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Chapter 1

Introduction

Politicisation

Politicization is a concept in political science and theory used to explain how ideas, entities or collections of facts become interpreted as political, and consequently become the subject of contestation. Politicisation has been described as compromising objectivity, and is linked with political polarisation. Conversely, it can have a democratising effect and enhance political choice, and has been shown to improve the responsiveness of supranational institutions such as the European Union. Politicisation is more likely to occur when justifications for political violence are considered acceptable within a society, or in the absence of norms condemning violence.

Depoliticisation, the reverse process, is characterised by governance through consensus-building and pragmatic compromise. It occurs when subjects are left to experts, such as technocratic or bureaucratic institutions, or left to individuals and free markets, through liberalisation or deregulation. It is often connected with multi-level governance. The concept has been used to explain the "democratic gap" between politicians and citizens who lack choice, agency and opportunities for deliberation. In the 21st century,

depoliticisation has been linked to disillusionment with neoliberalism. Depoliticisation has negative consequences for regime legitimacy, and produces anti-political sentiment associated with populism, which can result in "repoliticisation" (politicisation following depoliticisation).

Current studies of politicisation are separated into various subfields. It is primarily examined on three separate levels: within national political systems, within the European Union and within international institutions. Academic approaches vary greatly and are frequently disconnected. It has been studied from subdisciplines such as comparative politics, political sociology, European studies and legal theory.

The politicisation of science occurs when actors stress the inherent uncertainty of scientific method to challenge scientific consensus, undermining the positive impact of science on political debate by causing citizens to dismiss scientific evidence.

The dominant academic framework for understanding politicisation is the systems model, which sees politics as a sphere. In this perspective, politicisation is the process by which issues or phenomenon enter the sphere of "the political", a space of controversy and conflict. Alternatively, in the behaviouralist approach to political science, which sees politics as action or conflict and is more common in the United States, politicisation is conceptualised as the process by which

an issue or phenomenon becomes significantly more visible in the collective consciousness, causing political mobilisation.

In the systems model, depoliticisation is seen as "arena-shifting": removing issues from the political sphere by placing them outside the direct control or influence of political institutions, such as legislatures and elected politicians, thereby denying or minimising their political nature. In the behaviouralist model, depoliticisation indicates the reduction of popular interest in an issue, a weakening of participation in the public sphere and the utilisation of power to prevent opposition.

Majoritarian institutions, such as parliaments (legislatures) and political parties, are associated with politicisation because they represent popular sovereignty and their agents are subject to short-term political considerations, particularly the need to compete for votes ("vote-seeking") by utilising populist rhetoric and policies. Non-majoritarian institutions, such as constitutional courts, central banks and international organisations, are neither directly elected nor directly managed by elected officials, and are connected with depoliticisation as they tend towards moderation and compromise.

Declines in voter turnout, political mobilisation and political party membership, trends present in most OECD countries from the 1960s onwards, reflect depoliticisation. A number of causes for this shift have been suggested. The growth of big tent political parties (parties which aim to appeal to a broad

spectrum of voters) resulted in reduced polarisation and centralised decision-making, with increased compromise and bargaining. In postwar Europe, the development of neo-corporatism led to political bargaining between powerful employers' organizations, trade unions and the government in a system known as tripartism, within which cartel parties could successfully prevent competition from newer parties. Globally during the late 20th century, central banks and constitutional courts became increasingly important.

Robert Dahl argued that these processes risked producing alienation because they created a professionalised form of politics that was "anti-ideological" and "too remote and bureaucratized". Other contemporary scholars saw depoliticisation as a positive indication of dealignment and democratic maturity, as political competition came to be dominated by issues rather than cleavages. In the early 21st century, theorists such as Colin Crouch and Chantal Mouffe argued that low participation was not the result of satisfaction with political systems, but the consequence of low confidence in institutions and political representatives; in 2007, Colin Hay explicitly linked these studies with the concept of politicisation.

Since the 1990s, a process of "repoliticisation" has occurred on the national level, marked by the growth of right-wing populist parties in Europe, increased polarisation in American politics and higher voter turnout. The divide between the winners and losers of globalisation and neoliberalism is hypothesised to

have played a major role in this process, having replaced class conflict as the primary source of politicisation. Sources of conflict along this line include an "integration–demarcation" cleavage (between the losers of globalisation, who favour protectionism and nationalism, and the winners of globalisation, who prefer increased competition, open borders and internationalism); and a similar "cosmopolitan–communitarian" cleavage (which places additional emphasis on a cultural divide between supporters of universal norms and those who believe in cultural particularism).

Disillusionment with neoliberal policies has also been cited as a factor behind the processes of depoliticisation and repoliticisation, particularly through the lens of public choice theory. In 2001, Peter Burnham argued that in the UK the New Labour administration of Tony Blair used depoliticisation as a governing strategy, presenting contentious neoliberal reforms as non-negotiable "constraints" in order to lower political expectations, thus creating apathy and submission among the electorate and facilitating the emergence of "anti-politics".

Neo-Marxist, radical democratic and anti-capitalist critiques aim to repoliticise neoliberal society, arguing that Marx's theory of alienation can be used to explain depoliticisation.

Bureaucracy

The term **bureaucracy** (/bjʊəˈrɒkrəsi/) may refer both to a body of non-elected governing officials (bureaucrats) and to an

administrative policy-making group. Historically, a bureaucracy was a government administration managed by departments staffed with non-elected officials. Today, bureaucracy is the administrative system governing any large institution, whether publicly owned or privately owned. The public administration in many jurisdictions and sub-jurisdictions exemplifies bureaucracy, but so does any centralized hierarchical structure of an institution, e.g. hospitals, academic entities, business firms, professional societies, social clubs, etc.

Bureaucracy in a political theory is mainly a centralized form of management and tends to be differentiated from adhocracy, in which management tends more to decentralization.

Various commentators have argued for the necessity of bureaucracies in modern society. The German sociologist Max Weber (1864-1920) argued that bureaucracy constitutes the most efficient and rational way in which human activity can be organized and that systematic processes and organized hierarchies are necessary to maintain order, to maximize efficiency, and to eliminate favoritism. On the other hand, Weber also saw unfettered bureaucracy as a threat to individual freedom, with the potential of trapping individuals in an impersonal "iron cage" of rule-based, rational control.

The term "bureaucracy" originated in the French language: it combines the French word *bureau* – desk or office – with the Greek word κράτος (*kratos*) – rule or political power. The French

economist Jacques Claude Marie Vincent de Gournay (1712-1759) coined the word in the mid-18th century. Gournay never wrote the term down but a letter from a contemporary later quoted him:

The late M. de Gournay... sometimes used to say: "We have an illness in France which bids fair to play havoc with us; this illness is called bureaumania." Sometimes he used to invent a fourth or fifth form of government under the heading of "bureaucracy."

—*Baron von Grimm (1723-1807)*

The first known English-language use dates to 1818 with Irish novelist Lady Morgan referring to the apparatus used by the British to subjugate their Irish colony as "the Bureaucratie, or office tyranny, by which Ireland has so long been governed." By the mid-19th century the word appeared in a more neutral sense, referring to a system of public administration in which offices were held by unelected career officials. In this context "bureaucracy" was seen as a distinct form of management, often subservient to a monarchy. In the 1920s the German sociologist Max Weber expanded the definition to include any system of administration conducted by trained professionals according to fixed rules. Weber saw bureaucracy as a relatively positive development; however, by 1944 the Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises opined in the context of his experience in the Nazi regime that the term bureaucracy was "always applied with an opprobrious connotation," and by 1957 the American

sociologist Robert Merton suggested that the term "bureaucrat" had become an "epithet, a *Schimpfwort*" in some circumstances. The word "bureaucracy" is also used in politics and government with a disapproving tone to disparage official rules that make it difficult to do things. In workplaces, the word is used very often to blame complicated rules, processes, and written work that make it hard to get something done. Socio-bureaucracy would then refer to certain social influences that may affect the function of a society.

In modern usage, *modern bureaucracy* has been defined as comprising four features:

- hierarchy (clearly defined spheres of competence and divisions of labor)
- continuity (a structure where administrators have a full-time salary and advance within the structure)
- impersonality (prescribed rules and operating rules rather than arbitrary actions)
- expertise (officials are chosen according to merit, have been trained, and hold access to knowledge)

Ancient

Although the term "bureaucracy" first originated in the mid-18th century, organized and consistent administrative systems existed much earlier. The development of writing (c. 3500 BC) and the use of documents was critical to the administration of this system, and the first definitive emergence of bureaucracy occurred in ancient Sumer, where an emergent class of scribes

used clay tablets to administer the harvest and to allocate its spoils. Ancient Egypt also had a hereditary class of scribes that administered the civil-service bureaucracy.

In China, when the Qin dynasty (221–206 BC) unified China under the Legalist system, the emperor assigned administration to dedicated officials rather than nobility, ending feudalism in China, replacing it with a centralized, bureaucratic government. The form of government created by the first emperor and his advisors was used by later dynasties to structure their own government. Under this system, the government thrived, as talented individuals could be more easily identified in the transformed society. The Han dynasty (202 BC - 220 AD) established a complicated bureaucracy based on the teachings of Confucius, who emphasized the importance of ritual in a family, in relationships, and in politics. With each subsequent dynasty, the bureaucracy evolved. In 165 BC, Emperor Wen introduced the first method of recruitment to civil service through examinations, while Emperor Wu (r. 141–87 BC), cemented the ideology of Confucius into mainstream governance installed a system of recommendation and nomination in government service known as *xiaolian*, and a national academy whereby officials would select candidates to take part in an examination of the Confucian classics, from which Emperor Wu would select officials. In the Sui dynasty (581–618) and the subsequent Tang dynasty (618–907) the *shi* class would begin to present itself by means of the fully standardized civil service examination system, of partial recruitment of those who passed

standard exams and earned an official degree. Yet recruitment by recommendations to office was still prominent in both dynasties. It was not until the Song dynasty (960–1279) that the recruitment of those who passed the exams and earned degrees was given greater emphasis and significantly expanded. During the Song dynasty (960–1279) the bureaucracy became meritocratic. Following the Song reforms, competitive examinations took place to determine which candidates qualified to hold given positions. The imperial examination system lasted until 1905, six years before the Qing dynasty collapsed, marking the end of China's traditional bureaucratic system.

A hierarchy of regional proconsuls and their deputies administered the Roman Empire. The reforms of Diocletian (Emperor from 284 to 305) doubled the number of administrative districts and led to a large-scale expansion of Roman bureaucracy.

The early Christian author Lactantius (c. 250 – c. 325) claimed that Diocletian's reforms led to widespread economic stagnation, since "the provinces were divided into minute portions, and many presidents and a multitude of inferior officers lay heavy on each territory."

After the Empire split, the Byzantine Empire developed a notoriously complicated administrative hierarchy, and in the 20th century the term "Byzantine" came to refer to any complex bureaucratic structure.

Modern

The government of the Ashanti Empire was built upon a sophisticated bureaucracy in Kumasi, with separate ministries which saw to the handling of state affairs. Ashanti's Foreign Office was based in Kumasi. Despite the small size of the office, it allowed the state to pursue complex negotiations with foreign powers. The Office was divided into departments that handled Ashanti relations separately with the British, French, Dutch, and Arabs. Scholars of Ashanti history, such as Larry Yarak and Ivor Wilkes, disagree over the power of this sophisticated bureaucracy in comparison to the Asantehene. However, both scholars agree that it was a sign of a highly developed government with a complex system of checks and balances.

Instead of the inefficient and often corrupt system of tax farming that prevailed in absolutist states such as France, the Exchequer was able to exert control over the entire system of tax revenue and government expenditure. By the late 18th century, the ratio of fiscal bureaucracy to population in Britain was approximately 1 in 1300, almost four times larger than the second most heavily bureaucratized nation, France. Thomas Taylor Meadows, Britain's consul in Guangzhou, argued in his *Desultory Notes on the Government and People of China* (1847) that "the long duration of the Chinese empire is solely and altogether owing to the good government which consists in the advancement of men of talent and merit only," and that the British must reform their civil service by making the

institution meritocratic. Influenced by the ancient Chinese imperial examination, the Northcote–Trevelyan Report of 1854 recommended that recruitment should be on the basis of merit determined through competitive examination, candidates should have a solid general education to enable inter-departmental transfers, and promotion should be through achievement rather than "preferment, patronage, or purchase". This led to implementation of Her Majesty's Civil Service as a systematic, meritocratic civil service bureaucracy.

In the British civil service, just as it was in China, entrance to the civil service was usually based on a general education in ancient classics, which similarly gave bureaucrats greater prestige. The Cambridge-Oxford ideal of the civil service was identical to the Confucian ideal of a general education in world affairs through humanism. (Well into the 20th century, Classics, Literature, History and Language remained heavily favoured in British civil service examinations. In the period of 1925–1935, 67 percent of British civil service entrants consisted of such graduates.) Like the Chinese model's consideration of personal values, the British model also took personal physique and character into account.

Like the British, the development of French bureaucracy was influenced by the Chinese system. Under Louis XIV of France, the old nobility had neither power nor political influence, their only privilege being exemption from taxes. The dissatisfied noblemen complained about this "unnatural" state of affairs, and discovered similarities between absolute monarchy and

bureaucratic despotism. With the translation of Confucian texts during the Enlightenment, the concept of a meritocracy reached intellectuals in the West, who saw it as an alternative to the traditional *ancien regime* of Europe. Western perception of China even in the 18th century admired the Chinese bureaucratic system as favourable over European governments for its seeming meritocracy; Voltaire claimed that the Chinese had "perfected moral science" and François Quesnay advocated an economic and political system modeled after that of the Chinese. The governments of China, Egypt, Peru and Empress Catherine II were regarded as models of Enlightened Despotism, admired by such figures as Diderot, D'Alembert and Voltaire.

Napoleonic France adopted this meritocracy system and soon saw a rapid and dramatic expansion of government, accompanied by the rise of the French civil service and its complex systems of bureaucracy. This phenomenon became known as "bureaumania". In the early 19th century, Napoleon attempted to reform the bureaucracies of France and other territories under his control by the imposition of the standardized Napoleonic Code. But paradoxically, that led to even further growth of the bureaucracy.

French civil service examinations adopted in the late 19th century were also heavily based on general cultural studies. These features have been likened to the earlier Chinese model.

Other industrialized nations

By the mid-19th century, bureaucratic forms of administration were firmly in place across the industrialized world. Thinkers like John Stuart Mill and Karl Marx began to theorize about the economic functions and power-structures of bureaucracy in contemporary life. Max Weber was the first to endorse bureaucracy as a necessary feature of modernity, and by the late 19th century bureaucratic forms had begun their spread from government to other large-scale institutions.

Within capitalist systems, informal bureaucratic structures began to appear in the form of corporate power hierarchies, as detailed in mid-century works like *The Organization Man* and *The Man in the Gray Flannel Suit*. Meanwhile, in the Soviet Union and Eastern Bloc nations, a powerful class of bureaucratic administrators termed *nomenklatura* governed nearly all aspects of public life.

The 1980s brought a backlash against perceptions of "big government" and the associated bureaucracy. Politicians like Margaret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan gained power by promising to eliminate government regulatory bureaucracies, which they saw as overbearing, and return economic production to a more purely capitalistic mode, which they saw as more efficient. In the business world, managers like Jack Welch gained fortune and renown by eliminating bureaucratic structures inside corporations. Still, in the modern world, most organized institutions rely on bureaucratic systems to manage

information, process records, and administer complex systems, although the decline of paperwork and the widespread use of electronic databases is transforming the way bureaucracies function.

Theories

Karl Marx theorized about the role and function of bureaucracy in his *Critique of Hegel's Philosophy of Right*, published in 1843. In *Philosophy of Right*, Hegel had supported the role of specialized officials in public administration, although he never used the term "bureaucracy" himself. By contrast, Marx was opposed to bureaucracy. Marx posited that while corporate and government bureaucracy seem to operate in opposition, in actuality they mutually rely on one another to exist. He wrote that "The Corporation is civil society's attempt to become state; but the bureaucracy is the state which has really made itself into civil society."

Writing in the early 1860s, political scientist John Stuart Mill theorized that successful monarchies were essentially bureaucracies, and found evidence of their existence in Imperial China, the Russian Empire, and the regimes of Europe. Mill referred to bureaucracy as a distinct form of government, separate from representative democracy. He believed bureaucracies had certain advantages, most importantly the accumulation of experience in those who actually conduct the affairs. Nevertheless, he believed this form of governance compared poorly to representative

government, as it relied on appointment rather than direct election. Mill wrote that ultimately the bureaucracy stifles the mind, and that "a bureaucracy always tends to become a pedantocracy." The German sociologist Max Weber was the first to formally study bureaucracy and his works led to the popularization of this term. In his essay *Bureaucracy*,[1], published in his magnum opus *Economy and Society*, Weber described many ideal-typical forms of public administration, government, and business. His ideal-typical bureaucracy, whether public or private, is characterized by:

- hierarchical organization
- formal lines of authority (chain of command)
- a fixed area of activity
- rigid division of labor
- regular and continuous execution of assigned tasks
- all decisions and powers specified and restricted by regulations
- officials with expert training in their fields
- career advancement dependent on technical qualifications
- qualifications evaluated by organizational rules, not individuals

Weber listed several preconditions for the emergence of bureaucracy, including an increase in the amount of space and population being administered, an increase in the complexity of the administrative tasks being carried out, and the existence of a monetary economy requiring a more efficient administrative system. Development of communication and transportation technologies make more efficient administration

possible, and democratization and rationalization of culture results in demands for equal treatment.

Although he was not necessarily an admirer of bureaucracy, Weber saw bureaucratization as the most efficient and rational way of organizing human activity and therefore as the key to rational-legal authority, indispensable to the modern world. Furthermore, he saw it as the key process in the ongoing rationalization of Western society. Weber also saw bureaucracy, however, as a threat to individual freedoms, and the ongoing bureaucratization as leading to a "polar night of icy darkness", in which increasing rationalization of human life traps individuals in a soulless "iron cage" of bureaucratic, rule-based, rational control. Weber's critical study of the bureaucratization of society became one of the most enduring parts of his work. Many aspects of modern public administration are based on his work, and a classic, hierarchically organized civil service of the Continental type is called "Weberian civil service" or "Weberian bureaucracy". It is debated among social scientists whether Weberian bureaucracy contributes to economic growth.

Writing as an academic while a professor at Bryn Mawr College, Woodrow Wilson's essay *The Study of Administration* argued for bureaucracy as a professional cadre, devoid of allegiance to fleeting politics. Wilson advocated a bureaucracy that "is a part of political life only as the methods of the counting house are a part of the life of society; only as machinery is part of the manufactured product. But it is, at

the same time, raised very far above the dull level of mere technical detail by the fact that through its greater principles it is directly connected with the lasting maxims of political wisdom, the permanent truths of political progress."

Wilson did not advocate a replacement of rule by the governed, he simply advised that, "Administrative questions are not political questions. Although politics sets the tasks for administration, it should not be suffered to manipulate its offices". This essay became a foundation for the study of public administration in America.

In his 1944 work *Bureaucracy*, the Austrian economist Ludwig von Mises compared bureaucratic management to profit management. Profit management, he argued, is the most effective method of organization when the services rendered may be checked by economic calculation of profit and loss. When, however, the service in question can not be subjected to economic calculation, bureaucratic management is necessary. He did not oppose universally bureaucratic management; on the contrary, he argued that bureaucracy is an indispensable method for social organization, for it is the only method by which the law can be made supreme, and is the protector of the individual against despotic arbitrariness. Using the example of the Catholic Church, he pointed out that bureaucracy is only appropriate for an organization whose code of conduct is not subject to change. He then went on to argue that complaints about bureaucratization usually refer not to the criticism of the bureaucratic methods themselves, but to

"the intrusion of bureaucracy into all spheres of human life." Mises saw bureaucratic processes at work in both the private and public spheres; however, he believed that bureaucratization in the private sphere could only occur as a consequence of government interference. According to him, "What must be realized is only that the strait jacket of bureaucratic organization paralyzes the individual's initiative, while within the capitalist market society an innovator still has a chance to succeed. The former makes for stagnation and preservation of inveterate methods, the latter makes for progress and improvement." American sociologist Robert K. Merton expanded on Weber's theories of bureaucracy in his work *Social Theory and Social Structure*, published in 1957. While Merton agreed with certain aspects of Weber's analysis, he also noted the dysfunctional aspects of bureaucracy, which he attributed to a "trained incapacity" resulting from "over conformity". He believed that bureaucrats are more likely to defend their own entrenched interests than to act to benefit the organization as a whole but that pride in their craft makes them resistant to changes in established routines. Merton stated that bureaucrats emphasize formality over interpersonal relationships, and have been trained to ignore the special circumstances of particular cases, causing them to come across as "arrogant" and "haughty". In his book "A General Theory of Bureaucracy", first published in 1976, Dr. Elliott Jaques describes the discovery of a universal and uniform underlying structure of managerial or work levels in the bureaucratic hierarchy for any type of employment systems.

Elliott Jaques argues and presents evidence that for the bureaucracy to provide a valuable contribution to the open society some of the following conditions must be met:

Number of levels in a bureaucracy hierarchy must match the complexity level of the employment system for which the bureaucratic hierarchy is created (Elliott Jaques identified maximum 8 levels of complexity for bureaucratic hierarchies).

Roles within a bureaucratic hierarchy differ in the level of work complexity.

The level of work complexity in the roles must be matched with the level of human capability of the role holders (Elliott Jaques identified maximum 8 Levels of human capability).

The level of work complexity in any managerial role within a bureaucratic hierarchy must be one level higher than the level of work complexity of the subordinate roles.

Any managerial role in a bureaucratic hierarchy must have full managerial accountabilities and authorities (veto selection to the team, decide task types and specific task assignments, decide personal effectiveness and recognition, decide initiation of removal from the team within due process).

Lateral working accountabilities and authorities must be defined for all the roles in the hierarchy (7 types of lateral working accountabilities and authorities: collateral, advisory, service-getting and -giving, coordinative, monitoring, auditing,

prescribing). The definition of effective bureaucratic hierarchy by Elliott Jaques is of importance not only to sociology but to social psychology, social anthropology, economics, politics, and social philosophy. They also have a practical application in business and administrative studies.

Public Sector Organizational Culture

Experience from Frontline Bureaucracies

Culture in public sector organizations varies in its dimensions. Organizations comprise people. People are divided into nation-states and are variably exposed to different things such as events and information, which help form their own beliefs, values, and attitudes. These differences in beliefs, values, and attitudes result in different cultural practices, which in turn get a reflection in the organizations of their respective societies. Within a society, different subgroups exist with distinct beliefs and practices. The different generational cohorts within a society become exposed to things, technologies, and events that are particular to their own time. Therefore, subgroups within a society develop thinking and behaviors that may be considered distinct. The societal general culture and subcultures affect the cultural beliefs and practices of the organizations of society.

It is generally taken for granted that culture motivates the employees of an organization to behave in a particular way. Not much research is done on how culture affects the performance

of organizations. The limited number of studies investigating the cultural influence on performance reports the linkage to be positive. In some other contexts, despite deliberate efforts, in the public sector, organizations have shown indifference to the adoption of the prescribed culture In spite of the influences from the new public management tools, public sector organizations tend to be internal-oriented rather than being external-oriented. Organizations can develop the practice of subculture, which can be considered a management technique.

This chapter focuses on the cultural practices of the frontline bureaucrats in Bangladesh. The few studies conducted on the bureaucratic culture in Bangladesh are different from the current one in their focuses and methodologies. Jamil conducted a survey in December 1992 and January 1993 on 161 bureaucrats working in both the central level administration and the field level administration and found that the bureaucrats inculcate power distance, uncertainty avoidance tendency, and are less participatory in their decision-making process. Haque and Mohammad, analyzing the historical accounts, relevant literature, and their observations, concluded that the prevalence of pervasive corruption in the Bangladeshi bureaucracy could be explained in terms of the existence of some culture dimensions in the public administration. Conducting 40 qualitative semi-structured interviews with bureaucrats from the central and field administration, Rahman found that the bureaucrats suffer from indecision over maintaining political neutrality and political responsiveness. Zafarullah found in his study of

bureaucratic culture in Bangladesh that the bureaucrats support clientelism and self-preservation and oppose change initiatives. Based on personal experience and review of literature, Rashid concluded that bureaucrats had less engagement with members of the civil society and non-government organizations.

