

International Politics and Human Rights

Brandon Simon



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Chapter 1

Introduction

International politics and human rights

Human rights are “rights (Rights are legal, social, or ethical principles of freedom or entitlement; that is, rights are the fundamental normative rules about what is allowed of people or owed to people, according to some legal system, social convention, or ethical theory. Rights are of essential importance in such disciplines as law and ethics, especially theories of justice and deontology.

Rights are often considered fundamental to civilization, being regarded as established pillars of society and culture, and the history of social conflicts can be found in the history of each right and its development. The connection between rights and struggle cannot be overstated—rights are not as much granted or endowed as they are fought for and claimed, and the essence of struggles past and ancient are encoded in the spirit of current concepts of rights and their modern formulations.) and freedoms to which all humans are entitled.”Proponents of the concept usually assert that everyone is endowed with certain entitlements merely by reason of being human. Human rights are thus conceived in a universalist and egalitarian fashion. Such

entitlements can exist as shared norms of actual human moralities, as justified moral norms or natural rights (Natural and legal rights are two types of rights theoretically distinct according to philosophers and political scientists. Natural rights, also called inalienable rights, are considered to be self—evident and universal. They are not contingent upon the laws, customs, or beliefs of any particular culture or government. Legal rights, also called statutory rights, are bestowed by a particular government to the governed people and are relative to specific cultures and governments. They are enumerated or codified into legal statutes by a legislative body.) supported by strong reasons, or as legal rights either at a national level or within international law International law is the term commonly used for referring to laws that govern the conduct of independent nations in their relationships with one another. It differs from other legal systems in that it primarily concerns provinces rather than private citizens.

In other words it is that body of law which is composed for its greater part of the principles and rules of conduct which States feel themselves bound to observe,

- The rules of law relating to the function of international institutions or organizations, their relations with each other and their relations with States and individuals; and
- Certain rules of law relating to individuals and non-state entities so far as the rights and duties of such individuals and non-state entities are the concern of

the international community. However, the term “international law” can refer to three distinct legal disciplines

- Public international law, which governs the relationship between provinces and international entities, either as an individual or as a group. It includes the following specific legal field such as the treaty law, law of sea, international criminal law and the international humanitarian law.
- Private international law, or conflict of laws, which addresses the questions of
 - In which legal jurisdiction may a case be heard;
 - The law concerning which jurisdiction
 - Apply to the issues in the case
- Supranational law or the law of supranational organizations, which concerns at present regional agreements where the special distinguishing quality is that laws of nation states are held inapplicable when conflicting with a supranational legal system)

However, there is no consensus as to the precise nature of what in particular should or should not be regarded as a human right in any of the preceding senses, and the abstract concept of human rights has been a subject of intense philosophical debate and criticism.

The human rights movement emerged in the 1970s, especially from former socialists in eastern and western Europe, with major contributions also from the United States and Latin America. The

movement quickly gelled as social activism and political rhetoric in many nations put it high on the world agenda. By the 21st century, Moyn has argued, the human rights movement expanded beyond its original anti-totalitarianism to include numerous causes involving humanitarianism and social and economic development in the Third World.

Many of the basic ideas that animated the movement developed in the aftermath of the Second World War, culminating in its adoption by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) is a declaration adopted by the United Nations General Assembly (10 December 1948 at Palais de Chaillot, Paris).

The Declaration arose directly from the experience of the Second World War and represents the first global expression of rights to which all human beings are inherently entitled. It consists of 30 articles which have been elaborated in subsequent international treaties, regional human rights instruments, national constitutions and laws.

The International Bill of Human Rights consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and its two Optional Protocols. In 1966 the General Assembly adopted the two detailed Covenants, which complete the International Bill of Human Rights; and in 1976, after the Covenants had been ratified by a sufficient number of individual nations, the Bill took on the force

of international law.) in Paris by the United Nations General Assembly The United Nations General Assembly (UNGA/GA) is one of the five principal organs of the United Nations and the only one in which all member nations have equal representation. Its powers are to oversee the budget of the United Nations, appoint the non-permanent members to the Security Council, receive reports from other parts of the United Nations and make recommendations in the form of General Assembly Resolutions. It has also established a wide number of subsidiary organs.

The General Assembly meets under its president or secretary general in regular yearly sessions the main part of which lasts from September to December and resumed part from January until all issues are addressed (which often is just before the next session's start). It can also reconvene for special and emergency special sessions. Its composition, functions, powers, voting, and procedures are set out in Chapter of the United Nations Charter.

The first session was convened on 10 January 1946 in the Westminster Central Hall in London and included representatives of 51 nations. Voting in the General Assembly on important questions—recommendations on peace and security; election of members to organs; admission, suspension, and expulsion of members; budgetary matters—is by a two-thirds majority of those present and voting.

Other questions are decided by majority vote. Each member country has one vote. Apart from approval of budgetary matters, including adoption of a scale of assessment, Assembly

resolutions are not binding on the members. The Assembly may make recommendations on any matters within the scope of the UN, except matters of peace and security under Security Council consideration. The one state, one vote power structure theoretically allows states comprising just eight per cent of the world population to pass a resolution by a two-thirds vote.

During the 1980s, the Assembly became a forum for the North-South dialogue—the discussion of issues between industrialized nations and developing countries. These issues came to the fore because of the phenomenal growth and changing makeup of the UN membership. In 1945, the UN had 51 members. It now has 192, of which more than two-thirds are developing countries. Because of their numbers, developing countries are often able to determine the agenda of the Assembly (using coordinating groups like the G77), the character of its debates, and the nature of its decisions. For many developing countries, the UN is the source of much of their diplomatic influence and the principal outlet for their foreign relations initiatives) in 1948. While the phrase “human rights” is relatively modern the intellectual foundations of the modern concept can be traced through the history of philosophy and the concepts of natural law rights and liberties as far back as the city states of Classical Greece and the development of Roman Law.

The true forerunner of human rights discourse was the concept of natural rights which appeared as part of the medieval Natural law tradition, became prominent during the Enlightenment with such philosophers as John Locke, Francis Hutcheson, and Jean-

Jacques Burlamaqui, and featured prominently in the political discourse of the American Revolution. The American Revolution was the political upheaval during the last half of the 18th century in which thirteen colonies in North America joined together to break free from the British Empire, combining to become the United States of America. They first rejected the authority of the Parliament of Great Britain to govern them from overseas without representation, and then expelled all royal officials. By 1774 each colony had established a Provincial Congress, or an equivalent governmental institution, to form individual self-governing states.

The British responded by sending combat troops to re-impose direct rule. Through representatives sent in 1775 to the Second Continental Congress, the new states joined together at first to defend their respective self-governance and manage the armed conflict against the British known as the American Revolutionary War (1775–83, also American War of Independence). Ultimately, the states collectively determined that the British monarchy, by acts of tyranny, could no longer legitimately claim their allegiance.

They then severed ties with the British Empire in July 1776, when the Congress issued the United States Declaration of Independence, rejecting the monarchy on behalf of the new sovereign nation. The war ended with effective American victory in October 1781, followed by formal British abandonment of any claims to the United States with the Treaty of Paris in 1783. The American Revolution was the result of a series of social, political,

and intellectual transformations in early American society and government, collectively referred to as the American Enlightenment.

Americans rejected the oligarchies common in aristocratic Europe at the time, championing instead the development of republicanism based on the Enlightenment understanding of liberalism. Among the significant results of the revolution was the creation of a democratically-elected representative government responsible to the will of the people. However, sharp political debates erupted over the appropriate level of democracy desirable in the new government, with a number of Founders fearing mob rule.

Many fundamental issues of national governance were settled with the ratification of the United States Constitution in 1788, which replaced the relatively weaker first attempt at a national government adopted in 1781, the Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union. In contrast to the loose confederation, the Constitution established a strong federated government. The United States Bill of Rights (1791), comprising the first 10 constitutional amendments, quickly followed. It guaranteed many “natural rights” that were influential in justifying the revolution, and attempted to balance a strong national government with relatively broad personal liberties.

The American shift to liberal republicanism, and the gradually increasing democracy, caused an upheaval of traditional social hierarchy and gave birth to the ethic that has formed a core of

political values in the United States and the French Revolution. The French Revolution (French: *Revolution française*; 1789–99) was a period of radical social and political upheaval in French and European history. The absolute monarchy that had ruled France for centuries collapsed in three years. French society underwent an epic transformation as feudal, aristocratic and religious privileges evaporated under a sustained assault from liberal political groups and the masses on the streets. Old ideas about hierarchy and tradition succumbed to new Enlightenment principles of citizenship and inalienable rights.

The French Revolution began in 1789 with the convocation of the Estates-General in May. The first year of the Revolution witnessed members of the Third Estate proclaiming the Tennis Court Oath in June, the assault on the Bastille in July, the passage of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen in August, and an epic march on Versailles that forced the royal court back to Paris in October.

The next few years were dominated by tensions between various liberal assemblies and a conservative monarchy intent on thwarting major reforms. A republic was proclaimed in September 1792 and King Louis XVI was executed the next year. External threats also played a dominant role in the development of the Revolution.

The French Revolutionary Wars started in 1792 and ultimately featured spectacular French victories that facilitated the conquest of the Italian peninsula, the Low Countries and most

territories west of the Rhine—achievements that had defied previous French governments for centuries.

Internally, popular sentiments radicalized the Revolution significantly, culminating in the rise of Maximilien Robespierre and the Jacobins and virtual dictatorship by the Committee of Public Safety during the Reign of Terror from 1793 until 1794 during which between 16,000 and 40,000 people were killed. After the fall of the Jacobins and the execution of Robespierre, the Directory assumed control of the French state in 1795 and held power until 1799, when it was replaced by the Consulate under Napoleon Bonaparte.

The modern era has unfolded in the shadow of the French Revolution. The growth of republics and liberal democracies, the spread of secularism, the development of modern ideologies and the invention of total war all mark their birth during the Revolution. Subsequent events that can be traced to the Revolution include the Napoleonic Wars, two separate restorations of the monarchy and two additional revolutions as modern France took shape. In the following century, France would be governed at one point or another as a republic, constitutional monarchy and two different empires (the First and Second) All human beings are born free and equal in dignity and rights. They are endowed with reason and conscience and should act towards one another in a spirit of brotherhood.

International concern with HR

International concern over human rights aims at influencing the government that engages in human rights violations to change its attitude towards its own citizens. This concern ranges from friendly influences to political and economic pressures, and in some cases involves direct military intervention to pressure the government to take human rights seriously. The success of international pressure depends on the level of pressure exerted on the target country, the level and kind of linkages (political, economic, defence) between the centres of external pressure and the target state, and the self-confidence of the government to hold social dissatisfaction at home (efficiency of the police state to control dissenting voices). These elements determine the decision of domestic governments as to whether they should cooperate with international pressure centres.

In some cases, when confronting brutal dictators, diplomatic, political and economic leverage seems to be ineffective at stopping massive and consistent violation of basic human rights. Thus, the concern that there should be moral limits to territorial sovereignty leads to a quest for an exception to the non-intervention principle that is believed to guide international relations. Intervention is commonly defined as “dictatorial or coercive interference by an outside party or parties, in the sphere of jurisdiction of a sovereign state”. The elements of “dictatorial or coercive interference” include not only direct military interference but also non-military measures, especially economic ones. If a government takes a stand against foreign governments

to promote their human rights practice and links its relations to some economic and political bilateral relations, this may be regarded from a conventional perspective as an interventionary policy—as a move against the very essence of the sovereign states system.

The foreign policy of sovereign states has traditionally been conducted within the paradigm of the ‘morality of states’ that attaches a moral priority and autonomy to the state, whereas the conception of universal human rights presupposes a notion of cosmopolitan human existence on which world politics should be based. Since the moral autonomy of the state is, in practice, formulated in terms of national sovereignty, a cosmopolitan conception of human rights tends to conflict with this idea of sovereign statehood that has constituted pillar of the modern international system since the Westphalian peace. The claims of the state for domestic jurisdiction over its people and resources are in conflict with any kind of external-universal authoritative moral design for national politics, simply because it would be seen as a breach of the state’s sovereign rights.

Thus from a conventional viewpoint, human rights and foreign policy form an uneasy partnership as each refers to and arranges different political domains. Whereas the former essentially refers to the domestic political structure in which the individual-state relationship is constitutionally determined and practically carried out, the latter conventionally deals with interstate relations without concerning itself with the internal affairs of the other states, *i.e.* the state of human rights. Therefore relations between

states, according to the state-centric view of international relations, are conducted on the basis of mutual respect for sovereignty; that is from where the principle of non-intervention is derived, “if sovereignty then non-intervention”. Here the question is not the rights of individuals and groups, but states.

As autonomous moral entities, states enjoy internationally recognised rights; the most basic of which is territorial sovereignty. If the state is a moral entity, like the individual, then any external intervention will be a violation of the moral autonomy of the state that is granted by its very existence. Interstate relations thus should be based on mutual agreement on the respect for territorial sovereignty that is derived from the autonomy of states; just like individuals, states have autonomous rights and should be left alone to seek their own ends. Furthermore, in an essentially anarchical international system, there is no supreme moral authority (a sovereign) existing above states to impose a higher morality.

The proposition that states are morally autonomous entities has been criticised within the tradition of natural rights theory claiming that the rights of states are derived from individual rights and therefore have no autonomous moral standing. If the ultimate justification for the existence of states is the protection of the natural rights of citizens, “a government that engages in substantial violation of human rights betrays the very purpose for which it exists”. As a result, the government loses not only domestic but also international legitimacy. The liberal argument therefore concludes that the “right of autonomy for states is

derived from the respect of the state for the individual's right of autonomy".

What emerges from this picture is that there is an "inescapable tension" between human rights and foreign policy. The tension is actually between a liberal-universal understanding of human rights and an absolutist notion of territorial sovereignty that gives birth to a realist conception of international relations. When a state makes human rights an issue of inter-state relations, it implies that an essentially national issue is extended to the international arena where states are no longer absolutely sovereign and there is no supreme moral authority to set values for the whole community.

If we take the sovereignty of the state as the absolute right to control and govern resources and citizens, then from this we can derive the principle of non-interference as an absolute rule to govern inter-state relations. But in such an extreme conceptualisation, any expression of displeasure by foreign states about the way in which a state treats its own citizens would constitute an intervention in the sovereign rights of the state. This is so because nobody except the state is morally entitled to decide to organise its political regime as it sees fit. In this context, therefore, the internationalization of human rights necessarily involves a clash with the concept and practice of sovereign statehood with its internal and external implications. Yet, as the former Secretary-General of the UN, Boutros Boutros Ghali, put forward in his Agenda for Peace, "the time of absolute and exclusive sovereignty has passed".

From an international law perspective, it can be furthermore argued that the non-intervention principle is not an absolute norm in the contemporary international normative system. The UN forbids intervention in matters that are within the domestic jurisdiction of another state. But, first it should be decided which matters fall within the domestic jurisdiction of the state before applying the principle to any case. As a demarcation, Henkin and Buergenthal suggested, "To the extent a matter has been internationalised, the traditional prohibition against intervention in the domestic jurisdiction of a state is inapplicable". Many international lawyers are convinced that since the Second World War international undertakings have transformed the human rights issue from domestic jurisdiction to international jurisdiction. Therefore, any concern over human rights cannot be refuted as unwarranted intervention.

Within the international normative order, one can argue that human rights now constitute the basis on which the international legitimacy of a state is determined. To link international legitimacy to respect of the state for human rights is to link it to domestic legitimacy. That means that international legitimacy is derived from domestic legitimacy and thus states do not have an autonomous moral standing divorced from their domestic political institutions and processes, respected by the international community.

In sum, elements of contemporary international society entail a loosening of the absolutist conception of state sovereignty so that human rights are included in the discourse of international

relations without endangering the very existence of the society of states. Development of a normative order of international relations, economic interdependencies and the increasing levels and importance of transnational relations have transformed an atomic view of states in world politics and, to some extent, have weakened both the autonomy and sovereignty of the contemporary state.

Shifting power centres in the contemporary world, alongside national, regional and international agencies have spread sovereign power to these different levels of governance. Additionally, contemporary states cannot ignore demands from domestic society for the inclusion of the human rights issue into foreign-policy making in democratic societies, but at the same time they cannot adopt a liberal-cosmopolitan stand either, for their domestic responsibilities override international moral commitments. This tension, in practice, results in a moderate inclusion of human rights in foreign policy agendas.

Human Rights In Foreign Policy

Relativity of Human Rights

The inclusion of human rights in foreign policy is, however, not free from theoretical and practical difficulties. There are strong arguments both for and against such an undertaking in foreign policy. Despite his rather discursive recognition of the place of morality in politics, Hans Morgenthau, a classic proponent of the realist school, dismisses the inclusion of human rights in foreign

policy as morally misconstrued and practically impossible. He bases his idea of morality in politics on the view that places 'prudence' as the "supreme virtue in politics" without which "there can be no political morality".

He denies then the universality of human rights by invoking the concept of cultural relativism and arguing that our understanding of human rights is shaped by historical and social settings that differ from culture to culture. Therefore, to pursue a human rights policy abroad means imposing one's moral values on others, that is moral imperialism and will make things worse. In recent years, the idea of a 'clash of civilization' as put forward by Mr Huntington reflects the relativist argument from a Western point of view. Mr Huntington argues that the West, with its values and institutions, is not universal but unique.

Thus, the attempt to impose Western values and institutions on the rest is politically imprudent and practically impossible. The uniqueness of civilizations should not only be respected but also have to be put into account in policy planning and implementation. In sum, for Mr Huntington the West can not and should not try to export 'Western' values of democracy and human rights. The political elite of many non-Western countries embrace both the idea of cultural relativism and the inviolability of the state's sovereign rights over its domestic jurisdiction. They are resistant to any idea or move that may seem to compromise the sovereign rights of the state and that may warrant any kind of interference. Many repressive regimes may incline to invoke the particularities of their history and culture, and attempt to

justify policies that violate civil and political rights as understood in the West and expressed by the UN Universal Declaration and the covenants.

Once cultural relativism is accepted as to confine moral considerations at national borders, state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention will set political and practical limits for an international politics of human rights in the face of neo-imperialist charges. However, to object to human rights concerns in foreign policy on the grounds of cultural relativism seems a weak argument.

From a political and legal perspective, not an anthropological one, it can be argued that the UN member states' acceptance of international human rights documents refutes any argument for cultural relativism. Despite different understandings about the content of these documents among international actors, there still exists an almost universal consensus that genocide, arbitrary arrest and execution, systemic torture and racial discrimination are violations of basic human rights. No governments that violate human rights can or would defend their abuses on the basis that their particular culture justifies torture, mass killings, arbitrary arrest, etc.

Thus, authoritarian governments are likely to uphold cultural relativism to justify their oppressive regimes by referring to indigenous cultural and moral values and thereby attempt to secure the silence of the international community. But, at least as far as the physical integrity rights are concerned, there could

be no moral, economic or political grounds that would justify the absence of their provision in any human community.

Priority of Domestic Imperatives: the National Interest

It is also argued that, even if the universality of human rights is accepted, states should not take up human rights as a project because it is a moral fault “for they neglect thereby their citizens”. The prime responsibility of the government is towards its own people. The rights and needs of compatriots come first; any universalist responsibility claim for national governments disregards the immediate rights of the compatriots. Especially in a democratic regime, the government is accountable to the people for what it has done for the security and welfare of its nationals, not those of the international community. People may approve a human rights policy in principle, but not at the expense of their own interest.

From a utilitarian perspective, promotion of the rights of people in foreign countries may seem rather peripheral to foreign-policy making because the purpose of the state is to advance the security and welfare of its citizens, which are not brought about through pursuing a human rights policy abroad. Instead, the security and economic interests of the state are best served by pursuing a pragmatic foreign policy. Criticism of the domestic human rights record of a government would cause reaction, and harm to bilateral relations. Not only will diplomatic relations, which are designed to keep communication channels open to

maintain “good relations” between governments, be put in jeopardy, but economic and political relations will also suffer.

But the problem in this line of argument is that the pursuit of human rights in foreign policy does not necessarily hamper the interest of the citizens at large; it will not directly put people’s interest in jeopardy. An international awareness about the rights of every individual threatened by his or her own government does not harm the interests of people in democratic countries. Diplomatic protests and cutting off military and economic assistance are not necessarily pursued at the expense of citizens’ interests.

Quite contrary to the argument that democracy and international concern about human rights are not compatible, the very existence of democracy forces governments to take an international stand against the violation of human rights in other countries. International human rights are a reflection of democratic principles and values, and a product of the democratization process through which domestic interest and pressure arose to include human rights concern in foreign policy. In this context, one can observe that the presence and activities of NGOs in liberal democracies have played a very significant role in the process of including human rights concerns in the foreign-policy making of major Western governments. A related group of arguments against human rights in foreign policy is based on the view that such a policy may constrain the pursuit of national interest as the primary goal of foreign policy. Economic and

strategic considerations must always be given priority in the conduct of foreign policy.

Therefore, human rights should not be allowed to upset the stability of interstate relations and the pursuit of strategic interests. National security interests also compel the treatment of allies and adversaries differently. Hence, we can not put all violations of human rights in foreign countries in one basket. Once the human rights issue conflicts with other foreign policy objectives, the priority should be given to the latter.

As for the argument that security and economic interests override all other secondary concerns, it could be maintained that both security and economic interests and the objectives of human rights policy can be obtained at the same time. One can even argue that there is an interdependency between international peace and security, on the one hand, and respect for human rights on the other. A political regime based on the values of human rights reinforces international security and facilitates global economic integration providing the framework for national welfare.

