theory was "*Allgemeine Systemtheorie* ", pointing out the information that "Theorie" presently as "Wissenschaft", "has a much broader meaning in German than the closest English languages 'theory' and 'science'". With these ideas referring to an organized body of knowledge and "any systematically presented set of concepts, whether they are empirical, axiomatic, or philosophical, "Lehre" is associated with theory and science in the etymology of common systems, but also does not translate from the German extremely well; "teaching" is the "closest equivalent", but "sounds dogmatic and off the spot". While several of the root meanings for the thought of a "common systems theory" might have been lost in the translation and several were led to consider that the systems theorists had articulated nothing but a pseudoscience, systems theory became the name used through early investigators for the interdependence of relationships created in institutions through defining a new method of thinking in relation to the science and scientific paradigms.

An organization from this frame of reference is collected of frequently interacting or interrelating groups of activities. For instance, in noting the power in organizational psychology as the field evolved from "an individually oriented industrial psychology to a systems and developmentally oriented organizational psychology," it was established that institutions are intricate

social systems; reducing the sections from the entire reduces the overall effectiveness of institutions. This is dissimilar from conventional models that center on individuals, structures, departments and units separate in section from the entire instead of recognizing the interdependence flanked by groups of individuals, structures and procedures that enable an organization to function. Laszlo explains that the new systems view of organized complexity went "one step beyond the Newtonian view of organized simplicity" in reducing the sections from the entire, or in understanding the entire without relation to the sections. The connection flanked by institutions and their environments became established as the foremost source of complexity and interdependence. In mainly cases the entire has properties that cannot be recognized from analysis of the constituent elements in separation. Béla H. Bánáthy, who argued—beside with the founders of the systems community— that "the benefit of humankind" is the purpose of science, has made important and distant-reaching contributions to the region of systems theory. For the Primer Group at ISSS, Bánáthy defines a perspective that iterates this view:

- The systems view is a world-view that is based on the discipline of ORGANIZATION ENQUIRY. Central to systems enquiry is the concept of ORGANIZATION. In the mainly common sense, organization means a configuration of sections linked and joined jointly through a web of relationships. The Primer group defines organization as a family of relationships in the middle of the members acting as an entire. Von

Bertalanffy defined organization as "elements in standing connection".

Same ideas are establish in studying theories that urbanized from the similar fundamental concepts, emphasizing how understanding results from knowing concepts both in section and as an entire. In information, Bertalanffy's organism psychology paralleled the studying theory of Jean Piaget. Interdisciplinary perspectives are critical in breaking absent from industrial age models and thinking where history is history and math is math, the arts and sciences dedicated and separate, and where teaching is treated as behaviourist conditioning. The influential modern work of Peter Senge gives detailed discussion of the commonplace critique of educational systems grounded in conventional assumptions in relation to the learning, including the troubles with fragmented knowledge and lack of holistic studying from the "machine-age thinking" that became a "model of school separated from daily life." It is in this method that systems theorists attempted to give alternatives and an evolved ideation from orthodox theories with individuals such as Max Weber, Émile Durkheim in sociology and Frederick Winslow Taylor in scientific management, which were grounded in classical assumptions. The theorists sought holistic ways through developing systems concepts that could be integrated with dissimilar regions.

The contradiction of reductionism in conventional theory is basically an instance of changing assumptions. The emphasis with systems theory shifts from sections to the organization of sections, recognizing interactions of the sections are not "static"

and consistent but "dynamic" procedures. Conventional closed systems were questioned with the growth of open systems perspectives. The shift was from absolute and universal authoritative principles and knowledge to comparative and common conceptual and perceptual knowledge, still in the custom of theorists that sought to give means in organizing human life. Meaning, the history of ideas that proceeded was rethought not lost. Mechanistic thinking was particularly critiqued, especially the industrial-age mechanistic metaphor of the mind from interpretations of Newtonian mechanics through Enlightenment philosophers and later psychologists that laid the foundations of contemporary organizational theory and management through the late 19th century. Classical science had not been overthrown, but questions arose in excess of core assumptions that historically convinced organized systems, within both social and technological sciences.

Applications of System Theory

Systems biology is a movement that draws on many trends in bioscience research. Proponents define systems biology as a biology-based inter-disciplinary study field that focuses on intricate interactions in biological systems, claiming that it uses a new perspective.

Particularly from year 2000 onwards, the term is used widely in the biosciences, and in a diversity of contexts. An often stated ambition of systems biology is the modeling and detection of emergent properties, properties of an organization whose

theoretical account is only possible by techniques that fall under the remit of systems biology. The term systems biology is idea to have been created through Ludwig von Bertalanffy in 1928.