The above studies had a limitation in terms of their sample size and sampling process. This study covered a larger sample chosen from the field administration only. It investigated how four dimensions of organizational culture were practiced by the frontline bureaucrats. There are two broad types of bureaucrats in the public services of the country—cadre services and non-cadre services. Recruitment, training, and mobility of the bureaucrats of these two categories are different. Therefore, how the two groups of frontline bureaucrats differ in practicing culture dimensions of power distance, uncertainty avoidance, participation, and team orientation had remained unexplored, and this has been the main objective of this study. The second section discusses how organizational culture is understood, followed by a discussion on culture dimensions in the third section. The fourth section discusses the relevance of the four dimensions of organizational culture to frontline bureaucracies, followed by a short section introducing frontline bureaucrats in Bangladesh in the fifth section. The sixth and seventh sections discuss the methods followed and the findings of the study, respectively. The last two sections present a discussion on the findings and conclusion of the study.

Understanding organizational culture

Hofstede, Hofstede, and Minkov described culture as a "mental programming" or "software of the mind." It is shared patterns of thinking, feeling, and acting. Therefore, it is always a collective phenomenon. The patterns of thinking, feeling, and acting differentiate one group of people from others. Thus, culture is "the collective programming of the mind that distinguishes the members of one group or category of people from others". The patterns of thinking, feeling, and acting come from the unwritten rules of the social game. The understanding of culture given by Hofstede et al. is similar to that of Pettigrew, who defined it as a "system of such publicly and collectively accepted meanings operating for a given group at a given time" and provides "a general sense of orientation" to the group.

O'Reilly, Chatman, and Caldwell have argued that organizational culture as a concept has a long history and goes back to early sociological studies of the early 1950s. It received prominence in the 1980s. Hofstede, Neuijen, Ohayv, and Sanders found no consensus on the definition of the concept. However, they identified several characteristics of organizational culture. Organizational culture is: (1) holistic, (2) historically determined, (3) related to anthropological concepts, (4) socially constructed, (5) soft, and (6) difficult to change. Schein published an article defining organizational culture as "(1) a pattern of basic assumptions, (2) invented, discovered, developed by a given group, (3) as it learns to cope

with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration, (4) that has worked well enough to be considered valid and, therefore (5) is to be taught to new members as the (6) correct way to perceive, think, and feel in relation to these problems." Schein identified three levels of organizational culture: (1) artifacts, (2) values, and (3) assumptions. However, Hofstede et al., in their study, found that shared perceptions of daily practices rather than shared values represent the core of an organization's culture.

Organizational culture has also been described as an administrative culture or bureaucratic culture or corporate culture. Jamil argued that there is something additional in an administrative culture than can be found in organizational culture. This additional item is politics. Most culture studies focus on the private organization where politics is not an issue of interest. These studies look at the internal context of an organization. Any framework for understanding administrative culture has to incorporate politics, i.e. how bureaucrats interact with politics and society as a whole. Jamil's arguments obtain strength from the fact that the mission of public sector organizations significantly differs from that of private sector organizations. Most public sector organizations are not profit-making and do not rely on profits for their existence.

In contrast, private sector organizations are profit-oriented and rely on profits for their existence. Public sector organizations cannot avoid politics because they execute the government's

policies. There is a subtle nuance between the usages of the concepts of "bureaucratic culture" and "corporate culture." The concept of bureaucratic culture refers to the values and practices in public sector organizations, while corporate culture usually refers to private sector organizations.

Whatever the characteristics or levels of organizational culture are, it is a "powerful force" in an organization and immensely affects the well-being and success of an organization. It is described as the glue that holds the organization together. The culture encourages the members in the organization to behave similarly. It impacts how well the organization will function. Rong and Hongwei argue that organizational culture stems from the social culture and works as an "invisible hand" in public sector management. This hand is relatively stable but transforms itself in the long run in line with social change.

Lloyd found that there are debates about what organizational culture is. Some believe it as what an organization "is" and others believe that it is what an organization "has." However, both arguments converge in the belief that culture is something to be made up of such concepts as beliefs, assumptions, and values. Values have received prominence in the definitions of organizational culture. Values are defined as a criterion using which one tends to prefer certain states of affairs over others. Beliefs are something that one considers as truth. The learned linkage between beliefs and values becomes attitudes. When the values, beliefs, and attitudes become so entrenched in an organization that they are no longer doubted

or debated, they become assumptions. These values, beliefs, and assumptions are shared among the members of the organizations. Hofstede et al. in a cross-organization study of 20 organizations in two countries found that practices rather than values play a major role. Organizational cultures are acquired on the job and are exchangeable when one takes a new job. While social cultures reside in values, organizational cultures reside in practices. These practices are visible and consciously carried out.

Organizational culture is not a one-dimensional concept. Culture researchers have found different dimensions in organizational culture. Hofstede et al. in their cross-organization study have identified six dimensions of organizational culture with respect to the practices where organizations differ. These dimensions are (1) process orientation vs. results orientation, (2) employee orientation vs. job orientation, (3) parochialism vs. professionalism, (4) open system vs. closed system, (5) loose control vs. tight control, and (6) normative vs. pragmatic. They argue that these dimensions may not be universally valid or sufficient. Organizational cultures in different contexts may require additional dimensions or some of the identified six dimensions may seem less useful. Along with these six practice dimensions of organizational culture, they also identified three value dimensions, which are (1) the need for security (uncertainty avoidance), (2) work centrality (job involvement), and (3) the need for authority (power distance).

The first practice dimension of organizational culture in Hofstede et al.'s study opposes a concern for means to a concern for goals. They equate this contrast with the distinction made between the mechanistic and organic management systems of Burns and Stalker. With a process or mechanistic orientation, an organization tends to focus on technical improvements of means rather than the accomplishment of ends. An organic system tends to focus on concern as a whole. The second practice dimension opposes concern for the employees to concern for the job to be done. In the third practice dimension, a contrast is made between the identification of the employees deriving from the organization (parochial) and the type of job (professionalism). The fourth dimension focuses on the tendency of the organization to respond to its environment. The fifth practice dimension shows the contrasts in the internal structuring of an organization. The sixth practice dimension shows how an organization is oriented toward its customers. A normative organization looks at its task toward its customers as the implementation of inviolable rules. A pragmatic organization tends to stay close to its customers. The authors distinguish results orientation from customer orientation in that "trying to serve the customer does not automatically imply a results orientation".

Ghosh and Srivastava noted that the concept of organizational culture has been interpreted differently and not all complement or converge. After reviewing a sample of the literature on the instruments used in survey studies of organizational culture, the authors concluded that no two

instruments were alike, and no two instruments shared a common theoretical basis. These authors reported that Ashkanasy, Wilderom, and Peterson and Wilderom, Glunk, and Maslowski had studied 18 culture measure questionnaires published between 1975 and 1992 and 10 empirical culture research studies respectively. Both studies found great variation in the definition and operationalization of organizational culture and its dimensions.

Ghosh and Srivastava, based on Kluckhohn and Strodtbeck's model, identified seven dimensions of organizational culture: (1) participation, (2) respect for individual, (3) attitude to risk, (4) attention orientation, (5) trust, (6) openness, and (7) power distance. Schein in attempting to understand the content of a culture identifies some of its dimensions and presents questions to be asked regarding each dimension. Answers to these questions will identify the content of that culture, but he cautions about the danger of over-generalizing the dimensions.

Harrison and Baird compared the organizational culture of public sector organizations in Australia with that of private sector organizations using O'Reilly et al.'s organizational culture profile (OCP) and by focusing on five dimensions: (1) outcome orientation, (2) respect for people, (3) attention to detail, (4) team orientation, and (5) innovation. O'Reilly et al. developed the OCP in order to quantitatively assess organizational culture in their study examining the person-culture fit and its implications for work attitudes and behaviors. These researchers carried out two types of factor

analyses—for the individual and as organizational profiles. The first analysis produced eight dimensions of an organization's culture: (1) innovation and risk-taking, (2) attention to detail, (3) orientation toward outcome or results, (4) aggressiveness and competitiveness, (5) supportiveness, (6) emphasis on growth and rewards, (7) a collaborative and team orientation, and (8) decisiveness. The second analysis produced seven dimensions: (1) innovation, (2) stability, (3) respect for people, (4) outcome orientation, (5) attention to detail, (6) team orientation, and (7) aggressiveness. Denison and Mishra used four organizational traits—involvement, adaptability, consistency, and mission—in their research to determine the relationship between organizational culture and organizational performance.

Jamil studied bureaucratic culture in the context of Bangladesh in order to determine the dominant type of culture and its consequences and also to identify the bearers of administrative subcultures. He noted that most studies on organizational culture have dealt with private sector organizations. He argued that public sector organizations are different from the private sector ones in that politics play a major role in the public sector organizations. Any study about public sector organizational culture has to take into account its external context, that is, its relationship with politics and the society in general.

Jamil argued that bureaucrats' attitudes in the external context could be typified in terms of their relationships to

politics and relationships to citizens and civil society. In the case of the first typology, Jamil argued, borrowing from Putnam, that bureaucrats can be classified into classical or political. Classical bureaucrats are procedure-oriented or rule-oriented, whereas political bureaucrats are problem-oriented or program-oriented. In the case of the second typology, bureaucrats can be universal or clientelistic. Universal bureaucrats believe in impartial applications of rules, which in Weberian terms are called the rational-legal type. Clientelism, on the other hand, serves in return for patronage and a power base. A recent development in the bureaucrat-citizen relationship has revealed that citizens are considered as customers in Western nations and as subjects in developing countries.

In the internal context, bureaucrats' attitudes, Jamil continued, can vary in specific characteristics such as power distance, uncertainty avoidance, guiding decision-making, and preferred employees. Power distance is a character that affects the decision-making behavior of bureaucrats. Where power distance is high, top bureaucrats take decisions, and lower bureaucrats carry out them. Where power distance is low, superiors and subordinates make consultations to take decisions.

According to Jamil, uncertainty avoidance is another character that affects decision-making behavior as well. Bureaucrats with a high tendency toward uncertainty avoidance tend to follow the rules and regulations strictly and do not take risks.

Contrarily, a low tendency toward uncertainty avoidance encourages them to take risks in terms of bending or breaking the rules.

Bureaucrats need information for making decisions. Jamil argued that the nature of the decision-making structure affects information search behavior. A top-down or hierarchic type of decision-making structure leads bureaucrats to limit their information search within its boundaries, their superiors, colleagues, or juniors. However, a collegial structure of decision-making leads bureaucrats to search beyond its boundaries, that is, politicians; citizens; academic, economic, and voluntary organizations.

Another characteristic of bureaucratic decision-making, where bureaucrats differ in their attitudes, Jamil argued, is preferred employees. The attribute of preferred employees argues that the employees for an organization should be chosen considering their social values and cultural characteristics. The social values and the cultural characteristics of the chosen employees should benefit the organization.

A comparison of the dimensions of the organizational culture identified by the different studies is presented in Table. It reveals that scholars do not agree in identifying common cultural dimensions. However, some of them agree with some of the dimensions. Some other dimensions are given different names by different authors.

Frontline bureaucracy and culture dimensions

Frontline bureaucracies—also known as street-level bureaucracies—are located at the bottom of the governmental pyramid. The citizens experience their government through the frontline bureaucracies because these are the service providing windows of the government. Therefore, the cultural practice of the frontline bureaucrats is of paramount importance to the government.

Alom identified four culture dimensions that affect transparency and accountability behaviors of the frontline bureaucrats. These culture dimensions are power distance, uncertainty avoidance tendency, participation, and team orientation. One of the critical features of good governance is accountability, which comes through transparency. In this sense, the four culture dimensions affect good governance the most.

Most frontline bureaucracies bear two common characteristics—they enjoy discretion but suffer from resources. The resource limitation characteristic may vary from context to context based on economic development of the countries, but discretion has been reported to exist irrespective of the level of economic development. Discretion is a structural feature, while resources are issues of an endowment. Therefore, these are not cultural factors. However, these factors in interaction with the cultural beliefs and practices—power distance, uncertainty avoidance,

participation, and team orientation—may impact on the good governance practices of the frontline bureaucrats. A brief discussion of these four cultural beliefs and practices is given below.

Power Distance: Power distance is the tendency to accept inequality among ranks in the system. Bureaucrats, in socially backward contexts such as Bangladesh, believe that they are socially superior, and they are not accountable to the service seekers. They protect this power position. Therefore, any reform initiatives that are directed to change this power position are not acceptable to them or at least will hinder the implementation of such initiatives. Redistribution of power in a social structure that has traditionally practiced a patron-client relationship among its members is particularly problematic.

Bureaucrats that possess power distance in relation to their clients will also possess the same in their organizational structure. Rong and Hongwei suggested that organizational culture stems from social cultures. Jamil's study supports this argument. He found that the traditions from the samaj (society as a whole) and the British colonial administration dominate bureaucratic culture in Bangladesh. The samaj and the colonial traditions maintain a hierarchical or patron-client social structure. The influence of these traditions is reflected in the bureaucracy in the form of high power distance. Therefore, high power distance supports a hierarchical power structure in the organization as well as in society.

Uncertainty Avoidance: Bureaucrats do not want to be in uncomfortable situations. In other words, they like to avoid situations or avoid anything that may create situations, putting them in trouble or discomfort. They want to be certain that any action committed by them will not bring them discomfort. According to Zafarullah, "The civil service in Bangladesh has shown an extraordinary predilection to hang on to the established rather than readily accepting change in its status, structure, functions, and norms of engagement with extra-bureaucratic instruments." The bureaucrats are "more at ease operating in a familiar environment employing conventional practices than embracing anything new or different".

Participation: Participation is allowing those in the decision-making process for whom decisions are being made. In other words, it refers to the quality, quantity, and diversity of input from the stakeholders in government decisions.

Organizations that are under stronger influence from external stakeholders are likely to exhibit a higher level of participation. In Jamil's language, this type of participation is guiding decisions, that is, how the decisions of the bureaucrats are guided. Do the frontline bureaucrats consult with their stakeholders, that is, politicians; citizens; and business and voluntary organizations? A bureaucrat's attitude toward the level of interaction with its stakeholders regarding the decision-making process influences the practice of participation.

Team Orientation: Practice of teamwork increases productivity in organizations. A team is a group of individuals who share their responsibilities to accomplish their shared goals. Group members have discretion in deciding how to carry out tasks and allocate tasks among themselves. Team orientation is a dimension of organizational culture identified by Schein and O'Reilly et al. and has been used by Harrison and Baird in their research. Hierarchical structures in public bureaucracies work as barriers to team building. A public sector organization is a "machine bureaucracy" that needs to change its hierarchically controlled managerial culture into "a coaching environment" where the individuals will appreciate "interpersonal needs and the benefits of intuition and creativity".

Frontline bureaucrats in Bangladesh

The frontline public bureaucracy in Bangladesh represents the characteristics of the overall public service of the country. These characteristics descended from the British colonial administration and the post-colonial administration of Pakistan. Bangladesh was liberated from Pakistan through a liberation war in 1971. Considering the recruitment, training, and mobility of the bureaucrats, one characteristic of the public services in Bangladesh has been that they are divided into cadre and non-cadre services. The cadre services have distinct hierarchy and specified functions—specialized and generalized. The members of these services belong to the Bangladesh Civil Service (BCS) who are recruited by the Public

Service Commission (PSC) through highly competitive examinations. They are hired as Assistant Secretary or equivalent and can move to the Senior Secretary position through promotions. They can move from one department to another. On the other hand, members of the non-cadre services are recruited to particular departments and do not have a definite structure of mobility horizontally and vertically. They need to serve within the department to which they are recruited. These bureaucrats have limited training opportunity throughout their service life. The frontline bureaucracy of Bangladesh has officials from both cadre and non-cadre services, but the size of the former category is smaller than the later.

Data for this study were collected from sub-district level frontline bureaucrats in Bangladesh using a survey questionnaire. Bangladesh had 488 sub-districts at the time of data collection. Twenty-nine sub-districts were chosen using a multistage sampling technique. From each of the selected sub-districts, 16 pre-decided office heads out of around 25 were given the questionnaire to fill out. The 16 office heads were chosen because they were perceived by practitioners as the frontline bureaucracies that had most interactions with citizens. Seven of these 16 offices are headed by cadre officials, and the rest nine offices are headed by non-cadre officials.

For data collection, the researcher traveled to the respondents. It was not possible to return with all filled-out questionnaires all the time. Therefore, questionnaires were left with the offices

of those respondents where they were not available in their offices. It was not possible to contact each of these office heads before going to their offices. Instead, the chief executive officer (UNO) of the sub-district was contacted before going to that particular sub-district. The UNO office in a sub-district carries some importance because it plays a coordinating role among all the offices of the sub-district. After going to a sub-district, help from officials from the UNO office was obtained sometimes in distributing and collecting the questionnaires. Thus, the UNO office was used as the first contact point.

After going to a sub-district, this researcher went to each of the 16 selected offices in the sub-district. Where the office head was present, this researcher requested him or her to fill out the survey questionnaire. Where the office head was not present, his/her contact cell phone number was collected from the other officials of the office. Then the office head was contacted over the phone and requested to fill out the survey questionnaire when he/she was available in the office and was requested either to send the filled out questionnaire to the UNO office or the postal address of this researcher. In most cases, an envelope (with postage stamp) was left with the postal address of the researcher written on it.

Around 40% of the survey questionnaires, on average, were collected directly by the researcher. Some filled out questionnaires came directly from the respondents through the postal service. The remaining questionnaires were submitted to the UNO office, or the officials of the UNO office collected them

from the other offices and then sent them together to the researcher through postal service. Altogether, 329 questionnaires were collected for the study out of the sample of 456. This constituted a response rate of 72.15%. However, three questionnaires were rejected because two of them had more than 50% items unanswered, and one was a duplicate. The duplication happened because one officer was in charge of two offices. That official filled out two questionnaires. Thus, one of these two questionnaires was rejected. Finally, data from 326 questionnaires were entered into the SPSS program. Demographic information of the respondents is presented in Table.

Table :Demographic information of respondent (% in parenthesis).

(1) Sex:		(3) Education		(5) Nature of service	
Male	291(89)	Bachelor	105(32)	Cadre	144(44)
Female	35(11)	Master	209(67)	Non-cadre	182(56)
		PhD	2(1)		
(2) Age		(4) Career (years in service):			
26-35	79(25)	1-5	147(46)		
36-45	108(37)	6-10	87(27)		
46-55	97(30)	11-15	30(9)		
56-	29(9)	16-20	30(9)		
		≥21	25(8)		

The questionnaire had items taken from validated instruments to measure each of the cultural dimensions. Each item had a four-point scale which varied from "always" to "never" or "agree" to "disagree." A five-item scale was constructed based on Jamil to measure power distance. The items were: (1) I seek my subordinates' opinions before making a decision; (2) My

subordinates suggest me ideas about my office work; (3) Confident subordinates in my office disagree with my decisions; (4) I tell my subordinates what decisions are to be taken; and (5) When I am confident, I disagree with my higher authority. To measure uncertainty avoidance, a four-item scale was developed based on Jamil which were: (1) I emphasize results more than following routines, procedures to the point; (2) I feel nervous about satisfying my higher authority with my work; (3) I look for the best alternative even if it goes beyond routines, and procedures; (4) I expect my higher authority to tell me if I am doing a good job. Participation was measured using a four-item scale developed following theoretical arguments. The items were: (1) My office should serve citizens according to their preferences; (2) Officers can learn nothing from service seekers; (3) My office should seek feedback from service recipients about their satisfaction; and (4) Service seekers should not advise us on what to do. Based on Harrison and Baird, a four-item scale was used to measure team orientation. The items were: (1) Working in teams can produce better results; (2) We should help each other in our office work; (3) Sometimes subordinates can give better opinions than superiors; (4) Subordinates should not disagree with the superior's opinion.

Results of two independent samples t-tests and descriptive statistics of group differences in the means of the culture dimensions practiced by the cadre and non-cadre officials are presented in Table. Power distance in non-cadre officials is higher than in cadre officials. The difference is significant at

0.10 level of significance. Concerning uncertainty avoidance, the non-cadre officials again have a significantly higher tendency to avoid uncertainty compared to the cadre officials. The cadre officials' mean score in the participation culture dimension is significantly higher than the mean score of the non-cadre officials. This finding is indicative of the cadre officials' higher tendency to accommodate stakeholders in decision-making processes. With regard to team orientation, the mean score of cadre officials is also significantly higher than the non-cadre officials. Therefore, cadre officials possess a higher mentality of teamwork compared to non-cadre officials.

Table :Results of t-test and descriptive statistics for culture dimensions by cadre.

| Culture Dimension | Group | | | | | | 95% CI for Mean | | | |
| | Cadre | | | Non-Cadre | | | | | | |
	M	SD	n	M	SD	n	Difference	t	df	Sig.
Power Distance	2.20	.40	145	2.28	.43	179	-0.17, 0.02	-1.64	319	.10
Uncertainty Avoidance	2.54	.52	143	2.70	.51	182	-0.27, -0.05	-2.79	323	.01
Participation	3.47	.55	141	3.34	.53	181	0.01, 0.25	2.17	320	.03
Team Orientation	3.46	.32	144	3.39	.31	182	-0.00, 0.14	1.93	324	.05

The four culture dimensions influence the daily works of the frontline bureaucrats. Generally, power distance within an office context is an extension of the power distance that prevails in society. High power distance among the employees of an organization contributes to the fortification of its formal and rigid hierarchical structure. The cadre officials of the frontline bureaucracies inculcate this culture slightly less than

the non-cadre officials and both scores are slightly lower than the average of the scale. Jamil reported the existence of higher power distance in the cadre officials in general (central and frontline bureaucrats). Power distance in this study shows scores lower than the average (2.5 points on the scale of 4). Therefore, this culture has not changed much.

The culture of uncertainty avoidance tendency negatively affects the achievement of the targeted results of an organization. It bars officials from taking initiatives of innovation. Strict enforcement of bureaucratic procedures, in some contexts, may not fetch the desired results. Therefore, officials need to apply their discretion and take some risks, which might bring them some uncertainty. Generally, everyone wants to remain in his comfort zone. In public service delivery, when facing the complexity of local contexts, frontline bureaucrats need to come out of their comfort zones sometimes. This study found high uncertainty tendency in the frontline bureaucrats. The non-cadre officials have a greater tendency to avoid uncertainty than the cadre officials. High level of uncertainty avoidance tendency among the bureaucrats in Bangladesh was reported by Jamil, and the current scenario does not show any change.

Participation in this research was used to mean bureaucrats' citizen-orientation, that is, their attitude toward feedback from citizens. The frontline bureaucrats directly deliver services to the citizens. Their understanding of the expectations of the citizens can equip them with appropriate services. The findings

of this study show that the frontline bureaucrats have a very high tendency to get feedback from the citizens. Again the cadre officials are ahead of the non-cadre ones. This finding is also similar to that of Jamil.

The frontline bureaucrats show a positive attitude toward teamwork. The score of cadre officials is higher than the non-cadre officials. These frontline bureaucrats work in their offices with limited resources. They face huge workloads as well. These workloads happen because of two reasons. One reason is that the demand for services is very high. Bangladesh is a populous country. So these bureaucrats face more service seekers than the ideal size. The second reason is that many of the sanctioned positions in the frontline bureaucracies remain vacant. Therefore, the bureaucrats from within an organization need to cooperate among themselves through teamwork.

Organizational culture is difficult to change without a deliberate effort. In the public sector organizations, this change is even harder to bring. The bureaucrats are rule followers and change-resistant. They remain to be in their comfort zones. Bringing desired changes in the practice of culture will require conscious and deliberate efforts. These efforts may include education, training, and social campaign. The difference in the scores in the dimensions of culture practiced by the cadre and non-cadre bureaucrats can be attributed to the different outlook they develop through their participation in social events. Although both groups of bureaucrats come from the same social context, they become exposed to different social events. One obvious social event is training. The cadre bureaucrats take part in different long- and short-term training programs

even at the very beginning of their services. The non-cadre bureaucrats hardly get any training. The second social factor is that the cadre bureaucrats, because of their mobility, attend various seminars and workshops on governance issues, which help them change their mindset. This scope is limited to the non-cadre bureaucrats.

This research had limitations. The items used to measure the culture dimensions in this research match the research context. The measurement tools might be different in other contexts. Future researchers can investigate why the cadre and non-cadre officials differ significantly in their organizational culture.

Chapter 2

Corruption, Causes and Consequences

Political and economic environment

The word corruption is derived from the Latin word "corruptus," which means "corrupted" and, in legal terms, the abuse of a trusted position in one of the branches of power (executive, legislative and judicial) or in political or other organizations with the intention of obtaining material benefit which is not legally justified for itself or for others.