Furthermore, when economic and strategic interests are set within a long-term perspective in foreign policy, the advancement of human rights in a foreign country may serve the other objectives too. The case of the transformation of Eastern Europe is a relevant example. Though we cannot exclusively attribute the liberal revolutions that took place in Eastern Europe to Western human rights policy vis-a-vis the East, democratisation of

Eastern Europe served both Western economic and strategic interests and the betterment of human rights conditions for the local peoples.

Primacy of International Order and Security

Another group of arguments against the inclusion of human rights in foreign policy is based on the idea of the primacy of international order. Once the maintenance of international order is set as a priority in international relations, international promotion of human rights is believed to lead to some consequences that are not compatible with this priority. International order is defined as “a pattern of activity that sustains the elementary or primary goals of the international society”. The two elementary or primary goals of international society are to preserve both the society of states itself and the external sovereignty of its constituent units. Here human rights emerge as a challenge to international society with its emphasis on the rights of individuals, not that of the state, and its prescription for a recognition and protection of the rights of man on a transnational base.

If human rights assume not only a moral but also a legal form that justifies interference in the domestic jurisdiction of a sovereign state to protect the human rights of its citizens, “the basic rules of the society may be undermined”. Thus, the priority of order in the international system overrides demands for universal human rights. Order and justice, like foreign policy and universal human rights are taken as contending paradigms.

Referring to the formative years of the modern international system, Bull asserts, "In an international society of this sort, which treats the maintenance of order among states as the highest value, the very idea of human or natural rights...is potentially disruptive."

Against the argument for the international order, it may simply be asserted that a concern for human rights in foreign policy does not necessarily lead to an interventionist policy and endanger peace and stability. The order of interstate relations depends on many other variables. There is a chain of interdependence with regard to political, economic and defence issues that can not be broken easily because of resentment caused by an expressed concern for human rights from another country. There has also developed an understanding among states that the human rights issue has become an international concern. Therefore, many states are increasingly getting prepared for compromise on their human rights policies at home in the face of external criticism or pressure.

Furthermore, international peace and order are sustained better in an international system that consists of countries respectful of human rights. Therefore, it is not convincing that in the long run all cases of humanitarian concern via foreign policy are likely to create international instability and unlikely to result in positive domestic changes. One can also argue that the universal acceptance of the legitimacy of intervention, within a UN mandate for example, may deter states from engaging in consistent

massive violation of human rights and raise standards of observation of human rights world wide.

There is also a correlative relationship between peace at home and peace in the world. Global stability and peace cannot be separated from stability and peace within the states that comprise the international system. In other words, there is an undeniable connection between domestic political structure and the attitudes of the state vis-a-vis the external world. The behaviour of a state in the international arena cannot be separated from the way in which it treats its own citizens at home. This is to say that the kind of political regime prevalent domestically strongly influences its policy towards the outside world.

A government that does not respect its own people's basic human rights may well also be a source of tension and conflict in world politics. Therefore, threats to world order do not come from the internationalisation of human rights, but in the long term, from tyrannical sovereign states. As a result, the inclusion of human rights issues in foreign-policy making would not necessarily increase tension in world politics, on the contrary it may stabilise and standardise the behaviour of states at home and abroad.

Furthermore, an international human rights regime with mechanisms to uphold human rights globally and a genuine interest in the fate of human rights in interstate relations may also contribute to international peace and stability through the

formation of a politically homogeneous international system composed of states respectful to human rights. As Aron puts it, a homogeneous international system based on the society of states sharing common principles, *i.e.* democratic international society, is more conducive to security, peace and order. From a Kantian standpoint, it has also been argued that “perpetual peace” can only be achieved in an international system consisted of “republics”. Such a moral proposition can be supported by empirical data confirming that “democracies are unlikely to go to war against each other”. Lastly, violations of human rights do not only harm individuals, groups or the people in the country concerned but may well endanger others, particularly regional countries, for repercussions of human rights violations cannot be confined within national borders. For instance, the flow of refugees that is one of the most tragic outcomes of human rights violations may reach a massive scale in some cases, with grave security implications for the sending and receiving countries, damaging both regional and international security. In fact, in recent years, the Security Council of the United Nations in its resolutions has come to make a linkage between international peace and security and humanitarian crises.

Therefore, the search for global peace and security starts with improving human rights conditions at a domestic level since there exists a clear-cut linkage between national and international security. Therefore, while the respect for human rights enhances national security the state that is involved in systematic violations of human rights endangers not only national but also international peace and security.

State-Centric View of International Politics

There is no doubt that the state-centric view of international politics has not faded away completely, but it is also obvious that this view is unsustainable in its traditional form. The traditional view of state sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention have been challenged by economic interdependencies, transnational organisations and movements, and legal obligations undertaken by states that raise the individual as a subject of international politics and law.

In the face of emerging awareness for transnational protection of the rights of individuals in global politics, the rights of states are not as central to international politics and law as they used to be. While liberal-democratic states respond and contribute to the internationalisation of human rights through their foreign policy, the illiberal states try to resist to the activities of transnational civil society and liberal states by invoking an absolutist notion of national sovereignty and the principle of non-intervention. Yet, the process of globalisation in the realms of politics, economics and communication technology weakens the ability of both liberal and illiberal states to control the national space, thus eroding the conventional sovereign power of the state. The sovereign realm of the state has come to be shared both by global actors and regional-local centres of power at national level. Along these lines, demands for human rights, with their cross-national characteristics, forces the conventional notion of sovereignty to transform itself so as to allow some degree of economic and

political intervention. Growing global awareness for protecting the rights of individuals through transnational norms, institutions and processes, limits the sovereign rights of states at national and international levels.

State Responsibility for Human Rights

The obligation to protect, promote and ensure the enjoyment of human rights is the prime responsibility of States, thereby conferring on States responsibility for the human rights of individuals. Many human rights are owed by States to all people within their territories, while certain human rights are owed by a State to particular groups of people: for example, the right to vote in elections is only owed to citizens of a State. State responsibilities include the obligation to take pro-active measures to ensure that human rights are protected by providing effective remedies for persons whose rights are violated, as well as measures against violating the rights of persons within its territory.

Under international law, the enjoyment of certain rights can be restricted in specific circumstances. For example, if an individual is found guilty of a crime after a fair trial, the State may lawfully restrict a person's freedom of movement by imprisonment. Restrictions on civil and political rights may only be imposed if the limitation is determined by law but only for the purposes of securing due recognition of the rights of others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society.

Economic, social and cultural rights may be limited by law, but only insofar as the limitation is compatible with the nature of the rights and solely to promote the general welfare in a democratic society. In a legitimate and declared state of emergency, States can take measures which limit or suspend (or. derogate. from) the enjoyment of certain rights. Such derogations are permitted only to the extent necessary for the situation and may never involve discrimination based on race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin. Any derogation must be reported to the Secretary- General of the United Nations.

However, in accordance with article 4, of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), certain human rights. non-derogable rights. may never be suspended or restricted even in situations of war and armed conflict. These include the right to life, freedom from torture, freedom from enslavement or servitude and freedom of thought, conscience and religion. In addition, in times of armed conflict where humanitarian law applies, human rights law continues to afford protection.

In order to understand international environmental law, it is of value to have some basic understanding of general international law. International environmental law is a sub-sector of international law, and international law has been developing over along period of time. A significant part of international environmental law is incorporated in Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs).

Humanitarian law

International humanitarian law (sometimes referred to as “the law of armed Conflict” and “the law of war”) is a body of principles and norms intended to limit human suffering in times of armed conflict and to prevent atrocities. It can be defined as that part of international law—comprising international treaty and customary law—which seeks to protect persons who are not, or are no longer, taking part in the hostilities (*i.e.* sick, wounded or shipwrecked combatants, prisoners of war and civilians), and to restrict the method and means of warfare between parties to a conflict. The 1864 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded in Armies in the Field laid the foundations for contemporary humanitarian law.

The 1874 Diplomatic Conference and the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 constitute important milestones. Modern international humanitarian law is mainly embodied in the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 (188 States Parties) and the two 1977 Protocols Additional to those Conventions (152 and 144 States Parties respectively), namely:

- Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field;
- Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked members of the Armed Forces at Sea;

- Geneva Convention relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War;
- Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War;
- Additional Protocol I relative to the Protection of victims of international armed conflicts;
- Additional Protocol II relative to the Protection of victims of non international armed conflicts.

Significantly, common to all Geneva Conventions is article 3 which establishes minimum rules to be observed by each party to an internal armed conflict. This article provides that persons taking no active part in the hostilities shall in all circumstances be treated humanely, without adverse distinction. and the wounded and sick shall be collected and cared for

Other humanitarian law instruments deal with topics as diverse as the protection of cultural property in the event of armed conflict, the prohibition of biological and chemical weapons and of certain conventional weapons which may be deemed to be excessively injurious or to have indiscriminate effects. Recent examples of humanitarian law are the 1995 Protocol on Blinding Laser Weapons and the 1997 Convention on the Prohibition of Anti- Personnel Mines, Ottawa Treaty, which entered into force on 1 March 1999.

Link Between Humanitarian and Human Rights Law

Humanitarian law and human rights law were traditionally regarded as separate areas of international law. Human rights law setting standards for State conduct in guaranteeing the rights and freedoms of individuals and humanitarian law providing standards for the protection of war victims and the manner in which hostilities are conducted. In other words, it was thought that human rights law was less applicable in situations of humanitarian emergency and armed conflict. Those holding this view pointed to the provisions in the ICCPR which permit States to derogate temporarily from some civil and political rights in times of public emergency which threaten the life of the nation.

However, the provisions of most international human rights instruments apply even in times of armed conflict. The need to safeguard human rights during armed conflict has been given priority, as human rights are recognized as integral to peace and security. In 1966, the then Secretary-General investigated the extent to which international human rights instruments protected human rights in times of armed conflict. It was found that the major international instruments, for example the International Bill of Human Rights, provided for a broader spectrum of human rights protection than the Geneva Conventions.

This acknowledgement guided the adoption by the Teheran World Conference on Human Rights in 1968 and the General Assembly

in 1970 of a number of resolutions recognizing that fundamental human rights in international instruments continue to apply in situations of armed conflict. Similarly, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action called on all States and all parties to armed conflicts to pay strict observance to international humanitarian law as well as to the minimum standards required for protecting human rights.

In 1996, the Commission on Human Rights recognized the need to identify the fundamental principles applicable to situations of internal violence. It is now acknowledged that human rights law and humanitarian law should be viewed in an integrated and holistic manner, where the individual has protection under human rights law at all times, as well as that provided under humanitarian law during periods of armed conflict.

Chapter 2

International Relations and World Politics

History of International relations

International relations (IR) or international affairs, depending on academic institution, is either a field of political science, an interdisciplinary academic field similar to global studies, or an entirely independent academic discipline in which students take a variety of internationally focused courses in social science and humanities disciplines. In both cases, the field studies relationships between *political entities* (polities) such as states, sovereign states, empires, inter-governmental organizations (IGOs), international non-governmental organizations (INs), other non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and multinational corporations (MNCs), and the wider world-systems produced by this interaction. International relations is an academic and a public policy field, and so can be positive and normative, because it analyses and formulates the foreign policy of a given state.

As political activity, international relations dates from the time of the Greek historian Thucydides (c. 460–395 BC), and, in the early 20th century, became a discrete academic field (no. 5901 in the 4-digit UNESCO Nomenclature) within political science. In practice, international relations and international affairs forms a

separate academic program or field from political science, and the courses taught therein are highly interdisciplinary.

For example, international relations draws from the fields of: technology and engineering, economics, communication studies, history, international law, demography, philosophy, geography, social work, sociology, anthropology, criminology, psychology, gender studies, cultural studies, culturology, and diplomacy. The scope of international relations comprehends globalization, diplomatic relations, state sovereignty, international security, ecological sustainability, nuclear proliferation, nationalism, economic development, global finance, as well as terrorism and organized crime, human security, foreign interventionism, and human rights, as well, as, more recently, comparative religion.

The history of international relations can be traced back to thousands of years ago; Barry Buzan and Richard Little, for example, consider the interaction of ancient Sumerian city-states, starting in 3,500 BC, as the first fully-fledged international system.

The history of international relations based on sovereign states is often traced back to the Peace of Westphalia of 1648, a stepping stone in the development of the modern state system. Prior to this the European medieval organization of political authority was based on a vaguely hierarchical religious order. Contrary to popular belief, Westphalia still embodied layered systems of sovereignty, especially within the Holy Roman Empire. More than the Peace of Westphalia, the Treaty of Utrecht of 1713 is thought

to reflect an emerging norm that sovereigns had no internal equals within a defined territory and no external superiors as the ultimate authority within the territory's sovereign borders.

The centuries of roughly 1500 to 1789 saw the rise of the independent, sovereign states, the institutionalization of diplomacy and armies. The French Revolution added to this the new idea that not princes or an oligarchy, but the citizenry of a state, defined as the nation, should be defined as sovereign. Such a state in which the nation is sovereign would thence be termed a nation-state (as opposed to a monarchy or a religious state). The term republic increasingly became its synonym. An alternative model of the nation-state was developed in reaction to the French republican concept by the Germans and others, who instead of giving the citizenry sovereignty, kept the princes and nobility, but defined nation-statehood in ethnic-linguistic terms, establishing the rarely if ever fulfilled ideal that all people speaking one language should belong to one state only. The same claim to sovereignty was made for both forms of nation-state. (It is worth noting that in Europe today, few states conform to either definition of nation-state: many continue to have royal sovereigns, and hardly any are ethnically homogeneous.)

The particular European system supposing the sovereign equality of states was exported to the Americas, Africa, and Asia via colonialism and the "standards of civilization". The contemporary international system was finally established through decolonization during the Cold War. However, this is somewhat over-simplified. While the nation-state system is considered

"modern", many states have not incorporated the system and are termed "pre-modern".

Further, a handful of states have moved beyond insistence on full sovereignty, and can be considered "post-modern". The ability of contemporary IR discourse to explain the relations of these different types of states is disputed. "Levels of analysis" is a way of looking at the international system, which includes the individual level, the domestic state as a unit, the international level of transnational and intergovernmental affairs, and the global level.

What is explicitly recognized as international relations theory was not developed until after World War I, and is dealt with in more detail below. IR theory, however, has a long tradition of drawing on the work of other social sciences. The use of capitalizations of the "I" and "R" in international relations aims to distinguish the academic discipline of international relations from the phenomena of international relations. Many cite Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* (6th century BC), Thucydides' *History of the Peloponnesian War* (5th century BC), Chanakya's *Arthashastra* (4th century BC), as the inspiration for realist theory, with Hobbes' *Leviathan* and Machiavelli's *The Prince* providing further elaboration.

Similarly, liberalism draws upon the work of Kant and Rousseau, with the work of the former often being cited as the first elaboration of democratic peace theory. Though contemporary human rights is considerably different from the type of rights

envisioned under natural law, Francisco de Vitoria, Hugo Grotius and John Locke offered the first accounts of universal entitlement to certain rights on the basis of common humanity. In the 20th century, in addition to contemporary theories of liberal internationalism, Marxism has been a foundation of international relations.

Study of international relations

International relations as a distinct field of study began in Britain. IR emerged as a formal academic discipline in 1919 with the founding of the first IR professorship: the Woodrow Wilson Chair at Aberystwyth, University of Wales (now Aberystwyth University), endowed by David Davies. Georgetown University's Edmund A. Walsh School of Foreign Service is the oldest international relations faculty in the United States, founded in 1919. In the early 1920s, the London School of Economics' department of international relations was founded at the behest of Nobel Peace Prize winner Philip Noel-Baker: this was the first institute to offer a wide range of degrees in the field. This was rapidly followed by establishment of IR at universities in the US and in Geneva, Switzerland. The creation of the posts of Montague Burton Professor of International Relations at LSE and at Oxford gave further impetus to the academic study of international relations. Furthermore, the International History department at LSE developed a focus on the history of IR in the early modern, colonial and Cold War periods. The first university entirely dedicated to the study of IR was the Graduate Institute of International Studies (now the Graduate Institute of

International and Development Studies), which was founded in 1927 to form diplomats associated to the League of Nations. The Committee on International Relations at the University of Chicago was the first to offer a graduate degree, in 1928. In 1965, Glendon College and the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs were the first institutions in Canada to offer an undergraduate and a graduate program in international studies and affairs, respectively. In 2012, Ramon Llull University initiated the first International Relations degree in Barcelona, fully in English.

Theory of International Relations

International relations theory is the study of international relations (IR) from a theoretical perspective. It attempts to provide a conceptual framework upon which international relations can be analyzed. Ole Holsti describes international relations theories as acting like pairs of coloured sunglasses that allow the wearer to see only salient events relevant to the theory; e.g., an adherent of realism may completely disregard an event that a constructivist might pounce upon as crucial, and vice versa. The three most prominent theories are realism, liberalism and constructivism.

International relations theories can be divided into "positivist/rationalist" theories which focus on a principally state-level analysis, and "post-positivist/reflectivist" ones which incorporate expanded meanings of security, ranging from class,

to gender, to postcolonial security. Many often conflicting ways of thinking exist in IR theory, including constructivism, institutionalism, Marxism, neo-Gramscianism, and others. However, two positivist schools of thought are most prevalent: realism and liberalism. Constructivism, however, is increasingly becoming mainstream.

The study of International relations as theory can be traced to E. H. Carr's *The Twenty Years' Crisis* which was published in 1939 and to Hans Morgenthau's *Politics Among Nations* published in 1948. International relations as a discipline is believed to have emerged after the First World War with the establishment of a Chair of International Relations at the University of Wales, Aberystwyth. Early international relations scholarship in the interwar years focused on the need for the balance of power system to be replaced with a system of collective security. These thinkers were later described as "Idealists". The leading critique of this school of thinking was the "realist" analysis offered by Carr.

However, a more recent study by David Long and Brian Schmidt in 2005, offers a revisionist account of the origins of the field International Relations. They claim, that the history of the field can be traced back to late 19th Century imperialism and internationalism. The fact that the history of the field is presented by "great debates", such as the realist-idealist debate does not correspond with the historic evidence found in earlier works: "We should once and for all dispense with the outdated anachronistic artifice of the debate between the idealists and

realists as the dominant framework for and understanding the history of the field". Their revisionist account claims that up until 1918, International Relations already existed in the form of colonial administration, race science and race development.

Explanatory and constitutive approaches in international relations theory is a distinction made when classifying international relations theories. Explanatory theories are ones which see the world as something external to theorize about it. A constitutive theory is one which believes that theories actually help construct the world.

Realism

Realism is an important school of thought in international relations theory, theoretically formalising the realpolitik statesmanship of early modern Europe. Although a highly diverse body of thought, it can be thought of as unified by the belief that world politics ultimately is always and necessarily a field of conflict among actors pursuing power. Crudely, realists are of three kinds in what they take the source of ineliminable conflict to be. Classical realists believe that it follows from human nature, neorealists focus upon the structure of the anarchic state system, and neoclassical realists believe that it is a result of a combination of the two and certain domestic variables. Realists also disagree about what kind of action states ought to take to navigate world politics, dividing between (although most realists fall outside the two groups) defensive realism and offensive realism. Realists have also claimed that a realist tradition of

thought is evident within the history of political thought all the way back to antiquity, including Thucydides, Thomas Hobbes and Niccolò Machiavelli.

Jonathan Haslam from the University of Cambridge characterizes Realism as "a spectrum of ideas." Regardless of which definition is used, the theories of realism revolve around four central propositions:

- That states are the central actors in international politics rather than individuals or international organizations,
- That the international political system is anarchic as there is no supranational authority that can enforce rules over the states,
- That the actors in the international political system are rational as their actions maximize their own self-interest, and
- That all states desire power so that they can ensure their own self-preservation.

Realism is often associated with Realpolitik as both are based on the management of the pursuit, possession, and application of power. *Realpolitik*, however, is an older prescriptive guideline limited to policy-making (like foreign policy), while Realism is a particular paradigm, or wider theoretical and methodological framework, aimed at describing, explaining and, eventually, predicting events in the international relations domain. The

theories of Realism are contrasted by the cooperative ideals of Liberalism.

Common assumptions

Realism is a tradition of international theory centered upon four propositions.

- The international system is anarchic.
- No actor exists above states, capable of regulating their interactions; states must arrive at relations with other states on their own, rather than it being dictated to them by some higher controlling entity.
- The international system exists in a state of constant antagonism.
- States are the most important actors.
- All states within the system are unitary, rational actors
- States tend to pursue self-interest.
- Groups strive to attain as many resources as possible.
- The primary concern of all states is survival.
- States build up military to survive, which may lead to a security dilemma.

In summary, realists think that Mankind is not inherently benevolent but rather self-centered and competitive. This perspective, which is shared by theorists such as Thomas Hobbes, views human nature as egocentric (not necessarily selfish) and conflictual unless there exist conditions under which humans may coexist. It is also disposed of the notion that an

individual's intuitive nature is made up of anarchy. In regards to self-interest, these individuals are self-reliant and are motivated in seeking more power. They are also believed to be fearful. This view contrasts with the approach of liberalism to international relations.

The state emphasizes an interest in accumulating power to ensure security in an anarchic world. Power is a concept primarily thought of in terms of material resources necessary to induce harm or coerce other states (to fight and win wars). The use of power places an emphasis on coercive tactics being acceptable to either accomplish something in the national interest or avoid something inimical to the national interest.

The state is the most important actor under realism. It is unitary and autonomous because it speaks and acts with one voice. The power of the state is understood in terms of its military capabilities.