Systems Engineering

Systems engineering is an interdisciplinary approach and means for enabling the realization and deployment of successful systems. It can be viewed as the application of engineering techniques to the engineering of systems, as well as the application of a systems approach to engineering efforts. Systems engineering integrates other disciplines and specialty groups into a team attempt, forming a structured growth procedure that proceeds from concept to manufacture to operation and disposal. Systems engineering considers both the business and the technological requires of all customers, with the goal of providing an excellence product that meets the user requires.

Systems Psychology

Systems psychology is a branch of psychology that studies human behaviour and experience in intricate systems. It is inspired through systems theory and systems thinking, and based on the theoretical work of Roger Barker, Gregory Bateson, Humberto Maturana and others. It is an approach in psychology, in which groups and individuals, are measured as systems in homeostasis. Systems psychology "comprises the domain of engineering psychology, but in addition is more concerned with societal systems and with the study of motivational, affective,

cognitive and group behaviour than is engineering psychology." In systems psychology "aspects of organizational behaviour for instance individual requires, rewards, expectations, and attributes of the people interacting with the systems are measured in the procedure in order to make an effective organization". Whether considering the first systems of written communication with Sumerian cuneiform to Mayan numerals, or the feats of engineering with the Egyptian pyramids, systems thinking in essence dates back to antiquity. Differentiated from Western rationalist traditions of philosophy, C. West Churchman often recognized with the I Ching as a systems approach distribution a frame of reference same to pre-Socratic philosophy and Heraclitus. Von Bertalanffy traced systems concepts to the philosophy of G.W. Leibniz and Nicholas of Cusa's coincidentia oppositorum. While contemporary systems are substantially more complicated, today's systems are embedded in history.

A significant step to introduce the systems approach, into difficult sciences of the 19th century, was the power transformation, through figures like James Joule and Sadi Carnot. Then, the Thermodynamic of this century, with Rudolf Clausius, Josiah Gibbs and others, built the organization reference model, as a formal scientific substance. Systems theory as an region of study specifically urbanized following the World Wars from the work of Ludwig von Bertalanffy, Anatol Rapoport, Kenneth E. Boulding, William Ross Ashby, Margaret Mead, Gregory Bateson, C. West Churchman and others in the 1950s, specifically catalyzed through the cooperation in the Community for Common Systems Research. Cognizant of advances in science

that questioned classical assumptions in the organizational sciences, Bertalanffy's thought to develop a theory of systems began as early as the interwar era, publishing "An Outline for Common Systems Theory" in the British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, through 1950. Where assumptions in Western science from Greek idea with Plato and Aristotle to Newton's Principia have historically convinced all regions from the difficult to social sciences, the original theorists explored the implications of twentieth century advances in conditions of systems.

Subjects like complexity, self-organization, connectionism and adaptive systems had already been studied in the 1940s and 1950s. In meadows like cybernetics, researchers like Norbert Wiener, William Ross Ashby, John von Neumann and Heinz von Foerster examined intricate systems by mathematics. John von Neumann exposed cellular automata and self-reproducing systems, again with only pencil and paper. Aleksandr Lyapunov and Jules Henri Poincaré worked on the foundations of chaos theory without any computer at all. At the similar time Howard T. Odum, the radiation ecologist, recognized that the study of common systems required a language that could depict energetic, thermodynamic and kinetics at any organization level. Odum urbanized common systems, or Universal language, based on the route language of electronics to fulfill this role, recognized as the Power Systems Language. Flanked by 1929-1951, Robert Maynard Hutchins at the University of Chicago had undertaken efforts to encourage innovation and interdisciplinary research in the social sciences, aided through the Ford Basis with the interdisciplinary

Division of the Social Sciences recognized in 1931. Numerous scholars had been actively occupied in ideas before but in 1937 von Bertalanffy presented the common theory of systems for a conference at the University of Chicago. The systems view was based on many fundamental ideas. First, all phenomena can be viewed as a web of relationships in the middle of elements, or an organization. Second, all systems, whether electrical, biological, or social, have general patterns, behaviours, and properties that can be understood and used to develop greater insight into the behaviour of intricate phenomena and to move closer towards a unity of science. Organization philosophy, methodology and application are complementary to this science. Through 1956, the Community for Common Systems Research was recognized, renamed the International Community for Systems Science in 1988.The Cold War affected the research project for systems theory in methods that sorely disappointed several of the seminal theorists. Some began to recognize theories defined in association with systems theory had deviated from the initial Common Systems Theory (GST) view. The economist Kenneth Boulding, an early researcher in systems theory, had concerns in excess of the manipulation of systems concepts. Boulding concluded from the effects of the Cold War that abuses of power always prove consequential and that systems theory might address such issues. Since the end of the Cold War, there has been a renewed interest in systems theory with efforts to strengthen an ethical view.