Corruption was referred to as a great sin already in the Bible: "Do not accept a bribe, for a bribe blinds those who see and twist the words of the innocent." However, the history of corruption is in fact related to the beginning of the creation of law and the state and was already in the antiquity considered an evil, which negatively affects the public administration and the functioning of the political system. The earliest records of corruption date back to the thirteenth century BC, to the time of the Assyrian civilization. From the found plates, written in cuneiform, the archeologists managed to discern how and who accepted bribes. Under the Roman law, the criminal offense of corruption was defined as giving, receiving or claiming benefits in order to influence an official in connection with his work. Due to the prevalence of corruption in the country, this law

was supplemented by a new law, which predicted compensation for damage in double value of the damage, and the loss of political rights for the perpetrator of the corruptive act. However, this did not help alleviate corruption, especially due to the fact that corruption was most practiced by the members of the Senate and senior state officials, both in Rome itself and in the remote Roman provinces. The early Christian faith condemned corruption, yet corruption later also developed greatly in ecclesiastical structures, and achieved its peak with the selling of indulgences in the Middle Ages, all until the condemnation of the latter (as well as of other immoral acts of the clergy, with the Pope at the head) by Martin Luther. Apart from the condemnation of corruption, the Reformation also led to a break with until then dominant Catholic culture and the emergence of Protestant ethics.

As a child (he was a hostage at the Ravenna court), Attila1 noticed a high level of corruption among the state officials of the Western Roman Empire and how they appropriated the state money (as a consequence, there was less money in the Treasury and therefore the taxes increased). He thus decided that if he would ever to rule, he would do so fairly and by oppressing the corruption in his own country. The early feudalism was familiar with various laws that punished the bribing of courts also with death. Later, when the developed feudalism again turned to the Roman law, a number of laws (Dušan's Code, Mirror of the Swabians) discussed the abuse of position. Then, in late Feudalism, countries became virtually helpless in the fight against corruption, as illustrated by the

case of France, which in 1716 established a special court in which should rule in cases of abuse of royal finances; however, these abuses (embezzlement, extortion, bribery, scams, etc.) were so extensive that the court was abolished and a general amnesty introduced in 1717 made some forms of corruption quite a tradition. The corruption was also widespread during the time of the Spanish Inquisition, where the victim of the accusation could make amends with money, which made the corruption, especially among the inquisitors, extensive.

Throughout the history, many intellectuals dealt with corruption or theorized about it one way or another. Machiavelli had a low opinion on republics, considering them even more corrupt than other regimes, and according to him, corruption leads to moral degradation, bad education and bad faith. On the other hand, however, the great philosopher, diplomat and lawyer Sir Francis Bacon was known both for receiving bribes and taking them. When he reached the highest judicial position in England, he was caught in as many as 28 cases of accepting a bribe and defended himself before the parliament by saying that he usually accepted a bribe from both parties involved and that the dirty money therefore did not affect his decisions. The parliament did not accept these arguments and sent him to the jail where he spent only a few days as he was able to bribe the judge.

Thus, although the corruption has been occurring in society ever since, it has only been given more attention in the recent period—the researches on the phenomenon and its negative

impacts have become more common after 1995, when countries and international institutions began to be aware of this problem. The attitude of the public toward corruption was, until then, neutral. In 1998, Kaufmann and Gray found that:

Bribery is widespread, especially in the developing and transition countries; there are, however, significant differences between and within regions.

Bribery increases transaction costs and creates insecurity in the economy. Bribery usually leads to ineffective economic results, in the long term impedes foreign and domestic investments, reallocates talents due to income and distorts sectorial priorities and technology choices (for example, it creates incentives for contracting major defense projects or unnecessary infrastructure projects, but does not encourage investments in rural specialist health clinics or in preventive health care). This pushes companies into the "underground" (outside the formal sector), weakens the state's ability to increase revenue and leads to ever-increasing tax rates (as too little tax is taken), which is levied on less and less taxpayers, consequently diminishing the state's ability to provide enough public goods, including the rule of law.

Bribery is unfair, as it imposes a regressive tax, which heavily burdens in particular commercial and service activities performed by small businesses.Corruption destroys the legitimacy of the state.

Many other researchers and institutions (the World Bank Institute—WBI, the European Commission, the United Nations, the EBRD) have investigated corruption and its impact on macroeconomic and microeconomic indicators through various forms of corruption, as well as its connection with local customs and habits, and how it affects the everyday lives of people. Most studies are therefore mainly the analyses of the effects of corruption on various economic indicators, such as GDP growth, investments, employment, tax revenues and foreign investments, or the study of various forms of corruption in relation to politics and the economic environment, the research of its social condition and various manifestations. Dobovšek agrees with the negative effects, i.e. high economic, political and social costs, and adds that corruption is not a weakness of people but of institutions (supervisory and other), as they should be the ones to obstruct the greed and temptation of individuals within them.

Although corruption differs from country to country, it is possible to identify some of the key common driving forces that generate it.

What is common to all countries, which are among the most corrupt, has been identified by Svensson; all of them are developing countries or countries in transition, with rare exceptions, low-income countries, most countries have a closed economy, the influence of religion is visible (Protestant countries have far the lowest level of corruption), low media freedom and a relatively low level of education.

Regardless of the above, corruption cannot be assessed unambiguously, since there is never only one phenomenon that is responsible for the occurrence and the development of it; corruption always arises from an array of several, interrelated factors, which can differ considerably from one another. Among the most commonly mentioned factors that influence the development of corruption are: political and economic environment, professional ethics and legislation, as well as purely ethnological factors, such as customs, habits and traditions.

The phenomenon of corruption is strongly influenced by the political and economic environment. The more is the economic activity in the country regulated and limited, the higher the authority and the power of officials in decision making and the greater the possibility of corruption, since individuals are willing to pay or offer payment in order to avoid restrictions. A great potential for corruption is especially there where the officials are under the regulation given the opportunity to decide on the basis of discretion.

The level of corruption is also affected by the monetary policy. Goel and Nelson in their research found a strong link between monetary policy and corruptive activity in the States. The States that have a well-regulated financial sector, not a lot of informal economy or black market are also less corrupt than those where the opposite is true. They also find that there is less corruption in the countries with higher economic and political freedom.

Dimant puts it well in his claim that the level of efficiency of public administration determines the extent to which corruption can find fertile soil and sprout. Such efficiency is determined by the quality of the regulations and permits, since ineffective and unclear regulations help to increase the level of corruption in at least two different ways:

The artificially created monopoly of power that enables civil servants to obtain bribes is based on their superior position and embedded in the system.

On the other hand, however, ineffective and unclear regulations cause inhibition and therefore encourage natural persons to pay bribes in order to speed up the bureaucratic procedure.

Corruption is also strongly influenced by the low salaries of public administration employees (state officials), who are therefore trying to improve their financial position by receiving bribes, and consequently, the socio-economic situation of the government officials also affects the phenomenon of corruption. This is demonstrated also by Allen et al. in their study where they find that corruption arises because agencies, institutions and the government can no longer control corruption effectively due to underpaid officials, which is a problem especially in the developing countries, where they do not have the sufficient tax revenue to properly reward the local officials. However, low wages are not the only cause of corruption; the poor state of the public administration, which

is a consequence of political "overcrowding"4 of officials, due to which loyalty usually prevails over professional standards, also strongly affects the corruption. As an important factor influencing corruption, some authors also indicate satisfaction with the work done by officials—the more they are dissatisfied with their work or place of work, the higher the degree of corruption, which is confirmed by Sardžoska and Tang in their studies. The mentioned authors find that the private sector has higher ethical values, in particular those that affect satisfaction with work, than the public sector and is therefore less unethical (especially regarding thefts and corruption). Indirectly, Svenson also affirms this and states that in principle, the salary level of civil servants affects the receipt of a bribe (the higher it is, the smaller the chance that the person will act corruptly). However, he continues on that a higher salary also strengthens the negotiating power of the official, which leads to higher bribes and he also states that, on the basis of existing research, it is very difficult to determine whether a higher salary causes less corruption, which means that the level of salary is not a decisive factor, but merely one of many.

The economy is unfortunately largely dependent on politics and often reflects the rule of law; various options for eliminating competition are exploited, and bribery is just one of the possible weapons in the struggle to gain a job. At the same time is the mentality of the economy sometimes: "The cost of a bribe is only a substantial business cost, an integral part of the contract," or "Even if we stop the bribery, our rivals will

not, so we must bribe in order to remain competitive, "or" bribery and misleading behaviour are not really crimes, they are just part of the old business practice. They are part of the game and everyone does it." On the other hand is the point sometimes simply the "lubricating" of the bureaucratic wheel by the private sector to do certain things faster or easier.

The political influence of corruption is also manifested through the proverb: examples are attractive! If the top of the politics (government, parties and leading politicians) is corrupt, then corruption shows at all levels, and this evil at the same time spreads among the ordinary population, as nobody trusts the institutions or the rule of law. Johnston thus points out useful thinking in terms of two types of equilibrium—the balance between the openness and the autonomy of the institutions and elites it leads and the balance between political and economic power and opportunities for cooperation. Ideally, the institutions should be open to influences and feedback from different sources, yet at the same time sufficiently independent to effectively carry out their work. Where the openness and independence of the institutions are in balance, the officials are accessible, but not excessively exposed to private influences; if they can make authoritative decisions, while not using their power to arbitrate, the corruption is relatively low. But where the official power is poorly institutionalized, too exposed to private influence, and the officials' independence is reflected in excessive exploitation of their power—they can do as they please—the possibility for extreme corruption is again high.

Professional ethics and legislation

Lack of professional ethics and deficient laws regulating corruption as a criminal offense, and the prosecution and sanctioning of it are also an important cause for the emergence and spread of corruption. A great influence comes also from the ineffective sanctioning of corruption, which only increases the possibility of continuing the corruptive actions of those involved, creating at the same time a strong likelihood that others will join in the corruption due to this inefficient sanctioning.

The sole lack of professional ethics is a particular issue, as the administration requires different amounts of time to develop or change its ethics and professional standards, which is well known in transition countries (in some, ethics and professional standards changed overnight and approached the equivalents in the developed democracies, and in some, they remained the same as in socialism). It is precisely in the transition countries that the "softer" acts of corruption are often considered to be acceptable and justifiable. Therefore, due to lack of professional ethics in some countries that otherwise manage illegal corruption well, there is nevertheless a widespread form of legal corruption.

Corruption also generates a lack of transparency and a lack of control by supervisory institutions. Therefore, where there is insufficient legal basis or sufficient political will to control, which enables a non-transparent functioning of both politics and the economy, corruption flourishes. Corruption is also affected by the extensive, non-transparent or incomplete legislation, where laws can be interpreted in different ways (for the benefit of the one who pays).

Habits, customs, tradition and demography

Different countries have different attitudes to corruption. In Europe alone, we can find two extremes; from completely corruption intolerant North to the warm South, where corruption is an almost normal, socially acceptable phenomenon. Or the difference between countries with a democratic past, which traditionally prosecute corruption, and former socialist countries, where the corruption in the state apparatus was a part of folklore tradition. Then, there are also different customs; in some cases, a "thank you" in the form of a gift for a service (for which this person has already been paid with a salary) is an expression of courtesy, and elsewhere it is considered corruption. Everything is only a matter of ethics and morality; however, they can be very different in different areas and different countries.

Some forms of corruption also relate to an informal form of social security, where the family or the immediate community takes care of its members. Such forms of informal social security prevail in less developed countries, where there is no legal regulation of formal social security and in the countries of Southern Europe where the influence of the broader family (patriarchate5) is still very strong, like for example in Italy, Greece, Albania, Bosnia, etc. These countries are known for nepotism, cronyism and patronage, since the family as well as the wider community provide social security. The family or community takes care of their members, who, in return, must be loyal and in a way also repay the benefits they receive from

it. The same is true of faith. While the southern, predominantly Catholic, very hierarchically organized part of Europe, encourages the cult of the family (also joint and several community) and several liability, the northern, mainly Protestant part, emphasizes individualism and individual responsibility (which means less forms of corruption). The corruption also prospers better in countries where Islam and Orthodoxy are the main religion. The influence of the dominant religion in the country is thus important.

The influence of majority Protestantism has been tested several times and has proven to be an important factor for the low level of corruption in a country. However, the relationship between Protestantism and good governance is probably rooted more in history than in today's practice. Today, there are many nominally Protestant countries that are de facto secular, while also many non-Protestant countries fight effectively against corruption. Thus, the influence of Protestantism appears to emerge from its egalitarian ethos, which could indirectly function as a support to the general orientation toward ethical universalism, literacy and the promotion of individualism. Its role is therefore important, as it at certain stages of the development explains why the first countries that were well managed were predominantly Protestant. This does not mean that other religious traditions are incompatible with good governance, but only that they have not succeeded in compiling this particular array of factors at the right moment.

Similarly, the research by North et al. showed that, according to the authors, the least corrupt countries or those countries where the rule of law is the strongest were predominantly Protestant in 1900 and those who are most corrupt were predominantly Orthodox in the same year. The results of their research have shown that there is a link between religion and corruption on one hand, and respect for the rule of law on the other, but not that the link is causative. The questions therefore arise: Why do some religions respect the rule of law more than others and control corruption? Do the characteristics of a particular religion themselves lead to the results? Are there any differences in religious doctrines, practices or cultures that lead to such results? Are there other links that are not rooted in the religious culture, but are related to religious affiliation?

A study titled *Perception of corruption* by authors Melgar et al. tried to find out which groups of people are more likely to pay for corruption. They found that those who think that there is a lot of corruption also perceive it so and are consequently more willing to pay for it (as they think or expect the society to function that way). By using a wide and very heterogeneous set of data and econometrics, it has been shown that the social status and personal characteristics also play an important role in the shaping of corruption perception at the micro level. While divorced women, unemployed persons, persons working in the private sector or the self-employed are considered to be in positive correlation with the perception of corruption (corruption is perceived more and they are more willing to pay

bribes), the opposite applies to married persons, full-time employees, people who frequently attend religious ceremonies and people with at least secondary education (they perceive less corruption and are also unwilling to pay). According to the classification of countries, they find that it can be proved that all African and Asian countries are in the upper half of the table, and the same applies to the former socialist countries and most of the East Asian countries. People living in these countries perceive more corruption than others. On the contrary, most European countries and some of the former English colonies show lower perceptions than the average (there are also exceptions) and rank in the lower half, the same as half of the richest countries. They also added that the geographical classification of countries has been strongly correlated with the corruption perception index (CPI), which shows that individual characteristics and social conditions are specific factors that influence the perception of corruption. However, they have also found that better economic results reduce the perception of corruption, while the macroeconomic instability and income inequalities have precisely the opposite effect. With Mahič, we also found a similar influence on the perception of corruption; in the economic crisis (high unemployment and low purchasing power), the perception of corruption is rising.

A very important factor that affects corruption is also demographics. A number of studies have shown that patriarchal society is more prone to corruption. This is confirmed by several researches that actually explore to what

extent are men women corrupt. Several earlier, especially econometric contributions to the debate on who is more corrupt, men or women, argued that there is a link between a higher representation of women in government and lower levels of corruption. An influential study of 150 countries in Europe, Africa and Asia by the World Bank confirmed this and concluded that women are more reliable and less prone to corruption. The subsequent findings were later reinforced by further research. Rivas also affirms this in his research and notes that, according to the results of the survey, the conclusion could be that women are less corrupt than men and that the increase in the number of women on the labor market and in politics would help fight corruption. Lee and Guven in the survey: *Engaging in corruption—the influence of cultural values and the contagion effects at the micro-level* also raised the question of whether men are more corrupt than women. The findings of the research support the thesis that women are less susceptible to corruption than men, especially in cultures that require men to be ambitious, competitive and materially successful, as these factors significantly contribute to unethical behavior. This was surprisingly well shown also in practice when, due to gender equality, the Peruvian government a decade ago decided to involve more women in the police units. When the 2,500 female police officers were joined as traffic police officers, something unexpected happened; bribery was drastically reduced, and people welcomed the female police officers on the streets.

The impact of corruption on the economy

In 1997, Tanzi and Davoodi conducted a systematic study of the impact of corruption on public finances. Several important findings came to light:

Corruption increases the volume of public investments (at the expense of private investments), as there are many options that allow for public expenditure manipulation and are carried out by high-level officials so as to get bribes (which means that more general government expenditures or a large budget offer more opportunities for corruption).

Corruption redirects the composition of public expenditure from the expenditure necessary for basic functioning and maintenance to expenditure on new equipment.

Corruption tends to pull away the composition of public expenditure from the necessary fixed assets for health and education, as there is less chance of getting commissions than from other, perhaps unnecessary projects.

Corruption reduces the effectiveness of public investments and the infrastructure of a country.

Corruption can reduce tax revenues by compromising the ability of the state administration to collect taxes and fees, although the net effect depends on how the nominal tax and other regulatory burdens were selected by the officials, exposed to corruption.

The influence of corruption on the economy was studied by the same authors through several factors:

Through the impact of corruption on businesses: The impact of corruption on a business is largely depend on the size of the company. Large companies are better protected in an environment that is prone to corruption, they avoid taxes more easily and their size protects them from petty corruption, while they are often also politically protected, which is why the survival of small (especially start-up companies) and middle-sized companies, regardless of their importance for the growth of the economy and the development, is much more difficult than the survival of large companies.

Through the impact of corruption on investments: Corruption affects (a) total investments, (b) the size and form of investments by foreign direct investors, (c) the size of public investments and (d) the quality of investment decisions and investment projects.

Through the influence of corruption on the allocation of talents: Indirectly, corruption has a negative impact on economic growth through the allocation of talents, since gifted and prospective students are driven, due to the influence of the environment and the situation in the country, for example, to study law rather than engineering, which would add value to the country.

Through the impact of corruption on public spending: Corruption has a negative impact on public spending and has an especially strong impact on education and health. There are also indications of the correlation between corruption and military expenditure, which means that high level of corruption reduces economic growth due to high military expenditure.

Through the impact of corruption on taxes: Because of corruption, less taxes are levied than would otherwise be, as some of the taxes end up in the pockets of corrupt tax officials. There are also frequent tax relieves in the corrupt countries, selective taxes and various progressive taxes; in short, there is much less money than the country could have, and so corruption, through the country's financial deficit, also affects the economic growth; and conclude the findings on the negative impact (both indirect and direct) of corruption on economic growth.

Smarzynska and Wei came to similar conclusions regarding the effects of corruption on the size and composition of investments. Corrupt countries are less attractive for investors, and if they do opt for an investment, due to non-transparent bureaucracy, they often enter the market with a joint venture, as they usually understand or control matters of the home country better. The local partner can also help foreign companies with the acquisition of local licenses and permits or can otherwise negotiate with the bureaucratic labyrinths at lower costs. Generally inclined (as investors) to the joint venture in the corrupt countries are especially the US

investors; however, even investors from those European countries, which are among the highest ranked on the CPI, quickly adapt to local conditions.

Corruption for various reasons also affects the following:

- Employment, because the job does not go to the most suitable or qualified person, but the one who is ready to pay for it or in any other way return the favor.
- Also affects total investments.
- The size and composition of foreign investments and the size of public investments.
- The effectiveness of investment decisions and projects. In the presence of corruption, the investments are smaller, as entrepreneurs are aware that they will have to bribe the officials or even give them a profit share for a successful implementation of a business. Due to these increased costs, the entrepreneurs are not interested in investing.

We even made a projection which predicted that in the case of reduction in corruption in Bangladesh to the level of corruption in Singapore, the growth rate of GDP per capita would increase by 1.8% per year between 1960 and 1985 (assuming that the actual average annual growth rate was 4% per year), and the average per capita income could have been more than 50% higher, whereas the Philippines could, if its level of corruption was reduced to that of Singapore (if everything remained unchanged), have raised their investments in relation to GDP by as much as 6.6%, which means a significant increase in the investments. At the same time, he

notes that in order to reduce the corruption to the level of Singapore in the countries that he compared (India, Kenya, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Colombia, Mexico and Ghana), the State should raise the salaries of officials by 400—900%. He therefore asks himself whether this would even be possible. However, he notes that in the event of a large increase in salaries, a new form of corruption would likely arise when everyone would be prepared to pay a bribe for a well-paid official job.

Corruption often reduces the effectiveness of various financial assistance programs (both state and international), as money is "lost somewhere along the way" and does not reach those that need it or for whom it is intended, as the financial benefits, deriving from corruption, are not taxable because they are hidden. The state is thus also losing part of the income from the taxes due to corruption, while the public spending, resulting from corruption (or narrow private interests) leads to negative effects on the budget.

The European Commission in its report found that corruption is costing the European economy about 120 billion a year, and according to the European Commissioner for Home Affairs, Cecilia Malstotröm, the corruption in Europe is most present in public procurement, financing of political parties and health care.

The United Nations estimate that the cost of corruption in Afghanistan amounted to about $ 3.9 billion in 2012. According to Transparency International, the former leader of

Indonesia, Suharto, embezzled between $ 15 and $ 35 billion, whereas the embezzlements of Mobutu in Zaire, Ferdinand Marcos in the Philippines and Abacha in Nigeria are estimated to amount to $ 5 billion. However, the World Bank survey shows that $ 1 billion in bribes, both in rich and developing countries, is paid annually, which means that even the developed countries are not immune to corruption (but in a different form) and that the political corruption is especially present in large infrastructure projects. Bađun on the example of Croatia gives conclusions, which are valid for all post-communist countries.

Impact on enterprises: A survey conducted by the EBRD and the World Bank shows that bribes paid in smaller companies account for 5% of their annual profits and in medium-sized companies 4% of their annual profits. However, both are, compared to large companies, where bribes comprise less than 3%, in a much worse position, which shows how bribes are causing problems or are putting these smaller companies into a subordinate position compared to the large ones, which in turn leads to the collapse of these.

Also interesting is the study of the *Shadow Economy in Highly Developed OECD Countries* where Schneider and Buehn also find the link between the low quality of institutions that are the holders of the rule of law (or degree of corruption) and the shadow economy, and therefore, the weaker the "law" is, the higher the degree of corruption and of shadow economy. In the study *Corruption and the Shadow Economy*, the same authors

explore the relationship between the degree of corruption and the emergence of the shadow economy, and their findings are that the high level of shadow economy and the high degree of corruption are strongly linked to one another. One of the hypotheses in this survey (which has been confirmed) is also: the higher the degree of corruption, the lower the economic development measured by GDP per capita. The authors detected a positive correlation; corruption thus affects the economic development.

However, the extended practice of finding annuity outside the logic of the market and competition can therefore lead to a (neo) liberal conclusion that the root of the existence of corruption is in the very existence of the state—especially in excessive, selective and deforming state interventions and subsidies that create fertile soil for the development of corruption. The truth is that the devastating combination consists of widespread state intervention and subsidies in the simultaneous absence of a strong institutional framework and detailed rules of the game, including the control of public finances and effective anti-trust legislation and legal practices. On the other hand, however, there is no clear evidence that private monopolies are more effective and less corrupt than the public ones and that privatization, especially long-lasting, gradual and non-transparent one (so-called gradualism), reduces positive developmental and social effects, including the reduction of corruption. Yet market deregulation, legal and judicial reform and transparent management of public procurement would significantly reduce corruption in many

developing countries (as well as in transition countries), at which point the government should play an important role in the shaping of the anti-corruption policy. There should be a strong strengthening of the public procurement institution. The law is admittedly strict about the public procurement, but one of the main reasons for public procurement problems is the lack of a skilled workforce, and public procurement is thus still the breeding ground of corruption. There also exists a proverb "poverty is a curse," which applies largely to all developing countries, as these are the countries that are most affected by poverty. Poverty destroys all ethical and moral values.

One of the important aspects of the damage to the global economy is also the failure to respect copyright and intellectual property. The more corrupt countries are also inclined to lower respect for the aforementioned, and the economic damage amounts to billions of dollars. Cavazos-Cepeda et al. found that reforms, legal, fiscal and intellectual incentives to respect copyright and intellectual property patents encourage the society to make itself more innovative and economically more effective; however, they underline the importance of human capital and investment in people as one of the most important factors for reducing the level of corruption in the country.

There are also theories that corruption can act as the lubricant of the economic wheel and at least in some cases has a positive impact on the economic growth. The empirical analysis done by

Dreher and Gassebner on a sample of 43 countries between 2003 and 2005 shows that corruption is even useful, but with some reservations. In particular, they investigated the short-term effects of corruption and found, for example, that in countries where corruption is widespread, more new entrepreneurs enter the market (corruption in the public sector is expected to promote private entrepreneurial activity). They are, however, not necessarily to succeed, as there is a high likelihood that they will go bankrupt due to the rigid regulations that block the activity and because of which bribes are needed. They do acknowledge, on the other hand, that most authors who have been doing research for a longer period of time admit the harmfulness of corruption both for society and the economy. Something similar show the data for some Asian countries, where, unlike their findings (short-term benefit), the high degree of corruption coincides with the long-term economic growth.