A key concept under realism is the international distribution of power referred to as system polarity. Polarity refers to the number of blocs of states that exert power in an international system. A multipolar system is composed of three or more blocs, a bipolar system is composed of two blocs, and a unipolar system is dominated by a single power or hegemon.

Under unipolarity realism predicts that states will band together to oppose the hegemon and restore a balance of power. Although all states seek hegemony under realism as the only way to ensure

their own security, other states in the system are incentivised to prevent the emergence of a hegemon through balancing.

States employ the rational model of decision making by obtaining and acting upon complete and accurate information. The state is sovereign and guided by a national interest defined in terms of power. Since the only constraint of the international system is anarchy, there is no international authority and states are left to their own devices to ensure their own security.

Realists believe that Sovereign states are the principal actors in the international system. International institutions, non-governmental organizations, multinational corporations, individuals and other sub-state or trans-state actors are viewed as having little independent influence. States are inherently aggressive (offensive realism) and/or obsessed with security (defensive realism), and that territorial expansion is only constrained by opposing power(s). This aggressive build-up, however, leads to a security dilemma whereby increasing one's security may bring along even greater instability as an opposing power builds up its own arms in response (an arms race). Thus, security becomes a zero-sum game where only *relative gains* can be made.

Realists believe that there are no universal principles with which all states may guide their actions. Instead, a state must always be aware of the actions of the states around it and must use a pragmatic approach to resolve problems as they arise.

Realism in statecraft

- Henry Kissinger
- Zbigniew Brzezinski
- Brent Scowcroft

The ideas behind George F. Kennan's work as a diplomat and diplomatic historian remain relevant to the debate over American foreign policy, which since the 19th century has been characterized by a shift from the Founding Fathers' realist school to the idealistic or Wilsonian school of international relations. In the realist tradition, security is based on the principle of a balance of power and the reliance on morality as the sole determining factor in statecraft is considered impractical. According to the Wilsonian approach, on the other hand, the spread of democracy abroad as a foreign policy is key and morals are universally valid. During the Presidency of Bill Clinton, American diplomacy reflected the Wilsonian school to such a degree that those in favor of the realist approach likened Clinton's policies to social work. According to Kennan, whose concept of American diplomacy was based on the realist approach, such moralism without regard to the realities of power and the national interest is self-defeating and will lead to the erosion of power, to America's detriment.

Realists often hold that statesmen tend towards realism whereas realism is deeply unpopular among the public. When statesmen take actions that divert from realist policies, academic realists often argue that this is due to distortions that stem from

domestic politics. However, some research suggests that realist policies are actually popular among the public whereas elites are more beholden to liberal ideas.

Historical branches and antecedents

Realism as a formal discipline in international relations did not arrive until World War II, its primary assumptions have been expressed in earlier writings:

Modern realism began as a serious field of research in the United States during and after World War II. This evolution was partly fueled by European war migrants like Hans Morgenthau.

- George F. Kennan – containment
- Nicholas Spykman – geostrategy, containment
- Herman Kahn – nuclear strategy
- E. H. Carr

Classical realism

Classical realism states that it is fundamentally the nature of humans that pushes states and individuals to act in a way that places interests over ideologies. Classical realism is an ideology defined as the view that the "drive for power and the will to dominate [that are] held to be fundamental aspects of human nature".

Liberal realism or the English school or rationalism

The English School holds that the international system, while anarchical in structure, forms a "society of states" where common norms and interests allow for more order and stability than that which may be expected in a strict realist view. Prominent English School writer Hedley Bull's 1977 classic, *The Anarchical Society*, is a key statement of this position.

Prominent liberal realists:

- Hedley Bull – argued for both the existence of an international society of states and its perseverance even in times of great systemic upheaval, meaning regional or so-called "world wars"
- Martin Wight
- Barry Buzan

Neorealism or structural realism

Neorealism derives from classical realism except that instead of human nature, its focus is predominantly on the anarchic structure of the *international system*. States are primary actors because there is no political monopoly on force existing above any sovereign. While states remain the principal actors, greater attention is given to the forces above and below the states through levels of analysis or structure-agency debate. The international system is seen as a *structure* acting on the state

with individuals below the level of the state acting as *agency* on the state as a whole.

While neorealism shares a focus on the *international system* with the English School, neorealism differs in the emphasis it places on the permanence of conflict. To ensure state security, states must be on constant preparation for conflict through economic and military build-up.

Prominent neorealists:

- Robert J. Art – neorealism
- Robert Gilpin – hegemonic theory
- Joanne Gowa – neorealism
- Robert Jervis – defensive realism
- John Mearsheimer – offensive realism
- Kenneth Waltz – structural realism
- Stephen Walt – defensive realism

Neoclassical realism

Neoclassical Realism can be seen as the third generation of realism, coming after the classical authors of the first wave (Thucydides, Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes), and the neorealists (esp. Kenneth Waltz). Its designation of "neoclassical", then, has a double meaning:

- It offers the classics a renaissance;
- It is a synthesis of the neorealist and the classical realist approaches.

Gideon Rose is responsible for coining the term in a book review he wrote.

The primary motivation underlying the development of neoclassical realism was the fact that neorealism was only useful to explain political outcomes (classified as being 'theories of international politics'), but had nothing to offer about particular states' behavior (or 'theories of foreign policy'). The basic approach, then, was for these authors to "refine, not refute, Kenneth Waltz", by adding domestic intervening variables between systemic incentives and a state's foreign policy decision. Thus, the basic theoretical architecture of Neoclassical Realism is:

Distribution of power in the international system (independent variable) >>>

Domestic perception of the system and/or domestic incentives (intervening variable) >>>

Foreign policy decision (dependent variable)

While neoclassical realism has only been used for theories of foreign policy so far, Randall Schweller notes that it could be useful to explain certain types of political outcomes as well.

Neoclassical realism is particularly appealing from a research standpoint because it still retains a lot of the theoretical rigor that Waltz has brought to realism, but at the same time can

easily incorporate a content-rich analysis, since its main method for testing theories is the process-tracing of case studies.

Prominent neoclassical realists:

- Randall Schweller
- Thomas J. Christensen
- William Wohlforth
- Aaron Friedberg
- Norrin Ripsman
- Fareed Zakaria
- Tom Dyson
- Jonathan D. Kirshner

Left realism

Several scholars, including Mark Laffey at the School of Oriental and African Studies, and Ronald Osborn at the University of Southern California, have argued for the idea of a "Left Realism" in IR theory with particular reference to the work of Noam Chomsky. Both Laffey and Osborn have suggested in separate articles in *Review of International Studies* that Chomsky's understanding of power in the international sphere reflects the analytical assumptions of classical realism combined with a radical moral, normative or "Left" critique of the state.

Realist constructivism

Some see a complementarity between realism and constructivism. Samuel Barkin, for instance, holds that "realist constructivism" can fruitfully "study the relationship between normative structures, the carriers of political morality, and uses of power" in ways that existing approaches do not. Similarly, Jennifer Sterling-Folker has argued that theoretical synthesis helps explanations of international monetary policy by combining realism's emphasis of an anarchic system with constructivism's insights regarding important factors from the domestic level. Scholars such as Oded Löwenheim and Ned Lebow have also been associated with realist constructivism.

Criticisms

Democratic peace theory advocates also that realism is not applicable to democratic states' relations with each another, as their studies claim that such states do not go to war with one another. However, Realists and proponents of other schools have critiqued both this claim and the studies which appear to support it, claiming that its definitions of "war" and "democracy" must be tweaked in order to achieve the desired result.

Hegemonic peace

Robert Gilpin developed the theory of hegemonic stability theory within the realist framework, but limited it to the economic field. Niall Ferguson remarked that the theory has offered insights into

the way that economic power works, but neglected the military and cultural aspects of power. Historian Max Ostrovsky applied the theory to political field. Comparing different civilizations, he found that the core of the realist paradigm—the balance of power—was in world history exception from the rule. The rule was unipolar orders ranging from hegemonies to empires. Persistent worldwide hegemony and empire are both possible and probable. There is a causal link between democracy and peace but the link is reverse: peace causes democracy, while the cause of peace is the unipolar distribution of power and the hegemonic world order.

Federalism

The term refers to the theory or advocacy of federal political orders, where final authority is divided between sub-units and a centre. Unlike a unitary state, sovereignty is constitutionally split between at least two territorial levels so that units at each level have final authority and can act independently of the others in some area. Citizens thus have political obligations to two authorities. The allocation of authority between the sub-unit and centre may vary. Typically the centre has powers regarding defence and foreign policy, but sub-units may also have international roles. The sub-units may also participate in central decision-making bodies.

The basic idea behind federalism is that a unifying relationship between states should be established under a common system of law. Conflict and disagreement should be resolved through

peaceful means rather than through coercion or war. Its most important aspect is in recognizing that different types of institutions are needed to deal with different types of political issues.

Post-realism

Post-realism suggests that Realism is a form of social, scientific and political rhetoric. It closes rather than opens a debate about what is real and what is realistic in international relations.

Prominent Post-Realists:

- Francis A. Beer
- James Der Derian
- Robert Hariman
- Michael J. Shapiro

Neorealism (international relations)

Neorealism or structural realism is a theory of international relations that says power is the most important factor in international relations. It was first outlined by Kenneth Waltz in his 1979 book *Theory of International Politics*. Alongside neoliberalism, neorealism is one of the most influential contemporary approaches to international relations; the two perspectives have dominated international relations theory for the last three decades. Neorealism emerged from the North American discipline of political science, and reformulates the

classical realist tradition of E.H. Carr, Hans Morgenthau, and Reinhold Niebuhr.

Neo-realism is subdivided into defensive and offensive neo-realism:

Origins

Neorealism is an ideological departure from Hans Morgenthau's writing on classical realism. Classical realism originally explained the machinations of international politics as being based on human nature, and therefore subject to the ego and emotion of world leaders. Neorealist thinkers instead propose that structural constraints—not strategy, egoism, or motivation—will determine behavior in international relations. Kenneth Waltz made significant distinctions between his position on the three types of international relations in defensive neorealism and that of Morgenthau in his book *Man, the State, and War* from the late 1950s. John Mearsheimer made significant distinctions between his version of offensive neorealism and Morgenthau in this co-authored book on Israel with Stephen Walt at Harvard University titled *The Israel Lobby and U.S. Foreign Policy*.

Theory

Structural realism holds that the nature of the international structure is defined by its ordering principle, anarchy, and by the distribution of capabilities (measured by the number of great powers within the international system). The anarchic ordering

principle of the international structure is decentralized, meaning there is no formal central authority; every sovereign state is formally equal in this system. These states act according to the logic of self-help, meaning states seek their own interest and will not subordinate their interest to the interests of other states.

States are assumed at a minimum to want to ensure their own survival as this is a prerequisite to pursue other goals. This driving force of survival is the primary factor influencing their behavior and in turn ensures states develop offensive military capabilities for foreign interventionism and as a means to increase their relative power. Because states can never be certain of other states' future intentions, there is a lack of trust between states which requires them to be on guard against relative losses of power which could enable other states to threaten their survival. This lack of trust, based on uncertainty, is called the security dilemma.

States are deemed similar in terms of needs but not in capabilities for achieving them. The positional placement of states in terms of abilities determines the distribution of capabilities. The structural distribution of capabilities then limits cooperation among states through fears of relative gains made by other states, and the possibility of dependence on other states. The desire and relative abilities of each state to maximize relative power constrain each other, resulting in a 'balance of power', which shapes international relations. It also gives rise to the 'security dilemma' that all nations face. There are two ways in which states balance power: internal balancing and external

balancing. Internal balancing occurs as states grow their own capabilities by increasing economic growth and/or increasing military spending. External balancing occurs as states enter into alliances to check the power of more powerful states or alliances.

Neorealists contend that there are essentially three possible systems according to changes in the distribution of capabilities, defined by the number of great powers within the international system. A unipolar system contains only one great power, a bipolar system contains two great powers, and a multipolar system contains more than two great powers. Neorealists conclude that a bipolar system is more stable (less prone to great power war and systemic change) than a multipolar system because balancing can only occur through internal balancing as there are no extra great powers with which to form alliances. Because there is only internal balancing in a bipolar system, rather than external balancing, there is less opportunity for miscalculations and therefore less chance of great power war. That is a simplification and a theoretical ideal.

Scholarly debate

While neorealists agree that the structure of the international relations is the primary impetus in seeking security, there is disagreement among neorealist scholars as to whether states merely aim to survive or whether states want to maximize their relative power. The former represents the ideas of Kenneth Waltz and defensive realism while the latter represents the ideas of John Mearsheimer and offensive realism.

With other schools of thought

Neorealists conclude that because war is an effect of the anarchic structure of the international system, it is likely to continue in the future. Indeed, neorealists often argue that the ordering principle of the international system has not fundamentally changed from the time of Thucydides to the advent of nuclear warfare. The view that long-lasting peace is not likely to be achieved is described by other theorists as a largely pessimistic view of international relations. One of the main challenges to neorealist theory is the democratic peace theory and supporting research such as the book *Never at War*. Neorealists answer this challenge by arguing that democratic peace theorists tend to pick and choose the definition of democracy to get the wanted empirical result. For example, the Germany of Kaiser Wilhelm II, the Dominican Republic of Juan Bosch, or the Chile of Salvador Allende are not considered to be "democracies of the right kind" or the conflicts do not qualify as wars according to these theorists. Furthermore, they claim several wars between democratic states have been averted only by causes other than ones covered by democratic peace theory.

Advocates of democratic peace theory see the spreading of democracy as helping to mitigate the effects of anarchy. With enough democracies in the world, Bruce Russett thinks that it "may be possible in part to supersede the 'realist' principles (anarchy, the security dilemma of states) that have dominated practice... since at least the seventeenth century." John Mueller believes that it is not the spreading of democracy but rather

other conditions (e.g., power) that bring about democracy and peace. Confirming Mueller's argument, Kenneth Waltz notes that "some of the major democracies—Britain in the nineteenth century and the United States in the twentieth century—have been among the most powerful states of their eras."

Liberalism

Liberalism (international relations)

Liberalism is a school of thought within international relations theory which can be thought to revolve around three interrelated principles:

- Rejection of power politics as the only possible outcome of international relations. Questions security/warfare principles of realism
- Accentuates mutual benefits and international cooperation
- Implements international organizations and nongovernmental actors for shaping state preferences and policy choices.

Liberals believe that international institutions play a key role in cooperation among states. With the correct international institutions, and increasing interdependence (including economic and cultural exchanges) states have the opportunity to reduce conflict. Interdependence has three main components. States interact in various ways, through economic, financial, and

cultural means; security tends to not be the primary goal in state-to-state interactions; and military forces are not typically used. Liberals also argue that international diplomacy can be a very effective way to get states to interact with each other honestly and support nonviolent solutions to problems. With the proper institutions and diplomacy, Liberals believe that states can work together to maximize prosperity and minimize conflict.

Liberalism is one of the main schools of international relations theory. Liberalism comes from the Latin "liber" meaning "free", referred originally to the philosophy of freedom. Its roots lie in the broader liberal thought originating in the Enlightenment. The central issues that it seeks to address are the problems of achieving lasting peace and cooperation in international relations, and the various methods that could contribute to their achievement.

Areas of study

Broad areas of study within liberal international relations theory include:

- The democratic peace theory, and, more broadly, the effect of domestic political regime types and domestic politics on international relations;
- The commercial peace theory, arguing that free trade has pacifying effects on international relations. Current explorations of globalization and

interdependence are a broader continuation of this line of inquiry;

- Institutional peace theory, which attempts to demonstrate how cooperation can be sustained in anarchy, how long-term interests can be pursued over short-term interests, and how actors may realize absolute gains instead of seeking relative gains;
- Related, the effect of international organizations on international politics, both in their role as forums for states to pursue their interests, and in their role as actors in their own right;
- The role of international law in moderating or constraining state behavior;
- The effects of liberal norms on international politics, especially relations between liberal states;
- The role of various types of unions in international politics (relations), such as highly institutionalized alliances (e.g. NATO), confederations, leagues, federations, and evolving entities like the European Union; and,
- The role, or potential role, of cosmopolitanism in transcending the state and affecting international relations.

Early beginnings

Liberalism originally arose from both deep scholarly and philosophical roots. With the theory's prime principle being international cooperation and peace, early influences are seen in

some bigger religious practices sharing the same goal. It was later in the 17th and 18th centuries in which political liberalism began to take form that challenged nobility and inherited equality. Followed shortly after was the Enlightenment where liberal ideals began to develop with works by philosophers such as Voltaire, Locke, Smith, and German thinker Immanuel Kant. In part, liberal scholars were influenced by the Thirty Years' War and the Enlightenment. The length, and disastrous affects of the Thirty Years' War caused a common disdain for warfare throughout much of Europe. Thinkers, like Locke and Kant, wrote about what they saw in the world around them. They believed that war is fundamentally unpopular and that man is born with certain rights because the end of the Thirty Years' War proved these ideas to them.

John Locke discusses many ideas that are now attributed to Liberalism in *Two Treatises of Government*, published in 1689. In his second treatise, Locke comments on society and outlines the importance of natural rights and laws. Locke believes that people are born as blank slates without any preordained ideas or notions. This state is known as the State of Nature because it shows people in their most barbaric form. As people grow, their experiences begin to shape their thoughts and actions. They are naturally in the State of Nature until they choose not to be, until something changes their barbaric nature. Locke says that, civil government can remedy this anarchy. When it comes to the Law of Nature, people are more likely to act rationally when there is a government in place because there are laws and consequences to abide by. Locke argues that civil government can help people gain

the basic human rights of health, liberty and possession. Governments that grant these rights and enforce laws benefit the world. Many of these ideas have influenced leaders such as the Founding Father's during the American Revolution and French revolutionaries during the French Revolution.

In Kant's *To Perpetual Peace*, the philosopher set the way by forming guidelines to create a peace program to be applied by nations. This program would require cooperation between states as well as the mutual pursuit of secure freedom and shared benefits. One such idea was the Democratic Peace Theory. In *To Perpetual Peace*, Kant put forth the idea that democracies do not fight wars because leaders were too worried about re-election. Because war was naturally unpopular, Kant thought that leaders would avoid burdening voters with its costs. After seeing success in intertwining states through economic coalition, liberal supporters began to believe that warfare was not always an inevitable part of IR. Support of liberal political theory continued to grow from there.

Liberal theory today

Kant's Democratic Peace Theory has since been revised by Neoliberals like Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye. These theorists have seen that democracies do in fact fight wars. However, democracies do not fight wars with other democracies because of capitalist ties. Democracies are economically dependent and therefore are more likely to resolve issues diplomatically. Furthermore, citizens in democracies are less

likely to think of citizens in other democracies as enemies because of shared morals. Kant's original ideas have influenced liberalist scholars and have had a large impact on liberal thought.

Neoliberalism (international relations)

In the study of international relations, neoliberalism refers to a school of thought which believes that states are, or at least should be, concerned first and foremost with absolute gains rather than relative gains to other states. Neoliberalism is not the same as neoliberal economic ideology, although both theories use common methodologies, which include game theory.

Activities of the international system

Neoliberal international relations thinkers often employ game theory to explain why states do or do not cooperate; since their approach tends to emphasize the possibility of mutual wins, they are interested in institutions which can arrange jointly profitable arrangements and compromises.

Neoliberalism is a response to Neorealism; while not denying the anarchic nature of the international system, neoliberals argue that its importance and effect has been exaggerated. The neoliberal argument is focused on neorealists' alleged underestimation of "the varieties of cooperative behavior possible within... a decentralized system." Both theories, however, consider the state and its interests as the central subject of

analysis; neoliberalism may have a wider conception of what those interests *are*.

Neoliberalism argues that even in an anarchic system of autonomous rational states, cooperation can emerge through the cultivation of mutual trust and the building of norms, regimes and institutions.

In terms of the scope of international relations theory and foreign interventionism, the debate between Neoliberalism and Neorealism is an intra-paradigm one, as both theories are positivist and focus mainly on the state system as the primary unit of analysis.

Development

Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye are considered the founders of the neoliberal school of thought; Keohane's book *After Hegemony* is a classic of the genre. Other major influences are the hegemonic stability theory of Stephen Krasner and the work of Charles P. Kindleberger, among others.

Contentions

Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, in response to neorealism, develop an opposing theory they dub "Complex interdependence." Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye explain, "... complex interdependence sometimes comes closer to reality than does realism." In explaining this, Keohane and Nye cover the three

assumptions in realist thought: First, states are coherent units and are the dominant actors in international relations; second, force is a usable and effective instrument of policy; and finally, the assumption that there is a hierarchy in international politics.

The heart of Keohane and Nye's argument is that in international politics there are, in fact, multiple channels that connect societies exceeding the conventional Westphalian system of states. This manifests itself in many forms ranging from informal governmental ties to multinational corporations and organizations. Here they define their terminology; interstate relations are those channels assumed by realists; *transgovernmental* relations occur when one relaxes the realist assumption that states act coherently as units; *transnational* applies when one removes the assumption that states are the only units. It is through these channels that political exchange occurs, not through the limited interstate channel as championed by realists.

Secondly, Keohane and Nye argue that there is not, in fact, a hierarchy among issues, meaning that not only is the martial arm of foreign policy not the supreme tool by which to carry out a state's agenda, but that there are a multitude of different agendas that come to the forefront. The line between domestic and foreign policy becomes blurred in this case, as realistically there is no clear agenda in interstate relations.

Finally, the use of military force is not exercised when complex interdependence prevails. The idea is developed that between

countries in which a complex interdependence exists, the role of the military in resolving disputes is negated. However, Keohane and Nye go on to state that the role of the military is in fact important in that "alliance's political and military relations with a rival bloc."

Lebow

Richard Ned Lebow states that the failure of neorealism lies in its "institutionalist" ontology, whereas the neorealist thinker Kenneth Waltz states, "the creators [of the system] become the creatures of the market that their activity gave rise to." This critical failure, according to Lebow, is due to the realists' inability "to escape from the predicament of anarchy." Or rather, the assumption that states do not adapt and will respond similarly to similar constraints and opportunities.

Mearsheimer

Norman Angell, a classical London School of Economics liberal, had held: "We cannot ensure the stability of the present system by the political or military preponderance of our nation or alliance by imposing its will on a rival."

Keohane and Lisa L. Martin expound upon these ideas in the mid 1990s as a response to John J. Mearsheimer's "The False Promise of International Institutions," where Mearsheimer purports that, "institutions cannot get states to stop behaving as short-term power maximizers." In fact Mearsheimer's article is a direct

response to the liberal-institutionalist movement created in response to neo-realism. The central point in Keohane and Martin's idea is that neo-realism insists that, "institutions have only marginal effects... [which] leaves [neo-realism] without a plausible account of the investments that states have made in such international institutions as the EU, NATO, GATT, and regional trading organizations." This idea is in keeping with the notion of complex interdependence. Moreover, Keohane and Martin argue that the fact that international institutions are created in response to state interests, that the real empirical question is "knowing how to distinguish the effects of underlying conditions from those of the institutions themselves." The debate between the institutionalists and Mearsheimer is about whether institutions have an independent effect on state behavior, or whether they reflect great power interests that said powers employ to advance their respective interests.

Mearsheimer is concerned with 'inner-directed' institutions, which he states, "seek to cause peace by influencing the behavior of the member states." In doing so he dismisses Keohane and Martin's NATO argument in favor of the example of the European Community and the International Energy Agency. According to Mearsheimer, NATO is an alliance that is interested in "an outside state, or coalition of states, which the alliance aims to deter, coerce, or defeat in war." Mearsheimer reasons that since NATO is an alliance it has special concerns. He concedes this point to Keohane and Martin. However, Mearsheimer reasons, "to the extent that alliances cause peace, they do so by deterrence, which is straightforward realist behavior." In essence,

Mearsheimer believes that Keohane and Martin "are shifting the terms of the debate, and making realist claims under the guise of institutionalism.

Mearsheimer criticizes Martin's argument that the European Community (EC) enhances the prospects of cooperation, particularly in the case of Great Britain's sanctioning of Argentina during the Falklands war, where it was able to secure the cooperation of other European states by linking the issues at hand to the EC. Mearsheimer purports that the United States was not a member of the EC and yet the US and Britain managed to cooperate on sanctions, creating an ad hoc alliance which effected change. "... Issue linkage was a commonplace practice in world politics well before institutions came on the scene; moreover, Britain and other European states could have used other diplomatic tactics to solve the problem. After all, Britain and America managed to cooperate on sanctions even though the United States was not a member of the EC."

Post-liberalism

One version of post-liberal theory argues that within the modern, globalized world, states in fact are driven to cooperate in order to ensure security and sovereign interests. The departure from classical liberal theory is most notably felt in the re-interpretation of the concepts of sovereignty and autonomy. Autonomy becomes a problematic concept in shifting away from a notion of freedom, self-determination, and agency to a heavily responsible and duty laden concept. Importantly, autonomy is

linked to a capacity for good governance. Similarly, sovereignty also experiences a shift from a right to a duty. In the global economy, International organizations hold sovereign states to account, leading to a situation where sovereignty is co-produced among "sovereign" states. The concept becomes a variable capacity of good governance and can no longer be accepted as an absolute right. One possible way to interpret this theory, is the idea that in order to maintain global stability and security and solve the problem of the anarchic world system in International Relations, no overarching, global, sovereign authority is created. Instead, states collectively abandon some rights for full autonomy and sovereignty. Another version of post-liberalism, drawing on work in political philosophy after the end of the Cold War, as well as on democratic transitions in particular in Latin America, argues that social forces from below are essential in understanding the nature of the state and the international system. Without understanding their contribution to political order and its progressive possibilities, particularly in the area of peace in local and international frameworks, the weaknesses of the state, the failings of the liberal peace, and challenges to global governance cannot be realised or properly understood. Furthermore, the impact of social forces on political and economic power, structures, and institutions, provides some empirical evidence of the complex shifts currently underway in IR.

Constructivism (international relations)

In the discipline of international relations, constructivism is the claim that significant aspects of international relations are historically and socially constructed, rather than inevitable consequences of human nature or other essential characteristics of world politics.

Development

Nicholas Onuf is usually credited with coining the term "constructivism" to describe theories that stress the socially constructed character of international relations. Contemporary constructivist theory traces its roots to pioneering work not only by Onuf, but also by Richard K. Ashley, Friedrich Kratochwil, John Ruggie, and Christian Reus-Smit. Nevertheless, Alexander Wendt is the best-known advocate of social constructivism in the field of international relations. Wendt's 1992 article "Anarchy is What States Make of It: the Social Construction of Power Politics" published in *International Organization* laid the theoretical groundwork for challenging what he considered to be a flaw shared by both neorealists and neoliberal institutionalists, namely, a commitment to a (crude) form of materialism. By attempting to show that even such a core realist concept as "power politics" is socially constructed—that is, not given by nature and hence, capable of being transformed by human

practice—Wendt opened the way for a generation of international relations scholars to pursue work in a wide range of issues from a constructivist perspective. Wendt further developed these ideas in his central work, *Social Theory of International Politics* (1999).

Since the late 1980s and early 1990s, constructivism has become one of the major schools of thought within international relations. John Ruggie and Christian Reus-Smit have identified several strands of constructivism. On the one hand, there are constructivist scholars such as Martha Finnemore, Kathryn Sikkink, Peter Katzenstein, Elizabeth Kier, and Alexander Wendt, whose work has been widely accepted within the mainstream IR community and has generated vibrant scholarly discussions among realists, liberals, institutionalists, and constructivists. On the other hand, there are radical constructivists who take discourse and linguistics more seriously.

Theory

Constructivism primarily seeks to demonstrate how core aspects of international relations are, contrary to the assumptions of Neorealism and Neoliberalism, *socially constructed*, that is, they are given their form by ongoing processes of social practice and interaction. Alexander Wendt calls two increasingly accepted basic tenets of Constructivism "that the structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than material forces, and that the identities and interests of purposive actors are constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature". The notion that international relations are not only

affected by power politics, but also by ideas, is shared by writers who describe themselves as *constructivist theorists*. According to this view, the fundamental structures of international politics are social rather than strictly material. This leads to *social constructivists* to argue that changes in the nature of social interaction between states can bring a fundamental shift towards greater international security.

Challenging realism

During Constructivism's formative period Neorealism was the dominant discourse of international relations, thus much of Constructivism's initial theoretical work challenged basic Neorealist assumptions. Neorealists are fundamentally causal *Structuralists*, in that they hold that the majority of important content to international politics is explained by the structure of the international system, a position first advanced in Kenneth Waltz's *Man, the State, and War* and fully elucidated in his core text of Neorealism, *Theory of International Politics*. Specifically, international politics is primarily determined by the fact that the international system is anarchic – it lacks any overarching authority, instead it is composed of units (states) which are formally equal – they are all sovereign over their own territory. Such anarchy, Neorealists argue, forces States to act in certain ways, specifically, they can rely on no-one but themselves for security (they have to *Self-help*). The way in which anarchy forces them to act in such ways, to defend their own self-interest in terms of power, Neorealists argue, explains most of international politics. Because of this, Neorealists tend to disregard

explanations of international politics at the "unit" or "state" level. Kenneth Waltz attacked such a focus as being reductionist.

Constructivism, particularly in the formative work of Wendt, challenges this assumption by showing that the causal powers attributed to "structure" by Neorealists are in fact not "given", but rest on the way in which Structure is constructed by social practice. Removed from presumptions about the nature of the identities and interests of the actors in the system, and the meaning that social institutions (including Anarchy) have for such actors, Wendt argues Neorealism's "structure" reveals very little: "it does not predict whether two states will be friends or foes, will recognize each other's sovereignty, will have dynastic ties, will be revisionist or status quo powers, and so on". Because such features of behavior are not explained by Anarchy, and require instead the incorporation of evidence about the interests and identities held by key actors, Neorealism's focus on the material structure of the system (Anarchy) is misplaced. But Wendt goes further than this – arguing that because the way in which Anarchy constrains states depends on the way in which States conceive of Anarchy, and conceive of their own identities and interests, Anarchy is not necessarily even a 'self-help' system. It only forces states to self-help if they conform to Neorealist assumptions about states as seeing security as a competitive, relative concept, where the gain of security for any one state means the loss of security for another. If States instead hold alternative conceptions of security, either "co-operative", where states can maximise their security without negatively affecting the security of another, or "collective" where states

identify the security of other states as being valuable to themselves, Anarchy will not lead to self-help at all. Neorealist conclusions, as such, depend entirely on unspoken and unquestioned assumptions about the way in which the meaning of social institutions are constructed by actors. Crucially, because Neorealists fail to recognize this dependence, they falsely assume that such meanings are unchangeable, and exclude the study of the processes of social construction which actually do the key explanatory work behind Neorealist observations.

Identities and interests

As Constructivists reject Neorealism's conclusions about the determining effect of anarchy on the behavior of international actors, and move away from Neorealism's underlying materialism, they create the necessary room for the identities and interests of international actors to take a central place in theorizing international relations. Now that actors are not simply governed by the imperatives of a self-help system, their identities and interests become important in analyzing how they behave. Like the nature of the international system, Constructivists see such identities and interests as not objectively grounded in material forces (such as dictates of the human nature that underpins Classical Realism) but the result of ideas and the social construction of such ideas. In other words, the meanings of ideas, objects, and actors are all given by social interaction. We give objects their meanings and can attach different meanings to different things. Martha Finnemore has been influential in examining the way in which international organizations are

involved in these processes of the social construction of actor's perceptions of their interests. In *National Interests In International Society*, Finnemore attempts to "develop a systemic approach to understanding state interests and state behavior by investigating an international structure, not of power, but of meaning and social value". "Interests", she explains, "are not just 'out there' waiting to be discovered; they are constructed through social interaction". Finnemore provides three case studies of such construction – the creation of Science Bureaucracies in states due to the influence of UNESCO, the role of the Red Cross in the Geneva Conventions and the World Bank's influence of attitudes to poverty.

Studies of such processes are examples of the Constructivist attitude towards state interests and identities. Such interests and identities are central determinants of state behavior, as such studying their nature and their formation is integral in Constructivist methodology to explaining the international system. But it is important to note that despite this refocus onto identities and interests—properties of States—Constructivists are not necessarily wedded to focusing their analysis at the unit-level of international politics: the state. Constructivists such as Finnemore and Wendt both emphasize that while ideas and processes tend to explain the social construction of identities and interests, such ideas and processes form a structure of their own which impact upon international actors. Their central difference from Neorealists is to see the structure of international politics in primarily ideational, rather than material, terms.

Research areas

Many constructivists analyze international relations by looking at goals, threats, fears, cultures, identities, and other elements of "social reality" as social facts. In an important edited volume, *The Culture of National Security*, constructivist scholars—including Elizabeth Kier, Jeffrey Legro, and Peter Katzenstein - challenged many realist assumptions about the dynamics of international politics, particularly in the context of military affairs. Thomas J. Biersteker and Cynthia Weber applied constructivist approaches to understand the evolution of state sovereignty as a central theme in international relations, and works by Rodney Bruce Hall and Daniel Philpott (among others) developed constructivist theories of major transformations in the dynamics of international politics. In international political economy, the application of constructivism has been less frequent. Notable examples of constructivist work in this area include Kathleen R. McNamara's study of European Monetary Union and Mark Blyth's analysis of the rise of Reaganomics in the United States.

By focusing on how language and rhetoric are used to construct the social reality of the international system, constructivists are often seen as more optimistic about progress in international relations than versions of realism loyal to a purely materialist ontology, but a growing number of constructivists question the "liberal" character of constructivist thought and express greater sympathy for realist pessimism concerning the possibility of emancipation from power politics.

Constructivism is often presented as an alternative to the two leading theories of international relations, realism and liberalism, but some maintain that it is not necessarily inconsistent with one or both. Wendt shares some key assumptions with leading realist and neorealist scholars, such as the existence of anarchy and the centrality of states in the international system. However, Wendt renders anarchy in cultural rather than materialist terms; he also offers a sophisticated theoretical defense of the state-as-actor assumption in international relations theory. This is a contentious issue within segments of the IR community as some constructivists challenge Wendt on some of these assumptions. It has been argued that progress in IR theory will be achieved when Realism and Constructivism can be aligned or even synthesized. An early example of such synthesis was Jennifer Sterling-Folker's analysis of the United States' international monetary policy following the Bretton Woods system. Sterling-Folker argued that the U.S. shift towards unilateralism is partially accounted for by realism's emphasis of an anarchic system, but constructivism helps to account for important factors from the domestic or second level of analysis.

Recent developments

A significant group of scholars who study processes of social construction self-consciously eschew the label "Constructivist". They argue that "mainstream" constructivism has abandoned many of the most important insights from linguistic turn and social-constructionist theory in the pursuit of respectability as a

"scientific" approach to international relations. Even some putatively "mainstream" constructivists, such as Jeffrey Checkel, have expressed concern that constructivists have gone too far in their efforts to build bridges with non-constructivist schools of thought.

A growing number of constructivists contend that current theories pay inadequate attention to the role of habitual and unreflective behavior in world politics. These advocates of the "practice turn" take inspiration from work in neuroscience, as well as that of social theorists such as Pierre Bourdieu, that stresses the significance of habit and practices in psychological and social life - essentially calling for greater attention and sensitivity towards the 'every day' and 'taken for granted' activities of international politics. Increasingly, these scholars are also moving towards employing the related sociological approach known as Actor-Network Theory (ANT), which extends the early focus of the Practice Turn on the work of Pierre Bourdieu towards that of Bruno Latour and others. Scholars have employed ANT in order to disrupt traditional world political binaries (civilised/barbarian, democratic/autocratic, etc.), consider the implications of a posthuman understanding of IR, explore the infrastructures of world politics, and consider the effects of technological agency.

Chapter 3

Human Rights and Alternative Approaches

Functionalism (international relations)

Several alternative approaches have been developed based on foundationalism, anti-foundationalism, positivism, behaviouralism, structuralism and post-structuralism. These theories however are not widely known.

Behaviouralism in international relations theory is an approach to international relations theory which believes in the unity of science, the idea that the social sciences are not fundamentally different from the natural sciences.

The "English School" of international relations theory, also known as International Society, Liberal Realism, Rationalism or the British institutionalists, maintains that there is a 'society of states' at the international level, despite the condition of "anarchy", i.e., the lack of a ruler or world state. Despite being called the English School many of the academics from this school were neither English nor from the United Kingdom. A great deal of the work of the English School concerns the examination of

traditions of past international theory, casting it, as Martin Wight did in his 1950s-era lectures at the London School of Economics, into three divisions:

- Realist or Hobbesian (after Thomas Hobbes)
- Rationalist (or Grotian, after Hugo Grotius)
- Revolutionist (or Kantian, after Immanuel Kant)

In broad terms, the English School itself has supported the rationalist or Grotian tradition, seeking a middle way (or via media) between the power politics of realism and the "utopianism" of revolutionism. The English School reject behaviorist approaches to international relations theory. The international relations theories have become a typical learning of the fundamental insight and origin of international relations.

Functionalism is a theory of international relations that arose during the inter-War period principally from the strong concern about the obsolescence of the State as a form of social organization. Rather than the self-interest of nation-states that realists see as a motivating factor, functionalists focus on common interests and needs shared by states (but also by non-state actors) in a process of global integration triggered by the erosion of state sovereignty and the increasing weight of knowledge and hence of scientists and experts in the process of policy-making (Rosamond, 2000). Its roots can be traced back to the liberal/idealist tradition that started with Kant and goes as far as Woodrow Wilson's "Fourteen Points" speech (Rosamond, 2000).

Functionalism is a pioneer in globalisation theory and strategy. States had built authority structures upon a principle of territorialism. State-theories were built upon assumptions that identified the scope of authority with territory (Held 1996, Scholte: 1993, 2000, 2001), aided by methodological territorialism (Scholte 1993). Functionalism proposed to build a form of authority based in functions and needs, which linked authority with needs, scientific knowledge, expertise and technology, i.e. it provided a supraterritorial concept of authority. The functionalist approach excludes and refutes the idea of state power and political influence (realist approach) in interpreting the cause for such proliferation of international organizations during the inter-war (which was characterized by nation-state conflict) and the subsequent years.

According to functionalism, international integration – the collective governance and 'material interdependence' (Mitrany, 1933:101) between states – develops its own internal dynamic as states integrate in limited functional, technical, and/or economic areas. International agencies would meet human needs, aided by knowledge and expertise. The benefits rendered by the functional agencies would attract the loyalty of the populations and stimulate their participation and expand the area of integration. There are strong assumptions underpinning functionalism: 1) That the process of integration takes place within a framework of human freedom, 2) That knowledge and expertise are currently available to meet the needs for which the functional agencies are built. 3) That states will not sabotage the process.

Neofunctionalism

Neofunctionalism reintroduced territorialism in the functional theory and downplayed its global dimension. Neofunctionalism is simultaneously a theory and a strategy of regional integration, building on the work of David Mitrany. Neofunctionalists focused their attention solely on the immediate process of integration among states, i.e. regional integration. Initially, states integrate in limited functional or economic areas. Thereafter, partially integrated states experience increasing momentum for further rounds of integration in related areas. This "invisible hand" of integration phenomenon was termed "spill-over." by the neofunctionalist school. This was most apparent in the study of euthanasia. Although integration can be resisted, it becomes harder to stop integration's reach as it progresses.

According to neofunctionalists, there are two kinds of spillover: functional and political. Functional spillover is the interconnection of various *economic* sectors or issue-areas, and the integration in one policy-area spilling over into others. Political spillover is the creation of supranational governance models, as far-reaching as the European Union, or as voluntary as the United Nations.

One of its protagonists was Ernst B. Haas, a US political scientist. Jean Monnet's approach to European integration, which aimed at integrating individual sectors in hopes of achieving spill-over effects to further the process of integration, is said to have followed the neofunctional school's tack. Unlike previous

theories of integration, neofunctionalism declared to be non-normative and tried to describe and explain the process of regional integration based on empirical data. Integration was regarded as an inevitable process, rather than a desirable state of affairs that could be introduced by the political or technocratic elites of the involved states' societies. Its strength however was also its weakness: While it understood that regional integration is only feasible as an incremental process, its conception of integration as a linear process made the explanation of setbacks impossible.

Comparing Functionalism to Realism

John McCormick compares functionalism's fundamental principles with realism's thus (comments added to emphasise key distinctions):

	Realism	Functionalism	Comments
Dominant goals of actors	Military security	Peace and prosperity	security through: Power vs collaboration
Instruments of state	Military force and economic	Economic instruments and political acts of	State policy of assertion

policy	instruments	will	vs negotiation
Forces behind agenda formation	Potential shifts in the balance of power and security threats	Initial emphasis on low politics, such as economic and social issues	Agenda sought: maintenance of position vs reaching consensus
Role of international organizations	Minor; limited by state power and the importance of military force	Substantial; new, functional international organizations will formulate policy and become increasingly responsible for implementation	International involvement: minimal vs substantial

Functional Cooperation and Functional International Organization

The objective of functionalism towards global peace is achieved through functional cooperation by the work of international

organizations (including intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations). The activities of functional international organizations involve taking actions on practical and technical problems rather than those of military and political nature. They are also non-controversial politically and involve a common interest to solve international problems that could best be tackled in a transnational manner. According to David Mitrany, dealing with functional matters provides the actors in the international community the opportunity to successfully cooperate in a non-political context, which might otherwise be harder to achieve in a political context. Further development would lead to a process called “autonomous development” towards multiplication, expansion, and deepening of functional international organizations. Ideally, this would ultimately result in an international government. Functionalists in this manner assume that cooperation in a non-political context would bring international peace. Eradication of existent non-political, non-military global problems, which Functionalists consider to be the very origin of conflict within the global community, is what they aim to pursue. However, critics point out some limitations of functionalist assumption: 1. In practice, dealing with functional matters does not necessarily and always facilitate cooperation. 2. Its simplified assumption overlooks different causes of state conflict.

The proliferation of functional international organizations has occurred without adequate reorganization and coordination efforts due to a lack of central global governance to ensure accountability of such organizations. As a result, a pattern of

decentralization could be observed among functional international organizations to the present day. For example, the League of Nations' effort to coordinate functional international organizations in the field of social and economic cooperation through establishment of UN Economic and Social Council has been futile. As a result, the idea of decentralization prevails to the present day except in cases of special cooperative relationships between Economic and Social Council and some functional organizations. Subsequently, summits such as the World Summit for Social Development in 1995, The Millennium Summit in 2000 and World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 were held to address and coordinate functional cooperation, especially regarding the social and economic aspects.

Substantive functions of functional international organizations include human rights, international communication, health, the law of the sea, the environment, education and information, international relief programs, refugee support, and economic development.