Svendson also notes that, in light of the theoretical literature and various research studies, notwithstanding that these show the negative impact of corruption on the economic growth, but this cannot be said for sure, since there are difficulties in measuring corruption, and at the same time, the question arises whether the econometric models that were made are good enough to capture all the important variables. He also states that corruption appears in many forms and that there is no reason to assume that all types of corruption are equally harmful to the economic growth.

Recent empirical researches also attest to that; while many countries have suffered, as a characteristic consequence of corruption, the decline in economic growth, other countries have had economic growth (in some cases a very positive one) despite corruption. The latter is also to be expected, since corruption has many manifestations and it would be surprising if all types of corrupt practices had the same effect on economic performance.

Analyses show that one of the reasons for this is the extent to which the perpetrators of corrupt practices—in this case the bureaucrats—coordinate their behavior. In the absence of an organized corruption network, each bureaucrat collects bribes for himself, while ignoring the negative impact of others' demands for them. In the presence of such a network, the collective bureaucracy reduces the total value of the bribe, which results in lower bribe payments and higher innovation, and the economic growth is consequently higher in the latter case than in the former case.

The interesting question is not so much why is the degree of corruption in poor countries higher than in the rich ones, but rather why the nature of corruption differs between countries. The extent to which corruption is organized is just one aspect of this, but there are other aspects. For example, it is common practice in some countries to pay ex post (as a share of profit, for example) instead of ex ante (in advance, as a bribe) to officials or politicians, so it is assumed that the effects on the economy will be different. The precise reason why corruption

should take on one form and not the other is an important issue which has been largely ignored and which could have to do with cultural, social and political reasons, as well as economic circumstances.

In the fight against corruption, a remarkable role was also played by the debt crisis. The die Welt newspaper mentions the study of the Hertie School of Governance, which shows that Italy, Spain and Portugal have made great strides in the fight against bribery and corruption of their civil servants due to lack of money, which enabled a significantly more transparent and "pure" practice for the award of public procurement. The crisis is supposed to dry up monetary resources and thus reduce the chances of corruption. Also, the crisis has changed the perception of the society, and bad business practices, which were acceptable before the crisis, are acceptable no longer. However, the fight against corruption is often similar to the fight against windmills. The case of India shows how corruption is changing, getting new dimensions, not only in scope, but also in methods. Just as the population in India is growing, so is corruption, and there are always new ways how to cheat both the state and the society. The perception of corruption is increasing year after year. Despite all the anti-corruption moves and anti-corruption initiatives, people do not hesitate to offer or accept a bribe. The bribers are becoming innovative, they adapt to the situation and the innovation of companies in paying bribes and hiding them is also visible. However, just as elsewhere in the world, the negative effects of corruption are the same; it reduces foreign direct and domestic

investments, increases inequality and poverty, raises the number of freeloaders (renters, free-riders) in the economy, distorts and exploits public investments and reduces public revenues.

Corruption is, in fact, a multidirectional process. On one hand, the provider benefits, on the other the recipient, and both are aware of the deed that remains hidden. The third link in the chain is everyone else, the victims. Although not every act of corruption is yet a criminal offense, it is, however, unethical and detrimental to the economic and political development of a society. Usually, there are persons involved with political, economic and decision-making power, and as the philosopher Karl Popper wrote in his book, *The Open Society and its Enemies*, that the greatest problem is not the question of who should give orders, but how to control the one who gives them. How to organize the political and social institutions in order to prevent the weak and incompetent rulers from doing too much harm? However, as there is no general and unmistakable way of preventing the tyranny or corruptions of the heavyweights, the price of freedom is eternal alertness. Greediness, ambition, rapacity and immorality have been known to the human society ever since the emergence of civilization and use every tool available to them: kinship, common past, school contacts, common interests, friendship and, of course, political as well as religious ties.

In a study by Šumah et al., we did an analysis of countries, taking into account their ranking on the Corruption Perception

Index published every year by Transparency International, and identified the main factors affecting the level of corruption in a particular group of countries, or rather, we tried to find similarities and differences between individual groups of countries in terms of what affects the level of corruption in these groups. We have established a basic model of three factors (risk, benefit and consciousness) that was created on the basis of the merger of several known, scientifically proven factors that cause or reduce corruption or affect its level in the individual country. According to this degree of corruption, we have identified five groups, classified the countries and analyzed their common characteristics. The findings were as follows:

- Corruption is linked to the level of GDP (the higher the GDP, the lower the rate of corruption).
- Corruption is related to the level of education (the higher the average level of education, the lower the level of corruption).
- Corruption is strongly linked to the geographical location. The highest level is in Asia (mainly in Central Asia), Africa (North and Central Africa) and South America (according to the Transparency International map).
- Corruption is strongly linked to the country's prevailing religion.
- Corruption is linked to freedom in the country (personal freedom, freedom of speech, economic freedom, etc.), with respect to the rule of law in a country and inefficiency of public administration, which is often also locally limited or is inherently corrupt.

- The lower the country is ranked, the more dominant is the patriarchal society.

Many researchers are still involved in corruption. The findings show that there is a link between corruption and its negative effects, but from most of the studies it is not possible to determine what the cause is and what the consequence. Whether is the level of corruption lower due to high GDP, or is it vice versa, cannot be directly identified, since the corruption depends on economic indicators, while at the same time affecting them.

It is also very difficult to claim that the average low level of education is due to corruption or, conversely, that corruption is a result of low education. Similarly goes for the rule of law and (in)efficiency of public administration. This interdependence will surely continue to be the subject of numerous researches in the future, for the only way to be successful in the fight against corruption is if we know the causes and begin to eliminate them.

Nevertheless, there remains something that needs to be emphasized. Almost all of the studies ignore the fact that the top of the most corrupt countries consists of countries with one of the various forms of armed conflict (civil war, intertribal conflicts, inter-religious wars or some other form of aggression), which means that peace in the country is a prerequisite for a successful fight against corruption. The least corrupt countries are countries that have a lasting peace on

their territory (most since the Second World War or even longer), which is confirmed by the above fact. Peace is therefore one of the prerequisites for a successful fight against corruption.

The answer to the question of how to deal with corruption is not unambiguous; some countries have achieved great success in dealing with it in a relatively short time (Singapore, Estonia and Georgia) and some have been struggling for a long time (the most famous example is Italy). The first condition is in any case to ensure freedom (personal freedom, economic freedom, freedom of speech, freedom of the press, etc.) and democracy, and then education and awareness of people. However, at this point, it is not about introducing the Western type democracy, as our culture knows it, for it has often proven that, especially with the help of the army, more harm than benefit was caused. It is necessary to start using good practices of countries that are similar to each other (religion, habits, tradition, ethics and morality) and that have common history.

Electoral Legitimacy, Preventive Representation, and Regularization

Democracy is the most desired and legitimate political system in the modern world. Samuel P. Huntington's influential research has shown that over the past 200 years, countries around the world have generally displayed a political tendency to move toward democratic forms of government. Even though

there have been substantial reversals in some instances, generally, the trend, has gained momentum following the end of colonialism and, later, the end of the Cold War. This is substantiated by the fact that the number of countries with a democratic form of government today is much higher than at any other time in the past. Huntington argued that the process of democratization occurred in a number of waves; according to his analysis, the third and last wave created the biggest impact. Arguably, the trend toward democracy after 1990, following the end of the Soviet Socialist system, the Gulf war in 1991, and the "Arab Spring" in 2010, set the biggest wave, which some experts have termed the fourth wave.

As the cornerstone of democracy is the peoples' representation and rule, democratization obviously involves elections. Thus, elections have been the only means to connect between peoples' representation and democracy. However, elections as a system and mechanism are not a monolith; rather, it has taken on a variety of forms to ensure proper representation; the two most popular forms being first-past-the post, and proportional representation (and its varieties).

Over time, as the democratization trend continuously gained momentum, the election mechanism has developed with further complexities. Notwithstanding multiple variations and complexities, it appears that countries' transition toward—and continue in its maintenance of—democracy, invariably has led to elections being implemented as a means of legitimacy.

In mature and consolidated democracies, especially in highly industrialist countries, elections serve twin functions: representation of the people and continuity of democracy. But that, apparently, is not the case with new or young democracies in nonindustrialist or underdeveloped countries, where elections are used merely as legitimizing tools for the ruling regime to preserve and continue its power. Therefore, the true meaning of "representation" often remains suppressed.

An analysis of the relationship between elections and democracy in Asian, African, and Latin American countries reveal that the ruling regimes tend to hold periodic elections to maintain a "legitimacy cloak" of democracy. Hence, the meaning of and relationship between elections and democracy in "western" and nonwestern countries are not the same.

This chapter takes a detailed look at elections in Bangladesh, and their true function, not as a means of representation and democracy, but as a means of *preventive* representation, and a legitimizing label for the ruling regimes. In other words, elections are manipulated to prevent the opposition parties from representing the people, to provide legitimacy to the ruling parties, and to maintain the democratic label of governance.

The first section of the chapter provides an overview of the general electoral and democratic trends in western and nonwestern countries; and the second section offers a detailed analysis of elections and democracy in Bangladesh.

Election, representation, and democracy

There is an inseparable relationship among election, political representation, and democracy. One without the others is inconceivable. It is the idea of democracy as a political system that essentially necessitates the other two. The idea of democracy is not new; it is as old as the ancient Greek political thought. The Greek philosophers of the time, notably Plato and Aristotle, discussed and analyzed democracy as a system of government in comparison with other systems such as monarchy, aristocracy, and oligarchy. Even though it was well conceived, the philosophers did not prescribe the system as necessarily good for its society. These philosophers maintained a lofty vision of an ideal society, which was based on a different set of moral good and virtue from that of the common man. They perceived that the common citizen possessed neither the level of knowledge nor the balanced moral standard required to rule that ideal society. Hence, the concept of democracy as common peoples' rule was ranked at the lowest level of gradation. In any case, subsequently, the Greek political thought was overtaken by the prevalence of imperial and monarchic system. Interestingly, even that idea of democracy was not prevalent anywhere in the ancient world.

However, over the next two millennia, the gradual decline of the imperial and monarchial system gave rise to democratic thought and system. The European renaissance, reformation, and rationalism redefined the role and place of human beings in society. These movements placed humans at the center of

everything as the author and maker of society, its rules and regulations replacing the role of divinity. The preeminence of humans took the center stage. Eventually, rationality-based "legal-formal" political authority replaced "traditional." This legal-formal political authority was the direct or indirect representation of the people and was termed democratic. The process of representation eventually came to be known as elections. The mechanism of elections developed into the modern form of direct and indirect or first-past-the-post or proportional representation with different varieties. All over the world today, democracy is considered the most desired and legitimate form of political system, and the "democratic" regimes with all of their varieties are legitimized with one form of election or other.

Electoral practices in western and nonwestern countries

The western industrial countries experienced the emergence of democracy first, starting more than 200 years ago, which gave those democracies plenty of time to develop, mature, and consolidate by the time the nonwestern countries were introduced to the system following the end of colonialism. Over the course of two centuries, the mature western democracies of today have been able to institutionalize the electoral politics that ensure fair representation of the people in the government. With the exception of certain time periods when some of those democracies slipped into military authoritarianisms, generally, those democracies have maintained the tradition of party politics, electoral

competition, and elected governments. Free and fair elections have been the defining characteristics of those democracies. Therefore, the western European, North American, Australia, New Zealand, and Japanese democracies are referred to as models of ideal electoral democracies.

Following the continental European or American models of representative and electoral democracies, the nonwestern countries have adopted either the American presidential or British parliamentarian system. However, these nonwestern countries have adapted the models to their local conditions, instead of adopting them in entirety. Because of many local political, economic, cultural, and other social reasons, electoral politics in nonwestern countries have not been institutionalized; rather in the name of democracy, party politics and election, a culture of electoral corruption and denial of competitive and fair representation have persisted. The South Asian (Bangladesh, India, Pakistan), African (Nigeria, Kenya, Ethiopia, Mali, South Africa, Sierra Leon), and Latin American (Venezuela, Ecuador, El Salvador, Chile, Peru) democracies and electoral practices are heavily marred by violence, manipulation, malpractices, and subjected to government control.

Many authoritarian democracies and electoral politics in Asia (Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, and Russia), Africa (Algeria, Egypt), Arab (Iraq under Saddam Hussein, Syria), and Latin America (Venezuela) are heavily controlled by their sitting governments. There, the oppositions are systematically denied the

opportunity or offered a little space to contest in elections, and the controlled elections are meant just to legitimize the "democratic" label of the governments. Those democracies with defective and manipulative electoral politics are sometimes grouped together as "illiberal democracies," indicating that those "democracies" have serious shortcomings in terms of free and fair electoral politics.

Electoral trend and history in Bangladesh

Bangladesh is a tiny but populous South Asian country. Then called East Pakistan, its independence from West Pakistan in 1971 came as a result of West Pakistani's denial of a transfer of political power to the victorious East Pakistani political party. The entire Pakistan was to transit from military to democratic rule through national legislative elections held in December 1970. Historically, this occurred toward the end of what Huntington termed the Second Wave of democracy. Even though its citizens gave a resounding electoral mandate to the east Pakistani political party named Awami League, the west Pakistani popular leader and the west-Pakistan dominated military regimes were reluctant to uphold the representation choice of the people, and instead were inclined to a military authoritarian regime. Eventually, a 9-month long civil war broke out, essentially on the issue of representation; East Pakistan achieved independence with a new name: Bangladesh.

Since 1971, independent Bangladesh has conducted 10 national elections, the first in 1973, and the most recent in

2014. However, the electoral and government systems kept oscillating between parliamentary and presidential, until it finally settled in favor of a parliamentary system, which effected through a constitutional amendment in 1991. Its legislature, known as *Jatiyo Sangsad* (national assembly), is comprised of 350 directly elected members for a 5-year term. Of these, 300 are elected based on first-past-the-post system, representing single-member electoral districts. The elected members then fill the remaining 50 seats, reserved for women, based on proportional representation of the elected parties.

Even though there are at least four dozen political parties in Bangladesh, only two parties stand tall: Bangladesh Awami League (AL) and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). Since the mid-1980s, the two parties have maintained coalition alliances separately with other minor parties. AL has a coalition of 14 parties, and BNP has a coalition of 18 parties. In the early 1970s, AL enjoyed almost absolute popularity as a freedom-winning party for the country; in 1973, it achieved landslide victory in 1973 elections. However, by the late 1970s, BNP was established and wrested AL's popularity in the 1979 election. The tide turned in the 1986 elections when a new party, Jatiya Party (JP), which was formed in 1984, contested the election. From 1991 onward, electoral contestation has remained basically in the hands of AL and BNP.

In Bangladesh, elections are conducted at seven layers of administration at both national and local levels. From top to bottom, these are the presidential election, national assembly

election, city corporation election, district council election, subdistrict council election, municipal election, and union council election. At all levels, the elections are conducted along party lines.

During the first decade of independence, elections were largely a fairly competitive game for representative politics. Either because the people were not highly politically socialized, or the scope of political participation was limited to city dwellers, the elections were systematic, competitions were among professional politicians, and representations were by qualified politicians. However, over time, the representational politics became tainted with money, muscle, violence, manipulation, and became largely commercial in nature. The goals for such tainted representational politics were twofold: continuation of the ruling party in power by any means possible and prevention of the opposition from getting into power by any means possible. Between these two goals, the real objective of political representation through elections had disappeared. This remains the trend of politics of preventive representation and regularization of authoritarian democracy in Bangladesh.

Election engineering and preventive representation

Until 1970, Bangladesh (then East Pakistan) elections were contestations between east and west Pakistan, which probably bound the Bengalis more tightly, allowing them to overlook their differences. However, in independent Bangladesh, the scope, objectives and process of electoral competition have

changed such that the stakes have become very high, due to increasing population and limited resources. This was further aggravated by the nature and intensity of traditional and modern forms of economic and political clientelism that decisively control resource allocation and distribution in Bangladesh. Therefore, as a global wave, Bangladesh has had to lean toward maintaining a democratic form of government, and to do that, it had to allow for periodic elections. But since competition for political and economic resources are very high, elections did not remain immune from deliberate distortion. A culture of massive election engineering has developed since the mid-1980s, and has become a political endemic in the country, ridiculing representation and democracy.

There are many forms of election engineering that various political parties have practiced during the past three decades. These various forms include intentional timing, gerrymandering, changing of electoral rules, and the voting system. Due to the spike in population and sociopolitical development over time, such changes are sometimes warranted. Therefore, with the ever-changing contexts and demographics, even consolidated democracies sometimes adjust aspects of their electoral mechanisms and processes, though mostly for the purpose of ensuring fair representation. However, in young and new democracies, especially in Asian, African, and Latin American countries, election engineering includes deliberate means to control the entire election and representative process. Often, elections are offered periodically to renew the legitimacy—and ascertain the longevity—of the

ruling parties or regimes, and not necessarily to mean that those in power are the true representatives of the people. Simultaneously, the entire election mechanism is controlled in such a way that it prevents the representatives desired by the people from rising to power. During the past decade, the electoral practices in Bangladesh have displayed a strong tendency toward preventive representation.

Mechanism of preventive representation in Bangladesh

As described earlier, elections in nonwestern countries are heavily marred by defective practices, and Bangladesh is not an exception. In this section, specific forms of electoral malpractices and corruptions are discussed.

Controlling of the election commission

Elections in Bangladesh are managed and conducted by an autonomous body known as Bangladesh Election Commission (EC), which is constitutionally sanctioned and empowered. Constitutionally, the EC is to discharge the duties relating to election, maintaining absolute neutrality without favoring or disfavoring the ruling or the opposition parties. However, in Bangladesh, the EC has become a highly politicized and controversial institution since 1991. Since it has the absolute power in determining district boundaries, nomination and selection, ballot-box distribution and vote counting, the ruling parties have been heavily inclined to use the institutions in their favor by appointing like-minded or partisan Commissioners. The opposition parties, being aware of such facts, take it gravely, to the point of sparking serious antigovernment

movements and national political crises, as occurred in the mid- and late-1990s. So the appointment of an election commissioner is an important consideration of a sitting government.

An election commissioner should, ideally, be a politically neutral person commanding respect and acceptance by all. The most desired candidate for the post would, for instance, be a recently retired chief justice. A sitting government pays particular attention to this factor and awaits a suitable time when the retirement of a chief justice and appointment of an election commissioner coincides. For that matter, the government may intentionally appoint a chief justice knowing that his retirement could coincide with the timing for appointing a new election commissioner, so that he can then be chosen for the EC position. This was a common strategy during much of the 1990s, when major political parties could still force each other to change the course of action. However, over the recent decade, the issue has become normalized in favor of government choice, as the voice and influence of the opposition parties have been completely decimated through an authoritarian type of elected government. Since 1995, all seven chief election commissioners have been seriously controversial and considered to be highly partisan, as their decisions and behaviors clearly supported the government's preferences. The most notorious chief EC was the 11th commissioner (2012–2017), when the 2014 national and 2016 Union Council elections were the most controversial and defiantly in favor of the ruling party.

Imprisonment

Preventive representation is often associated with predatory legal means to disqualify prospective opposition candidates

from contesting elections. In Bangladesh, arbitrary and false cases against social and political opponents are commonplace, and are effective tools to score political gains. The culture of filing cases against anonymous suspects is very strong, and primarily used against political opponents.

The recently adopted antiterrorism and cybercrime laws have added a new dimension to the existing culture of false cases and arbitrary arrests. Usually, for any political violence, the ruling party activists file police cases *en masse* and anonymously against the opposition activists. During the election period, the police, then, in collaboration with the ruling party, arrested the key opposition figures, ostensibly for some wrong that had been filed earlier by an anonymous individual.

This is then used, with reference to electoral rules, to disqualify key opposition candidates from contesting in elections. In addition, many are denied bail by the courts, which are also controlled by the partisan judges. As such, a carefully coordinated legal, administrative and political nexus is used to frame political opponents within the legal grid to systematically prevent them from contesting. The implication is that such practice denies people the opportunity to choose from a wide range of candidates. In other words, it often offers the voters no alternative choice, which results in many voters abstaining from voting; this ensures that the ruling party's fielded candidates will win the elections.

Preventing nomination

Elections offer open and equal opportunity for every eligible citizen to contest to represent the people and their interests in politics and government. For that, every citizen has equal right to file a nomination for election, either independently, or on behalf of a party. However, in Bangladesh, such a level playing field is increasingly disappearing with the rise of new and innovative techniques to prevent the nomination of opposition candidates in the first place. This was very systematically played for the first time in massive form in 2014 national parliamentary elections.

In that instance, AL, which was (and still is) the sitting government, was bent to get re-elected with even a stronger majority, for which it adopted a policy of preventing nominations on a massive scale. The AL wanted to ensure its simple majority in that year's parliamentary elections amidst an empty field, i.e., no opposition candidates. To ensure this, AL's armed thugs and activists intimidated willing opposition candidates at their homes with threats, and warned them against filing a nomination; the opposition candidates who showed up on Nomination Day were prevented from approaching the election commission offices to file for nominations; and those who were able to file their nomination were forced under severe threats to withdraw. This was systematically done to ensure that at least 154 seats would not be contested, a figure sufficient to ascertain a simple majority. In total, 154 seats were uncontested. Of the remaining seats, the ruling party ensured that most of the seats were won by their candidates. Such massive manipulation of the election mechanism resulted in all of the opposition parties boycotting the election, thus preventing a fair representation.

Preventing political campaign

For elections, campaigning is a must. However, in Bangladesh, political campaigning is now mostly one sided, as the opposition parties enjoy no—or relatively little—opportunity to campaign: the nature of political campaigning is violence-prone, and its forms include large-scale, open-air political gatherings, mammoth street processions, competitive showdowns, and physical violence. Naturally, the ruling party always enjoys the support of the law-enforcement authorities in such competitive election campaigns, while the opposition parties are disfavored by those authorities. The police often approve the ruling party's use of a suitable public space, including major roads for campaign gathering, at the same time denying the opposition parties the same. Often, if a public venue is approved for an opposition party for a specific day and time, the ruling party will then organize a similar event at the same place and time; this then becomes an excuse for the police to cancel both events. In the face of such predatory government and police behaviors, the opposition is always disadvantaged. Obviously, such political and administrative obstructions prevent the opposition and the people from reaching out to the other during the campaign period.

Arresting polling agents

In elections, ballot casting venues are represented by polling agents of political parties. In their presence, manipulation of ballot papers or the

vote casting process is prevented. This ensures free and fair elections. However, for preventive representation, this is an obstacle.

Malpractice in elections is very common in Bangladesh, and it has become highly institutionalized since the 1986 parliamentary elections under the military regime. Among other malpractices, expelling the polling agents of opposition parties from the polling booths was a common complaint that the EC would receive in large numbers. However, recently under the AL government, the practice has spiked to a disproportionate level. This was particularly noticed in the 2018 Gazipur City Corporation election, where about 50 polling agents from opposition BNP were arrested by plainclothes secret police, even though there were no criminal bases against them. Reportedly, they were simply approached by a number of unknown individuals to step out of the polling booths for a chat; once out, the polling agents were asked to remain silent and were escorted out of the polling station and taken far away for the rest of the day. They were released 60–100 km away at the end of the day. By then, the voting was conveniently over, and the AL candidate had won with a huge margin.

Preventing polling agents

Expelling the polling agents or arresting them from the polling booths is an onsite example of electoral malpractices intended to prevent opposition candidates from winning. However, there are frequent offsite practices of the same when the polling agents are not even allowed to approach the polling stations in the first place. The armed supporters of the ruling party take position in groups en route to the polling stations, but not

within the vicinity, to block the polling agents from reaching the polling stations. Often at gun point, they are forced to turn back, and are asked to stay away for the entire day. This is a common practice in any type of election at any level. Absence of polling agents from the polling booths creates an unsafe atmosphere for the party supporters, which eventually keeps them away from voting.

Arresting supporters

Another recent trend has been the arrest of opposition party supporters by the police immediately before the election day. The police might initiate an anticrime drive a few days before the election and indiscriminately arrest supporters of opposition parties based on information given by the ruling party channels. The supporters may be forcibly taken from a political rally or campaign meeting in the name of public safety; once arrested, there may be arbitrary accusations filed against them even if they are innocent. This policy was extensively used in the Khulna City Corporation elections in 2018. In this way, a large number of supporters and voters are prevented from voting, which leads to unfair representation.

Casting of bogus votes

A very widespread electoral corruption in Bangladesh is bogus and phantom votes. The obsession to win and to deny the opposition a vote is a political attitude that makes no compromise. The major parties and their activists never consider elections as a win or lose game; rather, they

are obsessed with the attitude that elections are to win, and not to lose. As such, elections are for absolute gain. To secure that, the parties and their activists always want to make sure that they get more and, if possible, all the votes. An easy way to ensure winning is to stuff the ballot box with false votes.

False votes are casted in two major ways. Firstly, by voting on another's behalf: those who control the polling booths complete the vote casting on behalf of the voters according to the list of voter names in their possession. In this case, the party supporters are also allowed to enter the polling booths multiple times to caste on behalf of other voters. Individual voters who go to the polling stations may find that their votes have already been casted. In this case, the casted votes are always in support of the candidates whose supporters control the polling booths. Secondly, stuffing the ballot boxes with false votes: in this case, either the polling agents who control the polling booths stuff the boxes with ballot papers in favor of their party, or they allow party activists to enter the polling booths as a group and do the same. The obvious results of such electoral corruption are two; one, the ruling party candidates win, with a large margin of vote difference; and two, the total vote cast sometimes ends up with a bigger number than the total number of voters in the constituency or at a particular polling station.

The ultimate electoral corruption in Bangladesh takes place through hijacking the ballot boxes when it becomes clear that the ruling party candidates are likely to lose. Hijacking of ballot boxes involves armed violence and often, the law enforcing authorities are found to be inactive in preventing the crime. The purpose of hijacking is to destroy the casted ballot

papers so that in vote counting, the opposition does not win, or the voting process is canceled. Often, the EC and the police do not recognize such irregularities, and no legal challenge is entertained. Sometimes, the EC takes into consideration certain complaints but, in its investigation, the accusations are conveniently found to be baseless.

An Analysis of the Mechanism of Preventive Representation

Police Education in the United Kingdom

The foregoing section demonstrates the various types of means and ways of electoral malpractices and corruptions. It is clear from the discussion that elections are recognized as a means of political legitimacy; however, elections are highly manipulated in favor of the ruling regimes, and against opposition parties. An intimidating electoral atmosphere is deliberately created for the opposition parties so that they cannot take part in elections in the first place. Hence, only one political party represents the people in government, albeit through elections. So elections serve dual purposes—to ensure that the ruling party continues in power, and that the opposition is systematically prevented from representing the people. Theoretically, elections perform the job of selection and de-selection, and no ruling party wants to be removed from power through elections. However, these normal functions of elections are only partially applied in Bangladesh. Why is it so, and what are its implications?

Perhaps the answers to these questions are to be found in the peculiar nature of its political history, party politics, and political culture. Here, we attempt to offer some interpretation of these factors.

The political history, party politics, and political culture are highly interrelated in Bangladesh. The most important of the three is its political history, which officially starts with its independence—a highly charged political issue, which was both highly uniting and dividing at the same time. Independence was achieved after a long civil war in which the AL party led the independence movement and pro-independence civil war in association with some other left-oriented minor parties. However, a group of other political parties who were Islamic-oriented and local born, set out to establish a legacy of Pakistan movement prior to the 1947 partition of India, supported the united Pakistan and fought against the independence movement. This pro- and anti-independence divide later became permanently entrenched in Bangladesh politics postindependence. The divide is now so huge, sharp and politically lethal that it divides the entire nation into two camps. The AL, as the leading independence party, capitalized on the entire credit of independence and considers itself the only agent, proprietor, and protector. The party believes only in its own narratives of independence politics, which it then imposes on others. Those who disagree are regarded as anti-independence and, thus, deserve no role and share in politics.

This political history reflects on party politics of the country. Through a multiparty system, the parties are ideologically aligned with secular, religious, and socialist ideologies who maintain a peculiar love-hate relationship. Other than AL and BNP, the remaining political parties command a tiny support base among the people. However, neither of the two parties commands enough support and popularity to win majority seats in the parliament; hence, they form alliances with like-minded parties. This led to the emergence of alliance-based party politics from around the mid-1980s. Since then, the AL commands a 14-party alliance, while BNP commands an 18-party alliance. The AL is leftist-oriented in that it is composed of secular and socialist-communist parties; while BNP is considered rightist, with its alliance members mostly concerned with religious national identity at the core of their political beliefs.

Despite maintaining an alliance structure, most of the parties, with the exception of a tiny few, have internal factionalism and splinter groups. Some of the parties maintain the same name, but with different leadership. Individually, most of these parties are simply paper based, have no support-base among the people, and are never get elected. Nevertheless, many of them are significant in alliance politics. Their political relevance depends on their close relationship with the mother party, whether AL or BNP. Since 1991, the ruling governments have all been coalition-based. But, since AL and BNP are the only two major parties, each with an almost equal support base. The system can largely be called a two-party or two-plus

party system. Again, the two parties are largely seen as pro-independence versus anti-independence. Ideological differences remain, alongside some of their roles during the 1971 independence conflict, compelling the various political parties to side with a particular alliance against another.

The last factor is political culture, which is also highly subjective to the first factor: political history. In effect, Bangladesh shares a common political history with India and Pakistan prior to independence. From 1757 to 1947, it shares a common political history with the British-united India, and from 1947 to 1971, it shares common political history with a united Pakistan. During these two periods, the popular politics in Bangladesh was essentially the anti-government movement, because politics and government were neither represented nor controlled by the Bangladeshi people. From 1905 to 1971, the anti-government movement was led by one major party though known by three different names—the Muslim League (which fought for Pakistan's independence) which, during independent united Pakistan, splintered to form a new party called Awami Muslim League, and later renamed Awami League (during united Pakistan), and Bangladesh Awami League (in independent Bangladesh). Since 1905, these political parties were primarily anti-government movements. The essential elements of such movements were characterized by sheer distrust, political violence, non-cooperation, disobedience to laws and orders, and public agitation. These became the fundamental characteristics of political and party political culture in Bangladesh.

The significance of preventive representation politics in Bangladesh can be found in these three major factors. Since the AL has always persistently and consistently claimed that it is the sole agent, proprietor and defender of independence, it strongly believes that only it has the legitimate claim and right to be in political power. By definition, this implies that other parties have no legitimate right, not only to political power, but also the right to be involved in politics in the first place. These attitudes are clearly reflected in its political behavior when it is in power, as well as when it is outside of that power.

The AL took power during the first 5 years of independence, during when it banned many Islamic and rightist political parties, and toward the end of its regime, it introduced a one-party system in the country. This was one way of claiming ownership of the country along party lines. Between 1996 and 2000, the party returned to power, but before it could consolidate its power base, it was ousted. It returned to power in 2009, and has been in power ever since. Since then, it has successfully institutionalized its political claims with legal backup. For instance: AL's narratives on the day independence was declared, the constitutional status of its founding leader Sheikh Mujib, the history of the independence movement and war, are now constitutionally safeguarded to the point that the official narratives cannot be disagreed on or challenged. Any violation is subject to criminal prosecution.

Additionally, the current AL government is bent on decimating two political parties—namely, BNP and BJI—either by banning

them altogether or by attempts to introduce a formal one-party system like it did in 1974. AL believes that these two parties have no legitimate rights to be involved in politics. Their rationale: BNP is a party established by an army General who is thought be part of a conspiracy that killed Sheikh Mujib and his entire family, save for two daughters, in 1975. Furthermore, BNP maintains a close relationship with Pakistan, the perpetrator of genocide of Bangladeshis in 1971. As for BJI, it directly opposed the independence movement and war, and collaborated with the military regime of Pakistan in 1971. So for, family and political reasons, these two parties have become arch enemies of AL. Hence, since 2010, the AL government has taken a number of initiatives to corner the two parties.

Firstly, AL put on trial the three individuals accused of killing Sheikh Mujib and his family; the three were hanged in 2010. They had been arrested and tried earlier during AL's regime in 1996–2000, but were exonerated by BNP's founding leader, then by a Marshall Law Administrator, through the Indemnity Ordinance 1975. Secondly, in 2013, under the AL government, it reopened and re-tried an infamous murder of an army Colonel named Abu Taher in 1976. The court concluded that it was a cold-blooded murder orchestrated by the BNP leader General Ziaur Rahman, implicating him as a criminal.

Thirdly, the current BNP leader Begum Khaleda Zia, the widow of BNP founder Ziaur Rahman, was evicted from her residence, which is within the cantonment area in Dhaka, by a court

order subsequently in 2013. The military had sold the residence to her for a token sum after her husband Ziaur Rahman, then President, was killed in 1981. The AL government, during its earlier 1996–2000 term, had made an abortive attempt to evict her. The eviction clearly involves both personal vengeance and political reason. Personally, Sheikh Hasina, as prime minister, AL leader and one of two surviving daughters of Sheikh Mujib, could never accept that her nemesis, Khaleda Zia, was allowed to enjoy owning a property within the cantonment vicinity. And, politically, in a coup-prone country, Hasina could not compromise political security by letting her political opponent and opposition party leader continue to live within the cantonment area.

Fourthly, the AL government revived and proceeded to prosecute all cases that were filed against Khaleda Zia by the army-backed Caretaker Government in 2008. During that time, both Hasina and Khaleda had been arrested and scores of corruption cases were filed against each of them. When Hasina assumed premiership following the 2009 elections, her government withdrew all cases against her, but not those against her opponent. Ever since, Khaleda Zia has been fighting court battles over those and other cases filed against her following her anti-government movement during the 2014 general elections. After a prolonged court battle, Khaleda lost and was imprisoned in February 2018. Her attempts to obtain bail were delayed through official manipulation of time and hearing sessions; at other times, bail applications were blocked by arrest orders in other pending cases. As dozens of politically

motivated cases are filed against Khaleda Zia, and their prosecutions are in order with various terms of jail sentence it is likely that her chances that her chances of being released from jail is slim.

Fifthly, the ruling party's strategy is to decimate BNP by targeting its leaders, in the belief that a political party without its leaders will eventually become politically irrelevant. To date, all of BNP's top leaders, but for an insignificant few, are either in jail, have been forced to leave the country, or made to disappear by AL's plainclothes security forces. Others have been so severely tortured, they have become mentally disabled. Those fortunate enough to still be free face regular court battles to settle numerous cases filed against them in various courts throughout the country. In any event, they find themselves constantly in and out of jail.

Sixthly, the AL government has been even more ruthless against Jamaat-e-Islami, the party believed to be the symbol for anti-independence. Under the guise of trying for the war crimes in 1971, the AL government arrested all the top leaders of Jamaat and hanged four of the most prominent. One leader died in prison during trial, and another leader was handed a life imprisonment sentence "until death." There are serious concerns and doubts that the so-called International War Crime tribunal is impartial or remotely international at all, as none of the international legal agencies have been included, nor are international legal experts and representatives allowed to attend the hearings. In one case, it inadvertently leaked out

that the court decision was written by someone living in a European country, and that all of the evidence and witnesses presented by the government prosecutor were fabricated. In some cases, witnesses willing to testify against the prosecutor were made to disappear by plainclothes police. Alongside these "judicial killings," the government has killed several hundreds of Jamaat leaders, arrested thousands of them, and made them systematically disappear or compelled them to leave the country. Those who choose to remain in Bangladesh risk the same fate; and remain in hiding. Their private properties, businesses, and financial and educational institutions are forcefully taken over either by AL's local party leaders or by corporate syndicates. The case of Islami Bank Bangladesh Limited (IBBL) is a prime example; the party was forced to change its objectives and operating framework, and is facing the prospect of an outright ban.

Seventhly, the AL government has adopted policies to keep public—and sometimes private—administrations and offices away from BNP and Jamaat supporters. This they have done by adopting a three-pronged approach: by sacking opposition supporters from key positions; preventing them from occupying new positions; and, if they somehow are elected, they are either sacked by executive order or arrested on false charges leading to their disqualification. Interestingly, AL's inimical and violent behaviors are not necessarily occasioned or emboldened by its current legal and political authority; in any event, it maintains and displays these same bullying attitudes and behaviors even when it is in opposition. Many instances of

AL's violent behaviors during its antigovernment times in 1980s, 1990s, and early 2000s have been well documented.

The AL government's ultra-legal behaviors toward these two political parties—and others that are similarly defiant—attest to the AL government's staunch "winner takes all" policy. Most importantly, it fosters the culture of political intolerance, vengeance, noncompromise, police brutality, judicial killings, legal predatory arrest and torment, and denial of rights, including right to life. In such an authoritarian context, what purposes do elections signify?

If elections are taken as indicators, then the AL government would be regarded as highly democratic, since numerous elections were held between 2010 and 2018: 492 Upazila (sub-district) elections, 64 district level elections, and numerous other municipal and city corporations' elections to date (mid-2018). The national parliamentary elections are due in early 2019.

These regularly held elections would be sufficient to certify the government's avowed democratic label. However, if one delves deeper into the internal characteristics of those elections, one would find that the reality is more like the picture presented in the earlier section of this chapter. The opposition electoral contestation and representation is systematically prevented, with the ruling party, election commission, the police, and government, collectively ensuring that only the ruling party candidates win. The EC is no longer a neutral national agency,

and the police is no longer a neutral law enforcement agency. And, above all, the government does not represent the interest of its citizens; rather, to rephrase Abraham Lincoln, it is a government of the party, by the party, and for the party. Therefore, it is clear that elections in Bangladesh are not used as a means for fair representation of the people in the government; rather, elections are used as legitimizing labels for the authoritarian democracy and its regularization.

Democratization has been a popular political trend over the past several decades. As democracy denotes peoples' participation in politics and peoples' rule, democratization entails elections. Indeed, elections are considered to be the most visible criterion for democracy, as various "illiberal," semi-, or nondemocracies also hold regular elections so as to claim or enjoy democratic legitimacy. However, it is this apparent legitimizing function of elections that has suppressed its true meaning and significance: as equal political opportunities for all and fair representation of the people in the government.

This chapter argues that the electoral practices and politics in Bangladesh substantiate the above-mentioned claim. Due to certain peculiarities of the local politics in Bangladesh, political parties in power generally tend to claim an absolute control in political and other resources for which the people have equal rights to claim. Of the parties in Bangladesh, Awami League and its current ruling government are the most predatory, authoritarian, intolerant, and repressive. Since its current regime began in 2009, the AL-led government has conducted many elections at national, regional, and local levels. However, those elections are marred with various electoral malpractices and corruptions

such as the arrest, imprisonment and murder of opposition party candidates and their supporters; preventing the opposition from filing their nominations, holding meetings and conducting election campaigns; controlling and obstructing polling stations on election day; stuffing ballot boxes with false votes; hijacking the ballot boxes; and much, much more. The objectives of these malpractices are to prevent the opponents from contesting, and to ensure that AL's candidates win. Literally, the election festivity goes on almost year-round. Even though these are apparently elections, the preventive and threatening mechanisms that the AL government applies make the elections useless as a means of representation. While the elections serve to certify the democratic nature of the government, in essence, they regularize and preserve the authoritarian regime's continuity in power.

Challenges and Future Directions

In recent years, professionalisation has become a critical discourse for the development of police forces in the United Kingdom. As a result, moving away from traditional training programmes towards more formal higher education programmes has been seen as a way of progress to develop professionalism within the police force. In light of recent development in the field of policing, modernisation became the key concern for workforce development to fulfil the demands of the twenty-first century. The changing nature of policing and the complexity of police work became an integral part of police studies discourse. Recent studies show that having a higher education degree tends to have a more significant impact on police officers' knowledge and appreciation of the values and

lifestyles of peoples from different cultures, especially minority groups and immigrants. Therefore, the professional academic education programme has been suggested as a vital tool for the development of police forces in the United Kingdom.

In February 2016, the College of Policing, the national professional body for policing in England and Wales, introduced the Policing Education Qualifications Framework (PEQF) for developing academic programmes for the 43 police forces in England and Wales. The PEQF proposed different routes for providing education, namely Police Constable Degree Apprenticeship (PCDA), Degree Holder Entry Programme (DHEP), and Pre-Join Degree (PJD), in professional policing practice. Student officers are recruited by the forces for the PCDA and DHEP routes on a salaried full-time 40 hours per week contract. Within their contract hours, they have to engage 20% of their time for off-the-job learning with a partner university, being students of an enrolled programme.

Several police forces have already launched the PCDA programmes in partnership with several universities. On 7 September 2018, Nottinghamshire Police nationally pioneered the PCDA programme with their first cohort in partnership with the University of Derby. This initiative was followed by Derbyshire Police who then ran their first cohort of the PCDA programme with the same university. Then throughout the year in 2019, some other forces such as Leicestershire, Northamptonshire, South Wales, Gwent, Dyfed-Powys, West Midlands, Northumbria, Avon and Somerset, Staffordshire,

Merseyside, and Sussex started running the PCDA programme. These programmes, in fact, shifted the nature of police education and training with a particular focus on theoretical knowledge linking with the professional practice of police work with less or no emphasis on physical education. The primary mission for drastically changing police education and training is to make policing a graduate level occupation. It is not only to replace the Initial Police Learning and Development Programme (IPLDP) or give all officers a university degree, but also to make the officers academically and professionally sound for the complex challenges they face in contemporary policing.

It is not an easy task to transform the century-old traditional police training to the university education programmes over a period of 2–3 years. Due to this transition in developing professional qualifications, both the forces and the higher education institutions (HEIs) are facing challenges in tackling different practical and pedagogical issues in implementing new programmes. On the one hand, the police forces are traditionally conservative as Reiner claims that the majority of police officers are conservative 'both politically and morally' and the students of these programmes are the trainee officers of a disciplined force. On the other hand, universities are very much student-focused to ensure the best learning experience for every individual student and encourage them to be critical about their learning journey and broaden their horizons. To run an academic programme successfully, HEIs are required to comply with the frameworks of the Institute for

Apprenticeships and Technical Education and other funding requirements, for example from the Education and Skills Funding Agency (ESFA) as well as strictly maintaining academic regulations including Quality Assurance (QA) process and satisfy the Office for Students (OfS). Therefore, HEIs have to be in continuous conversations with the partner forces to solve the problems associated with teaching, delivery, and assessment as they arise.

Despite the fact that the Peelian objectives of policing were to ensure safety and security of person and property with the help of the community as well as prevent and detect crime, policing around the world became an 'extraordinarily complex endeavour' due to changing demands and new challenges including technological advancement and changing patterns of crimes. Police Officers do not spend a great deal of time in dealing with theft, robbery, and burglary that they did in the earlier days. Nowadays they deal with rapidly evolving crime threats such as terrorism, cybercrime, and serious and organised crime. Yet for the public, their role as citizens in uniform and bobbies on the beat as portrayed in the ever popular BBC series 'Dixon of Dock Green' (1955–1976) has not been lost as they still need to help the people whenever necessary. This is especially the case when austerity has meant a reduction to other public services in the UK leading to increasing demand on the police service, for example assistance with mental health-related incidents. Yet, there was a saying 'if you want to know the time, ask a policeman',

people still call the police to help them with non-crime incidents even to buy some groceries for vulnerable residents.

Historical development of police education and training

The role of a police constable is one of the oldest professions in Great Britain as its history dates back to 1285 Statute of Winchester, attestation of constables following an Act of Parliament in 1673, Bow Street Runners of 1749, the establishment of the City of Glasgow Police in 1800 and finally the creation of a full-time formal police organisation for London, the Metropolitan Police, in 1829. However, the establishment of the Metropolitan Police, a brainchild of the then Home Secretary Sir Robert Peel, who later served as a British Prime Minister, is seen as the introduction of the 'modern' public policing in the world; as a result, policing became a career that offered status and security at the end of the nineteenth century.

It was after 100 years since the establishment of the Metropolitan Police, serious efforts were made to develop police training. The Metropolitan Police College at Hendon was established in 1934 as a military-style institution with the intention to train the serving and newly recruited officers for senior rank. The idea originally came from the Indian Police Service (IPS) that used to recruit officers in senior ranks called probationer Assistant Superintendent of Police. The Assistant Commander of the College was seconded from the IPS. In five intakes, 188 officers were graduated from the college to become

inspectors until the institution was closed in September 1939. The college was not re-opened in the same format after the Second World War. Instead, in June 1948, the new National Police College (known as the Police Staff College since 1979) was established at Ryton-on-Dunsmore, near Coventry, to run different training courses for higher ranking officers with potentials to become senior police officers. The college ran residential and non-residential junior, senior, and short courses and also overseas command courses for promising officers, and a scholarship scheme was available.

Turning to the London Metropolitan Police 'was the first modern police force in a nation with representative government' and the British bobbies 'occupy a special place in the history of policing in the world' and was 'a role model of successful policing'. The initial recruit training played a great role in turning an ordinary citizen into a uniformed policeman. The Metropolitan Police Training School for constables was established at Peel House in Regency Street, Pimlico in 1907, which was there until 1974, and the Metropolitan Police College in Hendon was rebuilt and opened in 1974, popularly known as the Peel Centre.

Historically, initial police training was known as the foundation training or basic police training in the UK, which was followed by police organisations around the world, in particular, in former British colonies. Many national police forces such as the Bangladesh Police still run the same initial police training for the new recruits. After World War II, the

specialist cadet college for direct entry senior officers for the Metropolitan Police was turned into a Metropolitan Police Training School for recruit constables. The 17-week initial training was run at Hendon until 2007. However, since the 1960s, intense pressure to change the patterns of recruiting and training for the police force has led to an emphasis on recruiting graduates and since then support for higher education has grown.

In addition to Hendon, organisations such as the National Police Training (NPT) (a Home Office unit established in 1993, following the Police Training Council's recognition of problems with the arrangements for managing police training in 1992), the Central Police Training and Development Authority (CENTREX), and the National Policing Improvement Agency (NPIA) were involved in running the initial police training in England and Wales. The NPT aimed at bringing greater coherence to all police training establishments including the Police Staff College, Police Training Centres (PTCs), the Police National Computer School, a centre for the design of training and training of trainers at Harrogate and a centre for the training of surveillance techniques for National Crime Squad officers at Loughborough. CENTREX took over from the NPT in 2002 and ran the Probationer Training Programme at six PTCs in various parts of the country, namely Bruche, Ashford, Durham, Bramshill, Ryton-on-Dunsmore, and Cwmbran. In 2007, the functions of CENTREX were merged with the NPIA, which was dissolved in 2013 and the newly established College of Policing took over some of its responsibilities.

In 2006, the new 26-week IPLDP was introduced and it became the responsibility of the respective police forces to train the newly recruited constables. Since 2010, a level 3 qualification called Diploma in Policing was awarded to the recruits upon successful completion of the IPLDP training, which used to run week by week in four phases, that is induction, community placement, supervised patrol, and independent patrol.

The academic qualifications proposed by the PEQF have been gradually replacing IPLDP and it is expected that by 2020 all the forces in England and Wales will run the PEQF programmes. However, the Metropolitan Police is still in the process of implementing the PEQF and it is expected to run the PCDA and DHEP programmes from September 2020.

Following the government White Paper 'Policing A New Century—A Blueprint for Reform', the report of Her Majesty's Inspectorate of Constabulary (HMIC) entitled 'Training Matters' and BBC's the Panorama show entitled 'The Secret Policeman' (2003) that exposed racism in the regional Police Training Centre at Bruche had a significant impact on the long-lasting police training. As a result, the government came forward to reform the initial police training. Charman argues that:

'What the HMIC report "Training Matters" (2002) and the 2003 screening of the BBC documentary "The Secret Policeman" revealed was that both the formal and informal training of new police recruits needed a radical overhaul'.

The creation of the College of Policing in 2012 as well as the Coalition government's approval of the professionalisation agenda of policing and recognition of policing as a graduate level occupation led to the introduction of the PEQF in 2016. It is worth mentioning that as an indirect impact of this new professional body, the world famous Police Staff College, which was relocated to Bramshill in 1960 from Ryton-on-Dunsmore, popularly known as Bramshill, was closed in 2015 where many senior police officers from the UK and Commonwealth countries have undergone professional development training since 1948.

In 2017, the Police Minister Brandon Lewis MP while speaking at the PEQF conference identified the successes of the College of Policing in introducing a code of ethics, beginning a culture of continuous professional development (CPD), continually growing the body of professional knowledge, and establishing the final pillar through the PEQF as standards of professional qualification for policing. The Minister identified the implementation of the PEQF in cooperation with HEIs as 'a really big challenge' and justified the argument for professionalisation of policing as he stated that:

'... to those who say that policing isn't and shouldn't be a graduate job, I would ask you to just pause for a moment and encourage you to challenge that thought. Because policing needs to be prepared to meet the challenges of the future and the PEQF aims to give officers access to the knowledge and skills they need to succeed in a fast changing environment'.

Professionalisation agenda: policing as a graduate level occupation

The notion of the police as a profession is not new. Across different professions, professionalism is changing and being challenged and changed as professionals now increasingly work at scale. However, the policing professionalisation agenda of the College of Policing and the 'Policing Vision 2025' recognise policing as a graduate level occupation similar to those professions requiring specialist degrees in the relevant subjects such as doctor, social worker, and teacher. This 'Policing Vision 2025' has been developed by the Association of Police and Crime Commissioners (APCC) and the National Police Chiefs' Council (NPCC) in consultation with the College of Policing, National Crime Agency, staff associations, and other policing and community partners. Neyroud refers to a new professionalism in policing in England and argues that it focuses on improving and developing effective practice and building partnerships between higher education and police practitioners.