Post-structuralism

Post-structuralism differs from most other approaches to international politics because it does not see itself as a theory, school or paradigm which produces a single account of the subject matter. Instead, post-structuralism is an approach, attitude, or ethos that pursues critique in particular way. Post-

structuralism sees critique as an inherently positive exercise that establishes the conditions of possibility for pursuing alternatives. It states that "Every understanding of international politics depends upon abstraction, representation and interpretation". Scholars associated with post-structuralism in international relations include Richard K. Ashley, James Der Derian, Michael J. Shapiro, R.B.J. Walker, and Lene Hansen.

Postmodernism (international relations)

Postmodern International relations is an approach that has been part of international relations scholarship since the 1980s. Although there are various strands of thinking, a key element to postmodernist theories is a distrust of any account of human life which claims to have direct access to the "truth". Post-modern international relations theory critiques theories like Marxism that provide an overarching metanarrative to history. Key postmodern thinkers include Lyotard, Foucault and Derrida.

Criticisms

A criticism made of post-modern approaches to international relations is that they place too much emphasis on theoretical notions and are generally not concerned with the empirical evidence.

Postcolonialism (international relations)

Postcolonial International relations scholarship posits a critical theory approach to International relations (IR), and is a non-mainstream area of international relations scholarship. According to Baylis postcolonial international relations scholarship has been largely ignored by mainstream international relations theorists and has only recently begun to make an impact on the discipline. Post-colonialism focuses on the persistence of colonial forms of power and the continuing existence of racism in world politics.

Postcolonial IR challenges the *eurocentrism* of IR—particularly its parochial assumption that Western Enlightenment thinking is superior, progressive and universally applicable. Postcolonialists argue that this is enabled through constructing the *Other* as irrational and backwards.

Postcolonial IR attempts to expose such parochial assumptions of IR; for example, in the construction of white versus coloured peoples. An example is the IR story of a *white men's burden* to educate and liberate coloured men and women, to protect coloured women from coloured men. Often this is linked to other postpositivist theories, for example, through Postcolonial feminism, which analyze issues in IR through the lenses of *both* gender and culture. Examples of the parochialistic nature of IR include *geographical parochialism* and *cultural chauvinism*. For

the former, the construction of the Cold War era as a time of peace ignores the reality that major conflicts continued in the developing world. Furthermore, the oft-cited history of IR is constructed in western terms (*more information under history*); and IR has been used to justify everything from imperialism to a *playground* for skirmishes between the two Cold War superpowers. For the latter, the West (through IGOs such as the IMF's quick rush to "save" Asia in the aftermath of the Asian Financial Crisis of 1997–8) could be seen as both a *white men's burden* to save Asia or to reformulate Asian capitalism in a Western image.

Criticisms and defense

Such IR stories are purposefully limited in scope in terms of statecentric modelling, cataloguing and predicting in formal terms; and like other postpositivist theories, they do not attempt to form an overarching theory as after all, postpositivism is defined as *incredulity towards metanarratives*. This is replaced by a sensitivity and openness to the unintended consequences of metanarratives and their negative impacts on the most marginalised actors in IR. In defence, postpositivists argue that metanarratives have proven unworkable. Thus, such theories, although limited in scope, provide for much greater possibilities in the normative work of developing an emancipatory politics, formulating foreign policy, understanding conflict, and making peace, which takes into account gender, ethnicity, other identity issues, culture, methodology and other common issues that have emerged from problem-solving, rationalist, reductive accounts IR.

Evolutionary perspectives

Evolutionary perspectives, such as from evolutionary psychology, have been argued to help explain many features of international relations. Humans in the ancestral environment did not live in states and likely rarely had interactions with groups outside of a very local area. However, a variety of evolved psychological mechanisms, in particular those for dealing with inter group interactions, are argued to influence current international relations. These include evolved mechanisms for social exchange, cheating and detecting cheating, status conflicts, leadership, ingroup and outgroup distinction and biases, coalitions, and violence. Evolutionary concepts such as inclusive fitness may help explain seeming limitations of a concept such as egotism which is of fundamental importance to realist and rational choice international relations theories.

Neuroscience and IR

In recent years, with significant advances in neuroscience and neuroimaging tools, IR Theory has benefited from further multidisciplinary contributions. Prof. Nayef Al-Rodhan from Oxford University has argued that neuroscience can significantly advance the IR debate as it brings forward new insights about human nature, which is at the centre of political theory. New tools to scan the human brain, and studies in neurochemistry allow us to grasp what drives divisiveness, conflict, and human nature in general. The theory of human nature in Classical

Realism, developed long before the advent of neuroscience, stressed that egoism and competition were central to human behaviour, to politics and social relations. Evidence from neuroscience, however, provides a more nuanced understanding of human nature, which Prof. Al-Rodhan describes as emotional amoral egoistic. These three features can be summarized as follows: 1. emotionality is more pervasive than rationality and central to decision-making, 2. we are born neither moral, nor immoral but *amoral*, and circumstances decide how our moral compass will develop, and finally, 3. we are egoistic insofar as we seek to ensure our survival, which is a basic form of egoism. This neurophilosophy of human nature can also be applied to states - similarly to the Realist analogy between the character (and flaws) of man and the state in international politics. Prof Al-Rodhan argues there are significant examples in history and contemporary politics that demonstrate states behave less rationality than IR dogma would have us believe: different strategic cultures, habits, identity politics influence state conduct, geopolitics and diplomacy in profound ways.

Queer and transgender perspectives

Queer international relations scholarship aims to broaden the scope and method of traditional international relations theory to include sexed and gendered approaches that are often excluded in the discipline at large. While affiliated with feminist theory

and gender studies, as well as post-structuralism, queer IR theory is not reducible to any other field of international relations scholarship. Queer international relations theory works to expose the many ways in which sexualities and gender affect international politics. This includes the ways in which queer subjects and practices are disciplined, normalized, or capitalized on by traditional sites of power; how queer identities have often been the focus of domestic and foreign policy in heteronormative states; and how the order-versus-anarchy dichotomy in traditional international relations theory socially manifests itself in normal-versus-perverse and hetero/homo-normative versus queer dichotomies. Queer IR theory takes sites of traditional international relations scholarship (war and peace, international political economy, and state and nation building) as its subjects of study. It also expands its scope and methods beyond those traditionally utilized in Realist IR scholarship. Ontologically, queer IR utilizes a different scope from traditional IR, as it aims to non-monolithically address the needs of various queer groups, including trans-, inter-, cross-, and pan- gendered, sexed, and sexualized bodies. Epistemologically, queer IR explores alternative methodologies to those traditionally used in IR, as it emphasizes the sexual dimension of knowledge within international relations.

Criticism for queer theory in general, and queer international relations in particular, addresses worries of the minimization or exclusion of certain groups. While queer IR incorporates transgender individuals in its expanded scope, some argue its emphasis on sexuality fails to adequately capture transgender

experiences. Susan Stryker contests that queer theory's approach merely treats the 'T' in LGBT as another, detached genre of sexual identity, "rather than perceived, like race or class, as something that cuts across existing sexualities, revealing in often unexpected ways the means through which all identities achieve their specificities." While queer theoretical spaces remain friendly to transgender work, Stryker argues that 'queer' often acts as code for 'gays' or 'lesbians,' implicitly excluding transgender issues by privileging sexual orientations and identities. This leads Stryker to advocate that transgender studies follows its own trajectory.

Laura Sjoberg advocates for allying trans-theorizing and feminist theorizing in IR. She suggests some possible improvements that trans-theorizing may offer for feminist IR theory, which include a more nuanced understanding of gender hierarchy through a pluralist approach to sex, a holistic view of gender that resists viewing gender entirely either as a social construction or as biologically essential, and an increased awareness of gender as involving power relations among different sexes and genders. Additionally, Sjoberg argues, trans-theorizing makes important contributions to traditional IR's understanding of global politics. Discussions of 'outness,' visibility, invisibility, and hypervisibility in transgender theorizing are applicable to questions of identity, relations between individuals and groups, and the enforcement of norms in IR. Additionally, transgender understandings of transition and liminality can fill the gap in traditional IR's need for an account of change and unrest in the international system. Moreover, talk of "crossing" and "passing"

in trans-theorizing may assist in explaining the process, logic, and consequences of states shifting identities. Finally, transgender disidentification, either from exclusionary movements or from their assigned sex, can help in unpacking “the problem of difference” in international relations. As such, Sjoberg advocates for the inclusion of trans-theorizing in feminist IR theory in the interests of improving explanations and understandings of global politics.

Theory in international relations scholarship

Several IR scholars bemoan what they see as a trend away from IR theory in IR scholarship. The September 2013 issue of *European Journal of International Relations* and the June 2015 issue of *Perspectives on Politics* debated the state of IR theory. A 2016 study showed that while theoretical innovations and qualitative analyses are a large part of graduate training, journals favor middle-range theory, quantitative hypothesis testing and methodology for publishing.

Leadership theories

Interest group perspective

Interest group theory posits that the driving force behind state behaviour is sub-state interest groups. Examples of interest

groups include political lobbyists, the military, and the corporate sector. Group theory argues that although these interest groups are constitutive of the state, they are also causal forces in the exercise of state power.

Strategic perspective

Strategic perspective is a theoretical approach that views individuals as choosing their actions by taking into account the anticipated actions and responses of others with the intention of maximizing their own welfare.

Inherent bad faith model in international relations and political psychology

The "inherent bad faith model" of information processing is a theory in political psychology that was first put forth by Ole Holsti to explain the relationship between John Foster Dulles' beliefs and his model of information processing. It is the most widely studied model of one's opponent. A state is presumed to be implacably hostile, and contra-indicators of this are ignored. They are dismissed as propaganda ploys or signs of weakness. Examples are John Foster Dulles' position regarding the Soviet Union, or Israel's initial position on the Palestinian Liberation Organization.

Post-structuralist theories

Post-structuralist theories of IR developed in the 1980s from postmodernist studies in political science. Post-structuralism explores the deconstruction of concepts traditionally not problematic in IR (such as "power" and "agency") and examines how the construction of these concepts shapes international relations. The examination of "narratives" plays an important part in poststructuralist analysis; for example, feminist poststructuralist work has examined the role that "women" play in global society and how they are constructed in war as "innocent" and "civilians".

Levels of analysis

Systemic level concepts

International relations are often viewed in terms of levels of analysis. The systemic level concepts are those broad concepts that define and shape an international milieu, characterized by anarchy.

Sovereignty

Preceding the concepts of interdependence and dependence, international relations relies on the idea of sovereignty. Described in Jean Bodin's "Six Books of the Commonwealth in 1576, the three pivotal points derived from the book describe sovereignty as being a state, that the sovereign power(s) have

absolute power over their territories, and that such a power is only limited by the sovereign's "own obligations towards other sovereigns and individuals". Such a foundation of sovereignty permits, is indicated by a sovereign's obligation to other sovereigns, interdependence and dependence to take place. While throughout world history there have been instances of groups lacking or losing sovereignty, such as African nations prior to Decolonization or the occupation of Iraq during the Iraq War, there is still a need for sovereignty in terms of assessing international relations.

Power

Power in international relations is defined in several different ways. Modern discourse generally speaks in terms of state power, indicating both economic and military power. Those states that have significant amounts of power within the international system are referred to as small powers, middle powers, regional powers, great powers, superpowers, or hegemons, although there is no commonly accepted standard for what defines a powerful state. NATO Quint, The G7, the BRICS nations and the G20 are seen as forums of governments that exercise varying degrees of influence within the international system.

Entities other than states can also be relevant in power acquisition in international relations. Such entities can include multilateral international organizations, military alliance organizations like NATO, multinational corporations like Wal-Mart, non-governmental organizations such as the Roman

Catholic Church, or other institutions such as the Hanseatic League.

Concepts of political power

Political scientists, historians, and practitioners of international relations (diplomats) have used the following concepts of political power:

- Power as a goal of states or leaders;
- Power as a measure of influence or control over outcomes, events, actors and issues;
- Power as victory in conflict and the attainment of security;
- Power as control over resources and capabilities;
- Power as status, which some states or actors possess and others do not.

Power as a goal

Primary usage of "power" as a goal in international relations belongs to political theorists, such as Niccolò Machiavelli and Hans Morgenthau. Especially among Classical Realist thinkers, power is an inherent goal of mankind and of states. Economic growth, military growth, cultural spread etc. can all be considered as working towards the ultimate goal of international power. The German military thinker Carl von Clausewitz is considered to be the quintessential projection of European growth across the continent. In more modern times, Claus Moser

has elucidated theories centre of distribution of power in Europe after the Holocaust, and the power of universal learning as its counterpoint. Jean Monnet was a French left-wing social theorist, stimulating expansive Eurocommunism, who followed on the creator of modern European community, the diplomat and statesman Robert Schuman.

Power as influence

Political scientists principally use "power" in terms of an actor's ability to exercise influence over other actors within the international system. This influence can be coercive, attractive, cooperative, or competitive. Mechanisms of influence can include the threat or use of force, economic interaction or pressure, diplomacy, and cultural exchange.

Under certain circumstances, states can organize a sphere of influence or a bloc within which they exercise predominant influence. Historical examples include the spheres of influence recognized under the Concert of Europe, or the recognition of spheres during the Cold War following the Yalta Conference. The Warsaw Pact, the "Free World", and the Non-Aligned Movement were the blocs that arose out of the Cold War contest. Military alliances like NATO and the Warsaw Pact are another forum through which influence is exercised. However, "realist" theory attempted to maintain the balance of power from the development of meaningful diplomatic relations that can create a hegemony within the region. British foreign policy, for example, dominated Europe through the Congress of Vienna after the defeat of

France. They continued the balancing act with the Congress of Berlin in 1878, to appease Russia and Germany from attacking Turkey. Britain has sided against the aggressors on the European continent—i.e. the German Empire, Nazi Germany, Napoleonic France or Habsburg Austria, known during the Great War as the Central Powers and, in the World War Two were called the Axis Powers.

Power as security

Power is also used when describing states or actors that have achieved military victories or security for their state in the international system. This general usage is most commonly found among the writings of historians or popular writers. For instance, a state that has achieved a string of combat victories in a military campaign against other states can be described as powerful. An actor that has succeeded in protecting its security, sovereignty, or strategic interests from repeated or significant challenge can also be described as powerful.

Power as capability

American author Charles W. Freeman, Jr. described power as the following:

- Power is the capacity to direct the decisions and actions of others. Power derives from strength and will. Strength comes from the transformation of resources into capabilities. Will infuses objectives with resolve.

Strategy marshals capabilities and brings them to bear with precision. Statecraft seeks through strategy to magnify the mass, relevance, impact, and irresistibility of power. It guides the ways the state deploys and applies its power abroad. These ways embrace the arts of war, espionage, and diplomacy. The practitioners of these three arts are the paladins of statecraft.

Power is also used to describe the resources and capabilities of a state. This definition is quantitative and is most often used by geopoliticians and the military. Capabilities are thought of in tangible terms—they are measurable, weighable, quantifiable assets. A good example for this kind of measurement is the *Composite Indicator on Aggregate Power*, which involves 54 indicators and covers the capabilities of 44 states in Asia-Pacific from 1992 to 2012. Thomas Hobbes spoke of power as "present means to obtain some future apparent good." Hard power can be treated as a potential and is not often enforced on the international stage.

Chinese strategists have such a concept of national power that can be measured quantitatively using an index known as comprehensive national power.

Power as status

Much effort in academic and popular writing is devoted to deciding which countries have the status of "power", and how this can be measured. If a country has "power" (as influence) in

military, diplomatic, cultural, and economic spheres, it might be called a "power" (as status). There are several categories of power, and inclusion of a state in one category or another is fraught with difficulty and controversy. In his famous 1987 work, *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers*, British-American historian Paul Kennedy charts the relative status of the various powers from AD 1500 to 2000. He does not begin the book with a theoretical definition of a "great power"; however he does list them, separately, for many different eras. Moreover, he uses different working definitions of a great power for different eras. For example:

- "France was not strong enough to oppose Germany in a one-to-one struggle... If the mark of a Great Power is country which is willing to take on any other, then France (like Austria-Hungary) had slipped to a lower position. But that definition seemed too abstract in 1914 to a nation geared up for war, militarily stronger than ever, wealthy, and, above all, endowed with powerful allies."

Categories of power

In the modern geopolitical landscape, a number of terms are used to describe various types of powers, which include the following:

- *Superpower*: In 1944, William T. R. Fox defined *superpower* as "great power plus great mobility of power" and identified three states, the British Empire,

the Soviet Union and the United States. With the decolonisation of the British Empire following World War II, and then the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States is currently the only country considered to be a superpower.

- *Great power*: In historical mentions, the term *great power* refers to the states that have strong political, cultural and economical influence over nations around them and across the world.
- *Middle power*: A subjective description of influential second-tier states that could not quite be described as great or small powers. A middle power has sufficient strength and authority to stand on its own without the need of help from others (particularly in the realm of security) and takes diplomatic leads in regional and global affairs. Clearly not all middle powers are of equal status; some are members of forums such as the G20 and play important roles in the United Nations and other international organisations such as the WTO.
- *Small power*: The International System is for the most part made up by *small powers*. They are instruments of the other powers and may at times be dominated; but they cannot be ignored.

Other categories:

- *Regional power*: This term is used to describe a nation that exercises influence and power within a region. Being a *regional power* is not mutually exclusive with

any of the other categories of power. The majority of them exert a strategic degree of influence as minor or secondary regional powers. A primary regional power (like Australia) has often an important role in international affairs outside of its region too.

- *Cultural superpower*: Refers to a country whose culture, arts or entertainment have worldwide appeal, significant international popularity or large influence on much of the world. Countries such as Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States have often been described as cultural superpowers, although it is sometimes debated on which one meets such criteria. Unlike traditional forms of national power, the term cultural superpower is in reference to a nation's Soft power capabilities.
- *Energy superpower*: Describes a country that supplies large amounts of energy resources (crude oil, natural gas, coal, uranium, etc.) to a significant number of other states, and therefore has the potential to influence world markets to gain a political or economic advantage. Saudi Arabia and Russia, are generally acknowledged as the world's current energy superpowers, given their abilities to globally influence or even directly control prices to certain countries. Australia and Canada are potential energy superpowers due to their large natural resources.

Hard, soft, smart and just power

Some political scientists distinguish between two types of power: Hard and Soft. The former is coercive while the latter is attractive.

Hard power refers to coercive tactics: the threat or use of armed forces, economic pressure or sanctions, assassination and subterfuge, or other forms of intimidation. Hard power is generally associated to the stronger of nations, as the ability to change the domestic affairs of other nations through military threats. Realists and neorealists, such as John Mearsheimer, are advocates of the use of such power for the balancing of the international system.

Joseph Nye is the leading proponent and theorist of soft power. Instruments of soft power include debates on cultural values, dialogues on ideology, the attempt to influence through good example, and the appeal to commonly accepted human values. Means of exercising soft power include diplomacy, dissemination of information, analysis, propaganda, and cultural programming to achieve political ends.

Others have synthesized soft and hard power, including through the field of smart power. This is often a call to use a holistic spectrum of statecraft tools, ranging from soft to hard.

Oxford University Professor Nayef Al-Rodhan also introduced the concept of Just Power, stating that any foreign policy must be smart as well as just. In the 21st century, countries that want to

exert influence and enjoy legitimacy on the international stage must be perceived as respectful of the collective dignity of others, and they must adhere to international law and norms.

European powers of the modern age

During the time of the Renaissance, powers in Europe included Spain, Portugal, England, France, the Habsburg Empire, Poland-Lithuania and the Ottoman Empire. Bolstered by shipments of gold and silver from the Americas, the Spanish Habsburg dynasty emerged as a dominant force and regularly launched military interventions to project its power and defend Catholicism, while its rival, France, was torn apart by religious civil war. Meanwhile, in Eastern Europe, the Ottoman Empire reached its zenith and completed its conquest of the Balkan region.

During the 17th century the Netherlands and Sweden were added to the group, whilst the Ottomans, Poland and Spain gradually declined in power and influence. France progressively grew stronger and by the latter part of the century found itself repeatedly facing alliances designed to hold its military power in check.

In the 18th century, Great Britain (formed from a union of England and Scotland) progressively gained strength and Russia and Prussia also saw their importance increase, while Sweden and the Dutch Republic declined. Great Britain and France increasingly struggled for dominance both on the continent and abroad (notably in North America, the Caribbean and India). By

the century's end, the British had established themselves as the foremost naval power while the French were dominant on land, conquering many of their neighbors during the French Revolutionary Wars and establishing client republics. The struggle between the two nations ended only in 1815 with the final defeat of the French under Napoleon.

During the 19th century, there was an informal convention recognising five Great Powers in Europe: the French Empire, the British Empire, the Russian Empire, the Austrian Empire (later Austria-Hungary) and the Kingdom of Prussia (later the German Empire). In the late 19th century the newly united Italy was added to this group.

National interest

Perhaps the most significant concept behind that of power and sovereignty, national interest is a state's action in relation to other states where it seeks to gain advantage or benefits to itself. National interest, whether aspirational or operational, is divided by core/vital and peripheral/non-vital interests. Core or vital interests constitute the things which a country is willing to defend or expand with conflict such as territory, ideology (religious, political, economic), or its citizens. Peripheral or non-vital are interests which a state is willing to compromise. For example, in the German annexation of the Sudetenland in 1938 (a part of Czechoslovakia) under the Munich Agreement, Czechoslovakia was willing to relinquish territory which was

considered ethnically German in order to preserve its own integrity and sovereignty.