It is imperative that as a professional, police officers must be allowed a high degree of individual autonomy and they should have independence of judgement. The common elements of any profession to serve in a professional manner include a specialist knowledge and ethical practice related to that profession, scope for CPD, and certain standards set out to educate for that profession. But critics argued that knowledge-based policing in practice promotes a concept of knowledge

that indirectly threatens the police officers' traditional experience-based knowledge and professional discretion.

According to the College of Policing, there is a lack of consistency in relation to nationwide educational background or qualifications for all roles or ranks within the police forces, which provide knowledge and skills to meet the current and future challenges. It also says that:

'PEQF aims to bring consistent practice in terms of the implementation, assessment and accreditation of initial police training across the 43 forces in England and Wales. This consistency can contribute to the professionalism of the police service and put policing in line with other professions with regard to its formal education standards'.

It noted that the PEQF supports the NPCC and APCC's 'Policing Vision 2025' that 'By 2025 policing will be a profession with a more representative workforce that will align the right skills, powers and experience to meet challenging requirements'.

After long consultations, the College of Policing introduced the PEQF and three routes to recruit police constables. Before the PEQF, the IPLDP was introduced in 2006 as a level 3 Diploma in Policing that replaced the Foundation Training (still carried out by many police organisations around the world), which is still in use in some forces including the largest force London Metropolitan Police.

For clarity, it is worth mentioning here that Scottish Police runs Police Officer Recruit Training in line with the Police Scotland National Framework for Quality Assurance in Training and Education and therefore they are not part of the PEQF. Police Service of Northern Ireland runs its own foundation training for the recruit constables at the Northern Ireland Police College, which includes a 23-week Student Officer Training Programme that follows attestation ceremony and Probationer Development Programme. Due to the length, discussion about these programmes is beyond the scope of this chapter.

Policing Vision 2025: graduate level occupation

In 2016, the College of Policing announced that new police officers in England and Wales would have to be educated to degree level from 2020 onwards as the 'Policing Vision 2025' recognises policing as a graduate level occupation. With record numbers of British students attending universities, it would be the best opportunity for preparing the next-generation professional on police studies.

A formal possession of specialised knowledge credentials is considered as a key characteristic for the enclosure of a profession. That is why Livingstone and Antonelli argue that 'The most powerful professions have historically used the requirement of a high level of academic education as a primary criterion for entry into the profession'. They also highlight that:

'University training programs have been the most pertinent vehicles for providing codified professional knowledge and of testing potential entrants to verify they have obtained a basic grasp of the body of knowledge of the respective professional discipline'.

As an advocate of the professional model, Stone recommends that 'a college or university degree (or comparable educational qualification) to be adopted as the basic educational requirement of a professional police officer'. Providing the Government of the UK learns its lesson from cutting funding in Nursing and ensures sufficient financial support for all new Policing students, HEIs could be able to train 5000 new police officers a year, based on last year's intake into the police force. It is expected that 'By 2025 British policing will have risen effectively to new challenges and will continue to be highly regarded by both the British public and internationally as a model for others'.

The recommendations of Neyroud Report (2011) 'represent a fundamental overhaul of existing practices'. From these recommendations, Stanislas focuses on four specific recommendations such as 'full professionalisation of the police which in his view is critical to improving its status, clarifying areas of accountability and meeting public expectations'; establishment of a single professional body responsible for important aspects of policing, which will set national standards for entry and progression within the service, in particular a new pre-entry national qualification and a new

qualification for police managers; and finally that 'the police training and education be devolved outside the police training establishment and delivered in partnership with HEIs and specialist police training centres'.

Policing Education Qualifications Framework (PEQF)

In 2012, the College of Policing was established as a national professional body to improve police training in England and Wales drastically. There were arguments from academics and professionals for acknowledging policing as a graduate level occupation similar to doctors, teachers, and social workers who need a relevant degree to be qualified for their job. From this realisation, the then Home Secretary, Theresa May, was in favour of this major shift and asked the College of Policing to develop a qualification framework for police officers to get a relevant degree. David Cameron's coalition government (2010–2015) approved this qualification framework. Wood argued that the development of the PEQF was 'Bolstered by the recommendations of Neyroud and Winsor, both of which promoted closer collaboration between policing and academia' in their reports of two government reviews entitled 'Review of Police Leadership and Training' and 'The Independent Review of Police Officer and Staff Remuneration and Conditions'.

Partnership between forces and universities

In building the evidence base in policing, it is very important to ensure that police officers can develop their skills, build

their knowledge and expertise about what really works in policing and crime reduction so that they can put it into their practice. Through the partnerships, the police forces will be trained by the experts from a wide range of academic disciplines including policing, criminology, criminal justice, forensics, law, psychology, and cyber security from HEIs. They will be able to learn new skills, understand more about why crimes are committed, the relationship between crime and society, and use that evidence in innovative ways in their policing practice. However, the aim is to establish long-term partnerships between police forces and HEIs to deliver a recognised body of knowledge, evidence, and expertise on policing and crime reduction, and have the potential to meet the needs of the challenging environment through innovative solutions.

There are many partnerships across the UK between a police force and a university or a consortium of universities with several forces. Universities or consortiums need to bid to obtain a contract to provide education and training programmes, for example for 5 years with a force to provide their services. A force cannot award the contract to a local university without a competitive bidding process. Several successful procurement processes have already been run. So, for instance, Cumbria Constabulary and Lancashire Constabulary went for a joint tender and the contract was awarded to the University of Central Lancashire. Liverpool John Moores University obtained a partnership contract from Merseyside Police. It established the Liverpool Centre for

Advanced Policing Studies (2015) and provides teaching to the trainee officers of their local force. University of West of England received the PEQF contract from Avon and Somerset Constabulary while the University of Northumbria runs similar programmes for Durham Constabulary and Northumbria Police.

Some universities individually received contracts with several forces while some HEIs formed consortiums and are in contract with several forces. For example, Staffordshire University is running the PEQF programmes for four forces in the Midlands, that is Staffordshire, Warwickshire, West Mercia, and West Midlands, and their academic staff travel to the forces' headquarters.

The Police Education Consortium has been formed by four universities, namely the University of Middlesex, the University of Cumbria, Canterbury Christ Church University, and the University of Portsmouth, which is in a contract with Surrey and Sussex Police and Hampshire Constabulary to run the PCDA programme and DHEP.

In November 2019, Babcock International, an engineering organisation in the security and defence sector, which also offer recruitment services, received the £309m worth contract valid until 2028 as the learning partner of the London Metropolitan Police. They formed a consortium with four universities namely Brunel University London, the University of West London, the University of East London, and Anglia Ruskin University to teach the newly recruited officers of the

largest police service in the UK with 31,746 police officers (as of March 2020) and 25% of the budget for the police in England and Wales.

Regarding the current partnerships, one of the interesting observations is that only the post-92 universities came forward to develop police partnerships and run the PCDA programme and DHEP. Most of those involved such as Middlesex, Portsmouth, and Liverpool John Moores University have long-standing reputation for teaching and researching policing, criminology, and criminal justice. However, some HEIs without an established presence in teaching and research in policing, criminology, and criminal justice stepped in for the PCDA programme and DHEP.

This partnership is an opportunity for HEIs to support the police services for professional development of their officers through enhanced education techniques and research-informed teaching utilising an established evidence base. It is one of the main reasons for the universities to develop their partnerships with the police forces to design, develop, and deliver these academic programmes. Undoubtedly as part of these contracts, HEIs will receive a considerable number of students as the police forces are continuously recruiting to meet their recruitment targets. In addition to regular recruitments, the Government promised (publicly known as 'Boris 20,000') to recruit extra 20,000 new police officers, which is again an extra boost for both the forces and HEIs. In fact, the partner HEIs will receive several cohorts of student officers throughout

the year and they need to be flexible concerning the start date of the cohorts and compromise their traditional term dates to accommodate several intakes in an academic year.

Police Constable Degree Apprenticeship (PCDA) programme

The PCDA is a 3-year apprenticeship degree programme titled BSc (Honours) Professional Policing Practice for someone who has already completed their A levels or BTEC at level 2 and 3 or who are the former members of the Armed Forces. To enrol for this work-based learning programme where the uniformed students will study alongside their operational duties, one needs to join as a police officer first and then pursue the 3-year course as apprentices and will progress from academic level 4 to level 6 (degree level) when student officers need to spend 20% of their contract hours for their academic learning. However, this is a requirement set out by the College of Policing, which is different to the funding rules within the PCDA set by the Education and Skills Funding Agency (ESFA).

This 20% protected learning time has been seen very much as an abstraction issue rather than how it is as an 'investment in learning and development'. This 20% has become a significant barrier in the development of some programmes and disproportionately influenced the design of some programmes. This again hampers the opportunity to reach the full potential and development opportunities of these programmes and partnerships.

This is an opportunity for someone who wants to earn £20,880 per annum (varied from force to force) while achieving a professional degree in government's expenses. Entry requirements also vary from force to force. However, within the Derbyshire Constabulary, the entry requirements for policing apprenticeship is Level 2 Qualification in Maths and English (Grade C/4 and above), for example GCSE, Functional Skills and a Level 3 Qualification (A-level or equivalent) equal to 64 UCAS points for anyone aged between 18 and 55 years and the UK, EU, or Commonwealth citizen with no restrictions on leave to remain in the UK.

The College of Policing has outlined the National Police Curriculum (NPC) for the three new routes to become a police constable under the PEQF, and HEIs in consultation with their partner force(s) develop their programme and modules in line with the national curriculum for the PCDA, DHEP, and Pre Join degree in Professional Policing Practice and obtain approval from the college. Even officers and police trainers are involved in developing learning materials. However, the name of the modules may not be the same. But the overall programme and modules need to fulfil the requirements of the NPC. Williams et al. are critical about the development of the curriculum that 'on implementation, academia has a responsibility to develop police education in ways that it can achieve this critical feature of the PEQF' and indicate 'a risk of limiting the opportunities provided by the PEQF to deliver a real change to current police training unless the curriculum includes wider forms of knowledge, from the historical research

on policing to the evaluative research tantamount to the "what works" agenda'. However, the NPC is very prescriptive about what should be taught and as a result of this prescriptive nature, this could prevent all the benefits of higher education being accessed by the students who undertake these programmes. This is particularly relevant where the PCDA is compared to the DHEP as same content is delivered at different levels.

As prescribed by the NPC, the 3-year programme will be divided into several phases, which is a very traditional approach to delivery. For example, at the beginning of the PCDA student officers will continue 22 weeks of learning that will follow guided practical learning with a one-to-one mentor for 10 weeks. In addition to reflective practice and formative assessment, students' operational progression will be assessed continuously while summative assessments will be done for every module. However, it is very important to move forward from this prescribed delivery approach by adapting a more work-integrated professional practice approach.

Programme design and development vary from university to university. Some HEIs run the following modules for their PCDA programmes, which starts gradually some from the beginning, some during the company period when officers will learn more about practical policing with their employer and some modules when they achieve independent patrol status to become operational:

- *Modules:* (Titles of the modules could be different offered by different universities or partnerships. For example, following modules are offered by a university of a partnership).
- *Year 1 (level 4)*: 6 modules (6x20= 120 credits): Introduction to Policing, Studying Criminology, Community Policing, Operational Policing, Vulnerability, and Reflective Practice Based Learning.
- *Year 2 (level 5)*: 6 modules (6x20= 120 credits): Policing, Operational Policing 2, Community Policing 2, Vulnerability 2, Studying Criminology 2, and Reflective Practice Based Learning 2.
- *Year 3 (level 6)*: 3 modules (2 compulsory modules and one specialist module) and a project (2x20+40+40= 120 credits): Coaching and mentoring; Professional Policing Competence; one specialist module (such as Response policing, Community policing, Roads policing, Information and Intelligence, and Investigation) (This is worth 40 credits); and Professional Policing Practice Project. (This is similar to undergraduate dissertation as the preparation towards the final End Point Assessment (EPA), which will include submission of the project and a presentation to be assessed finally. However, confirmation of permanent employment as a fully operational police constable is subject to successful completion of EPA).

Some other partnership developed the PCDA programme in slightly different way, for example Derbyshire Constabulary adopted the following 3-year programme (Table).

Table :Adopted from Derbyshire Constabulary.

INITIAL PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Year 1
Academic Level 4
Operational Deployment
Tutor Patrol Phase
Obtain Independent Patrol Status
CONTINUOUS PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Year 2
Academic Level 5
Response Policing
Community Policing

Policing the Roads
Information and Intelligence
Conducting Investigations
ADVANCED PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT
Year 3
Academic Level 6
Specialism from Year 2
Evidence Based Research Project
Academic Assessment
Reflective Presentation and Panel Discussion
Operational Competence Portfolio

Currently, faculty members from partnership universities go to police headquarters to teach and tripartite review of the PCDA students in makeshift temporary classrooms. Blended learning

approaches are used to provide learning support including delivering little face-to-face master classes, and making all teaching and learning materials available to students via online workbooks and reading lists. Student constables rely upon their handheld devices, that is iPads and laptops connected via Wi-Fi access at force headquarters, police stations where they are attached for their field training and also at their home as the trainee officers stay at home and travel to police headquarters and police stations.

Degree Holder Entry Programme (DHEP)

The DHEP is a 2-year Graduate Diploma in Professional Policing Practice programme in academic level 6. This programme is for the newly recruited constables who have a university degree in any subject except in policing. They pursue this 2-year course to learn the theoretical knowledge of policing while they in fact apply their knowledge in operational policing. The student officers recruited under the DHEP pursue work-based learning while they work as trainee officers with respective forces in various locations. They can access the online learning materials including audio-visual materials and use them at any time from any location and can engage in their academic learning activities. They earn £24,177 per annum (varied from force to force) as an officer from day one while they pursue on and off-the-job learning through this graduate diploma programme at the expense of the government during their probation period.

Some forces post attractive videos as part of their recruitment campaign, which outlines the recruitment process in particular how the candidates will spend half a day at the force's assessment or recruitment centre undertaking a written test, taking part in role-play, and finally being interviewed to become a police officer.

Fast track detectives are also recruited under the DHEP and they follow the same syllabus except learning one or two specialist modules and spending a significant period of time at specialist departments such as CID (Criminal Investigation Department). It is understood that the forces received overwhelming response from the potential detectives for the exciting and challenging Fast-Track Detective Development Programme. However, confirmation of permanent employment as a police constable is subject to the successful completion of the course. Structure of this graduate diploma programme is described below:

Modules: Total of 6 modules (may run throughout the course), each module weight 20 credits and requires 20x10= 200 study hours.

Year 1(level 6): 3 modules (3x20 credits): Policing in Context; Communities, Intelligence and Information; Law, Policy and Practice.

Year 2 (level 6): 3 modules (3x20 credits): Ethics and the Policing Professional; Advance Policing Skills; and one policing

in practice specialism module from the following Response Policing; Community Policing; Roads Policing; Information and Intelligence; and Investigation. Finally, the completion of a portfolio as an evidence of Full Operational Competence is required to become a fully operational police officer.

Pre-Join Degree (PJD) programme

This PJD programme is a standard 3-year university degree programme entitled BSc (Hons) in Professional Policing. The prospective police officers pursue this course at their own expense and upon successful completion of the degree they can apply to join any police force in England and Wales. They need to learn theoretical knowledge of policing, criminology, and criminal justice as well as various aspects of operational policing over 3 years.

Year 1 (level 4): 6 modules (6x20 credits): Understanding the role of a police constable; Policing, decisions and ethics; Policing vulnerability in contemporary society; Police Legislation; Information and Intelligence; Academic skills and applied social sciences.

Year 2 (level 5): 6 modules (6x20 credits): Operational policing; Professionalism, Values and Standards; Vulnerability and risks; Specialist procedures; Academic research skills; Criminological concepts.

Year 3 (level 6): 6 modules (6x20 credits): Coaching and mentoring; Response policing; Community policing; Specialism—Police investigation; Specialism—Information; and Intelligence; Dissertation.

Cultural change

The police role was heavily criticised in dealing during Miner's strike (1984-85), Brixton riot (1981), Hillsborough tragedy (1989), and Stephen Lawrence's murder (1993). Reiner noted that despite initial opposition of the establishment of the Metropolitan Police by the London working class, the police achieved legitimacy over 100 years (1856–1959) through 'policing by consent', but he argued that the police again lost public's trust and confidence for its politicisation in 1960. It again deteriorated after the Metropolitan Police was labelled for being institutionally racist by Sir Macpherson in his report on Stephen Lawrence's murder and the Metropolitan Police's total failure in dealing with the investigation was exposed in this unprovoked racial attack in South London.

In the context of strong criticism of police application of unreasonable force against the protesters in the 1960s and 1970s, the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure in its report (1981) proposed specific legislation and code for police work to ensure its accountability and as a result the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) was introduced with specific codes for police conduct.

Following the Brixton riots (1981), Lord Scarman Report (1981) identified socio-economic factors for violent protest. Policing became a political agenda when Tony Blair declared during the 1997 election campaign that labour would be 'tough on crime, tough on the causes of crime'. He introduced the 'Crime and

Disorder Act 1998' just after the election that included Anti-Social Behaviour Order (ABSO) in section 1 and later brought the 'Police Reform Act 2002'.

In answering the question 'Why degree level education?', the College of Policing justified that the existing recruit training (IPLDP) was not designed to meet the demands of policing to analyse and solve the complex problems where officers have to make difficult decisions and take responsibility for their actions. However, the serving officers mostly learn to do these on the job with additional training. The new academic professional qualifications 'will give probationary officers the best chance of reaching the level of expertise found in serving officers'. The college further explains the nature of the new programmes:

'The empathy, compassion and common sense needed in policing will be supported, not replaced by the new programmes, and will allow officers to get recognition for the complexity of their job'.

It is expected that through the higher education programmes, police education and training will make expected changes for developing professionalism with the policing practice and make a cultural shift.

Challenges of newly introduced academic programmes

As has been mentioned, the idea of introducing academic qualifications for policing was challenged by the Chief

Constable of Lincolnshire in July 2019 arguing that it will put an extra burden on the police forces due to time and resource constraints. The review petition relied on the academic argument of Brown that 'the current body of research evidence is methodologically weak and there remains a gap in the literature for the provision of a convincing, unambiguous empirical case demonstrating the value added by graduates to policing'. The High Court rejected the application for permission for judicial review of the PEQF in December 2019. However, it is still in a very early stage to determine the success and failure of the three newly introduced routes.

Several HEIs started running the College of Policing's approved 3-year Pre-Join degree BSc (Honours) in Professional Policing degree programmes from September 2019. As it is run as a regular academic programme by the universities, licensed by the College of Policing that approve the universities' programmes in line with the syllabus given by them, it will be easier to successfully run the course. But it is difficult for the HEIs to recruit enough university staff with experience of operational policing, and knowledge of policing, criminology, and law to run this degree programme.

There is no alternative for the student police officers to learn both on-the-job and off-the-job as they need to learn the operational aspects, that is the real-life policing as well as theoretical aspects of policing to apply the knowledge to the relevant police work. It is anticipated that there is a division of labour between the HEI and the force, although how this is

implemented in practice varies across the country. However, in summary, the force is expected to deliver basic training such as how to handcuff suspects while the HEI is to provide the evidence base and critical arguments concerning their efficacy. It is rather like a driving theory and practical tests that one needs to successfully go through to be allowed to drive vehicles on the road to ensure his/her own safety as well as the safety of the other road users. Therefore, the nature and scope of the PCDA and DHEP courses and learning are characteristically different from regular degree courses as these involve students gaining knowledge, acquiring skills, and developing attitudes and behaviours to prepare themselves to face the challenges of modern-day policing.

As a profession-oriented course, the PEQF programmes are aimed to prepare professional police officers and one of the major challenges the teachers face is in bringing 'the field into the classroom' and 'the classroom to the field'. Incorporation of practice is essential in professional degree courses. It is proven that successful professional courses need to integrate theory and practice to bring the field into the classroom as well as take the classroom into the field—so that student officers can learn theoretical knowledge about crime and policing as well as legislation and procedures in the classroom and return to field learning at their units. Following application of their knowledge in practical policing, students can pursue further learning online and come back to the classroom. According to Wrenn and Wrenn, then they share their experience with their tutors or trainers and ask, 'How did you handle that?'

Following further discussions the teacher can present more scenarios and ask them, 'What would you do in a case like that?'. The trainee officers find this method is really helpful and effective for learning as Boud et al. suggest that when an example from one's own experience is shared learning occurs. Therefore, emphasis on experience is hugely significant rather than mere listening. As a result, 'the theory becomes clearer and more easily applicable to the real cases they face in a practice situation'.

Practice needs to be embedded in knowledge only Pre-Join Degree in Professional Policing, however, critical reflective thinking also needs to be embedded in the overall academic programmes based on the PEQF. As degrees in Professional Policing Practice are professional and service-related studies, the main focus is not only to learn theories but also to learn how to apply the theories in practice. Hutchings argues that 'What's at stake is the capacity to perform, to put what one knows into practice' to help students develop as professionals who are able to deal with real-world problems. In learning programmes such as police education, the ability to gain and utilise knowledge from practice and skill building is pivotal as the best learning environment is created when experience and knowledge are integrated within a course such as the DHEP and PCDA.

Experience of police training in various parts of the world shows that the police students prefer on-the-job training to academic studies such as driving police vehicles, shadowing

patrol teams, or practising situations for quick and better understanding of practical policing. Therefore, bringing field experience to the classroom of the DHEP and PCDA learners is mandatory as the popularity of reality TV shows proves that people prefer watching other's lives unfold. Enhanced learning models should be applied in police training so that learning can be made relevant, useful, and effective by bringing the real world of policing into the classroom. This will create an opportunity to stimulate the innovative, common sense, and dynamic learners as McCarthy emphasises on educating the 'whole brain' in addition to educating all types of learners. Most importantly, student officers' voices should be heard and their views should be taken into account in planning, designing, and delivering these academic programmes. Their learning expectations should also be considered as the potential police officers consider policing as a job as practical, exercised on the street, close to people, and with hands-on duties rather than sitting behind an office desk. At the same time, it needs to be appreciated that the aim of the newly introduced three routes of police recruitment is to ultimately help to develop police studies as a well-established academic discipline.

Wrenn and Wrenn argued that 'Educators in professional or service-related fields desire their students not only to learn theory and understand why theories are important but also to learn how to apply the theoretical frameworks in practice'. This is absolutely applicable in the case of teaching and learning in Professional Policing Practice degree programmes. Lecturers

and police trainers should assist the students to learn how to apply their knowledge and skills in practical policing and help them to develop their attitude and behaviours accordingly. Integration of practice and theory is the central consideration of all learning and students learn by doing and solving problems in real-life contexts noted that students retain '10% of what they read, 20% of what they hear, 30% of what they see, 50% of what they see and hear, 70% of what they say and 90% of what they say and do'. A study by Kramer et al. found that students taught by a practising faculty member scored higher as Good and Schubert argue that they are able to relate theory to practice effectively. Genuine knowledge, understanding, and skills derive not from abstract thoughts, but rather by integrating thinking and practical application of the same.

Undoubtedly an active learning environment enhances the integration of practice and theory in the classroom involving students. However, a substantial amount of materials provided for these academic programmes is self-learning materials access through Virtual Learning Environment (VLE). It is, therefore, essential to make the online learning materials more interactive as most of the time the trainee officers have to engage with their online materials. These also need to be presented in an organised way so that student officers from diverse academic backgrounds find the provided materials user-friendly and to help them to bridge their knowledge and skill gaps to provide a comfortable and enjoyable learning experience.

Because of the nature and structure of these programmes, different blending learning approaches are useful as the students can access their learning materials at any time from anywhere. Apart from online live sessions, all electronic course materials could be downloaded in their devices and used offline. However, for online access they would require internet connection whether they are at their homes or workplaces (police headquarters or police stations). In practice, some may struggle to have uninterrupted broadband access and some of them struggle to obtain proper connections at police premises due to existing restrictions.

In Australia, Charles Sturt University works with the NSW Police Academy where university lecturers and experienced police trainers teach and run university courses and officers are awarded a degree by the university. Police trainers need to involve students in the classroom and keep in mind that an active learning environment enhances the integration of practice and theory in the classroom by engaging students. As part of online learning and face-to-face master classes, students need to be involved in various activities as activities allow students to clarify, question, consolidate, and appropriate new knowledge. However, although experience may be the foundation of learning, it does not automatically lead to it and experiences alone is not enough for learning to take place and it requires a theoretical base.