Non-state actors

In the 21st century, the status-quo of the international system is no longer monopolized by states alone. Rather, it is the presence of non-state actors, who autonomously act to implement unpredictable behaviour to the international system. Whether it is transnational corporations, liberation movements, non-governmental agencies, or international organizations, these entities have the potential to significantly influence the outcome of any international transaction. Additionally, this also includes the individual person as while the individual is what constitutes the states collective entity, the individual does have the potential to also create unpredicted behaviours. Al-Qaeda, as an example of a non-state actor, has significantly influenced the way states (and non-state actors) conduct international affairs.

Power blocs

The existence of power blocs in international relations is a significant factor related to polarity. During the Cold War, the alignment of several nations to one side or another based on ideological differences or national interests has become an endemic feature of international relations. Unlike prior, shorter-term blocs, the Western and Soviet blocs sought to spread their national ideological differences to other nations. Leaders like U.S. President Harry S. Truman under the Truman Doctrine

believed it was necessary to spread democracy whereas the Warsaw Pact under Soviet policy sought to spread communism. After the Cold War, and the dissolution of the ideologically homogeneous Eastern bloc still gave rise to others such as the South-South Cooperation movement.

Polarity

Polarity in international relations refers to the arrangement of power within the international system. The concept arose from bipolarity during the Cold War, with the international system dominated by the conflict between two superpowers, and has been applied retrospectively by theorists. However, the term bipolar was notably used by Stalin who said he saw the international system as a bipolar one with two opposing powerbases and ideologies. Consequently, the international system prior to 1945 can be described as multipolar, with power being shared among Great powers.

The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 had led to unipolarity, with the United States as a sole superpower, although many refuse to acknowledge the fact. China's continued rapid economic growth (in 2010 it became the world's second-largest economy), combined with the respectable international position they hold within political spheres and the power that the Chinese Government exerts over their people (consisting of the largest population in the world), resulted in debate over whether China is now a superpower or a possible candidate in the future. However, China's strategic force unable of projecting power

beyond its region and its nuclear arsenal of 250 warheads (compared to 7700 of the United States) mean that the unipolarity will persist in the policy-relevant future.

Several theories of international relations draw upon the idea of polarity. The balance of power was a concept prevalent in Europe prior to the First World War, the thought being that by balancing power blocs it would create stability and prevent war. Theories of the balance of power gained prominence again during the Cold War, being a central mechanism of Kenneth Waltz's Neorealism. Here, the concepts of balancing (rising in power to counter another) and bandwagoning (siding with another) are developed.

Robert Gilpin's Hegemonic stability theory also draws upon the idea of polarity, specifically the state of unipolarity. Hegemony is the preponderance of power at one pole in the international system, and the theory argues this is a stable configuration because of mutual gains by both the dominant power and others in the international system. This is contrary to many neorealist arguments, particularly made by Kenneth Waltz, stating that the end of the Cold War and the state of unipolarity is an unstable configuration that will inevitably change.

The case of Gilpin proved to be correct and Waltz's article titled "The Stability of a Bipolar World" was followed in 1999 by William Wohlforth's article titled "The Stability of a Unipolar World"

Waltz's thesis can be expressed in power transition theory, which states that it is likely that a great power would challenge a hegemon after a certain period, resulting in a major war. It

suggests that while hegemony can control the occurrence of wars, it also results in the creation of one. Its main proponent, A. F. K. Organski, argued this based on the occurrence of previous wars during British, Portuguese, and Dutch hegemony.

Interdependence

Many advocate that the current international system is characterized by growing interdependence; the mutual responsibility and dependency on others. Advocates of this point to growing globalization, particularly with international economic interaction. The role of international institutions, and widespread acceptance of a number of operating principles in the international system, reinforces ideas that relations are characterized by interdependence.

Dependency

Dependency theory is a theory most commonly associated with Marxism, stating that a set of core states exploit a set of weaker periphery states for their prosperity. Various versions of the theory suggest that this is either an inevitability (standard dependency theory), or use the theory to highlight the necessity for change (Neo-Marxist).

Systemic tools of international relations

- Diplomacy is the practice of communication and negotiation between representatives of states. To some

extent, all other tools of international relations can be considered the failure of diplomacy. Keeping in mind, the use of other tools are part of the communication and negotiation inherent within diplomacy. Sanctions, force, and adjusting trade regulations, while not typically considered part of diplomacy, are actually valuable tools in the interest of leverage and placement in negotiations.

- Sanctions are usually a first resort after the failure of diplomacy, and are one of the main tools used to enforce treaties. They can take the form of diplomatic or economic sanctions and involve the cutting of ties and imposition of barriers to communication or trade.
- War, the use of force, is often thought of as the ultimate tool of international relations. A widely accepted definition is that given by Clausewitz, with war being "the continuation of politics by other means". There is a growing study into "new wars" involving actors other than states. The study of war in international relations is covered by the disciplines of "war studies" and "strategic studies".
- The mobilization of international shame can also be thought of as a tool of international relations. This is attempting to alter states' actions through 'naming and shaming' at the international level. This is mostly done by the large human rights NGOs such as Amnesty International (for instance when it called Guantanamo Bay a "Gulag"), or Human Rights Watch. A prominent use of was the UN Commission on Human Rights 1235

procedure, which publicly exposes state's human rights violations. The current UN Human Rights Council has yet to use this mechanism

- The allotment of economic and/or diplomatic benefits such as the European Union's enlargement policy; candidate countries are only allowed to join if they meet the Copenhagen criteria.

Unit-level concepts in international relations

As a level of analysis the unit level is often referred to as the state level, as it locates its explanation at the level of the state, rather than the international system.

Regime type

It is often considered that a state's form of government can dictate the way that a state interacts with others in the international system.

Democratic peace theory is a theory that suggests that the nature of democracy means that democratic countries will not go to war with each other. The justifications for this are that democracies externalize their norms and only go to war for just causes, and that democracy encourages mutual trust and respect.

Communism justifies a world revolution, which similarly would lead to peaceful coexistence, based on a proletarian global society.

Revisionism/status quo

States can be classified by whether they accept the international status quo, or are revisionist—i.e., want change. Revisionist states seek to fundamentally change the rules and practices of international relations, feeling disadvantaged by the status quo. They see the international system as a largely western creation which serves to reinforce current realities. Japan is an example of a state that has gone from being a revisionist state to one that is satisfied with the status quo, because the status quo is now beneficial to it.

Religion

Religion can have an effect on the way a state acts within the international system. Different theoretical perspectives treat it in somewhat different fashion. One dramatic example is the Thirty Years' War (1618–48) that ravaged much of Europe. Religion is visible as an organizing principle particularly for Islamic states, whereas secularism sits at the other end of the spectrum, with the separation of state and religion being responsible for the liberal international relations theory. Events since the September 11 attacks in the United States, the role of Islam in terrorism, and the strife in the Middle East have made it a major topic.

Individual or sub-unit level concepts

The level beneath the unit (state) level can be useful both for explaining factors in international relations that other theories

fail to explain, and for moving away from a state-centric view of international relations.

- Psychological factors in international relations – Evaluating psychological factors in international relations comes from the understanding that a state is not a "black box" as proposed by realism, and that there may be other influences on foreign policy decisions. Examining the role of personalities in the decision making process can have some explanatory power, as can the role of misperception between various actors. A prominent application of sub-unit level psychological factors in international relations is the concept of Groupthink, another is the propensity of policymakers to think in terms of analogies.
- Bureaucratic politics – Looks at the role of the bureaucracy in decision making, and sees decisions as a result of bureaucratic in-fighting, and as having been shaped by various constraints.
- Religious, ethnic, and secessionist groups – Viewing these aspects of the sub-unit level has explanatory power with regards to ethnic conflicts, religious wars, transnational diaspora (diaspora politics) and other actors which do not consider themselves to fit with the defined state boundaries. This is particularly useful in the context of the pre-modern world of weak states.
- Science, technology and international relations – How science and technology impact global health, business, environment, technology, and development.

- International political economy, and economic factors in international relations
- International political culturology – Looks at how culture and cultural variables impact in international relations
- Personal relations between leaders

Feminism (international relations)

Feminism is a broad term given to works of those scholars who have sought to bring gender concerns into the academic study of international politics.

In terms of international relations (IR) theory it is important to understand that feminism is derived from the school of thought known as reflectionism. One of the most influential works in feminist IR is Cynthia Enloe's *Bananas, Beaches and Bases* (Pandora Press 1990). This text sought to chart the many different roles that women play in international politics - as plantation sector workers, diplomatic wives, sex workers on military bases etc. The important point of this work was to emphasize how, when looking at international politics from the perspective of women, one is forced to reconsider his or her personal assumptions regarding what international politics is 'all about'.

However, it would be a mistake to think that feminist IR was solely a matter of identifying how many groups of women are positioned in the international political system. From its

inception, feminist IR has always shown a strong concern with thinking about men and, in particular, masculinities. Indeed, many IR feminists argue that the discipline is inherently masculine in nature. For example, in her article "Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals" *Signs* (1988), Carol Cohn claimed that a highly masculinised culture within the defense establishment contributed to the divorcing of war from human emotion.

A feminist IR involves looking at how international politics affects and is affected by both men and women and also at how the core concepts that are employed within the discipline of IR (e.g. war, security, etc.) are themselves gendered. Feminist IR has not only concerned itself with the traditional focus of IR on states, wars, diplomacy and security, but feminist IR scholars have also emphasized the importance of looking at how gender shapes the current global political economy. In this sense, there is no clear cut division between feminists working in IR and those working in the area of International Political Economy (IPE).

Feminist IR emerged largely from the late 1980s onwards. The end of the Cold War and the re-evaluation of traditional IR theory during the 1990s opened up a space for gendering International Relations. Because feminist IR is linked broadly to the critical project in IR, by and large most feminist scholarship has sought to problematise the politics of knowledge construction within the discipline - often by adopting methodologies of deconstructivism associated with postmodernism/poststructuralism. However, the growing influence of feminist and women-centric approaches

within the international policy communities (for example at the World Bank and the United Nations) is more reflective of the liberal feminist emphasis on equality of opportunity for women.

In regards to feminism in International Relations, some of the founding feminist IR scholars refer to using a "feminist consciousness" when looking at gender issues in politics. In Cynthia Enloe's article "Gender is not enough: the need for a feminist consciousness", Enloe explains how International Relations needs to include masculinity in the discussion on war, while also giving attention to the issues surrounding women and girls. In order to do so, Enloe urges International Relations scholars to look at issues with a 'feminist consciousness', which will ultimately include a perspective sensitive to masculinities and femininities. In this way, the feminist consciousness, together with a gendered lens, allows for IR academics to discuss International Politics with a deeper appreciation and understanding of issues pertaining to gender around the world.

Enloe argues how the IR discipline continues to lack serious analysis of the experiences, actions and ideas of girls and women in the international arena, and how this ultimately excludes them from the discussion in IR. For instance, Enloe explains Carol Cohn's experience using a feminist consciousness while participating in the drafting of a document that outlines the actions taken in negotiating ceasefires, peace agreements and new constitutions. During this event, those involved came up with the word "combatant" to describe those in need during these usually high-strung negotiations. The use of 'combatant' in this

context is particularly problematic as Carol points out, because it implies one type of militarized people, generally men carrying guns, and excludes the women and girls deployed as porters, cooks and forced 'wives' of male combatants. This term effectively renders the needs of these women invisible, and excludes them from the particularly critical IR conversation regarding who needs what in war and peace. This discussion is crucial for the analysis of how various masculinities are at play in International Politics, and how those masculinities affect women and girls during wartime and peace and initially eliminates them from the discussion.

Conversely, feminist IR scholar Charlotte Hooper effectively applies a feminist consciousness when considering how "IR disciplines men as much as men shape IR". So, instead of focusing on what and whom IR excludes from the conversation, Hooper focuses on how masculine identities are perpetuated and ultimately are the products of the practice of IR. In this way, it is ineffective to use a gendered lens and feminist consciousness to analyze the exclusion of a discussion in gender in IR. Hooper suggests that a deeper examination of the ontological and epistemological ways in which IR has been inherently a masculine discipline is needed. The innate masculinity of IR is because men compose the vast majority of modern IR scholars, and their masculine identities have been socially constructed over time through various political progressions. For instance, Hooper gives examples of the historical and political developments of masculinities that are still prevalent in IR and society at large; the Greek citizen/warrior model, the Judeo

Christian model and the Protestant bourgeois rationalist model. These track the masculine identities throughout history, where manliness is measured in militarism and citizenship, ownership and authority of the fathers, and finally, competitive individualism and reason. These masculinities in turn asks one to not only use the feminist consciousness to analyze the exclusions of femininities from IR, but additionally, Hooper illuminates how one can locate the inherent inclusions of masculinities in the field of IR with a feminist consciousness.

Feminist Anti-Militarism

Feminists within IR often look to how conceptions of masculinity have shaped foreign policy, state identity, and security and armament during and outside of warfare. One tradition that exists within the field for this purpose is that of feminist anti-militarism. This is a stance within Feminist International Relations that opposes weapons of mass destruction, such as nuclear weaponry, and holds gender accountable in part for the propagation of militarism. Gender becomes embedded in relations of power as that which is seen to be stronger is assigned a masculinized identity, while concepts such as emotion are seen as indicators of weakness and become associated with femininity. In this way, the military strength and capability of a state becomes associated with its degree of masculinity, which feminist anti-militarists see as problematic. As disarmament could be perceived as emasculatory, states are less likely to disarm; consequently, militarism becomes normalized, downplayed, and more likely to incite warfare. These are some of the concepts that

Carol Cohn and Sara Ruddick explored in their article “Feminist Ethical Perspective on Weapons of Mass Destruction,” (2003) which laid out the meaning behind what they referred to as “anti-war feminism”. They explain that it opposes the use of weapons of mass destruction whether for military, political, or deterring purposes, yet that it differs from pacifism in that it does not outright reject all forms of warfare. Such opposition stems partly from the questionability of how effective warfare/militarism is, and whether the costs, (albeit monetary, environmental, and especially human) that are inevitably incurred yet not always accounted, for are worth it.

Manifestations of feminist anti-militarism can be identified in various contexts and methods. In line with Cohn and Ruddick’s (2003) aforementioned article, part of what feminist anti-militarism critiques is the framework in which weapons of mass destruction are “discussed”. Such discourse assumedly would have large influence in the outcome, as investigated by Cohn in one of her earlier articles, “Sex and Death in the Rational World of Defense Intellectuals.” Her participation in security discussions allowed her to observe the way in which the “technostrategic” language used by American defense intellectuals was highly gendered, and assigned greater value and strength to that which was assigned masculine or highly sexualized terminology. While Cohn does not explicitly identify the use of a feminist anti-militarist view in this article, the ideas and subjects at hand run parallel. Relatedly, Claire Duncanson and Catherine Eschle do state their use of a feminist anti-militarist perspective in their article “Gender and the Nuclear

Weapons State: A Feminist Critique of the UK Government's White Paper on Trident". The authors borrow Cohn's rendition of the relationship between gender and nuclear weapons to examine the way in which discourses are shaped by underlying dichotomous views of masculinity and femininity. This perspective is then applied to the renewal of Trident nuclear weapons, a plan which Duncanson and Eschl argue is enabled by the UK government's use of masculinized language that seems to be constructed into the state's identity. The UK Trident Program was the cause of another expression of feminist anti-militarism, beginning a few decades earlier in the form of the Greenham Common Women's Peace Camp. The 1979 decision by NATO to base ground cruise missiles at Greenham Common initiated a response from women largely associated with various feminist and anti-nuclear groups. Their opposition to such militarism was demonstrated in the persistence of peace camps, demonstrations and other forms of resistance for the following two decades (nat. archive website). Such efforts brought to life the feminist anti-militarist perception of the relationship between gender and militarism as exhibited through nuclear weaponry.

Gender Theory and Feminisms

Gender theory highlights the limitations of linguistic categories, asserts the significance of intersectionality, values concrete cultural context over universalisms and essentialisms (for example, the notion of universal patriarchy), rigorously problematizes sex and gender binaries, recounts and accounts for the history of sex and gender relations, and deals directly with

other theoretical strains such as structuralism, post-structuralism, socialism, and psychoanalysis. For example, in her book *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity*, Judith Butler explores the possibility of *troubling gender* first by examining conventional understandings of gender that support masculine hegemony and heterosexist power, and subsequently wondering about the extent to which one can undermine such constitutive categories (that is, male/female, man/woman) through continually mobilizing, subverting, and proliferating the very foundational illusions of identity which seek to keep gender in its place. Gender theory can inform critical lenses and perspectives such as Cynthia Enloe's "feminist consciousness," as well as other feminist perspectives such as *liberal feminism*, *difference feminism*, and *poststructuralist feminism*. In terms of feminist international relations, gender theory engages directly with the notion of mainstreaming gender in both *institutional politics* and *discursive politics*.

Liberal feminism deals specifically with policy-making, and requires that women as well as perspectives on both women's and men's lived realities are fairly included and represented in that policy-making. With regard to liberal feminism, gender theory contemplates, for example, what is meant by the term "women," whose perspectives on "women's" and "men's" lived realities are considered valuable in facilitating fair representation in policy-making, and what aspects of life are considered components of "lived reality". *Difference feminism* focusses on empowering women in particular through specific designs, implementations, and evaluations of policies that account for the material and

cultural differences between men and women and their significance. With regard to difference feminism, gender theory questions, again, what is meant by the term “women;” what factors might lead to “women” requiring specific designs, implementations, and evaluations of policies; what is considered to constitute “difference” in the material and cultural experience of “men” and “women;” and what aspects of that “difference” suppose its especial significance.

Poststructuralist feminism prioritizes difference and diversity to the extent that it recognizes all identities as absolutely contingent social constructions. With regard to poststructuralist feminism, gender theory points out that due to this ontological and epistemological discursiveness, poststructuralist feminism can, in some cases, risk understanding the subjects in policy-making as distinct social subjectivities primarily and/or exclusively in terms of gender difference, rather than in terms of the multiplicities of difference that comprise subjectivities in poststructural feminist thought.

Institutional politics describes the political, material, bureaucratic, and organizational relationships and conventions that govern administrative institutions. Gender theory seeks to examine the ways in which these normalized relationships and conventions shape the policy-making processes of and within these institutions.

Discursive politics refers to the ways in which institutionalized norms, policy procedures, organizational identities, and material

structures shape the language and meaning of gender equality and/or difference therein. Gender theory, with regard to discursive politics, for instance, would examine the identities, the constitutive categories, created and/or perpetuated by the language and meaning of gender equality and/or difference in such international institutions.

Barriers to femininities and female bodies

A feminist approach to international relations also provides analyses for not only theoretical understandings of gender relations, but also the consequences that perpetuate the subordination of femininities and female-bodies. 'Women' (female bodies + performed femininities) endure a higher level of criticism for their actions, personalities, and behaviors within the public and private spheres, particularly while running for political office, whether this at the local or national levels. This is due to a perception of politically ambitious women as either being too feminine or too masculine, to be capable of the job that certain offices demand. This is typically linked to the ideal that women will take care of 'women's issues', such as education and abortion, while men will take care of 'men's issues' such as the military, national security, and the economy. It is critical that researchers seek to explain further the barriers that women endure in their attempts to attain political office on any level. To begin with, there must be a consideration of women's socioeconomic status, and thus a difficulty in funding a campaign. While women are more educated in the western world than ever before, the average women's socioeconomic powers still

do not match the average man's. This results in a further consequence for women, as employment is positively related to one's ability to attain political information, and to build internal political efficacy. Thus, not only does socioeconomic status lead to a lesser ability to finance a political campaign for women, but it also leads to lower levels of political efficacy, impacting women's participation in politics from the very beginning.

Further barriers exist into women's entrance into politics, which include, but are not limited to, attachment to the private sphere and the scrutiny of the media. Media coverage of campaigns can be particularly detrimental to a woman's ability to attain political office. The media focuses far more on physical appearance and lifestyle, rather than the prominent political questions of the campaign, for female candidates. Further, women receive less overall media coverage, the media questions women's abilities and potential for future power, as well as focusing on what are deemed as 'women's issues'. These kinds of coverage discourage voters from voting or contributing to the campaigns of female candidates, and moreover, discourage women from entering into a campaign. Thus, the media has demonstrated its ability to deem candidates either capable or ill-suited for political office, simply through the dialogue in which they use, that perpetuates systems of disqualification for women.

These dialogues place men in positions of high politics, and reinforce symbolic understandings of 'women's issues' versus 'men's issues', and who best represents offices of high-politics due to naturalized understandings of individual's bodies and

gendered identities. Through a feminist lens of international relations however, we may understand the systemic nature of these perceptions of the relationships between bodies and identities in order to discount popular dialogue, and find places for women within high-politics.

Chapter 4

International Human Rights Standards and their Development

The International Bill Of Human Rights

Article 1(3) of the UN Charter provides for the pursuit of international cooperation by resolving international problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian character, promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language or religion. To this end, the United Nations has embarked on the continuous process of articulating human rights in order to translate them from morality and principles into binding international law. These standards are the result of a gradual evolution over several decades with the participation of United Nations bodies, many nations, non-governmental organizations and individuals.

The adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Universal Declaration), in 1948, was the first step towards the progressive codification of international human rights. In the 50

years that have elapsed since then, the extraordinary visions enshrined in the principles of the Declaration have proved timeless and enduring. The principles have inspired more than 100 human rights instruments which, taken together, constitute international human rights standards. Outlined below are some significant international human rights instruments and developments.