Unlike previous contents for police training, the modules developed for the PEQF programmes highlight vulnerability,

legitimacy, equality, diversity, and ethical issues along with the National Decision Model. These are the changes that highlight transformation of police education, in particular to prepare the newly recruited officers with necessary knowledge and skills to fulfil demands of time as well as to develop their skills, attitudes, and behaviours to bring them outside the traditional rank and file mindset and police culture.

Chapter 4

Major Challenges

Leadership of the Partnership

One of the key issues about the nature of partnership related to the leadership could be a challenge. There could be debates whether this academic and professional partnership should be led by HEIs or the police forces. In most cases, these are HEIs which lead the partnerships so that they can comply with the national Apprenticeship Standard for the PCDA programme. Some forces may choose co-delivery approach and some may decide for their programme to be the police force led where they will develop course materials in line with the NPC and will be approved by the partner HEIs. In those cases, the main workload will be on the partner forces to implement the programme. Questions may be raised about the quality assurance and student learning experience of this type of programme. Within the HEIs, there are discussions whether the PCDA, DHEP, and Pre-Join degree programmes should be led by a pure academic or a practitioner-turned-academic as they are involved in curriculum design, development of course materials, coordinating modules and assessments, and running the overall programme. However, they need to decide on the availability of people with relevant knowledge, skills, and experience. The differing partnerships may also raise issues in regards to the uniformity of delivery across the country.

University faculty recruitment

There has been a reduction in the number of police officers, trainers, and training facilities. To address the shortage of police officers, when the Prime Minister Boris Johnson announced in 2019 to recruit 20000 new officers for the police forces across the country, neither the police forces, nor the HEIs were prepared although some universities in the UK have a long-standing working relationship with the police service as they helped the forces in developing their training programmes. Though the College of Policing welcome the policing pledge to address the shortage of police officers by recruiting 20,000 new officers, but warned of 'logistical challenges' at the time to achieve the goal, following the closure of police stations across the country as well as concerns over the lack of training instructors. In particular it is argued here that there is a scarcity of academics in policing and practitioners-turned-academics into policing as there is a shortage of suitable teaching staff. Against the advertisement for recruiting faculty members, the response rate is very low. HEIs need a good number of staff to run the PCDA programme and DHEP.

As part of the role, the academic staff, that is programme leader, module leaders, and work-based tutors and assessors need to travel to the police forces' premises. Therefore, it is a mandatory requirement for them to go through level 2 Non-Police Personnel Vetting (NPPV) or Disclosure and Barring Services (DBS) process by the relevant forces. Some academics may not be necessarily willing to go through the process, which

will ultimately limit their access and contribution to the police headquarters, police stations as well as specialised software such as Aptem as access is strictly maintained by the forces. Students will have access to the College of Policing's Managed Learning Environment (MLE) for further reading such as Authorised Professional Practice (APP) in addition to HEI's VLE, for example BlackBoard, Canvas, or Moodle for online learning materials.

Some HEIs are in favour of recruiting former police officers and in some cases officers from the same force they are in a contract with as they know the force well. While other HEIs are in favour of recruiting pure academics and practitioner-turned-academics to lead the programme and modules by ensuring academic standards. They argue that police trainers are enough to teach the practical aspects of policing and, therefore, ex-cops are not necessarily important to link theory into practice. In the context of police education in the USA, Sherman recommends based on a 2-year national study that full-time faculty members with PhD should be employed, not to make prior criminal justice experience as one of the essential criteria for recruiting faculties to run the academic programmes. However, there is a set of factors, as we are discussing in this chapter, for understanding the processes linking demands for further development in police education and practices.

As an example, Babcock International recruited lecturers and tutors, a mixture of former police officers and traditional

academics, to run the PEQF programmes in conjunction with the consortium universities in London. Some universities are still in the process of recruiting programme leaders and module leaders and are facing difficulties due to lack of suitable candidates. Moreover, other universities also recruit teaching and research staff with similar backgrounds to run their existing programmes in criminology, policing, and criminal justice as this is a rapidly expanding subject area. Jones noted that 'in 2015, the Universities and Colleges Admissions Service (UCAS) identifies 48 higher education institutions (HEIs) in England and Wales offering undergraduate policing degree programmes'. HEIs also need to recruit work based tutor and assessor to help the module leaders and police trainers in particular to do tripartite reviews of the PCDA and DHEP students and to provide them pastoral support.

Pursuing an effective tripartite review involving three parties, namely the student officer, university, and the police force (employer) is a major challenge for the successful continuation of the PCDA. Although there is no such mandatory requirement for the DHEP, it will use the best practice of the PCDA to pursue tripartite review. Academic staff and work-based tutor-assessors face practical difficulty to travel to various locations of police units in the force area, where the student officers are attached, to run face-to-face tripartite review. Throughout the tripartite engagement and collaboration, the complex process of quality assurance to satisfy both HEI regulations and College of Policing requirements is a real challenge in addition

to meeting the requirements of the Institute for Apprenticeships and Technical Education that approved the PCDA programme for delivery in March 2018 and Office for Students. The effective relationship between university staff (i.e. lecturers, module coordinators, or programme leaders) and police trainers is very important for this tripartite engagement and collaboration.

Diversity and recruitment

Since Macpherson's report published in 1999, there is still significant challenge for the police service to diversify its profile. The expectation of the NPCC is that by 2025 policing will be a profession with a more diverse workforce which mirrors the UK's population. While there has been a large increase in the numbers of female officers over time, there are still ongoing issues in regards to the recruitment of BAME staff and in particular black police officers. For example, in London, the Met head of recruitment,

Clare Davies commented, "If we continue even with the great progress we've made it would take over 100 years to be representative" of London. Currently, 58.4% of black people live in London, a population of between 1.1 and 1.2 million. Black people make up 15.6% of London's population whereas they number only 3.3% of metropolitan police officers. The PEQF routes should be an excellent opportunity for this community as for black Londoners, on average in 2016, 8% of first-year undergraduates across the UK were black. In the

same year, London has the highest proportion of black students, making up 17% of students overall. However, initial impressions from recruitment outside of London are not positive as the initial cohorts do not reflect this aspiration for diversity.

Although, the Macpherson's report recommended the recruitment of more black officers and this has been followed by further diversity initiatives, it is still the case that either members of the BAME community are not able to satisfy the criteria and successfully go through the selection process or more likely, are not willing to serve in the force. Nevertheless, forces are still encouraging application from under-represented black and ethnic minority candidates to apply to become a police constable. Apart from diversity in recruitment, interestingly some forces received a tremendous response for fast track detective roles.

According to the Guardian's list of top universities, no university in the top 20 applied to deliver the PEQF programmes. In London, all the top-ranking universities did not show any interest to be involved in running PEQF courses although London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE), Kings' College London, and the University College London (UCL) lead policing and criminology research globally. Only HEIs such as the University of East London, the University of Law, the University of Cumbria (London Campus), and Coventry University (CU London) offer pre-join degrees in policing.

Academic contact hours and blended learning approach

While designing learning materials for police studies to teach student officers, the 'diverse range of operational challenges' identified by Reiner and Newburn need to be considered. In designing, developing, and delivering the academic programmes, the 'peculiar features of late-modern society' need to be underscored for ensuring equity and social justice as 'one-size-fits-all' blueprints are not applicable in the changing world of policing. Emerging communication technologies and media indeed brought changes and complexity in police work.

In practice, academics and students may find it insufficient to spend only 20% of working hours towards the academic degree while students in regular university programmes are required to study and learn throughout the week.

Although it is appreciated that the PCDA and DHEP are perfect examples of blended learning, the syllabus given by the College of Policing is vast and students need to work more and more to learn the course materials, given the fact that most of the materials are online and that involves self-study, although they can contact their module coordinators or trainers at any time for further understanding or clarifications.

Moreover, the PCDA programme and DHEP, as technology enhanced blended learning programmes, face significant challenges as there are no PEQF-specific textbooks available although Bryant and Bryant suggest that Blackstone's

Handbook for Policing Students 2020 'Covers the learning requirements of all major entry routes into the police service, including pre-join degree courses and degree apprenticeships'.

In particular, the students may struggle to understand legislation and interact more in workshops. It should be considered that the PCDA and DHEP students are not learning to pass their assessments or to obtain university degrees, they will need this knowledge throughout their policing career as the constables are independent decision-makers who attend crime scene, instantly gather information and intelligence, and analyse and make decisions on their next steps to tackle the situation. In doing that, they need to continuously consider the National Decision Model (NDM) as well as National Intelligence Model (NIM) with an emphasis of ethics at the core of the decision-making process as the officers are accountable for their actions and may be liable for any wrongdoings or mistakes for which they may face departmental proceedings or even lose their jobs. Therefore, they need to properly understand the legislation, policy, and guidance such as Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 (PACE) and its codes that outline clear guidelines for various police work.

Multidisciplinary professional understanding

Officers need to understand the paradigm shift of applying their own judgement, common law fairness, and Wednesbury reasonableness to specific legislations such as the Human Rights Act 1998, which makes it mandatory to be considered in

any police actions with a minor exception in cases related to counterterrorism actions. Savage argues that the 1998 human rights legislation that incorporated the European Convention on Human Rights has significance for all institutions in the UK but particularly for the police. Officers are required to understand the English Legal System and procedures in the criminal justice system such as how the Magistrates Court and Crown Court operate and what role the defence and prosecution play to ensure justice. Students of Law degrees study the laws and legal procedures throughout their programmes. However, the student police officers will have limited time to cover relevant laws, policies, and guidance from few classroom-based lessons.

One of the major achievements of the PEQF is to shift the main focus of the initial policing training from rigorous physical training to developing knowledge, skills, attitude, and behaviours in addition to the empathy, compassion, and common sense that the British police officers already have. Through the academic programmes, personal and professional development of an individual officer will continuously focus on ethics at the centre of their learning and preparation for their professional career. As a result, police practice will be able to put in first place mandatory consideration of human rights and respect for equality to maintain the pride for democracy and the rule of law in the diverse British society. It is appreciated that police officers, as the law enforcers, need to be physically and mentally fit to perform their challenging duties efficiently. They necessarily need to learn drills, first aid, and law;

however, the PEQF will put less emphasis on quasi-military style drill and parade. Rather they will go through essential Officer Safety Training (OST) before they become operational.

The police forces should afford a residential accommodation for the trainee officers in a purpose-built campus with technology-facilitated master classrooms, small classrooms for seminars and group discussions, and assessment centre with required facilities for student officers who need additional support. This is also essential to have the facilities for physical training, arms training, safety training as well as gym, sports centre, and hydra simulation suit to facilitate immersive learning. Should the students reside in the police education premises, they could have time and space for protected learning and they could access library facilities in addition to existing access to the HEI's library and online resources.

To fulfil the demands of the twenty-first century, successful implementation of the PEQF will assist the society in achieving sustainable development goals (SDGs) related to peace and prosperity through reasonable policing by graduate officers who will be able to make informed decisions by applying their cognitive, affective, and psychomotor skills. As the UK historically led the development of professional policing, if the academic professional qualification programmes based on the PEQF are successfully implemented (as the first PCDA cohort is expected to be qualified in 2021 and the first Pre-Join Degree students will be graduated in 2022), this model of ultimate police education will be followed in other parts of the

world especially where countries are seeking effective police reform to overcome the crises of legitimacy and efficacy. However, this model of new policing will bring a significant change in police occupational culture, which has been blamed for many decades for lack of police legitimacy. Savage describes policing as a performing art and its paradigm shift as a process of reform.

Despite the Government of Australia has not recognised policing as a graduate level occupation, the NSW Police Force (NSWPF) has developed a unique programme in partnership with Charles Sturt University (CSU) where the prospective candidates first need to complete the University Certificate in Workforce Essentials (UCWE), a foundation level programme. Then they go through the recruitment process to be offered a police recruit position and enrolment for the CSU-run Associate Degree in Policing Practice (ADPP) at the NSW Police Academy. CSU's School of Policing Studies is located at the NSW Police Academy to jointly run this course where student officers need to reside at the Academy throughout the week. This 2-year programme also includes a field observation placement in Year 1 that will follow attestation and then the students will pursue the Year 2 studies as probationary constables. However, their employment as police constables will be subject to successful completion of the Year 2.

The Bangladesh Police Academy, Sardah, which was established in 1912 in British-ruled Bengal, still runs the fully residential basic police training with significant emphasis on

physical training such as early morning exercise, morning parade, afternoon parade, horse training (for the probationer Assistant Superintendents who join through the national civil service) and less focus on academic learning, arms training, safety training, and driving lessons. However, since 2008 probationer Assistant Superintendents of Police receive a Masters of Police Science degree from the University of Rajshahi upon successful completion of this police-led training. The UNDP-DFID sponsored Police Reform Programme in Bangladesh failed to bring a paradigm shift in police training and culture due to constant opposition of civil bureaucracy and lack of a strong political will as the policy-makers want to keep their strong control over the force. Similarly, many police organisations in the developed and developing world have their own police academies, police training centres such as Louisiana State Police Training Academy, USA that has a residential academy in Baton Rouge with a massive training area including Joint Emergency Services Training Center.

The physical learning environment is also crucial for an enjoyable learning experience. In practice, it is argued here that the lack of adequately equipped on-site residential facilities for the uniformed PCDA and DHEP students may have a negative impact in their learning as well as their team spirit as the members of a disciplined force. In this aspect, more could be learnt from the other professional qualifications offered by the universities and should be adapted for these programmes.

Developing Police Leadership is one of the crucial priorities for the twenty-first century's policing across the globe including the UK. The apprentice-turned-graduates under the PCDA programme, officers with a graduate diploma under the DHEP, and policing graduates-turned-officers are qualified enough to be promoted in leadership roles in 43 forces in England and Wales in the days to come. Although there are five entry routes into policing, namely constable, police staff, Fast Track to Inspector, Direct Entry at Superintendent, and Direct Entry at Chief Constable (for eligible overseas chief officers), most of the senior officers begin as a constable and follow the traditional route to be promoted to lead the forces. Undoubtedly the Fast Track for both new candidates and experienced officers as well as Police Now, which runs the National Graduate Leadership Programme and the National Detective Programme, will play a pivotal role in creating future leaders. However, the question for debate is 'will the NPC really allow this level of development, or do these programmes set the foundations on which to build leadership more strongly than current training provision?' which is beyond the scope of this chapter.

According to Bergan and Damian, '[e]ducation is about acquiring skills but also about acquiring values and attitudes' which are essential characteristics for leadership in an ethically and economically diverse society' that also needs a 'diverse student body'. In the same vein, Bok, a former President of Harvard University, emphasises that 'Our institutions are now the leading sources of all three of the

most important ingredients for progress and prosperity in modern societies: new discoveries, expert knowledge and highly trained people'. He further argues that 'universities are the essential institutions for preparing leaders throughout society. Every politician, every civil servant, every judge, doctor, priest and virtually every top business executive will attend our universities. Although this often goes unnoticed, more and more of these leaders are also returning to universities in mid-career for further education'.

Therefore, university education will help the forces to have more prudent police leaders who can bring diversity of thought and perspective into policing. They should pursue continuing professional development courses throughout their career to obtain up-to-date knowledge and prepare them to lead the forces and achieve legitimacy and set examples for the world.

The College of Policing's Leadership Review recommended to 'Create a new model of leadership and management training and development which is accessible to all within policing'. It has also echoed the Peelian principles of 1829, which are still relevant for public approval of police work as it states:

'From the origins of British policing in the 19th century, an emphasis on preventing crime was established as the most important duty of the police, along with the notion that securing public approval and cooperation are fundamental to achieving police objectives'.

Leadership is the one of the keys for an organisation to be efficient, effective, and successful in managing people and achieving goals. Bowling et al. argue that 'The police are supposedly a "totalizing institution" with a "chain of command"'. Therefore, this is very important for the police forces to develop well-prepared future leadership so that they can lead their respective forces. According to the College of Policing,

'The ideal police leader is driven by the core values of policing, seeks out challenge and is quick to adapt. … This is a leader who empowers, trusts and supports every individual to succeed among their peers, within their teams and across their organisations; who copes with the challenges of emerging crime and public safety issues; who values difference and diversity; and who readily accepts personal accountability while retaining the trust of communities'.

Pedagogical aspects

Generally, police education has been based on a top-down, instructor-led form of teaching by focusing on a student officer's technical competencies. These approaches are contrasted with the mainstream higher education pedagogies, that is learner-led participatory teaching and learning where critical thinking and innovative ideas are the keys to success. However, very little has been known from research regarding the pedagogical impact of different educational and training pathways into policing In this light, we are hoping to see wider

discussion on the relationship between the NPC and higher education elsewhere between academics and practitioners.

In the professional contexts, the police officers' learning must be followed by reflective thought and internal processing that links the experience with previous learning as learning takes place within a cycle of action, reflection, and application. A study on graduates from a professional graduate programme of Social Work found that class work had not adequately prepared them for real-world practice. Failure to incorporate knowledge in a relevant and meaningful way creates a barrier for effective learning.

Practical examples help the learners to understand and apply theories from the textbook to real situations, which enhanced their learning experiences. Similar views were expressed in The Relation of Theory to Practice in Education that content knowledge should not be remote from practical issues.

In the initial stage of academic police education programmes, learning may be found difficult by fresh students due to the lack of experiences. However, examples from their earlier life could be created and delivered through a virtual learning environment to assist the trainees in understanding the contexts and link with the theories. They should be given the opportunity to deal with real-life scenarios as student police officers who are too afraid to test their abilities will probably be worried police officers, which is not expected at all.

Interpersonal communication and critical thinking

As a professional course, interpersonal communication skills including critical thinking are very important in police education. The nine Peelian principles of policing are the main mantra of policing, which suggests police officers are citizens in uniform and they cannot succeed without the support and approval from the community. Throughout the curriculum of the professional education programmes, there should be an effective structure for teaching essential interpersonal skills so that student officers get a solid foundation, which enables them to remove some of the barriers between the police force and the public. Initial training through academic programmes builds an essential foundation for new officers because they need to master communication skills before they execute tactical and legal tasks in practice.

Effective policing occurs when police officers and members of the public become partners to create safe and crime-free communities. This partnership requires well-prepared police officers who display not only strong technical capabilities but also interpersonal skills. Therefore, police forces as the law enforcement agencies must train their officers on how to interact effectively with the public and work with them. In the professional setting, technical and interpersonal skills help the offers to perform their police work well.

Police officers face unique challenges and critical discourse as part of their role and they need to constantly reflect on their

learning and experience to overcome the situations successfully. It is therefore a key focus of the PCDA and DHEP to make the officers critical reflective thinkers and students reflect and write their reflective journals throughout these work-based learning. There is a pressing need to incorporate the practice into degree programmes for effective learning and developing skills as Hornyak et al. suggest that people learn best from direct experience with guided reflection and analysis. It is also essential for the best student learning experience and to develop necessary knowledge, behaviours, and skills for the student officers to become fully operationally competent police constables.

According to a recent study, students who are studying police studies at HEIs quickly assimilated a police identity, which affected their attitudes and behaviour. For fulfilling the potential of the PEQF, police services need to embrace, promote, and enable their police officers to become reflective practitioners through critical thinking and policing must be a reflective practice in the fullest sense. If the recently developed academic police studies programmes are able to provide interpersonal communication skills and critical thinking, only then HEIs will be able to provide radically transformed and well-equipped policing degrees for the better future.

Policing in emergencies

In times of crises or emergencies, there are more constraints imposed on the police forces, for instance, the recent COVID-

19 pandemic restricted individuals' movements and mass gatherings. As a result, education and training programmes have to be put on hold advised by the College of Policing as the situation demanded the forces to deploy more officers to support the operations throughout the country, to such an extent that the Metropolitan Police Service requested the retired officers to come back on a paid or unpaid role and the officers who are approaching their retirement age to not leave the force.

Again, due to the emergency situation and imposed restrictions, student officers have been grappling with different problems, for example, staying at home and even looking after some family members, having less time to engage with their ongoing courses.

In some cases, they have been struggling to connect with stable internet connections to access the virtual learning environments, in particular during their assessment day to participate in exams or submitting their work on time. In the changed circumstances, they have to sit for online examinations, in some cases for a fixed 2-hour assessment in a 24-hour window.

There were concerns about these exams' compatibility, credibility, and integrity as there was no physical surveillance and learning materials might be available to them during these exams. Although the PCDA student officers were at the very beginning of their academic learning, still there was a pressure

on the forces due to the crisis to deploy them operationally after completing their safety training and public order training.

Incorporating practice into professional learning is essential as Clapton and Cree suggest to integrate theory and practice to bring the experiences of the field into the classroom as well as take the classroom into the field. It is commonly accepted that experience is a great teacher; however, it cannot replace a classroom, for example for learning law and legal procedure, and vice versa. To find a balance between theory and experience, similarly in between classroom and practice, the professional policing practice needs to be embedded in its entirety in the Pre-Join degree, PCDA programme, and DHEP. Policing is a life-long learning process; indeed it is a part of the professionalisation agenda, and to ensure this life-long learning to happen the police should be a learning organisation.

Recently introduced, these three academic professional programmes are still under experiment as HEIs are running the programmes for the first time in partnerships with the police forces. HEIs and police forces need to learn from their partnerships through different approaches and efforts of 'trial and error' to find better ways to prepare future police workforce and they must work out their ways to develop effective partnerships to learn from each other to be successful in achieving the goals of the 'Policing Vision 2025'. Then this model of partnership for providing police education can be a beacon for other police organisations around the world as the

Leadership Review suggests that many around the world envy the British police service and respect it 'for its strength of purpose and public service ethos'. Especially Commonwealth countries such as Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Malaysia, and Nigeria, where those countries still are continuing their colonial legacy may be able to reform the recruitment process and education and training programmes of their forces to make a graduate level occupation through academic professional qualifications.

Although the newly introduced police education programmes are at the very early stage of their implementation as none of the three programmes has completed its cycle for its first cohort since introduction, continuous careful consideration is required to understand the challenges and overcome them in due course. This ongoing learning by doing effort is like 'trying to build an airplane while you are flying it' as the Chief US Training Officer for the Iraqi National Police Force said while expressing his experience of police capacity building in Iraq. Indeed the recent developments 'offer new and potentially unprecedented opportunities for HEIs to play a major role in the education of police officers at all levels'. The success of the academic professional qualification programmes based on the PEQF will depend on how stakeholders provide the opportunities to the HEIs to experiment their innovative administrative and pedagogical approaches and assist them to run the programmes as smoothly and flexibly as possible bearing in mind that 'the politics of the police and policing is complicated'.

Politics and Government

Politics

Politics is a process by which groups of people make collective decisions. The term is generally applied to the art or science of running governmental or state affairs, including behaviour within civil governments, but also applies to institutions, fields, and special interest groups such as the corporate, academic, and religious segments of society. It consists of "social relations involving authority or power" and refers to the regulation of public affairs within a political unit, and to the methods and tactics used to formulate and apply policy.

Etymology

The word *politics* comes from the Greek word *politika*, modeled on Aristotle's "affairs of the city", the name of his book on governing and governments, which was rendered in English mid-15 century as Latinized "Polettiques".

Thus it became "politics" in Middle English c. 1520s. The singular *politic* first attested in English 1430 and comes from Middle French *politique*, in turn from Latin *politicus*, which is the latinisation of the Greek *politikos*, meaning amongst others "of, for, or relating to citizens", "civil", "civic", "belonging to the state", in turn from *polites*, "citizen" and that from *polis*, "city".

History

The history of politics is reflected in the origin and development, and economics of the institutions of government.

Native Americans

Lewis H. Morgan, author of *Ancient Society*, considers the American Indians to be the link between the primitive and patriarchal state of society.

Patriarchal Societies

All patriarchal societies are known by certain characteristic features:

- Male kinship is prevalent. Men are counted as kin because they are descended from the same male ancestor.
- Marriage is permanent. It is not until one woman is married to one man that certainty of fatherhood appears in society but it is not a general rule of patriarchal society for polygamy does exist in the earlier stages of social development.
- Paternal authority is the ruling principle of the social order. In ancient Rome, the patria potestas extended to all descendants of one living male ancestor; it comprised control and punishment, not to mention questions of life and death.

These features of the development of the patriarchal state of society are as common among the Jews as among the Arabs, among the Aryans as among the Dravidians and even among the Germanic and Celtic peoples.

The patriarchal state of society consists of two stages, tribe and clan. The tribe is a large group of hundreds of members who descend from one common male ancestor, sometimes from a fictitious character satisfying the etiquette that descent from the male is the only basis of society. The clan, on the other hand, is a smaller group reaching back into the past for only four generations or so to a common well-known male ancestor.

The clan always breaks down into smaller units when its limit is reached. The tribe or larger unit is the oldest. When the tribe breaks down, clans are formed. When the clan system breaks down, it leaves the households or families as independent units. Finally, with the withering away of patriarchal society, the family is dissolved and the individual comes into existence.

The State

The origin of the state is to be found in the development of the art of warfare. Historically speaking, all political communities of the modern type owe their existence to successful warfare. As a result the new states are forced to organize on military principles. The life of the new community is military allegiance. The military by nature is competitive.

Of the institutions by which the state is ruled, that of kingship stands foremost until the French Revolution put an end to the "divine right of kings". Nevertheless, kingship is perhaps the most successful institution of politics. However, the first kings were not institutions but individuals. The earliest kings were successful militarily.

They were men not only of great military genius but also great administrators. Kingship becomes an institution through heredity.The king rules his kingdom with the aid of his Council; without it he could not hold his territories. The Council is the king's master mind. The Council is the germ of constitutional government.

Long before the council became a bulwark of democracy, it rendered invaluable aid to the institution of kingship by:

- Preserving the institution of kingship through heredity.
- Preserving the traditions of the social order.
- Being able to withstand criticism as an impersonal authority.
- Being able to manage a greater deal of knowledge and action than a single individual such as the king.

The greatest of the king's subordinates, the earls in England and Scotland, the dukes and counts in the Continent, always sat as a right on the Council. A conqueror wages war upon the vanquished for vengeance or for plunder but an established

kingdom exacts tribute. One of the functions of the Council is to keep the coffers of the king full. Another is the satisfaction of military service and the establishment of lordships by the king to satisfy the task of collecting taxes and soldiers.

The State and Property

Property is the right vested on the individual or a group of people to enjoy the benefits of an object be it material or intellectual. A right is a power enforced by public trust. Sometimes it happens that the exercise of a right is opposed to public trust. Nevertheless, a right is really the creation of public trust, past, present or future. The growth of knowledge is the key to the history of property as an institution. The more man becomes knowledgeable of an object be it physical or intellectual, the more it is appropriated. The appearance of the State brought about the final stage in the evolution of property from wildlife to husbandry. In the presence of the State, man can hold landed property.

The State began granting lordships and ended up conferring property and with it came inheritance. With landed property came rent and in the exchange of goods, profit, so that in modern times, the "lord of the land" of long ago becomes the landlord. If it is wrongly assumed that the value of land is always the same, then there is of course no evolution of property whatever. However, the price of land goes up with every increase in population benefitting the landlord. The landlordism of large land owners has been the most rewarded

of all political services. In industry, the position of the landlord is less important but in towns which have grown out of an industry, the fortunate landlord has reaped an enormous profit.

Towards the latter part of the Middle Ages in Europe, both the State - the State would use the instrument of confiscation for the first time to satisfy a debt - and the Church - the Church succeeded in acquiring immense quantities of land - were allied against the village community to displace the small landlord and they were successful to the extent that today, the village has become the ideal of the individualist, a place in which every man "does what he wills with his own." The State has been the most important factor in the evolution of the institution of property be it public or private.

The State and the Justice System

As a military institution, the State is concerned with the allegiance of its subjects as disloyalty is a risk to its national security. Thus arises the law of treason. Criminal acts in general, breaking the peace and treason make up the whole of criminal law enforced by the State as distinguished from the law enforced by private individuals. State justice has taken the place of clan, feudal, merchant and ecclesiastical justice due to its strength, skill and simplicity. One very striking evidence of the superiority of the royal courts over the feudal and popular courts in the matter of official skill is the fact that, until comparatively late in history, the royal courts alone kept

written records of their proceedings. The trial by jury was adopted by the Royal Courts, securing it's popularity and making it a bulwark of liberty. By the time of the Protestant Reformation, with the separation of Church and State, in the most progressive countries, the State succeeded in dealing with the business of administering justice.

The State

The making of laws was unknown to primitive societies. That most persistent of all patriarchal societies, the Jewish, retains to a certain extent its tribal law in the Gentile cities of the West. This tribal law is the rudimentary idea of law as it presented itself to people in the patriarchal stage of society, it was custom or observance sanctioned by the approval and practice of ancestors. The state of affairs which existed in the 10th century, when every town had its own laws and nations like France, Germany, Spain and other countries had no national law until the end of the 18th century, was brought to an end by three great agencies that helped to create the modern system of law and legislation:

- *Records*: From the early Middle Ages in Europe there come what are called folk-laws and they appear exactly at the time when the patriarchal is becoming the State. They are due almost universally to one cause: the desire of the king to know the custom of his subjects. These are not legislation in the sense of law-making but statements or declarations of custom. They are

drawn from a knowledge of the custom of the people. Unwritten custom changes imperceptibly but not the written. It is always possible to point to the exact text and show what it says. Nevertheless, the written text can change by addition with every new edition.

• *Law Courts*: By taking some general rule which seemed to be common to all the communities and ignoring the differences, English common law was modeled after such a practice so that the law became common in all the districts of the kingdom. The reason why in the rest of Europe, there was no common law till centuries later is because the State in those countries did not get hold of the administration of justice when England did. One of the shrewdest moves by which the English judges pushed their plan of making a common law was by limiting the verdict of the jury in every case to questions of fact. At first the jury used to give answers both on law and fact; and being a purely local body, they followed local custom. A famous division came to pass: the province of the judge and the province of the jury.

• *Fictions*: Records and Law Courts were valuable in helping the people adapt to law-making but like Fictions, they were slow and imperfect. Though slowly, Fictions work because it is a well known fact that people will accept a change in the form of a fiction while they would resist it to the end if the fact is out in the open.

Finally there is the enactment of laws or legislation. When progress and development is rapid, the faster method of political representation is adopted. This method does not originate in primitive society but in the State need for money and its use of an assembly to raise the same. From the town assembly, a national assembly and the progress of commerce sprang Parliament all over Europe around the end of the 12th century but not entirely representative or homogeneous for the nobility and the clergy. The clergy had amassed a fortune in land, about one-fifth of all Christendom but at the time, in the 12th and 13th centuries, the Church was following a policy of isolation; they adopted the rule of celibacy and cut themselves from domestic life; they refused to plead in a secular court; they refused to pay taxes to the State on the grounds that they had already paid it to the Pope. Since the main object of the king in holding a national assembly was to collect money, the Church could not be left out and so they came to Parliament. The Church did not like it but in most cases they had to come.

The medieval Parliament was complete when it represented all the states in the realm: nobles, clergy, peasants and craftsmen but it was not a popular institution mainly because it meant taxation. Only by the strongest pressure of the Crown were Parliaments maintained during the first century of their existence and the best proof of this assertion lies in the fact that in those countries where the Crown was weak, Parliament ceased to exist. The notion that parliaments were the result of a democratic movement cannot be supported by historical facts. Originally, the representative side of Parliament was

solely concerned with money; representation in Parliament was a liability rather than a privilege. It is not uncommon that an institution created for one purpose begins to serve another. People who were asked to contribute with large sums of money began to petition. Pretty soon, sessions in Parliament would turn into bargaining tables, the king granting petitions in exchange for money. However, there were two kinds of petitions, one private and the other public and it was from this last that laws were adopted or legislation originated. The king as head of State could give orders to preserve territorial integrity but not until these royal enactments were combined with public petition that successful legislation ever took place. Even to the present day, this has always been the basis of all successful legislation: public custom is adopted and enforced by the State.

In the early days of political representation, the majority did not necessarily carry the day and there was very little need for contested elections but by the beginning of the 15th century, a seat in Parliament was something to be cherished. Historically speaking, the dogma of the equality of man is the result of the adoption of the purely practical machinery of the majority but the adoption of the majority principle is also responsible for another institution of modern times: the party system. The party system is an elaborate piece of machinery that pits at least two political candidates against each other for the vote of an electorate; its advantage being equal representation interesting a large number of people in politics; it provides effective criticism of the government in power and it affords an

outlet for the ambition of a large number of wealthy and educated people guaranteeing a consistent policy in government.

These three institutions: political representation, majority rule and the party system are the basic components of modern political machinery; they are applicable to both central and local governments and are becoming by their adaptability ends in themselves rather than a machinery to achieve some purpose.

The State and the Executive System

The administration is one of the most difficult aspects of government. In the enactment and enforcement of laws, the victory of the State is complete but not so in regards to administration the reason being that it is easy to see the advantage of the enactment and enforcement of laws but not the administration of domestic, religious and business affairs which should be kept to a minimum by government.

Originally, the state was a military organization. For many years, it was just a territory ruled by a king who was surrounded by a small elite group of warriors and court officials and it was basically rule by force over a larger mass of people. Slowly, however, the people gained political representation for none can really be said to be a member of the State without the right of having a voice in the direction of policy making. One of the basic functions of the State in

regards to administration is maintaining peace and internal order; it has no other excuse for interfering in the lives of its citizens.

To maintain law and order the State develops means of communication. Historically, the "king's highway" was laid down and maintained for the convenience of the royal armies not as an incentive to commerce. In almost all countries, the State maintains the control of the means of communication and special freedoms such as those delineated in the First Amendment to the United States Constitution are rather limited. The State's original function of maintaining law and order within its borders gave rise to police administration which is a branch of the dispensation of Justice but on its preventive side, police jurisdiction has a special character of its own, which distinguishes it from ordinary judicial work. In the curfew, the State shows early in history the importance of preventing disorder. In early days, next to maintaining law and order, the State was concerned with the raising of revenue. It was then useful to the State to establish a standard of weights and measures so that value could be generally accepted and finally the State acquired a monopoly of coinage. The regulation of labour by the State as one of its functions dates from the 15th century, when the Black Plague killed around half of the European population.

The invariable policy of the State has always being to break down all intermediate authorities and to deal directly with the individual. This was the policy until Adam Smith's *The Wealth*

of Nations was published promoting a strong public reaction against State interference. By its own action, the State raised the issue of the poor or the State relief of the indigent. The State, of course, did not create poverty but by destroying the chief agencies which dealt with it such as the village, the church and the guilds, it practically assumed full responsibility for the poor without exercising any power over it. The Great Poor Law Report of 1834 showed that communism ran rampant in the rural areas of England. In newly developed countries such as the colonies of the British Empire, the State has refused to take responsibility for the poor and the relief of poverty, although the poor classes lean heavily towards State socialism.

Recognizing the great power of the State, it is only natural that in times of great crisis such as an overwhelming calamity the people should invoke general State aid. Political representation has helped to shape State administration. When the voice of the individual can be heard, the danger of arbitrary interference by the State is greatly reduced. To that extent is the increase of State activity popular. There are no hard and fast rules to limit State administration but it is a fallacy to believe that the State is the nation and what the State does is necessarily for the good of the nation.

In the first place, even in modern times, the State and the nation are never identical. Even where "universal suffrage" prevails, the fact remains that an extension of State administration means an increased interference of some by

others, limiting freedom of action. Even if it is admitted that State and nation are one and the same, it is sometimes difficult to admit that State administration is necessarily good.

Finally, the modern indiscriminate advocacy of State administration conceals the fallacy that State officials must necessarily prove more effective in their action than private enterprise. Herein lies the basic difference between Public and Business Administration; the first deals with the public weal while the second deals basically in profit but both require a great deal of education and ethical conduct to avoid the mishaps inherent in the relationship not only of business and labour but also the State and the Administration.

The Varieties of Political Experience

States are classified into monarchies, aristocracies, timocracies, democracies, oligarchies, and tyrannies. Due to an increase in knowledge of the history of politics, this classification has been abandoned. Generally speaking, no form of government could be considered the best if the best is considered to be the one that is most appropriate under the circumstances. All States are varieties of a single type, the sovereign State. All the Great Powers of the modern world rule on the principle of sovereignty. Sovereign power may be vested on an individual as in an autocratic government or it may be vested on a group as in a constitutional government. Constitutions are written documents that specify and limit the powers of the different branches of government. Although a

Constitution is a written document, there is also an unwritten Constitution. The unwritten constitution is continually being written by the Legislative branch of government; this is just one of those cases in which the nature of the circumstances determines the form of government that is most appropriate. Nevertheless, the written constitution is essential. England did set the fashion of written constitutions during the Civil War but after the Restoration abandoned them to be taken up later by the American Colonies after their emancipation and then France after the Revolution and the rest of Europe including the European colonies.

There are two forms of government, one a strong central government as in France and the other a local government such as the ancient divisions in England that is comparatively weaker but less bureaucratic. These two forms helped to shape the federal government, first in Switzerland, then in the United States in 1776, in Canada in 1867 and in Germany in 1870 and in the 20th century, Australia. The Federal States introduced the new principle of agreement or contract. Compared to a federation, a confederation's singular weakness is that it lacks judicial power. In the American Civil War, the contention of the Confederate States that a State could secede from the Union was untenable because of the power enjoyed by the Federal government in the executive, legislative and judiciary branches.

A. V. Dicey in An Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution, the essential features of a federal constitution are:

- A written supreme constitution in order to prevent disputes between the jurisdictions of the Federal and State authorities;
- A distribution of power between the Federal and State governments and
- A Supreme Court vested with the power to interpret the Constitution and enforce the law of the land remaining independent of both the executive and legislative branches.

Political Party

A political party is a political organization that typically seeks to attain and maintain political power within government, usually by participating in electoral campaigns, educational outreach or protest actions. Parties often espouse an expressed ideology or vision bolstered by a written platform with specific goals, forming a coalition among disparate interests.

As an Academic Discipline

Political science, the study of politics, examines the acquisition and application of power. Political scientist Harold Lasswell defined politics as "who gets what, when, and how". Related areas of study include political philosophy, which seeks a rationale for politics and an ethic of public behaviour, political economy, which attempts to develop understandings of the relationships between politics and the economy and the governance of the two, and public administration, which examines the practices of governance. The philosopher Charles

Blattberg, who has defined politics as "responding to conflict with dialogue," offers an account which distinguishes political philosophies from political ideologies. The first academic chair devoted to politics in the United States was the chair of history and political science at Columbia University, first occupied by Prussian émigré Francis Lieber in 1857.

Spectra

Left-Right Politics

Recently in history, political analysts and politicians divide politics into left wing and right wing politics, often also using the idea of center politics as a middle path of policy between the right and left. This classification is comparatively recent and dates from the French Revolution era, when those members of the National Assembly who supported the republic, the common people and a secular society sat on the left and supporters of the monarchy, aristocratic privilege and the Church sat on the right.

The meanings behind the labels have become more complicated over the years. A particularly influential event was the publication of the Communist Manifesto by Karl Marx and Frederick Engels in 1848. The *Manifesto* suggested a course of action for a proletarian revolution to overthrow the bourgeois society and abolish private property, in the belief that this would lead to a classless and stateless society.

The meaning of left-wing and right-wing varies considerably between different countries and at different times, but generally speaking, it can be said that the right wing often values tradition and social stratification while the left wing often values reform and egalitarianism, with the center seeking a balance between the two such as with social democracy or regulated capitalism.

Norberto Bobbio, one of the major exponents of this distinction, the Left believes in attempting to eradicate social inequality, while the Right regards most social inequality as the result of ineradicable natural inequalities, and sees attempts to enforce social equality as utopian or authoritarian.

Some ideologies, notably Christian Democracy, claim to combine left and right wing politics; Geoffrey K. Roberts and Patricia Hogwood, "In terms of ideology, Christian Democracy has incorporated many of the views held by liberals, conservatives and socialists within a wider framework of moral and Christian principles." Movements which claim or formerly claimed to be the left-right divide include Fascist Terza Posizione economic politics in Italy, Gaullism in France, Peronism in Argentina, and National Action Politics in Mexico.

Authoritarian-Libertarian Politics

Authoritarianism and libertarianism refer to the amount of individual freedom each person possesses in that society relative to the state. One author describes authoritarian

political systems as those where "individual rights and goals are subjugated to group goals, expectations and conformities", while libertarians generally oppose the state and hold the individual and his property as sovereign. In their purest form, libertarians are anarchists, who argue for the total abolition of the state, while the purest authoritarians are totalitarians who support state control over all aspects of society. For instance, classical liberalism is a doctrine stressing individual freedom and limited government. This includes the importance of human rationality, individual property rights, free markets, natural rights, the protection of civil liberties, constitutional limitation of government, and individual freedom from restraint as exemplified in the writings of John Locke, Adam Smith, David Hume, David Ricardo, Voltaire, Montesquieu and others. The libertarian Institute for Humane Studies, "the libertarian, or 'classical liberal,' perspective is that individual well-being, prosperity, and social harmony are fostered by 'as much liberty as possible' and 'as little government as necessary.'"

World Politics

The 20th century witnessed the outcome of two world wars and not only the rise and fall of the Third Reich but also the rise and fall of communism. The development of the Atomic bomb gave the United States a more rapid end to its conflict in Japan in World War II. Later, the development of the Hydrogen bomb became the ultimate weapon of mass destruction. The United Nations has served as a forum for peace in a world threatened by nuclear war. "The invention of nuclear and space weapons

has made war unacceptable as an instrument for achieving political ends." Although an all-out final nuclear holocaust is out of the question for man, "nuclear blackmail" comes into question not only on the issue of world peace but also on the issue of national sovereignty. On a Sunday in 1962, the world stood still at the brink of nuclear war during the October Cuban missile crisis from the implementation of U.S. vs U.S.S.R. nuclear blackmail policy.

Political Corruption

Political corruption is the use of legislated powers by government officials for illegitimate private gain. Misuse of government power for other purposes, such as repression of political opponents and general police brutality, is not considered political corruption. Neither are illegal acts by private persons or corporations not directly involved with the government.

An illegal act by an officeholder constitutes political corruption only if the act is directly related to their official duties. Forms of corruption vary, but include bribery, extortion, cronyism, nepotism, patronage, graft, and embezzlement. While corruption may facilitate criminal enterprise such as drug trafficking, money laundering, and trafficking, it is not restricted to these activities. The activities that constitute illegal corruption differ depending on the country or jurisdiction. For instance, certain political funding practices that are legal in one place may be illegal in another. In some

cases, government officials have broad or poorly defined powers, which make it difficult to distinguish between legal and illegal actions.

Worldwide, bribery alone is estimated to involve over 1 trillion US dollars annually. A state of unrestrained political corruption is known as a kleptocracy, literally meaning "rule by thieves".

- "Favoritism is the only use of power." Richard L Kempe "Politics is the art of creating situations involving the threat of loss." Richard L Kempe

Government

Government refers to the legislators, administrators, and arbitrators in the administrative bureaucracy who control a state at a given time, and to the system of government by which they are organized. Government is the means by which state policy is enforced, as well as the mechanism for determining the policy of the state.

The word government is derived from the Latin verb gubernare, an infinitive meaning "to govern" or "to manage".

States are served by a continuous succession of different governments. Each successive government is composed of a body of individuals who control and decide for the state. Their function is to enforce laws, legislate new ones, and arbitrate conflicts. In some societies, this group is often a self-

perpetuating or hereditary class. In other societies, such as democracies, the political roles remain, but there is frequent turnover of the people actually filling the positions.

In most Western societies, there is a clear distinction between a government and the state. Public disapproval of a particular government does not necessarily represent disapproval of the state itself. However, in some totalitarian regimes, there is not a clear distinction between the regime and the state. In fact, leaders in such regimes often attempt to deliberately blur the lines between the two, in order to conflate their interests with those of the polity.

Types of Governments

- *Authoritarian*: Authoritarian governments are characterized by an emphasis on the authority of the state in a republic or union. It is a political system controlled by unelected rulers who usually permit some degree of individual freedom.
- *Constitutional monarchy*: A government that has a monarch, but one whose powers are limited by law or by a formal constitution, such as the United Kingdom
- *Constitutional republic*: A government whose powers are limited by law or a formal constitution, and chosen by a vote amongst at least some parts of the populace. Republics which exclude parts of the populace from participation will typically claim to represent all citizens.

- *Democracy*: Rule by a government chosen by election where most of the populace are enfranchised. The key distinction between a democracy and other forms of constitutional government is usually taken to be that the right to vote is not limited by a person's wealth or race. A Democratic government is, therefore, one supported by a majority of the populace. A "majority" may be defined in different ways. There are many "power-sharing" or "electoral-college" or "constituency" systems where the government is not chosen by a simple one-vote-per-person headcount.

- *Dictatorship*: Rule by an individual who has full power over the country. The term may refer to a system where the dictator came to power, and holds it, purely by force - but it also includes systems where the dictator first came to power legitimately but then was able to amend the constitution so as to, in effect, gather all power for themselves.

- *Monarchy*: Rule by an individual who has inherited the role and expects to bequeath it to their heir.

- *Oligarchy*: Rule by a small group of people who share similar interests or family relations.

- *Plutocracy*: A government composed of the wealthy class. Any of the forms of government listed here can be plutocracy. For instance, if all of the voted representatives in a republic are wealthy, then it is a republic and a plutocracy.

- *Theocracy*: Rule by a religious elite.

- *Totalitarian*: Totalitarian governments regulate nearly every aspect of public and private life.

Governance

Governance is the act of governing. It relates to decisions that define *expectations*, grant power, or verify performance. It consists of either a separate process or part of management or leadership processes.

These processes and systems are typically administered by a government. In the case of a business or of a non-profit organisation, governance relates to consistent management, cohesive policies, guidance, processes and decision-rights for a given area of responsibility. For example, managing at a corporate level might involve evolving policies on privacy, on internal investment, and on the use of data.

To distinguish the term *governance* from govern*ment*: "governance" is what *a* "government" does. It might be a geo-political government, a corporate government, a socio-political government or any number of different kinds of government, but governance is the physical exercise of management power and policy, while government is the instrument that does it.

The term government is also used more abstractly as a synonym for governance, as in the Canadian motto, "Peace, Order and *Good Government*".

Origin of the Word

The word *governance* derives from the Greek verb *kubernáo* which means *to steer* and was used for the first time in a metaphorical sense by Plato. It then passed on to Latin and then on to many languages.

Processes and Governance

As a process, governance may operate in an organization of any size: from a single human being to all of humanity; and it may function for any purpose, good or evil, for profit or not. A reasonable or rational purpose of governance might aim to assure, that an organization produces a worthwhile pattern of good results while avoiding an undesirable pattern of bad circumstances. Perhaps the moral and natural purpose of governance consists of assuring, on behalf of those governed, a worthy pattern of good while avoiding an undesirable pattern of bad. The ideal purpose, obviously, would assure a perfect pattern of good with no bad. A government, comprises a set of inter-related positions that govern and that use or exercise power, particularly coercive power.

A good government, following this line of thought, could consist of a set of inter-related positions exercising coercive power that assures, on behalf of those governed, a worthwhile pattern of good results while avoiding an undesirable pattern of bad circumstances, by making decisions that define expectations, grant power, and verify performance.

Politics provides a means by which the governance process operates. For example, people may choose expectations by way of political activity; they may grant power through political action, and they may judge performance through political behaviour.

Conceiving of governance in this way, one can apply the concept to states, to corporations, to non-profits, to NGOs, to partnerships and other associations, to project-teams, and to any number of humans engaged in some purposeful activity.

Different Definitions

The World Bank defines governance as:

- The exercise of political authority and the use of institutional resources to manage society's problems and affairs.

The Worldwide Governance Indicators project of the World Bank defines governance as:

- The traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised.

This considers the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies and the respect of citizens and the state of the institutions that govern economic and social interactions among them.

An alternate definition sees governance as:

- The use of institutions, structures of authority and even collaboration to allocate resources and coordinate or control activity in society or the economy*.*

The United Nations Development Programme's Regional Project on Local Governance for Latin America:

- Governance has been defined as the rules of the political system to solve conflicts between actors and adopt decision. It has also been used to describe the "proper functioning of institutions and their acceptance by the public". And it has been used to invoke the efficacy of government and the achievement of consensus by democratic means.

The State and Politics

Some suggest making a clear distinction between the concepts of governance and of politics. Politics involves processes by which a group of people with initially divergent opinions or interests reach collective decisions generally regarded as binding on the group, and enforced as common policy. Governance, on the other hand, conveys the administrative and process-oriented elements of governing rather than its antagonistic ones. Such an argument continues to assume the possibility of the traditional separation between "politics" and "administration". Contemporary governance practice and

theory sometimes questions this distinction, premising that both "governance" and "politics" involve aspects of power.

In general terms, governance occurs in three broad ways:

- Through networks involving public-private partnerships or with the collaboration of community organisations;
- Through the use of market mechanisms whereby market principles of competition serve to allocate resources while operating under government regulation;
- Through top-down methods that primarily involve governments and the state bureaucracy.

These modes of governance often appear in terms of hierarchy, markets, and networks - but also in democracies. For instance, the tripartite governance of the United States consists of three branches of power.