At its first meeting in 1946, the General Assembly transmitted a draft Declaration of Fundamental Human Rights and Freedoms to the Commission on Human Rights, through the Economic and Social Council, relative to the preparation of an international bill of human rights. In 1947, the Commission authorized its officers to formulate a draft bill of human rights which was later taken over by a formal Drafting Committee consisting of 8 members of the Commission. The Drafting Committee decided to prepare two documents: one in the form of a declaration which would set forth general principles or standards of human rights; and the other in the form of a convention which would define specific rights and their limitations.

Accordingly, the Committee transmitted to the Commission draft articles of an international declaration and an international convention on human rights. The Commission decided to apply the term, International Bill of Human Rights, to the entire series of documents in late 1947. In 1948, the draft declaration was revised and submitted through the Economic and Social Council to the General Assembly. On 10 December 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted, a day celebrated each

year as -Human Rights Day.. The Commission on Human Rights then continued working on a draft covenant on human rights.

By 1950, the General Assembly passed a resolution declaring that the “enjoyment of civil and political freedoms and of economic, social and cultural rights are interconnected and interdependent” After lengthy debate, the General Assembly requested that the Commission draft two covenants on human rights; one to set forth civil and political rights and the other embodying economic, social and cultural rights. Before finalizing the draft covenants, the General Assembly decided to give the drafts the widest possible publicity in order that Governments might study them thoroughly and public opinion might express itself freely.

In 1966, two International Covenants on Human Rights were completed (instead of the one originally envisaged): the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), which effectively translated the principles of the Universal Declaration into treaty law. In conjunction with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the two Covenants are referred to as the. International Bill of Human Rights.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights consists of a Preamble and 30 articles, setting out the human rights and

fundamental freedoms to which all men and women are entitled, without distinction of any kind.

The Universal Declaration recognizes that the inherent dignity of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world. It recognizes fundamental rights which are the inherent rights of every human being including, inter alia, the right to life, liberty and security of person; the right to an adequate standard of living; the right to seek and enjoy asylum from persecution in other countries; the right to freedom of opinion and expression; the right to education, freedom of thought, conscience and religion; and the right to freedom from torture and degrading treatment.

These inherent rights are to be enjoyed by every man, woman and child throughout the world, as well as by all groups in society. Today, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is widely regarded as forming part of customary international law.

1998 -the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights

1998 highlighted the global commitment to these fundamental and inalienable human rights as the world commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The Universal Declaration was one of the first major achievements of the United Nations and after 50 years remains a powerful instrument affecting people's lives throughout the world. Since 1948, the Universal Declaration has been translated

into more than 250 languages and remains one of the best known and most cited human rights documents in the world. The commemoration of the fiftieth anniversary provided the opportunity to reflect on the achievements of the past fifty years and chart a course for the next century. Under the theme All Human Rights for All, the fiftieth anniversary highlighted the universality, indivisibility and interrelationship of all human rights. It reinforced the idea that human rights, civil, cultural, economic, political and social, should be taken in their totality and not dissociated.

The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights

After 20 years of drafting debates, the ICESCR was adopted by the General Assembly in 1966 and entered into force in January 1976. In many respects, greater international attention has been given to the promotion and protection of civil and political rights rather than to social, economic and cultural rights, leading to the erroneous presumption that violations of economic, social and cultural rights were not subject to the same degree of legal scrutiny and measures of redress. This view neglected the underlying principles of human rights- that rights are indivisible and interdependent and therefore the violation of one right may well lead to the violation of another.

Economic, social and cultural rights are fully recognized by the international community and in international law and are progressively gaining attention. These rights are designed to

ensure the protection of people, based on the expectation that people can enjoy rights, freedoms and social justice simultaneously. The Covenant embodies some of the most significant international legal provisions establishing economic, social and cultural rights, including, inter alia, rights relating to work in just and favourable conditions; to social protection; to an adequate standard of living including clothing, food and housing; to the highest attainable standards of physical and mental health; to education and to the enjoyment of the benefits of cultural freedom and scientific progress.

Significantly, article 2 outlines the legal obligations which are incumbent upon States parties under the Covenant. States are required to take positive steps to implement these rights, to the maximum of their resources, in order to achieve the progressive realization of the rights recognized in the Covenant, particularly through the adoption of domestic legislation. Monitoring the implementation of the Covenant by States parties was the responsibility of the Economic and Social Council, which delegated this responsibility to a committee of independent experts established for this purpose, namely the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. As at March 2000, 142 States were parties to the Covenant.

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights addresses the State's traditional responsibilities for

administering justice and maintaining the rule of law. Many of the provisions in the Covenant address the relationship between the individual and the State. In discharging these responsibilities, States must ensure that human rights are respected, not only those of the victim but also those of the accused. The civil and political rights defined in the Covenant include, inter alia, the right to self-determination; the right to life, liberty and security; freedom of movement, including freedom to choose a place of residence and the right to leave the country; freedom of thought, conscience, religion, peaceful assembly and association; freedom from torture and other cruel and degrading treatment or punishment; freedom from slavery, forced labour, and arbitrary arrest or detention; the right to a fair and prompt trial; and the right to privacy.

There are also other provisions which protect members of ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities. Under Article 2, all States Parties undertake to respect and take the necessary steps to ensure the rights recognized in the Covenant without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status. The Covenant has two Optional Protocols. The first establishes the procedure for dealing with communications (or complaints) from individuals claiming to be victims of violations of any of the rights set out in the Covenant. The second envisages the abolition of the death penalty.

Unlike the Universal Declaration and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, the Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights authorizes a State to derogate from, or in other words restrict, the enjoyment of certain rights in times of an official public emergency which threatens the life of a nation. Such limitations are permitted only to the extent strictly required under the circumstances and must be reported to the United Nations. Even so, some provisions such as the right to life and freedom from torture and slavery may never be suspended.

The Covenant provides for the establishment of a Human Rights Committee to monitor implementation of the Covenant's provisions by States parties. As at March 2000, 144 States were parties to the Covenant, 95 States were parties to the Optional Protocol and 39 States were parties to the Second Optional Protocol. The phenomenon of racial discrimination was one of the concerns behind the establishment of the United Nations and has therefore been one of its major areas of attention. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination was adopted by the General Assembly in 1965 and entered into force in 1969. Article 1 of the Convention defines the terms. racial discrimination. as: any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference based on race, colour, descent, national or ethnic origin with the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights in any field of public life, including political, economic, social or cultural life”

It is notable that this definition encompasses a much wider range of grounds on which discrimination can take place than that commonly referred to as “race”. It is also significant that the

definition includes the language “purpose or effect.. As a consequence, the definition covers not only intentional discrimination, but also laws, norms and practices which appear neutral, but result in discrimination in their impact Parties to the Convention agree to eliminate discrimination in the enjoyment of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights and to provide effective remedies against any acts of racial discrimination through national tribunals and State institutions. States parties undertake not to engage in acts or practices of racial discrimination against individuals, groups of persons or institutions and to ensure that public authorities and institutions do likewise; not to sponsor, defend or support racial discrimination by persons or organizations; to review government, national and local policies and to amend or repeal laws and regulations which create or perpetuate racial discrimination; to prohibit and put a stop to racial discrimination by persons, groups and organizations; and to encourage integration or multiracial organizations, movements and other means of eliminating barriers between races, as well as to discourage anything which tends to strengthen racial divisiveness. The Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination was established by the Convention to ensure that States parties fulfil their obligations. As at March 2000, 155 States were parties to the Convention.

Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women

The Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women was adopted by the General Assembly in 1979 and entered into force in 1981. Despite the existence of international instruments which affirm the rights of women within the framework of all human rights, a separate treaty was considered necessary to combat the continuing evident discrimination against women in all parts of the world. In addition to addressing the major issues, the Convention also identifies a number of specific areas where discrimination against women has been flagrant, specifically with regard to participation in public life, marriage, family life and sexual exploitation.

The objective of the Convention is to advance the status of women by utilizing a dual approach. It requires States parties to grant freedoms and rights to women on the same basis as men, no longer imposing on women the traditional restrictive roles. It calls upon States parties to remove social and cultural patterns, primarily through education, which perpetuate gender-role stereotypes in homes, schools and places of work. It is based on the premise that States must take active steps to promote the advancement of women as a means of ensuring the full enjoyment of human rights. It encourages States parties to make use of positive measures, including preferential treatment, to advance the status of women and their ability to participate in decision making in all spheres of national life. economic, social, cultural, civil and political.

States parties to the Convention agree, inter alia, to integrate the principle of the equality of men and women into national legislation; to adopt legislative and other measures, including sanctions where appropriate, prohibiting discrimination against women; to ensure through national tribunals and other public institutions the effective protection of women against discrimination; and to refrain from engaging in any discriminatory act or practice against women in the private sphere. Article 17 of the Convention establishes the Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women to oversee the implementation of its provisions. When the 1999 Optional Protocol enters into force, the Committee's functions will be expanded. As at March 2000, 165 States were parties to the Convention.

Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment

Over the years, the United Nations has developed universally applicable standards against torture which were ultimately embodied in international declarations and conventions. The adoption, on 10 December 1984 by the General Assembly, of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment, was the culmination of the codification process to combat the practice of torture. The Convention entered into force on 26 June 1987. Article 1 defines "torture" as: "any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or

a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity.”

The overall objectives of the Convention are to prevent acts of torture and other acts prohibited under the Convention and to ensure that effective remedies are available to victims when such acts occur. More specifically, the Convention requires States parties to take preventive action against torture such as the criminalization of acts of torture and the establishment of laws and regulations to promote respect for human rights among its public servants for both the alleged victim and the accused.

Despite these measures, there may be incidents where individuals are, or claim to have been, tortured. Governments that are committed to eliminating torture must also be committed to providing an effective remedy to alleged victims. This can be seen from the manner in which Governments address complaints of torture.

The Convention requires that complaints of torture be promptly and impartially investigated wherever there are reasonable grounds to believe that an act of torture may have been committed. In many cases, the most important evidence is physical marks on the body, which can fade or disappear, often

within days. The existence of a functional system for the administration of justice is thus critically important for victims of torture. The implementation of the Convention established a monitoring body, the Committee against Torture. As at March 2000, 118 States were parties to the Convention. Both the League of Nations and the United Nations had previously adopted declarations on the rights of the child and specific provisions concerning children were incorporated into a number of human rights and humanitarian treaties. In recent years, reports of the grave afflictions suffered by children such as infant mortality, deficient health care and limited opportunities for basic education, as well as alarming accounts of child exploitation, prostitution, child labour and victims of armed conflict, led many worldwide to call on the United Nations to codify children's rights in a comprehensive and binding treaty. The Convention entered into force on 2 September 1990, within a year of its unanimous adoption by the General Assembly.

The Convention embodies four general principles for guiding implementation of the rights of the child: non-discrimination ensuring equality of opportunity; when the authorities of a State take decisions which affect children they must give prime consideration to the best interests of the child; the right to life, survival and development which includes physical, mental, emotional, cognitive, social and cultural development; and children should be free to express their opinions, and such views should be given due weight taking the age and maturity of the child into consideration. Among other provisions of the Convention, States parties agree that children's rights include:

free and compulsory primary education; protection from economic exploitation, sexual abuse and protection from physical and mental harm and neglect; the right of the disabled child to special treatment and education; protection of children affected by armed conflict; child prostitution; and child pornography. Under article 43 of the Convention, the Committee on the Rights of the Child was established to monitor the implementation of the Convention by States parties. As at March 2000, an unprecedented 191 States were parties to the Convention: the largest number of ratifications of all international instruments. Throughout history, people have moved across borders for a variety of reasons, including armed conflict, persecution or poverty. Regardless of their motivation, millions of people are living as migrant workers, as strangers in the States in which they reside. Unfortunately, as aliens, they may be targets of suspicion or hostility and this inability to integrate into society often places them among the most disadvantaged groups in the host State. A vast number of migrant workers are uninformed and ill-prepared to cope with life and work in a foreign country.

Concern for the rights and welfare of migrant workers led to the adoption of the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. The Convention was adopted by the General Assembly on 18 December 1990 and will enter into force following ratification or accession by 20 States. As at March 2000, only 12 States had ratified the Convention. The Convention stipulates that persons who are considered as migrant workers under its provisions are entitled to enjoy their human rights throughout the migration

process, including preparation for migration, transit, stay and return to their State of origin or habitual residence.

With regard to working conditions, migrant workers are entitled to conditions equivalent to those extended to nationals of the host States, including the right to join trade unions, the right to social security and the right to emergency health care. State parties are obliged to establish policies on migration, exchange information with employers and provide assistance to migrant workers and their families. Similarly, the Convention stipulates that migrant workers and their families are obliged to comply with the law of the host State. The Convention distinguishes between legal and illegal migrant workers. It does not require that equal treatment be extended to illegal workers but rather aims to eliminate illegal or clandestine movements and employment of migrant workers in an irregular situation.

The Declaration on the Right to Development

In 1986, the Declaration on the Right to Development was adopted by the General Assembly, recognizing that development is a comprehensive economic, social, cultural and political process which aims at continuously improving the well-being of the entire population and of each individual. The Declaration on the Right to Development states that the right to development is an inalienable human right, which means that everyone has the right to participate in, contribute to, and enjoy economic, social, cultural and political development. This right includes permanent sovereignty over natural resources; self-determination; popular

participation; equality of opportunity; and the advancement of adequate conditions for the enjoyment of other civil, cultural, economic, political and social rights. For the purposes of development, there are three human rights standards that are particularly relevant to the full enjoyment of the right to development: the right to self-determination, sovereignty over natural resources and popular participation.

Self-determination

The right to self-determination is a fundamental principle of international law. It is found not only in the Charter of the United Nations but in both the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. Its importance to the respect for all human rights is reinforced by the Human Rights Committee's reference to it in General Comment 12 as being "of particular importance because its realization is an essential condition for the effective guarantee and observance of individual human rights and for the promotion and strengthening of those rights." It is generally recognized that the right to self-determination has two aspects, the internal and the external.

The external aspect is defined in General Comment 21 of the Human Rights Committee which states that it: "implies that all peoples have the right to determine freely their political status and their place in the international community based on the principle of equal rights and exemplified by the liberation of peoples from colonialism and by the prohibition to subject

peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation” The external consideration of self-determination is fundamental as it relates to development. It is necessary for a State to be free from the above-mentioned conditions to be able to determine its own policies fully in all realms of governance, and more particularly in the area of development policy. The internal aspect of the right to self-determination is best illustrated by the Human Rights Committee which defines it as: “the rights of all peoples to pursue freely their economic, social and cultural development without outside interference” [General Comment 21] The Committee goes on to link this internal aspect with a Government’s duty to “represent the whole population without distinction as to race, colour, descent or national or ethnic origin”

Sovereignty over natural resources

Article 1 of the Declaration on the Right to Development makes it clear that the full realization of the right to self-determination, which has been shown to be an integral part of development, includes the exercise of the “inalienable right to full sovereignty over all their natural wealth and resources”.

The ability of peoples to enjoy and utilize their resources and the impact of this ability on the well-being of the people of the State is given fuller expression in General Assembly Resolution 1803(XVII) which declares that.”The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their wealth and natural resources

must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of the well-being of the people of the State concerned”.

Popular participation

The principle of popular participation has been vital to the evolution of human rights standards. It is a basic element of social progress and seeks to ensure the dignity, value and freedom of the human person. Reference to popular participation is found in both International Covenants and has a prominent role in the Declaration on the Right to Development. Its significance is underscored by the General Assembly, it stresses “the importance of the adoption of measures to ensure the effective participation, as appropriate, of all the elements of society in the preparation and implementation of national economic and social development policies and of the mobilization of public opinion and the dissemination of relevant information in the support of the principles and objectives of social progress and development.”

Beneficiaries

As with all human rights, the human person is the subject and the beneficiary of the right. The right to development is claimable both individually and collectively. Significantly, this right is binding both on individual States (in ensuring equal and adequate access to essential resources) and the international community (in its duty to promote fair development policies and effective international cooperation). International attention

focused more closely on the right to development during consultations in Geneva, in early 1990, which reaffirmed that the right of individuals, groups and peoples to take decisions collectively, to choose their own representative organizations and to have freedom of democratic action free from interference was fundamental to democratic participation.

The concept of participation was of central importance in the realization of the right to development. The consultation also considered that development strategies oriented only towards economic growth and financial considerations had failed, to a large extent, to achieve social justice and that there was no single model for development applicable to all cultures and peoples. Development is a subjective matter, and development strategies should be determined by the peoples concerned themselves and should be adapted to their particular conditions and needs. Taking the lead in the implementation of the Declaration on the Right to Development, the United Nations set up mechanisms for ensuring the compatibility of all United Nations activities and programmes with the Declaration.

The relationship between development and human rights was affirmed at the World Conference on Human Rights in the 1993 Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action which gave new impetus to the Declaration on the Right to Development. The Vienna Declaration confirmed that democracy, development, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms are interdependent and mutually reinforcing. It was acknowledged that the full enjoyment of human right requires durable economic

and social progress, and vice versa: in other words, there cannot be full attainment of human rights without development, nor can there be development without respect for human rights.

Landmark Human Rights Conferences

Declarations and proclamations adopted during world conferences on human rights are also a significant contribution to international human rights standards. Instruments adopted by such conferences are drafted with the participation of international agencies and non-governmental organizations, reflecting common agreement within the international community and are adopted by State consensus. The Teheran and Vienna World Conferences on human rights were particularly significant for strengthening human rights standards. Both involved an unprecedented number of participants from States, agencies and nongovernmental organizations who contributed to the adoption of the Proclamation of Teheran and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action respectively.

Teheran World Conference on Human Rights-1968

The International Conference on Human Rights held in Teheran from April 22 to May 13 1968 was the first world meeting on human rights to review the progress made in the twenty years that had elapsed since the adoption of the UDHR. Significantly, the Conference reaffirmed world commitment to the rights and fundamental freedoms enshrined in the UDHR and urged

members of the international community to fulfil their solemn obligations to promote and encourage respect for those rights.

The Conference adopted the Proclamation of Teheran which, inter alia, encouraged respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all without distinctions of any kind; reaffirmed that the UDHR is a common standard of achievement for all people and that it constitutes an obligation for the members of the international community; invited States to conform to new standards and obligations set up in international instruments; condemned apartheid and racial discrimination; invited States to take measures to implement the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries; invited the international community to co-operate in eradicating massive denials of human rights; invited States to make an effort to bridge the gap between the economically developed and developing countries; recognized the indivisibility of civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights; invited States to increase efforts to eradicate illiteracy, to eliminate discrimination against women, and to protect and guarantee children's rights.

By reaffirming the principles set out in the International Bill of Human Rights, the Proclamation of Teheran paved the way for the creation of a number of international human rights instruments.

Vienna World Conference on Human Rights–1993

On 14 June 1993, representatives of the international community gathered in unprecedented numbers for two weeks in Vienna to

discuss human rights. The World Conference reviewed the development of human rights standards, the structure of human rights frameworks and examined ways to further advance respect for human rights. Members from 171 States, with the participation of some 7,000 delegates including academics, treaty bodies, national institutions and representatives of more than 800 non-governmental organizations, adopted by consensus the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action. In light of the high degree of support for and consensus from the Conference, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action can be perceived as a forceful common plan for strengthening human rights work throughout the world. The contents of the Declaration

The Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action marked the culmination of a long process of review of and debate on the status of the human rights machinery worldwide. It also marked the beginning of a renewed effort to strengthen and further implement the body of human rights instruments that had been painstakingly constructed on the foundation of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights since 1948.

Significantly, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action:

- Reaffirmed the human rights principles that had evolved over the past 45 years and called for the further strengthening of the foundation for ensuring continued progress in the area of human rights;

- Reaffirmed the universality of human rights and the international commitment to the implementation of human rights;
- Proclaimed that democracy, development and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms as interdependent and mutually reinforcing.

The Conference agenda also included examination of the link between development, democracy and economic, social, cultural, civil and political rights, and an evaluation of the effectiveness of United Nations methods and mechanisms for protecting human rights as a means of recommending actions likely to ensure adequate financial and other resources for United Nations human rights activities. The final document agreed to in Vienna was endorsed by the forty-eighth session of the General Assembly (resolution 48/121, of 1993). 1998: Five-Year Review of the Vienna Declaration and

Programme of Action

The 1993 World Conference on Human Rights requested through its final document, the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action (VDPA), that the Secretary-General of the United Nations invite on the occasion of the fiftieth anniversary of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights all States, all organs and agencies of the United Nations system related to human rights, to report to him on the progress made in the implementation of the present Declaration and to submit a report to the General Assembly at its fifty-third session, through the Commission on Human Rights

and the Economic and Social Council. (VDPA, Part II, paragraph 100). Regional bodies, national human rights institutions, as well as non-governmental organizations, were also invited to present their views to the Secretary-General on the progress made in the implementation of the VDPA five years later.

In 1998, the General Assembly concluded the review process which had begun in the Commission on Human Rights and the Economic and Social Council earlier in the year. A number of positive developments in the five years since the World Conference were noted, such as progress achieved in human rights on national and international agendas; human rights-oriented changes in national legislation; enhancement of national human rights capacities, including the establishment or strengthening of national human rights institutions and special protection extended to women, children, and vulnerable groups among others and further strengthening of the human rights movement worldwide. The General Assembly reiterated its commitment to the fulfilment of the VDPA and reaffirmed its value as a guide for national and international human rights efforts and its central role as an international policy document in the field of human rights.

Chapter 5

Global Application of human Rights Norms

United Nations Organs and Human Rights

Human rights norms are often studied as an independent body of law with tribunals dedicated to interpreting and enforcing those norms. However, human rights norms are also increasingly incorporated into the development of substantive law in fields as diverse as labour law, corporate governance, environmental law, torts, intellectual property, and armed conflict.

The symposium brought together scholars in diverse areas of substantive law to discuss the impact of human rights norms in their fields.

It included the following questions:

- Are human rights norms used to define elements of causes of action, legal responsibility, or defences?
- How are human rights norms taken into account in law reform efforts?

- Have human rights norms been the driving force behind law reform?
- To what extent is the law of human rights balanced with another area of law in judicial decisions? How is that balanced achieved?
- What are the consequences of greater incorporation of human rights norms?
- What happens when national and international institutions adopt conflicting interpretations of human rights norms?
- Is fragmentation necessarily problematic or can it serve useful purposes, such as facilitating experimentation with diverse approaches or providing a check on hegemonic ambitions?
- Alternatively, if harmonization should be a priority in this field, what kinds of processes and institutions are best positioned to advance it?

This part outlines the relationship between the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights and those other organs having responsibility for human rights. Whilst many United Nations staff members may be familiar with certain structures and mandates of these organs, it is worth reviewing the broader canvas of the United Nations system.

The charter-based organ

The United Nations Charter provided for the creation of six principal organs mandated to carry out the overall work of the

United Nations. Inasmuch as they were created by the Charter, these bodies are commonly referred to as Charter-based organs. The six principal organs are outlined below, as well as other major bodies resulting from these organs.

List of Charter-Based Bodies

Organs Under The UN Charter

- for the formulation, drafting and adoption of instruments, supervision:
- The general assembly
- The economic and social council
- Commission on human rights
- Sub-commission on the promotion and protection of human rights (formerly, the Sub-Commission on prevention of discrimination and protection of minorities)
- Commission on the Status of women
- The Security council
- International tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
- International tribunal for Rwanda
- International criminal court
- The International court of justice
- The Secretariat (Secretary-General)
- The Trusteeship council (suspended 1:11.95)

Each organ was mandated by the Charter to perform varying human rights functions. Naturally, these roles have evolved over time.

The General Assembly (UNGA)

The United Nations General Assembly is the main deliberative, supervisory and reviewing organ of the United Nations. It is composed of representatives of all Member States, each one having one vote. Most decisions are reached by simple majority. Decisions on important questions such as peace, admission of new members and budgetary matters, require a two-thirds majority.

Powers and Functions

The United Nations Charter sets out the powers and functions of the General Assembly. The main functions of the General Assembly in relation to human rights include the following: initiating studies and making recommendations for promoting international political cooperation; the development and codification of international law; the realization of human rights and fundamental freedoms for all; and international collaboration in the economic, social, cultural, education and health fields. This work is carried out by a number of committees established by the General Assembly, international conferences called for by the General Assembly and by the Secretariat of the United Nations. Most items relating to human rights are referred to the “Third Committee” (the Social, Humanitarian and Cultural

Committee) of the General Assembly. The General Assembly's competence to explore issues concerning human rights is almost unlimited, in that, under Article 10, it is allowed to discuss any questions or any matters within the scope of the present Charter, and to make "recommendations" to Member States on these subjects. Decisions of the UNGA are referred to as resolutions which reflect the will of the majority of Member States. General Assembly resolutions largely determine the work of the United Nations.

Sessions

The General Assembly meets in regular session in New York each year on the third Tuesday of September and continues until mid December. It may also meet in special or emergency sessions at the request of the Security Council or at the request of the majority of the members of the United Nations.

The Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC)

The Economic and Social Council was established by the United Nations Charter as the principal organ to coordinate the economic and social work of the United Nations and the specialized agencies. The Council has 54 members elected for three-year terms by the General Assembly. Voting is by simple majority, each member having one vote.

Powers and Functions

Some of the main powers and functions of the Economic and Social Council are as follows:

- To serve as the central forum for the discussion of international economic and social issues of a global or an inter-disciplinary nature and the formulation of policy recommendations addressed to Member States and to the United Nations system as a whole;
- To promote respect for, and observance of, human rights and fundamental freedoms for all;
- To make or initiate studies and reports and make recommendations on international economic, social, cultural, educational, health and related matters;
- To call international conferences and prepare draft conventions for submission to the General Assembly on matters falling within its competence;
- To make recommendations and to co-ordinate activities of specialized agencies;
- Co-ordinate, rationalize and, to some extent, programme the activities of the United Nations, its autonomous organs and the specialized agencies in all of these sectors through consultations with and recommendations to the General Assembly and members of the United Nations.

Consultation with Non-Governmental Organizations

A further function of the Economic and Social Council is to consult with non-governmental organizations concerned with matters falling within the Council's competence. The Council recognizes that these organizations should have the opportunity to express their views and that they often possess special experience or technical knowledge of value to the Council and its work. Those NGOs having consultative status may send observers to public meetings and submit written statements relevant to the Council's work. Over 1,500 non-governmental organizations have consultative status with the Council.

They are classified in the following three categories:

- *General Consultative Status:* For large, international NGOs whose area of work covers most of the issues on the Council's agenda.
- *Special Consultative Status:* For NGOs that have special competence in a few fields of the Council's activity.
- *Inclusion on the Roster:* For NGOs whose competence enables them to make occasional and useful contributions to the work of the United.

Nations and who are available for consultation upon request. NGOs on the Roster may also include organizations having consultative status with a specialized agency or other United Nations body.

Sessions

The Economic and Social Council generally holds one five to six-week substantive session each year, alternating between New York and Geneva, and one organizational session in New York. The substantive session includes a high-level special meeting, attended by Ministers and other high officials, to discuss major economic and social issues. The year-round work of the Council is carried out in its subsidiary bodies, commissions and committees -which meet at regular intervals and report back to the Council.

Commissions of the Economic and Social Council

Between 1946 and 1948, the Council took a number of key institutional decisions concerning human rights. In 1946, pursuant to Article 68 of the Charter, it established the Commission on Human Rights and the Commission on the Status of Women.

Commission on Human Rights (CHR)

When the Commission met for the first time, its prime function was to oversee the drafting of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. That task was accomplished and the Declaration was adopted by the General Assembly on 10 December 1948. Today, the Commission on Human Rights serves as the main subsidiary organ of the United Nations dealing with human rights

matters. The Commission comprises 53 representatives of Member States of the United Nations.

Powers and Functions

The Commission submits proposals, recommendations and reports to the Economic and Social Council regarding: international declarations or conventions; the protection of minorities; the prevention of discrimination on grounds of race, sex, language or religion; and any other matter concerning human rights. The Commission considers questions relating to the violation of human rights and fundamental freedoms in various countries and territories as well as other human rights situations. If a particular situation is deemed sufficiently serious, the Commission may decide to authorize an investigation by an independent expert or it may appoint experts to assess, in consultation with the Government concerned, the assistance needed to help restore enjoyment of human rights.

The Commission also assists the Council in the co-ordination of activities concerning human rights in the United Nations system. The Commission has increasingly turned its attention in the 1990s to the needs of States to be provided with advisory services and technical assistance to overcome obstacles to the enjoyment of human rights. At the same time, more emphasis has been placed on the promotion of economic, social and cultural rights, including the right to development and the right to an adequate standard of living. Increased attention is also being given to the protection of the rights of vulnerable groups in society, including

minorities and indigenous people. Protection of the rights of the child and the rights of women, including the eradication of violence against women and the attainment of equal rights for women, falls into this category. The Commission is authorized to convene ad hoc working groups of experts and the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights (formerly Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities).

Sessions

The Commission on Human Rights meets once a year in Geneva, for six weeks in the March/April period. It can also meet exceptionally between its regular sessions, if a majority of States members agree. To date, there have been four extra-ordinary sessions. The Sub-Commission is the main subsidiary body of the Commission on Human Rights. It was established by the Commission at its first session in 1947 under the authority of the Economic and Social Council. The Sub-Commission is composed of experts acting in their personal capacity, elected by the Commission with due regard for equitable geographical representation. Half of the members and their alternates are elected every two years and each serves for a term of four years. In addition to the members and alternates, observers attend sessions of the Sub-Commission from States, United Nations bodies and specialized agencies, other intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations having consultative status with the Economic and Social Council.

Powers and Functions

- To undertake studies, particularly in the context of the Universal Declaration;
- To make recommendations to the Commission on Human Rights concerning the prevention of discrimination of any kind relating to human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the protection of racial, national, religious, and linguistic minorities;
- To perform any other functions which may be entrusted to it by the Economic and Social Council or the Commission on Human Rights. Studies prepared by members of the Sub-Commission have been undertaken on topics such as harmful practices affecting the health of women and children, discrimination against people infected with HIV/AIDS, freedom of expression, the right to a fair trial, the human rights of detained juveniles, human rights and the environment, the rights of minorities and indigenous peoples, the question of impunity concerning violations of human rights and the right to adequate housing.

Working Groups

The Sub-Commission is assisted by special reporters an individual expert working on a particular issue and working groups (a group of independent experts working together on a particular issue):

- *Special Rapporteurs on:* Impunity Concerning Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; Impunity Concerning Civil and Political Rights; the Human Rights Dimension of Population Transfers; Human Rights and Income Distribution; Traditional Practices Affecting the Health of Women and the Girl Child; Systematic Rape and Sexual Slavery During Armed Conflict; Treaties, Agreements and Other Constructive Arrangements Between States and Indigenous Populations; Indigenous Peoples and Their Relationship to Land; the Question of Human Rights and States of Emergency; Privatization of Prisons; Freedom of Movement; Terrorism and Human Rights; Scientific Progress and Human Rights.
- *Working Groups on:* Communications Contemporary Forms of Slavery; Indigenous Populations; Minorities.

Sessions

The Sub-Commission meets annually in August for a four-week session in Geneva. The session is attended by observers from Member and nonmember States of the United Nations and from United Nations departments and specialized agencies, other inter-governmental organizations and nongovernmental organizations

Commission on the Status of Women (CSW)

The Commission on the Status of Women is the principal technical body of the United Nations for the development of substantive policy guidance with regard to the advancement of women. The Commission presently consists of 45 government experts elected by the Economic and Social Council for a period of four years.

Members, who are appointed by Governments, are elected in accordance with the following criteria of geographical representation: thirteen from African States; eleven from Asian States; four from Eastern European States; nine from Latin American and Caribbean States; and eight from Western European and Other States.

Powers and Function

The functions of the Commission are to promote women's rights through

- The preparation of recommendations and reports to the Economic and Social Council on promoting women's rights in the political, economic, social and educational fields; the formulation of recommendations to the Council on urgent problems. The Council has stated that urgent aspects of women's rights should be aimed at achieving de facto observance of the principle of equality between men and women and that the

Commission should propose ways of implementing such recommendations. Following the 1995 Fourth World Conference on Women, the General Assembly mandated the Commission on the Status of Women to play a catalytic role, regularly reviewing the critical areas of concern in the Platform for Action adopted by the Conference.

Session

Between 1971 and 1989, the Commission's sessions, each of three weeks duration, were held every two years in New York or Geneva. However, since 1989, sessions of the Commission are held annually in New York. Sessions are attended by members and alternates and by observers for other Member States of the United Nations, representatives of bodies of the United Nations system, intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental organizations.

The Security Council

The United Nations Charter established the Security Council as one of the principal organs of the United Nations. It comprises 5 permanent members (China, France, Russia, United Kingdom and United States) and 10 nonpermanent members elected for two years by the United Nations General Assembly. Each member has one vote and permanent members have the power to block the adoption of any resolution (known as the veto power). Decisions

require a majority of nine votes and the agreement of all five permanent members.

Powers and Functions

In accordance with the United Nations Charter, the Security Council has primary responsibility for:

- The maintenance of peace and international security;
- Investigation of any dispute, or any situation that might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. By joining the United Nations, all Member States agree to accept and carry out decisions of the Security Council.

Human Rights

The Security Council has the authority to:

- Put human rights mandates into peace-keeping operations or to mandate separate human rights operations;
- Consider gross human rights violations that are threats to peace and security under article 39 of the Charter and recommend enforcement measures;
- Establish international criminal tribunals.

International Criminal Tribunal for Former Yugoslavia

Faced with a situation characterized by widespread violations of international humanitarian and human rights law in the former Yugoslavia, including the existence of concentration camps and the continuance of the practice of ethnic cleansing., the Security Council initially adopted a series of resolutions requesting that all parties concerned in the conflict comply with the obligations under international law, more particularly under the Geneva Conventions. The Security Council reaffirmed the principle of the individual criminal responsibility of persons who commit or order the commission of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions or other breaches of international humanitarian law. Owing to a lack of compliance with its early resolutions, the Security Council eventually decided that an international tribunal would be established for the prosecution of persons responsible for serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 and requested the Secretary-General to prepare a report on this matter.

The report of the Secretary-General incorporating the Statute of the International Tribunal was submitted to the Security Council, which, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, adopted it in its resolution 827 (1993) of 25 May 1993, thereby establishing an international tribunal for the former Yugoslavia in The Hague. The statute defines the Tribunal's authority to prosecute four clusters of offences: grave breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions; violations of the laws or customs

of war; genocide; and crimes against humanity. From the date of its establishment to January 1999, the Tribunal has handed down indictments against 93 individuals.

International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda

The scale and severity of gross human rights abuses and ethnic cleansing in Rwanda during 1994, led to the adoption by the Security Council, on 8 November 1994, of resolution 955 (1994) creating the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, eighteen months after the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia had been established by Security Council resolution 827 of 25 May 1993.

The Security Council resolution decided “to establish an international tribunal for the sole purpose of prosecuting persons responsible for genocide and other serious violations of international humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda and Rwandan citizens responsible for genocide and other such violations committed in the territory of neighbouring States” The Statute gives the Tribunal the power to prosecute genocide, crimes against humanity, violations of common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol II.

The Tribunal’s jurisdiction covers crimes committed by Rwandans in the territory of Rwanda and in the territory of neighbouring States as well as non-Rwandan citizens for crimes committed in

Rwanda between 1 January and 31 December 1994. The Tribunal is based in Arusha, Tanzania. As at January 1999, the Tribunal had issued 28 indictments against 45 individuals.

International Criminal Court

An international criminal court is considered the missing link in the international legal system for the reason that the International Court of Justice at The Hague handles only cases between States, not individuals. In the absence of an international criminal court for dealing with individual responsibility as an enforcement mechanism, acts of genocide and egregious violations of human rights often go unpunished. In the last 50 years, there have been many instances of crimes against humanity and war crimes for which no individual has been held accountable.

Following long and intense negotiations, in 1998 the United Nations adopted the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court. Following the entry into force of the Statute, the Court will be established as a permanent institution with the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of international concern. The Court is meant to be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. According to article 126 of its final clauses, the Statute will “enter into force on the first day of the month after the 60th day following the date of the deposit of the 60th instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations”. As at March 2000, 7 States had ratified the Statute.

The International Court of Justice (ICJ)

The International Court of Justice was established by the United Nations Charter as the judicial organ of the United Nations. It is composed of 15 independent judges elected by the Security Council on the recommendation of the General Assembly. In accordance with the provisions of article 36 of the Statute of the Court annexed to the Charter, only States may be seized before the Court.

This means that individuals, entities having legal personality and international or non-governmental organizations may not be parties in litigation before the Court. International human rights instruments do not specifically provide for adjudication by the Court. However, from time to time, the Court has taken decisions in an adjudicatory or advisory capacity on questions regarding the existence or protection of human rights.

The Court's deliberations on these issues are of considerable interest, since its decisions have played a significant role in defining international human rights law. In this respect, the judicial practice of the ICJ is consistent with the decisions handed down by its predecessor, the Permanent Court of International Justice.

International Human Rights Law

The formal expression of inherent human rights is through international human rights law. A series of international human

rights treaties and other instruments have emerged since 1945 conferring legal form on inherent human rights. The creation of the United Nations provided an ideal forum for the development and adoption of international human rights instruments. Other instruments have been adopted at a regional level reflecting the particular human rights concerns of the region. Most States have also adopted constitutions and other laws which formally protect basic human rights.

Often the language used by States is drawn directly from the international human rights instruments. International human rights law consists mainly of treaties and customs as well as, inter alia, declarations, guidelines and principles.

- *Treaties*: A treaty is an agreement by States to be bound by particular rules. International treaties have different designations such as covenants, charters, protocols, conventions, accords and agreements. A treaty is legally binding on those States which have consented to be bound by the provisions of the treaty - in other words are party to the treaty. A State can become a party to a treaty by ratification, accession or succession. Ratification is a State's formal expression of consent to be bound by a treaty. Only a State that has previously signed the treaty (during the period when the treaty was open for signature) can ratify it. Ratification consists of two procedural acts: on the domestic level, it requires approval by the appropriate constitutional organ (usually the head of State or

parliament). On the international level, pursuant to the relevant provision of the treaty in question, the instrument of ratification shall be formally transmitted to the depositary which may be a State or an international organization such as the United Nations. Accession entails the consent to be bound by a State that has not previously signed the instrument.

States ratify treaties both before and after the treaty has entered into force. The same applies to accession. A State may also become party to a treaty by succession, which takes place by virtue of a specific treaty provision or by declaration. Most treaties are not self-executing. In some States treaties are superior to domestic law, whereas in other States treaties are given Constitutional status, and in yet others only certain provisions of a treaty are incorporated into domestic law. A State may, in ratifying a treaty, enter reservations to that treaty, indicating that, while it consents to be bound by most of the provisions, it does not agree to be bound by certain specific provisions.

However, a reservation may not defeat the object and purpose of the treaty. Further, even if a State is not a party to a treaty or if it has entered reservations thereto, that State may still be bound by those treaty provisions which have become part of customary international law or constitute peremptory rules of international law, such as the prohibition against torture.

- *Custom:* Customary international law (or simply, custom.) is the term used to describe a general and consistent practice followed by States deriving from a sense of legal obligation. Thus, for example, while the Universal Declaration of Human Rights is not in itself a binding treaty, some of its provisions have the character of customary international law.
- *Declarations, Resolutions etc. Adopted by UN Organs:* General norms of international law principles and practices that most States would agree are often stated in declarations, proclamations, standard rules, guidelines, recommendations and principles. While no binding legal effect on States ensures they nevertheless represent a broad consensus on the part of the international community and, therefore, have a strong and undeniable moral force on the practice of States in their conduct of international relations. The value of such instruments rests on their recognition and acceptance by a large number of States, and, even without binding legal effect, they may be seen as declaratory of broadly accepted principles within the international community.

The Secretariat of the United Nations

The United Nations Charter provided for the creation of a Secretariat which comprises the Secretary-General as the chief administrative officer of the Organization, and such staff as the Organization may require. More than 25,000 men and women

from some 160 countries make up the Secretariat staff. As international civil servants, they and the Secretary-General answer solely to the United Nations for their activities, and take an oath not to seek or receive instructions from any Government or outside authority. The Secretariat is located at the headquarters of the United Nations in New York and has major duty stations in Addis Ababa, Bangkok, Beirut, Geneva, Nairobi, Santiago and Vienna.

Organization

The Secretariat consists of a number of major organizational units, each headed by an official accountable to the Secretary-General. These include, inter alia, the Executive Office of the Secretary-General; Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs; Department for General Assembly Affairs and Conference Services; Department of Peacekeeping Operations; Department of Economic and Social Affairs; Department of Political Affairs, Department for Disarmament and Arms Regulation; Office of Legal Affairs; Department of Management.

Subsequent to the Secretary-General's reform package presented in document available, the work of the Organization falls into four substantive categories: peace and security, development cooperation, international economic and social affairs; and humanitarian affairs.

Human rights is designated as a cross-cutting issue in all four categories. Each area is co-ordinate by an Executive Committee

which manages common, cross-cutting and overlapping policy concerns. In order to integrate the work of the Executive Committees and address matters affecting the Organization as a whole, a cabinet-style Senior Management Group, comprising the heads of department under the chairmanship of the Secretary-General, has been established. It meets weekly with members in Geneva, Vienna, Nairobi and Rome participating through teleconferencing. A Strategic Planning Unit has also been established to enable the Group to consider individual questions on its agenda within broader and longer-term frames of reference. The Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights forms part of the Secretariat and is responsible for the overall promotion and protection of human rights. The High Commissioner, entrusted by General Assembly resolution of 20 December 1993 with principal responsibility for United Nations human rights activities, comes under the direction and authority of the Secretary-General and within the framework of the overall competence, authority and decisions of the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and the Commission on Human Rights. The High Commissioner is appointed by the Secretary-General with the approval of the General Assembly and is a member of all four Executive Committees.

Powers and Functions

According to the United Nations Charter, the Secretary-General is required to: participate in all meetings and to perform all functions entrusted to him by the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, and the Trusteeship

Council; report annually to the General Assembly on the work of the Organization; and to bring to the attention of the Security Council any matter which, in his opinion, threatens international peace and security. The Secretary-General therefore functions as both the conscience of the international community and the servant of Member States.

The work carried out by the Secretariat is as varied as the problems dealt with by the United Nations. These range from mediating international disputes to issuing international stamps. The Secretariat's functions are, *inter alia*, to: provide support to the Secretary-General in fulfilling the functions entrusted to him or her under the Charter; promote the principles of the Charter and build understanding and public support for the objectives of the United Nations; promote economic and social development, development cooperation, human rights and international law; conduct studies, promote standards and provide information in various fields responding to the priority needs of Member States; and organize international conferences and other meetings. The work of the Secretary-General entails routine daily consultations with world leaders and other individuals, attendance at sessions of various United Nations bodies, and worldwide travel as part of the overall effort to improve the state of international affairs. The Secretary-General issues an annual report in which he appraises the work of the Organization and presents his views on future priorities.